THE MAIN PROBLEM-A SATISFACTORY DEFINITION OF TRUTH.
At a later date 'satisficing', in Econ, would be the polar opposite of 'optimisation'. What is satisfactory is merely what is sufficient for a particular purpose. I was a 'satisfactory' student of mathematics, for the purpose of becoming an Accountant. But it isn't true that I know math even if, for professional purposes, I use it just as well or as badly as my colleagues.
What is satisfactory, is a matter of Economics- Supply & Demand. If the supply of good mathematicians into Accountancy rises, I would no longer be considered satisfactory. I would be considered an innumerate lump of shit who should be sacked at the first convenient opportunity.
Our discussion will be centered around the notion of truth.
There are many such for different purposes. Around this time, Mahatma Gandhi was doing 'satyagraha'- 'struggle for truth'- which consisted of doing stupid shit in the belief that stupid shit has magical powers.
The main problem is that of giving a satisfactory definition of this notion, i.e., a definition which is materially adequate and formally correct.
Tarksi, Godel, Turing, Church, Gentzen et al. were first class thinkers and innovators. They may not have got everything right but- like Brouwer, Weyl, Heytig etc.- their work was very useful in a manner few ordinary people, like me, could have anticipated even four decades ago
But such a formulation of the problem, because of its generality, cannot be considered unequivocal, and requires some further comments.
How to 'restrict comprehension' so paradoxes don't arise? You can rid yourself of a notion of Truth Simpliciter with reference to some language of your own invention- with respect to yourself alone. But, if the thing can be used by anybody, you can't prevent the thing coming back in one form or another. Obviously, if you take care to make it useless, nobody will fucking use it. But if it is useful enough to do addition and subtraction, some fucking Kripke will invoke the Knaster-Tarski fixed-point theorem on a set-theoretic metalanguage to bend things towards Brouwer & Heytig and so as to make it more useful yet.
order to avoid any ambiguity, we must first specify the conditions under which the definition of truth will be considered adequate from the material point of view.
Tarski was at the forefront of his field and what he considered 'adequate' would be more than enough for most people.
The desired definition does not aim to specify the meaning of a familiar word used to denote a novel notion; on the contrary, it aims to catch hold of the actual meaning of an old notion.
Which had been greatly clarified by mathematical logic.
We must then characterize this notion precisely enough to enable anyone to determine whether the definition actually fulfills its task.
We may be content to treat crucial concepts as 'primitives'- i.e. leave them undefined. Mathematicians must be stricter.
Secondly, we must determine on what the formal correctness of the definition depends.
It depends on our determination. Tarksi showed that first order logic can't have unicity (categoricity) but second order could do so by quantifying over every possible subset of the domain, it binds the induction principle to the literal power set of the domain. This leaves no room for non-standard, rogue elements.
On the other hand, categoricity shifts the emphasis every from meaning to structure. This begs the question, if the structure is the same, does it really matter if meanings are different? Isn't this 'just semantics?' In Hindu thought, we have something similar. Does it matter that 'matam' (dogma) is different, if the vigyan (praxis/science) is the same? Tarski's recursive definition of satisfaction was in terms of a structure satisfying a formula. A theory T is a set of sentences. According to Tarski, a "model" of T is any structure \(\mathcal{M}\) where every sentence in T evaluates to true If a theory is κ-categorical (cardinality k), then for Tarski's semantics there is only one possible way to construct a universe of size κ that makes the axioms true. The Łoś–Vaught test is a criterion for a theory to be complete, unable to be augmented without becoming inconsistent. It states that if a first-order satisfiable theory is κ-categorical and has no finite model, then it is complete. Thus, categorical uniqueness at size κ forces observational (elementary) equivalence across all sizes. A denotational semantics where denotational equality perfectly matches operational observational equivalence is called fully abstract. This has given rise to the notion of full compeleteness. It appears that game semantics can provide a unifying mathematical framework for natural & computer languages, by modeling communication as an interactive, multi-player game. This helps logicians and computer scientists understand the underlying rules of meaning in both human discourse and software systems.
Everybody else had always understood that meaning was about gaining the means to get cool shiny stuff. It turned out computers can help in that department. Tarksi wasn't a useless tosser after all.
Thus, we must specify the words or concepts which we wish to use in defining the notion of truth; and we must also give the formal rules to which the definition should conform. Speaking more generally, we must describe the formal structure of the language in which the definition will be given. The discussion of these points will occupy a considerable portion of the first part of the paper. 2. THE EXTENSION OF THE TERM "TRUE." We begin with some remarks regarding the extension of the concept of truth which we have in mind here. The predicate "true" is sometimes used to refer to psychological phenomena such as judgments or beliefs, sometimes to certain physical objects, namely, linguistic expressions and specifically sentences, and sometimes to certain ideal entities called "propositions." By "sentence" we understand here what is usually meant in grammar by "declarative sentence"; as regards the term "proposition," its meaning is notoriously a subject of lengthy disputations by various philosophers and logicians, and it seems never to have been made quite clear and unambiguous. For several reasons it appears most convenient to apply the term "true" to sentences, and we shall follow this course.5 Consequently, we must always relate the notion of truth, like that of a sentence, to a specific language; for it is obvious that the same expression which is a true sentence in one language can be false or meaningless in another. Of course, the fact that we are interested here primarily in the notion of truth for sentences does not exclude the possibility of a subsequent extension of this notion to other kinds of objects.
You can avoid 'intensional paradoxes' by making sure extensions are well defined. But this means that whereas first order semantics is complete, second order semantics is not. Truth outruns proof.
3. THE MEANING OF THE TERM "TRUE." Much more serious difficulties are connected with the problem of the meaning (or the intension) of the concept of truth.
It has been shown that Liebniz's L2 is like modern second order semantics (which uses Liebniz's law for identity) except that it is intensional (appealing to a notion of containment) rather than extensional simply.
The word "true," like other words from our everyday language, is certainly not unambiguous. And it does not seem to me that the philosophers who have discussed this concept have helped to diminish its ambiguity. In works and discussions of philosophers we meet many different conceptions of truth and falsity, and we must indicate which conception will be the basis of our discussion. We should like our definition to do justice to the intuitions which adhere to the classical Aristotelian conception of truth-intuitions which find their expression in the well-known words of Aristotle's Metaphysics: To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true.
Tarski could have a great impact on American thought precisely because he appealed to the essential continuity of Western thought and gave a young country- thrust, against its will, into the leadership of the 'free world'- the confidence to side-step philosophical paradoxes and aporias in a pragmatic manner.
If we wished to adapt ourselves to modern philosophical terminology, we could perhaps express this conception by means of the familiar formula: The truth of a sentence consists in its agreement with (or correspondence to) reality. (For a theory of truth which is to be based upon the latter formulation the term "correspondence theory'' has been suggested.) If, on the other hand, we should decide to extend the popular usage of the term "designate" by applying it not only to names, but also to sentences, and if we agreed to speak of the designate of sentences as "states of affairs," we could possibly use for the same purpose the following phrase: A sentence is true if it designates an existing state of affairs.6 However, all these formulations can lead to various misunderstandings, for none of them is sufficiently precise and clear (though this applies much less to the original Aristotelian formulation than to either of the others); at any rate, none of them can be considered a satisfactory definition of truth. It is up to us to look for a more precise expression of our intuitions.
Since Aristotle, there was an awareness that 'akreibia- seeking greater precision than the subject matter allowed- was dangerous. Tarksi's 'economia' consisted in stiputlaing just enough precision to make everything more useful. This was not C.S Pierce's view but Tarski credited him with laying the foundations for the theory of relations (logic of relatives).
More impressive yet was Tarski's embrace of Henkin who showed categoricity in second-order logic is entirely dependent on how we define a "property" or "set." By changing that definition, Henkin stripped second-order logic of its unicity, collapsed it back into a variant of first-order logic, and sparked an ongoing philosophical debate about what "true" logic really is. Quine, always suspicious of second order theory as set theory in sheep's clothing, insisted that true logic must be purely structural and non-committal about the inventory of the universe (akin to first-order predicate logic). Because Henkin semantics relies on a comprehension schema that mimics the existence of sets (even if a restricted subset of them), Quine would still view it as bordering on set theory or higher-order mathematics rather than pure, austere logic. Tarski & Henkin developed cylindric algebra (algebraization of first-order logic with equality) Quine's Predicate Functor Logic was a "modification of Bernays' modification of Tarski's cylindrical algebra". which eliminated bound variables using predicate functors. However, the loss of intuitive cross-referencing made the thing too cumbersome to be useful.
Let us start with a concrete example. Consider the sentence "snow is white."
It is false. Snow is translucent.
We ask the question under what conditions this sentence is true or false.
It is false in general. However 'the snow I am looking at right now appears white' may be true.
It seems clear that if we base ourselves on the classical conception of truth, we shall say that the sentence is true if snow is white, and that it is false if snow is not white. Thus, if the definition of truth is to conform to our conception, it must imply the following equivalence: The sentence "snow is white" is true if, and only if, snow is white. Let me point out that the phrase "snow is white" occurs on the left side of this equivalence in quotation marks, and on the right without quotation marks. On the right side we have the sentence itself, and on the left the name of the sentence. Employing the medieval logical terminology we could also say that on the right side the words "snow is white" occur in suppositio formalis, and on the left in suppositio materialis. It is hardly necessary to explain why we must have the name of the sentence, and not the sentence itself, on the left side of the equivalence. For, in the first place, from the point of view of the grammar of our language, an expression of the form "X is true" will not become a meaningful sentence if we replace in it 'X' by a sentence or by anything other than a name- since the subject of a sentence may be only a noun or an expression functioning like a noun. And, in the second place, the fundamental conventions regarding the use of any language require that in any utterance we make about an object it is the name of the object which must be employed, and not the object itself. In consequence, if we wish to say something about a sentence, for example, that it is true, we must use the name of this sentence, and not the sentence itself. It may be added that enclosing a sentence in quotation marks is by no means the only way of forming its name. For instance, by assuming the usual order of letters in our alphabet, we can use the following expression as the name (the description) of the sentence "snow is white": the sentence constituted bg three words, the first of which consists of the 19th, 14th, 15th, and 23rd letters, the second of the 9th and 19th letters, and the third of the 23rd, 8th, 9th, 20th, and 5th letters of the English alphabet. We shall now generalize the procedure which we have applied above. Let us consider an arbitrary sentence; we shall replace it by the letter 'p.' We form the name of this sentence and we replace it by another letter, say 'X.' We ask now what is the logical relation between the two sentences "X is true" and 'p.' It is clear that from the point of view of our basic conception of truth these sentences are equivalent. In other words, the following equivalence holds: (T) X is true if, and only if, p. We shall call any such equivalence (with 'p' replaced by any sentence of the language to which the word "true" refers, and 'X' replaced by a name of this sentence) an "equivalence of the form (T)." Now at last we are able to put into a precise form the conditions under which we will consider the usage and the definition of the term "true" as adequate from the material point of view: we wish to use the term "true" in such a way that all equivalences of the form (T) can be asserted, and we shall call a definition of truth "adequate" if all these equivalences follow from it. It should be emphasized that neither the expression (T) itself (which is not a sentence, but only a schema of a sentence) nor any particular instance of the form (T) can be regarded as a definition of truth. We can only say that every equivalence of the form (T) obtained by replacing 'p' by a particular sentence, and 'X' by a name of this sentence, may be considered a partial definition of truth, which explains wherein the truth of this one individual sentence consists. The general definition has to be, in a certain sense, a logical conjunction of all these partial definitions. (The last remark calls for some comments. A language may admit the construction of infinitely many sentences; and thus the number of partial definitions of truth referring to sentences of such a language will also be infinite. Hence to give our remark a precise sense we should have to explain what is meant by a "logical conjunction of infinitely many sentences"; but this would lead us too far into technical problems of modern logic.)
To cut a long story short, a name is just a name, not the thing itself. You may cally your daughter Angela but she may be diabolical. We may give the name of truth to things which are anything but. This may be for a protocol bound reason. Thus, OJ was innocent of murder according to criminal justice but was guilty of murder according to civil law.
5. TRUTH AS A SEMANTIC CONCEPT. I should like to propose the name "the semantic conception of truth" for the conception of truth which has just been discussed. Semantics is a discipline which, speaking loosely, deals with certain relations between expressions of a language and the objects (or "states of affairs") "referred to" by those expressions.
Semantics is 'sematntics' as people used to say back when I was young.
As typical examples of semantic concepts we may mention the concepts of designation, satisfaction, and definition as these occur in the following examples: the expression "the father of his country" designates (denotes) George Washington; snow satisfies the sentential function (the condition) "x is white"; the equation "2-x = 1" defines (uniquely determines) the number 1/2. While the words "designates," "satisfies," and "defines" express relations (between certain expressions and the objects "referred to" by these expressions), the word "true" is of a different logical nature: it expresses a property (or denotes a class) of certain expressions, viz., of sentences. However, it is easily seen that all the formulations which were given earlier and which aimed to explain the meaning of this word (cf. Sections 3 and 4) referred not only to sentences themselves, but also to objects "talked about" by these sentences, or possibly to "states of affairs" described by them. And, moreover, it turns out that the simplest and the most natural way of obtaining an exact definition of truth is one which involves the use of other semantic notions, e.g., the notion of satisfaction. It is for these reasons that we count the concept of truth which is discussed here among the concepts of semantics, and the problem of defining truth proves to be closely related to the more general problem of setting up the foundations of theoretical semantics.
by 'just semantics'- i.e. nothing useful or true.
It is perhaps worth while saying that semantics as it is conceived in this paper (and in former papers of the author) is a sober and modest discipline which has no pretensions of being a universal patent-medicine for all the ills and diseases of mankind, whether imaginary or real. You will not find in semantics any remedy for decayed teeth or illusions of grandeur or class conflicts. Nor is semantics a device for establishing that everyone except the speaker and his friends is speaking nonsense.
Which is why the 'ordinary language' philosophers rebelled against Tarksi though he was perfectly happy to see natural languages as semantically closed. The problem is that his 'Convention T' seems useless or uninformative at least as far as human- or even LLM' artificial- intelligences- are concenred. However, Theorem Provers do use formal, truth-conditional, logic. Tarski, after all, was a mathematician first and last.
No comments:
Post a Comment