Wednesday, 2 September 2026

Max Miller on democratization & redistribution

 To redistribute assets, you need 'control rights' over them. These are costly to acquire and maintain. That is why when I try to redistribute the baby's candy to myself, he beats the shit out of me and keeps the candy bar. 

A regime has to defend the assets in its territory from predators- external or internal- or else it will be replaced. Defending territory may involve assigning control rights to guys who are good at fighting or who are good at producing vital goods and services. 

As Graciella Chichilnisky has noted, under a 'Goldilocks' condition for endowment and preference diversity, both open markets and representative democracy can function quite well. Sadly, if such diversity becomes too large or too small, both markets and representative insitutions will disappear or become irrelevant. 

Democratization occurs when conflicts as to who should rule are resolved by holding elections. We say 'democratization' increases when the suffrage is expanded and where the elected chamber holds more power. However, if the hands of the Legislature are increasingly bound by Treaty Law or a diminished Judicial  'doctrine of political question' we may say that Democracy has decreased. The regime is more judicio-bureaucratic or 'Corporatist'. 

Is Democracy connected to redistribution? Revolution may be so. Democracy may appear a peaceful way to achieve Revolutionary aims. However, the devil is in the detail. An elected Chamber may be less capable of effective redistribution than an authoritarian State Agency. Equally, if only regressive taxes can finance National Security, democracy is the method of using representation to get the taxation. 

Democratic movements traditionally offered support to land reform programs in agricultural countries. As the percentage of the workforce employed on the land fell, this became less urgent or attractive. Conversely, Industrialization was associated with the burgeoning of parties which supported organized labour against Employer's confederations. Finacialization, or the shift to the tertiary sector, has been associated with increased 'Identity' politics. Traits other than the economic have gained salience. Politics is more about affiliation than gaining or retaining affluence. 

During certain periods, there have also been calls to 'squeeze the rich, till the pips squeak'. In particular, 'unearned income' (dividends, interest payments, rents) have been taxed at a higher rate. Employers may be subject to higher taxes and contributions for worker's health & retirement benefits. The problem here is that factors which are inelastic in the short run become elastic in the long run. Thus raising tax rates ends up lowering revenue.  If industries disappear, workers- whether unionized or not- lose their jobs.

What can be redistributed is 'rent'. But factors in elastic supply earn no rent. You can't take away what isn't there. Raise the tax and businesses go elsewhere. You are left with nothing. 

In some countries, the majority harbours hatred and envy of particular minorities. Such minorities may value a Monarch or Dictator because Democracy would mean their losing their property and even their lives.

It can also be the case that the vast majority in a country are too poor to pay taxes. They are also stupid and ignorant. Here, a transition to democracy may mean that the country quickly goes bankrupt as those with the means to pay taxes, run the fuck away. This is an example of a Democracy where the majority may come to regret having gained the vote. 

In a paper titled 'Who values Democracy' Max Miller writes. 

This paper examines the conventional view that redistribution is central to the democratization process using data from stock markets.

Miller forgets that a lot of recent 'democratizations' were about ending Communist tyranny. People where voting for greater Income and Wealth inequality.  

Consistent with this view, democratizations have a large, negative impact on asset valuations driven by a rise in redistribution risk.

Is this true of any Warsaw pact country? Consider Hungary- under economic reforms known as "goulash Communism," Hungary permitted the issuance of corporate and government bonds starting in 1982–1983 to help state enterprises raise capital. A full fledged Stock Exchange was opened in 1990 after the first free and fair elections in that country. Asset valuations rose because there was no fucking redistribution risk. Hungarians were sick of the thing. The same was true of Poles & Czechs & Latvians & so forth. 

Across 90 countries over 200 years, risk premia are substantially elevated— similar in magnitude to financial crises—prior to and during democratizations.

Because things could go either way. Suppose some crazy gengeral had come to power in Moscow. He might have sent troops into all the Warsaw pact countries. It had happened before. It could happen again.  

A shift in Catholic church doctrine in support of democracy

occurred from the 1890s onward. The Pope told French Catholics to stop hankering for 'Divine Right' Monarchy. Instead they should seek to ally with Labour.  

provides causal evidence that democratizations increase risk premia.

Greater exogenous risk may make democratization more likely but it could also put an end to it. Many countries lapse into Autocracy after a botched transition to Democracy. Arguably, this is what has happened in Russia.  

Successful democratizations lead to substantial redistribution: the size of the public sector grows,

Most Warsaw Pact countries went in for Privatization. Those that didn't- e.g. Ukraine- regretted it.  

income inequality falls,

It rose in ex-Commie countries  

and the labor share of income rises.

The standard of living for workers may rise but the Capital stock rises faster. That's a good thing because productity has to rise & provision has to be made for the retirement benefits of existing workers.  

An extended version of the canonical redistribution-based model of democratization that includes asset prices can quantitatively explain these effects.

It can explain things that don't exist. That's not a good thing.  

Reductions in inequality and increased taxes explain approximately half of the results. The rest comes from greater economic competition and equality in government spending. The model also explains the negligible asset pricing response to autocratizations.

Sadly, autocrats can allow their chums to plunder private corporations. Sooner or later this affects asset prices. 

In the past two centuries, over half of the world’s nations have transitioned to democracy.

China went from being an Empire to a democratic Republic. It didn't last long- just as democracy didn't last long in Russia, Portugal, Spain etc. The same story could be told about Latin America & Africa & various Islamic countries.  

The predominant view in political economy and political science argues these democratizations stem from intrinsic conflicts among different political or social classes and the owners of the means of production (Marx and Engels, 1848, Lipset, 1959, Moore, 1966, Boix, 2003, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, Ansell and Samuels, 2010).

All regimes, of every type, stem from intrinsic conflict and intrinsic cohesion and intrinsic cooperation and intrinsic saying catty things about each other. 

Democratization is associated with Nationalism. Emperors had Princes and Dukes and Counts and Barons under them. When multi-ethnic Empires dissolved, what succeeded them was Nation States. Not all held free and fair elections or retained genuinely representative institutitions. Still, there was some pretence in this regard at some points in time.

Max writes 'Related evidence in favor of this point is that nearly all the rise in dividend yields leading into democratizations is concentrated in the period after World War I,

Sadly, there was no democratization after the Great War. The new Republics or Nation States either turned Fascist or were conquered. This had nothing to do with asset prices. 

 the beginning of the First Wave of Democratization. 

More and more European countries adopted or expanded the franchise over the course of the nineteenth century. Even the Tzar had a Duma by 1906.  Interestingly, the Ottoman Turks were agead if the Russians in that they had local elections in the 1840s and a General election in the 1870s. However, it was the 1908 election which signalled a true transfer of power. 

This is in line with a narrative in the comparative politics literature about the nature of democratization before and after The Great War (Luebbert, 1991). 

Such literature is retarded. 

Before the war democratizations were mainly agreements between the aristocracy and the burgeoning middle class, shutting out the then nascent labor movements. 

No. The landed gentry could ally with the proles against the urban industrialists. 

As such, they benefited this new capital-owning class by protecting their property rights and the status quo between capital and labor. It is also consistent with the literature discussing the case of Britain after the Glorious Revolution documented in both North and Weingast (1989) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006).

James II was a Catholic and had a son who would be raised a Catholic. He had to go. That's what the Glorious Revolution was about. Property was as secure before as after it. 

 After World War I, however, democratizations became more labor driven, focusing on increasing labor bargaining power and reducing inequalities.

This was a feature of industrial societies regardless of economic regime. 

 Transitioning to democracy thus became more costly for the capital-owning elites, bringing higher risk premia in the transition period.

National bourgeoisies gained from transitioning from Imperialism whether or not their countries were Democracies. In Spain, the wealth gained by exporters during the Great war was protected by autarkic policies which continued regardless of who was in power.. 

 For example, prior to the reforms of William III after the Glorious Revolution, property rights were not secure enough in England to allow for the formation of stock markets (Brodhurst, 1897). 

Fuck off! It was under Cromwell that you start having permanent joint stocks saleable on a secondary market. By the end of the seventeenth century there were enough jobbers for an infomal exchange to exist. 1672 marked the 'great stop' when the Crown defaulted. Goldsmiths would no longer lend to the King. Many went bankrupt. This contributed to the creation of the Bank of England in 1694

Max quotes a silly fellow who wrote a book about the Stock Exchange (formally founded in 1801)

From Brodhurst (1897): “In the time of James I, the excitements of the Stock Exchange, and the allurements of stock-brokers had not yet begun to trouble the English people. A national debt, the creation of the Venetians, was as yet unknown in England. 

The Crown borrowed from the Bank of England. This meant there was a secondary market for Consols

Loans, indeed, to satisfy the necessities of State had been raised by Henry VIII and many others of the English Sovereigns; but as they never thought of repaying money which they had borrowed, and as those who were forced to lend, probably had not any expectation of seeing their property again, there was little opportunity for speculation.

Nobody had been forced to lend since the time of Charles I whose head was chopped off. English Kings decided to get out of the forced loan racket. 

 It was left to William III to introduce the principle that it is the duty of a State to keep faith with its creditors, and thereby to open the door to those commercial movements which were ultimately to result in the creation of the Stock Exchange.”

Billy was Protestant. Charlie & Jamie were Catlicks. You can trust a Protestant. Catlicks will rob you blind. 

It would be fair to say that widening inequality & the rise of Anarchist assassins and Communist agitators caused the 'idle rich' to begin to fear for their own future in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Could an accommodation be reached with the working class? As more working men gained the vote in the UK, the cry went up 'we must educate our masters!' But as Board Schools improved in quality, the old barriers of class were bound to breakdown. 

...there is little evidence on whether, ex ante, elites consider redistribution to be the central risk they face in democratization.

Such evidence can always be found. Big landlords have warned the smaller landlords that redistribution won't just affect the big estates. Moreover, once the 'land-hunger' of the peasant is kindled, even the 'kulak' won't be safe. Jacquerie will follow Jacquerie. Men will soon sink to the condition of beasts.

Meanwhile, in the towns, there was a 'Poujadist' movement amongst the small shopkeeper who (the Leftist intellectual said) were so crazy as to think they themselves had any wealth which the State might take away. Mrs Thatcher- a grocer's daughter- was derided by the Tory elite as being a British equivalent of Poujade.  

Second, conditional on redistribution risk being central, there is little understanding of which among the various forms of political and economic redistribution that democracy might entail are most important (Acemoglu et al., 2015).

Redistribution can be done by the existing regime. Thus, the Viceroy, prior to the 1935 Act, could have scrapped the Permanent Settlement & created a loyal class of property owning 'ryots'. Indeed, a lot of the politics of the inter-war years in Bengal was about how to frustrate this. Vikram Seth's 'Suitable Boy' describes a similar retrograde type of politics in post-independence Bihar. 

Democratization may increase subsidiarity which in turn affects who gets to keep what. In a segmentary society, it is likely that Democratization just means more factionalism and rent-seeking.  

This paper tests whether redistribution is central to democratizations in a way that addresses both of these issues: examining stock market prices during democratizations.

Consider the Stock Market plunge after Franco's death. Did it represent 'redistribution risk' (i.e. Commies taking power)? Or was it just  the horrible international climate- high oil prices etc- which was spooking people? The answer has to do with what was happening in Portugal after the 'Carnation Revolution'. Leftists had taken power and nationalised a lot of enterprises. The Stock market was shut down till 1977. 

Interestingly, in Spain, because Franco made the heir to the throne his successor, this was a case of a transition to Monarchy & then to Democracy.

Since asset prices disproportionately reflect the expectations and preferences of mostly wealthy capital holders

they may be net debtors. You dare not refuse a loan to the Dictator's nephew. 

—especially in autocratic countries—they are an ideal source for understanding the risk the elites perceive from the democratization process in real time. How do financial markets respond when democratization becomes more likely?

The problem here is that democratization becomes more likely at times when anarchy becomes more likely. Some may object to democracy but all suffer if anarchy prevails.  

Using a panel of equity data that covers 90 countries over 200 years, I show that stock market valuations fall substantially when transitions to democracy are more likely.

or transitions to anarchy are more likely.  

In the data, I document that this decline is similar in magnitude to what we observe in financial crises, suggesting that these periods are associated with increased systematic risk to investors.

Indeed. There could be redistribution from the small fish (widows & orphans) to the big fish- as in a Balzac novel. 

To understand whether the risk of redistribution drives this result, however, two key empirical challenges must be addressed. First, it is essential to tackle potential endogeneity concerns by ruling out other common factors that could simultaneously affect democratizations and financial markets, and provide evidence that the ancillary effects of democratization—for example, political instability or violence—are not driving the results.

It would be fair to say that the issue of redistibution does not arise in a democracy, or during democratization, if property owners will kill to protect their possessions.  Only a totalitarian dictator- like Stalin or Mao- could push redistribution through in a manner which dispossessed millions of sturdy 'kulaks'. 

Second, it is necessary to show that the primary driver of the asset pricing response is redistribution risk.

It is likely that people in the market at the time said 'land prices have fallen because the new Government is expected to acquire it at a low price and redistribute it to the poor. ' That sort of evidence clinches the matter.  

This requires showing that redistribution indeed follows successful democratizations, and that it is substantial enough to rationalize the observed market responses.

No. Expectations are all that matters. Still, I suppose, they can 'create Reality'. 

Now for the problematic part-

 The first strategy uses exogenous variation in the probability of a successful democratization emanating from a shift in Catholic church doctrine in favor of democracy from 1959 to 1963.

There were only three Catholic countries which could be said to have 'democratised' during that period. However, Betancourt, who returned to power in Venezeula in 1959-64, had previously held office from 1945-48. In Peru, Belaunde Terry held power from '63 to '68, but he had fought his first election in 1956. Interestingly, the military coup which toppled him was more left-wing than he was.

 In the Dominican Republic, Juan Bosch did win an election and lasted for a few months before being toppled by the military. It would be absurd to suggest that the Catholic hierarchy shed any tears when such brief interludes of Democracy proved evanescent. In Portugal & Spain, the Church wholeheartedly supported Salazar & Franco. 

This shift particularly impacted majority Catholic autocracies.

Which ones? Not Spain. Not Portugal. It must be said, both had been democracies at an earlier period.  

Huntington (1991) labels the shift as one of the main reasons the third wave of democratization of the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s occurred and why it was concentrated in majority Catholic autocracies.

This was his 'clash of civilizations' thesis. But there was no such clash between Protestants & Catholics in Europe- save in Ultster (which English Protestants did not care about). Religion was declining as a factor in politics during that time (even in Islamic countries) and, the plain fact is, the Catholics in Latin America started losing market share to the Pentecostals etc.  

Consistent with this narrative, I show that indices denoting the threat to the governing regime posed by civil society organizations and the size and frequency of democratic protests rose dramatically in majority Catholic autocracies compared to non-Catholic autocracies.

Perhaps the author is thinking of Poland's 'Solidarity'.  

This indicates that the doctrinal shift materially changed political realities on the ground in majority Catholic autocracies.

Doctrinal shifts didn't matter because people no longer believed the priest could get you into heaven. Women wanted the pill. So did men. Till the mid Sixties, Catholics had more babies than Protestants in Europe. But as contraception (and abortions) became easier of access, fertility rates collapsed by the mid Seventies. My point is, if you don't listen to the Pope when it comes to sex, why would you heed him when it comes to politics? 

I may mention, there was a time when some Protestants claimed that Catholics were unfit for Democracy because they voted for whoever their priest told them to. Empirical evidence from 150 years ago showed there was no truth to this idea. 

The second part of the paper investigates whether a rise in redistribution risk can explain the negative stock market reaction to democratizations.

In Portugal there was large scale nationalization. It would be easy enough to establish whether the guys likely to take power were talking about expropriating the rich.  

Comparing successful and failed democratizations,

like that of Bolshevik Russia? China actually held a reasonably free and fair general election before Russia. It was the last that country would ever see.  

I find that democratization redistributes resources in two ways. First, it increases explicit redistribution by raising the size of the public sector

Communist revolutionaries may do the same thing as may Miltarist Dictators.  

and lowering income inequality. On average, government revenue-GDP ratios rise by 4.8 percentage points,

inevitable if there is high Income elasticity of demand for Government services 

Gini coefficients decline by 2.3 percentage points, and the labor share of GDP rises by 6.7 percentage points in the 20 years after a successful democratization.

Sadly the labour share falls as the population ages. 

Second, successful democratizations also increase tacit redistribution. For example, autocracies allocate a greater share of government spending to elites (Tullock, 1986).

Was the Tonton Macoute 'elite'? The goons loyal to the Dictator aren't refined fellows who studied at Ivy League Colleges.  

They also provide more protection to incumbent firms from new entrants (Perotti and Volpin, 2006, Martinez-Bravo and Wantchekon, 2021).

This has nothing to do with 'Democratization'. It may have something to do with an IMF bailout or an international trade agreement.  

I find that, during successful democratizations, bribery and corruption indices fall

in Bengal they rose so quickly that there were two big famines (in 1943 & 1974) because power had passed to elected Bengali Muslims. 

while pro-competitive regulation and net entry of new firms rise.

Unless crazy Leftists have taken over. GDP fell by 15 percent in Portugal. IMF bailouts came with conditionalities which tempered the craziness. To be fair, Portugal was saddled with half a million people returning from the newly liberated colonies. 

Since this also redistributes resources away from autocratic elites, it could also play an important role in the asset pricing results.

The new regime in Portugal closed the Stock Market for a couple of years. 

To understand whether the redistribution in the data is quantitatively large enough to explain the asset pricing results, I calibrate a model of democratic transitions in the style of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) embedded within a standard asset pricing framework.

Why bother? For any qualifying country or time period there is superior contemporary testimony.  

Like in Acemoglu and Robinson, the economy starts in autocracy where the elites have all the political power, and try to avoid redistributing their income to the more numerous poor citizens.

No country in the history of the world has been an autocracy of this type. The autocrat may rape and kill members of the elite. His power rests on armed thugs who, at best, are semi-literate. The good news is that assassination tempers autocracy. 

What about 'oligarchy' (rule by the rich)? The problem is that it may have democratic features- e.g. elected Legislatures. Oligarchies can turn into full fledged Democracies- e.g. UK between 1832 and 1919.  But the UK could also impose universal suffrage on a Colony- e.g. Ceylon in 1931. There definitely was an elite in Sri Lanka. But it wasn't cohesive. Still, it has remained a democracy despite undergoing Civil War. 

The citizens influence the policies of the elites by threatening to revolt.

No. If there is such a threat, the elites hire soldiers. If there isn't enough money for enough soldiers then the problem is fiscal. The country needs to change so as to be fiscally viable.  

Revolution is costly: all the elites are killed and a fraction of resources are destroyed, making it undesirable for both sides.

There have been bloodless Revolutions- e.g. the British Glorious Revolution. Only 4 people died during the Portuguese Carnation Revolution.  

This cost the citizens bear from revolution—which determines the revolutionary threat the elites face—varies over time.

The Portuguese didn't want their young men to die in pointless colonial wars. The cost of stupidity can be very high indeed as Trump supporters are discovering.  

If the fraction of resources destroyed is low enough, though, the citizens may prefer the revolution to autocracy.

How can this be known in advance? The fact is, if countries like Germany and Japan could start wars they are bound to lose, how could 'citizens' show superior rationality? For most working people, little changes when the regime changes. Even when the shit really hits the fan- e.g. post-Chavez Venezuela- people vote with their feet or just pray for a better tomorrow.  

When this happens, the elites would like to promise future redistribution. But they cannot credibly commit to future transfers where there is little or no revolutionary threat.

Sure they can. Atlee credibly committed to Clause 4 (Nationalisation of 'commanding heights) even though there was no threat of revolution in 1945. Similarly, Thatcher credibly committed to Privatization. Nehru's India had no 'revolutionary threat' after October 1951. But land reform could be done at the State level under mechanisms put in place by the British in 1935. 

The fact is, some leaders are credible. Others are not. 

Here, only conceding democracy can keep the revolution off the equilibrium path, as democracy acts as a mechanism for the elites to credibly commit to future redistribution.

Where? When? The answer is- nowhere. Never. Russia and China probably can't be ruled as Democracies. They can have Revolutions and top-down redistribution. India turned out to be capable of being ruled as a Democracy (probably because the Army was too narrowly recruited) whereas Pakistan went in the opposite direction. Why? The Army is mainly recruited from the most populous and dominant province. 

While democracy is a much better state for the elites than the revolution, the redistribution it brings is costly, making it, nonetheless, a deleterious state for them.

Some members of the landed gentry can gain political clout and thus the ability to extract rents. Similarly, a labour aristocracy working in the unionized formal sector can gain much higher wages and benefits than the vast majority stuck in small sweat shops in the informal sector. Democracy and rent seeking go hand in hand. That is why the old 'anti-Browder' Communist line was that gaining power through the ballot box was counter-revolutionary. No matter how pure your Communist ideals, you would be rendered a eunuch, or else get corrupted by the system. The odd thing was that, in 1967, a Communist Land Revenue Minister in Bengal- Hare Krishna Konar- discovered that British era rules allowed him to transfer 'surplus' land to his Party's supporters. Hilariously, he took 13 acres away from Charu Mazumdar, the head of the extreme Maoists!  

To make the model relevant to study asset prices, I add four main ingredients. First, I allow for incomplete financial markets, meaning that the elites can trade with one another in financial markets but not with the citizens.

There have been countries which restricted ownership of shares or property to people of a particular religion or ethnicity. There may also be insider trading or 'ethnic monopoly' (e.g. non-African mercantile communities monopolizing the financial sector in some African countries). However, nothing prevents ordinary people buying stocks and shares even if they are illiterate and have to do so through an intermediary. 

Second, to achieve realistic asset pricing dynamics, I allow for preferences in the style of Epstein and Zin (1989).

 this seaparates risk aversion from elasticity of intertemporal substitution. This explains why functions are less smooth than our theory would predict. 

Third, I allow for multiple potential forms of redistribution that align with what we see in the data, namely, reduced inequality,

which may be the result of the leisured propertied elite being lazy and profligate, thus falling behind the productive classes. There could be a racial element to this- e.g. the revolution in Zanzibar, when blacks raped Arab or Asian women thus avenging the crime of Slavery. 

increased taxes,

sadly, you can't tax what is elastic in supply or demand. If the rich are smarter and have more options, they are likely to have more elasticity. Thus, the government has to fall back on regressive taxes. 

reduced ability for the elites to skim rents from government spending,

Which can turn those elites from a class of parasites into a class of entrepreneurs.  

and increased economic competition.

Which creates losers and winners within every class of society. The kulak prospers. The subsistence farmer has to sell up and move to a shanty town. The two may be closely related by blood.In India, there was a rash of kidnappings of the kids of the noveau riche. In almost every case, it was a cousin who lured the kid away and then killed him in panic. 

I also allow for the redistribution elites face in democracy to be uncertain. Fourth, I modify the cost of revolution process to allow for three states: autocracy, democratization, and democracy. The new state, democratization, is one where a permanent transition to democracy becomes more likely.

This is probably exogenous. India had too much diversity to be anything but a Democracy. Pakistan had too little to be anything but a Military dictatorship with some Civilian window-dressing.  

Since the elites price assets, uncertainty over whether a democratization will succeed—ushering in democracy and redistribution— or fail—keeping society in autocracy—increases the risk to the elites’ future consumption, causing risk premia to rise.

Unless they can be hedged against quite cheaply. This depends on the possibility of global mobility. This was increasing in the post-war world. It was thus possible to diversify portfolios in various ways. It is a characteristic of power elites in autocratic countries, that they have family members with different passports and valuable property holdings in affluent Rule-of-Law Democracies. 

Very often they are net debtors in their own country. Thus when they fly the coop, they have 'stranded liabilities' not assets.  

In this way, the consolidation of democracy and the redistribution of income and political power it brings, acts as a “rare disaster” for the elites, explaining the increased risk premia observed during democratizations in the data (Rietz, 1988, Barro, 2006, Gabaix, 2012, Wachter, 2013).

Different members of the elite, even within the same family, have different risk premia related to their portfolios,  primary citizenship, domicile, and whether their assets are protected by international treaty. Thus, in India, one member of a business family has Indian citizenship & is the Company promoter. But his control rights are based on pyramiding. His relatives have other passports and have routed their investments through third countries- e.g. Mauritius- so as to gain protection under Treaty law. 

My point is that 'rare disaster' has to be hedged outside the market by doing things like getting foreign passports for family members, setting up family offices abroad, etc, etc. Moreover, Revolutionary parties- Communist, Islamic, or whatever- have their own 'bag men' who enable mutually beneficial deals to be struck such that risk is reduced. But this is an opaque process.

When calibrated to reasonable preference parameters and the redistribution observed in the data, the model explains nearly all the rise in dividend yields observed during democratizations.

Which countries does the author think had 'democratizations'? 

nearly all the rise in dividend yields leading into democratizations is concentrated in the period after World War I, the beginning of the First Wave of Democratization.

Which was associated with the demise of multi-ethnic Empires & the rise of Nation States which might have to introduce conscription to defend or extend their borders. Thus War was no longer 'the sport of Kings' or the natural occupation of the aristocracy. Sadly, this 'First Wave' foundered in places where Kings had made decisions- e.g. Germany or Italy (where the King appointed Mussolini and later dismissed him)- and Legislatures were too factionalized to act cohesively. In other words, places which had no long-standing tradition of Parliamentary sovereignty tended to fall off the wagon.

As for 'dividend yield'- it was affected by exogenous factors.  

This is in line with a narrative in the comparative politics literature about the nature of democratization before and after The Great War (Luebbert, 1991). Before the war democratizations were mainly agreements between the aristocracy and the burgeoning middle class, shutting out the then nascent labor movements.

No. The Aristocracy could outflank the bourgeoisie by appealing to the better off peasant & skilled worker. Either the Liberals dug their own graves by supporting Organized Labour or they could only survive by taking up regional issues (e.g. the Celtic fringe in British politics).  

As such, they benefited this new capital-owning class by protecting their property rights and the status quo between capital and labor. It is also consistent with the literature discussing the case of Britain after the Glorious Revolution documented in both North and Weingast (1989) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006).2 After World War I, however, democratizations became more labor driven,

if women were getting the vote, the unskilled male worker (many of whom had died in the trenches) had to get it to. Alternatively, you could reverse the proposition. If your man-servant gets the vote why not let your wife have it too?  

focusing on increasing labor bargaining power and reducing inequalities.

Sadly, labour lost bargaining power after the War. Real wages for UK coal miners peaked in 1913-14. By 1925, wages had often been slashed by fifty percent in nominal terms.  

Transitioning to democracy thus became more costly for the capital-owning elites, bringing higher risk premia in the transition period.

Democracy worked as a safety valve. Left wing parties tended to split over the course of the Twenties & Thirties often on 'guns or butter' issues. The Conservative forces found they didn't really need any ideology or, if they did have some such thing, that it was better not to talk too much about it though, obivously, muttering darkly about yids, kikes, niggers, homos, etc.  was perfectly all righ.  

The model also allows me to understand which forms of redistribution have the largest effect on asset prices. The predominant effect comes from increased economic competition and displacement risk for incumbent firms post-democratization (Garleanu, Kogan and Panageas ˆ , 2012).

This has to do with abandoning autarkic 'import substitution' for 'export led growth'. It happened in both democratic and authoritarian countries regardless of ideology.  

This channel drives 41.9% of the rise in dividend yields, providing support to a theoretical literature that argues increased creative destruction and structural transformation are the primary driving forces behind higher growth after successful democratizations (

Or successful consolidation of the power of the Chinese Communist Party. Xi now has more power than Mao. He doesn't need no stinkin' 'Cultural Revolution' as an excuse to get rid of his rivals in the Politburo.  

 The remaining 58.1% of the rise in dividend yields comes from the more traditional channels of higher taxes and reduced inequality and corruption. A redistribution-based framework also explains the negligible stock market effect observed in autocratizations.

In other words, purely economic forces or improved governance explain everything. 'Democritization' explains nothing.  

To do this, I modify the model and allow for democracy to be reversible provided the elites are willing to risk a transition. If they succeed, society becomes an autocracy, but if they fail, they face a permanent loss of a fraction of their consumption. The key insight is that while democratization is a risk imposed on the elites, autocratiza tion is a risk they take.

Wherever there has been a Conservative counter-coup, some elements of the elite have stood against it precisely because of the likely humanitarian cost. Spain saw a mass exodus, known as La Retirada, which included business owners, bankers, and industrialists. 

 Consider the Spanish Civil War- which was itself a horrible disaster. The plain fact is, Franco- once firmly in the saddle- made things worse. It is estimated that 200,000 starved to death between 1939 and the early 1950s, during the años de hambre (years of hunger). 

Some of  Franco's crony capitalists- e.g. Juan March Ordinas & Pedro Barrié de la Maza- had genuine ability but most entrepreneurs suffocated under the corrupt, incompetent, Falangist bureaucracy. Opus Dei technocrats & the Mondragon cooperative helped create a Spanish miracle in the Fifties and Sixties but there is no reason to think that Franco himself contributed anything to their achievements.

I may mention, Portugal- under the economist, Salazar- though avoiding a famine, had poor outcomes in the post-war years. 

Because who decides to transition differs in each case, there is an asymmetric effect on asset prices. The elites optimally choose when to attempt autocratization,

Only a General can deliver this. What if the fellow is crazy or incompetent?  

so it always improves the expected present value of their consumption.

I suppose elites can panic & believe they will be slaughtered in their beds unless they back a strongman.  The problem with a strongman is that he may want to start a war which he is bound to lose. The good thing about Franco was that he was so utterly shit that Hitler didn't want his help. 

However, levered claims to this consumption— for example, the dividend claim—can still be adversely affected. In the model, dividend yields still rise because the increased risk in the event of a failed autocratization matters more than the higher payoff upon success to a risk averse investor.

The Stock Market would be shut down if there is a coup or counter-coup. We don't have figures for the grey market during such periods but it is likely that asset prices fall dramatically.  

This also leads autocratizations with higher potential payoffs to come with larger rises in dividend yields, as the elites accept a higher penalty in the event of failure to achieve autocracy. Taken together, these results provide powerful support for redistribution-based models of democratization.

The author thinks Democracy is about the Left coming to power & taxing the rich. But, it could also be about Civilians coming to power & cutting taxes. The Generals grumble that without tax-money, they can't fulfill their dream of conquest. The Civilians say 'you've lost every fucking war you started. Shut the fuck up.' 

Sadly, if your country is named Pakistan, you will end up in jail if you say this. Meanwhile Field Marshal Munir will boast of nuking half the world after receiving a rapturous welcome at the White House. 

It would be fair to say that the fall of one leader or the rise of another can affect share valuations in companies owned by 'cronies'. 

  Fisman (2001) finds strong negative returns for politically connected firms in Indonesia as a result of the fall of the Suharto regime.

Precipitated by IMF 'tough love'. In other words, this isn't a story about 'Democratization'. It is a story about fiscal viability. India was pushed down the road of reform by its currency crisis in 1991 when it had to ship its gold reserves to the UK. Perhaps, if Rajiv hadn't been assassinated, Companies owned by his Doon School buddies would have been given a soft landing.  

Similarly, Acemoglu, Hassan and Tahoun (2017) find that more intense protests in Egypt after the fall of the Mubarak regime relate to lower stock market valuations for firms connected to the group currently in power.

Actually, all firms were affected. The index fell by 16 percent in two days which is why the authorities shut down the Stock Exchange. Consider the fate of Naguib Sawaris- a Coptic Christian and critic of the Muslim brotherhood. He was seen as close to Mubarak's son and so his companies took a hit. But people felt that he wasn't political and so he avoided prosecution. I suppose his attacks on the Ikhwan (he had to leave the country under Morsi)  endeared him to El Sisi. But, ultimately, he is good at his job which is why he has survived.  

Dube, Kaplan and Naidu (2011) find that US companies that stood to benefit from US-backed coups see high returns after the coup.

Those who stood to benefit, benefited. That's a fucking tautology mate.  

My paper builds on this body of research by providing the longest time series and widest panel of equity data used to date to study the stock market impact of democratizations.

Though stock markets are often shut down during such periods.  

 First, there is substantial heterogeneity around the average effects I document. For example, some democratizations may come with a reduction in risk premia as securing property rights dominates other channels.

In which case, 'Democratization' means 'stronger rule of law. The crazy dictator and his homicidal chums were chased away'.  

Second, the results above are strongest for countries transitioning to democracy with an active stock market.

Only such countries could show up in his survey. If you do a survey in a brothel, your results will be strongest for women who work as prostitutes.  

This means that countries where property rights were not secure enough to foster open financial markets are scoped out of the analysis when examining valuations. One example of this is transitions from left-wing authoritarian states, like the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Since regimes of this style were not fond of capital markets, their data on asset prices do not generally exist.

Most democratizations over the last four decades have involved countries giving up Communism or getting rid of crazy dirigiste Dictators or Dynasties. I suppose one could say 'In India, Assassination tempered Dynastic Autocracy. This permitted the Indian Stock Exchange to rise by leaps and bounds'. But this does not change the fact that India was and remains a Democracy.  

My analysis, therefore, helps us to better understand transitions from relatively more right-wing autocracies, where the threat of redistribution likely played a greater role.

The problem here is that some right-wing autocracies 'go for growth'. True, you may say 'actually, the Dictator is Socialist and, in the case of Korea's Park or Singapore's Lee, there's some truth in it. The plain fact is, keeping a lid on Trade Union activism is good for the working class.  

The author relies on V-Dem's 'Episodes of Regime Transformation' (ERT) dataset.  Sadly, it is nonsense. V-Dem’s Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) shows India today as at its lowest since 1975 when all the principal opposition leaders were in jail. Yet, India now is vastly less Dynastic and much more Democratic. There is a coalition government at the center and long-standing Chief Ministers- e.g. Patnaik, Mamta, Stalin, etc- are getting kicked to the curb. New parties- e.g. AAP- have risen. The next election will see seat redistribution (frozen for 50 years) and thus all votes will have equal value regardless of where they are cast. It appears that one third women's reservations, too, will go through. 

It must be said, the US has fallen a lot according to this score. The UK too has been down rated. Why? Nobody knows. Nobody cares. 

Research involving 'democritization' is now worthless verbiage based on fantasies- e.g. that Vatican II had any political effect separate from the steep decline in the auctoritas of the Pope. However, the cruelty, corruption and crapulous coprophagy of the Church made this outcome inevitable. 

Evidence from equity markets

which may not exist in a democracy while functioning well in an autocracy 

provides resounding support for redistribution-based models of democratization.

Eastern Europe now has equity markets but they have pursued the opposite of redistribution- even, in some cases,  inviting back the aristocracy to take back estates expropriated after the Communists seized power. 

Democratizations lower stock valuations and raise risk premia substantially across several proxies in data covering 90 countries over 200 years.

The reverse happened in the UK. Each time the franchise was extended equities went up till the Great War loomed large and the Stock Exchange was shut down in July 1914 (because of a run on gold). The Government had to bailout the Merchant Banks to the tune of 40 percent of total public expenditure. When the Stock Market was reopened in 1915, there was a 60 year decline in  total stock market capitalization. It fell from roughly 150% of the UK's GDP in 1914 down to just 30% by 1974. But this is a story about the end of the golden age of Classical Liberalism and the rise of National Security State perpetually under the cloud of total war. It has nothing to do with redistribution. The fact is, the Government may have to bail out the rich to help the poor. But the opposite is even better if the poor rise in productivity and affluence creating a virtuous circle of expanding prosperity. 

These results cannot be explained by increased macroeconomic risk nor do other periods of high political or regime transition risk have the same effect.

Max's 'results' are nonsense. Redistribution risk in agricultural countries has to do with the breakup of large estates. The Stock Market scarcely matters. Total Wars create losers and winners amongs Corporations. Those with 'cost plus' contracts may be undervalued but their promoters live high on the hog. The same is true of dirigiste regimes- Socialist or Catholic or Gandhian or whatever.  

Exogenous variation coming from a change in Catholic church doctrine confirms that risk premia rise with the probability of a successful democratization

Catholicism declined. It became irrelevant. It wasn't the case that Franco or Salazar started to hold elections because the Pope told them to.  

Redistribution risk can explain these results.

Did the Catholic Church want to give up its property? No. But where that property was already lost, there was no point praying for a King or Dictator who would restore it.  

In the data, redistribution follows successful democratizations:

Autocracies could do land-reform even more effectively. Look at Taiwan. Still, there can be no doubt that it was the Commies who were best at taking stuff away from the aristocrats and giving it to the peasants before taking it away and laughing heartily as the peasants starved to death.  

the size of the public sector and measures of economic competition rise,

because both are income elastic. If real income is falling even the public sector goes to the wall.  

and income inequality and measures of corruption fall.

If it can be measured, it isn't the sort of corruption which really matters.  

Moreover, democratizations with higher redistribution risk see a substantially larger rise in risk premia than other democratizations.

A tautology. Cats with higher risk have higher risk.  

A redistribution-based model of democratic transitions with asset prices and incomplete markets can fully explain the results.

It can also explain why cats say bow-wow. That's how ex falso quodlibet works.  

It can also explain the lack of an asset pricing effect observed in autocratizations.

Though autocracies can kill and eat the rich and take all their cool, shiny, stuff.  

The analysis highlights several potential channels of redistribution that generate the asset pricing results.

Why stick with saying 'cats say bow-wow'? Why not highlight the potential channels by which they can become Actuaries in Afghanistan?  

That said, in standard macroeconomic models, more redistribution would generally lower growth. This is at odds with empirical evidence that suggests democracy causes higher growth (Acemoglu et al., 2019).

This is Grainger causality at best.  

Reconciling this disparity would be a natural path for future research. The paper also highlights a potential resolution to this apparent contradiction. While much work has focused on declines in inequality or increasing taxation, this paper shows that increased competition and a loss of government consumption for the elites can also play a role in transitions.

This is what happens when a big war ends. Generals who had been used to living like Lords, have to retire to the suburbs.  

Indeed, while taxes and inequality are certainly important, they may not play a central role in all democratizations, in particular transitions from left-wing autocracies that are not captured when examining stock market data.

In other words, this guys study is useless.  

Finally, this paper shows that any financial history of the last 200 years that excludes democratizations is incomplete.

I know the financial history of the UK and India. Democratization had zero effect on either. War mattered. Economic policy mattered. But, above all else, productivity mattered. If it fell, there had to be transfers which endangered fiscal viability and spurred reforms (or backtracking from reforms). 

In doing this, it provides new avenues of study in consumptionbased models by focusing on political institutions and how they interact with the distribution of resources.

This is fully anticipated.  

In a model with incomplete markets, redistribution shocks can have large consequences on asset prices.

D'uh!  

This means that neither an increase in the probability of a large drop in aggregate consumption nor an increase in the volatility of aggregate consumption is necessary for an increase in risk premia.

If policy becomes more arbitrary, it is less predictable. We may say Knightian Uncertainty has increased.  

The consumption risk faced by relatively wealthy investors need only be affected.

As Keynes pointed out, it is their Investment decisions which have a multiplier effect.  

This paves the road for the risk of redistribution to be a primary historical driver of asset prices.

Politicians are increasingly tempted to increase property taxes on the wealthy. This dampens property prices at the top end of the market. Are higher taxes on 'unearned income' likely? Are we on the cusp of a bear market which will run on into the 2040s?

If so, it is likely that some of the shibboleths V-Dem associates with Democratization will fall by the wayside. We may come to think of 'proper' Democracies as ones which deports people of a different colour or faith. 



Monday, 31 August 2026

The nonsense that is the Nash Bargaining Solution.



John Nash mathematically resolved the problem of the "indeterminate contract curve" by introducing a unique, axiomatic framework known as the Nash Bargaining Solution. [1, 2]
Before Nash's breakthrough, classical economists (following Francis Ysidro Edgeworth) established that when two parties engage in a bilateral monopoly or barter exchange, the resulting allocations form a contract curve. While every point on this curve is Pareto efficient, economic theory considered the exact final division of gains indeterminate—meaning traditional supply-and-demand mechanics could not predict exactly where the two parties would agree to settle along that line. [1, 2, 3

How Nash Solved the Indeterminacy
Instead of trying to simulate the unpredictable psychological back-and-forth of human negotiation, Nash approached the problem backwards. He asked: What reasonable mathematical properties must a final, "fair" agreement satisfy?

In other words, Nash's solution is that if there is a fair agreement because fair agreement is militted for then there will be fair agreement though sadly nobody could ever say any agreement whatsoever wasn't fair or unfair or the product of sodomy with Satan 

He proposed four fundamental axioms that any rational bargaining solution should follow: [1, 2]
Pareto Efficiency: The parties will not settle for an agreement if another exists that leaves at least one person better off without harming the other. (The solution must lie on the contract curve). [1, 2]

This requires omniscience on both sides. Nobody would ever reach any agreement if this were a condition.  

Symmetry: If both players have identical preferences and strategic positions,

they must also have identical endowments (otherwise they would have different strategies to acquire what they lack and sell what they have too much off) and thus would not want to trade 

they will receive identical payoffs. 

Zero, because they won't want to trade. 

Invariance to Coordinate Transformations (Scale Invariance): Changing the units used to measure utility (e.g., switching from Fahrenheit to Celsius equivalent) will not change the physical outcome of the deal. [1, 2]

 i.e. utility isn't derived from what it is measured in. Sadly, this is not the case if it is measured in a transferable form- e.g. money.

Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): If the parties prefer option A over option B out of a large set of choices, removing other unchosen options from the table shouldn't suddenly make them pick option B. [1, 2]

This means those unchosen options 

1) don't convey any information relevant to the decision. 

2) have no 'external' effects. In particular, there is no 'supermodularity' (complementarity)

3) don't alter risk or Knightian uncertainty. 

When it comes to economic transactions, market-makers exist. There is derived or speculative demand. Whether two peopl decide to do a deal rather than go through an arbitrageur has a lot to do what other options exist. When some of them disappear, their behaviour is likely to change for prudential reasons. 

    The Unique Mathematical Proof

Nash proved that if these four rules hold true, there is only one mathematically viable point on the entire contract curve.

There would be no contract curve. There would only be an omnescient, ubitquitous, information source, directing all actions without any need for communication or coordination. 

To find it, you establish a disagreement point (or threat point), which represents the payoff each party gets if negotiations completely collapse.

Both sides bluff. If an agent gets a reputation for being obdurate or extreme in their demands, they may not be able to transact business. The same may happen to people considered mendacious or of weak character.  

The unique Nash Bargaining Solution is the exact allocation that maximizes the product of the parties' utility gains above that disagreement point. 

This is the idea that an outsider can always improve deadlocked negotiations. It is false.Why? Because, in a repeated game, it leads to resources being diverted to improving the threat point.  

Where U represents the utility of the players and d represents their respective fallback positions. By tethering the final outcome directly to each party's "outside options" and risk preferences, Nash turned a vague, indeterminate range of options into a single, predictable mathematical equilibrium.

Nash published his result 75 years ago. Did indeterminacy disappear? Nope. It increased. Why? Mathsy masturbation has nothing to do with reality. 

Saturday, 29 August 2026

Peter Singer on the Bangladesh famine

The Argumentum ad Populum (Bandwagon Fallacy) consists of presuming that an idea is good or correct simply because you treat it as a universal norm. However, to the best of our knowledge there is no 'indefeasible' universal norm- i.e. one which operates all the time. Thus I was often told by my Professors that 'farting is bad' even if you happen to be a Hindu and believe it is your religious obligation to express appreciation of a lecture through thunderous flatulence. However, though farting is frowned upon in the classroom, it is perfectly acceptable once you are in the toilet. 

In 1972, Peter Singer published 'Famine, Affluence & Morality' which was nothing but a cascade of 'bandwagon fallacies' meretriciously or mischievously strung together. 

As I write this, in November I97I,

it wasn't clear that India would win & Bangladesh would be liberated. Nor was it obvious that the transition to democracy in East Bengal would cause a big famine- just as happened in 1943.  

people are dying in East Bengal from lack of food, shelter, and medical care.

Many were being killed by soldiers or 'razakars'.  

The suffering and death that are occurring there now are not inevitable, not unavoidable in any fatalistic sense of the term. Constant poverty, a cyclone, and a civil war have turned at least nine million people into destitute refugees;

No. It was the Pakistan Army's genocidal policies which caused people to flee.  

nevertheless, it is not beyond the capacity of the richer nations to give enough assistance to reduce any further suffering to very small proportions.

It was beyond Nixon's capacity to save Yahya Khan & his troops from defeat. 

The decisions and actions of human beings can prevent this kind of suffering.

Indira Gandhi decided to put an end to East Bengal's suffering. Also, she hoped the refugees would go home once the Pak army had surrendered.  

Unfortunately, human beings have not made the necessary decisions.

Indira had. Singer was and is an ignorant shithead.  

At the individual level, people have, with very few exceptions, not responded to the situation in any significant way. Generally speaking, people have not given large sums to relief funds;

Stupid fucker didn't get that guns and soldiers were needed to defeat the genocidal Pak army.  

they have not written to their parliamentary representatives demanding increased government assistance;

because they weren't as stupid as Singer. 

they have not demonstrated in the streets, held symbolic fasts, or done anything else directed toward providing the refugees with the means to satisfy their essential needs.

Sadly, Singer didn't fast to death on this issue.  But he did express puzzlement that Britain spent 30 times more money on Concorde- an investment it believed would be profitable- than on famine relief to Bangladesh (a country whose main problem was that it was occupied by genocidal Pakistani soldiers who wanted to change the DNA of the Bengalis by systematically raping their women.)

The implication is that the British government values a supersonic transport more than thirty times as  highly as it values the lives of the nine million refugees.

No. The implication is that it thought Concorde was a profitable investment. Over the course of its lifetime, the Government expected to get much more money out of it than it put into it. Nobody thinks feeding the starving is an investment. It is charity and nothing more.  

.... India will be forced to choose between letting the refugees starve or diverting funds from her own development program, which will mean that more of her own people will starve in the future.'

Which is why Indira sent in the Indian Army.  

These are the essential facts about the present situation in Bengal.

There was only one essential fact- viz. Pak Army was raping and killing Bengalis. Many ran away. Some stayed to fight. But only the Indian Army could force the surrender of the Pakistanis.  

So far as it concerns usi here, there is nothing unique about this situation except its magnitude. The Bengal emergency is just the latest and most acute of a series of major emergencies in various parts of the world, arising both from natural and from man-made causes.

I suppose Singer was thinking of the Biafra famine which was War related. But the Bangladesh campaign was short and did not affect food supply.  

There are also many parts of the world in which people die from malnutrition and lack of food independent of any special emergency.

American food aid did save millions of lives till the Green Revolution worked its magic. Speaking generally, only Communist countries- which refused food aid and denied they had a famine- were not getting adequate help from US and UN bodies. 

There also were some charitable foundations which did good work. However, dumping food on agricultural countries harms indigenous farmers and creates dependency. By the Seventies, some charitable organisations were being subject to infiltration and takeover by Leftist nutters. The joke was that it was Communist famines which had killed the largest number of people in the Twentieth Century. 

I take Bengal as my example only because

Singer assumed his audience was as ignorant of it as he was himself. To be fair, India only officially entered the war on the third of December. 

it is the present concern, and because the size of the problem has ensured that it has been given adequate publicity. Neither individuals nor governments can claim to be unaware of what is happening there. What are the moral implications of a situation like this?

Support Indira when she sends in Indian troops. Screw the Baghdad pact. Tell Yahya he is on his own.  

In what follows, I shall argue that the way people in relatively affluent countries react to a situation like that in Bengal cannot be justified;

Singer's reaction can't be justified. Sending money and food to Bangladesh would have enriched the Pakistan army and enabled the Razakars to buy support.

People in affluent countries should get on with their own jobs. They shouldn't do stupid shit. Diplomats are paid out of the money raised by taxes. Let them figure out what to do about emergencies in far away places. 

The word 'ultracrepidarian' has to do with talking about things of which you have little knowledge or experience. Singer's ultracrepidarian essay was published some months after Indira had solved the Bangladesh problem with military force. After that aid did flood in but the incompetence and corruption of the new regime meant that when a big famine hit in 1974, there was compassion fatigue. Also, the global food market was very tight. It was obvious that food was not a 'distributional' issue. It was agronomic- i.e. a scientific matter of raising yields and economising on inputs. 

indeed, the whole way we look at moral issues-our moral conceptual scheme -needs to be altered, and with it, the way of life that has come to be taken for granted in our society.

If we did stupid shit- of the sort Singer recommends- we would almost immediately become as poor as those we seek to help. Thus the determination to do stupid shit itself reduces the ability to do stupid shit. 

In a footnote, Singer says ' There was also a third possibility: that India would go to war to enable the refugees to return to their lands. Since I wrote this paper, India has taken this way out. The situation is no longer that described above, but this does not affect my argument, as the next paragraph indicates.'

It was always known that war-time famines can seldom be alleviated save by one side winning. This is because food aid given to an occupied country could be diverted to the occupying power. Indeed, it may be sold so as to buy weapons. 

In arguing for this conclusion I will not, of course, claim to be morally neutral. I shall, however, try to argue for the moral position  that I take, so that anyone who accepts certain assumptions, to be made explicit, will, I hope, accept my conclusion.

They would have to be mad or stupid to accept Singer's assumptions. In technical terms, he is committing a fallacy of relevance or 'ignoratio elenchi' 

I begin with the assumption that suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad.

For whom? My suffering is bad for me but is entertaining for my enemies. Still, I suppose one could say that savants who discover more efficient or efficacious methods of providing food, shelter & medical treatment are considered to have done a good thing. But this doesn't mean that such actions are always good. Suppose resources required for defence are diverted to welfare spending and the Nation suffers conquest and enslavement, then tolerating hunger and disease was the right course of action.  

More generally, we understand that it would be bad if Mummy died but we also understand that it would be worse if nobody ever died. 

What Singer can't do is to show that the world would be a better place if his policy prescriptions were followed. I suppose, not being an economist, he doesn't have the tools to do it. But, the thing can't be done.

I think most people will agree about this, although one may reach the same view by different routes. I shall not argue for this view. People can hold all sorts of eccentric positions, and perhaps from some of them it would not follow that death by starvation is in itself bad.

Sadly, agricultural workers who survive a famine gain higher real wages precisely because the supply of labour fell. 

The fact is significant starvation deaths can cause even the most evil of tyrants to change their policies- or fail to enforce them. 

 

It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to refute such positions, and so for brevity I will henceforth take this assumption as accepted. Those who disagree need read no further.

Nobody needs to read ignorant shite. 

My next point is this: if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.

In this case, Indira had to sacrifice 'Ahimsa' (non-violence) to save the lives of millions. One risk she took was that Nixon might 'nuke Calcutta'.  

By "without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance" I mean without causing anything else comparably bad to happen, or doing something that is wrong in itself, or failing to promote some moral good, comparable in significance to the bad thing that we can prevent.

In economic terms, Singer is saying 'do good provided there is no opportunity cost'. Sadly, the only thing which isn't scarce is worthless virtue signalling verbiage.  

This principle seems almost as uncontroversial as the last one.

It is meaningless. One can ascribe any moral value one likes to an 'opportunity cost'. Suppose Indira hadn't got a defence pact with the Soviet Union. Then she could have said 'I grieve for the people of Bangladesh but won't send in the Army because we Indians are so greatly attached to Ahimsa.' As a matter of fact, Pakistan let the US off the hook by attacking India first.  

It requires us only to prevent what is bad, and not to promote what is good, and it requires this of us only when we can do it without sacrificing anything that is, from the moral point of view, comparably important.

Anybody can say anything at all is morally more important than anything else.  

I could even, as far as the application of my argument to the Bengal emergency is concerned, qualify the point so as to make it: if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it.

Indira sent in the army. But Pakistan attacked first. She had her cake and could eat it too.  

An application of this principle would be as follows: if I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out.

Unless you believe God wants the kid to drown and to defy His Will is impious.  

This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be a very bad thing.

Or it may be a blessed deliverance because Joseph Kony is about to enter the village. He will rape the kid and get him acddicted to drugs and then turn him loose as a child soldier.  

The uncontroversial appearance of the principle just stated is deceptive.

It isn't a principle at all. It's just the assertion that saving a kid from drowning is worthwhile even if your clothes get muddy. The assumption is that you live in an affluent society of a certain sort. 

Suppose you are the ADC to the Dictator. You arrive late and with a muddy uniform and you are sent to the Gulag. Your whole family is ruined. Let the kid drown. He'd have starved in any case.  

If it were acted upon, even in its qualified form, our lives, our society, and our world would be fundamentally changed.

No. If stupid ideas are acted upon bad shit happens till, at the margin, those stupid ideas are more honoured in the breach.  

For the principle takes, firstly, no account of proximity or distance. It makes no moral difference whether the person I can help is a neighbor's child ten yards from me or a Bengali whose name I shall never know, ten thousand miles away.

Which is why people can be fooled into thinking that for the low low price of $ 9. 99  you can save the lives of ten trillion African kids & bring them to Jesus. 

Secondly, the principle makes no distinction between cases in which I am the only person who could possibly do anything and cases in which I am just one among millions in the same position.

In other words, the principle ignores 'uncorrelated asymmetries' (e.g. who has the power & responsibility to assist and who is merely a virtue signalling nutter) and thus can't create eusocial 'bourgeois strategies'.  

I do not think I need to say much in defense of the refusal to take proximity and distance into account.

Verifiable information is available to the person in proximity.  The person at distance may or  may not get 'hear-say' information

The fact that a person is physically near to us, so that we have personal contact with him, may make it more likely that we shall assist him, but this does not show that we ought to help him rather than another who happens to be further away.

Nothing shows what anybody ought to do though they may speak as though this were not the case- e.g. saying 'the Bible shows me what to do' rather than 'my decision to become a Christian causes me to read the Bible and to alter my behaviour in accordance with what I read there.' 

If we accept any principle of impartiality, universalizability, equality, or whatever,

absolutely nothing is entailed.  

we cannot discriminate against someone merely because he is far away from us (or we are far away from him).

Very true. When I serve dinner to my guests I also travel around the world serving dinner to everybody. This is because I accepted some silly principle and thus gained super-powers.  

Admittedly, it is possible that we are in a better position to judge what needs to be done to help a person near to us than one far away, and perhaps also to provide the assistance we judge to be necessary.

However, by accepting some stupid principle, you will gain the powers of Superman & Santa Claus combined!  

If this were the case, it would be a reason for helping those near to us first. This may once have been a justification for being more concerned with the poor in one's own town than with famine victims in India.

It is the justification for giving much higher Social Security benefits to one's own people than one does to people in other countries.  

Unfortunately for those who like to keep their moral responsibilities limited, instant communication and swift transportation have changed the situation.

By accepting Singer's principles, you turn into Superman. You can hear anything said in distant galaxies. You can travel faster thant the speed of light so as to go back in time to provide food for the merely peckish.  

From the moral point of view, the development of the world into a "global village" has made an important, though still unrecognized, difference to our moral situation.

It made large scale famines possible in countries which hadn't had the thing for centuries. Why? World Wars & Cold Wars & the possibility of exogenous supply shocks created greater vulnerability among populations dependent on food imports from distant continents.   

Expert observers and supervisors, sent out by famine relief organizations or permanently stationed in famine-prone areas, can direct our aid to a refugee in Bengal almost as effectively as we could get it to someone in our own block.

No. It turned out that the Bengali public distribution system was as shitty in 1974 as in 1943. It simply wasn't the case that there was an Oxbridge philosophy professor supervising things in every single Bengali village.  

There would seem, therefore, to be no possible justification for discriminating on geographical grounds.

Which is why Peter Singer personally flies around the world wiping the bums of everybody rather than content himself with just wiping his own bum. 

There is a legal justification for helping those to whom one has a legal obligation- e.g. the Government of Bangladesh's responsibility to feed East Bengalis under the provisions of the 1913 Act. There is a legal obstacle (to do with fiduciary duty) to using public funds or that of some corporate entity for a purpose not justified by law. 

Is there a philosophical justification for accepting legal justifications? Sure. It is called Utilitarianism.  

There may be a greater need to defend the second implication of my principle- that the fact that there are millions of other people in the same position, in respect to the Bengali refugees, as I am, does not make the situation significantly different from a situation in which I am the only person who can prevent something very bad from occurring.

Sure it does. Suppose I am the last man left on earth. I feel I have a duty to have sex with any surviving woman who wishes to have a baby. Indeed, I may even feel justified in raping the young and nubile nun whose sacred vows prevent her from consenting to what she herself sees as a necessary act. However, if there are millions of men, I have no duty or justification for having sex with any particular woman. Someone else has a stronger claim with respect to each of them- unless there actually is some girl undiscriminating enough to want me to slip her the sausage. 

Again, of course, I admit that there is a psychological difference between the cases; one feels less guilty about doing nothing if one can point to others, similarly placed, who have also done nothing.

The opposite is more likely. You feel your guilt is greater because, unlike everybody else, you are a lovely bloke. 

I may mention, I feel more and more guilt that I didn't prove the Reimann hypothesis by creating a 'field of one' because I was too busy fucking super-models. No. They weren't male super-models. They were young human females- albeit imaginary ones. 

In this case, my 'guilt' is actually a claim to being a gifted mathematician rather than a fucking moron.  

Yet this can make no real difference to our moral obligations.2 Should I consider that I am less obliged to pull the drowning child out of the pond if on looking around I see other people, no further away than I am, who have also noticed the child but are doing nothing?

If you see the life-guard is doing nothing, chances are the child isn't drowning. Also, it isn't a child. It is a walrus. Should of gone to Specsavers- innit? 

One has only to ask this question to see the absurdity of the view that numbers lessen obligation.

Numbers create 'collective action problems' whose solutions are studied by Political Economy. Philosophy can only add noise to signal.  

It is a view that is an ideal excuse for inactivity; unfortunately most of the major evils-poverty, overpopulation, pollution-are problems in which everyone is almost equally involved.

These are collective action problems whose solutions have existed for thousands of years. Poverty is tackled by raising total factor productivity. Overpopulation is tackled through contraception. Pollution is tackled through Pigouvian taxes, Coasian 'internalization' on the basis of property rights & tort law, as well as legislation. The problem of famine was tackled through buffer stocks & (for rain fed agriculture) water management through check dams, ponds, canals etc.  

The view that numbers do make a difference can be made plausible if stated in this way: if everyone in circumstances like mine gave to the Bengal Relief Fund, there would be enough to provide food, shelter, and medical care for the refugees; there is no reason why I should give more than anyone else in the same circumstances as I am; therefore I have no obligation to give more.

It is true that there can be a 'free rider problem'. But mechanism design is the 'reverse game theory' which tackles the problem such that robust solutions to collective action problems become available. England hasn't had a famine since 1623. But it has had periods of quite severe rationing.  

Each premise in this argument is true, and the argument looks sound. It may convince us, unless we notice that it is based on a hypothetical premise, although the conclusion is not stated hypothetically. The argument would be sound if the conclusion were: if everyone in circumstances like mine were to give, I would have no obligation to give more than.

The solution to ollective action problems generally involve legal obligations- e.g. for those earning more than a certain amount to pay taxes or for those who are able bodied getting conscripted. A particular philosopher may feel he or she has a supererogatory obligation. But rapists too may think it is up to them to supply sperm to attractive women- or goats.   

If the conclusion were so stated, however, it would be obvious that the argument has no bearing on a situation in which it is not the case that everyone else gives .

It had no bearing in a situation where some governments were indeed spending tax money on overseas aid. Moreover, there were international organizations as well as NGOs coordinating aid. 

The Bangladesh case was peculiar because

1) Pakistan was an American ally and Pakistan didn't want Bangladesh to get aid. Moreover, Sheikh Mujib was a Socialist allied to Moscow. The US were particuarly angry with his decision to tade with Cuba

2) There was a global food crisis in 1974. Thus though there was enough aid in 1972, there wasn't in 1974. No doubt, corruption in Bangladesh exacerbated the situation. 

This, of course, is the actual situation. It is more or less certain that not everyone in circumstances like mine will give. So there will not be enough to provide the needed food, shelter, and medical care. Therefore by giving more  I will prevent more suffering than I would if I gave just the same amount.

Sadly, the amount would not be 'material' from the accountancy point of view unless you are very rich indeed. Even then, the logistical problems may be insurmountable.  

In a footnote, Singer writes 

2. In view of the special sense philosophers often give to the term, I should say that I use "obligation" simply as the abstract noun derived from "ought," so that "I have an obligation to" means no more, and no less, than "I ought to." This usage is in accordance with the definition of "ought" given by the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary: "the general verb to express duty or obligation." I do not think any issue of substance hangs on the way the term is used; sentences in which I use "obligation" could all be rewritten, although somewhat clumsily, as sentences in which a clause containing "ought" replaces the term "obligation." 

Singer ignores the fact that obligation started off as meaning a legal or ritual obligation.  

It stems from the Latin verb obligare, meaning "to bind, tie up, or bandage" (ob- meaning "around" or "against" plus ligare meaning "to tie"). Figuratively, it meant to put someone under a legal or moral constraint. [1, 2, 3]
Old French: The term passed into early 13th-century Old French as obligacion, meaning duty or responsibility. [1]
Middle English: It entered the English language around 1300 as obligacioun, referring to a binding pledge or a commitment to fulfill a promise. [1]
Modern Meanings: By roughly 1600, the definition expanded to mean a moral duty or a state of indebtedness caused by gratitude

By contrast 'ought' is Anglo-Saxon & originally referred to ownership or what is owed. By the 17th century it functioned as a modal verb- i.e. it modified a regular verb referring to an action or state. 'I ought to' does not mean 'I have an obligation to'. Thus Mummy may say 'I ought to break your leg because you climbed that tree even though I told you not to.' This does not mean Mummy has a legal obligation to break your leg. However, she may say 'I am obliged to report you to the police because you stabbed your sister. I don't want to do so because I know they will go easy on you. Indeed, I ought to kick your fucking head in, you evil little shit.' 
It might be thought that this argument has an absurd consequence. Since the situation appears to be that very few people are likely to give substantial amounts, it follows that I and everyone else in similar circumstances ought to give as much as possible,

Since very few people are chopping off their heads and shoving them up their arses, it follows that we must show greater alacrity in doing so.  

that is, at least up to the point at which by giving more one would begin to cause serious suffering for oneself and one's dependents-perhaps even beyond this point to the point of marginal utility, at which by giving more one would cause oneself and one's dependents as much suffering as one would prevent in Bengal.

This is the sort of delusion Simone Weil suffered. She starved herself to death in the belief that people in France were on similar short rations. The coroner decided that she was mad at the time.  

The plain fact was that stupid Professors of worthless subjects couldn't alter the condition of people living in far away places. What they could do was alleviate suffering in their own neighborhoods by giving beejays to hobos. 

If everyone does this, however, there will be more than can be used for the benefit of the refugees, and some of the sacrifice will have been unnecessary. Thus, if everyone does what he ought to do, the result will not be as good as it would be if everyone did a little less than he ought to do, or if only some do all that they ought to do. The paradox here arises only if

people don't have Rational Expectations- i.e. expect the prediction of the correct economic theory (which has to do with collective action problems). Econ had closed a question to which Philosophy had contributed nothing since the time of Gossen & 'diminishing marginal utility'.  

we assume that the actions in question-sending money to the relief funds-are performed more or less simultaneously, and are also unexpected. For if it is to be expected that everyone is going to contribute something, then clearly each is not obliged to give as much as he would have been obliged to had others not been giving too. And if everyone is not acting more or less simultaneously, then those giving later will know how much more is needed, and will have no obligation to give more than is necessary to reach this amount.

This is crazy shite. Everybody reading Singer's paper in 1972 knew that collective action problems re. famine were being tackled in ways pioneered by Hoover and later codified by civil servants like B.R. Sen. 

It must be said, prior to the complete break-down of Bretton Woods, there was some sense to campaigning to raise the proportion of GNP devoted to overseas aid because capital markets weren't free to do the job. But, already, people like Myint & Bauer had shown how and why this was counter-productive. It must be said, the Rockerfeller & Ford Foundation did a good job in helping finance the Green Revolution. Oxfam, too, was once quite useful. Sadly, it became the target of anti-apartheid activists because of its association with Barclays Bank. The lunatics were taking over the asylum. Thus, in the Eighties, the World Bank did a great job in Communist China but were hamstrung by 'activists' when they tried to replicate their success in the Nineties in India. 

To say this is not to deny the principle that people in the same circumstances have the same obligations,

which is certainly true of tax-payers. This is called 'horizontal equity'.  

but to point out that the fact that others have given, or may be expected to give, is a relevant circumstance: those giving after it has become known that many others are giving and those giving before are not in the same circumstances.

Yes they are provided they have Rational Expectations. If they don't, they are irrational and should mend their ways. 

Under Singer's assumption you would have a 'cobweb' which would be destabilizing if elasticity of supply (i.e. food aid) is greater than than demand (i.e. food required by the starving). Here you could get a perverse outcome such that indigenous farmers are priced out and thus local supply falls and immeserization increases. 

The problem with dependency of this type is that charity can suddenly disappear. 

So the seemingly absurd consequence of the principle I have put forward can occur only if people are in error about the actual circumstances- that is, if they think they are giving when others are not, but in fact they are giving when others are.

No. This is merely a failure of coordination. Sadly, these things do happen. There are many places which refuse to accept aid when a disaster strikes because 'too many cooks spoil the broth'- i.e. there are diseconomies.  

The result of everyone doing what he really ought to do cannot be worse than the result of everyone doing less than he ought to do, although the result of everyone doing what he reasonably believes he ought to do could be.

Governments exist because collective action problems arise where 'externalities' arise. Philosophers may not know this but, if you really care about famines you need to study the economic conditions under which they arise or are nipped in the bud.  

If my argument so far has been sound,

it is ignorant nonsense 

neither our distance from a preventable evil nor the number of other people who, in respect to that evil, are in the same situation as we are, lessens our obligation to mitigate or prevent that evil.

There is no obligation to do stupid shit- e.g. respond to an economic problem by talking philosophical bollocks.  

I shall therefore take as established the principle I asserted earlier.

viz. that individuals acting independently can solve collective action problems. That is why, in 1939, many British people bought guns and uniforms and went off to fight the Nazis. It isn't the case that they left it to their Government to recruit soldiers and to train and arm them and then send them into battle under experienced commanders.  

As I have already said, I need to assert  it only in its qualified form: if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening,

as individuals, it isn't, if the thing has the hallmarks of a 'collective action problem'- i.e. large group size, externalities, non-convexities, preference revelation problems, concurrency problems, high coordinations costs etc.  

without thereby sacrificing anything else morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it.

If there is an opportunity cost, this will be case. The problem is that there is no objective way to say what is or isn't morally significant.  

The outcome of this argument is that our traditional moral categories are upset.

Our common sense is outraged. This nutter thinks collective action problems can be solved by individual actions of a morally motivated type. 

I suppose there were people who went to fight in the Spanish Civil War because of their moral beliefs. But they achieved nothing whatsoever. That is why they accepted immoral alliances (e.g. with Stalin) so as to avoid defeat.  

The traditional distinction between duty and charity cannot be drawn, or at least, not in the place we normally draw it. Giving money to the Bengal Relief Fund

doesn't actually give any relief to a Bengali unless some Government- e.g. that of Indira or that of Mujib- permits and facillitates it.  

is regarded as an act of charity in our society. The bodies which collect money are known as "charities."

Which, at one time, they were. Then, many of them were taken over by lefty gobshites.  

These organizations see themselves in this way-if you send them a check, you will be thanked for your "generosity." Because giving money is regarded as an act of charity, it is not thought that there is anything wrong with not giving. The charitable man may be praised, but the man who is not charitable is not condemned.

In a free society anyone can condemn anybody for anything 

People do not feel in any way ashamed or guilty about spending money on new clothes or a new car instead of giving it to famine relief.

They don't even weep bitter tears over their own selfish refusal to suck off hobos.  

(Indeed, the alternative does not occur to them.)

Whereas Singer always remembers that the alternative to giving a lecture is to spend that time sucking off hobos. He weeps bitterlay at his moral failure.  

This way of looking at the matter cannot be justified. When we buy new clothes not to keep ourselves warm but to look "well-dressed" we are not providing for any important need.

Singer is not providing for the important needs of horny hobos. Shame on him!  

We would not be sacrificing anything significant if we were to continue to wear our old clothes, and give the money to famine relief.

We wouldn't be achieving anything 'material'- i.e. impactful enough to be registered by Accounants.  

By doing so, we would be preventing another person from starving.

This is the delusion fostered by the Charity sector. Still, they pay their employees which is why they aren't hobos whom Peter Singer ought to be sucking off.  

It follows from what I have said earlier that we ought to give money away, rather than spend it on clothes which we do not need to keep us warm.

If everybody did so, the economy would collapse. If a few do so, nothing changes. Some boring shitheads get to go around puffed up with pride. But are they sucking off hobos? No? If so they are selfish cunts.  

To do so is not charitable, or generous. Nor is it the kind of act which philosophers and theologians have called "supererogatory"-an act which it would be good to do, but not wrong not to do. On the contrary, we ought to give the money away, and it is wrong not to do so.

This is an ipese dixit assertion of no greater or lesser worth than my claim that Singer should suck off hobos.  

(it might)..be interesting to consider why our society, and most other societies, do judge differently from the way I have suggested they should.

The answer is that all societies understand the difference between collective action problems and those where no coordination between individuals is required (other than which spontaneously appears- e.g. the price vector in the market)  

In a well-known article, J. 0. Urmson suggests that the imperatives of duty, which tell us what we must do, as distinct from what it would be good to do but not wrong not to do, function so as to prohibit behavior that is intolerable if men are to live together in society.

Where a collective action problem arises a person is entrusted with a particular duty in return for remuneration or as part of a liturgical duty enforced by the State.  

This may explain the origin and continued existence of the present division between acts of duty and acts of charity.

A person who helps the poor because he is paid to do so by a Charity is said to be doing his duty. However, if there is a supererogatory aspect to this, or his 'transfer earnings' are very high, we may say that he acts not out of duty but as a matter of charity or profound altruism.  

Moral attitudes are shaped by the needs of society, and no doubt society needs people who will observe the rules that make social existence tolerable.

It needs policemen who will arrest those who make social existence intolerable. Singer writes as though he was unaware that Governments exist everywhere. The police get paid to catch & lock up bad hombres.  

From the point of view of a particular society, it is essential to prevent violations of norms against killing, stealing, and so on. It is quite inessential, however, to help people outside one's own society.

But it could be helpful in a Cold War context. The Bangladesh famine was America's way of telling the Muslims in OPEC that Uncle Sam had a 'food weapon' more powerful than the 'oil weapon'. One result was that Saudi Arabia subsdized agriculture to an extent ruinous of its acquifers. Thus, forty years ago, Saudi Arabia was exporting water melons!  

If this is an explanation of our common distinction between duty and supererogation, however, it is not a justification of it.

Anything can be the justification of anything else in the eyes of some person. My fart is my justification for having proved the Reimann hypothesis while making love to Arsulla Undress. Sadly, I failed to write it down but my justification for that is my having shat myself.  

The moral point of view requires us to look beyond the interests of our own society.

We don't know what is beyond the interests of anyone or anything.  

Previously, as I have already mentioned, this may hardly have been feasible, but it is quite feasible now.

Could Singer acquire enough food to ship to Bangladesh in 1974 so as to avert famine deaths? No. The US government could have decided to draw down strategic reserves and requisition or otherwise arrange shipping. They may even have been able to 'put boots on the ground' to ensure the distribution of food. But the Americans were in no mood to repeat the mistakes they had made in Vietnam.  

From the moral point of view, the prevention of the starvation of millions of people outside our society must be considered at least as pressing as the upholding of property norms within our society.

This is sheer fantasy. The American Government did have the food reserves & the military might to intervene. Nixon did send the fleet to the Bay of Bengal on December 10. A 'humanitarian mission' would not have been opposed but the American voter was war weary.  

It has been argued by some writers, among them Sidgwick and Urmson, that we need to have a basic moral code which is not too far beyond the capacities of the ordinary man, for otherwise there will be a general breakdown of compliance with the moral code.

Something like this has always obtained which is why courts have faced no great difficulty in adjudicating 'moral clauses' or detecting and punishing moral lapses of a justiciable type.  

Crudely stated, this argument suggests that if we tell people that they ought to refrain from murder and give everything they do not really need to famine relief, they will do neither, whereas if we tell them that they ought to refrain from murder and that it is good to give to famine relief but not wrong not to do, so, they will at least refrain from murder.

More crudely stated, this argument is that a fucking cretin will be listened to if he says 'please don't eat your own shit'. The fact is nobody gives a toss about what professors of worthless shite are saying.  

The issue here is: Where should we drawn the line between conduct that is required and conduct that is good although not required, so as to get the best possible result? This would seem to be an empirical question, although a very difficult one.

Yet courts decide such questions all the time.  

One objection to the Sidgwick-Urmson line of argument is that it takes insufficient account of the effect that moral standards can have on the decisions we make.

This is like saying eating your own shit takes insufficient account of piss.  

Given a society in which a wealthy man who gives five percent of his income to famine relief is regarded as most generous,

He isn't if he keeps banging on about it. We think Bill Gates is a narcissistic self-promoter, not Mother fucking Theresa.  

it is not surprising that a proposal that we all ought to give away half our incomes will be thought to be absurdly unrealistic.

It is like the proposal that all Utilitarians should  suck off hobos.  

In a society which held that no man should have more than enough while others have less than they need,

there was no such society. Marx said 'to each according to his contribution'. Also it turned out that living in poverty- like Mahatma Gandhi or the Pope- cost much more than living like a Rothschild. 

such a proposal might seem narrow-minded.

As might my proposal than Singer suck off hobos when, the truth is, he should also let Nazis shit on his tits.  

 In order to show that my conclusions, while certainly contrary to contemporary Western moral standards, would not have seemed so extraordinary at other times and in other places, I would like to quote a passage from a writer not normally thought of as a way-out radical, Thomas Aquinas. 

He believed that he would get to Heaven for all eternity. If you believe the same you might even chop off your own bollocks- like Origen.  

Now, according to the natural order instituted by divine providence, material goods are provided for the satisfaction of human needs. Therefore the division and appropriation of property, which proceeds from human law, must not hinder the satisfaction of man's necessity from such goods. Equally, whatever a man has in superabundance is owed, of natural right, to the poor for their sustenance. So Ambrosius says, and it is also to be found in the Decretum Gratiani: "The bread which you withhold belongs to the hungry; the clothing you shut away, to the naked; and the money you bury in the earth is the redemption and freedom of the penniless."

Also if you don't hand over lots of money to the Church- while letting the Vicar sodomize your son- you will BURN IN HELL FOR ALL ETERNITY! 

Still, you can't say the Vatican wasn't broad-minded. The Pope was prepared to let Henry VIII marry off his bastard son to his legitimate daughter. 

I now want to consider a number of points, more practical than philosophical, which are relevant to the application of the moral conclusion we have reached. These points challenge not the idea that we ought to be doing all we can to prevent starvation, but the idea that giving away a great deal of money is the best means to this end. It is sometimes said that overseas aid should be a government responsibility, and that therefore one ought not to give to privately run charities.

What's wrong with creating jobs in the voluntary sector? There are worse things you can do with your money more particularly if coke whores are involved.  

Giving privately, it is said, allows the government and the noncontributing members of society to escape their responsibilities.

If you suck off a hobo, Donald Trump escapes his responsibility for doing so.  

This argument seems to assume that the more people there are who give to privately organized famine relief funds, the less likely it is that the government will take over full responsibility for such aid. 

In a free society, the Government can't prevent such voluntary action. Speaking generally, Exchange Control under Bretton Woods made an exemption for charitable outflows. 

his assumption is unsupported, and does not strike me as at all plausible. The opposite view-that if no one gives voluntarily, a government will assume that its citizens are uninterested in famine relief and would not wish to be forced into giving aid-seems more plausible. In any case, unless there were a definite probability that by refusing to give one would be helping to bring about massive government assistance, people who do refuse to make voluntary contributions are refusing to prevent a certain amount of suffering without being able to point to any tangible beneficial consequence of their refusal.

Sadly, there is no way of knowing if a voluntary contribution will definitely reduce suffering by some measurable amoung.  

So the onus of showing how their refusal will bring about government action is on those who refuse to give. 

Only in the sense that the onus is on Singer to suck off hobos. In other words this is an arbitrary ipse dixit assertion of a foolish type.  

I do not, of course, want to dispute the contention that governments of affluent nations should be giving many times the amount of genuine, no-strings-attached aid that they are giving now.

Bauer & Myint, who were economists (the latter was Burmese) thought Aid could be very harmful indeed. On balance, they were right.  

I agree, too, that giving privately is not enough, and that we ought to be campaigning actively for entirely new standards for both public and private contributions to famine relief. Indeed, I would sympathize with someone who thought that campaigning was more important than giving oneself, although I doubt whether preaching what one does not practice would be very effective.

This is like Amartya Sen who believes there are 'second order' public goods- i.e. campaigning for more public goods is itself a public good. But such second order work can crowd out first order provision. Like the Bengali students who burnt buses to protest agains the lack of buses, the underlying problem was exacerbated.  

Singer, however, views this as a desirable outcome!

..., it should be clear that we would have to give away enough to ensure that the consumer society, dependent as it is on people spending on trivia rather than giving to famine relief, would slow down and perhaps disappear entirely.

In which case we could never again give money away. Rather, we would have to beg.  

There are several reasons why this would be desirable in itself.

Begging is good. Having money is bad.  

The value and necessity of economic growth are now being questioned not only by conservationists, but by economists as well.

Back then Schumacher was respected. The fucker thought Burma had chosen the right path to rise! 

It is sometimes said, though less often now than it used to be,

because the thing was blindingly obvious 

that philosophers have no special role to play in public affairs,

Stalin was a philosopher.  

since most public issues depend primarily on an assessment of facts. On questions of fact, it is said, philosophers as such have no special expertise, and so it has been possible to engage in philosophy without committing oneself to any position on major public issues. No doubt there are some issues of social policy and foreign policy

and policy regarding famine & structural volatility in agriculture 

about which it can truly be said that a really expert assessment of the facts is required before taking sides or acting, but the issue of famine is surely not one of these.

No. It has always been a purely positive, ideographic, matter. Fine words butter no parsnips. Good intentions pave the path to hell. You need high level local knowledge to establish a structural causal model and thus identify those parameters amenable to improvement.  

The facts about the existence of suffering are beyond dispute.

Cancer causes suffering. I don't dispute that. But I don't want Singer involved in diagnosing or treating cancer or any other type of disease. 

I wouldn't even want him to raise money for Cancer Research. Why? He has shit for brains. He'd probably waste the money on some charlatan who would mislead the public.  

Nor, I think, is it disputed that we can do something about it, either through orthodox methods of famine relief

known only to experts in that field.  

or through population control

see above. 

or both. This is therefore an issue on which philosophers are competent to take a position.

Philosophers, who know no Mathematics and no Physics, can take a position on String Theory. But so can a drunken hobo. What they can't do is make any useful contribution to it because they can't understand it in the first place.  

The issue is one which faces everyone who has more money than he needs to support himself and his dependents,

i.e. has some 'discretionary income'. The problem here is that how you use discretionary income impacts what you will earn in the future. Spend a lot on booze & hookers & you may become unemployable. On the other hand, you may be promoted more speedily if you spend on smart suits, an expensive watch or car, and cultivate a taste for fine wine.

Interestingly, a reputation for charitable giving boosts credit-worthiness especially in 'high-trust' in-groups. You are sending a signal that you have money to spare. True you could have spent it on cocaine, but cocaine is addictive. It is easy to go cold turkey on charity. 

or who is in a position to take some sort of political action. These categories must include practically every teacher and student of philosophy in the universities of the Western world.

Were teachers of philosophy well paid in 1972?  Not really. What political action were they capable of? The French philosophers who came out onto the streets in '68, had gone back to the class-room. De Gaulle had triumphed. The future of the Left lay with Mitterand not some maître à penser

If philosophy is to deal with matters that are relevant to both teachers and students,

famine? That's a big problem in the Philosophy faculty?  

this is an issue that philosophers should discuss.

so as to exhibit their own stupidity to those who might not have been aware that the subject had become adversely selective of imbecility. 

Discussion, though, is not enough. What is the point of relating philosophy to public (and personal) affairs if we do not take our conclusions seriously?

Philosophy is like Literature- i.e. part of Paideia. Acquiring the rudiments of such disciplines signals breeding.  

In this instance, taking our conclusion seriously means acting upon it.

By quitting Academica & taking a job with Oxfam? 

The philos-opher will not find it any easier than anyone else to alter his attitudes and way of life to the extent that, if I am right, is involved in doing everything that we ought to be doing.

A French philosopher- Bernard Henri Levi- went to Bangladesh and got a post with the new government. Singer is a couple of years older than BHL.

At the very least, though, one can make a start.

Singer did start giving away 20 to 40 percent of his income. I suppose, Leftists mocked him for being a 'bourgeois idealist'.  

The philosopher who does so will have to sacrifice some of the benefits of the consumer society, but he can find compensation in the satisfaction of a way of life in which theory and practice, if not yet in harmony, are at least coming together.

Singer wasn't intimidated by the Maoists in the economy. He had lost family members to Hitler &, being Australian, was in no mood to truckle to hatemongering lunatics.  

One may say he was stupid but he was a man of character. Sadly, the same can't be said for some of the 'effective altruist' fraudsters.