Monday, 24 August 2026

Guha on Sumit Sarkar


In a previous post, I explained how Sir Ashutosh Mukherjee- the father of the founder of India (and West Bengal's) ruling party- helped found the Postgrad Dept of Physics at Calcutta University. Almost immediately it produced three world-class scientists- Bose (of Boson fame), Saha (cosmic rays) & Nobel laureate CV Raman. 

As Vice Chancellor, Sir Ashutosh had also founded the first Department of History in India and personally funded a Professorship in Ancient Indian History & Culture,  in 1913. 

Initially, there were 'increasing returns' to historical scholarship and thus the 'golden age' of Indian historiography coincided with the rise and increasing success of the Independence movement. In the field of archaeology, the discovery of the Indus Valley Civilization raised interest in history to a peak in the early Thirties. This is reflected in the prison writings of Jawaharlal Nehru. However, after Independence, interest in history decreased. Diminishing returns had set in. Still, there was interest in the historical development of the property regime for agricultural land for two reasons

1) the American obsession with land reform as being vital to prevent a Communist revolution

2) the Communist obsession with classifying economic regimes so as to justify a revolution as the only way to break with 'feudalism' or 'bourgeois capitalism' or some such abstraction.

In this context, the historian, Susobhan Sarkar- who wrote the manifesto for the Communist Party of India- has some significance in that he bridged the gap between the older Brahmo bhadralok culture, as exemplified by Santiniketan, and the newer Bolshevik ideas gaining traction in the Thirties. Sarkar had done a second degree  at Jesus College in the mid Twenties. It is said he came to the attention of Communist recruiters there. Since Sarkar was teaching European history- a subject of little interest to Indians- he had no direct political impact on his students despite being a conscientious and even quite able pedagogue. Sarkar did yield to the narcissism of his class and glorified its nugatory accomplishments to the best of his slender ability. However, because the Communists did come to power (after he had retired) but before died (in 1982) Sarkar was vindicated by history- at least for three decades.

Not so his son Sumit Sarkar who died a few days ago. He had lived to see the complete rout of Communism in West Bengal and, more sadly, the triumph of the BJP in Calcutta itself. 

The always ridiculous Ram Guha writes in Scroll

 Historian Sumit Sarkar took his scholarship beyond the confines of the academy

He took it to the crapper.  

He was was one of several prabasi Bengali intellectuals who helped make Delhi University the foremost academic institution in all of South Asia.

What made Delhi important was the fact that power- and then money- became more and more concentrated there.  Sadly, since smart people don't study History, History Departments are bound to be populated by stupid nonentities.  


In a late essay reflecting on his intellectual journey over the decades,

it was a journeu from shit to shit 

Sumit Sarkar remarked: “So far, we Indian historians have written the histories that we wanted to write,

If you wanted your book to sell (i.e. be put on the reading list) you had to write politically correct shite- e.g. Modi is Hitler!  

following no agenda but our own. That seems to be a fast-vanishing luxury.”

Guys who made their money in Merchant Banking, are now earning big bucks with nationalist history books. In other words, things have come full circle back to the time of the nationalist Hindu historians at the beginning of the Twentieth Century. 


In a long and very productive life, Sarkar – who was born in Calcutta in 1939 and died in Delhi earlier this month – had to confront three historical agendas imposed by others.

There was only one agenda. Write boring shite about how horrible Hindoooos are.  

The first was a dogmatic Marxism which viewed the past through a narrow economistic lens,

as opposed to the dog-shit lens of the Subaltern Group 

and was very influential in Sarkar’s hometown

which Marxists had turned into a yet bigger shit-hole. 

(his father, also a historian, was a member of the Communist Party of India).

There was a time when Commies thought History Professors worth recruiting. After Independence, the CPI was prepared to launch Ranajit Guha (whom they believed to be close to the KGB) in the Trade Union movement. Sadly, he was useless and thus was left to moulder as a historian. It must be said, Calcutta University refused to give him a PhD for his illiterate shite.  

The second was the interlinked trend of post-modernism and post-colonialism which

have turned into Jason Arday style Grievance Studies. At least Arday had the grace to top himself.  

viewed history as fragmented and culturally relative, and focused on texts and discourses rather than the lived experiences of people in the past.

The lived experience of people then and now is that low IQ professors are as boring and useless as shit.  

The third was the religious majoritarianism of the sangh parivar, which glorified Hindus and demonised Muslims,

Islam doesn't demonise kaffirs at all. It gives them kisses and cuddles. 

and despite – or perhaps because of – its Manichaeism gained ideological and political ascendancy in the 1990s and beyond.

The job of the Hindu 'intellectual' is to say 'Hindooos are fucking horrible, mate. Take it from me. I'm a particularly high caste one myself'.  

‘Pomo-poco’ thought

Sarkar refused to succumb to the seductions of “pomo-poco” thought, for he saw – more clearly than his fellow members of the Subaltern Studies school – how it underplayed the economy, social conflict, and lower-caste deprivation.

These shitheads thought there was such a thing as 'elite historiography'. The truth was History professors are ill-paid drudges. The Backward and 'untouchable' caste leaders were becoming Chief Ministers (or, in the case of Modi, Prime Minister) and it was their versions of history which would become normative.  

His rejection of Hindutva was absolute,

So what? Both Delhi and Calcutta are now ruled by Hindutvadis. Sumit's 'rejection' was futile. Guha, at least, still lives in a Congress run State.  

based both on its misreadings of the past and its dangerous consequences for democracy and pluralism in the present.

Modi is the dangerous consequence. Did you know, he hasn't even been to Durham University- forget Oxford or Cambridge!  

His relationship with Marxism, however, was more complex.

He was prepared to suck it off but what it wanted was a titty-wank. It turned a deaf ear to Sumit's pleas for Relationship Counselling.  

He moved away early from its economic determinism, recognising that in India caste and gender were axes of inequality as significant as class.

Fuck that. Money is the only relevant axis. Go to IIT & IIM & you may become a billionaire. Do history and everybody thinks you have shit for brains. 

His prose was free of Marxist jargon, and (as far as I know) he never joined a communist party.

None wanted him.  

Yet he did not entirely disavow the Marxism of his youth either. He continued to see it as a philosophy of emancipation, which – whatever its perversions in countries like the Soviet Union – still stood, broadly, on the side of equality and justice.

After Deng took power, Chinese Communism became worthy of emulation. Sumit turned against the Left Front just when it looked as though it was prepared to go down that road. 


Sarkar’s first book was The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, published in 1973.

Everybody already knew all there was to know about it. To be frank, Tagore had done a good job burying that shite.  

A richly crafted political and social history, it used primary sources in English and Bengali to examine the Swadeshi upsurge against a backdrop of rising Hindu-Muslim tensions

it fuelled those tensions- as Tagore kept pointing out. 

and the partition of the province.

Tagore warned the Hindus that they would be massacred in the East. Ultimately, the Hindus insisted on partition.  

A counterpart of this focused, immersive regional study is the wide-ranging essay collection, Writing Social History (published in 1997).

Social History is better written on Social Media when you are drunk off your head.  

Here, critical assessments of the bhadralok icons, Ramakrishna and Vidyasagar, share space with essays on Calcutta, on caste in the making of political ideologies, and on historiographical traditions the author admired or else deplored.

Nirad Chaudhuri, who failed his MA around the time Sumit's father was gathering up the glittering prizes, did a better job. But the bhadralok didn't greatly matter even to themselves. What did was emigration.  


Both these books are well worth reading and re-reading.

read them aloud in a Bengali accent. They are fucking hilarious.  

But Sarkar’s most important book was undoubtedly Modern India: 1885-1947, a magisterial account of the last decades of colonial rule and of the emergence of mass nationalism.

It was not magisterial. It was partisan. The fact is Hinduism played the biggest role as far as Hindus were concerned.  

The preface has the author stating his two aims: first, “a synthesis of the massive data unearthed in recent years by the flood of monographs on specific problems in political, social and economic history”;

Sadly, they were all shite. Why? History is adversely selective of imbecility.  

and second, the possibilities of a “history from below”

i.e. from educationally backward castes. They were mobilized in the name of religion. Indeed, they still are. That's why the BJP has just won Bengal.  

as a counterpart to nationalist historiography and its concentration on “the activities, ideals, or factional manoeuvres of leaders”.

Who only kept their position as leaders if, for caste or religious reasons, they had a mass following.  


These twin ambitions are splendidly realised. This is a genuinely all-India history, with illustrative examples from across the subcontinent. Equal attention is paid to tribal and peasant movements as to initiatives by the major nationalist party, the Congress.

Sadly, they were all equally irrelevant. The Brits made all the decisions. To understand the period, you have to understand the British masses.  The history of the Raj is the history from below of Britain. 

The origins of Hindu-Muslim conflict

which is like the origin of Christian-Muslim conflict 

and the onset of Independence and Partition are deftly delineated. Forty-three years after its publication, it remains the best single-volume account of the period.

It is also the worst depending on your own biases.  

The attention to caste in Modern India shows how heterodox Sarkar’s Marxism had now become.

He, following Churchill, believed that Dalits, Tribals, OBCs, Homosexuals, Muslims, & sexually harassed squirrels should all come together to defeat the evil Brahmins who, as Peter Navarro says, are responsible for all the evil in the world.  

Perhaps an even more notable departure from his inherited beliefs was his treatment of the historical figure of Gandhi. Marxist ideologues like RP Dutt and MN Roy saw the Mahatma’s non-violence as a cunning device to wean the masses away from revolutionary action, and his emphasis on communal amity as a distraction from class struggles.

It is sad that Stalin never got a chance to do to them what he did to Chatto.  

Sarkar, however, understood the deep ethical component of Gandhi’s politics. He recognised that, for Gandhi, non-violence and satyagraha constituted “a deeply-felt and worked-out philosophy… revealing considerable originality”. In Gandhi’s view, “the search for truth was the goal of human life, and as no one could ever be sure of having attained the ultimate truth, use of violence to enforce one’s own necessarily partial understanding of it was sinful.”

Gandhi believed in re-birth. Spin cotton & refrain from sex in this life & you will be reborn on a paradisal planet where you can live happily for ten billion years.  


This assessment comes in Sarkar’s discussion of the 1920s; towards the end of the book, he has a section titled “The Mahatma’s Finest Hour”, on Gandhi’s pilgrimage for peace in Noakhali and the fasts to restore Hindu-Muslim harmony that followed in Calcutta and Delhi.

They didn't work. Still, Sarkar was probably jizzing copiously as he thought of virile Muslims raping and killing Hindus.  

As Sarkar writes here, “Gandhi’s unique personal qualities and true greatness was never more evident than in the last months of his life…”

His uselessness was never more evident.  It was one thing for Mountbatten to pretend that he himself needed to do nothing because Gandhi's soul force would ensure no excess mortality in Bengal, it is quite another for a professional historian to endorse this myth. 


Like the best historians, Sumit Sarkar took his clues from the archives, and was always willing to have his prior conjectures modified or even overthrown by what the primary sources revealed.

They revealed that religion matters. Hindus had good reason to fear the Muslims. That is what drove the politics of the period. But, as the recent election results in Bengal make clear, that's what still drives politics.  

His work had an explicitly comparative lens, juxtaposing Indian studies on popular protest against studies by European historians on the same broad theme,

but all historians everywhere are low IQ shitheads. Nothing is gained by juxtaposing shite with shite.  

as well as studying regional variations within different parts of India itself. And he was a fine prose stylist, which took his scholarship beyond the confines of the academy.

No. He had a pedestrian style.  


These attributes, so rare in combination, are what made Sumit Sarkar an enduringly influential historian.

People thought there might be something to him forty years ago. Then they read him and discovered he was a fucking cretin.  

He was in addition an inspirational teacher; as the journalist, Ravish Kumar, who attended Sarkar’s classes, has remarked, his pedagogical approach was “Gandhian and democratic”.

His work was the enema he administered to himself to produce yet more of the stuff.  

He himself acknowledged learning much from his students, and perhaps even more from his life’s companion, the distinguished feminist historian, Tanika Sarkar, whose influence is manifest in much of her husband’s later work.

He also learnt much from Billy the Cat- a feline historian who stresses the role of tabby cats in the Freedom Struggle.  

The historian whom Sumit Sarkar most admired was EP Thompson, like him a very heterodox Marxist with no party affiliation.

Thompson was writing for his own people. Sumit wasn't.  Incidentally, Thompson left the British Communist party after Kruschev's secret speech. 

Sarkar once wrote that Thompson’s books as well as “the many discussions, political and historical, with him over the years inspired me as nothing else had ever done before or has since”. I re­call how, after EP Thompson died in September 1993,

nobody in the UK noticed. The general feeling was that the working class could kiss my arse. I work in privaate equity. 

Sarkar spoke movingly about him at a memorial meeting held at the India International Centre in Delhi. The other speakers were the historians, Partha Sarathi Gupta and Neeladri Bhattacharya, and the literary scholar, Harish Trivedi. They all had known Thompson too, and, like Sarkar, spoke brilliantly on the day.

Did they masturbate while doing so? I hope not.  

It remains a matter of abiding regret that no recording of that meeting exists.

So, masturbation did occur.  

Sumit Sarkar was one of a number of prabasi Bengali intellectuals who helped make my alma mater, Delhi University, the epicentre of social science and humanities scholarship in India from the 1960s through the 2000s.

There was no such scholarship anywhere in the world. Some kids who went to Uni were able to get into stand-up comedy or acting or novel writing.  

Among the others were the economists, Sukhamoy Chakravarty

he had died three years previously.  

and Mrinal Datta Chaudhuri, the legal scholar, Lotika Sarkar, the polymathic literary historian, RK Das Gupta, and the sociologist, André Béteille, all of whom are now dead.

like Sukhamoy. But that won't stop them turning up on to commemorate some dead White dude.  


Their collective contribution to Delhi University was immense, yet it must also be said that the university gave a great deal to them in return. Had these individuals remained in Calcutta, they may never have emerged as the scholars they eventually became.

ie. they'd have spent their time chatting rather than writing worthless shite.  

In their home milieu, their colleagues and students would almost all have been fellow Bengalis. Here, they were exposed as in no other university in India to the staggering social and cultural diversity of our country.

Fuck off. There is no diversity in Delhi. There are bureaucrats and those who want to be bureaucrats and those who have to bribe bureaucrats.  


Besides, whereas in Calcutta or indeed in the capital’s Jawaharlal Nehru University, the ideology of Marxism was dominant, the professoriat in Delhi University had many more contending currents, with the non-Marxists and anti-Marxists being as numerous, as articulate, and as admired as the Marxists. The exchange of ideas with intellectuals of diverse orientations from his surely enriched Sarkar’s scholarship.

You have to have ideas before you can exchange them.  


What I say about these Bengali scholars also holds true for the Tamils, Maharashtrians, Kannadigas, Odi­yas, Biharis, Punjabis and so on who taught in Delhi University.

They were looked down on by the bureaucrats. Some economists did manage to get on to the Planning Commission. But nobody gave a fuck about historians.  

Adding to the all-India character of its students and staff were the juxtaposition within a single campus of first-rate undergraduate colleges and outstanding graduate faculties in the sciences, the humanities, law, and even music.

Indian universities declined greatly relative to those in the West. Those who could, emigrated.  It must be said, 'Subaltern Studies' & Post-Colonial theory did in fact create a fair number of jobs in the West.  Oddly, it was Priyamvada Gopal, an Englis Lit graduate from Delhi, who appears to have made the most money with her worthless books.  

Friday, 21 August 2026

Sarcasm bites sarcoma



For every Alazon's Eiron, or Yusuf's Iron in Yaqub's soul
Irony is Theodicy & Zuleikha made whole
That my Prajapati is Pratiloma
Sarcasm bites but sarcoma

Wednesday, 19 August 2026

Madhushree Mukherjee & Churchill's secret wank

Correlation is not causation. It is a fact that Indira Gandhi was Prime Minister of India at exactly the time when Margaret Thatcher jumped out of the TV screen and subjected me to aggravated acts of fellatio & tittywanking. This does not mean Indira Gandhi caused Mrs. Thatcher to behave in this reprehensible manner. Still, one mighs say that there is an element of Granger Causality in what may appear to be mere coincidence. My point is everything may be correlated in an opaque manner. 

Did you know, both Thatcher & Gandhi attended Somerville College, Oxford? What's the opposite of Oxford? Cambridge. Guess who was the youngest black Professor there? Jason Arday. Connect the fucking dots, sheeple!

It in the spirit of Ardayan epistemology that I turn back to Madhushree Mukherjee's 'Churchill's secret wank' which proves that the Bengal famine was caused by Winston having a crafty wank and jizzing over 3.2 million tons of wheat which should have gone to Calcutta. Needless to say, the ships were diverted so as to conceal the British Prime Minister's dirty little secret. 

Scott Horton, of Harper's magazine, put the following 6 questions to Madhushree Mukherjee 

1. You write that Hitler never fully embraced the Indian nationalist cause

 

This is Hitler shaking the hand of Subhas Chandra Bose, a former President of the Indian National Congress. He recruited Indians for the Waffen SS before joining hands with the Japanese in Singapore.

because he expected Britain to reach some accommodation with Germany that allowed it to retain most of its empire, and specifically India.

But, once it became clear that Britain would fight, Hitler's focus changed to some sort of partition of India with the Japanese. He expected to keep the MENA & both Iraq & Iran had leaders who were pro-Axis. It was in this context that the Indian revolutionaries in Germany were expected to earn their keep. Unfortunately, the man who helped Bose to escape was a Communist and thus became a British double agent after Hitler invaded the Soviet Union. 

What is it about Churchill and Britain that Hitler misunderstood in this regard?

Hitler lived in a fantasy world. He may have thought that Oswald Moseley could take power in the UK. When Hess flew to England, he may have hoped to do some sort of deal with people whom Berlin considered pro-German.  

Hitler believed that the so-called Nordic race, which in his view included Germans and Britons, was destined to rule the world.

He thought Germany would be top dog.  

He sought to emulate, not supplant, the British Empire: the German empire would comprise the Slavic countries to the east. As he saw it, the United Kingdom would retain its colonies but assume the role of Germany’s junior partner in world domination.

In other words, the Brits would be turnkeys in a world which is just a large, open air, Nazi prison.  

Hitler underestimated the depth of Churchill’s reverence for England’s imperial traditions.

That was irrelevant. Britian was determined to fight & Churchill was appropriately bellicose. Maybe Lloyd George would have been offered the job had he been in better health. 

To Churchill, the British would be second to none.

No. Churchill's mother was American. He understood that Britain would play second fiddle in a 'Union of the English speaking people.'  

Moreover, Churchill’s reading of history told him that Britain had always maintained the balance of power in Europe:

Nonsense! Churchill knew that his father's generation favoured 'splendid isolation'. The first alliance the Brits made after they came to realize that the Royal Navy could not 'go it alone' was with the Japanese. 

Britian's policy has always had to do with invasion threats from a foreign Armada. It went to war in 1914 for Belgium. Why? Keeping a great-power out of the Low Countries has always been its strategic objective.  

whenever France or Germany had marched, England had marched—against.

The UK stayed out of the wars of German or Italian reunification. Randholph Churchill's pal- Joe Chamberlain- had put out feelers for a pact with Germany a little before the treaty with the Japanese. The problem was the Kaiser's obsession with turning Germany into a naval power.  

This time would be no different. Churchill also believed that it was his destiny to lead his country in war against a vile enemy.

Sadly, Britain wasn't strong enough to win any such war. At best, it could keep its independence & hope for a 'Russian steamroller' or American intervention.  

Hitler may have evoked particular repugnance because,

he was a fucking gangster as was proved by the night of the long knives. Mussolini was a refined gentleman by comparison. 

in addition to persecuting Jews, he was seeking to enslave Europeans.

Whereas the Kaiser had been trying to give them kisses and cuddles.  

Churchill had condoned the Japanese invasion of Manchuria,

because the old fool saw Japan as an ally.  

explaining that the aggressor was “an ancient State, with the highest sense of national honour and patriotism and with a teeming population and a remarkable energy.” And he had advised against intervention when Italy attacked Abyssinia, on the grounds that

Mussolini was seen as a potential ally against Hilter- particularly in terms of opposing Anshluss in 1934. Let him help himself to Ethiopia. I suppose, at the time, the Brits thought they would hang on to the 'White Highlands' in Kenya- if only so as to have a place where they could send the more degenerate specimens of the Aristocracy.  

the victim was not “a fit, worthy, and equal member” of the League of Nations. Hitler trusted that British leaders would likewise comprehend his desire to induct Slavs, whom he saw simply as slaves, into the Third Reich.

The Sudetens had a genuine grievance. Moreover, Poland and Hungary were happy to take a bite out of Czechoslovakia. If the Poles had agreed to let Soviet troops through, then Stalin would have stuck with a 'United Front' policy and allied with France (and Britain).  


2. Yet you do write that Churchill harbored a deep racism or at least ethnocentrism when it came to the Indians and that he toyed with the idea of building a British alliance with Untouchables, Sikhs, and Muslims to hold India and keep Hindu nationalists at bay.

He said, in 1931, that Nehru, a Brahmin, was plotting to take over India and suppress the Muslims and Dalits etc. Oddly, this view has been adopted by many on the Left in India. Strangely, they have no problem with Nehru's Brahmin dynasty- probably because it is now half Italian.  

Did this reflect a reasonable appreciation of the forces then at work in India?

No. The old boy was off his head on brandy.  The fact is Churchill, in his wilderness years, had to take his friends where he found them. He was also a supporter of King Edward & his American, ex-prostitute of a wife. 

Churchill’s divide-and-rule policies found fertile ground among India’s Muslims.

He took those policies from Muslim intellectuals like Waris Ameer Ali. The question then was how to prevent the Hindu majority gaining power in India just as the question now is how to keep the BJP, which is Hindu Nationalist, from coming to power in more State and ruling India for another fifteen years. 

For decades, British conservatives had sought to deepen India’s inherent fissures in order to weaken the nascent independence movement.

Just as, after Independence, the Indian Left has sought to deepen caste divisions to prevent Hindu consolidation 

For instance, in 1905 Viceroy Curzon planned to partition Bengal province along religious lines, so as to enhance rivalries between Muslim landowners in its east and Hindu nationalists in its west.

It would reduce them because they would be in separate states. The Hindus thought they could dominate the whole Province and thus insisted on cancelling the partition. They changed their minds in 1946 after having experienced Muslim rule.  

He also encouraged the formation of the Muslim League as a counterweight to the dominant nationalist party, the Indian National Congress.

The INC was split between the moderates and extremists.  

A prolonged agitation led to Bengal being partitioned instead along linguistic lines.

i.e. creation of Bihar, Odisha & Assam.  

But then the colonial government introduced separate electorates for Muslims—that is, every Muslim in British India was required to vote for a Muslim.

This was the Morley-Minto reform of 1909. Montague-Chelmsford, in 1919, created separate electorates for Sikhs, Europeans, Indian Christians, & Anglo-Indians.  

The measure favored separatists,

because Muslims don't like kaffirs 

who could get elected by appealing to narrow sectarian sentiments. The British subsequently introduced separate electorates for other groups as well, but the effort was partially repulsed.

India has reserved seats for Scheduled Tribes & Castes.  

So although Churchill was interested in exploiting diverse social fault lines,

he was against the Round Table Conferences and the Tory 1935 GoI act. But he was ignored. People thought he wasn't quite sane on the topic of India.  

he concentrated on widening the Hindu-Muslim rift—which he regarded as “the bulwark of British rule in India.”

Where there are any sizable number of Muslims, there is a rift. God alone knows what the bulwark of British rule in Britain is. My guess is Sharia Law.  

When Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League, called for a separate nation of Pakistan, Churchill hailed “the awakening of a new spirit of self-reliance and self-assertiveness” among India’s minorities.

Jinnah supported the war effort. Gandhi & Co did not.  

During the war, the British government encouraged the demand for Pakistan and propagandized along Islamist lines against Hindus.

Niradh Chaudhuri says most Hindus were for Hitler. The Japanese, however, committed atrocities against Muslims and thus there was some possibility that Islamic sentiment could be stirred up against them.  


3. At several points you suggest that Churchill was inspired by the remembrance of the 1857 uprising to take steps that disregarded the value of civilian lives in India.

Churchill was constrained by the GoI act. There was a chain of command and a doctrine of collective responsibility. If Churchill did evil shit, Atlee too was complicit. 

But, as you note, in 1920, following the Amritsar massacre, Churchill denounced precisely that logic when it was used by Brigadier Reginald Dyer and his supporters to justify the tragedy that had occurred. Churchill decried what happened as “frightfulness” and called for accountability for Dyer. Doesn’t this suggest a different attitude towards the Indians?

Churchill mollified the crazy Ulstermen in Parliament before making a very simple point- was any General anywhere in the Empire willing to give Dyer a command? No. The guy was a nutter. Suppose he is made the Colonel of a Territorial Regiment. He might order the shooting of strikers. What would follow would be a Revolution. If even the Black & Tans didn't want Dyer, what was the point of sticking up for him? 

Incidentally, the Mutiny was very costly. Britain was broke. Geddes axe meant big cuts for the Army and Navy. Military commanders needed to be diplomatic. There was no money for an expensive campaign. As things were Churchill was being blamed for the vast expense of the Mesopotamian campaign.  


In 1920 Churchill was not hostile to Indians. The independence movement had yet to develop to its full strength; and the Indian Army, which was largely loyal to the British, had just sacrificed 60,000 lives in World War I.

Brits had sacrificed more than ten times that figure 

The British Empire was threatened mainly by actions such as Dyer’s. By killing more than a thousand Sikh civilians—at least by the Indian account—Dyer had undermined the loyalty of Sikh soldiers in the Indian Army.

No. Dyer went on to lead Indian soldiers in the third Afghan war. 

The army had accordingly dismissed Dyer;

He was put on the retired list. But so were thousands of others. 

and, as secretary of state for war, Churchill was called upon to defend the army’s action. Hence his speech denouncing “frightfulness,” or terror tactics.

Make a hero of Dyer and some young Captain in the Territorial might open fire on a bunch of picketers outside his Daddy's factory. That's how Revolutions happen.  

Incidentally, in these years Churchill was calling for gas attacks on rebellious Iraqis, in order to “spread a lively terror.”

In order to save money. Under the new arrangement, the British government had to pay for Indian troops used outside India. 

By the 1940s, the Indian situation had changed dramatically. The freedom movement, led by Gandhi, posed a potent challenge to the Empire and caused Churchill’s animosity toward Indians to escalate.

It had peaked at the time of the Round Table Conference & never really subsided (though Churchill got on well enough with Birla). 

And the Indian Army had acquired many native officers,

about 400, all told, in 1939- i.e. about ten percent 

whose loyalty could not be taken for granted. So Churchill ensured that if rebellion broke out in India, the colony’s best-equipped and -trained battalions would be fighting the Axis—on another continent.

That decision was made before he became PM. Though Congress resigned Ministries at the outbreak of war, no rebellion was apprehened till Feb 1942 & the fall of Singapore. Even then, it looked as though a deal would be done with Congress. Sadly, Gandhi overplayed his hand.  

India was bereft of defenses, so that when Japanese forces reached the colony’s borders, the War Cabinet ordered scorched-earth measures to deter their advance.

Burma had been separated out in 1937. A lot of materiel in South East had been abandoned during the British reteaat and thus fell into Japanese hands.  

The resulting destruction of rice and boats contributed to famine.

Whereas, if the Japs had gotten their hands on that rice and those boats, Bengalis could have enjoyed being raped and enslaved by their new conquerors.  


4. The central thesis in your book is that Churchill and the War Cabinet took a series of decisions which led inexorably to the starvation of between 1.5 and 3 million persons in 1943.

Lose Burma & food deficit states in India are going to take a hit. However, what sealed Bengal's fate was the 1937 election. Once Bengalis were running things, famine & ethnic cleansing became inevitable.  

You do not, however, charge that it was their conscious intention to starve these people to death—unlike what the Nazis did in 

Holland? 

east central Europe about this same time, when starvation was a conscious policy objective.

Slaves have to be fed. Nazis relied on slave labour. Still, I suppose, food requistioning is bound to impact food availability.  

But do you believe that they knew or should have known that this catastrophe would follow from their decisions?

If the Bengalis didn't want to impose rationing on themselves so as to feed the hungry, what could Churchill do about it? Tear up the GoI Act of 1935? But that would require a Parliamentary vote. The problem is that everybody thought Churchill's ideas about India were crazy. Nobody could put back the clock.  

The War Cabinet received repeated warnings that famine could result from its exhaustive use of Indian resources for the war effort—and ignored them.

They also received repeated warnings, from Hitler, that they should surrender before some really evil shit came down upon their heads. Sadly, they ignored these warnings.  

The Japanese occupation of Burma in March 1942 cut off rice imports, of between one and two million tons per year, to India. Instead of protecting the Indian public from the resultant food shortage,

as opposed to Japanese invaders 

the War Cabinet insisted that India absorb this loss

i.e. grow more food. Tell you what- why don't eat some of your sacred cows? Incidentally, even American people were having to 'absorb losses' by tightening their belt.  Thus, an American family in 1942 had a ration book with coupons for Sugar, coffee, meat, butter, cheese, and processed canned foods. In Bengal, if you had the money, you could eat as much as you liked. 

and, further, export rice to countries that could no longer get it from South East Asia. As a result, after war arrived at India’s borders, the colony exported 260,000 tons of rice in the fiscal year 1942-43.

The strange thing was that Indians preferred to get paid for the rice they produced rather than give it away to starving people.  


Meanwhile India’s war expenditures increased ten fold, and the government printed paper money to pay for them. In August 1942 a representative of India’s viceroy told the War Cabinet that runaway inflation could lead to “famines and riots.”

And a Japanese invasion could lead to a thousand years of slavery. The plain fact is, Indians didn't greatly care about the famine. Nobody is writing books about the corrupt politicians and businessmen who minted money during the famine.  


In December 1942, Viceroy Linlithgow warned that India’s grain supply was seriously short and he urgently needed 600,000 tons of wheat to feed soldiers and the most essential industrial workers.

Everybody was demanding more. Failure to do so meant more would be demanded of you.

The War Cabinet stated that ships were not available. In January 1943, Churchill moved most of the merchant ships operating in the Indian Ocean over to the Atlantic, in order to build up the United Kingdom’s stockpile of food and raw materials.

After all, Gandhi was telling him to 'Quit India'. It wasn't till March 1944 that that Brits stopped retreating from the Japanese. 

The Ministry of War Transport cautioned him that the shift would result in “violent changes and perhaps cataclysms” in trade around the Indian Ocean. (In addition to India, the colonies of Kenya, Tanganyika, and British Somaliland all suffered famine in 1943.) Although refusing to meet India’s need for wheat, Churchill insisted that India continue to export rice.

He also insisted Singapore not surrender. Much good it did him. 

With famine raging, in July 1943 Viceroy Linlithgow halted rice exports and again asked the War Cabinet for wheat imports, this time of 500,000 tons. That was the minimum required to feed the army and otherwise maintain the war effort. The news of impending shipments would indirectly ease the famine, he noted: any hoarders would anticipate a fall in prices and release grain, causing prices to fall in reality. But at a meeting on August 4, the War Cabinet failed to schedule even a single shipment of wheat for India. Instead, it ordered the buildup of a stockpile of wheat for feeding European civilians after they had been liberated. So 170,000 tons of Australian wheat bypassed starving India—destined not for consumption but for storage.

This made Bengali politicians & their business partners very rich.  

Meanwhile, the United Kingdom’s stockpile of food and raw materials, intended for shoring up the postwar British economy, reached 18.5 million tons, the highest ever.

Britain's contribution to the war effort was ten times that of India despite its much smaller population. Why? It was much richer and its people were far more productive. But Britain could not prevail on its own. Russian manpower & American airpower did the heavy lifting. Over the course of 1943, the Brits learned to accept their second class military status. The last Nazi victory of the war was against Churchill's campaing in the Dodecanese (which the Germans took over from the Italians).  

Sugar and oilseeds overflowed warehouses and had to be stored outdoors, under tarpaulins.

Churchill thought a second front in Greece & the Balkans could be opened up. Feed the Greeks and they will be better able to fight for you. But without American airpower, the UK could do nothing in that theater.  

Of course Churchill knew that his priorities would result in mass death.

Nobody knew this for a fact save those who were familiar with the corruption and callousness of the Bengali people. Why didn't their Premier impose the same draconian type of rationing that Churchill had implemented in England?  

In one of his tirades against Indians, he said they were “breeding like rabbits” anyway.

An argument frequently made by Indians who opposed higher taxes to pay for the public food distribution system.  

On behalf of Indians, the War Cabinet ignored an offer of 100,000 tons of Burmese rice from freedom fighter Subhas Chandra Bose

who couldn't deliver shit to anybody 

(who was allied with the Japanese), discouraged a gift of wheat from Canada, and turned down rice and wheat volunteered by the United States.

But it wasn't Churchill & his chums who benefitted by high black market food prices in Bengal. It was the Muslim League & their crony capitalists. 

The War Cabinet eventually ordered for India 80,000 tons of wheat and 130,000 tons of barley. (Barley was useless for famine relief because it had no impact on prices.) The first of these meager shipments reached India in November. All the while, the Indian Army consumed local rice and wheat that might otherwise have fed the starving.

No. The starving wouldn't have got anything. The food would be diverted to tbe black market by elected Bengali politicians.  

The famine came to an end in December 1943, when Bengal harvested its own rice crop—at which point Churchill and his friend Cherwell renewed their demand for rice exports.

Churchill could demand things just as Hitler and Stalin could demand things. The difference was that Churchill could be safely ignored. Defying Hitler or Stalin was fatal.  


5. Another figure who comes in for a shellacking in your book is Frederick Alexander Lindemann, later Lord Cherwell, an Anglo-German known as “the Prof,” who exercised a powerful influence over Churchill. You describe Cherwell as an impressive scientist but also someone who harbored some rather sinister Malthusian ideas with a latent racist component. What were these ideas and how did they contribute to the famine?

Sadly, Cherwell was right. The Viceroy was wrong. Famine didn't matter to Indians. Suhrawardy became Premier in 1946. Similarly, Mujib would have been re-elected despite the 1974 famine if he hadn't been assassinated (and had bothered to hold elections).  


All the evidence points to the prime minister and his closest adviser having believed that Indians were ordained to reside at the bottom of the social pyramid, such that their financial ascendancy as creditors during the war became a source of frustration and fury.

Churchill didn't get that if you owe the bank a billion, then you own the bank. Sterling balances meant that India & Pakistan had to play nice with the UK when he returned to power.  

Long after India had obtained independence, the Prof would describe the “abdication of the white man” as the worst calamity of the twentieth century—more deplorable than two world wars and the Holocaust.

Five years after he died (in 1957) so many dark skinned people had signalled their agreement with him by emigratint to the UK, that the country was forced to introduce curbs on immigration from the Commonwealth. 

Niradh Chaudhuri's first book- demanding the return of White colonizers to Bengal- had been met with fury in India. By the mid-Sixties he was considered a prophet. His articles found a ready market within India. Then he settled in the UK where his health improved. It wasn't just Indians who were shitty. The country itself was hostile to human life. 


Judging by a lecture that Cherwell gave in the 1930s, he regarded colonial subjects as “helots,” or slaves,

Gandhi & Nehru & Bose kept saying Indians were slaves.  

whose only reason for existence was the service of racial superiors. In drafts of this talk, he outlined how science could help entrench the hegemony of the higher races. By means of hormones, drugs, mind control, and surgery, one could remove from slaves the ability to suffer or to feel ambition—yielding humans with “the mental make-up of the worker bee.” Such a lobotomized race would have no thought of rebellion or votes, so that one would end up with a perfectly peaceable and permanent society, “led by supermen and served by helots.”

These were drafts, not the published article. The truth is, Cherwell was a pal of Churchill. He stuck by him in his wilderness years and was rewarded for it. Don't forget, most Tories didn't like Churchill.  

In November 1943, Cherwell urged Churchill to hold firm against demands for famine relief.

 Churchill's job was to win the war. If the autonomous government of Bengal didn't want to introduce British style rationing, Churchill had no locus standi to force them to do so. After all, they knew their own country best. 

Some did warn that famine would help the Communists which in turn would threaten the 'Permanent Settlement'. But, Fazl had become Premier in 1937 promising to get rid of the thing. In other words, Britian had no business meddling in the fiscal arrangements of a distant, autonomous, Province of an Indian Empire which might, at any moment, gain a Federal Government of its own. 

Else, he warned, “so long as the war lasts [India’s] high birthrate may impose a heavy strain on this country which does not view with Asiatic detachment the pressure of a growing population on limited supplies of food.” That is, he blamed the famine on the irresponsible fecundity of natives—and ignored the devastation of the Indian economy by the war effort. He also elided the fact that the War Cabinet was preventing India from using its ample sterling balance or even its own ships to import sufficient wheat.

Very true. Premier Nazimuddin would say 'lets ration food'. Cherwell would fly down to Calcutta and brutally sodomize him till he agreed to let the poor starve.  

By Cherwell’s Malthusian argument, England should have been the first to starve.

No. Britain's birthrate was 15 per 1000. India's was 48. Moreover, the Brits were welcome to emigrate (indeed, were subsidised to do so) to the vast, empty, settler colonies. Nobody wanted Indians save for coolie work. 

It was being kept alive by massive imports.

Which it paid for.  

In 1943 the United Kingdom imported 4 million tons of wheat, 1.6 million tons of meat, 1.4 million tons of sugar, 409,000 heads of live cattle, 325,000 tons of fish, 131,000 tons of rice, 206,000 tons of tea, 172,000 tons of cocoa, and 1.1 million gallons of wine for its 47.7 million people—a population an eighth that of India.

Because the Brits were highly productive and hence could afford lots of food. True, wealthy Indians had better rations during the War than wealthy Britishers but that was because they didn't give a fuck about those of their own people who were starving.  

To Cherwell and also to Churchill, colonial subjects were worth saving only if they made a direct contribution to the war effort

Churchill couldn't save British subjects (and over 50,000 British soldiers) in Malaya and Burma from the Japanese. 

I suppose what Madhushree means is that, during a war, Governments preferentially feed their soldiers and those involved in defence related industries.

It must be said Bengali officials, on orders from elected Bengali politicians, did requisition food at below free-market prices. This why they were able to make so much money. 

According to Field Marshal Wavell, Churchill wanted to feed only those Indians who were “actually fighting or making munitions or working some particular railways.” The rest were dispensable.

Wavell had to use great brutality to put down the Quit India revolt. True, British casualties were minimal but the thing was bad for morale more particularly because the Japs continued to press forward till July 1944. Like Allenby in Egypt, 22 years previously, Wavell became defeatist. He wanted to evacuate the White population before utter chaos consumed the country.  


6. Arthur Herman argues that you rely too heavily on Leo Amery’s diaries, recording Churchill’s intemperate outbursts, and pass by the fact that Churchill took decisive steps to ameliorate the famine. “Without Churchill,” he says, “the famine would have been worse.” How do you respond to this?

Churchill was irrelevant. He gambled on a 'soft underbelly' strategy in 1943 but it quickly came unstuck. Britain was now revealed to be a second rate power. Australia and Canada would deal directly with the US. What about India? Mountbatten (and Blackett, a little later) befriended Nehru who was suspicious of Yankee domination. But Pakistan gladly allied with Eisenhower's America. 



My indictment is based on what Churchill did, not on what he said. The Ministry of War Transport papers, the Cherwell Papers, and the official histories of British wartime food supply, shipping, and economy are my key sources.

They are irrelevant. Why? Bengal was ruled by elected Bengali politicians. Churchill never visited India after his stint there as a soldier ended in 1899. Amery, the Secretary of State, was born in India but only visited in 1948 after he left office. My point is, India was a side show.  

They show, for instance, that the War Cabinet scheduled eighteen ships to load with Australian wheat in September and October, 1943. Not one of these ships was destined for famine-stricken India.

The Mayor of Calcutta did appeal to the Americans for food. Interestingly, he chose to remain in Hindu India after Partition. This suggests that he wasn't one of the guys who got rich at that time.  

Had anyone else been prime minister,

Lord Halifax? Lloyd George? Clement Atlee?  

he would have striven to relieve India’s plight instead of consigning wheat to stockpiles.

No. Churchill was mulish on the Indian question. Others would have contrived some cosmetic sort of self-government. The problem was that India was very poor. It could supply mercenaries but its own force projection capacity was limited by its very low per capita GDP. Thus, though Japan had about 80 per cent of India's GDP, it could have three times as many active combatants. 

Churchill’s diatribes, as recorded in Amery’s and others’ diaries, are, however, useful in understanding why he acted as he did.

No. They are useless. To understand his actions during the War, you have to understand his military delusions.  

Famine had failed to temper his hostility toward Indians. Churchill would tell his secretary that Hindus were a foul race protected by their rapid breeding from “the doom that is their due.” He wished Arthur Harris, the head of British bomber command, could “send some of his surplus bombers to destroy them.”

He also got drunk and said that the Labour Party might establish a Gestapo. Sadly, he said this on the BBC radio. This cost him a lot of votes. People thought the old boy was off his rocker. Oddly, after a stroke or two, he became a decent enough Prime Minister in his second spell in office. 

Madhushree Mukherjee vs Amartya Sen

Madhushree drew Sen's ire by the following passage from a letter she sent the NYT 


In his review of my book, Churchill’s Secret War [NYR, December 23, 2010], Joseph Lelyveld notes that I do not discuss Amartya Sen’s assertion that Bengal contained enough grain to ward off famine.

If this were the case, Churchill could not have secretly starved the Bengalis.  

I avoided this aspect of Sen’s work because his conclusion of sufficiency in Bengal has been seriously challenged.

They were nonsense. If Bengal had a bumper crop in 1943, food prices would have fallen because the demand for food is inelastic. The Government, or charities, could have easily procured food and opened 'langars' (soup kitchens).  

Historian Mark Tauger has shown that Sen based his crop estimates on projections,

made up figures. Ian Stephenson, in his book Monsoon Mornings, explains why everybody in Bengal knew the official figures were made up.  

and that crop diseases spread by wet weather appear to have drastically reduced the actual harvest. The notes in my book contain a number of different estimates of the crop shortage, all of which are substantial. Furthermore, in his paper Sen misquoted the government’s estimate of the rice shortfall as a mere 140,000 tons (instead of the 1.4 million tons stated in the document he cites)—which led him to mistakenly claim that the authorities could not have predicted famine.

Sen’s insight that loss of entitlement provides a deeper explanation for famine remains true and profound,

It was nonsense. People had an entitlement to food. The Government was corrupt and incompetent and thus there was entitlement failure. Otherwise, just by getting arrested, everybody would have been getting three square meals a day. Sadly, there wasn't enough food.  

however. My work shows that the concept can be extended to include the far larger entitlement of British citizens than of colonial subjects to food—as illustrated by several of Churchill’s decisions. 

Gandhi was just as much a British subject as Churchill. The word 'citizen' was only used after Labour came to power. 

British people in the UK had good leaders who ensured they got enough food to eat. Some poor Bengali people in Bengal did not get enough food because they had shitty leaders.  

Amartya Sen replied thus- 

Madhusree Mukerjee seems satisfied with little information.

She has more than Sen did.  

Mark Tauger’s data come from exactly two “rice research stations” from two districts in undivided Bengal,

Whereas Sen comes from zero stations (though he tries to make out Sriniketan was some such thing) 

which had twenty-seven districts.

If rice output really had gone up, as Sen claims, the price would have fallen. But it fell. Thus Sen is wrong.  

Since weather variations have regionally diverse effects, it would require more than this to “seriously challenge” the analysis I made, using data from all districts,

all of that data was made up as Ian Stephens had remarked. This was known to everybody- including Sen's daddy and uncle and B.R Sen and Mahalanobis etc. Suppose Sen is right and there was more food in 1943 than in 1941, why did the price rise rather than fall? Economists all around the world would have been studying this question.  

which indicated that food availability in 1943 (the famine year) was significantly higher than in 1941 (when there was no famine).

Sen had met Ian Stephens. Did he not read his book? How could a Bengali who did his first degree in Bengal not know that Bengali food statistics were made up?  

Ignoring the range of data I used in my study,

Sen claimed that some notebooks kept at Sriniketan showed there was plenty of food. But Sriniketan was a charity. It didn't sell food at the market price.  

she misdescribes my estimates as being based only “on projections.”

They were based on made up figures.  

On the other point mentioned by Mukerjee, she makes a story out of a typo in my quotation from a statement of the secretary of state for India, omitting to mention that the typo has not the slightest bearing on my assessment of the food situation.

So much the worse for Sen. The Government says there is a shortfall. Everybody else agrees there is a shortfall. Only Sen says there was more food, not less.  

Moreover, even a “shortage” of 1.4 million tons is a small proportion of the total crop of “60/70 million tons” (as the secretary of state mentioned).

A two percent fall in the supply of food is likely to cause at least a 4 to 10 percent rise in price because food is inelastic in demand. This assumes the food market clears which does not happen where food is requisitioned and supplied at one price to some with others being left at the mercy of the black market (assuming there are 'market makers' accessible to them).  

The confounding issue, of course, is the idea of “shortage” itself, as Lelyveld has noted.

It isn't confounding at all. Was there more food? No. Was there corruption? Yes. This meant that the public distribution system faced a massive shortage- i.e. could not get enough food to discharge its obligations. This is why the Mayor of Calcutta wrote to the American President asking for food shipments. 

There was indeed a substantial shortfall compared with demand, hugely enhanced in a war economy, as I have described in detail, but that is quite different from a shortfall of supply compared with supply in previous years.

No. It is exactly the same thing. There was less food in Bengal in 1943 compared to 1941.  

Mukerjee seems to miss this crucial distinction,

It is a figment of Sen's imagination 

and in her single-minded, if understandable, attempt to nail down Churchill,

If Bengal had more food in 1943 than in 1941 then Churchill would have been highly irresponsible if he sent food to Calcutta. Why? He would have crashed the price and ruined the hardworking farmer.  

she ends up absolving British imperial policy of confusion and callousness, which had disastrous consequences.

How could it have disastrous consequences? The Bengalis were an agricultural people. If they had more food in 1943 than in 1941, they had less, not more, need for food shipments. 

 

 

Madhushree Mukherjee & how Churchill starved Bengalis

 Madhushree Mukherjee- a physicist & successful Science Journalist- wrote a very readable book blaming Churchill for the Bengal Famine.

I suppose one could say 'Churchill as Chancellor took a shilling off income tax instead of spending it on the navy. This doomed Singapore and thus the British Empire in Asia.' The problem here is that Churchill had been in the wilderness during the Thirties. That's when he earned notoriety for attacking the Tory plan for transferring power to the Indians. When he returned to power, his colleagues found him 'not quite sane' on the topic of India. This did not greatly matter because he had little influence on Indian policy. 

To my mind, Mukherjee's best argument has to do with availability of shipping in 1943. 

In a letter to the NYR, she wrote

in January 1943 (Churchill) acted on Cherwell’s advice to remove 60 percent of the merchant ships from the Indian Ocean, so that these vessels could instead be used to shore up the United Kingdom’s supplies of food and raw materials.

Churchill was the Prime Minister of the UK, not India. Moreover, the UK was vital to the Allies' war effort. Bengal was inconsequential.  

By this move, he made it impossible for Australian wheat to be carried to India and triggered the famine in Bengal.

Could Churchill have stopped the Americans or the Australians or any other country transporting food to Bengal? No. He had no such power. He made a decision on the basis of what he thought was best for his country & the Allied War Effort. 

On the other hand, it is true that Churchill did not travel to India to prevent a nasty dog from chasing my mother's cat up a tree. This proves Churchill hated Indian cats and secretly killed lots of them.  

In ther book 'Churchill's secret war' she writes

In truth, perhaps at no other period during the war than in the summer and fall of 1943 did the number of ships at hand so greatly exceed those already committed to Allied operations.

Quite true. The Allies had supremacy in the Indian littoral by the end of 1943. The Japanese were having to pivot to the Pacific 

The war against U-boats was won and American production of ships was increasing steeply; the net gain for the Allies had been 1.5 million tons of shipping in May alone. That month the president had transferred to British control fifteen to twenty cargo vessels for the duration of the war. By the summer of 1943, the British shipping crisis had given way to what historian Kevin Smith calls a ”shipping glut” and the S branch would refer to as ”[w]indfall shipping.” Lord Arthur Salter, who had headed the British shipping mission to Washington, returned to London to find that instead of worrying about the scarcity of ships, his colleagues were now concerned about the impact on postwar trade of too many ships in American hands. So many vessels would present at North American ports that autumn to be loaded with supplies to add to the United Kingdom’s stockpile that not enough cargo could be found to fill them.

In other words, a shipping glut could not magically create surpluses to fill the holds of those ships.  

If ever during the war a window had opened for saving lives in Bengal—at no discernible cost to the war effort—this was it.

But releasing food stocks in Bengal would have crashed the price of food leaving the cronies of the ruling party (the Muslim League had taken power in April) out of pocket. Moreover, there was still a Japanese threat. The battle of Imphal began in March 1944. It was by no means a foregone conclusion that Bose & his Indian National Army would be useless. Why bring in food which might enable the Japs to escape starvation?

The prime minister had other uses for the surplus ships, however. He had observed in mid-July that the ”immense saving” in shipping had been ”partly allowed for in our calculations and plans, but if maintained should require a further drastic re-examination of these in a favourable sense.” He urged that some of the extra ships be used to restore white bread to the United Kingdom.

Churchill was a British MP. He wanted his people to have better food. What's wrong with that?  

With the remainder, the War Cabinet would continue to bolster the United Kingdom’s stockpile— and it would create a second one in the Mediterranean region, in preparation for a British liberation of the Balkans.

Again, this was a perfectly reasonable war aim. Feed your future allies & they will fight side by side with you so as to completely defeat and occupy Germany.


As First Lord of the Admiralty during World War I, Churchill had pushed through a seaborne attack on the Ottoman Empire.

The invasion of Italy in September 1943 was a 'soft underbelly' strategy. Churchill had met the Turkinst President in January, but an alliance was not feasible. Greeks and Serbs would have scarcely welcomed Turkish troops. The Bulgarians were already with the Axis.  

The Gallipoli (or Dardanelles) campaign had ended in dismal failure, with more than 40,000 Allied troops killed, and Churchill’s superiors had forced his resignation. He had retained an interest in the region—and an apparent desire to prove, by means of a successful reprise, that his strategic concept had been sound. Churchill hoped that military successes in the vicinity of Turkey would induce that nation, which remained neutral, to join the war on the Allied side and provide an unconventional route for attacking Germany and supplying the Soviet Union.

Churchill, quite naturally, wanted to end the agony of Greece. It was only in October 1944 that the Allies were able to land there.  

Historian A.J.P. Taylor would describe Churchill’s strategy as a ”strange fantasy.” The venture was doomed for several reasons, including mountainous terrain in the Balkans that was easy for the enemy to defend, the Turkish determination to stay out of the war, and American hostility to the plan—which would lead the president and his generals to withhold vital military equipment.[387]




As a prelude to what he envisioned as a full-scale campaign in the region, on August 3, 1943, Churchill had instructed his military chiefs to prepare for an occupation of islands in the Aegean Sea (which lies between Greece and Turkey).

 This was the Dodecanese campaign (8 September – 22 November 1943), the last German victory of the War. They defeated the Italian and British garrison. The episode showed the crucial importance of air-support- which is also what enabled the Allies to get the Japs out of Burma (by air-dropping food to their men who then went around the Japs, leaving them to starve)

Australian wheat and the surplus ships would meanwhile be used to build up a substantial stockpile for feeding the civilian population of southeastern Europe—just in case these inadequately supported but prospectively heroic efforts in the eastern Mediterranean led to freedom for Greece, Yugoslavia, and other Balkan countries.

In other words, Churchill hoped to use food to get valourous soldiers with a burning desire for vengeance. Meanwhile Bose, the great Bengali leader, had recruited Indians for the Waffen SS and then gone over to the Japanese.  

Premier Fazl ul Haq had demanded food for Bengal in August 1942 & then, in March, asked that controls on transport of food be suspended so Bengal could get grain from Punjab. The problem was that he was close to the Bose brothers and the Muslim League (whose support was vital for the war effort) wanted to bring him down. Thus, his successor, Nazimuddin, insisted that Bengal had enough resources (i.e. his supporters could continue to get rich by diverting food from the public distribution system to the black market).

Of course, to speak of corruption would be damaging to war-time morale (why should White soldiers die so that darkies can line their pockets) and so various officials gave themselves an alibi, one way or another. 

”India’s need is absolutely urgent and immediate,” Amery would remonstrate in late October. ”Relief for the Balkans, badly needed as it is, cannot be delivered in any quantities for many months to come for the simple reason that the enemy still control the situation. As for depleting our stocks here to danger point, that is a pretty remote consideration, especially now that we have got so effective a whiphand over the U-boats.'

This may have been true, but it was beside the point. If the Premier of Bengal- who is an actual Bengali- says there is enough food then who is the Secretary of State to claim otherwise? Either provincial autonomy is a sham or the Secretary of State should take the Premier's word for it. 

I suppose, all the Brits involved, gave themselves an alibi one way or another. 

In March, Governor Herbert had requested permission to use special wartime ordinances to dismiss Bengal’s cabinet,

i.e. get rid of Fazl ul Haq. But the League would only be happy if it formed the Ministry. 

which he felt would enable him to deal directly with the food problem. Linlithgow replied that these coercive laws were for containing political subversion, not for solving problems of food supply, which might ”disappear entirely”—after the war was over.

Linlithgow wasn't a fool. He knew lots of people were making vast sums of money on the black market.  

Linlithgow did lift provincial barriers so that Bengal could purchase rice in Bihar and Orissa.

But not Punjab. 

This time the food minister, Huseyn Suhrawardy, appointed the Ispahani Company the principal buyer of grain, giving it an advance of 30 million rupees and instructions to buy at any price. (An exhausted Leonard George Pinnell had departed for a district posting.) Prices in Bihar and Orissa immediately rose, and starvation deaths were reported there, so the administrators of those provinces defied the Government of India’s orders, arrested the purchasing agents, and held up grain shipments to Bengal. They suspected fraud—and, indeed, a subcontractor of the Ispahanis was later proved to have cheated the government out of millions of rupees.

This is the real story of the 1943 and 1974 famines in Bengal. Churchill caused them by failing to collectivize Indian agriculture and establish a pure Communist state. By failing to ban dicks, he also caused RAPE. Fuck you, Churchill! Fuck you very much!



Monday, 17 August 2026

Christopher Bollas, Booker & Socioproctology

 I asked Copilot to 'Write monograph chapter on Christopher Bollas's influence on Vivek Iyer'

Takeaway: This chapter presents a full monograph‑level treatment of how Christopher Bollas’s concept of extractive introjection forms the psychoanalytic core of Vivek Iyer’s satirical‑epistemic method in Socioproctology. Bollas provides the mechanism (the narcissistic appropriation and depletion of another’s psychic or symbolic vitality), while Iyer provides the diagnostic frame (how this mechanism manifests in intellectual behaviour, producing conceptual prolapse, moral inflation, and policy nonsense). Booker remains relevant as the theorist of collapse, but Bollas is the theorist of the theft that precedes it.

**Chapter IV — The Bollasian Engine of Socioproctology:

Extractive Introjection as Intellectual Pathology**

1. Introduction: Why Bollas Matters for Iyer

Christopher Bollas’s theory of extractive introjection describes a pathological relational process in which one subject introjects aspects of another’s psyche and then extracts vitality, meaning, or symbolic capital from the internalised object. The other person is left depleted; the introjector becomes inflated.

Vivek Iyer’s Socioproctology repurposes this mechanism with striking fidelity. His intellectual protagonists introject not people but discourses—rights, capabilities, activism, moralised economics—and then extract from them moral prestige, rhetorical authority, and heroic self‑image. The discourse is left hollow; the intellectual becomes inflated.

This chapter argues that Bollas provides the psychoanalytic engine of Iyer’s critique. Extractive introjection explains why certain intellectuals produce arguments that are simultaneously morally grandiose, analytically vacuous, and institutionally harmful.

Guided links:

  • Christopher Bollas

  • Socioproctology

2. Bollas’s Concept: Extractive Introjection in Clinical Form

Bollas’s extractive introjection is a mechanism of psychic appropriation:

  • The subject introjects an aspect of another person’s internal world.

  • The subject then extracts vitality, creativity, or symbolic meaning from the introjected object.

  • The other person is left depleted, while the introjector becomes inflated.

  • The process is unconscious and often rooted in narcissistic pathology.

This is not imitation. It is a form of psychic theft.

In Bollas’s clinical cases, the extractive introjector:

  • drains the other’s emotional life,

  • appropriates their worldview,

  • steals their creativity,

  • and uses the extracted material to maintain a fragile ego.

Guided links:

  • introjection

  • narcissistic pathology

3. Iyer’s Adaptation: Extractive Introjection as Intellectual Theft

Iyer transposes Bollas’s mechanism from interpersonal relations to intellectual behaviour. His protagonists introject discourses rather than people.

Iyer’s three‑stage Bollasian model:

  1. Introjection of a valorised discourse The intellectual internalises a socially prestigious discourse—rights, capabilities, activism, “speaking truth to power.”

  2. Extraction of symbolic capital They mine the discourse for:

    • moral prestige,

    • rhetorical authority,

    • heroic self‑image,

    • immunity from analytic scrutiny.

  3. Externalisation as theory or policy The extracted material is projected outward as:

    • moralised economics,

    • activist scholarship,

    • policy proposals with no mechanism,

    • discursive “solutions” to coordination problems.

The discourse is left hollow, stripped of causal content. The intellectual becomes inflated, not through reasoning but through appropriation of moral vitality.

Guided links:

  • Iyer’s method

  • narrative pathology

4. Why Bollas Fits Iyer’s Project: The Narcissistic Structure of Intellectual Error

Iyer’s central puzzle is: Why do highly educated thinkers produce arguments that collapse under minimal analytic pressure?

Bollas provides the answer: Because they are engaged in extractive introjection—appropriating moral prestige to maintain a narcissistic self‑image.

Three structural homologies:

  • (a) Narcissistic ego‑maintenance Bollas’s introjector steals vitality to maintain the ego. Iyer’s intellectual steals moral prestige to maintain heroic self‑image.

  • (b) Depletion of the object Bollas: the other person is left depleted. Iyer: the discourse (rights, capabilities, democracy) is left hollow.

  • (c) Inflation of the subject Bollas: the introjector becomes falsely enriched. Iyer: the intellectual becomes a moral hero without analytic labour.

Thus, Iyer’s intellectual pathology is a Bollasian narcissistic pathology in epistemic form.

5. Extractive Introjection and Conceptual Prolapse: The Proctological Turn

Iyer’s scatological metaphor—prolapse—marks the moment when extractive introjection produces conceptual waste rather than analytic content.

Mechanism of prolapse:

  • The introjected discourse is metabolised poorly.

  • The extraction is self‑serving rather than analytic.

  • The externalisation is excretory rather than reasoned.

  • The resulting theory is structurally nonsensical.

This is Bollas’s pathology rendered in epistemic terms: the intellectual’s internal world cannot process what it steals, so it collapses into prolapse.

Guided links:

  • akreibia

  • Knightian uncertainty

6. Booker’s Role After Bollas: Collapse as Narrative Fate

Once Bollas provides the mechanism of inflation, Christopher Booker provides the structure of collapse. Booker’s tragic ego:

  • introjects a false self‑image,

  • extracts a distorted narrative,

  • becomes blind to reality,

  • collapses under contradiction.

This is precisely the fate of Iyer’s intellectual protagonists.

Thus:

  • Bollas → mechanism of theft

  • Iyer → epistemic diagnosis

  • Booker → narrative collapse

Guided links:

  • Booker’s meta‑plot

  • Seven Basic Plots

7. Extractive Introjection as the Psychoanalytic Core of Socioproctology

With Bollas restored to his rightful place, we can state the chapter’s thesis clearly:

Extractive introjection is the psychoanalytic engine of Iyer’s critique. It explains why intellectuals cling to moralised narratives, why analytic content collapses, and why satire becomes necessary as diagnosis.

Iyer’s intellectual protagonists are not merely mistaken; they are engaged in a Bollasian theft of vitality from discourse. Their conceptual prolapse is the inevitable result of a narcissistic metabolism that cannot process what it steals.

Christopher Booker as a precursor of Socioproctology

 When I was 16,  I liked Christopher Booker's pieces in the Spectator. My memory is that I actually signed up one or two fellow first years at the LSE with a view to gaining accreditation from the Student's Union for a 'Christopher Booker Appreciation Society'. 

Then Dad arranged for me to dine with Alexander Chancellor, editor of the Spectator, who had brought in Booker some four or five years previously. Chancellor was a straightforward bloke. He severely discouraged my adolescent crush on his Jungian friend. My memory is that someone, either Dad or Chancellor, quoted some Latin or Greek or Sanskrit tag to the effect 'We are depreciated by what we appreciate'. Paideia is nothing but deflation when it isn't 'practicing death'. 

I was reminded of this today reading a tweet by Richard North (Booker's writing partner) on the Arday affair. 

I asked Copilot whether my own Socioproctology had been influenced by Booker's hysterical shite.

This was the answer I received within 5 seconds.

Christopher Booker, Narrative Pathology, and the Satirical Epistemology of Socioproctology

A Comparative Essay in Narrative Theory and Intellectual Satire

I. Introduction: Narrative Theory Meets Satirical Epistemology

Christopher Booker’s monumental study The Seven Basic Plots (2004) proposes that human storytelling is governed by deep psychological structures rooted in archetypal patterns of ego, self‑knowledge, and moral integration. Vivek Iyer’s Socioproctology, by contrast, is a satirical, often caustic commentary on intellectual error, policy confusion, and the recurrent tendency of public thinkers to mistake narrative coherence for causal adequacy. Although the two authors operate in radically different registers—Booker in mythopoetic psychology, Iyer in comic‑analytic polemic—their work converges on a shared insight: human reasoning is inseparable from narrative, and when narrative goes wrong, reasoning collapses.

This essay argues that Booker’s narrative psychology provides a structural analogue for Iyer’s “proctological” method. Booker’s tragic ego, inflated and blind to reality, maps onto Iyer’s intellectual protagonist who suffers conceptual prolapse, mistaking moral rhetoric for analytic rigor. The comparison is interpretive rather than genealogical; no textual evidence suggests direct influence. Yet the resonance is strong enough to justify a sustained academic exploration.

Guided links:

  • Booker’s meta‑plot

  • Socioproctology

II. Booker’s Narrative Psychology: Ego, Archetype, and the Failure of Integration

Booker’s central thesis is that stories are psychological maps tracing the movement from ego‑inflation to self‑integration. His seven plots—Overcoming the Monster, Rags to Riches, The Quest, Voyage and Return, Comedy, Tragedy, and Rebirth—are not merely literary categories but archetypal patterns of human development. The tragic plot, in particular, is defined by:

  • Ego‑inflation: the protagonist becomes absorbed in a false self‑image.

  • Loss of self‑knowledge: the hero cannot see the limits of their own perspective.

  • Detachment from reality: the narrative becomes increasingly self‑referential.

  • Collapse: the story ends in destruction or humiliation.

Booker’s tragic hero is thus a figure of narrative pathology—someone whose story has ceased to reflect the world and instead reflects only their own illusions.

Guided links:

  • Jungian archetypes

  • Narrative pathology

III. Iyer’s Socioproctology: Intellectual Error as Narrative Dysfunction

Iyer’s Socioproctology is not a treatise on narrative, yet it repeatedly diagnoses intellectual failure in narrative terms. Economists, activists, and policy theorists are portrayed as protagonists trapped in stories that no longer correspond to reality. Their errors are not merely technical but mythic: they cling to narratives of moral heroism, technocratic mastery, or discursive salvation.

Iyer’s recurring targets—Amartya Sen, certain development economists, activist‑academics—are depicted as suffering from:

  • Conceptual prolapse: the collapse of analytic structure under moral pressure.

  • Over‑precision (akreibia) in domains where uncertainty forbids it.

  • Narrative substitution: replacing causal reasoning with moral storytelling.

  • Coordination blindness: ignoring game‑theoretic constraints in favour of heroic narratives.

These failures are not random; they follow a pattern analogous to Booker’s tragic ego. The intellectual protagonist becomes inflated, blind, and detached from reality, leading to policy nonsense.

Guided links:

  • akreibia

  • Knightian uncertainty

IV. Archetypes and Anti‑Archetypes: Booker’s Mythic Figures vs. Iyer’s Intellectual Types

Booker’s archetypes—hero, mentor, monster—are psychological projections. Iyer’s intellectual types are satirical projections of epistemic dysfunction. Yet both operate as structural roles within narrative systems.

Booker’s ArchetypeIyer’s Intellectual TypeStructural Function
HeroEconomist‑MessiahProtagonist of a redemption narrative
MonsterComplexity, uncertaintyThe “villain” intellectuals refuse to face
MentorEmpirical realityThe guide whose lessons are ignored
Tragic EgoConceptually prolapsed theoristThe figure who collapses under contradiction

Iyer’s satire thus becomes a kind of anti‑mythology, in which intellectuals enact distorted versions of Booker’s archetypal plots.

Guided links:

  • Booker’s seven plots

  • Iyer’s method

V. Narrative Failure as Epistemic Failure: Booker’s Tragedy and Iyer’s Proctology

Booker’s tragic plot is defined by the protagonist’s refusal to integrate self‑knowledge. Iyer’s intellectual tragedy is defined by the refusal to integrate:

  • uncertainty,

  • computability constraints,

  • coordination failures,

  • institutional realities.

Both authors diagnose ego‑pathology, but Iyer’s version is comic and scatological rather than mythic. Booker’s tragic hero collapses because he clings to illusion; Iyer’s intellectual collapses because he clings to theory.

The parallel is structural:

  • Booker: narrative → psychology → collapse

  • Iyer: narrative → epistemology → policy collapse

Guided links:

  • coordination games

  • marginal propensity

VI. Conclusion: Booker as an Unacknowledged Structural Influence

There is no evidence that Iyer read Booker. Yet Booker’s narrative psychology offers a powerful interpretive framework for understanding Socioproctology. Both authors treat human reasoning as fundamentally narrative, and both diagnose failure as a form of narrative pathology. Booker’s tragic ego and Iyer’s prolapsed intellectual are structurally analogous figures whose stories collapse under the weight of their own illusions.

Thus, while the influence is not historical, it is conceptual: Booker’s theory helps illuminate the deep structure of Iyer’s satirical epistemology.