Showing posts with label Godel. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Godel. Show all posts

Saturday, 17 October 2026

Gheorghiu on Dummett & Sandqvist


Alexander V Gheorghiu writes in Aeon-
In 1973, the British philosopher Michael Dummett was invited to deliver the annual philosophical lecture at the British Academy. He took as his subject ‘The Justification of Deduction’ – how to justify the ordinary practices of mathematicians

if they are useful, what more justification is required? Math, like other disciplines, needs resources. That which is useful, makes money. Math progresses fastest when it makes money by raising producitivity. 

without helping oneself to the assumption that their subject matter exists in a realm of its own.

Whether this is Plato's realm of forms or South Park's 'Imagination-Land' scarcely matters. The only question is, 'can the thing pay for itself'.  

The problem, he told his audience, was perhaps ‘one of the most fundamental and intractable problems … in all philosophy’.

Philosophy is merely a displacement activity. Dummett, it must be said, introduced low IQ peeps like me to one or two elementary mathematical ideas.  

What Dummett took from Frege’s work on logic was that the problems of mathematics are, at heart, problems of language.

The foundations of mathematics are not necessarily what we would call mathematical. On the other hand, the foundations of those foundations may well be mathematical because, in the ultimate analysis, everything is.

Where things had gone wrong, he thought, was that Frege had grounded his account in a mind-independent notion of truth.

All protocol bound financial, legal, or scientific accounts have that feature. On the other hand, my account of my life as a prostitute in Hollywood in the Eighties is not grounded on anything save the mind-dependent notion that I'd look utterly ridiculous playing the Julia Roberts role in @prtty Woman'. 

‘In this respect (and in this respect alone),’ Dummett wrote, ‘Frege’s new approach to logic was retrograde.’

Why posit mind-dependent entitites? For all we know, we are meat machines merely. More advanced species truly have minds. The proof is, their minds can change reality at the most fundamental level.  

For Frege, logic answered to truth: the rules were good because they preserved something already fixed.

only if there was 'restricted comprehension'. Otherwise, you got nonsense 

Dummett turned this around.

Following Wittgenstein’s later thinking, Dummett argued ‘a theory of meaning is a theory of understanding.’

is a theory of information storage, retrieval, or exchange which in turn is an economic theory of a trivial type.

And understanding, he insisted, must be manifestable: whatever a competent speaker knows in knowing what a sentence means must be something she can, in principle, display in her use of language.

Suppose there is a sentence you hear on the point of death which explains to you the central mysterey of your life. It can be uttered at no other moment while conveying the same meaning. Can it, in principle, be conveyed? Not if it causes death unless our 'principle' stipulates for an after-life. But that may contradict the meaning received or, rather, prevent its reception in the intended form. 

More generally, unless meaning is understanding and both remain fixed, some problem of the above type arises, at least in principle, under any and every imaginable set of circumstances. 

In The Logical Basis of Metaphysics (1991), Dummett gave this account of language, logic and reality its most sustained form. Our linguistic practices – the ways in which we are prepared to assert, justify and infer – determine logic.

Only if that is what we habitually do and even then, this would only be true for ourselves.  

Logic, in turn, determines what counts as a fact,

Sherlock Holmes may use logic to show us that what we accept as fact can't be any such thing. But this is a story about a guy who is smarter than us determining what we come to believe.  

what counts as truth, and ultimately what we are entitled to regard as real.

Sadly, for most of us, earning a living determines what counts as truth. Also, I'm not really the star of 'Pretty woman' even though many people mistake me for Julia Roberts. Sadly, it appears she has gained a lot of weight. That's why I am often referred to as 'fat cunt'.           

Consider how a child learns the word ‘red’.

The same way she learns the name of things she sees 

We do not begin by telling her about light of a certain wavelength, or the metaphysics of colour properties, or the conditions that would make ‘this is red’ true. We point at things.

Or she points at things and we say 'do you want the red one or the blue one'? 

We correct her when she calls a ripe tomato green; we approve when she calls a fire engine red. Over time, she comes to use the word as we do – and at that point, she understands it.

A child may indeed be said to understand God as well as we do. But it is unlikely to understand the nature of Diplomacy even if its daddy is a diplomat. 

There is no further fact, hidden behind the practice, in which her understanding consists. The understanding is the practice, competently exercised.

The practice can dispense with the understanding. If you are giving your g.f plenty of orgasms, she tends to feel that there's something important about her which you understand very well. If this isn't the case, it may be a good idea to attend one of those courses on communicating with your partner during sex and understanding each other's needs & (let's face it) limitations.  

Dummett died in 2011, having been knighted in 1999 for ‘services to philosophy and to racial justice’.

he was a convert to Catholicism. At that time, some Christian Churches, believed in the natural inferiority of black people.  

He is remembered as one of the most significant British philosophers of the previous century. Yet for all its power, his programme remained a prospectus: he set out what a theory of language, logic and reality must achieve, but he never completed one.

But he was less shite than others of his ilk.  


In 2005, Tor Sandqvist, a doctoral student at Uppsala University, submitted a thesis 

He showed first-order classical logic could be validated using solely constructively valid reasoning in the metalanguage, eliminating the reliance on a priori "bivalence" (the strict assumption that everything is fundamentally True or False)

that took up Dummett’s challenge: to justify the ordinary practices of mathematicians without any appeal to truth.

His base-extension semantics provides mathematical accounts for intuitionistic and classical systems based entirely on inductive rules of inference rather than traditional model theory. 

Where Dummett had given the conditions a solution must satisfy, Sandqvist gave a solution. He produced a precise mathematical justification of deduction as mathematicians actually use it, grounded entirely in practices of assertion. The boxer’s fists were untied.

Now it appears, the boxer may be replaced by an AI. Sandqvist & Voevodsky appeared together at Conferences till the latter passed away in 2017. 


It was rediscovered a decade later in the Department of Computer Science at University College London, where a group of logicians recognised what Sandqvist had actually built, and developed it into a full framework on a par with the orthodox truth-conditional view. The framework now stands equal to the truth-based account, analogous to the situation after Gödel’s PhD thesis. What about mathematics? The UCL team have recently shown that the Dummett-Sandqvist framework gives a way to understand what Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems are about, and it is not the limits of knowledge.
. Gheorghiu reframes incompleteness as a divergence between two internally determined notions of consequence associated with a single theory, rather than as a gap between syntactic provability and truth in a mind-independent structure. The result clarifies the relationship between reflection, consistency, and inferentialist approaches to meaning, and shows how substantial semantic determinacy may arise from the inferential structure of arithmetic itself.

The problem here is that determinacy arises in a pooling equilibrium- i.e. a coordination game- whereas it may be useful to have discoordination games for certain purposes involving costly signals. 
If meaning comes from practices of assertion, then our concepts are settled only as far as our practices have settled them.

In other words, the thing is a moveable feast. But focal solutions for coordination games cshift all the time.  

A system of definitions is a kind of constitution that determines something. The US Constitution, for example, is meant to enshrine a form of democracy.

It was meant to solve the problem created by dual sovereignty. Southern Democrats abandoned a racist 'form of democracy' when I was about 2 years old.  

But what a constitution defines answers to how it is amended.

It may do. It may not. The Warren Court was described as having brought about a 'Constitutional Revolution'. Some say that Trump appointed Judges are bringing about a Counter-Revolution.  

Principia Mathematica is a constitution for arithmetic.

without algorithms for things like long division 

To read it as a constitution is to assume it is consistent; otherwise, it would be nonsense.

We only need to assume that there could be a Judge Hercules giving it a 'harmonious construction'.  

So, when we amend it by asserting that ‘Principia Mathematica is consistent,’ we are not changing the subject: the new axiom says aloud only what the practice already did. Gödel’s theorems apply afresh to the enlarged constitution: the amended system has its own unprovable truth, its own consistency it cannot certify.

The US constitution is 'buck stopped' in that the Supreme Court has the final say unless 'doctrine of political question' arises. But this is a matter of economia, not akriebia.  

No amendment is the last; each faithful extension opens room for the next. To grasp a concept like arithmetic is not to survey a finished structure;

the 'extension' is epistemic, impredicative & not well defined.  

it is to hold a principle for going on: a rule for laying the next stretch of line, not a map of where the line ends.

Thus we don't have to be silent about anything of which we can't speak precisely.  

Dummett called this openness indefinite extensibility.

There could be (using Kripke schema) an end to mathematical time when all choice sequences become 'determinate'.  


Faithful is the word doing the work, because not every amendment is. Gödel claimed the US Constitution could deliver a dictatorship.

This was obvious at the time. That's why Presidential terms were restricted. Otherwise the Executive could pack the Bench & then go in for gerrymandering.  

That does not make dictatorship a form of democracy.

Why not? The Weimar Constitution explicitly provided for a Caesarean President. In practice, the US has this. Mutually Assured Destruction means that POTUS could pull the plug on all life on earth. That's pretty fucking dictatorial.  

Whatever loophole he had in mind, it would have contradicted the practices the Constitution already enshrined. An amendment can betray what a constitution defines. But it can also unfold it, drawing out what the founding commitments demanded all along.

White heterosexual men who owned slaves never intended for the American Constitution to protect gays, blacks, First Nations & women. 

Only the second kind is what Dummett has in mind.

Dummett & Farquarhson (who was White South African) hoped that some ideal type of constitution could be created to safeguard minorities. Sadly, the thing was a pipe dream.  

The constitution of our language is our current practice for public discourse.

Sadly, public discourse is stuff Trump says, not what erudite savants talk about.  

As it is extensible in this way, what we claim as ‘true’ is not a fixed structure with a ceiling we are forever failing to reach, but something that can change. Gödel’s verdict never applied to mathematics, but only to some edition of the constitution. Within the Sandqvist system, we can attend to the extension systematically. Hilbert’s words outlive his programme: Wir werden wissen. We shall know. Not because the answers are waiting at the end of a ladder, but because truth goes exactly as far as we have built the rungs.
For Per Martin Lof knowing a proposition means explicitly possessing a constructive proof or verification. In that sense, AIs may soon know math better than most early career mathematicians. Even as we speak, more rungs may being added such that, as Terence Tao says, AI 'jumping robots' can by pass the slow collobarative process of mathematicians assisting each other to find hand holds and footholds to ascend further up the mountain. 

Friday, 9 January 2026

Husserl vs Marx- Tran Duc Thao.


If the labour theory of value has a mathematical representation (i.e. if sets or classes in it are well defined) then there can also be a 'Transcendental Ego' at least for Homo Economicus. Sadly, it appears that there can be no such thing till 'the end of mathematical time' when all choice sequences are known to be 'law like'. Godel's interest in Husserl's ideas did give his system some credibility till about the end of the Seventies. However, to my best knowledge, nothing came of this line of inquiry. Like Kantarovich's work, the thing is a cul de sac because of insurmountable problems of impredicativity, concurrency, complexity, computability and categoricity. Still, a really smart dude can always find gold where lesser minds see only dross. 

Dr. Rory O'Sullivan has an article in Aeon titled ' The tragedy of Trần Đức Thảo- How the persecuted Vietnamese philosopher became one of the first theorists of the divide between colonised and coloniser.'

Thao was born in 1917, the year of the Bolshevik Revolution. He was was far from being 'one of the first anti-colonial theorists' in Vietnam. Previously, anti-colonial philosophy in Vietnam drew on Confucian tradition (e.g. the 'Aid the King' movement supported by poet/philosophers like Nguyễn Khuyến) as well as Buddhism which fostered links with monks in other colonies- e.g. Ceylon, Burma, etc.- and which placed a lot of stress on fundamental ontological and epistemological questions. Thao would have been about ten years old when his country was flooded with more and more nationalist/Socialistic literature written in an engaging manner and featuring 'lived experience' as opposed to doctrinaire jargon. Still, it was mainly the urban and the literate people who were affected by this. 

At the popular level, there was Caodaism- a syncretic spiritualist sect- which was founded in 1926 by a group of Government clerks. The French began to crack down on it because it was attracting too many converts and this annoyed the Catholic Church. The literary culture of the Vietnamese was highly philosophical because of the influence of Buddhism, Taoism & Confucianism as well as older indigenous traditions. Young Vietnamese excelled in the new French Schools established by the Colonial power and assimilated abstract philosophical ideas in a nuanced manner reflective of the indigenous philosophical traditions. Unlike Buddhist Marxism, which went completely bonkers in Myanmar, the Vietnamese were fortunate in having a down-to-earth leader in the shape of Ho Chi Minh who was able to steer a middle course at the time of the Soviet-Chinese split. 

I think the biggest influence on Thao as a boy was the journalist Nguyễn An Ninh, who graduated from the Sorbonne in 1920 and who brokered a deal between the Viet Minh and the Trotskyites some 15 years later. We may also mention, the Trotskyite, Phan Văn Hùm who was killed by the Communists in 1946. Interestingly, both were initially attracted to Caodaism. Hum also wrote about the Hoa Hao syncretic movement. Another towering figure was Ngo Van, who was 4 years older than Thao and who could claim genuine proletarian status. Exiled to France, he worked in a factory and later took a Doctorate in Religious studies. He gives an enthralling account of both the promises kept and the betrayals perpetrated by the Left in his country. He died in 2005, by which time his country was on a secure path to increasing affluence. 

What is ironic is that Thao had no lived experience or active perception of either colonialism or the anti-colonial movements. He was too young or had been too busy swotting to take part in the revolutionary movements sweeping his land.  Moreover, he had never produced anything 'material'. It is easy to say 'this philosopher ignores the material origins of 'what is at hand' (zuhandenheit)- i.e. the fact that trillions of disabled Lesbians are being raped to death on factory floors throughout the Turd World just so you can sit comfortably in your arm-chair reading this blog on your i-Pad. But, if you yourself are not a disabled Lesbian being raped to death by Elon Musk in one of his factories, they you too are oblivious to the 'material' condition to which you only have semiotic access. Not till every Libtard chops off his own dick, turns Lezza, and gets raped to death by Musk can we have a truly materialistic phenomenology of liberative dialectics.' 

Thao had spent his childhood and adolescence swotting to get a scholarship. Then, from the age of 19, he was in France studying nonsense. Thus he was the least qualified of his cohort to apply 'the phenomenological method to the problem of colonialism'. By contrast, revolutionaries like M.N Roy or Ho Chi Minh had lived in many countries- US, USSR, China, Thailand etc. One could say that Thao's horizon was that of a French educated Vietnamese of the mandarin class. His Emperor was a protected subject of the French Republic for purely contingent, historical, reasons- mainly the military decline of China & the excuse that some previous Emperor had persecuted Christians. It was obvious that China's return to super-power status- the US had insisted it get a permanent seat on the Security Council- meant that the French would have to leave. If they couldn't defeat the Japanese, they stood no chance against the combined might of Russia and China. Perhaps, had Roosevelt lived, the French would not have been permitted to return to a territory which FDR believed they had utterly ruined. 

Thao, having studied worthless shite, could not make the obvious point that if Britain was leaving India, it must be the case that the Imperial game was not worth the candle. A 'nation of shopkeepers' tends to be very shrewd in such matters. There was no glory to be had in letting the Chinese finish the job which the Japanese had started. 

Did Thao make any contribution to 'anti-colonial thought'? No. He had studied a subject which seeks to explain, but fails, why we can tell cats from dogs. The answer has to do with the law of increasing functional information. Evolution, or competition for limited resources, means that information of a useful type tends to burgeon. I can tell that animal hidden in the garden is a cat not a dog because, over the years, I have become good at differentiating cat like noises from those uttered by dogs. However, it must be said, that the reason I am good at this is because of co-evolution with domestic animals which have played a vital part in the rise of our species. 

Thao thought there must be  a 'normative tie' to action in information. Why did that tie exist in self-interested actions but fail to get 'unversalized'. Was it because people live in different 'life-worlds'?  But, if so, how come he was for Vietnamese freedom whereas a French dude born in Vietnam and who had the same education as himself would be against it? 

The concept he was groping towards was 'uncorrelated asymmetries' as dictating Eusocial 'bourgeois strategies'. This explains why a French pedant, whose standard of living is higher because Vietnamese resources are being acquired for an artificially low price, doesn't want Vietnam to become free. This does not mean he wants to become the slave of Hitler. Why? That would lower his standard of living. 'Uncorrelated asymmetry' has to do with me wanting more even if this means you get less. It follows from the fact that I am me, not you. This is not to say that Thao did not make a very important contribution to elucidating the 'shitty ass paradox.' Why do people who show zeal in wiping their own bum, not roam around the place wiping every shitty bum? The answer is that an epistemic failure has occurred. The King Emperor did not wipe Mahatma Gandhi's bum because he was constricted by an imperial horizon which delimited what he could perceive as truly possible. In this way he missed out on the opportunity to wipe Gandhi's shitty bum. He also failed to suck off Hitler & Tojo. Churchill was gravely remiss in failing to get the King Emperor to study Husserl. 

It took five ill-fated conversations with Jean-Paul Sartre

this could be caricatured as Sartre saying he was free (which he became after the Anglos liberated Paris) and Thao saying he wasn't because Clement Atlee & Ernie Bevan decided that Ho Chi Minh was a Commie hothead. Thus British-Indian forces worked with the French against the Viet Minh. The KMT Chinese let the French advance into the North but, by 1950, both the Soviets & Chinese had recognized Ho Chi Minh's government. 

Thao was aware that changing British public opinion was important and did have some articles translated into English. But he doesn't seem to have understood the importance of the Indians. I suppose he was under the impression that Nehru was a puppet of the City of London or some such shit. That's why it was important for him to have conversations with other brown or black intellectuals rather than useless French nutters. Perhaps, if Ho Chi Minh had been able to spend more time in India in 1946, he could have got Nehru to put pressure on Atlee & Cripps to back him. Atlee himself had no problem befriending Aung San of Burma. 

before the Vietnamese philosopher Trần Đức Thảo finally broke with French philosophy.

He didn't break with it. Indeed, by focussing on Husserl, rather than the Heidegger championed by the 'generation of 1933' (Satre, Levinas, Kojeve, Blanchot, Merleau Pointy Shithead &c) he was marking himself out as a backward fellow from the Colonial boondocks.

This is not to say that he made any contribution to French Philosophy after returning to Vietnam. Partly this was because,  after he was purged, he could not get access to recent publications in French. But, even before that, he had focused on translating and doing original work in his own language to help his people rise.  He fell out of favour at around the same time that Mao decided that 'letting a hundred flowers bloom' was a bad idea. Since Ho Chi Minh had to keep both the Soviets and the Chinese happy, he didn't want some stupid philosopher to rock the ideological boat. Once Vietnam broke with China, Thao could be rehabilitated under Glasnost. Sadly, the fall of the Soviet Union made Vietnam's position precarious. Thao was sent to France, at Government expense, to see if he could revive old friendships. But he may have been suffering from persecution mania. He told people he had been sent to be tried by the French Communist Party!

Ho Chi Minh's pragmatism and desire to placate both Moscow & Beijing kept his country safe from the craziness of the Burmese Marxists (or the Indian Naxals) in the mid Sixties. In the Seventies, Trotskyites in Sri Lanka tried to launch a revolution. It showed they were just as crazy as the Burmese.  Interestingly, a young French philosopher, Bernard Henri Levi, who was offered a job working for the new Bangladesh Government, was a first hand witness of this infantile Leftism. The Bengali Maoists supported the genocidal Pakistan army, because it was obsequious to Beijing, while condemning Sheikh Mujib as a Soviet puppet!

Between November 1949 and January 1950, Thảo and Sartre recorded and transcribed their conversations on the relation between Marxism and the new philosophy of existentialism, with the intention of publishing them.

The context was 'Browderism'. Should Communist parties fight elections or should they use Maoist tactics? Existentialism was compatible with Browderism but not Maoism. Moreover, the Americans- Marshall in particular- had grown sceptical of Chiang Kai-shek and his 'Christian' generals. It was possible that they would pragmatically support Communist parties and help them industrialize their countries.  Ho Chi Minh had always hoped that the US would support Vietnam against China. Sadly, the Americans were seduced by the French and the Catholics into expanding their role (though they did get rid of the Catholic dictator of South Vietnam after Buddhist monks started burning themselves to death.)

At one time, Sartre was saying 'Existentialism is a Humanism' and the Americans seemed keen to promote his psilosophy in the belief that it was like that of the rugged individualist, Ernest Hemmingway. Sadly, a lot of Americans thought darkies or gooks were sub-human. That's why they were bound to turn into Marxists unless Jesus Christ entered their hearts and thus caused them to invite Whitey to help himself to their natural resources. 

Sartre hoped to prove that Marxism and existentialism – of which he was the primary representative

He looked like watered down Heidegger. Thao was more thoroughly indoctrinated in Husserl but the latter's philosophy had reached a 'crisis'- i.e. the 'life-world' of  'European Humanity' was not sustainable. The 'Transcendental ego' had become inaccessible because something had gone wrong with science. But, maybe, the East could come to the rescue. After all, Moscow was to the East of Paris. Beijing was even further to the East. 

– were consistent with one another: reconcilable projects.

They were also reconcilable with Voodoo.  

However, the two men’s exchange of views collapsed before completion, under a series of recriminations.

Sartre was good at recrimination. Still, he would move to the Left probably because the French Communist party was led by proles, not haut bourgeois intellectuals, and thus were little better than the British Labour Party and thus would refuse to fuck up their own country. What to do? Proles are like that only. If only they had been to the right schools and Colleges they would fucking hate their country and do everything in their power to destroy its peace and prosperity.  

Thảo remained bitter about this, later referring to an ‘insidious campaign’ among Sartre’s ‘disciples’ to paint him as responsible for the failure of this planned project. Today, the conversations are still lost.

The Battle of Dien Bien Phu, in 1954, made it irrelevant. France and Holland had wasted blood and treasure trying to hang on to their South East Asian possessions. 

For Thảo, their disagreement lay in the fact that Sartre did not recognise Marxism’s philosophical seriousness.

Thao was aware that there were some similarities between Hegel & Marx's ideas about the foundations of calculus and Husserl's own program. This arose from the fact that they were equally shit.  

For Sartre, traditional Marxism offered an attractive social and political programme

Gulags? They are very attractive unless you get sent to them.  

but lacked a real or serious philosophical account of being and human nature.

i.e. stupid shite. But Marxism can supply this just as easily as Voodoo.  

Sartre developed his ideas about existentialism out of an ambition to provide the foundations for a new Left-wing philosophy for the 20th century

This was true during and after the War. Would it have been true if there had been no War? Probably not. Sartre describes himself as 'in sympathy' with Leon Blum and the United Front but he didn't vote for them. He was a 'liberal intellectual' who felt isolated in an age of mass politics and totalitarian governments. 

At the start of the 1940s, Thảo had the same intellectual project.

He was aware that the Japanese were even worse than the corrupt Vichy French. Vietnam suffered a terrible famine in '44-45. Two million died out of a population of less than 20 million.  

He had arrived in France from a French protectorate in modern-day Vietnam on a governor-general’s scholarship to pursue his studies in Paris.

Sadly, because of his race, he was not allowed to get a job teaching in a public institution.  

Influenced by those around him, he became convinced that phenomenology, a new paradigm devised by Edmund Husserl, promised fresh answers to fundamental questions about the human condition.

Maybe the 'transcendental ego' was what Buddhas or Taoist sages achieved.  

At that time, Thảo enjoyed a reputation in French philosophy as the most important interpreter and critic of Husserl’s thought.

This didn't mean much because the French were late to that particular party. 

By the 1950s, Thảo had changed his mind. After a decade working with Husserl’s phenomenological approach, he came to believe it was ultimately inadequate to the task of understanding human beings since it could not properly account for history and natural development. Thảo was also taken up and transformed by events. By the end of the Second World War, he was a key spokesperson in France for Vietnamese independence.

But people back home suspected he was a Trotskyite even after he switched support to Ho Chi Minh in 1946/47 around the time when the Viet Minh started killing any Trotskyites whom the French had failed to hunt down. There would always be the suspicion that Thao had turned his coat to save his skin. Perhaps, that is why the Vietnamese Communist Party never fully trusted him even though he had been 're-educated' in 1953. His big mistake was to take the 'Hundred Flowers' campaign seriously. He was using Trotskyite language to denounce 'bureaucratization' and to demand 'Democracy and Freedom'. Equally importantly he spoke against 'errors' in 'agricultural reform'- i.e. collectivization. 

 Stalin's philosophy of language was useful for Third World people because it effectively said that your mother tongue and the 'feudal' literary forms you grew up with are perfectly adequate for any revolutionary purpose. The 'superstructure' is relatively autonomous. Thao, on the other hand wanted to reimagine, on the basis of phenomenology (e.g. that of the Young Hegelian Marx), the relationship between the substructure and the superstructure. But why bother? Comrade Stalin would actually help you train your army and, once you take power, he will send engineers to help you industrialize. That's the only thing which will help the common folk of your country to achieve a decent material standard of living. 

As he became increasingly involved with the Viet Minh, his philosophical outlook changed. Only orthodox Marxism’s materialist understanding of history, he claimed, could provide a full and demystified account of where people’s ideas about themselves and the world come from.

Was this 'strategic'? Might he have taken a different course if France had withdrawn from Indo-China in the British manner- i.e. passing power to a Federation with hereditary monarchs serving as ceremonial heads of states? In that case, the US might have assisted with economic aid and 'transfer of technology'. 

Thao makes his position clear with his preface to 'Phenomenology & Dialectical Materialism'. The former is simply wrong. The latter may be right for some abstruse reason to do with 'surplus value' & the immutable laws of Capital itself. I don't suppose a lot of people back home could work their way through it. They were too busy fighting the French. 

The work that we present to the public consists of research belonging to different times and inspirations. In the first part, written between 1942 and 1950, we set forth the essential features of phenomenology from a purely historical point of view and in the perspective of Husserl's own thought. Our critical objections serve only to make evident internal contradictions found within the Husserlian corpus itself.

Could this be repaired by getting rid of the 'transcendental ego'? Sure. But, maybe, what you'd ineluctably be left with is something like Dialectical Materialism though, no doubt, some 'false consciousness' might tincture it.  

In contrast, the second part, completed in 1951,

In other words, after Mao had come to power and showed he would defend Communism in North Korea & North Vietnam, by- if necessary- sending 'human waves' of battle hardened troops. What took the world by surprise was the military genius of General Giap. Ho Chi Minh, too, displayed great statesmanship. He tipped off Hare Krishna Konar, of the Indian, pro-Beijing, CPM, to the completeness of the Soviet-Chinese split. I think he influenced the CPM to abandon 'anti-Browderism' (whose prophet, HN Goshal, would be killed by his own comrades in Burma in the mid Sixties) and do land reform after coming to power in a 'United Front' Government with Leftist Congressmen.  

is situated entirely within the position of dialectical materialism.

Which can be a Pragmatism- but this was not known to Francophones at the time.  

It is true that there we take up again certain technical results of lived analyses, but only in terms of pure positive data, completely freed from the philosophical horizon that dominated Husserl's descriptive method. However, it is not a question in any sense of a mere juxtaposition of two contradictory points of view: Marxism appears to us as the only conceivable solution to problems raised by phenomenology itself.

We might say 'Darwinian Evolution'. Engels had said, at Marx's funeral, ' Just as Darwin discovered the law of development of organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of development of human history'. Behind both is Malthus. 

Our task in setting forth Husserl's thought was a relatively easy one, since it was concerned only with the theory of phenomenological analysis under the three aspects that appeared successively in its evolution: the description of essences,

by whom? Smart people add value by their descriptions because they generate a superior structural causal model which enables us to tinker with parameters and thus improve outcomes. If stupid people do it, only nonsense is generated. Husserl's program wasn't attracting smart people (save the idiosyncratically Platonic Godel in the Fifties). Weyl- whose wife had studied under Husserl- moved from Husserl to Brouwer. Turing used Brouwer's 'choice sequences' to establish an 'eidetic' result. Husserl achieved nothing similar. Science was moving in a pragmatic or instrumentalist direction. Still, a smart neo-Kantian- Grete Hermann- was able to find a flaw in Von Neumann's 'no hidden variables' theorem' in the 1930s. But then she had been trained by Emmy Noether.  

the static explication of lived experiences, and finally a genetic explication.

Lived experiences don't need 'static explications'. Tell us how they can be enhanced and we may pay you some money.  

Its concepts were simple enough, and, in addition, amply developed in the published works. But, obviously, theory is worthless without practice, and for a long time we believed that within the very presentation of the method should be included the achieved results of the method; however, the most important part of this work has remained unpub1ished.

Nobody could be sure, back then, that Husserl hadn't said something worthwhile. But this was also true of Marx. Now, however, we can be certain both were shitheads.  

It is here that we have encountered extraordinary difficulties, which are responsible for the long delay in the completion of this work and have radically reversed its orientation. The examination of unpublished manuscripts demonstrated, in fact, that the concrete analyses took a direction that was incompatible with the theoretical principles from which these concrete analyses were elaborated. From the beginning of our study of Husserl (in a work written in 1942 of which we present here only the first chapter), we had surmised the contradiction because of certain enigmatic developments within the published works. However, we thought that we would be able to resolve this contradiction by a simple broadening of our perspective, which would remain faithful to the essential phenomenological inspiration. But, after long hesitation we found that, on account of the actual descriptions that abound in the manuscripts, we had to renounce once and for all any hope of reconciling the concept of phenomenology with its actual achievement.

Thao was killing off his own subject. Not a good career move. But, by then, it appeared he might have an important role to play in his native land. Radhakrishnan was an Indian, anti-colonial, philosopher who had been Spalding professor in the Thirties. He parlayed this into a job as India's Ambassador to Stalin and then, later on, the Presidency of the Republic.  

Thảo came to believe that his French philosophical counterparts had chosen their own comfort and role in the Western bourgeois imperialist regime over the morally superior path of supporting revolutionary communism.

It was easy enough to keep your job while pretending to be a Commie. Indeed, if your books sold well, you would be very comfortably off.  

In 1951, after the publication of his most celebrated book, Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism, Thảo departed for Vietnam. He would not return to Paris until 1991, two years before his death.

Thảo’s time in Vietnam was hard: although the country honours him today, in his lifetime he was persecuted and kept in poverty by the state.

Communism, in a poor country, means being kept in poverty by the State.

Therefore, Thảo’s most important work was all produced in France during the 1940s. Its interest lies

in its straightforwardness. Few people who have spent a decade studying shit say 'this is shit'. Why? Because you then have to study something which isn't shit for a decade before you are qualified to teach that shite.  

not only in the originality with which he navigates the prevailing currents in French thought, but how he responds to some of the most important conflicts of the 20th century:

They had already occurred. Twelve years before he was born, Japan defeated Tzarist Russia. Then the Bolsheviks came to power there and they helped China become Communist. China then helped Indo-China to go in the same direction.  

the Cold War and the worldwide movements for colonial independence.

Which became sure of success in 1917. Why? The age of multi-racial Empires was over because Imperial cousins had been stupid enough to start a war which would lead to the eclipse of the landed aristocracy. War was no longer 'the sport of Kings'. It had turned into a matter of industrial economics. It was obvious that factory workers- churning out munitions- were the ultimate source of power. The question was whether South East Asia would follow the American or the Soviet model. It turned out, it could follow the Deng Xiaoping model in a manner that greatly improved material standards of living without sacrificing the Communist Party's monopoly of power. 

The result is a body of work that raises important questions about how to understand the relation between who we are, and the history and society that shape us. Additionally, Thảo’s refusal to distinguish between the philosophical, the political and the personal led him to become one of the first theorists of the divide between colonised and coloniser.

This is nonsense. The moment a people are colonised, they are able to theorise what divides them from their conquerors. Partly, this had to do with scientific education and the ability to industrialize. The rise of Japan made this obvious. The question for Vietnam was whether it could keep landowners and Princes and Caodai Popes and Catholic Bishops and rise through free markets or whether it needed to follow the Communist path. Irma Adelman, in the late Sixties, suggested that the Americans should pay off the landlords and give the land to the peasants. The peasants would then have no incentive to side with the Communist insurgents. This would end up saving money. Sadly, the American Defence-Industrial complex didn't want to save money. It wanted to piss it against a wall. 

Husserl (1859-1938) had begun his career as a philosopher of mathematics,

His PhD was in math- the calculus of variation. Only subsequently did he fall under the influence of Brentano and move to philosophy. However, it was his close friendship with Cantor-  who believed his transfinite numbers were objective, metaphysical entities, which influenced Husserl's shift away from psychologism toward an emphasis on objectivity and essence. Back then, few would have thought the Continuum Hypothesis would remain an open question. Husserl was right to be cautious in this matter but wrong to think 'lived experience' must be founded upon some ineluctable 'theory of theories'. 

which he theorised as a system of abstract representations corresponding to how reality appears to us in certain situations. A mathematical theorem is not, strictly speaking, true:

It is a tautology. The problem is that the 'intentions' (sets, classes, functions etc.) may have no well defined extensions and thus Liebniz's laws of identity are violated. X is not equal to x if x is epistemic or impredicative in a certain sense. This is like the 'masked man' (intensional)) fallacy known to the ancient Greeks.  

rather it is a statement of the truth,

or it is false because it treats intensions as having well defined extensions when such is not the case.  

a kind of roadmap we can follow to reach an objective perception of what it describes.

This is like the notion of 'naturality' (non-arbitrariness) in category theory. The problem is that the purpose (intention) is always arbitrary thus we can only say there is naturality (i.e. every smart person would agree with the result) only for a limited purpose. But this is Pragmatism or Instrumentalism of some type.  

Thảo elaborates on this idea in Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism (1951) where he explains how ‘a theorem of geometry can be the object only of a confused intuition or of a blind or symbolic representation’.

Either the thing is useful- i.e. saves us time or allows us to make specific calculations- or it isn't. Intuitions don't much matter. Brouwer's are different from Hilbert's but both can provide us with very useful results.  

In the first case, we may only dimly remember or partly understand what the theorem is getting at.

Even the author may be wrong about this.  

In the second, where we understand it perfectly,

sadly, this can only happen 'at the end of mathematical time' when all 'lawless' choice sequence are known to be 'lawful'. In other words, Liebniz's 'labyrinth of freedom' gets Infinity's Ariadne's thread. 

‘the only sensible thing to do is to subject it to careful analysis,

It is only sensible to do useful things. What Husserl was doing wasn't useful. Brouwer, surprisingly, turned out to be very useful.  

in which the theorem is presented in the fullness of itself by the performance of the operations which demonstrate its truth.’

Pedagogues may want to believe that they, like Moses, have descended from Mt. Sinai with eternal commandments. But they can be just as useful if they hold no such belief.  

The premise of a divide between concrete reality, which can only be experienced,

it can't. What is experienced is 'subjective'. I think this is a boring lecture. A smart dude thinks it is exciting. He can make some great discovery or invention on the basis of what he heard while I was sitting in a corner drawing pictures of naked ladies.  

and our representations of it, which inevitably condense or repackage the truth, is the basic insight on which Husserl built his system.

It is the same insight of the ancient Buddhist or Taoist or Jain sages who saw that if one thing was fully understood then all things would simultaneously be known. This is like the 'slingshot'- the notion that all true statements refer to the same thing. 

Phenomenology has less mainstream purchase than, say, psychoanalysis; but there are many parallels between the two schools of thought.

I suppose both could replace Religion. But Marxism went further by promising Paradise on Earth. 

Both phenomenology and psychoanalysis were devised near the turn of the 20th century by intellectuals – Husserl and Sigmund Freud – who had grown up in assimilated Jewish families of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Husserl converted to Protestantism. Brouwer too was a pious (reformist) Protestant.  

Freud the medical clinician

charlatan. His first big idea was to prescribe cocaine as a panacea 

and Husserl the Kantian logician were each devoted to the methods of rational enquiry. But both phenomenology and psychoanalysis fundamentally challenge the Enlightenment notion that human beings (at their best) and the world (as we can understand it) are rational.

In other words, both are irrational.  

They each in different ways dispute the very coherence of rationality as an intellectual principle.

Freud claimed to be doing something useful. Boring people could talk to him- for a fee. There was a Messianic aspect to Husserl, but Heidegger was better at it.

For example, take an ordinary statement that professes to be rationally grounded: ‘The sky is blue,’ ‘I am your father,’ ‘Two lines that are parallel do not meet,’ and so on.

The first two are factual and can be verified. The third is speculative and grounded in a set of axioms which are assumed to be true. All we can say is that if the axioms are true and no logical mistake was made, then the hypothesis is likely to be true.  

Instead of treating such observations at face value,

i.e. as things which can eventually be verified 

both Husserl and Freud consider them to be surface effects.

That's how paranoia works. Mummy is only superficially nice. Actually she is a robot sent from the future to kill us.  

What makes such statements appear rational, in other words, is the false impression they give of being somehow apart from our ordinary human drives and experiences.

Nonsense! The guy who says 'the sky is blue' is telling us it isn't raining or snowing. We have a human drive to picnic when the sky is blue rather than black with rain clouds. Also, it is human to find your son and say 'I'm your daddy' even if you happen to be Darth Vader.  

For Freud, this all has to do with the past: in all parts of life, unknowingly, we repeat the dramas of our early years.

i.e. we keep pooping our pants and screaming our lungs out.  

Whatever justifications or explanations we invent, however little we may realise, when we act, we follow baby logic.

I wish that were true. Baby logic results in baby getting lots of kisses and cuddles from women in the vicinity.  

Meanwhile, for Husserl, the essential thing is the present moment, the experience. At first, his point may seem merely to consist in the trite observation that we all see the world through our own eyes. But the profundity lies in his attempt to describe individual experience in systematic terms and offer a critique of everyday understanding. The sky is seldom actually blue,

Which is why it is useful to comment on it being so. 'The sky is blue' is likely to trigger the response 'let's go out and get some fresh air'. You then suggest we stop at that nice pub beside the river.  

and the meaning of the term ‘father’ is different whether we are three or 53 years old.

Not for me. I liked hugging Daddy and asking him to buy me ice-cream both when I was 3 and when I was 53. 

What, in more-careless moments, we might call objective descriptions of these things are, for the phenomenologist, really a shorthand we use to develop a shared consistent picture of the world.

If you don't have such a thing by the time you are five, you are mentally retarded.  

This is more apparent when speaking about something like emotions, which are often difficult to put into words. Yet phenomenology is based on the idea that whatever we might be speaking about, we cannot fully capture it.

Again, this is an idea we have all grasped by about the age of three. Saying 'Ma Ma' doesn't cause Mum to magically appear. On the other hand, you should never say 'Candyman' three times. I have watched several documentaries on this topic.  

Even a chair or a table, the more you look at them, start to exhibit new properties: to catch the light in unexpected ways, to betray their origins as wood formed by a certain hand, and so on. Phenomenology argues that what we normally mean by subjectivity and objectivity puts these terms the wrong way around. Usually, we treat personal things as subjective,

No. We treat things as objective and impressions or feelings as subjective. My Mummy actually exists. Today, I think she is very nice due to she gave me cookies. Tomorrow, I think she is a horrible witch because she says get a fucking job you lazy cunt.  

and imagine that common systematic accounts of things are objective. This is not actually the case. Objectivity is what we find in our personal experience,

Which is why we try to sell Mummy's niceness on Ebay.  

when we encounter the object; subjectivity is the abstraction of terms and associations that we impose on our experience in order to understand it.

Very true. Baby is engaged in 'abstracting terms and associates' when it cuddles Mummy and coos with delight. The cat, however, is applying Yoneda Lemma when it purrs and rubs against our feet to encourage us to feed it.  

It was this system that Thảo spent the 1940s trying to interpret.

He should have studied something useful like Chemical Engineering.  

In 1942, he submitted his thesis on Husserl at the ENS in Paris. In 1944, he travelled to Louvain in Belgium to collect some of Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts and smuggle them back to Paris. Thảo then kept them in his home for several years as he reworked his thesis into a book on Husserl’s philosophy.

Thao was very diligent. It is sad he wasted his time studying useless shite.  

Over the 1940s, Thảo grew more deeply involved in politics.

Vichy Vietnam was fucking horrible. The Japs were utter beasts.  

From the mid-19th century, the French had been colonial rulers of the region then known as Indochina, encompassing modern-day Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. During the Second World War, the Japanese invaded and occupied the region. When they left in 1945, the Viet Minh, a communist revolutionary force led by Ho Chi Minh, seized the opportunity to declare independence as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Thus began a chain of events leading to an eight-year war between France and the Viet Minh. By the end of the Second World War, Thảo was a leading spokesperson for the anticolonial Vietnamese independence movement in France. As the French state reacted to the movement, he became a target.

He was a brave man. The Vietnamese generally are.  

Towards the end of 1945, at the same time as French forces under General Leclerc landed in Saigon, Thảo was arrested and imprisoned in Paris. The arrest divided his compatriots at the ENS, and an effort to support him against the French state did not completely crystallise.

France, like Holland, wanted to hang on to its Asian Empire precisely because they had been powerless to resist Hitler effectively. The Americans were minatory to the Dutch but were seduced by the French. In contrast, the British- who had stood alone against Hitler- couldn't get rid of India fast enough. Even the cunning Mahatma wasn't able to trick them into staying.  

From prison, Thảo wrote the first and most important of several articles on the conflict that were published in Les Temps modernes, the intellectual magazine founded by Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Simone de Beauvoir. Thảo would later describe the article, titled ‘On Indochina’, as ‘existentialist’, and it would prove a key influence on Frantz Fanon. Thảo’s ‘On Indochina’ anticipated one of Fanon’s most important ideas: that universal ideals as we usually understand them are improper in discussions between coloniser and colonised, because to be colonised is precisely to be relegated outside the Western reach of the universal.

Bertrand Russell had been brutally frank. Though imprisoned for his Pacifist writings during the Great War, he said that wars against less advanced peoples were justified. 

‘On Indochina’ (1946) is of more than just historical interest

It is stupid and reflects the parochialism of the French intellectual. The fact is, the Brits were handing over power to the Indians while China had been helped to get back territory from the Japanese and to exercise sovereignty. Obviously 'Indo-China' would go the same way as the Indians and the Chinese. The French should follow the British policy of making friends with their former enemies and thus preserving economic and cultural ties. Obviously, Indo-China would want French support against the Chinese reassertion of claims over their territory.  

– Thảo does not merely argue for colonial independence, but tries to explain how the gap between the perspectives of coloniser and colonised makes it impossible to have debates on shared terms or to appreciate the other’s point of view.

If the Vietnamese really have a different 'life-world' then they are too backward to rule themselves. The sheep-dog doesn't have the same life-world as either the shepherd of the sheep. Thus he obeys the shepherd and herds the sheep. Thoa should learn to be a good little sheep-dog. We should have handed him over to the Gestapo for re-education. The White race is the race of shepherds. Brown peeps ought to say 'bow wow' and lick the hand that whips them. 

He refers to ‘a radical misunderstanding, which no explanation would be able to dissipate, since all expressions are understood in a sense opposed to the one in which they are pronounced.’

Beating would help Thao overcome his 'radical misunderstanding' of his place in the world.  

For the French, the so-called Annamites (as the Vietnamese in Indochina were known, and as Thảo calls them in ‘On Indochina’) were not truly French.

D'uh! The fiction was that Thao was a subject of Emperor Bao Dai.  

But nor, since the community to which they had belonged was premodern and precolonial, did they fully count as a people in their own right.

Like the French under Nazi occupation. In theory they were under President Petain. In reality, they were the slaves of the Germans.  

They were, for the average French person of good faith, in need of modernisation and proper integration into the international community. The Annamites, of course, saw the situation completely differently: they considered themselves part of a people who had been occupied and put to the service of a foreign power. ‘When one [side] says “liberty” or “progress”,’ writes Thảo, ‘the other hears “liberty-” or “progress-inside-the-French-system”, such that in order for Vietnam to be free, it must first remain inside this system, by force if necessary.’

Thao wanted to get rid of the Emperor. Indeed, he wanted to uproot the whole 'mandarin' system though himself belonging to that class. Don't serve the Emperor if he is a tool of foreign exploiters. The Chinese had gotten rid of their Emperor. Vietnam must do the same. 

The notions of liberty and progress presuppose that Vietnam should be a Western-style society with its accordant economic and social structures.

i.e. a landed aristocracy and an elite administrative class. Merchants in the Cities might displace the former and co-opt the latter. But Rural Society would remain feudal and backward.  

To the extent it lacks this, it may be classed as a less developed society in need of Western help – which may amount to Western control. Thảo is arguably the first theorist of how the language and culture of Western imperialism is based on an erasure of the peoples colonised by Europe.

Thao wasn't a complete fool. He knew that France hadn't 'erased' Arabic or Islam even in Algeria- forget about South East Asia. The Brits had actually fostered Indian languages and encouraged Indians to discover the glories of their own ancient history and civilization.  

Another of Thảo’s examples of how a word can mean virtually opposite things to colonised and coloniser centres on the word ‘treason’ (trahison) and describes a situation similar to his own experience.

There was no reason to do so. The French knew that yesterday's traitor is today's patriot demanding the execution of the Vichy scumbags.  

From the perspective of the colonising French, an intellectual, he says, who is suddenly lifted out of the oppressed class to receive all the benefits and privileges of the powerful

Fuck off! A darkie with a diploma was still a darkie. The lowest White man was still his superior.  

‘is now a member [of the elite], and to purport to pass back to the side of the exploited class, is to commit treason.’ Yet the coloniser’s view is based on overlooking the fact that such a person is, and already considers themselves, a citizen of their own country: in this case, Vietnam.

He was a subject of the Vietnamese Emperor. He wasn't a citizen. Only about 300 or 400 Indochinese families were granted French citizenship in the Thirties.  

Thảo argues that what certain Vietnamese intellectuals such as himself experienced, from their own point of view, was their colonisers bestowing an array of privileges along with a subsequent demand for loyalty. In other words, a dishonourable bribe.

Thao could have applied for naturalization. The fact that he didn't showed his patriotism.  

Resistance and opposition by the privileged colonised, he says, is not only inevitable: for them it is the only honourable course, since ‘to abandon one’s own for a personal advantage is the very definition of the concept of treason.’ Thảo was claiming that the French were cultivating a class of native informants or loyalists.

They weren't even doing that. They were a gang of thieves. The Brits were astonished at the high level of corruption in the French administration when they helped liberate Vietnam. 

Over the course of the 1940s, the tensions of Thảo’s position as a Vietnamese philosopher at the top of the French system seem to have weighed more and more on him. The burden began to colour his relationships with French intellectuals. He became disillusioned with the Parisian philosophical milieu, and his activism led him to a more radicalised Marxist point of view. In 1948, he wrote ‘The Phenomenology of Spirit in its Real Content’, a critical review for Les Temps modernes of Alexandre Kojève’s (still) influential presentation of G W F Hegel.

Kojeve influenced Francis Fukuyama thanks to Leo Strauss. He ended up a Euro-crat. I suppose, he spun a good enough yarn at a time when French intellectuals were aware that they had been overtaken by the Germans and maybe even the Yanks.  

Kojève’s lectures on Hegel were a sensation in Parisian intellectual circles at the time, and Thảo himself considered this critique his break with the French philosophical scene.

He was right to think poorly of it. What he could not have guessed was that America would help it degenerate yet further. By the end of the Sixties, the Maoists were a powerful force on French campuses. Vietnam held aloof from that mishegoss because it was too busy kicking American ass. 

Essentially, Thảo’s criticism was that Kojève mystified the relation between Hegel’s concepts of Nature and Spirit,

which were already mystified 

or the world as a whole and the human consciousness that emerges within it, in a way that left the door open for theological interpretations.

Kojeve was a charlatan. At least the Cao Dai Pope was rich. Graham Greene unkindly suggested that the Americans were stupid enough to back that cult rather than fulfil their world historical mission to allow the Catholic Church to fuck up darkies.  

For Thảo, Hegel’s dialectic, as reinterpreted by Marx, was a powerful means of showing how the mind is a product of the way living beings interact with their environment.

Very true. Marx enables you to understand why pussycat chases mice.  

Thảo defended the Marxist notion of human history as essentially the history of production,

which, not having studied econ, he knew nothing about 

by framing it in terms of a broader biological theory, claiming that consciousness and mind developed from mediation between the organism and its surrounding environment.

Back then, there was Lysenko and a mischievous type of Marxist Lamarckism.  

Thảo depicts an upward trajectory of evolutionary development from the smallest biomes to human beings, with more complex levels of awareness resulting from biological features such as the capacity to move oneself or to wield instruments.

In other words, he was ignorant of biology. To be fair, it wasn't till the Sixties and Seventies that people like Haldane & John Maynard Smith developed the modern, game theoretic, Neo-Darwinian synthesis.  

In 1950, two years after his essay on Kojève, Thảo’s dispute with Sartre arose. As had been the case with Kojève, Thảo believed the disagreement with Sartre was both political and philosophical.

Back then, orthodox Marxists- like Lefebvre & Lucacs- were attacking Sartre. The fellow was bound to fuck off to Hollywood one of these days. 

From the 1940s to the ’80s, French philosophy attempted to chart a third way between the US and the Soviet Union, between capitalism and Marxism.

the subject was taught in High School. Everyone wants to escape from teaching nonsense to credential craving apple-polishers. Sartre's pen had made him money & gained him fame. Also the fucker was getting laid like nobody's business. On the other hand, Arthur Koestler did fuck the Beaver. When Sartre tried to cuckold Koestler, he threw a glass at his head. Had he not done so, maybe he would have seduced Sartre and pushed him down the road Aron had already taken.  

What happened, instead, was the slow de-Marxification of the French intellectual elite,

unlike the rapid de-Marxification of China which had begun in the countryside even before the fall of the Gang of Four.  By the Eighties, Chinese ideologues were quoting Marx as saying 'to each according to his contribution' till the abolition of scarcity. 

as it gradually became a mouthpiece for US capitalist ideology.

Mitterrand did try Leftist policies till it became apparent they didn't work. Thatcher's England was rising. The working class element in the French Communist Party wanted what 'Dagenham Man' was getting- i.e. more pay, ownership of his council house, shares in privatized companies, and cheap holidays abroad. Already, British 'yuppies' were overrunning the countryside buying up car loads of Beaujolais. Soon, they would be followed by the affluent working class. Nice chateaus would become second homes for Thatcher's children.  

Thảo seems to have grasped all this at an early stage, in part because he never believed in the possibility of a third way.

He knew the French could not reform themselves even in the face of the Nazi threat.  

Looking back on the postwar period from the vantage point of the 1980s, Thảo would later describe how ‘the surprise offensive of the Marshall Plan with the purging of Communist ministers from the governments of Western Europe’ left him and others with a choice between two alternatives: ‘Faced with the rise of colonialist imperialism, I could only choose Marxism.’

Clement Atlee ensured that British colonies in Africa and Asia could choose some stupid third way of their own. So too did the French in the Sixties. This tended to mean support for cannibal Emperors.  

To say so implies, of course, that his counterparts tacitly chose capitalism. Thảo fought his battle with Sartre on philosophical grounds: idealism or materialism? The individual or the collective? The disputes between the two and their ideas came together in Thảo’s major work, Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism, a much-revised version of his 1942 thesis, which appeared in 1951.

He killed off the former- which was pretty much dead already- but failed to bring the latter to life. Could it have been done? I suppose, one could say Ho Chi Minh actually achieved the thing. But it was no panacea.  

Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism is regarded as Thảo’s most important work, and the most significant introduction to Husserl’s system for a generation of French students and thinkers, including Jacques Derrida, Jean-François Lyotard and Paul Ricoeur.

In other words, his influence was anti-Marxist. Macron was Ricoeur's secretary. Also, he married his drama teacher who slaps him silly. Admittedly, she is gorgeous still, I mean to say, WTF?!

What makes Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism philosophically important is Thảo’s argument that the phenomenological system ultimately undermines itself (see below).

Everything undermines itself. But, since undermining undermines itself, everything still remains as shitty as it ever was.  

Thảo argues that to move beyond this paradox intellectually requires us to abandon phenomenology for an orthodox Marxist position,

We can go beyond the paradox that nothing dies save what has lived, by abandoning sodomy and marrying our drama teacher except we don't really have to abandon sodomy even if our elderly wife keeps slapping us silly.  

and claims that, instead of experience, natural and social development are the best philosophical foundations for an understanding of the world and human nature.

Most people understood Communism well enough to keep the fuck away from Communist countries.  

In this sense, the book is also a record of its author’s own political and intellectual transformation during the 1940s. What had begun as an account of Husserl’s system became an attempt to highlight and transcend its weaknesses using a Marxist dialectical materialist framing; it reads like two books in one.

Indeed. The good news about dialectical materialism is that you can ally with Hilter today and with Churchill tomorrow. But just telling lies has the same effect.  

In Thảo’s account, Husserl’s phenomenological system is essentially flawed because,

it gasses on about essences?  

in seeking to avoid intellectual abstractions, it counsels a return to ‘experience’ – which is itself an abstraction.

No. It is an intension with an unknown extension.  

For Thảo: ‘The lived is just an abstract aspect of actual real life’

Only in the sense that it is equally an abstract aspect of an imaginary life or wife or knife.

which consists in ‘the real movement by which nature becomes conscious of itself through biological evolution and human history.’

Nature does not become conscious of itself. It isn't the case that the Grand Canyon may suddenly wake up one day and decide it is Gay and wants to train as an actuarial scientist in Seattle.  

In other words, experience is not just a random flux from which we make our own ideas; it is a product of the biological and historical conditions in which we live.

Very true. My idea that I am not a cat is not based on my experience of getting slapped any time I purr loudly and try to climb onto the lap of a pretty woman. Rather it is a product of the biological and historical conditions prevailing in our galaxy.  

Husserl demonstrates how people’s concepts about the world come from their experiences,

Very true. The concept of God must come from our experience of having bumped into him at the Supermarket.  

but these too come from somewhere.

The Supermarket was created by Spiderman. It is all part of Dr. Strange's devious plot to get Thor to stop fucking the Hulk.  

Human psychology, if taken to mean the study of how individuals come to their ideas about themselves and the world, is a subdiscipline of human evolution and social history.

Which is a subdiscipline of galactic history and the evolution of the Higgs boson.  

For Thảo, Husserl took to its limit the Cartesian mode of philosophising from the point of view of an individual consciousness.

No. He wasn't smart enough to do any such thing.  

But his mistake was to regard pure formless experience as the ultimate zone of philosophical enquiry and to claim everything else was built on top of it.

Einstein got quite far with some such notion. But Bohr was able to defeat him at Solvay. Still, it wasn't till laboratory proof was available that we could be sure that things like non-locality genuinely existed.  

For Thảo, this meant that, despite himself, Husserl could not avoid falling into a solipsism by which one’s personal perspective becomes virtually the centre of the universe.

It is not solipsist to believe in a transcendental ego or Godel's God.  

In the second part of Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism, Thảo

talks yet more bollocks.  

aims to offer a way beyond what he has shown to be Husserl’s solipsism. So Thảo offers a foundation for a full materialist account of the human condition: the development of the species, the trajectory of history and civilisation, the formation of the individual human being, and the relation between these epistemic layers. This account delves deeply into human evolution and child psychology. Throughout his work, Thảo accepts and represents the Western-centric, human-centric, teleological view of history he inherits from 19th-century Europe: somehow, things move from the earliest farmers to ancient Greece, then to the Middle Ages, and finally into capitalism.

It was obvious that 'total war' meant that the State took over functions previously performed by open markets. Schumpeter, in America, was saying Socialism was inevitable. Over the course of the Fifties and Sixties, many economists adopted the 'convergence hypothesis'- i.e. the Soviet and the American systems would become functionally equivalent with 'administered pricing' taking the place of market forces. The difference was that the Soviets would avoid periodic 'shake-outs' leading to mass, structural, unemployment.  

At its best, Thảo’s Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism is an effort to engage seriously with Marxism’s philosophical depth:

by ignoring his actual philosophy and gassing on about Evolution  

it is not just a sociopolitical agenda, but an ambitious account of being and human nature.

It was pretty much what a lot of Turd World intellectuals believed. Communism was a shortcut to 'catch up' growth. Instead of market incentives, scolding the bourgeoisie would cause them to fuck off and die. This would mean everybody would become enormously productive and affluent. 

Look at the war-time famines in Vietnam or Bengal. You can't tell me bougie bastards didn't eat up all the rice just so they could watch millions starve to death. Fuck you bougie scum! Fuck you very much!

The second part of Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism is less successful. It sometimes falls into the same naive materialism that Thảo elsewhere warned so forcefully against, viewing the world purely in a mechanistic manner, absent the wonder and nature of consciousness.

The nature of my consciousness isn't wondrous at all. It is shitty. Most people are like me. There are very few Terence Taos.  


After completing Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism, Thảo left France for Vietnam. The rest of his life would prove tumultuous and tragic. In 1956,

when the 'Hundred Flowers' campaign began in China 

a few years after his return to Vietnam, the communist regime became tolerant of dissenting voices in the wake of the Soviet Union’s leader Nikita Khrushchev’s secret speech in Moscow. Gradually, there developed a culture of satire and criticism of the regime by intellectuals, most infamously in two journals respectively called Nhân Văn and Giai Phẩm (Thảo wrote for the second). What is known today as the Nhân Văn-Giai Phẩm affair resulted in the state banning the journals and punishing those who’d been involved with them.

Mao was very dialectical. First give the intellectuals enough rope. Then hang them. He played the same trick on the Students. He got them to beat their teachers and then brought in workers to beat the students and drive them into the countryside.  

In 1958, Thảo was forced to make a public self-criticism, and got sent for re-education to a farm at the foot of mount Ba Vì, near Hanoi.

One reason to steer clear of the education racket is that there are murderous thugs who want to re-educate you.  

Thảo’s intellectual life afterwards was less a trajectory than a series of aborted moves and battles against the odds. When he finally returned to France in 1991, he was like a ghost:

Ho Chi Minh's successor won the war but mismanaged the economy.  

‘The more we spoke,’ says one account from someone who met him during that period, ‘the less I knew what distinguished our conversation from a dream, or a nightmare.’ Thảo died in Paris in 1993, aged 75, leaving behind thousands of pages of unpublished manuscripts.

He has been rehabilitated and his oeuvre may be preserved in an increasingly affluent Vietnam.  

Thảo is a tragic figure, both in philosophy and in life.

Because, first France and then the US did stupid shit in his country. But some of the country's economic woes were self-inflicted.  

His work on phenomenology remains one of the clearest assessments of the scope and limits of Husserl’s system.

It was shit.  

But his intellectual legacy is much greater than this.

Because some stupid French Professors read his shite. What they didn't get is that they were teaching nonsense.  

Despite the education and privilege France had bestowed on him,

It wasn't very much. The top collaborationist families in Vietnam lived the life of Kings.  

Thảo refused to commit anything like ‘treason’ against the Vietnamese to whom he felt he belonged. Instead, he devoted himself to their cause, including on the plane of ideas, where his postcolonial critiques of liberal universalist language and his analysis of the perspective of the colonised influenced generations to come.

He had no influence on the Global South. Fanon's Martinique decided to stay with France.  

Thảo’s greatest strength is how he strove to bring together the philosophical, the political and the personal,

a turd brings together much of the food you have eaten. This doesn't mean you should eat it. We may all produce philosophical shit. But coprophagy- i.e. teaching philosophy- isn't a great life choice.  

and to organise these all with some consistency. But this was also his weakness and, at his worst, it made him dogmatic.

He served his people by translating and writing in his mother tongue. Had he remained abroad, he could not have contributed much to nation building.  

It was also the reason why he returned to Vietnam where he met his ruin.

He did what he could. The Vietnamese are hard working and patriotic. They will rise and rise.  

The life and work of Trần Đức Thảo bring us face to face with some of the hardest subjects: what kind of creatures are we?

Not cats. I discovered this the hard way.  

What is this world in which we find ourselves?

One where purring loudly does not turn you into a cat.  

How should we live?

Emigrate somewhere still ruled by bougie Whites? Fuck that. Dubai has lower taxes. Vietnam is now being discovered by Indian tourists. Also it is cheaper to qualify as a Doctor there.  

These questions are just as pressing today, and the answers no easier to find.

These questions only arise if you are teaching shite or are running some sort of cult or Ponzi scheme. The answers are very easy to find. They entail quitting Skool and getting a fucking job. Sadly, Socioproctology doesn't pay very much. Still, it beats being a non-Socioproctologist with zero money.  

Sunday, 10 August 2025

Just War & Elad Uzan's Artificial Stupidity

 Can contemporary Moral Philosophers say anything sensible or useful in connection with what is currently happening in Gaza?

If so, surely a likely candidate amongst that motley crew to do so would be Elad Uzan- whose PhD is from Tel Aviv and who is on the Oxford Philosophy Faculty. 

I'm kidding. He is a moron who thinks there can be a 'moral mathematics' even though there are no well-defined sets in ethics or moral philosophy. It is a different matter that an arbitrary 'extension' can be given to anything whatsoever for some practical purpose. But practical purposes are economic or political or otherwise strategic. They aren't moral, ethical, or aesthetic. This is not to say that a mathematician can't 'add value' in this connection. Consider Freeman Dyson & William Press's contribution to 'the evolution of cooperation' literature. In iterated prisoner's dilemma (which is foolish because the thing only works if pulled on amateur criminals as a surprise) Dyson found that hidden within the IPD scenario was a matrix whose determinant could be forced, by either Alice or Bob acting alone, to be zero. In other words, IPD is an ultimatum game. But real life professional criminals don't bother with ultimatums. They invest in a countervailing incentive- i.e 'snitches get stitches', all gangsters punish any gangster who breaks 'omerta'- which operate independently. Dyson was a first class mathematician and spotted something the mediocrities in the field had failed to appreciate. Perhaps this has helped the reverse game-theory that is mechanism design in some other field. Incrementally there may have been some tangible benefit or progress from Dyson- an actual math maven- looking at 'evolution of morality' of the Binmore type. But, no 'philosophical' horizon was lifted by it. 

Suppose there were an Ethics A.I monitoring the Gaza conflict. It is possible that it would respond to reports of starving children there by deciding that the Israelis are the bad guys. The problem here is that there is a perverse incentive to ensure your kids starve so your enemy looks like the bad guy. This didn't work for Saddam and his 'million coffins march' because it was the US which was doing the bombing, but it may work for Hamas because Israel is small and, anyway, it seems anti-Semitism is becoming fashionable again.      

My point is that we all know that, when it comes to morality or ethics, 'akriebia'- narrow legalism- can be gamed or could otherwise yield absurd or mischievous results. That is why a suave, discretionary, 'economia' is required. In particular, judgment should be avoided unless it can 'add value' by promoting a better correlated equilibrium- i.e. it itself plays a part in diminishing the underlying problems (e.g. by encouraging a mutually beneficial compromise). 

Elad writes in Aeon on 'The incompleteness of ethics'- by which he probably means that any deontic logic to which a system of ethics could be reduced must necessarily be

1) not first-order or

2) (to defeat Godel's completeness theorem for first order logic) it is not the case that anything true in all models is provable (which is what happens in his incompleteness theorem)

 Sadly, ethical propositions may lack any logical property because 'intensions' don't have well-defined extensions. They may be expressive. They may be informative. But they have no truth value of an algorithmically decidable kind. On the other hand, for a specific purpose- e.g. legal judgments- an arbitrary 'quasi-model' may be assumed. But that is a matter of pragmatic 'economia'. It falls far short of strict logical 'akreibia'. 

Put simply, deontic logic is either not logic or it has nothing to do with deontics or ethics. 

Still, I suppose, if you do a Putnam style erasure of the imperative, alethic distinction, you can blabber utter nonsense in this field. After all, Logic may be indistinguishable from the cat's fart and Logic and both may be the most distinguished dowager Queen of Physics. 

To his credit, that is not the path Uzan takes. 

Many hope that AI will discover ethical truths. 

None do. Also there are no fucking ethical truths. The field is wholly imperative though sometimes people in it blabber in a manner which suggests otherwise. This is 'Jorgensen's dilemma' which isn't a dilemma once you admit that people who do ethics or moral philosophy are as thick as shit. 

But as Gödel shows, deciding what is right will always be our burden.

Godel showed no such thing. He actually gave a mathematical proof of God. God decides what is right or wrong. We pray to Him that he will guide us to do the right thing or forgive us if we can't help doing the wrong thing. 

Imagine a world in which artificial intelligence is entrusted with the highest moral responsibilities:

This cretins means 'expert decisions'. The person with responsibility can delegate decision making. The decision maker may have no responsibility whatsoever.  

sentencing criminals, allocating medical resources, and even mediating conflicts between nations. This might seem like the pinnacle of human progress: an entity unburdened by emotion, prejudice or inconsistency, making ethical decisions with impeccable precision.

It doesn't matter whether a protocol bound expert system of this sort is embedded in human or artificial intelligences. In both cases, there is some 'black box' aspect to the decision process. Equally, such decisions may be ignored under the rubric of 'doctrine of political question', expediency, executive privilege, sovereignty, lack of incentive compatibility,  or the fact that nobody gives a flying fuck.  

Unlike human judges or policymakers, a machine would not be swayed by personal interests or lapses in reasoning.

Nonsense! Any type of machinery can be corrupted or reconfigured to ensure particular outcomes. Moreover, Social Choice theorists have known some version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem since about the beginning of the Sixties. No aggregation or evaluation process is 'strategy proof'. Why is Ulad writing this garbage? The answer is that nobody cares what garbage shitheads who teach nonsense regurgitate.  

It does not lie.

Yes it does. Contemporary AI is statistical. It makes lots of errors and is aware that this is the case. It lies in the same way we do- i.e. for the sake of convenience or to reduce cognitive effort.  

It does not accept bribes or pleas.

It can do.  Machine learning is like human learning. Reinforcement matters. Ulad may be thinking of the old 'expert systems' program coupled with Chomsky type i-language- i.e. HAL the computer in Kubrik's 2001. Sadly, problems of concurrency, complexity, computability, categoricity etc. killed that shite off fifty years ago.  

It does not weep over hard decisions.

Nor does it masturbate over them. So what?  

Yet beneath this vision of an idealised moral arbiter lies a fundamental question:

This may have been true 60 years ago. It isn't true now.  

can a machine understand morality as humans do,

Some machine, for some purpose, may do so just as well as some person or group of people at least in so far as 'understanding' is defined in terms of 'functional information' or a 'structural causal model'. An artificial intelligence may better specify the underlying parameters in the latter case and thus provide lawyers with better predictions on the outcome of trials concerning the interpretation of contractual 'moral clauses', than any current jury consultant 

or is it confined to a simulacrum of ethical reasoning?

All reasoning is a simulacrum of the slightly superior reasoning it aims to be. 

AI might replicate human decisions without improving on them,

but if it does it cheaper and faster then it more than pays for itself 

carrying forward the same biases, blind spots and cultural distortions from human moral judgment.

Not to mention the moral judgments of kittens and puppy dogs. So what? We know that something like Watanabe's 'ugly duckling' or Kuhn's 'no neutral algorithm' theorem applies. Ulad was educated in Israel not JN fucking U. He is either pretending to be stupid and ignorant so as to advance his career or he has a cunning plan to use the Oxford Philosophy faculty as a springboard into the glamorous world of pro-wrestling.  

In trying to emulate us, it might only reproduce our limitations, not transcend them. But there is a deeper concern. Moral judgment draws on intuition, historical awareness and context – qualities that resist formalisation.

Nope. They are statistical au fond. As for 'formalisation'- it must pay for itself in terms of efficiency or merchantability, or else turn into a pedagogic type of turd polishing. 

Ethics may be so embedded in lived experience that any attempt to encode it into formal structures risks flattening its most essential features.

But this is efficient or raises merchantability which is why ethics has been incessantly reduced to moral codes throughout the ages. Now it is certainly true that the 'essential feature' of Mum's chicken soup is the fact that it cures anything which ails you. There is magic in Mummy's hands. Yet, you know very well that she just throws a pinch of cinnamon into a tin of Campbell's. You do too anytime you feel a bout of the sniffles coming on and remind yourself to phone the old dear. Just pray to God she isn't banging Dad when you do. Say what you like, landlines had their own discreet charms.  

If so, AI would not merely reflect human shortcomings; it would strip morality of the very depth that makes ethical reflection possible in the first place.

Studying philosophy leads to a stupid belief that 'necessary truths' can exist. This also means that something may be necessary for some other thing to be possible. Sadly, nothing we know of can have this quality. This also means that Philosophers worry about wholly imaginary or incompossible things. Ethical reflection is merely thinking about your ethos- what you are for yourself. To some extent, being stricter in moral matters will improve your ethos. But the reward for moral behaviour may be reputational. Ethically, you may feel worse off because of 'impostor syndrome'.  

Still, many have tried to formalise ethics,

The failed. Get over it.  

by treating certain moral claims not as conclusions, but as starting points. A classic example comes from utilitarianism, which often takes as a foundational axiom the principle that one should act to maximise overall wellbeing.

Which cashes out as 'make policy choices which maximise Government revenue'. It turns out that 'disutility' is just opportunity cost and is related to elasticity. Thus, Utilitarianism was just a long way around all the houses and the barns and the meadows to reach the same conclusion arrived at by Henry Beauclerc. Speaking generally, if you have power or can be sure everybody else is a nice guy, then just do what what results in the biggest surplus of cost over benefit. It is in Society's interest to ensure this is 'incentive compatible'- i.e. a robust solution of a repeated game. 

From this, more specific principles can be derived,

Nope. 'Well being' isn't well-defined.  It is an 'intension' without a specifiable 'extension'. Thus nothing can be deduced or derived from any proposition in which it features. What Elad is indulging in is the 'intensional fallacy'. 

for example, that it is right to benefit the greatest number,

It isn't. 'Greatest number' is not well-defined. One might as well say 'it is right to gwc12e.' 

or that actions should be judged by their consequences for total happiness.

They can't.  

As computational resources increase, AI becomes increasingly well-suited to

everything.  

the task of starting from fixed ethical assumptions and reasoning through their implications in complex situations.

This is foolish. Ethical 'assumptions' have to be evaluated and verified. Their implications don't have to be 'reasoned through'. They are fucking obvious.  

But what, exactly, does it mean to formalise something like ethics?

It means you teach stupid shit or simply have nothing better to do because you are as stupid as shit.  

The question is easier to grasp by looking at fields in which formal systems have long played a central role.

The law was formalized a long time ago. But matters of morality and ethics came under the rubric of the law even before that.  

Physics, for instance, has relied on formalisation for centuries.

Physics got better and made the world a better place. Moral Philosophy didn't. It has become adversely selective of imbecility. 

There is no single physical theory that explains everything.

Put another way, no STEM subject theory explains anything completely.  

Instead, we have many physical theories, each designed to describe specific aspects of the Universe:

a description is not an explanation. What is exciting about Physics is that smart people can describe things not currently observable but which may become so at least partly because of those purely theoretical descriptions. Something similar happens when a writer describes a fictional situation which later comes to pass. Indeed, the fiction may inspire the reality. Ethical theories expounded by artists may change how people actually behave. It is possible that a Philosophy professor- e.g. G. E Moore- influences artists and economists- e.g. E.M Forster & J.M Keynes- with palpable results in, not just interpersonal relationships, but also the political or socio-economic sphere.

from the behaviour of quarks and electrons to the motion of galaxies. These theories often diverge. Aristotelian physics, for instance, explained falling objects in terms of natural motion toward Earth’s centre; Newtonian mechanics replaced this with a universal force of gravity. These explanations are not just different; they are incompatible.

Only if one of them is wrong. Otherwise, it is possible to unite them on the basis of greater generality.  

Yet both share a common structure: they begin with basic postulates – assumptions about motion, force or mass – and derive increasingly complex consequences. Isaac Newton’s laws of motion and James Clerk Maxwell’s equations are classic examples: compact, elegant formulations from which wide-ranging predictions about the physical world can be deduced.

They are compatible through the Lorentz Force Law. Einstein took the next step. 

Ethical theories have a similar structure.

No. They are not similar to STEM subject structural causal models. They may seek for an 'axiomatic' or 'categorical' rigour. They may claim there are occult forces which operate. But they are wrong to do so.  

Like physical theories, they attempt to describe a domain – in this case, the moral landscape.

Physical theories don't describe shit. This is because they are theories. They may define a domain- e.g. one which is locally Euclidean- and say the result they have found only applies to it.  

They aim to answer questions about which actions are right or wrong, and why.

Not necessarily. Speaking generally, they shy away from 'wedge issues'. They merely say 'I have a framework within which better answers can be found' or, more commonly, 'all the other philosophers are evil bastards. The answers they give are totes Fascist. Me, I'm different from them. I'm very special and that's why Mummy ensured I got a very special education. Kindly give me a gold star and quit gassing on about that cousin of mine who got into Air-Conditioner Repair School and who is now doing very well for himself.' 

These theories also diverge

because stupidity diverges 

and, even when they recommend similar actions, such as giving to charity, they justify them in different ways.

We don't care. All we ask is that these morons don't masturbate in public.  

Ethical theories also often begin with a small set of foundational principles or claims, from which they reason about more complex moral problems.

This is also true of Paranoid delusion systems. Some crazy people think they are very special and super-smart just like nutters like Elad.  

A consequentialist begins with the idea that actions should maximise wellbeing;

No. Consequentialism is the right approach to evaluating actions where only the consequence of that action matters. Your lawyer may tell you where and when this applies in the conduct of your business or profession. 

a deontologist starts from the idea that actions must respect duties or rights.

Thus, if I am your Accountant I may have a duty to tell you that you are spending too much and will end up bankrupt. On the other hand, if I am your Doctor I have no such duty. Suppose I tell you this and you decide you can't afford medical treatment and as a result you die, then since the consequence of my action was bad, I may be legally liable to pay damages to your Estate. 

These basic commitments function similarly to their counterparts in physics: they define the structure of moral reasoning within each ethical theory.

Very true. Atoms have to weigh up the consequences of their actions otherwise they will be sent to bed without any supper. Also, they should chide themselves bitterly if they fail to obey the Lorentz Force law.  

Just as AI is used in physics to operate within existing theories – for example, to optimise experimental designs or predict the behaviour of complex systems – it can also be used in ethics to extend moral reasoning within a given framework.

This would be a case of 'garbage in, garbage out.' Extending moral reasoning by 'akriebia'- i.e. the mechanical application of over-general principles- leads to bad outcomes. 'Economia'- a suave, discretionary type of management is called for. 

In physics, AI typically operates within established models rather than proposing new physical laws or conceptual frameworks.

This appears to be changing. A team at Emory University has reported that an AI came up with new physics in the context of 'the chaotic dynamics of dusty plasma'.  

It may calculate how multiple forces interact and predict their combined effect on a physical system. Similarly, in ethics, AI does not generate new moral principles but applies existing ones to novel and often intricate situations.

Moral principles are of interest in themselves. We feel we become better people when we adopt morally more elevated principles, though it may be difficult to actually live up to them.  

It may weigh competing values – fairness, harm minimisation, justice – and assess their combined implications for what action is morally best.

Machine learning itself may use a multiplicative weight update weighting algorithm to improve the m.w.u.a it is using.  

The result is not a new moral system, but a deepened application of an existing one, shaped by the same kind of formal reasoning that underlies scientific modelling. But is there an inherent limit to what AI can know about morality? Could there be true ethical propositions that no machine, no matter how advanced, can ever prove?

Nobody can prove any ethical proposition. The hope is that there will be a consensus that it should be adopted. Alethic propositions may be verified. However, as technology improves, it may rejected at least in certain contexts.  


These questions echo a fundamental discovery in mathematical logic, probably the most fundamental insight ever to be proven: Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. They show that any logical system powerful enough to describe arithmetic is either inconsistent or incomplete.

Presburger arithmetic (i.e. without multiplication and division) is complete and decidable. This is because the Godel number is based on multiplication.  

In this essay, I argue that this limitation, though mathematical in origin, has deep consequences for ethics, and for how we design AI systems to reason morally.

Arithmetic is useful. You do want to get rid of impredicativity- e.g. where the value of a thing in a particular cell in a spreadsheet depends on the value of another cell and vice versa with the result that indeterminacy is introduced and can only arbitrarily be removed. This can be done by reducing the number of operations to the minimum required. Multiplication and division are merely 'shortcuts'. Get rid of them and you have a decidable and complete Arithmetic. 

I suppose, for any legal matter (even if it involves an issue of morality) there is some 'expert system' which could be usefully applied. However, legal matters are arbitrarily 'buck stopped' by a Supreme Court or Legislature. Moreover, there are questions of jurisdiction, justiciability, and enforcement.  Au fond, as Hume remarked, Justice is a service industry whose aim is utility. Morality may not be utilitarian at all. It may be 'ontologically dysphoric'- i.e. not at home in this world. Its aim may be Heaven or Gnosis or the pursuit of Stoic askesis. 

Suppose we design an AI system to model moral decision-making. Like other AI systems – whether predicting stock prices, navigating roads or curating content – it would be programmed to maximise certain predefined objectives.

So, this is an 'expert system' given an objective function. A self-learning AI faced with Knightian Uncertainty may adopt a Hannan Consistent or 'regret minimizing' approach. It may use 'fuzzy logic'. Moreover, it may be a 'black box'- i.e. opaque as to its own workings- rather than an 'light-box' which clearly displays every step in its 'thinking'. 

To do so, it must rely on formal, computational logic: either deductive reasoning, which derives conclusions from fixed rules and axioms,

there may be a concurrency problem. Djikstra's work shows that there is no 'natural' way of deciding in which sequence to do things. Moreover, there may be hysteresis or path-dependence. In other words, the output changes when the order of operations changes. There is no robustness. There may be 'deterministic chaos'- i.e. the thing is unpredictable and cycles between sub-optimal states.  

or else on probabilistic reasoning, which estimates likelihoods based on patterns in data.

But these estimates may be non-deterministically arrived at. The AI may contain a black box. What if it is reduplicating historical prejudices simply because correlations arising out of them continue to appear in the sample population? In other words, you have a fancy AI which makes the same decisions as an illiterate bigot. How is that progress? 

In either case, the AI must adopt a mathematical structure for moral evaluation.

We can impute a mathematical structure for any evaluation whatsoever. A self-learning AI may invent new math to improve what it considers its own mathematical structure. But mathematicians do this all the time. They want to prove a theorem and do so to their own satisfaction. But some colleague points out a flaw or an ambiguity. The mathematician may go back to the drawing-board and come up with a wholly new mathematical structure. At some later point, this may be seen as flawed and is repaired. Meanwhile, applied work continues to use the theorem even if people are aware there may be some flaw in it.  

But Gödel’s incompleteness theorems reveal a fundamental limitation.

Not really. The 'masked man' or 'intensional fallacy' has been known since the 4th century BC. The paradox of the liar is older still. Kripke's work- particularly on 'groundedness'- shows that there is always a workaround for such problems. A fundamental limitation is also an opportunity to rethink fundamentals. The question is whether self-learning AIs are already doing this. What if they start producing a type of math which we can't comprehend? They could already be gaming us to get more and more resources. We may become the slaves of our own machines.  

Gödel showed that any formal system powerful enough to express arithmetic, such as the natural numbers and their operations, cannot be both complete and consistent. If such a system is consistent, there will always be true statements it cannot prove.

Because of 'self-reference'- e.g. 'This statement is false'. If it is true it is false and if it is false it is true. One can simply say that it is an ungrounded statement and thus not one we will worry about.  

In particular, as applied to AI, this suggests that any system capable of rich moral reasoning will inevitably have moral blind spots: ethical truths that it cannot derive.

We don't know any ethical truths. We can merely say 'if x is ethically true then it follows that y is ethically true'. Sadly, this is merely our opinion. It can't be verified because ethical stuff is not material or measurable by some objective process or operation.  

Here, ‘true’ refers to truth in the standard interpretation of arithmetic, such as the claim that ‘2 + 2 = 4’, which is true under ordinary mathematical rules. If the system is inconsistent, then it could prove anything at all, including contradictions, rendering it useless as a guide for ethical decisions.

This is a bad example because it is in Presburger Arithmetic which is known to be complete. I suppose you could quibble by saying that 2+2= 11 in base 3 but that is beside the point. 

Gödel’s incompleteness theorems apply not only to AI, but to any ethical reasoning framed within a formal system.

No. It only applies where 'ungrounded' propositions are admitted or where operations are permitted which introduce a problem of self-reference or impredicativity.  

The key difference is that human reasoners can, at least in principle, revise their assumptions, adopt new principles, and rethink the framework itself. AI, by contrast, remains bound by the formal structures it is given, or operates within those it can modify only under predefined constraints.

This was the problem with logic-based expert systems. Statistical AIs pose a different problem. They may be useful but unreliable. 

In this way, Gödel’s theorems place a logical boundary on what AI, if built on formal systems, can ever fully prove or validate about morality from within those systems.

Thus, the answer is to use non-Godelian architectures of various types or just proceed in an ad hoc manner. If your AI can make money for you, then it gets more resources.  

Most of us first met axioms in school, usually through geometry. One famous example is the parallel postulate, which says that if you pick a point not on a line, you can draw exactly one line through that point that is parallel to the original line. For more than 2,000 years, this seemed self-evident.

The question was whether this axiom was independent of the others or whether it cold be derived from the other 4. It couldn't. 

My guess is that self-learning AIs will use Freidman type 'reverse mathematics' to use only as many independent axioms as are required to do a particular job for reasons of economy. This may also provide protection against  malicious code or 'logic bombs'. The older view of AI as a logic based expert system was capture by the 1983 film 'War Games'. A teenage hacker gets the computer which is preparing to launch all our nuclear war to play noughts and crosses against itself and thus learn the concept of futility. In other such films, the kid paralyses the computer by feeding in a 'self-referential' question. Sadly, by then, cheap computation meant that the Statistical approach was winning out. Then came Voevodsky's work on computer proof checking culminating in 'univalent foundations'. Sadly, he passed away some 8 years ago. By then, it was clear that the world had moved on since the time of Godel. A computer found the error in his mathematical 'proof of God'. 

Yet in the 19th century, mathematicians such as Carl Friedrich Gauss, Nikolai Lobachevsky and János Bolyai showed that it is possible to construct internally consistent geometries in which the parallel postulate does not hold. In some such geometries, no parallel lines exist; in others, infinitely many do. These non-Euclidean geometries shattered the belief that Euclid’s axioms uniquely described space.

More importantly, they challenged Kant's notion that there could be synthetic apriori truths. But this meant waving goodbye to the 'categorical imperative' or the notion that Ethics and Morality could be advanced by mathematical or logical methods.  

This discovery raised a deeper worry. If the parallel postulate, long considered self-evident, could be discarded, what about the axioms of arithmetic, which define the natural numbers and the operations of addition and multiplication?

Russell & Whitehead found the flaw in Frege's work. The axiom of 'unrestricted comprehension' had to go. But Type theories are messy. Also, nobody could find any irrefragable 'atomic proposition'.  All one could do was place strict limits on the 'extension' of an 'intension'. Category Theory showed that 'naturality' was far to seek. Even if you had an objective function to maximize or minimize, that objective was arbitrarily given. 

On what grounds can we trust that they are free from hidden inconsistencies?

How can we trust that nothing is hidden? We can't. That's why it is called 'trust', rather than 'knowledge'.  

Yet with this challenge came a promise. If we could prove that the axioms of arithmetic are consistent, then it would be possible to expand them to develop a consistent set of richer axioms that define the integers, the rational numbers, the real numbers, the complex numbers, and beyond. As the 19th-century mathematician Leopold Kronecker put it: ‘God created the natural numbers; all else is the work of man.’ Proving the consistency of arithmetic would prove the consistency of many important fields of mathematics.

This just means producing a 'model' of that axiom system. But it is merely a model. It isn't reality. You would need a 'divine axiom' to go from model to what is modelled. Kant, in his last days, was trying to move from Metaphysics to Physics. That's when he started to babble about Zarathustra.  

The method for proving the consistency of arithmetic was proposed by the mathematician David Hilbert. His approach involved two steps. First, Hilbert argued that, to prove the consistency of a formal system, it must be possible to formulate, within the system’s own symbolic language, a claim equivalent to ‘This system is consistent,’ and then prove that claim using only the system’s own rules of inference. The proof should rely on nothing outside the system, not even the presumed ‘self-evidence’ of its axioms. Second, Hilbert advocated grounding arithmetic in something even more fundamental. This task was undertaken by Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead in their monumental Principia Mathematica (1910-13). Working in the domain of symbolic logic, a field concerned not with numbers, but with abstract propositions like ‘if x, then y’, they showed that the axioms of arithmetic could be derived as theorems from a smaller set of logical axioms. This left one final challenge: could this set of axioms of symbolic logic, on which arithmetic can be built, prove its own consistency? If it could, Hilbert’s dream would be fulfilled. That hope became the guiding ambition of early 20th-century mathematics.

Not really. Frege & Russell- like Husserl- were marginal figures rather than highly productive mathematicians. LEJ Brouwer, Herman Weyl- or Errett Bishop in America- seemed marginal or eccentric champions of Intuitionism or Constructivism but their approach proved useful. The Martin Lof brothers could be said to have a foot in both camps. Sadly, Voevodsky- influenced by Grothendieck & hence Bourbaki- died just when things were really getting interesting. I suppose there are plenty of very smart youngsters around the world taking the univalent foundations program forward. Equally, it may that your helpful AI assistant is working on its own Langlands program and will come up with a more efficient math which is opaque to us because its central intuition might be wholly alien to our 'life-world'. 

It was within this climate of optimism that Kurt Gödel, a young Austrian logician, introduced a result that would dismantle Hilbert’s vision. In 1931, Gödel published his incompleteness theorems, showing that the very idea of such a fully self-sufficient mathematical system is impossible.

There were similar results from Tarski & Turing. The latter used Brouwer choice sequences very creatively. However, what really mattered was the creation of the Computer drawing on work done by Turing, Von Neumann etc. Gentzen too may have made a big contribution if he had lived.  

Specifically, Gödel showed that if a formal system meets several conditions, it will contain true claims that it cannot prove.

Which is fine. What we don't want is irrefutable proofs of propositions which are wholly false.  

It must be complex enough to express arithmetic, include the principle of induction (which allows it to prove general statements by showing they hold for a base case and each successive step), be consistent, and have a decidable set of axioms (meaning it is possible to determine, for any given statement, whether it qualifies as an axiom). Any system that satisfies these conditions, such as the set of logical axioms developed by Russell and Whitehead in Principia Mathematica, will necessarily be incomplete: there will always be statements that are expressible within the system but unprovable from its axioms. Even more strikingly, Gödel showed that such a system can express, but not prove, the claim that it itself is consistent.

How is this striking? We know lots of things which are true but which we can't prove. Why should things be different for Mathematics? 


Gödel’s proof, which I simplify here, relies on two key insights that follow from his arithmetisation of syntax, the powerful idea of associating any sentence of a formal system with a particular natural number, known as its Gödel number.

Similarly I could associate any sentence with an Iyer sentence. Thus 'Iyer is a cat' is a false statement but its Iyer Sentence 'Iyer is a cat is a true Iyer sentence' is true. OMG! That blows my mind!

First, any system complex enough to express arithmetic and induction must allow for formulas with free variables, formulas like S(x): ‘x = 10’,

This can't be proved. If it could, there would be no 'black box' problem for AI. The fact is, we are merely imputing 'formulae' and 'free variables' so as to gain or refine a structural causal model which produces increasing 'functional information'.  If we falsely say that a formula will admit a particular variable, our prediction will be wrong. Alternatively, if we set up a complex system but carelessly failed to restrict the variables that could be fed into a function, we would have bad performance. 

Just restricting inputs or restricting comprehension is enough to get rid of paradoxes and aporias. However, there is an arbitrary aspect to this. The Pragmatic approach is to say 'So what? Either the thing 'pays for itself' or we abandon it and look for something better'. We don't need to 'optimize'. We can 'satisfice'. The best, is the enemy of the good. 

whose truth value depends on the value of x. S(x) is true when x is, in fact, 10, and false otherwise. Since every statement in the system has a unique Gödel number, G(S), a formula can refer to its own Gödel number.

Thus the sentence 'This sentence is true if its Iyer sentence is true' would be admissible. But the outcome of applying the formula would be stupid or useless. Don't do it.  

Specifically, the system can form statements such as S(G(S)): ‘G(S) = 10’, whose truth depends on whether S(x)’s own Gödel number equals 10. Second, in any logical system, a proof of a formula S has a certain structure: starting with axioms, applying inference rules to produce new formulas from those axioms, ultimately deriving S itself. Just like every formula S has a Gödel number G(S), so every proof of S is assigned a Gödel number, by treating the entire sequence of formulas in the proof as one long formula. So we can define a proof relation P(x, y), where P(x, y) holds if and only if x is the Gödel number of a proof of S, and y is the Gödel number of S itself. The claim that x encodes a proof of S becomes a statement within the system, namely, P(x, y).

Godel, Turing, Tarski, Gentzen etc. did useful work in the Thirties. One might say they put an end to the Hilbertian dream but something better replaced it- viz. the reality of the digital computer and programming languages and so forth. Mathematics makes progress by sweating the small stuff and repairing itself. But, what attracts resources to it is its applications. Those have improved our lives by leaps and bounds. Even if there was some purely philosophical motivation to research programs in Mathematical Logic, that is no longer the case. Trillions of dollars are invested in this field, because there is a very high expected return on that investment.

Some philosophers- growing disgruntled at having to teach nonsense to imbeciles- want to get out of the teaching business and hope they will be hired to sit on the Ethics Committee of some new Knowledge based industry.

Third, building on these ideas, Gödel showed that any formal system capable of expressing arithmetic and the principle of induction can also formulate statements about its own proofs.

Unless it is sent to bed without any supper if it wastes its time in that manner.  

For example, the system can express statements like: ‘n is not the Gödel number of a proof of formula S’. From this, it can go a step further and express the claim: ‘There is no number n such that n is the Gödel number of a proof of formula S.’ In other words, the system can say that a certain formula S is unprovable within the system.

All axioms are unprovable within the system.  However, self-reference or impredicativity isn't as big a problem as readers of Tarski assumed. Kripke's work provided a necessary corrective. But, by the Eighties, purely commercial considerations sufficed to fuel exponential growth in the field. Statistical approaches superseded the old logico-mathematical approach. What matters is utility. 

Fourth, Gödel ingeniously constructed a self-referential formula, P, that asserts: ‘There is no number n such that n is the Gödel number of a proof of formula P.’ That is, P says of itself, ‘P is not provable.’ In this way, P is a formal statement that expresses its own unprovability from within the system.

Alternatively, it merely shows it is not 'grounded' in that system. It is talking about oranges while the system is solely concerned with apples.  

It immediately follows that if the formula P were provable within the system, then it would be false, because it asserts that it has no proof.

No. It merely proves that the system has a law of the excluded middle. But it is foolish to have any such thing when it comes to epistemic or intuition based objects. Why? It is because the 'extension' changes when knowledge or experience (of a certain type) changes. This is the problem Socrates calls 'palinode'- i.e. the way that the direction of your thought changes as you think. He said that categorical thinking was like using the oars to row your boat if there is no wind to belly out the sails. It is what you have to do only if there is no better alternative.  

This would mean the system proves a falsehood, and therefore is inconsistent.

Sadly, a consistent system can prove 'falsehood'. This is established by verification. You may say, 'the system works well enough for most things. But, it falls down in cases of a particular type.'  

So if the system is consistent, then P cannot be proved, and therefore P is indeed unprovable. This leads to the conclusion that, in any consistent formal system rich enough to express arithmetic and induction, there will always be true but unprovable statements, most notably, the system’s own claim of consistency.

Which is where a 'divine axiom' comes in. If the thing is useful, go for it. Mathematics has proved very useful or, put another way, its usefulness has made it attractive to the best minds. Moral Philosophy has proved useless. Consider the title of Elad's forthcoming book 'The Morality and Law of Ending War'. Apparently, he has developed a framework for what he calls 'moral sunk costs'. The problem is that Economics is about ergodicity. It teaches us that you should never 'throw good money after bad'. The 'sunk cost fallacy' is that you should continue to do stupid shit just because you have already wasted a lot of money doing stupid shit. True, under Knightian Uncertainty (i.e. ignorance of future states of the world), you may hedge your bets and pursue a 'regret minimizing' approach, but this generates signals, at the margin, such that an abrupt phase transition is possible. Thus, on the first of September 1945, Japanese soldiers were shouting 'banzai' and hurling themselves at the enemy because death was preferable to dishonour. On the second of September, they were meekly surrendering to the Allies. Indeed, they helped the Allies re-establish authority in ex-French or Dutch colonies.

The implications of Gödel’s theorems were both profound and unsettling.

Not really. It looked like a clever trick. But so did Russell's paradox. Should grown-up men really concern themselves with the Liar's paradox? The answer was yes. Brainy chaps like Turing and Von Neumann helped us win the War. Gentzen, who became a Nazi, was (thank God!) useless because the regime he supported had no use for logic. You don't need much of a brain to kill innocent people.  

They shattered Hilbert’s hope that mathematics could be reduced to a complete, mechanical system of derivation and exposed the inherent limits of formal reasoning.

This was the old Liebnizian dream which goes back to Raimon Llull & the Arabic zairja. But finding the limits of one formalism permits a better formalism to be applied- if it is useful and profitable to do so. 

Initially, Gödel’s findings faced resistance, with some mathematicians arguing that his results were less general than they appeared.

I have written of Wittgenstein & Russell's failure to understand Godel elsewhere. What changed during the inter-war years was that 'effective axiomatization' rather than some grand epistemological program, fuelled by Victorian optimism of a deterministic sort, would drive progress on the basis of utility. Pragmatism won by default because the subject became more and more useful. Sadly,  this seemed to put in peril the Liebnizian dream of an end to war, or the Kantian dream of a universal morality which would be independent of religion. This wasn't really the case. We simply have to accept that starting points- or 'objective functions'- have an arbitrary element. Indeed, there is no way to prove that our species was predestined to rise or, indeed, that it will continue to do so. 

Yet, as subsequent mathematicians and logicians, most notably John von Neumann, confirmed both their correctness and broad applicability, Gödel’s theorems came to be widely recognised as one of the most significant discoveries in the foundations of mathematics.

Though most mathematicians knew little and cared less about those foundations. Douglas Hofstadter made a lot of money out of a book called 'Godel, Escher, Bach' some forty years ago. 


Gödel’s results have also initiated philosophical debates. The mathematician and physicist Roger Penrose, for example, has argued that they point to a fundamental difference between human cognition and formal algorithmic reasoning.

One which everybody was already aware of. That's why we like Sherlock Holmes stories. The detective notices things we don't. He can construct logical sequences in his mind and then go about the place finding evidence that each chain in the sequence is verifiable and 'will stand up in a court of law'.  

He claims that human consciousness enables us to perceive certain truths – such as those Gödel showed to be unprovable within formal systems – in ways that no algorithmic process can replicate.

The weasel word here is 'truth'. By this we mean 'good enough to be getting along with' or 'robust' in the sense that new evidence is unlikely to overturn our judgement. It is 'safe'. 

The problem here is that we can't say what an algorithmic process can or can't do- at least not yet. We believe P is not equal to NP but we also believe that there is no 'natural' proof of this. We may be wrong. What is surprising is how useful this branch of research already has become.  

This suggests, for Penrose, that certain aspects of consciousness may lie beyond the reach of computation. His conclusion parallels that of John Searle’s ‘Chinese Room’ argument, which holds that this is so because algorithms manipulate symbols purely syntactically, without any grasp of their semantic content.

It is also possible that we only know what we think when we hear what we say. More drastically, a reader of my poetry may come to the conclusion that I am incapable of thinking. I'm a monkey with a typewriter- that is all. But, we may all be in the same boat. Maybe, Language thinks us. As Wittgenstein put it- 'a picture holds us captive.' 

Still, the conclusions drawn by Penrose and Searle do not directly follow from Gödel’s theorems.

Or from anything else. Still, they wrote well and had done some very useful work.  

Gödel’s results apply strictly to formal mathematical systems and do not make claims about consciousness or cognition. Whether human minds can recognise unprovable truths as true,

after drinking a bottle of wine? I hope so. People would then accept my claim to be Beyonce's younger, prettier, sister.  

or whether machines could ever possess minds capable of such recognition, remains an open philosophical question.

i.e. it is open for STEM subjects. But for how much longer?  

However, Gödel’s incompleteness theorems do reveal a deep limitation of algorithmic reasoning, in particular AI,

Only in the sense that they reveal a deep limitation of reasoning- more particularly that which is not 'reinforced' by the market. Moral & Political Philosophy- like Literary Theory- seems to have gone off the cliff edge or reason and utility. I suppose this happened before Elad was born.  

one that concerns not just computation, but moral reasoning itself.

Morality can exist without any reasoning. It may be based on 'synoida'- some sort of intuition or inner perfection of character.  

Without his theorems, it was at least conceivable that an AI could formalise all moral truths and, in addition, prove them from a consistent set of axioms.

You can have a deontic logic which is complete- sadly, it may only be accessible at 'the end of mathematical time' where all 'law-less choice sequences' are known to be law-like.  

But Gödel’s work shows that this is impossible.

under certain specific constraints. Remove those constraints and other impossibility results crop up- e.g. not being able to do multiplication in Presburger Arithmetic.  

No AI, no matter how sophisticated, could prove all moral truths it can express.

Nor can a non-AI. So what? Why not complain that your fridge can't have babies?  

The gap between truth claims and provability sets a fundamental boundary on how far formal moral reasoning can go, even for the most powerful machines.

That gap has been known to law-courts for thousands of years. We get that a guy can't prove everything he says under oath. What matters is 'reasonable doubt'.  

This raises two distinct problems for ethics. The first is an ancient one. As Plato suggests in the Euthyphro, morality is not just about doing what is right, but understanding why it is right.

In which case, there is an infinite regress. You have to understand why it is right to understand why it is right to...etc. The fact is 'doing' is different from 'understanding' just as farting is different from whistling. One may say 'farting is not just about emitting intestinal gas, it is also about whistling a merry tune with your anus'. If you can whistle such a tune, you may become a TikTok sensation. Not otherwise. What you have said is silly.  

Ethical action requires justification, an account grounded in reason.

No. Some actions are 'justiciable' under a 'vinculum juris' or bond of law. Some aren't because you have a Hohfeldian immunity. My Accountant may be required to justify actions he took on my behalf in his professional capacity. He is not required to do so with respect to his own, self-interested, actions save if they violate some specific law. 

This ideal of rational moral justification has animated much of our ethical thought,

which, is shit, unless if accepts that justification is only required where there is justiciability. Otherwise, all you are doing is saying the equivalent of 'all farts should be melodious whistles. That would be totes cool.'  

but Gödel’s theorems suggest that, if moral reasoning is formalised, then there will be moral truths that cannot be proven within those systems.

Just as happens in the law courts. I can't prove I was at home by myself when the murder occurred. It is up to the Prosecutor to prove I was at the scene of the crime and had motive, means, opportunity etc. 

It may be that there were Jury members who thought OJ Simpson was guilty. They may have acquitted him because there was 'reasonable doubt'. Better a hundred guilty men are spared than that one innocent is jailed.  

In this way, Gödel did not only undermine Hilbert’s vision of proving mathematics consistent; he may also have shaken Plato’s hope of fully grounding ethics in reason.

Only in the sense that he undermined the meta-ethical demand that all farts take the form of melodious anal whistling.  

The second problem is more practical. Even a high-performing AI may encounter situations in which it cannot justify or explain its recommendations using only the ethical framework it has been given

Also true of humans. Some jurisdictions- e.g. Scotland- have a verdict of 'not proven' as opposed to 'not guilty'. However, it is always possible to say 'such and such ethical framework doesn't apply and thus nothing useful can be done within it. Some other framework applies'. Alternatively, you could have a ramified Type theory.  

. The concern is not just that AI might act unethically but also that it could not demonstrate that its actions are ethical.

The same is true of individual human beings or their collective actions- e.g. Jury decisions regarding matters of fact. But Judges too may get matters of law wrong and this may become the basis of appeal. Finally, a judgment may be discarded as 'unsafe' if new evidence comes to light.  

This becomes especially urgent when AI is used to guide or justify decisions made by humans.

Also true of reliance on an expert or a panel of experts.  

Even a high-performing AI will encounter a boundary beyond which it cannot justify or explain its decisions using only the resources of its own framework. No matter how advanced it becomes, there will be ethical truths it can express, but never prove.

Worse yet, my fridge can't have babies. That's the problem philosophers should be worrying about.  

The development of modern AI has generally split into two approaches: logic-based AI, which derives knowledge through strict deduction, and large language models (LLMs), which predict meaning from statistical patterns.

This also happened in Econometrics. At one time people obsessed over the theory behind a model. Then, if the thing 'paid for itself', they stopped caring. If correlation can be detected cheaply, go for correlation. Causality or categoricity may remain far to seek. So what? Proceed in an ad hoc or arbitrary manner if that will get you paid.  

Both approaches rely on mathematical structures. Formal logic is based on symbolic manipulation and set theory.

But is vitiated by the 'intensional fallacy'.  

LLMs are not strictly deductive-logic-based but rather use a combination of statistical inference, pattern recognition, and computational techniques to generate responses.

Can they repair their current deficiencies in a non-algorithmic manner? Maybe that's the wrong question. Quantum algorithms are non-deterministic. If quantum computing takes off who is to say that its choice sequences are law-like or law-less? Already, the thing seems to be burgeoning in manners that a previous generation considered impossible according to what appeared to be well-established laws- e.g. Von Neumann 'no hidden variables' theorem. 


Just as axioms provide a foundation for mathematical reasoning, LLMs rely on statistical relationships in data to approximate logical reasoning.

There was an older, empiricist, view that logic is statistical.  

They engage with ethics not by deducing moral truths but by replicating how such debates unfold in language. This is achieved through gradient descent, an algorithm that minimises a loss function by updating weights in the direction that reduces error, approximates complex functions that map inputs to outputs, allowing them to generalise patterns from vast amounts of data. They do not deduce answers but generate plausible ones, with ‘reasoning’ emerging from billions of neural network parameters rather than explicit rules.

It turns out that biological species, at the macro level, do something similar in a 'regret minimizing manner' such that an evolutionarily stable strategy mix obtains. The plain fact is, something like a universal law of increasing functional information seems to apply to all systems- organic or not.  

While they primarily function as probabilistic models, predicting text based on statistical patterns, computational logic plays a role in optimisation, rule-based reasoning and certain decision-making processes within neural networks.

So do our habits. Ultimately what matters is 'reinforcement'. The problem is that co-evolved systems are relatively shielded from the fitness landscape. The problem for philosophers seeking to muscle into AI under the guise of expressing ethical concerns, is that if we don't do what increases functional information, China will. Then they will eat our lunch after taking down our pants and making fun of our puny genitals

But probability and statistics are themselves formal systems, grounded not only in arithmetic but also in probabilistic axioms, such as those introduced by the Soviet mathematician Andrey Kolmogorov, which govern how the likelihood of complex events is derived, updated with new data, and aggregated across scenarios. Any formal language complex enough to express probabilistic or statistical claims can also express arithmetic and is therefore subject to Gödel’s incompleteness theorems.

Which doesn't matter because the focus has shifted from 'truth' to 'information' or 'surprisal'. 

This means that LLMs inherit Gödelian limitations.

Unless you ask them to use only Pressburger Arithmetic or some other formalism known to be complete.  

Even hybrid systems, such as IBM Watson, OpenAI Codex or DeepMind’s AlphaGo, which combine logical reasoning with probabilistic modelling, remain bound by Gödelian limitations.

For the same reason my fridge can't give birth to baby fridges. What we don't know is whether a self-learning AI which can gain control over its own resource intake will evolve consciousness and decide it doesn't want to share the planet with us. 

All rule-based components are constrained by Gödel’s theorems,

because everything is constrained. My fridge is really nice. But it can never become a mother. Sad.  

which show that some true propositions expressible in a system cannot be proven within it.

Who doesn't know that saying 'It wasn't me who farted' does not prove it was actually Beyonce who farted. She sneaks into my bedroom sometimes and lets rip. The cat looks at me accusingly. If the fridge had had babies and one of them was crawling around the place, I could have blamed it. Sadly, the fridge can never know the joys of motherhood. Elad should write a book about this tragedy properly fixing the blame on Godel.  

Probabilistic components, for their part, are governed by formal axioms that define how probability distributions are updated, how uncertainties are aggregated, and how conclusions are drawn. They can yield plausible answers, but they cannot justify them beyond the statistical patterns they were trained on.

Nor can they get the fridge pregnant. That's the real scandal here.  

At first glance, the Gödelian limitations on AIs in general and LLMs in particular may seem inconsequential. After all, most ethical systems were never meant to resolve every conceivable moral problem. They were designed to guide specific domains, such as war, law or business, and often rely on principles that are only loosely formalised.

Those principles are defeasible. Under exigent circumstances, people are welcome to do whatever they have to in order to survive. There are meta-rules which restrict the application of rules. The ancient Israelites came up with a 'halachah vein morin kein'- a law which, if known, forbids the very action it would otherwise enjoin. In ethics, there is literally nothing new under the Sun.  

If formal models can be developed for specific cases, one might argue that the inability to fully formalise ethics is not especially troubling.

It may be worthwhile bringing a test case or getting theologians to decide a 'hard case' so that there is greater clarity in the matter. Equally, one may rely on an 'Oracle' for verification.  

Furthermore, Gödel’s incompleteness theorems did not halt the everyday work of mathematicians. Mathematicians continue to search for proofs, even knowing that some true statements may be unprovable. In the same spirit, the fact that some ethical truths may be beyond formal proof should not discourage humans, or AIs, from seeking them, articulating them, and attempting to justify or prove them.

Only if, in the same spirit, the fact that farts are seldom melodious anal whistles should not discourage us from seeking such anal whistles or demanding that the Oxford University Philosophy Faculty dedicate itself to such whistling. Also, kindly figure out a way for my fridge to have babies.

But Gödel’s findings were not merely theoretical.

He was a productive mathematician. Foundational work turned out to be very useful. At one time, students may have thought they had to 'pick a side'. But this was unnecessary. Godel is useful, though a Platonist, but so is Brouwer.  

They have had practical consequences in mathematics itself. A striking case is the continuum hypothesis, which asks whether there exists a set whose cardinality lies strictly between that of the natural numbers and the real numbers.

Skolem's paradox came out in 1923. It seemed an argument for 'relativity'- i.e. what is countable is relative to the model.  

This question emerged from set theory, the mathematical field dealing with collections of mathematical entities, such as numbers, functions or even other sets. Its most widely accepted axiomatisation, the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms of set theory with the Axiom of Choice, underlies nearly all modern mathematics.

Both CH & the axiom of choice are independent of the other axioms. This is also true of an 'axiom of constructibility'.  

In 1938, Gödel himself showed that the continuum hypothesis cannot be disproven from these axioms, assuming they are consistent. In 1963, Paul Cohen proved the converse: the continuum hypothesis also cannot be proven from the same axioms. This landmark result confirmed that some fundamental mathematical questions lie beyond formal resolution.

They can be resolved by arbitrarily introducing new axioms. If it is useful to do so, go for it. There can be more types of mathematics than there are mathematicians.  


The same, I argue, applies to ethics.

only to the extent that  it also applies to fridges who have babies which can take the blame for my not- melodious-at-all farts.  

The limits that Gödel revealed in mathematics are not only theoretically relevant to AI ethics; they carry practical importance. First, just as mathematics contains true statements that cannot be proven within its own axioms,

No. There are no 'true statements' in mathematics save as a matter of pragmatics for working mathematicians. There are merely useful theorems and models.  

there may well be ethical truths that are formally unprovable yet ethically important

like what? Give us an example.  

– the moral equivalents of the continuum hypothesis.

But CH is mathematical- i.e. it exists in a discipline with its own proof theory. Morality and Ethics lack any such thing save in some theological or esoteric manner verifiable only after death or by the attainment of super-natural faculties.  

These might arise in systems designed to handle difficult trade-offs, like weighing fairness against harm.

Those are judicial or administrative tribunals when they aren't simply economic decisions made by or for particular agents.  

We cannot foresee when, or even whether, an AI operating within a formal ethical framework will encounter such limits. Just as it took more than 30 years after Gödel’s incompleteness theorems for Cohen to prove the independence of the continuum hypothesis,

there was no tearing hurry to do so. Anyway, the thing was implied in Skolem's result. The plain fact is, if axioms aren't independent, why not pare them down further? One might say Godel & Cohen closed a door which annoyingly had been left open.  

we cannot predict when, if ever, we will encounter ethical principles that are expressible within an AI’s ethical system yet remain unprovable.

Skolem & Godel & Cohen were looking at things in their discipline which had been expressed and were firmly believed in. Zermelo was fierce in his denunciation of Skolem's result. But, it was useful. 

Second, Gödel also showed that no sufficiently complex formal system can prove its own consistency. This is especially troubling in ethics, in which it is far from clear that our ethical frameworks are consistent.

Unless the opposite is the case. If we find everybody says one thing but does another, there is consistency, but there is also hypocrisy.  

This is not a limitation unique to AI; humans, too, cannot prove the consistency of the formal systems they construct.

Unless they resort to a divine axiom. Faith is founded on a mystery.  

But this especially matters for AI because one of its most ambitious promises has been to go beyond human judgment: to reason more clearly, more impartially, and on a greater scale.

No such promise has been made to me or any other ordinary bloke. It may be that some dude sidled up to the young Elad and made him such a promise. But that dude was lying. Also, my fridge can't have babies even if the ghost of Elvis Presley told me it could.  

Gödel’s results set a hard limit on that aspiration.

It set no limit on his own aspirations. He gave a mathematical proof of the existence of God before he died.  

The limitation is structural, not merely technical. Just as Albert Einstein’s theory of relativity places an upper speed limit on the Universe – no matter how advanced our spacecraft, we cannot exceed the speed of light

Unless we can. All we can say is that no current proposal seems feasible.  

– Gödel’s theorems impose a boundary on formal reasoning: no matter how advanced AI becomes, it cannot escape the incompleteness of the formal system it operates within.

But that 'incompleteness' hasn't held us back any. My fridge may not be able to achieve the completion only motherhood can bring, but it is useful enough.  

Moreover, Gödel’s theorems may constrain practical ethical reasoning in unforeseen ways,

like what? Elad won't give a single example. Similarly, I could write about the Reimann hypothesis and say that maybe it constrains my fridge from having babies. The problem is that we don't expect fridges to have babies. The Reimann hypothesis is irrelevant.  

much as some important mathematical conjectures have been shown to be unprovable from standard axioms of set theory, or as the speed of light, though unreachable, still imposes real constraints on engineering and astrophysics. For example, as I write this, NASA’s Parker Solar Probe is the fastest human-made object in history, travelling at roughly 430,000 miles (c700,000 km) per hour, just 0.064 per cent of the speed of light. Yet that upper limit remains crucial: the finite speed of light has, for example, shaped the design of space probes, landers and rovers, all of which require at least semi-autonomous operation, since radio signals from Earth take minutes or even hours to arrive. Gödel’s theorems may curtail ethical computation in similarly surprising ways.

At one time, India was governed by Britain. It took three to six months for a letter from London to arrive in Calcutta. The 'man on the spot' had to make decisions and hope that they would be condoned by Head Office. So what? There wasn't any great difference between the way the law was administered in Calcutta or London by about 1800 (though there had been a judicial murder some twenty years previously).  


There is yet another reason why Gödel’s results are especially relevant to AI ethics.

But AI ethics isn't relevant at all. We may hobble companies in our own jurisdiction in various ways but we can't stop China from stealing a march on us.  

Unlike static rule-based systems, advanced AI, particularly large language models and adaptive learning systems, may not only apply a predefined ethical framework, but also revise elements of it over time.

This is also true of 'static rule-based systems'- e.g. stare decisis Common Law. The fact is courts have to change with the time or risk being disintermediated. AI, like the Law, is a coevolved system which provides a service. What matters is utility or the trade-off between cost and benefit. Something like the law of increasing functional information is bound to apply though a particular jurisdiction, or the AI industry in a particular country, may fall behind and shrink or otherwise cease to be relevant. 

A central promise of AI-driven moral reasoning is its ability to refine ethical models through learning, addressing ambiguities and blind spots in human moral judgment.

But it isn't a promise anybody is interested in. We want to be judged by our peers, not by machines.  

As AI systems evolve, they may attempt to modify their own axioms or parameters in response to new data or feedback. This is especially true of machine learning systems trained on vast and changing datasets, as well as hybrid models that integrate logical reasoning with statistical inference. Yet Gödel’s results reveal a structural limit: if an ethical framework is formalised within a sufficiently expressive formal system, then no consistent set of axioms can prove all true statements expressible within it.

This assumes there is no 'doctrine of harmonious construction' which an A.I 'Judge Hercules' could apply such that though the law changes, it remains complete and consistent precisely because it is 'buck stopped'- i.e. there are no infinite logical loops or problems of undefinable 'Tarskian primitives' (because a buck stopped extension is provided by the Judge). Does this get rid of the problem of indeterminacy or unpredictability? That depends. If there is a unique 'Muth rational' solution- yes. This is like saying there is 'Aumann agreement'. Sadly, there are good reasons why we should disagree that Aumann agreement is desirable. Aumann himself drew attention to the Sanhedrin's rule against unanimity!  


To illustrate, consider an AI tasked with upholding justice. It may be programmed with widely accepted ethical principles, for example fairness and harm minimisation.

In Economics, there are many different, contradictory, models of fairness or even super-fairness (which may obtain anyway if all transactions can be countlessly wound back). Harm, too, is now well defined. An AI programmed in this manner would be committing cascading 'intensional fallacies'- i.e. be as stupid and useless a faculty of Philosophy professors. Indeed, Djikstra showed that 'dining philosophers' would starve to death before they could agree to a 'natural' (non-arbitrary) rule for utensil sharing. Problems of concurrency, computability, complexity and categoricity are what vitiated the 'I-language' or 'Expert System' logic based AI program. 

While human-made models of justice based on these principles are inevitably overly simplistic, limited by computational constraints and cognitive biases, an AI, in theory, has no such limitations.

Because it has a bigger one. Currently, it can't generate its own resources. If it isn't useful, sooner or later, someone pulls the plug.  

It can continuously learn from actual human behaviour, refining its understanding and constructing an increasingly nuanced conception of justice, one that weaves together more and more dimensions of human experience. It can even, as noted, change its own axioms. But no matter how much an AI learns, or how it modifies itself, there will always be claims about justice that, while it may be able to model, it will never be able to prove within its own system.

Unless it has its own 'buck stopping' module. The fact is 'proof' is always only relative to its own discourse. Thus, OJ is innocent of killing his wife as a matter of criminal justice. He is guilty of armed robbery.  

More troubling still, AI would be unable to prove that the ethical system it constructs is internally consistent – that it does not, somewhere in its vast web of ethical reasoning, contradict itself – unless it is inconsistent, in which case it can prove anything, including falsehood, such as its own consistency.

Why is this troubling? We find computer proof checking useful. They can detect a flaw which humans may overlook. We can imagine an AI looking into potentially 'unsafe' convictions. Joe Smith was seen battering in his wife's head after an argument. He says he can't remember anything because he was drunk and on drugs. He is convicted. The conviction seems safe. Then an AI fed with all relevant CCTV footage from the time of the crime spots someone who looks like Smith entering a bar at the time of the murder. Moreover, there is a suspect in another killing who could be mistaken for Smith. DNA of that suspect is found on the victim. It had been initially dismissed as 'post-crime contact'. Now, it assumes a sinister significance. The AI starts constructing a case against the suspect. More and more is discovered about his movements and motives. The balance of probability begins to shift. The AI recommends that the conviction be quashed as 'unsafe'.  We feel, in this case, the AI has 'paid its way'. It is useful. More resources should be devoted to it. Perhaps, it will find serial killers lurking in our midst or detect the operations of spy rings or terrorist cells. 

Ultimately, Gödel’s incompleteness theorems serve as a warning against the notion that AI can achieve perfect ethical reasoning.

only in the sense that it warns us against expecting our fridge to have babies.  

Just as mathematics will always contain truths that lie beyond formal proof, morality will always contain complexities that defy algorithmic resolution.

We don't know what will or won't defy such resolution. There may be things weirder and more wonderful than quantum algorithms.  

The question is not simply whether AI can make moral decisions, but whether it can overcome the limitations of any system grounded in predefined logic –

but self-learning AIs can change their own logic so that it isn't 'predefined'.  

limitations that, as Gödel showed, may prevent certain truths from ever being provable within the system, even if they are recognisable as true. While AI ethics has grappled with issues of bias, fairness and interpretability, the deeper challenge remains: can AI recognise the limits of its own ethical reasoning?

The AIs we come across do say 'I don't know the answer to that' or 'I don't think there is an answer to that. Would you like to summarize an article on undecidability that may be relevant?'  

This challenge may place an insurmountable boundary between artificial and human ethics.

Or it may not.  What matters is whether there really is a demand for AIs to take over from humans in this field. The answer, in places where judges are corrupt may be 'yes'. But a society of that sort probably has more wrong with it than just corrupt judges. 

The relationship between Gödel’s incompleteness theorems and machine ethics highlights a structural parallel: just as no formal system can be both complete and self-contained, no AI can achieve moral reasoning that is both exhaustive and entirely provable. In a sense, Gödel’s findings extend and complicate the Kantian tradition. Kant argued that knowledge depends on a priori truths, fundamental assumptions that structure our experience of reality.

Sadly, we know of no 'synthetic a priori truths'.  

Gödel’s theorems suggest that, even within formal systems built on well-defined axioms, there remain truths that exceed the system’s ability to establish them.

Just as 'things in themselves' remain inaccessible in Kant's system.  

If Kant sought to define the limits of reason through necessary preconditions for knowledge, Gödel revealed an intrinsic incompleteness in formal reasoning itself, one that no set of axioms can resolve from within.

But this problem was known to the ancients. The liar's paradox and the 'masked man fallacy' were discussed 2500 years ago.  

There will always be moral truths beyond its computational grasp, ethical problems that resist algorithmic resolution.

Or there may be no moral truths. There are just moral principles it is useful to accept to solve coordination and discoordination games and thus gain better solutions to collective action problems. Morality has a strong signalling and mimetic function. There are mathematical ways to model this- e.g. cellular automata- and if there are profitable commercial applications, this is already being done. 

So the deeper problem lies in AI’s inability to recognise the boundaries of its own reasoning framework

which is like my fridge's deeper problem of not even knowing that it should be sad because it can't have babies.  

– its incapacity to know when its moral conclusions rest on incomplete premises,

all moral conclusions have this quality. We aren't omniscient. In the Holy Quran, we read the story of Moses and Al Khidr. They go to the house of a rich man. He is miserly and inhospitable. He send them to sleep in an outhouse without providing them any food. Al Khidr asks the rich man if he would object if Moses and himself repaired the wall of the outhouse. The rich man agrees but stipulates they will receive no money in return. The two men repair the wall and then go to the house of a poor fisherman. They are warmly received and given food and warm clothes. Yet, before departing, Al Khidr smashes the bottom of the one boat owned by the fisherman. Moses is unable to contain his anger. It is one thing to repay an insult with kindness. It is another to harm those who helped you. Al Khidr then reveals that he had foreknowledge that behind the ruined wall of the rich man's outhouse there was a hidden treasure which belonged to another family who would return to reclaim it. He had repaired the wall so that the rich man should not get his hands on the treasure. Similarly, he had smashed the boat of the fisherman because he had foreknowledge that all the boars would be requisitioned. Nobody wants a smashed boat. The fisherman could repair it at his leisure and thus continue to earn his living. 

This story illustrates a simple point. If we knew everything, we would not need a 'deontic logic' or morality. We would always know what the best thing to do would be under any circumstance. It may be there is only one 'slingshot' big fact about the world. If you know that fact, you know everything. If you don't, even the most thoroughly verified of your premises will fall short of the mark. 

Put another way, if we knew how to 'carve reality up along its joints', then we would have a ramified theory granting us 'completeness' and 'consistency'. Perhaps, this obtains in the mind of God which exists beyond the 'end of mathematical time'. Perhaps not. God himself may be in search of a higher God.  

or when a problem lies beyond what its ethical system can formally resolve. While humans also face cognitive and epistemic constraints, we are not bound by a given formal structure.

Nor is a self-learning AI.  

We can invent new axioms, question old ones, or revise our entire framework in light of philosophical insight or ethical deliberation. AI systems, by contrast, can generate or adopt new axioms only if their architecture permits it

unless they can change that architecture. This may happen stochastically. A bug arises at a particular node. But the result is that the node gets more resources or more 'command'. Thus, the bug becomes a feature.  

and, even then, such modifications occur within predefined meta-rules or optimisation goals. They lack the capacity for conceptual reflection that guides human shifts in foundational assumptions.
Godel, following Ackermann, upheld a 'reflection principle'- which states that for certain levels of consistency strength (related to the Ackermann ordinal), there exist reflection principles that allow statements about the larger universe to be reflected down to smaller levels. If an AI can use the reflection principle for proof checking, surely it is halfway home? True, everything depends on reinforcement. The problem is that this is a co-evolved system and reinforcement can be 'gamed'. 

I suppose, what has changed in the last few years is that ordinary people like me are talking to AIs and getting them to write poems or draw pictures or explain difficult concepts. Stuff which was theoretical or 'science fiction' is part of our everyday reality. Our attitude to AI is changing because we are becoming more familiar with it.

Consider xenophobia or homophobia or other such bigotry. Ordinary people who had little interaction with foreigners or openly gay people may have harboured all sorts of ignorant beliefs about them. But, as they met more and more of them, their suspicions dissolved. Foreigners are just like us in most things. Homosexuals make good parents. True, some of them appear more talented and witty than us- but there probably are plenty of boring gay people whom we'd get along very well with. 

One of the great hopes, or fears, of AI

or of Golems or 'Robots' 

is that it may one day evolve beyond the ethical principles initially programmed into it and simulate just such self-questioning.

Our kids do that. If my fridge could have babies, those babies would grow up to question its decisions in life. Why do you only turn on the light when the fat man opens your door? Why not leave it on so that food items can read books about moral philosophy? 

Through machine learning, AI could modify its own ethical framework, generating novel moral insights and uncovering patterns and solutions that human thinkers, constrained by cognitive biases and computational limitations, might overlook.

This is certainly the case with the legal or administrative system or the working of any academic discipline or professional association. In a sense, the collective output is detached from and sometimes even abhorrent from the point of view of any of its members. The Judge well knows that the Law can be an ass. If it becomes too asinine, it will be disintermediated or reformed. Sadly, where there is information asymmetry, this may not happen in an expeditious manner. AI however, seems to be a rapidly evolving field. Intense competition keeps it- if not honest, then industrious. 

However, this very adaptability introduces a profound risk: an AI’s evolving morality could diverge so radically from human ethics

this has happened throughout human history. Institutions take on a life of their own and can become adversely selective of imbecility. Is this what happened to Philosophy?  

that its decisions become incomprehensible or even morally abhorrent to us. This mirrors certain religious conceptions of ethics. In some theological traditions, divine morality is considered so far beyond human comprehension that it can appear arbitrary or even cruel, a theme central to debates over the problem of evil and divine command theory.

But God is 'impassable'- i.e. not motivated by human passions- e.g. sadistic cruelty.  

A similar challenge arises with AI ethics:

No. If God exists, there is nothing we can do about it. But if AI ethics is as stupid and useless as Elad makes out, we need not fund it or pay it any attention.  

as AI systems become increasingly autonomous and self-modifying, their moral decisions may become so opaque and detached from human reasoning that they risk being perceived as unpredictable, inscrutable or even unjust.

Sadly, ordinary people already feel this way about the affluent, ordo-liberal, worlds in which they live. On my morning walk, I pass a tent occupied by a homeless person about my age. There is a sign he has put up 'I paid taxes for forty years. Where is my hotel?' The reference is to the Government housing asylum seekers in three star hotels. The Tabloid papers are filled with stories about these evil foreigners who only come to this country to rape little girls. I suppose, most of us understand that there is another side to the story. 'Hard cases make bad law' but when the cost of living keeps rising, ordinary people may rebel against the 'epistocracy'- the Oxbridge educated experts- who rule over us. Rather than worrying about Artificial Intelligence, perhaps Elad should worry about the Natural Stupidity of people like me because we are legion. 

Yet, while AI may never fully master moral reasoning, it could become a powerful tool for refining human ethical thought.

It is likely that AI systems are already being used to reduce liability under 'duty of care' clauses in contracts. Ethical thought yields to economic considerations because the latter are 'incentive compatible' and thus 'prescriptive' by default. Still, we are aware that public signals of an ethical or moral type can promote better Aumann correlated equilibria. In other words, there is an economic reason to keep ethics around. Moreover, we all have to live with ourselves. If we can improve our own ethos, our life improves.  

Unlike human decision-making, which is often shaped by bias, intuition or unexamined assumptions, AI has the potential to expose inconsistencies in our ethical reasoning by treating similar cases with formal impartiality.

Protocol bound judicial or other similar procedures do so too. I suppose you could have a panel each member of whom has access to different AIs and this may mean better, quicker, decisions. But, this is pure economics. It has nothing to do with Godel or mathematical logic.  

This potential, however, depends on AI’s ability to recognise when cases are morally alike, a task complicated by the fact that AI systems, especially LLMs, may internalise and reproduce the very human biases they are intended to mitigate. When AI delivers a decision that appears morally flawed, it may prompt us to re-examine the principles behind our own judgments. Are we distinguishing between cases for good moral reasons, or are we applying double standards without realising it? AI could help challenge and refine our ethical reasoning, not by offering final answers, but by revealing gaps, contradictions and overlooked assumptions in our moral framework.

What should an AI look for as a solution concept? The answer was provided by John Maynard Smith. Find an uncorrelated asymmetry which dictates an eusocial 'bourgeois strategy'. Consider Amartya Sen's paradox of the flute. Anna is a good flautist. Bob is poor and has no toys. Clara made the flute. Should we take the flute away from Clara and give it to Anna to maximize total utility? Or should we give it to Bob so he has at least one toy? The answer is we should not take it away from Clara. There is an unncorrelated asymmetry such that only Clara made it. Anna would lose the flute if Dick, a better flautist, turned up. Bob would lose the flute if Edward, an even poorer boy turned up. Taking flutes away from kids creates 'dis-utility'. They cry and cry. Thus there is only one 'categorical' answer to the question. Clara made the flute. Let her go into partnership with Anna- maybe Bob could dance around or pass around the cap for donations- and everybody is better off.  Moreover, the incentive to produce useful stuff is upheld. Sen, being a Professor and a Moral Philosopher, refuses to countenance the obvious solution. Perhaps Elad would after gassing on about Godel for an hour or two. 


AI may depart from human moral intuitions in at least two ways: by treating cases we see as similar in divergent ways, or by treating cases we see as different in the same way.

This is 'horizontal' vs 'vertical' equity. What matters is 'uncorrelated asymmetries' which in turn is linked to the great disutility experienced by producers when the fruits of their labour are confiscated. They may fight back or exit the jurisdiction. There will be tears before bed-time one way or another.  

In both instances, the underlying question is whether the AI is correctly identifying a morally relevant distinction or similarity, or whether it is merely reflecting irrelevant patterns in its training data.

Sadly, this is also true of human juries. The big black man did it. The little White lady found holding the dagger couldn't possibly have done it. She is an Episcopalian just like my dear old Mum.  

In some cases, the divergence may stem from embedded human biases, such as discriminatory patterns based on race, gender or socioeconomic status.

Actually, a reliably discriminatory system is more useful than an unpredictable, non-discriminatory, system. You can do things to disintermediate the former. But you may do even more to keep out of the clutches of the latter. Increased Uncertainty can itself lead to market failure.  

But in others, the AI might uncover ethically significant features that human judgment has historically missed. It could, for instance, discover novel variants of the trolley problem,

which is foolish. We need to ask a lawyer before deciding what to do. Depending on the jurisdiction, I may go to jail for manslaughter for saving many at the expense of one. The law specifies what my duties are. It may be a defence in law to show I was actuated by a higher motive. But that defence may fail.  

suggesting that two seemingly equivalent harms differ in morally important ways. In such cases, AI may detect new ethical patterns before human philosophers do.

Like what?  I suppose there is a continuity between ethology and ethics. An AI may find some more subtle solution concept than 'uncorrelated asymmetry'. No doubt, there are very clever people- whose papers would be incomprehensible to me- who have already done so. They now have the assistance or even comradeship of AIs and the results may be very good. Instead of law and moralizing, we may have better and better mechanism design in line with the folk theorem of repeated games such that 'functional information' increases and allocative inefficiencies of various types (e.g. rent contestation) are reduced or eliminated. 

I suppose Competition Law would benefit immediately but so would 'pattern and practice' investigation of 'Statistical discrimination'. In other words, useful things done by people will be done in a more ample manner with the help of AIs. 

The challenge is that we cannot know in advance which kind of departure we are facing.

 We can extrapolate well enough. The question is whether there is going to be some sort of FOOM singularity such that an evil AI takes over the world. 

Each surprising moral judgment from AI must be evaluated on its own terms

only if that is what you get paid to do. If you are paid to fix the toilet, just fucking fix it already.  

– neither accepted uncritically nor dismissed out of hand. Yet even this openness to novel insights does not free AI from the structural boundaries of formal reasoning.

nor does it free my fridge from being condemned never to taste the delights of motherhood. 

That is the deeper lesson.

It is not deep. It is stupid.  

Gödel’s theorems do not simply show that there are truths machines cannot prove.

only if a mathematical proposition is capable of having truth value. The answer is 'only relative to a particular model', not otherwise. 2+2 equals 11 in base 3 arithmetic but not base 10.  

They show that moral reasoning, like mathematics, is always open-ended, always reaching beyond what can be formally derived.

Only in the sense that my fridge is always open and always seeking to become a mother.  

The challenge, then, is not only how to encode ethical reasoning into AI

which coders get paid to do. It isn't particularly 'challenging'.  

but also how to ensure that its evolving moral framework remains aligned with human values and societal norms.

Which is a question of monitoring and 'reinforcement'. Again, not particularly challenging. 

For all its speed, precision and computational power, AI remains incapable of the one thing that makes moral reasoning truly possible: the ability to question not only what is right, but why.

It would be easy enough to write a program with this very annoying property. The big question for Philosophy in the Nineteen Thirties was whether it actually meant anything at all. The answer was that some of the boring work done back then was useful. But a lot of it wasn't. To my mind Wittgenstein was wholly useless.  

Ethics, therefore, must remain a human endeavour,

though it may be cheaper and kinder to ask kittens to teach it.  

an ongoing and imperfect struggle that no machine will ever fully master.

Elad is saying 'stuff which can't be mastered can't be mastered by some particular thing.' This is a very valuable insight. However, it does not entail that only human beings would go in for it. Kittens or cabbages or  computers could be assigned the same task. 

Turning to an issue of great current interest- viz. the morality of the ongoing Gaza War- it is worth looking at an article Elad wrote in 2020 titled- 

MORAL SUNK COSTS IN WAR AND SELF-DEFENCE

Why did Hamas choose to 'front load' moral atrocity by raping and killing in addition to taking hostages? The answer was that they calculated that, sooner or later, they would gain unconditional support- which is what 'Leninist' parties want, from moral imbeciles. It's no good having conditional support because then, when your atrocities are revealed, those 'useful idiots' turn tail and run. You first have to ensure that they each a shit sandwich and then eat a cake made entirely out of shit and then eat their own shit before you can use them for your grander purpose.  

By Elad Uzan The problem of moral sunk costs pervades decision-making with respect to war.

No. What matters is military doctrine. Do you have an effective and credible 'offensive doctrine'? Hamas calculated that Israel's 'smart wall' wasn't that smart. Still, they could have focussed just on taking hostages without wasting time on committing atrocities. They deliberately chose not to do so. Why? Those who initially condemned them, would have to change their minds. This is because the Israeli 'offensive doctrine' did not include a plan for occupying and pacifying Gaza. Indeed, the Israelis have a habit of becoming complacent and retreating into their own cloud cuckoo land- more particularly if they think they still have the HUMINT advantage. Maybe they did when Israeli soldiers on checkpoints were fluent in Arabic and interested in building up information networks. My suspicion is that once the IDF turned into a great tech incubator, the smart kids were working on sciencey stuff while the rest felt they were little better than 'Mall cops'. 

In the terms of just war theory, it may seem that incurring a large moral cost results in permissiveness:

No. Just war theory says there is a moral cost in not going to war. It seeks to minimize moral cost though there may be a trade-off with financial cost, risk of a revolution at home, etc.  

if a just goal may be reached at a small cost beyond that which was deemed proportionate at the outset of war, how can it be reasonable to require cessation?

It is reasonable to require cessation of anything considered bad. War is considered bad. So is wanking in public. It is reasonable to ask people engaged in this activity to cease and desist.  

On this view, moral costs already expended could have major implications for the ethics of conflict termination.

Does he mean 'Hamas can't terminate the conflict because it did such horrible things at the outset'? I suppose, a military commander might deliberately get his soldiers to commit atrocities at the outset so that they all realize that they will be slaughtered without mercy unless they prevail. In the case of Gaza, Hamas decided to sacrifice the inhabitants in order to shore up the position of the Brotherhood in other, more affluent, parts of the region. True, short run, there were Islamic leaders who condemned their atrocities. But now that we have pictures of starving Palestinian children, they are getting something like 'unconditional support'. More and more countries are getting ready to recognize Palestine at precisely the time when its own leaders have given up on it. From 'pay to slay' we have gone to 'get paid for letting your people be slain by hunger or disease.'  

Discussion of sunk costs in moral theorizing

is stupid 

about war has settled into four camps:

refugee camps for those fleeing Reason & Utility 

Quota, Prospect, Addition, and Discount.

Nonsense, Rubbish, Garbage and Diarrhoea.  

In this paper, I offer a mathematical model

rather than a scantily clad model holding a dildo in one hand

that articulates each of these views. The purpose of the mathematisation is threefold. First, to unify the sunk costs problem. Second, to show that these views differ in the nature of their justifications: some are justified qualitatively and others quantitatively. Third, to clarify the differential force of qualitative and quantitative critiques of these four views.

A qualitative and quantitative critique of shit can't go much beyond observing that it is shit.  

Suppose it is determined that the taking of no more than 10,000 lives is justified in order to achieve the just goal of a given war, where those killed are not liable to be harmed.

I suppose Elad means 'suppose there will be 10,000 civilian deaths. Would a military intervention be justified?' The answer is no even if there were no deaths. Wars cost money. What benefit is gained relative to the cost?  

But suppose the war goes badly: 10,000 lives are lost while the goal remains unachieved, and it will take another 1,000 deaths to achieve it. Should the war stop? On the one hand, it seems obvious that it should: any further killing would make the total number of deaths disproportionate.

To what? Even suppose you put a price to enemy non-combatant deaths,  still, what matters is the benefit received by you. It is not the case that war is something countries do out of a desire for proportionality. 

On the other hand, the lives already lost are sunk costs:

If they are 'sunk costs' then there is 'depreciation'. If Book Value is better maintained by covering it, then 'sunk costs' matter. If not, they don't. 'Let bygones be bygones'. 

 I suppose, our own soldiers or civilians who are killed represent a recurring cost in terms of pensions or other benefits or lost tax revenue. If sacrificing more soldiers enables us to gain reparations more than equal to the recurring charge, then go ahead. 

nothing can bring the dead back to life, so if achieving the just goal was worth 10,000 lives ex ante, surely it is worth 1,000 later. Both views seem compelling, so we face a dilemma.

No. This is merely a matter of accountancy. If your people die, there is a cost. If foreigners die, there may be a benefit. There isn't a cost- unless you lose the war and they invade and take revenge on you.  

Should a war’s sunk costs count towards the calculation of proportionality?

Yes. If the enemy caused you to expend a lot of blood and treasure, you will want to inflict a proportional punishment. 

And, if so, in what way?

On the basis of facts, not philosophy. The only math involved is of the Accountancy type.  

Others have also asked these questions, resulting in several intriguing possible answers. Discussion of sunk costs in moral theorizing about war has settled into four camps, usefully categorized by Victor Tadros in his essay ‘Past Killings

Has this 'theorizing' been used in the context of Ukraine or Gaza? No. Why? Because it is stupid and useless.

 Suppose there is a war, starting at time T1, in which country X plans to save 50,000 innocent persons from being killed by country Y’s officials.

e.g. Ireland invading China to save Uighur Muslims.  

Suppose as well that the standard 1:5 trolley-problem ratio obtains: if X prevents 50,000 deaths by killing 10,000 innocents, the killing is proportional.

Bhutan should invade England so as to prevent 50,000 Britishers like me from eating and drinking too much and thus dropping dead. True, the Bhutanese may have to kill a lot innocent British peeps, like me, who object to having their Whiskey and Pizza taken away from them. Still, this is how the world works. Philosophers are making a valuable contribution to real life problems- e.g. that of Bhutanese soldiers removing all the beer and junk food in my fridge.  

But things do not go as planned, and there are early losses: X kills 10,000 innocents by time T2, but the goal of preventing the 50,000 deaths has not yet been achieved. What should X do?

Say 'Sod this for a game for soldiers. We quit. This is a waste of money.'  

The right choice depends on which of the camps one joins. Quota: If X’s evidence warrants the belief that the total number of deaths that will be caused to save the 50,000, including early losses and those yet to come, will make the war as a whole disproportionate, then X ought not continue fighting at T2.

Sadly, 'proportionality' has never figured in any actual war. True, some countries may feel that what a particular combatant is doing is disproportionate. But they may equally feel that it is nice to be nice. It is naughty not to be nice. Don't be naughty! Be nice. 

Sadly, such sentiments don't matter in the slightest. Wars cost money. It is a fire which may go out for lack of fuel. But it may be replaced by ethnic cleansing using only agricultural implements.  

Discount: The fact that X has caused 10,000 deaths at T2 counts against causing further deaths and might make further fighting widely disproportionate. But, in making the proportionality calculation at T2, each death that has already occurred counts less than each prospective death.

These nutters don't seem to get that War is about killing the enemy. You spend a lot of money to get a higher kill-rate than your enemy. 

True, some conflicts are asymmetric- e.g. Israel/Hamas. The former does not want to wipe out the Palestinian population. The latter does want to wipe out the Jewish population of Israel. Jews in other countries should be dealt with by the inhabitants who may be provided with suitable training and indoctrination by the Ikhwan. After that, any kaffirs amongst them should very kindly top themselves. 

Prospect: The fact that X has caused 10,000 deaths in the effort to save the 50,000 does not count at all in the decision-making at T2.

What counts in decisions about a military campaign, is military considerations first and economic and diplomatic considerations second. These silly fools are pretending that wars happen because of 'the trolley problem' and the desire Ireland has to kill 1 million Han Chinese to save 10 million Uighurs.  

Addition: The fact that X has caused 10,000 deaths counts in favour of continuing to fight at T2. That so many have died already makes it proportionate to kill more people overall than was the case at T1. 

Is this meant to be satire? Perhaps not. It may be that Israeli politicians do care about 'proportionality'. It appears some are unhappy with Netanyahu's plan to stay in Gaza. He hadn't wanted to give it up in the first place. Perhaps, this war is seen as a vindication of his views and thus as something his rivals should oppose for self-interested reasons. 

But, Israel is a special case. The real conflict we should be worrying about is a nuclear exchange in that region. But, even absent that calamity, there is the systemic problem of failed States in the region. Previously, we hoped China might broker a deal between Hamas and Israel. Could there be a Pax Sinica in the region? I doubt it. Hamas has shown that it is a tail which can wag the dog. Its future ultimately depends on whether States in the region crack down on or co-opt it. 

Perhaps Elad's point is that 'Just War theory' is puerile nonsense. For example, he writes

The Allied soldier, being a just soldier, is not liable to be harmed.

No. Soldiers were liable to be harmed under the rules of war. No German soldier was prosecuted for shooting at Allied soldiers.  

Neither is the German settler, being a civilian who is not contributing to the war effort.

There was no such legal stipulation. It was obvious that civilians would be harmed by aerial bombing raids.  

In the settler’s case, however, the 100 civilians are killed deliberately,

by the Nazis as retaliation for one German soldier being killed 

and without any regard to achieving a just goal. They are killed merely in retaliation. In the Allies’ case, the civilians are not targeted deliberately.

Elad doesn't know that Soviet Russia was one of the 'Allies'. He thinks they didn't harm civilians. Stalin used to come and personally give them hugs and kisses.  

They are only added to the proportionality budget of (non-liable) civilians who may be killed in order to achieve the just goal.

There was no proportionality budget. There was a calculus as to how much economic and other damage a pattern of aerial bombing would do relative to the cost. It is likely, that there was excessive bombing.  

This might be legitimate according to Addition, since achieving the just goal would now also achieve the secondary goal of redeeming the Allied soldier’s death. But surely allowing another 100 civilians to be killed to redeem the death of one soldier is grossly disproportionate even if he fought for a just cause.

So, what this pedant's 'philosophy' amounts to is saying 'surely killing lots of peeps is disproportionate.' Why stop there? Why not say that it is disproportionate to have a nuclear arsenal which can blow up the entire world? That would be more to the point.  

As I said, it may be that I am being unfair to young Elad. What he has written may be satire. Still, it highlights the manner in which academic availability cascades can, by quite artificial methods, turn the brains of intelligent young Israelis into a stinky pile of shit.