Friday, 28 August 2026

Nathan Cofnas's bright future.

 Nathan Cofnas is 40 years old. He is a post-doctoral fellow in Belgium researching 'the future of liberalism'. In other words, even if he isn't brain-dead, he is in a zombie profession where the only thing worse than being a post-doc would be being a fucking Professor. Nevertheless, thanks to the Jason Arday affair, it now looks as though he can establish himself in the front rank of well remunerated public intellectuals.

Does he deserve his good luck?

Briefly- yes. He took risks and completed worthless theses at different intstitutions on different continents. Still, it was sheer luck that the Arday case ended in the manner that it did because, it turned out, the diversity hire was genuinely nuerodivergent ( i.e. he genuinely believed invisible racists were trying to kill him) and that his own family didn't bother to take steps to get him sectioned & thus kept safe from self-harm. 

Nathan wasn't mathsy and thus could make no contribution to evolutionary biology or philosophy. He got his start critiquing a low IQ Catholic anti-Semite but there really wasn't a lot of mileage in it because George Soros ws determined to provie evidence that 'rootless' Jews wanted to destroy Christendom by importing hordes of crazy Jihadis. 

What about attacking affirmative action & 'wokeness' back home in the US? The problem here is that you need heavy econometric chops to muscle in on that territory. Moreover, if even African American Sociolgists, publishing alethic research, can get cancelled, what hope had Nathan? 

Interestingly, after a first degree from Columbia, Nathan went to Hong Kong for his masters and then Cambridge and Oxford for his M.Phil & PhD respectively. The problem he faced was that 'Philosophy of Biology' is either super-mathsy or else it is finger painting with your own faeces. 

As a case in point, consider a recent paper by Cofnas taking issue with the stardard defintion of natural selection as featuring

(1) “phenotypic variation,”

 (2) “differential fitness,” 

(3)  'heritable fitness'

 I argue that the standard formulation is inadequate because it fails to distinguish natural selection from artificial selection by humans,

humans are part of nature 

intelligent design by God,

God is immanent in Nature 

forward-looking orthogenetic selection,

bound to happen if a species evolved by sexual selection gains consciousness. 

and adaptation via the selection of nonrandom variation.

There is no way to tell random from pseudorandom (Razbarov Rudich) 

In the case of artificial selection and intelligent design, natural or supernatural agents intervene in the mutation and/or selection process to drive evolution in a predetermined direction.

There may be such a direction- e.g. 'the law of increasing functional information'- which, however, maps poorly to what we cognize as biological life or, indeed, an 'extended phenotype'.  

“Orthogenesis” refers to the idea that evolution follows a predetermined path. (“Ortho” comes from the Greek word for “straight.”)

It may be that 'at the end of mathematical time' (i.e. after all possible mathematics is completed) all lawless choice sequences are known to be lawful or, as the mystics say, all Freedom is discovered to be Bondage or the other way around. 

In the case of orthogenetic selection, a natural teleological force influences survival and reproduction in order to guide evolution toward a predetermined endpoint.

If there is verification that such is the case, then we know the choice sequence of the Universe is lawful though we may still not comprehend what exactly that law is.  

I will also call this “natural teleological selection.”

A Brouwerian free creating subject could have a teleolgy. Indeed, the Intuitionist may say that his adventious discoveries were all pre-planned in a manner occult even to himself. Like Novalis's magician, he is unaware of how he performs his own tricks.  

Adaptation via the selection of nonrandom variation involves heritable variation arising because it will be favored by selection. All four of these evolutionary processes involve heritable variation in fitness, but, I claim, they should not be classified as natural selection.

 They aren't. We speak of 'artificial insemination' as opposed to such as would occur in the wild. Moreover, devout people speak of God as having created their imperishable soul. They may also mention supernatural beings- e.g. Angels- who worked miracles for a particular purpose. 

Natural selection can be distinguished from artificial selection, intelligent design, orthogenetic selection, and adaptation via the selection of nonrandom variation by adding a no teleology condition. No teleology The evolutionary process is not teleological.

What of the fitness landscape? If it is teleological- for e.g. aimed at increased functional information- then evolution is teleological or, in the case of our species, about to become so. 

When God guides evolution in order to achieve his purpose, this is paradigmatically teleological.

Not unless it is his purpose that we grasp this or, equally, that is his purpose is that we don't grasp this or if God's purposes could not seem purposive to us.  

But it is not clear what it means for there to be a telos in the absence of an agent who intends and strives.

Nor is it clear what purpose means or means means. They are Tarskian primitives.  

There may not be a simple, unifying concept of teleology that covers both goal-directed behavior by agents and (hypothetical) forward-looking natural forces that may or may not be metaphysically reducible to efficient causes.

Or there may be nothing but that concept.  

If agential interference in the evolutionary process, orthogenetic selection, and adaptation via the selection of nonrandom variation should not be classified as “natural selection,”

nothing follows. One 'should' is compatible with an equal and opposite 'should'. Imperative statements may look logical but they aren't really. This is Jorgensen's dilemma. 

the no teleology condition will have to invoke different concepts of “teleology”—different ways of aiming at a telos.

This is a meta-telos- having a purpose with respect to purpose. But that is still just a purpose. Does it arise out of natural selection (because we all do)? If so is it a 'spandrel' or is it functional? Can there be 'naturality' in this matter?

No. The thing is mere displacement activity- like the rest of philosophy. It passes the time as time passes us by. 

I will classify these under two headings: “agential teleology” and “natural teleology.”

Such classifications always turn out to be a distinctions without a difference. What matters is whether there scientists can identify 'natural transformations'. Currently this seems promising. It looks as though phenotypic mutational robustness bounds in genetics naturally align with fractal curves and pure number-theoretic functions, pointing to deep, unforced mathematical regularities in evolution. This is useful but only provisionally so. At some point some arbitrary element intrudes. Still, one could say 'synthetic' information causes a particular type of error accumulation & model collapse but the way it is repaired is by increasing verification. This is where the arbitrary element returns. My point is that naturality is mathematical not philosophical. The verification protocol can always be modelled as agential. But it is the fitness landscape which is in the driver's seat. 

I address these two types of teleology, in turn, in the following two sections.

 Agential teleology A process exhibits agential teleology if it is guided toward an end that is represented in the mind of an agent.

Did any mind guide any historical process in the Twentieth century towards an end it intended? One might say 'all the minds of the belligenerents who went to war in 1914 had the purpose of going to war'. But that is circular. It isn't informative. One might as easily say 'everybody's purpose is to die which is why everybody does manage to end up dead within a century or so.' 

The evolutionary process exhibits agential teleology when an agent—such as a breeder, a genetic engineer, or a divine intelligent designer—introduces mutations nonrandomly with respect to, or selects heritable variants with reference to, a mentally represented endpoint.

No. The evolutionary process is only at work where some such people are weeded out while others gains more resources. If there is no competition or predators there is no selection pressure.

There is no great harm in writing shite of the sort I have just quoted. Equally, it would be easy enough for anyone with half a brain to gas on about the future of liberalism precisely because it began by apotheosizing 'naturality' against arbitrariness. Could there be a categorical Utopia of the Condorcet type? Malthus's theory of population ws the counter claim. Even if a utopia was established, immigration or (in the absence of 'vice' (i.e. wanking, contraception, homosexuality etc.)) runaway population growth would turn everything to shit again. This was connected (as Keynes would note) with 'underconsumption' crises. Darwin, of course, applied Malthus's paradigm to Biology & thus got to natural selection. This meant either Eugencis/Planned Economies as needful for 'Social' Liberalism or else (after mathematical Mendelism triumphed over vestigal Lamarckism) a Hayekian scepticism re. information aggregation which was reinforced by purely mathematical problems of concurrency, complexity, computability & categoricity. 

For the Left, Maynard Smith (a former card-carrying Commie) and Hamilton, Price, etc., presented a scandal. Uncoreelated asymmetries (especially if they generate Aumann public signals) dictate eusocial 'bourgeois strategies'. Moreover 'co-evolved strategies can increase evolvability but without categoricity (or  unicity). 

In this context, there are no 'conceptual' problems. Everything is merely pragmatic and relates to shifting coordination & discoordination games. Thus we can say, for any practical purpose there are Voevodsly style 'univalent foundations' or 'observational equivalence'. 

In other words, though guys doing mathsy evolutionary biology may be doing very useful stuff, philosophy can only add noise to signal. Rockefeller Uni realised this when it got rid of its high price Philosophy Dept. in the mid Seventies even though the discipline still had some high IQ dudes back then. 

It may be that AI will enable non-mathsy dudes to become more productive, or- more to the point- useful, and, if so, Nathan may redeem himself as he rises within the Academy. 


Thursday, 27 August 2026

Roland Fryer on Jason Arday

Roland Fryer writes in the WSJ about Jason Arday.


I am saddened by the story of Jason Arday.

He was suffering from Schizophrenia. He believed racists were trying to kill him. It may be that he took his life because he feared that his family might be targetted if he himself remained alive.

The tragedy here is that Arday's supporters didn't really believe evil racist murderers existed. That's why they didn't reassure Arday that he had nothing to fear. 

Now, Arday's supporters are claiming him as a martyr to their cause though it was their own negligence and stupidity which caused Arday's death. 

There was the life, as he told it: autistic, unable to speak until 11 or to read and write until 18, and at 37 the youngest black professor in the history of Cambridge. I was 30 when I became the youngest black professor to get tenure at Harvard.

Like Sowell, Fryer was disliked by the Liberal Academy because he was providing empirical evidence against some of their foundational myths.  

There was the unraveling: a July report that passages of his thesis matched another scholar’s, an investigation,

Arday should have gone on the offensive by saying that 'plagiarism' or 'copying' is a social construct based on 'intellectual property'. It is the product of the diseased White male mind. In Africa, there is Ubuntu- sharing rather than ownership.  

his resignation and, nine days later, his death. And there was the press’s unrelenting scrutiny, which I too know something about.

But Arday hadn't been snorting coke while groping girls. All he did was confuse fantasy with reality which was entirely understandable given his diagnosis (Autism is actually close to Schizophrenia though Baron Cohen had previousy suggested otherwise). 

I felt something similar watching the frenzy around Claudine Gay two years ago, despite my history with her, and around Jayson Blair two decades before that.

Glen Loury was the precedent in Fryer's case.  

I don’t know the whole truth of these cases, and for what economics has to say about how to avoid them, it doesn’t matter.

No. The truth does matter to Economics. But, in Arday's case everything was normative, nothing alethic. There is no theft of intellectual property if it is merely a set of imperative statements which are being echoed. 

Each case raises the same question: Have elite institutions become so eager for diversity

they are hiring monkeys? 

that they take chances on people whose credentials wouldn’t otherwise get them in the door?

That isn't the case here. Arday should have gone on the attack by saying 'plagiarism' was the invention of diseased white minds which affirm 'intellectual property' rather than 'Ubuntu'. 

Sadly, he was genuinely mentally ill.  

I hope so.

Fair point. Maybe, after Trump resigns & gets a pardon from Vance, he should come to Harvard to teach Trade theory.  

Many people took chances on me. My grades weren’t impressive, my home life was a mess, and a vocational-education teacher had to talk me into finishing high school. At each step someone looked past the record and bet on what I might become.

Fryer is considered to have done good work- at least by the standards of his discipline.  

My quarrel with DEI has never been that it takes chances. It’s with what happens after the initial opportunity.

If DEI in Medicine leads to Black surgeons killing patients, we'd all have a bone to pick with it. But that hasn't happened. If unqualified people teach worthless shite, we don't give a fuck.  

At the University of Chicago, where I finished graduate school, nobody confused potential with accomplishment.

But they were as confused as fuck as to what is or isn't junk social science.  

Gary Becker, Steven Levitt and Sherwin Rosen pushed me constantly.

Fryer would be an effective propagandist for their cause. But the same was true of Arday. Sadly, Arday's mental illness left him unable to distinguish reality from fantasy. I think he killed himself because he thought there really were evil racists with supernatural powers who were determined to destroy him.  

So did James Heckman, who, I’m fairly sure, never liked me. The message wasn’t that I was bad. It was that I wasn’t good yet. Rosen once told me that not only did he not practice affirmative action, he was trying not to hold my race against me. It sounded harsh, but it meant his opinion was worth having.

If Econ was worth doing. It wasn't. Trump has proved that.  

For years, before I submitted a paper I would present it in a Chicago workshop; if it wasn’t completely destroyed, I figured it might be ready.

The freshwater Economists were competing with the saltwater toffs. Fryer was their palladin or padawan.  

The Chicago approach did two things at once: It built my skills and tested whether I had any. While I was there, Mr. Heckman was developing a theory of skill-building, published in 2007 with Flavio Cunha as “The Technology of Skill Formation.” Skills at each stage of life, in their model, are produced from the skills one already has and the investment made at that stage.

Yet new skills can be acquired by a set of people all of whom have a different skill base from each other.

Skills persist and feed on one another, and skill already in place raises the return on new investment, so by the same logic early investment fades unless it is followed up.

The problem with appeals to supermodularity are that the thing isn't falsifiable.  

Their canonical example was early childhood education,

Nothing acquired as such can't be gained by some adult who lacked any such thing.  

but the logic applies just as well to faculty development.

This isn't logic. It is a fantasy. 

Finding out whether one has skills is less obvious.

No. It is easy to verify you lack a skill.  

Investing in someone builds capacity and reveals how much capacity there is to build.

Nonsense! An investor may or may not build capacity and may or may not have any good way to be sure it is happening during the investment process.  

Philipp Harms and I modeled this as a two-armed bandit.

Mathematical masturbation is still just smasturbation.  

Picture two slot machines: One pays a known amount; what the other pays you can learn only by playing it. In our version, playing the unknown machine—investing in the person—both raises its payout and reveals what it is worth.

This is a just-so story. We don't know where, if at all, it applies.  

That second job, finding out, is the one DEI forgets.

Nonsense! DEI can test to destruction. We pick a random bunch of guys for paratroop training. Then we push them all out of a plane. The one's who go splat are dropped from the program. So are the ones who soiled themselves and are now screaming their tits off. 

Taking a chance on someone is a bet that the initial signals—test scores, transcripts, a résumé—understated the candidate. Rational. But an institution that overrides a noisy signal has taken on an obligation to produce better ones.

It really hasn't unless it is in the breast-feeding business. Fryer forgets that the US Army, during war, had to embrace DEI at least at the margin. No doubt, this did mean a lot of 'negroes' went splat. But those that didn't could rise- like Colin Powell.  

A school, business or organization that makes the bet and won’t read the results has paid for the option and thrown it away.

The result gets read. Arday went splat. Cambridge has egg on its face. Suppose Arday had played the Ubuntu card re. plagiarism and then done a documentary about living with psychosis (a la 'Beautiful Mind') he'd be laughing all the way to the bank right now. Cambridge's Dept of Education would be vindicated. The next step would be to get feral cats into Chairs of Cognitive Psychology. After that, aardvarks might hope to head the Department of Actuarial Science.  

The perverse achievement of much of DEI is that it begins by declaring the initial signals unreliable and ends by making every subsequent signal unreliable too.

That's what happened to Econ. All we can say is that this piece of shite represents best current practice/ 

Both obligations—to keep investing in the person, and to provide honest signals about how it’s going—can be met.

By seeing what makes more money. That's all that matters.  

Development is the easier one. In a randomized trial of the City University of New York’s ASAP program—which entails intensive advising and tutoring—three-year graduation rates for low-income students were 40%, vs. 22% in the control group.

But did it result in higher earnings? No. Fuck it.  

The harder obligation is telling people the truth about their work.

More particularly in a country where shooting up your high school or community college is a national pastime.  

The psychologist Kent Harber has spent a quarter-century showing that white evaluators give gentler comments on the same essay when they believe the writer is black or Hispanic rather than white. They presumably think they are being kind; they are withholding the one thing the writer needs.

Writing is adversely selective because shite gets paid better than worthwhile stuff. Praise the cretin by all means. Who else will want to earn a living by marketing their own stupidity?  

When David Yeager and Geoffrey Cohen had teachers’ marked-up essays returned to seventh-graders with one sentence attached—“I’m giving you these comments because I have very high expectations, and I know that you can reach them”—the share of black students who chose to revise rose to 71% from 17%.

Has this been replicated? Perhaps. But there's a 'Hawthorne effect' here. The feeling that someone is paying attention changes work effort  

Often the experiment fails, and it must, or there would be nothing to learn. A healthy society needs to be able to say:

we don't eat our own shit 

We saw potential, we took a chance, we invested seriously, the evidence came in, and we were wrong.

Let people do it on their own. Blacks do well in highly competitive fields- provided they are intrinsically rewarding & , at the top end, very well remunerated. Academia is neither of these things. 

But imagine a university that took 100 chances on minority faculty and denied tenure to 95.

They fan out and teach in High Schools or Middle Schools or, in the case of the most abjectly retarded, Primary or Nursery Schools. What's wrong with that? That's how the educational system is supposed to run in a 'normal population'. 

That would be a scandal too, so the pressure runs toward parity in outcomes and toward promoting rather than developing.

In an 'ageing population', this would swiftly yield a situation where there are ten professors for every student. The thing is not fiscally viable.  

Stephen Morris, an economic theorist, explained why in a 2001 paper titled “Political Correctness”: An adviser who fears being thought a bigot shades what he says until it carries no information at all.

Fuck off! Advisers actively lie.  

Opportunity alone didn’t produce these scandals. Refusing to hold anyone to a real standard afterward did. By 2002 Mr. Blair had so many corrections at the New York Times

does anybody now think the NYT is a credible news source?  

that his editor, Jonathan Landman, wrote colleagues: “We have to stop Jayson from writing for the Times. Right now.” The paper moved him to the national desk anyway. Howell Raines, the Times’s executive editor, told his newsroom he believed in hiring minorities aggressively, then conceded: “You have a right to ask if I, as a white man from Alabama, with those convictions, gave him one chance too many.”

We have a right to think the NYT was and is garbage.  

Ms. Gay went from professor to dean to president of Harvard on 11 published articles. The question isn’t what she did with the job but what the people promoting her were reading.

At least she wasn't an Economist- like Larry Summers.  

Cambridge answered detailed complaints about Mr. Arday’s work in 2023with his department’s “full support,” according to Retraction Watch. The scandal was only the last chapter; the failure was in every earlier one, when someone could have been harder on the work and wasn’t.

Fryer may think that 'Sociology of Education' in the UK is based on econometric investigation. It isn't. Arday wasn't stupider than average. He was mentally ill. That's why he killed himself.  

As I was leaving Chicago in 2003, a professor told me, “Be careful of the liberals.” I thought it was about politics. It wasn’t. He wasn’t worried that I would be ignored at Harvard, the usual concern of junior faculty. He was worried that I wouldn’t get feedback—that the people around me would want so badly for me to succeed, and for themselves not to be mistaken for bigots, that they would flinch from the uncomfortable things required to make me better. Mr. Raines was that person for Mr. Blair.

Fryer's work has had no impact. There is little point going down the Sowell/Clarence Thomas route. Keep your nose clean & prepare for a Harris administration.  

Every time I see a minority pilloried as “unqualified,” I wince. The trope is old—the black hire who couldn’t do the job—and durable, because the cases that fit it become news,

old news 

and the ones that don’t become careers.

You can make a career out of being the diversity hire who was let down by her boss- e.g. Kamala Harris.  

Sadder than the stories themselves would be the lesson many will draw from them: Take fewer chances. It is exactly backward. If we believe in the people we bet on, the obligation starts at the door, and the remedy is to run these bets the way anyone runs a series of experiments: as a portfolio.

The Chinese think like engineers. But so did the Americans- once upon a time. Sadly, a portfolio of crap is still just crap.  

Take 10 chances and expect most to fail; those who make it are people the market would never have found.

Unless there are market makers- which is all that private universities are.  

Venture capitalists lose money on most of what they fund, and nobody calls a failed startup a scandal.

Unless coke whores were involved.  

The people who took chances on me changed my life.

But you have changed nothing.  

The people who risked being called bigots to tell me I wasn’t good enough yet changed it even more.

& the people who ask you why, if you know Econ, you aren't a trillionaire, would change it even more if they existed. They don't exist because nobody thinks an Econ PhD isn't a certificate in stupidity.  

Wednesday, 26 August 2026

Why Sumit Sarkar wasted his life.


Sumit Sarkar's father was a Communist at a time when the power of the Communist party was rising in West Bengal. The Centre, too, was moving Leftward & had allied with the Soviet Union.

Sumit, however, lived to see the BJP come to power both in Delhi and Kolkata. Communism was dead. 'Subalterns' had taken power. Consider Alluri Sitarama Raju, the Hindu Sanyassi who led the Rampa revolt in 1922. There was a time when Sumit could say the fellow was unknown outside his district. But the film RRR  came out in 2022. It won the Oscar for best song. There is an airport and a district named after the hero. No one can pretend he was actually a voiceless tribal or incipient Maoist. The man was a Hindu revolutionary of precisely the type that created and continue to inspire the current ruling party both at the Centre and in West Bengal. 

In 'Open Magazine', Shaan Kashyap writes-

Sumit Sarkar (1939-2026) and the Deepening of Indian Democracy

Sumit had nothing to do with the deepening of anything whatsoever. Dynasticism declined and the Hindu majority asserted itself.  

Sumit Sarkar’s life as a historian and public intellectual was defined by

writing worthless shite. The stupid cunt was part of the 'subaltern' group. They didn't seem to be aware that the subaltern was taking power all over the country. It was tribals and Dalits and OBCs who were becoming Chief Ministers. New States were being carved out for them. Stupid Marxists either emigratedo or were ignored.  

a persistent scrutiny of power

He couldn't scrutinise shit. Historians had no power. They weren't an elite. They were deluded shitheads.  

—whether exercised by the Right, the Left, the state or institutions of knowledge

Neither the Right nor the Left would give him the time of day. He was irrelevant. I suppose, there was a time when one could say 'he represents West Bengal's determination to keep the BJP out of power' but there was no such determination. Sarkar's virtue signalling was worthless. 

Sumit Sarkar (1939-2026), who passed away on August 13, 2026, was not only one of the tallest historians of modern India

He was rubbish. History is written by those who make it, not by those who live in cloud cuckoo land.  

but also a public intellectual of rare courage, clarity and intellectual integrity.

He may have been a public toilet. What is certain is he was overflowing with shit.  

His writings as a public intellectual can be read as a sustained interrogation of a deceptively simple question: what makes democracy possible, and what makes it vulnerable?

Nonsense! Everybody knows what makes democracy possible- viz. periodic elections which lead to one party or bunch of politicians displacing another. This requires a good enough Election Commission and an Army which doesn't conduct coups. 

What makes democracy vulnerable is a large  Muslim population. The peaceful religion doesn't seem congenial to democracy. Look at Pakistan and Bangladesh. Im the Dim is in jail. Sheikh Hasina is in exile. Now look at India. The Bench may send a politician to jail but, chances are, he will be out on bail soon enough. Nobody has to go into exile. The Army has zero political role.  

His answer was

meaningless gibberish 

never confined to elections or constitutional institutions. It concerned the distribution of power—in universities, communities, political parties, historical memory and the nation itself.

All of which are wholly irrelevant. The distribution of power wasn't so different between India & Pakistan. India has been democratic. Pakistan hasn't. 

The fact is, when a Dictator usurps power, it can't be because power has been redistributed though, subsequently, some such thing may occur. Thus, when Portugal, Spain, Greece and, later on, Warsaw pact countries, switched to Democracy, there simply hadn't been enough time for a big change in power distribution. Thus Sumit was completely wrong. This was because his entire brain was constituted by a thick lump of shit.  

The argument was already visible in his 1989 essay, ‘Autonomy for Whom?’, written against Rajiv Gandhi’s education reforms and the UGC’s proposals for autonomous departments and colleges.

Neither of which mattered in the slightest. The only comment that can be made about that period is that 'Autocracy is tempered by Assassination'. Universities don't matter- more particularly if they tuned to shit long ago.  

The language of the reforms was democratic:

No. Nobody was saying that College Principals or Vice Chancellors should be elected.  

autonomy, decentralisation and freedom from bureaucratic control.

have nothing to do with Democracy. The fact is Democracy has been associated with increased centralization and bureaucratic control not just in Europe and America but also India.  

Sarkar questioned the assumption that decentralisation was automatically democratic.

If some Indian shithead was making that assumption, then it was because the fellow had shit for brains. It was fucking obvious that Democracy in India had increased centralization and reduced 'subsidiarity'.  

Feudal Europe had been decentralised;

No. It was synoecist. The Pope in Rome had the power to loose and bind. It is a different matter that centralization of various types was 'contested'. But, the fact is, where there are Emperors (e.g. the Holy Roman one) there is greater centralization than when there are Nation States.  

so, had the slaveholding American South.

Which was democratic.  

The real question, he insisted, was the distribution of power within an autonomous unit:

The unit isn't autonomous if some within it are allied with powerful forces outside it.  

autonomy for whom?

For the unit, you fucking cretin. If it is cohesive and acts independently of other power centers then it is autonomous. If some powerful constitutent within it gets it to do what some alien power center wants, then it isn't autonomous at all.

Thus, if a University is held hostable by the youth wing of the Communist party, the University isn't really autonomous.  On the other hand, if it pursues a rational strategy to compete in terms of excellence with other Universities, then it is autonmous. 

The proposed reforms made his concern concrete.

Neither he nor those reforms mattered in the slightest.  

Departmental councils could exclude half or more of the teachers; students had no meaningful representation; teachers outside the council need not be consulted even on syllabi; and day-to-day administration would effectively rest with the head. The UGC’s autonomous-college scheme similarly removed elected teacher representatives from governing bodies, replacing elections with rotation according to seniority. Sarkar warned that “autonomy” could simply produce dominant cliques around principals and heads.

But Universities couldn't actually get very much worse. Nor could they get better. Both students and staff were utterly shite  


The draft Accreditation Council report, Sarkar suggested, claimed to fight the legacies of colonial education, while quietly restoring precisely those features that nationalists had once opposed: less elected teacher representation, greater official control and tighter authority over universities. Lord Curzon, Sarkar observed with characteristic irony, would have been a happy man to find such worthy successors.

Lord Curzon did what was in the interest of Britain. Sarkar objected to the Indian government doing things which were in India's interest. If nationalism involved trying to fuck up the British rulers, surely it also entails fucking up Indian rulers? 


A year later, this concern with power moved from institutions to communal politics.

As Hindus, is it not our duty to ensure that Muslims are able to slaughter us with impunity? 

In ‘Understanding Communal Violence: Nizamuddin Riots’ (1990), written with Pradip Datta, Biswamoy Pati, Tanika Sarkar and Sambuddha Sen, Sarkar examined the violence of March 17, 1990, in which two Bangladeshi Muslim refugees

Why would Muslims need to run away from an Islamic Republic? The two men may have been economic migrants. They could not have been refugees.  

were killed in police firing and around 50 Muslims were injured. The immediate dispute concerned a boundary wall on land claimed by the Waqf Board and the Delhi Municipal Corporation. The police protected the Hindu crowd constructing it; municipal tankers supplied water for the mortar while refugee settlements burned nearby. An Arya Samaj leader explicitly compared the construction to the Ayodhya shilanyas and called it karseva.

If Muslims in Pakistan are ethnically cleasning Hindus, ought we not to try to help Muslims in India from doing the same thing? Is that not the true meaning of being a worthless Bengali shithead? 


Sarkar and his co-authors challenged conventional secular explanations of communal violence, which tended to blame criminals, a communalised police apparatus or distorted class conflict.

What he couldn't challenge was the notion that killing kaffirs is a religious duty. 

Such explanations could leave both elites and ordinary people strangely innocent. The investigation instead followed the organisations and networks behind the mobilisation and connected Nizamuddin to the wider Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid campaign.

This is why Hindus voted for those organisations and networks. Shitheads like Sumit helped the BJP by highlighting this.  

Communalism, they argued, had to be understood as a social and political process rather than an external aberration.

It is the process whereby one group enslaves or ejects another group from valuable territory.  

That method shaped Sarkar’s subsequent writings on Hindutva. In ‘Conversions and Politics of Hindu Right’ (1999), he examined the politics of conversion and the construction of the Christian “Other”.

You are the other who will go to Hell if you don't accept Lord Jesus as your personal God & Saviour.  

His argument was not an uncritical defence of Christianity. He acknowledged missionary coercion and the colonial history of conversion. But he also pointed to Christian participation in anti-war, anti-nuclear and socially progressive movements, including cooperation with secular, liberal and Left groups.

i.e. they are useless virtue signallers who will insist that we all let nice Jihadis chop our heads off.  

The important distinction was between a religion and the political uses made of stereotypes about it.

What was important for Sumit was that kaffirs offer themselves for slaughter.  


The history of shuddhi sharpened the argument.

If you are forcibly converted, nobody should be allowed to reconvert you to your ancestral religion.  

Arya Samaj campaigns that might have begun as social reform increasingly became exercises in policing religious boundaries.

There weren't any Arya Samajis in East Bengal. Why did Hindus have to run away from there.  

Shuddhi, tabligh and tanzim became mutually reinforcing sources of Hindu-Muslim tension in the 1920s. Savarkar’s 1923 definition of the Hindu through pitribhumi and punyabhumi further connected religious identity with nationalism.

Just like Narendra Modi & Suvendu Adhikari. Sumit wasted his fucking life.  


Tuesday, 25 August 2026

Sen's Exchange Entitlements


In August 1976, two years after the Bangladesh famine, Amartya Sen wrote in the EPW about

Famines as failures of Exchange Entitlement.  

In places like twentieth century Bengal or Britian, famine deaths could only arise by a failure of the public distribution system to supply enough food to some people within their jurisdiction. Here the entitlement to food is legal or political. It is not on the basis of 'Exchange'. 

One may think of buffer stocks and public distribution systems for food as 'risk pooling' or a type of social insurance. 

However, it is 'demographic transition'- i.e. lower birth rates- which ensures that long term food security will obtain. 

THE approach of 'food availability decline', which 'I will call FAD (without apologising), attributes the causation of famines to a sharp decline in the avail- ability of food supply in the region in question.

There has been no famine without FAD- though food availability may have declined because of forcible requisition and femoval of food stocks rather than a bad harvest

This is the common element of the approach, through the manifestatians of famines can be explained in one of several distinct way.

I suppose Sen means that food availability may decline for different reasons- e.g. floods, a drought, war, embargoes etc.  

Also, the causation of the sudden decline of tood supply can also be explained in many different ways.

The explanation of a manifestation is its causation.  

Frequently enough, FAD goes with a Malthusian theory of population.

No. Malthusian theory explains why a population may have a meagre diet and thus have low longevity, height, weight, stamina etc. This goes hand in hand with 'involution' in agricuture- i.e. employing more people on the land with scarcely any increase in output.  

To quote-an in- fluential recent book by Brown and Eckholm: "Since agriculture began, food production has increased several hundredfold. Unfortunately, man's numbers have also expanded to absorb the additional food, always pressing against the limits of supply.

Not necessarily. Women may decide not to have babies who are bound to be very poor. Malthusian famines are defeated by 'vice' (contraception was once viewed as immoral) 

Under these circumstances, a sudden sharp reduction in- the food supply in any particular geographical locale has usually resulted in widespread hunger and famine."

Unless Uncle Sam sent food aid.  

(L R Brown and E P Eckholm, "By Bread Alone", Per-gammon Press, Oxford, 1975, p 25.)

It was topical because of the 1974 global food shortage. 

But FAD can also be "non-Malthusian" as far as the causation of the food shortage is concerned. (Indeed Brown and Eckholm, themselves also note that while "world population growth continues to be rapid, ... rising affluence now has emerged as another major claimant on the world's food- producing resources", p 6.)

This didn't matter. If the rich eat a lot there is more incentive to grow a lot of food. Anyway, the rich move away from low-Income elasticity 'Giffen' goods to more and more expensive items. Thus they end up eating less 'staples' (bread, potatoes, etc.)  Even so, over all demand for staples may rise if they are fed to livestock or used in other ways 'complementary' to 'normal goods'. 

The elsential aspect of FAD is the view that famines are caused by a sudden decline in food availability, and no matter what the immediate causes of this decline are, or what its predispos- ing conditions happen to be, FAD stands as long as the famine is accept- ed to be the result of that decline.

No. It is simply a fact that if less food is available and the public distribution system is inadequate, then some people may starve.  

In some ways, FAD is the most obvious approach to famines.

Only an utter cretin, like Sen, would dispute it.  

In explaining, say, the Irish famine of the 1840s, one has rather compelling reasons to concentrate on the decline in the food availability arising from the potato blight. There are other factors too, clearly enough, but they seem subsidiary to the central fact of unavailability of potatoes. The 'annewari' systems

under which, if crop assessors thought output would be less than half the normal, a famine could be declared and the Famine Code implemented. Sadly, if there wasn't enough money in the kitty (for example, if there was an ongoing war) the thing was ignored.  

used in the 'famine codes' in India almost certainly deriv-ed their rationale from some variant of FAD, and it was natural that this view should traditionally be taken. ' 

The idea was that the Administration should buy food from elsewhere & bring it in and distribute it through 'food for work' and other such schemes.  

FAD works best when much of the food eaten by a family happens to be grown by it without the need of exchange.

Not if the family has multiple sources of nutrition. In a good year, the inferior crop is fed to livestock. In a bad year, livestock are slaughtered & the inferior cereal is eaten by the family. Sadly, some climate events- e.g drought, flooding- can affect all options.  

FAD is used by advanced economies where there is no subsistence sector. If the forecast is that there will be less food available because of a war or a drought in the country which traditionally exports a type of food to us, then our Food Ministry will seek alternative suppliers so as to make up the shortfall. 

In an exchange economy, however, one has to look at the terms of exchange,

Even subsistence farmers participate in exchange. What Sen means is prices are important. It may be necessary to subsidise or ration food. 

and while food availability clearly will be an important influence on these terms, there' are also other factors involved.

There is supply and there is demand. The thing isn't rocket science.  

In an exchange economy, a family's ability to buy food depends on

how much money they have. Bengal may have been a shithole but it was a monetized shithole. For the very poor, gifts of food or Government rations were important because they had no money.  

the rates at, which its labour and other possessions can be exchanged - multilaterally or bilaterally - with other commodities especially food.

Sen is assuming a free market for food. However, at a time of dearth, the State may requisition food supplies and ration them through the p.d.s. (public distribution system).  

If something leads to a sharp decline in the food that these possessions can command in exchange, the family will have to starve.

Not if they can rely on charity or borrowing or running down savings.  

This elementary recognition opens up another dimension in the causation of famines.

No. The cause of famine remains a supply shock leading to FAD.  

It is, of course, a common place to say that famines depend "not merely on production, but also on distribution". This piece of wisdom throws remarkably little light on the problem.

Sen sheds none at all.  

For an economy based on the consumption of self-produced food,

there has never been any such economy. Perhaps, Sen is thinking of plants. They produce their own nourishment. But they are not economically active.  

production and distribution of food cannot really be separated.

Sure they can. The stronger people in the clan may gobble up the food produced by weaker members- or slaves.  

For an exchange economy, they can be, but the aphorism is not particularly helpful there either, until something is said on the way the distribution of food is brought about.

What Sen didn't understand was that the reward for growing food had to rise signifiicantly if India was to avoid famine or mendicancy.  This meant productivity had to rise- i.e. the guy harvesting the grain had to consume a smaller proportion of the output.  This could be achieved by improving the soil, applying fertilizer, using tractors, and developing higher yielding seeds. 

Obviously, our ulti- mate concern must be with the amounts of food which the respective families consume,

In poor countries, gathering information of this sort is not feasible. 

and this can be expressed through a total availability figure

no such figure is available save in advanced countries  

combined with the relative shares of that total going to the set of families, respectively.

 Nobody knows what that set is.  Sen didn't get that most statistics in India are just made up. 

While this style of ex- pression may give us the satisfying feeling that we have taken a step for- ward in the analysis of famines, this illusion will not survive a close scrutiny. The crucial fact is that in an exchange economy the 'distribution' of a particular commodity is the result of exchange,

No. The exchange of a particular commodity is a change in its distribution. One isn't the result of the other. In the case of food, the person who exchanges money for it, eats it. The commodity then ceases to exist. 

and whether a family has something to eat depends on what it can sell

or what it can borrow or 'dissave' 

and the prices that are fetched by what it can sell in comparison with the prices of food.

Sen forgets that people can borrow or gain transfers.

An economy in a state of comparative tranquillity may develop a famine if there is a sudden shake up of the system of rewards for exchange of labour, commodities and other possessions.

That is why Communist countries can suffer famines. But India too suffered when the distribution of food was made a Government monopoly.  India nationalised the wholesale trade in wheat on April 1, 1973, under the government of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. By the next year, even the middle class in the cities was having to pick stones out of the shitty rice supplied by the ration shops. Minhas had resigned from the planning commission over this. Indira asked him to return once it became obvious he was right. 

Incentives matter & some mechanisms (e.g. free markets vs a Government monopoly) are more efficient than others. 

A sharp revision of 'exchange entitlements' can precipitate a famine even when there is no over-all shortage of food.

If it isn't worthwhile for farmers to take take their food to market, the cities will starve.  The Soviets called this the 'scisssors problem'. 

However, this can't happen in a market economy. Food is inelastic in supply and demand. If there is no overall shortage, there is no supply shock. Thus there can be no 'sharp revision' of food prices. Thus exchange entitlements can't change.

I suppose one could say 'if we assume there was no ongoing war, then the fact that 20,000 Londoners died during the Blitz, can only be explained by a drastic change in the rate at which being alive was exchanged to getting blown to pieces. This proves that Londoners can be killed by German bombs even if there is no war with Germany. What is puzzling is why so many Londoners were blown up in 1940 but virutually none suffered in this manner in 1930 or 1950. 

It is this type of causation that the approach of the 'failure of exchange entitlements' (FEE for short) is aimed at capturing.

It is the type of causation we invoke when we assume there was no war in 1940 and thus it wasn't Hilter who was bombing London.  

By 1975, everybody in India was aware that Minhas was right. He was a Punjabi Sikh- i.e. not a worthless wanker.  If you make food a Government monopoly, good quality rice disappears from the market. 

Perhaps a disclaimer is needed here. The expression 'entitlement' can be given a normative sense, e g, in Robert Nozick's interesting account of 'rights' (see his "Anarchy, State and Utopia", Blackwell, 1974). No such meaning is intended here.

One can say 'in a free market economy there is a Hohfeldian immunity for buying and selling certain goods and services provided title is acquired or transferred in a legal manner.' 

Any system of exchange is a system of entitlements, e g, person i can sell his labour for wage with which he can buy q amount of food.

No. One may have a Hohfeldian immunity to offer to work for the going wage. But there is no entitlement to employment. If the market fails to clear, you have no legal recourse. However, you may be entitled to payments from a Social Insurance fund.  

People's ability to survive in an exchange economy depends on the system of exchange entitlements, and if the entitlements change in a way as to exclude a lot of people from the ability to acquire food, a famine results.

Not in England, because of the Poor Law. The last famine was in 1623. One could see the Poor Law as an early example of 'risk pooling' or Social Insurance. It had the effect of reducing vagrancy and raising productivity.  

This does not go into the issue as to whether the earlier system of entitlements was itself 'just' or not indeed several normative theories of justice may find it quite unjust - but the issue under dliscussion is the more factual one of relating inability to survive shifts in the pattern of exchange entitlements

Sen doesn't understand that people can go in for 'risk pooling'. In good times, you pay into a social insurance scheme. In bad times, you can draw upon it. Buffer stocks of food can be maintained so tht communities can survive exogenous shocks.  

In this connec- tion, it may be worth remarking that Marx's theory of 'exploitation' - like Nozick's theory of 'entitlements' - also goes into the acceptability of certain rights, and my current concern is not with that issue.

Sen's concerns were crazy. Both India and England had laws which created entitlements for food. To some extent, they were justiciable- i.e. a court could order the government to provide more food to a particular area- though, under exigent circumstances, there might be entitlement collapse. That is what happened in Bengal in 1943 and 1974.

Another disclaimer is concerned with the relations between prices and exchange entitlements.

Prices actually exist. 'Exchange entitlements' are a figment of Sen's imagination.  

Though prices typically fonn an inpmrtant part of a system of exchange entitlements, there is a difference. Exchange entitlements are concerned with what a person can, in fact, get throuigh- exchange and not with what he could get if he could buy and sell at given prices.

Under laissez faire they are one and the same provided markets clear. I suppose Sen means that 'downwardly sticky' money wages, rents & 'administered pricing' can create involuntary unemployment or shortages. However, in that case, what a person actually gets is not knowable in advance. Some get lucky. Others get nothing.  

The presence of unkmployment drives a wedge between the wage rate and the entitlement from exchanging labour.

No. It means that some people can't get a job. That's because they don't have any entitlement to it. They have a Hohfeldian immunity such that they can take a job. But employers too have an immunity to not hire some people.  

The presence of monopoly and other restrictions also makes prices depart from exchange entitlements.

No. Monopoly & restrictive practices are likely to drive prices up unless there are substantial economies of scope and scale. 

There is no entitlement- legal or otherwise- to renumerative employment or a guaranteed buyer for anything you produce.  

Exchange entitlements represeint a comprehensive picture of exchange possibilities faced by groups of people,

They are unknowable save after the event. But even then, how can we be sure that the unemployed guy isn't a lazy 'scrounger'? 

and reflects, among other things, the institutional structure of the economy.

No. It reflects expectations which are independent of that structure. That's why a Great Depression can affect countries with different institutions in pretty much the same way.  

It is, of course, possible to speak of a parti- cular person's anticipations of exchange entitlements on which his own plans are based whether or not these antici- pations reflect the real possibilities faced by him,

Nobody knows their own 'real possibilities' let alone those of anyone else. It was possible that Sen wouldn't be a useless shithead. He could have studied soil science like his dad and contributed to the Green Revolution.  

though it is natural to expect correction of anticipations in the light of experience. It can be argued that FEE-ty,pe famines have a special relevance for developing countries at early stages of modemisation and growth.

No. FEE is unknowable. What is knowable is incentives. Can farmers make a profit by expanding output? Yes, if the Government subsidizes some inputs and provides transport and other infrastructure. A.O Hume understood this. He published a book on how to raise productivity in Indian agriculture back in the 1870s. He set up the Indian National Congress because he was foolish enough to think that Indians might want their country to grow richer, or, at least, better fed. 

The odd thing is that B.R Sen, who was related to Amartya, did a great job as head of the FAO. Indeed, Amartya was offered a job with the FAO in Rome in 1957, shortly after his relative took over there.  

In a primi- tive economy based on family labour or communal labour prior to the development of the wage system, famines resulting from failures in exchanging labour cannot arise.

Sure they can. During a famine, you sell yourself into slavery or bonded labour. If there are no takers, you starve or run the fuck away.  

In so far as exchange of commodities is also limited and people eat what they themselves grow, the role of other failures of exchange entitlements is also remote.

Nonsense! If you can't get a bit of protein in your diet by sucking cock, you are well and truly fucked. Obviously, if you can collect a bunch of hoodlums and start killing and robbing, then you may be on your way to becoming the next Emperor.  

Famines based on FAD can, of course, take place, but the relevance of FEE-type famines grows only as the economy becomes more exchange-orientated and in particular as labour emerges as another 'commodity' to be bought and sold in the market.

No. A more sophisticated economy means more availability of insurance, buffer stocks & other 'hedges'.  

Failures of exchange entitlements are also less ikely in socialist economies,

Hilarious! The biggest famines were in Stalin's USSR & Mao's China. Mujib's Socialism was a factor in the 1974 Bangladesh famine.  

or in advanced capitalist econo- mies, since a system of emnployment guarantee in the former and entitle- ments to 'unemployment benefits' in the latter, tend to rule out large-scale starvation resulting from, inability to exchange one's war.

To be fair, back in 1976, lots of economists thought Communism had worked wonders in Russia & China.  

It is perhaps worth remarking in this context that the absence of famines in the economi- cally advanced countri?s is almost certainly due to the altered system of exchange entitlements through 'social security' rather than due to the average level of national prosperity as such.

Sen didn't know about the Elizabethan Poor Law in England. But, it would be fair to say, that continually rising productivity was what made the Poor Law affordable.  

In contrast an exchange economy based on wage labour, without a sys- tem of unemployment benefits and re- lated measures of social security, is particularly susceptible to famines of the FEE-type.

Unless the Famine Code is implemented. Food is brought in and distributed through 'langars' and food-for-work programs. Scratch that. Just get in food and distribute it through ration shops.  

A recent example was the 1974 famine in Bangladesh. -The flood that destroyed the crop did reduce the availability of food, but the sharp decline in employment

because there wasn't enough food to make it worthwhile to keep a worker alive 

and the failure of exchange entitlement of labour was immediate,

there was an entitlement to food from the public distribution system. Sadly, Bangladesh was as corrupt as fuck.  

and the famine was made severe by that. (Research carried out at the Bangladesh Institute of Develop- ment Studies seems to provide ample evidence of the impact of wage earning failure.)

Workers need to eat in order to work. If there isn't enough food, they don't get employed. My good friend Anwar Haq has described in moving terms his inability to gain nutrition through cunnilingus in Dacca. He moved to England, where he soon achieved great success in that department- or so he claimed.  

Similar failures in ex- changing labour have been observed in recent Indian famines.

This is obvious. If you haven't enough food to eat, you won't hire an extra servant or two. Were Indian economists all entirely stupid? No. Some were Gujarati or Punjabi. They wanted the country to get rich. This shows they were very evil.  

While the light that these studies throw on exchange entitlements is incidental to their respective mam themnes, quite a bit of information does, in fact, emerge on variations of exchange entitlements in the process of famines.

All this was well know to District officers under the Raj. The solution was to improve transport links and bring in food where there was a supply shock.  

There are reasons to think that the 'exchange entitlements' approach is particularly important after wage labour emerges in the process of development and before social security measures become common.

Sen doesn't get that local authorities can fund Workhouses & 'outdoor relief' out of local rates. That what the English did in England. That's what Ripon wanted the Indians to do from the mid 1880s onward. But the Indians couldn't be arsed.  

Expansion of com- modity exchanges in general also contributes to this. The 'food availabi- lity' approach - no matter how rele- vant for medieval famines - is not robust enough to permit a serious analysis of modem famines.

Nope. Modern famines can be quickly alleviated because of the great progress made in transport technology and the increasingly globally integrated nature of food markets.  

There is little doubt that Malthus' analysis of food shortage in 1800 was a supplement to his theory of popula-' tion presented two years earlier.

Malthus was responding to Condorcet's utopian schemes. 

"To what then can we attribute the present inability in the country to support its inhabitants, but to the increase of population?

The Corn Laws. Landlords wanted protected markets for corn.  

I own that I cannot but consider the late severe pressures of distress on every defi- ciency in our crops, as a very strong exemplification of a principle which I endeavoured to explain in an essay published about two years ago, en- titled, "An Essay on the Principle of Population, as It Affects the Future Improvement of Society." It was considered by many who read it mere- ly as a specious. argument, inapplicable to the present state of society; because it contradicted some precon- ceived opinions on these subjects.

To be fair, the potato seemed a miraculous plant which would enable a doubling of population and thus a great increase in rents. This did happen in Ireland, but then came the blight.  

Two years' reflection have, however, serv- ed strongly to convince me of the truth of the principlei there advanced, and of its being the real cause of the continued depression and poverty of the lower classes of society, of the total inadequacy of all the pre- sent establishments in their favour to relieve them, and of the periodical returns of such seasons of distress as we have of late experienced." 

Malthus was right about some European famines which were only alleviated by mass migration. However, as shipping technology improved, England would find that it could import as much as it wanted. Problems such as wheat 'sprouting' over the course of a long voyage were disappearing as voyage duration grew shorter. 

I should explain, Malthus supported the Corn Laws (though England had become a net importer of wheat between 1770-90) and thus there was a 'the poor ye shall always have with you' aspect to his polemics.  

But over and above claiming con- firmation for his theory of food shortage arising from population expansion, Malthus also presented a theory linking the food shortage to the behaviour of prices and distribution, and that theory was not essentially dependent on the genesis of the food shortage.

but it could be alleviated by ending agricultural protection. Sen's ignorance of British history prevented him from understanding what Ricardo & Malthus & Smith etc. were really saying.  

Malthus' analysis of adjustments of food prices had two notable features.

They were shit because the poor fellow had no knowledge of commerce or economics. He was a clergyman with some small mathematical talent.  

First, prices had to rise

for the market to clear. 

to eliminate a sufficient number of demanders from the market to make the current supply last.

That was irrelevant.  

The price rise was not caused by specula- tive activities

it was caused by expectations.  

but simply by the role of prices to adjust demand to supply.

i.e. to get the market to clear.  

"It seems now to be universally agreed, that the stock of old corn remaining on hand at the beginning of the harvest this year was unusual- ly small, notwithstanding that the harvest came on nearly a month sooner than could have been expect- ed in the beginning of June. This is a clear, decided, and unanswerable proof that there had been no speculations in corn that were prejudicial to the country.

The opposite is the case. If it becomes known that stocks are low, there is an incentive to buy and hoard. Why does Sen not point this out? Why was he so much in awe of a dead White male who had zero knowledge of modern econ? 

All that the large farmers and cornfactors had done, was to raise the corn to that price which excluded a sufficient number from their usual consumption, to enable the supply to last throughout the year." 

They sold at the going price. No doubt they held back some corn 'just in case'. Still, there was no guarantee that the stock would last throughout the year.  

The second feature was the role at- tributed to the operation of the system of parish allowances in making it diffi- cult to eliminate thc dermand for food by the, poor, thereby leading to a much larger increase in prices.

Because of the French war, the English had to be more generous in this matter. Malthus's supporters were laughing all the way to the Bank while the manufacturing interest complained that it was shouldering a bigger and bigger financial burden.  

"This price, however, has been most essentially and powerf itlv affected by the ability that has been given to the labouring poor, by means of pa- rish allowances, of continuing to -purchase wheat notwithstanding its extraordinary rise."

The big farmer and landowner benefitted while the rate-paying manufacturer and artisan were taxed to the hilt.  

[Malthus (1880, p 16).] Malthus did not, of course, condemn the parish allowances for this reason, buf regarded it as absurd that the poor should complain of the price rise.

In other words, the guy was merely a polemicist serving the interest of a particular section of society- viz. the landed gentry to which he himself belonged by birth.  

"I do not, however, by any means, intend to infer, from what I have said, that the parisb aJlowances have been prejudicial to the state; or that, as far as the system has been hitherto pursued, or is likely to be pursued, in this country, that it is not one of the best modes of relief that the circumstances of the ca-se will admit. The system of the poor laws, in ge- neral, I certainly do most heartily condemn, as I have expressed in an- other place, but I am inclined to think that their op ration in tbe pre- sent scarcity has been advantageous to the country.

Why does Sen not understand that this is special pleading?  Once the threat posed by revolutionary France was negated, there would be no reason to coddle the English poor for fear of an indigenous jacquerie. 

The principle bene- fit which they have produced, is exactly that which is most bitterly complained of - the high price of all the necessaries of life. The poor cry ouit loudly at this price; but, in so doing, they are very little aware of what they are about; for it has undoubtedly been owing to this price that a much greater number of them has not been starved." [Malthus (1800, pp 18-9).]

But the manufacturing sector was taking a hit. Ricardo was their champion. What followed was the build up of pressure to pass the Great Reform Bill and, a little later, get rid of the Corn Law.  

I am puzzled as to why Sen- writing for Indians- spends so much time quoting Malthus without mentioning his political motivation. 

Malthus' theory, then, is one of a genuine food shortage leading to price rise to eliminate a part of the demand by pricing some consumers out of the market to bring total demand in line with supply.

Why not import wheat? Scrap the fucking Corn Law!  

Speculators simply give shape to these "genuine principles of fair trade" without aggravating the price rise, but attempts to resist the starva- tion of the poor by raising allowances and wages do increase the prices more than they would have otherwise.

There may have been a conspiracy in restraint of trade. Indeed, the Radicals were making the point that the landed gentry weren't really benefitting all that much from the Corn Law. Some secretive cabal (who were also buying and selling Consols & East India Company shares) was enriching itself and using its wealth to buy pocket-boroughs and itself rise into the Aristocracy.  

The most imrportant deficiency in Malthus' model is the lack of people producing or selling goods whose fortunes are presumably affected by changes in prices. Malthus talks of the poor living on parish allowances and wages paid under the Poor Laws, and on charity. He talks of the rich who have to foot these bills.

The rich may live in a different borough and thus not have to pay the poor rate.  

There is no question of starvation being generated by the fall in the exchange price of some commodity which provides the livelihood of a section of the community.

Because anybody who becomes indigent could go into the Work-house- at least in theory. Some preferred to starve or emigrate. 

I should explain, under the Speenhamland 'outdoor relief' some agricultural parishes gave money payments to agricultural labourers. Few industrial parishes had workhouses and they too gave mony to those obviously unable to fend for themselves. 

The exchange rates between food and other goods and services do not come in at all - except in a brief re- ference to the prices of "butter, cheese, bacon, piclded pork, rice, potatoes,

Sen does not know that bacon and potatoes are types of food 

etc" rising as . the poor "make use of their additional command of money" through increased allowances to purchase these goods (pp 13-14).

They are gross substitutes.  

A crisis of 'exchange entitlements' leading to starvation can- not have much of a role in the model specified by Malthus

because of the Poor Law. The Middle Classes were opposed to outdoor relief and wanted more Workhouses of a bleak 'Oliver Twist' sort. 

, and it is not sur- prising that the only cause of starvation that is investigated is the genuine shor- tage of food grains. Speculators are given na role except to dampen price variations since they buy cheap and sell dear in a competitive way, and if a speculator "be wrong in his speculation, he loses perhaps verv considerably him- self" (p 15). While Malthus' analysis was geared to the situation in Britain in 1799 and 1800, as he saw it, it is clear that he felt he was putting forwai-d a theory of some generality.

No. He was writing about a country which had had no famine since 1623. It had quite well functioning local authorities. It also witnessed an industrial revolution of a wholly unprecented type.  

And, indeed, his views of food shortages and also of specula- tion have survived, and one meets simi- lar analyses in many recent writings. The fact that these views emanate from an extremely simple model, leaving out most of the essential features of an ex- change economy, is worth noting.

There is no model. It is simply a fact that if poor people eat a lot of a staple item- e.g. wheat or potatoes- then a supply shock has a big 'Income effect'. Perversely, this may swamp the 'substitution effect' such that they end up eating more of the staple and less of the 'normal' good with high Income elasticity.

I may mention, there is 'supermodularity' such that increased demand for 'normal goods' also helps inferior goods which are complementary to them.  

The presence of many commodities and the possibility of wages responding to mar- ket forces open up other routes to star- vation and famines.

No. Nobody starved because butter became very expensive. They did starve if they couldn't get enough of the cheapest staple- wheat, rice, potatoes etc.  

Even Malthus' neat analysis of the benign nature of speculation, in which he anticipated a well known modern theory associated with the names of Mlilton Friedman and others, does not really survive in a more complex model.

Anyone can 'make a market'- e.g. a Government or Charity- by producing and distributing a good or service. One may say this is 'speculative'. How do you know people will want it? But some people gain power and influence by taking this risk.  

(On this see the recent contribution of Oliver Hart, "On the Profitability of Specuilation", Discussion Paper No 64, University of Essex, 1975; note however that Hart traces the argu- ment "that speculation is stabilising" to John Stuart Mill, but not to the earlier writing of Mlalthus.)

We now understand that volatility can be a good thing. Though, in any given market, increased volatility reduces liquidity, at the macro level, the opposite may be the case.  

There is going to be arbitrage one way or another. Sometimes, we'd prefer the Government to do it. Other times, we prefer smart entrepreneurs to do it. 

Malthus' analysis stood perfectly well within his model but the dependence of that analysis on the extrenmely limited nature of the model reduces the relevance of his conclusions.

Why mention him? He was from a country where the Government was so much better than anything obtainable in India, that India ended up being ruled by a couple of thousand Britishers. Sadly, the transition to Democracy in Bengal led to famine and ethnic cleansing on two separate occassions in Sen's life-time.  

Malthus provided an early theory of the FAD view of star- vation and famnines, and with the recent explosion of interest in "food crises", this theory has been making frequent re-appearances in policy discussions.

Malthus laid the basis for Darwin's theory of Evolution. Populations can grow by leaps and bounds on the same territory provided their food supply increases in proportion. This can be achieved by raising productivity, not talking Sententious bollocks.  

III The Bengal Famine of 1943 - the greatest famine of the century - can be viewed

as what happens when Bengali Muslims get elected and become Prime Minister 

both in terms of 'food availability decline' (FAD)

Sen denied this. He said there was more food in 1943 than previously.  

as well as that of 'failures of exchange entitle- nments' (FEE).

He means that labourers couldn't get work bringing in the harvest because the harvest failed. There was nothing to bring in. Real income fell which meant demand for all sorts of other goods and services took a hit. There was more 'involuntary unemployment'. Why? FAD. That's what lowered real income.  

ln a forthcoming paper I have tried to present the contrast between the two approaches as applied to the Bengal Famine, and have argu- ed that the FAD approach works very badly in this case, while the FEE approach works much better ("Famines, Food Shortage and Exchange Entitle- ments: The Case of the Great Bengal Famine", forthcoming in the Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol 1).

In 1943, Bengal was at War, There were severe Government restrictions on private enterprise and the free workings of markets.

There was a supply shock and there was corruption and incompetence. That's why famine mortality was so high.  

While I shall not try to repeat the arguments here, I would mention that it emerges that the food availability per capita in Bengal in 1943 was not substantially different from availabilities in previous years even after note has been taken of: (i) the disappointing aman crop of December 1942,

the main cause of FAD. Traders expected the Government to bring in imports over the course of 1943. This did not happen partly because of the war situation and partly because the ruling party was making lots of money out of the famine.  

(ii) the loss of import of rice from Burma, (iii) net transactions with the rest of India both in rice and in wheat, (iv) grains purchased by the military, (v) loss of food due to the 'denial' policies impos- ed by the military, (vi) population growth, and (vii) the 'carry-over' ef- fects of previous bad crops.

How does Sen know? The answer is he relies on official figures which everybody else- including Ian Stephens- knew to be wholly fabricated.  

The FAD view received the qualified blessing of the official Famine Incquiry Commission of 1944 (see "Report on Bengal", p 77), and this endorsement has been widely echoed in distinguish- ed scholarly works (e g, see B M Bhatia, "Famines in India 1860-1965", Asia, 1966, pp 321-4; G Blyn, "Agri- cultural Trends in India 1891-1967", University of Pennsylvania Press, p 98).

In other words, smart and qualified people acknowledged that food availability had fallen. What they refused to do was condmenn the Bengali politicians involved because they had won the 1946 elections. 

More recently, the FAD inter- pretation of the Bengal Famine has been frequently cited in the outbursts of alarm about the "world food crisis" [e g, in the Brown and Eckholm (1975, p 27), and even in Sartaj Aziz's

who hated Hindus & believed the creation of Pakistan was vital to prevent Hindus (like Sen) exploiting Muslims (like himself) 

critically important document for institutionalised international action, "Hunger, Politics and Markets: The Real Issues in the Food Crisis", Univer- sity of New York Press, p 27].

Aziz drew on Sen's work under the impression that Sen actually understood Bengali famines (because Sen was Bengali). Aziz was wrong.  

The factual basis of this diagnosis of the Bengal Famine seems eminently questionable.

It isn't because everyone involved said 'there's less food around'. Sen's mistake was to rely upon official statistics which were mere projections and which had no relationship to the actual outcome. 

The' years 1942 and 1943 were of unprecedented inflation, mainly result- ing from war expenditures, and the absolute level of prices moved rapidly upwards. But prices of different com- modities did not move in the same way, and there were sharp contrasts between relative rates. 

There was repressed inflation- i.e. shortages.  

As an illustra- tion, the rice prices and the exchange rates vis-a-vis rice of some indicator commodities in the Bolpur area of the Birbhum district are presented in the Table.

The 'income effect' of high food prices meant a fall in demand for other goods (e.g. milk) or services (e.g. haircuts).  

What Sen does not understand is that a supply shock in an agricultural economy has a real income effect which is bound to create involuntary employment across the board. 

The exchange eintitlements were undergoing rapid transformation. I have tried to go into the causation of the shifts in exchange rates else- where (in the forthcoming paper in the Cambridge Joutroial of Econiomics, referred to earlier),

Sen never mentions the income & substitution effects.  

but the pattern of the shifts is itself of some interest.

It is unknown. A very poor country can't afford to compile accurate statistics` 

Unskilled rural wages were falling far behind rice price - indeed even money wages fell in absolute terns around November 1942 - and by May 1943,

only if some food was provided 

the wage-rice exchange index with December 1941 base (100) stood around 24. The ruiral labouring classes, which earn a high proportion of their incomes in the short-lasting 'peak' seasons, tend to be hit anyway by un- expected price rises, unreflected in the wages in the previous peak period.

Sen doesn't get that nobody gets hired to harvest a ruined crop 

But on top of that, current wages were left far behind as food prices moved up. The was reinforced in certain regions of Bengal by a direct decline in employment arising from loss of agricultural activity due to cyclonic destruction and fungus infection, the destruction .and removal of boats, etc,

all of which would have caused food availability deficit 

and 'exchange entitlements' worsened for several groups more than the ex- change rates might indicate.

Nobody knows what those rates might have been 

Some classes undoubtedly ate better, benefiting from the newly created in- comes in the war-inflated economy,

Why were they so callous as not to spare some food for the starving? The truth is there may have been war time profiteering and some workers may have had generous subsidised canteens & food rations but money income did not rise to match food prices in 1943. Thus the over all income effect was to depress demand. Did this create an incentive to divert food out of Bengal? No. Even if the spirit was willing, transport was not available.  

and this expansion of demand exerted upward pressurcs on food prices.

There was repressed inflation. Apart from food, there wasn't a lot you could buy.  

Others, e g, rural wage earners, faced higher prices of food without a cor- responding rise in money income (in- deed sometimes wvith reduced money income and employment). The catastrophic rise of rice prices during March-May 1943 was largely speculative.

i.e. caused by Hindus. Thanfully a righteous Muslim League politician became Chief Minister- which is when the shit really hit the fan.  

Reports of hunger had started coming in; panic had gripped Bengal; the somewhat smaller (but not unusually so) aman harvest was followed by a remarkably large withholding from the markets in the situation of inflation (and low money rates of interest);

This assumes that the aman harvest wasn't disastrous- which, sadly, it was.  

and anyone with money to spend was trying to build up a stock of rice.

Not really. If you have hoarded rice, you are likely to be attacked.  

The widespread economic distress led to restricted demand for 'superior' food items, e g, fish, milk and for non-food cortrnodities, especially services and crafts, affecting in turn the classes supplying these commodities.

Which means real income had fallen. Why? Food availability deficit.  

The relative rates of pauperisation of different occupation groups, as calculated from the primary data presented by P C Mahalanobis, R Mukherjea and A Ghosh

Bengalis don't want to prevent famine. They want to measure it while chortling with glee.  

("A Sample Survey of After- Effects of the Bengal Famine of 1943", Sankhya, Vol 7, par! 4, 1946) tend to reflect this complex pattern of distress (analysed in my forthcoming paper in the Cambidge Journal of Econamics referred to earlier).

Sen would later predict a famine in Thatcher's England! 

The FAD .3ppi)ach concentrating on over-all shortall of food supply seems to miss both the gross reality of the Bengal Famine-

there would have been little excess mortality if the Province had built up a buffer stock . Don't forget, Bengalis had been ruling the place since 1937.  

a as well as its finer details. The focuis on exchange entitle- ments seems to permit a much more discriminating analysis

It is useless. When it comes to basic dietary staples, the demand side doesn't matter. You need buffer stocks to cope with supply shocks &, in case of a National Emergency, a public distribution system.  

Monday, 24 August 2026

Guha on Sumit Sarkar


In a previous post, I explained how Sir Ashutosh Mukherjee- the father of the founder of India (and West Bengal's) ruling party- helped found the Postgrad Dept of Physics at Calcutta University. Almost immediately it produced three world-class scientists- Bose (of Boson fame), Saha (cosmic rays) & Nobel laureate CV Raman. 

As Vice Chancellor, Sir Ashutosh had also founded the first Department of History in India and personally funded a Professorship in Ancient Indian History & Culture,  in 1913. 

Initially, there were 'increasing returns' to historical scholarship and thus the 'golden age' of Indian historiography coincided with the rise and increasing success of the Independence movement. In the field of archaeology, the discovery of the Indus Valley Civilization raised interest in history to a peak in the early Thirties. This is reflected in the prison writings of Jawaharlal Nehru. However, after Independence, interest in history decreased. Diminishing returns had set in. Still, there was interest in the historical development of the property regime for agricultural land for two reasons

1) the American obsession with land reform as being vital to prevent a Communist revolution

2) the Communist obsession with classifying economic regimes so as to justify a revolution as the only way to break with 'feudalism' or 'bourgeois capitalism' or some such abstraction.

In this context, the historian, Susobhan Sarkar- who wrote the manifesto for the Communist Party of India- has some significance in that he bridged the gap between the older Brahmo bhadralok culture, as exemplified by Santiniketan, and the newer Bolshevik ideas gaining traction in the Thirties. Sarkar had done a second degree  at Jesus College in the mid Twenties. It is said he came to the attention of Communist recruiters there. Since Sarkar was teaching European history- a subject of little interest to Indians- he had no direct political impact on his students despite being a conscientious and even quite able pedagogue. Sarkar did yield to the narcissism of his class and glorified its nugatory accomplishments to the best of his slender ability. However, because the Communists did come to power (after he had retired) but before died (in 1982) Sarkar was vindicated by history- at least for three decades.

Not so his son Sumit Sarkar who died a few days ago. He had lived to see the complete rout of Communism in West Bengal and, more sadly, the triumph of the BJP in Calcutta itself. 

The always ridiculous Ram Guha writes in Scroll

 Historian Sumit Sarkar took his scholarship beyond the confines of the academy

He took it to the crapper.  

He was was one of several prabasi Bengali intellectuals who helped make Delhi University the foremost academic institution in all of South Asia.

What made Delhi important was the fact that power- and then money- became more and more concentrated there.  Sadly, since smart people don't study History, History Departments are bound to be populated by stupid nonentities.  


In a late essay reflecting on his intellectual journey over the decades,

it was a journeu from shit to shit 

Sumit Sarkar remarked: “So far, we Indian historians have written the histories that we wanted to write,

If you wanted your book to sell (i.e. be put on the reading list) you had to write politically correct shite- e.g. Modi is Hitler!  

following no agenda but our own. That seems to be a fast-vanishing luxury.”

Guys who made their money in Merchant Banking, are now earning big bucks with nationalist history books. In other words, things have come full circle back to the time of the nationalist Hindu historians at the beginning of the Twentieth Century. 


In a long and very productive life, Sarkar – who was born in Calcutta in 1939 and died in Delhi earlier this month – had to confront three historical agendas imposed by others.

There was only one agenda. Write boring shite about how horrible Hindoooos are.  

The first was a dogmatic Marxism which viewed the past through a narrow economistic lens,

as opposed to the dog-shit lens of the Subaltern Group 

and was very influential in Sarkar’s hometown

which Marxists had turned into a yet bigger shit-hole. 

(his father, also a historian, was a member of the Communist Party of India).

There was a time when Commies thought History Professors worth recruiting. After Independence, the CPI was prepared to launch Ranajit Guha (whom they believed to be close to the KGB) in the Trade Union movement. Sadly, he was useless and thus was left to moulder as a historian. It must be said, Calcutta University refused to give him a PhD for his illiterate shite.  

The second was the interlinked trend of post-modernism and post-colonialism which

have turned into Jason Arday style Grievance Studies. At least Arday had the grace to top himself.  

viewed history as fragmented and culturally relative, and focused on texts and discourses rather than the lived experiences of people in the past.

The lived experience of people then and now is that low IQ professors are as boring and useless as shit.  

The third was the religious majoritarianism of the sangh parivar, which glorified Hindus and demonised Muslims,

Islam doesn't demonise kaffirs at all. It gives them kisses and cuddles. 

and despite – or perhaps because of – its Manichaeism gained ideological and political ascendancy in the 1990s and beyond.

The job of the Hindu 'intellectual' is to say 'Hindooos are fucking horrible, mate. Take it from me. I'm a particularly high caste one myself'.  

‘Pomo-poco’ thought

Sarkar refused to succumb to the seductions of “pomo-poco” thought, for he saw – more clearly than his fellow members of the Subaltern Studies school – how it underplayed the economy, social conflict, and lower-caste deprivation.

These shitheads thought there was such a thing as 'elite historiography'. The truth was History professors are ill-paid drudges. The Backward and 'untouchable' caste leaders were becoming Chief Ministers (or, in the case of Modi, Prime Minister) and it was their versions of history which would become normative.  

His rejection of Hindutva was absolute,

So what? Both Delhi and Calcutta are now ruled by Hindutvadis. Sumit's 'rejection' was futile. Guha, at least, still lives in a Congress run State.  

based both on its misreadings of the past and its dangerous consequences for democracy and pluralism in the present.

Modi is the dangerous consequence. Did you know, he hasn't even been to Durham University- forget Oxford or Cambridge!  

His relationship with Marxism, however, was more complex.

He was prepared to suck it off but what it wanted was a titty-wank. It turned a deaf ear to Sumit's pleas for Relationship Counselling.  

He moved away early from its economic determinism, recognising that in India caste and gender were axes of inequality as significant as class.

Fuck that. Money is the only relevant axis. Go to IIT & IIM & you may become a billionaire. Do history and everybody thinks you have shit for brains. 

His prose was free of Marxist jargon, and (as far as I know) he never joined a communist party.

None wanted him.  

Yet he did not entirely disavow the Marxism of his youth either. He continued to see it as a philosophy of emancipation, which – whatever its perversions in countries like the Soviet Union – still stood, broadly, on the side of equality and justice.

After Deng took power, Chinese Communism became worthy of emulation. Sumit turned against the Left Front just when it looked as though it was prepared to go down that road. 


Sarkar’s first book was The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, published in 1973.

Everybody already knew all there was to know about it. To be frank, Tagore had done a good job burying that shite.  

A richly crafted political and social history, it used primary sources in English and Bengali to examine the Swadeshi upsurge against a backdrop of rising Hindu-Muslim tensions

it fuelled those tensions- as Tagore kept pointing out. 

and the partition of the province.

Tagore warned the Hindus that they would be massacred in the East. Ultimately, the Hindus insisted on partition.  

A counterpart of this focused, immersive regional study is the wide-ranging essay collection, Writing Social History (published in 1997).

Social History is better written on Social Media when you are drunk off your head.  

Here, critical assessments of the bhadralok icons, Ramakrishna and Vidyasagar, share space with essays on Calcutta, on caste in the making of political ideologies, and on historiographical traditions the author admired or else deplored.

Nirad Chaudhuri, who failed his MA around the time Sumit's father was gathering up the glittering prizes, did a better job. But the bhadralok didn't greatly matter even to themselves. What did was emigration.  


Both these books are well worth reading and re-reading.

read them aloud in a Bengali accent. They are fucking hilarious.  

But Sarkar’s most important book was undoubtedly Modern India: 1885-1947, a magisterial account of the last decades of colonial rule and of the emergence of mass nationalism.

It was not magisterial. It was partisan. The fact is Hinduism played the biggest role as far as Hindus were concerned.  

The preface has the author stating his two aims: first, “a synthesis of the massive data unearthed in recent years by the flood of monographs on specific problems in political, social and economic history”;

Sadly, they were all shite. Why? History is adversely selective of imbecility.  

and second, the possibilities of a “history from below”

i.e. from educationally backward castes. They were mobilized in the name of religion. Indeed, they still are. That's why the BJP has just won Bengal.  

as a counterpart to nationalist historiography and its concentration on “the activities, ideals, or factional manoeuvres of leaders”.

Who only kept their position as leaders if, for caste or religious reasons, they had a mass following.  


These twin ambitions are splendidly realised. This is a genuinely all-India history, with illustrative examples from across the subcontinent. Equal attention is paid to tribal and peasant movements as to initiatives by the major nationalist party, the Congress.

Sadly, they were all equally irrelevant. The Brits made all the decisions. To understand the period, you have to understand the British masses.  The history of the Raj is the history from below of Britain. 

The origins of Hindu-Muslim conflict

which is like the origin of Christian-Muslim conflict 

and the onset of Independence and Partition are deftly delineated. Forty-three years after its publication, it remains the best single-volume account of the period.

It is also the worst depending on your own biases.  

The attention to caste in Modern India shows how heterodox Sarkar’s Marxism had now become.

He, following Churchill, believed that Dalits, Tribals, OBCs, Homosexuals, Muslims, & sexually harassed squirrels should all come together to defeat the evil Brahmins who, as Peter Navarro says, are responsible for all the evil in the world.  

Perhaps an even more notable departure from his inherited beliefs was his treatment of the historical figure of Gandhi. Marxist ideologues like RP Dutt and MN Roy saw the Mahatma’s non-violence as a cunning device to wean the masses away from revolutionary action, and his emphasis on communal amity as a distraction from class struggles.

It is sad that Stalin never got a chance to do to them what he did to Chatto.  

Sarkar, however, understood the deep ethical component of Gandhi’s politics. He recognised that, for Gandhi, non-violence and satyagraha constituted “a deeply-felt and worked-out philosophy… revealing considerable originality”. In Gandhi’s view, “the search for truth was the goal of human life, and as no one could ever be sure of having attained the ultimate truth, use of violence to enforce one’s own necessarily partial understanding of it was sinful.”

Gandhi believed in re-birth. Spin cotton & refrain from sex in this life & you will be reborn on a paradisal planet where you can live happily for ten billion years.  


This assessment comes in Sarkar’s discussion of the 1920s; towards the end of the book, he has a section titled “The Mahatma’s Finest Hour”, on Gandhi’s pilgrimage for peace in Noakhali and the fasts to restore Hindu-Muslim harmony that followed in Calcutta and Delhi.

They didn't work. Still, Sarkar was probably jizzing copiously as he thought of virile Muslims raping and killing Hindus.  

As Sarkar writes here, “Gandhi’s unique personal qualities and true greatness was never more evident than in the last months of his life…”

His uselessness was never more evident.  It was one thing for Mountbatten to pretend that he himself needed to do nothing because Gandhi's soul force would ensure no excess mortality in Bengal, it is quite another for a professional historian to endorse this myth. 


Like the best historians, Sumit Sarkar took his clues from the archives, and was always willing to have his prior conjectures modified or even overthrown by what the primary sources revealed.

They revealed that religion matters. Hindus had good reason to fear the Muslims. That is what drove the politics of the period. But, as the recent election results in Bengal make clear, that's what still drives politics.  

His work had an explicitly comparative lens, juxtaposing Indian studies on popular protest against studies by European historians on the same broad theme,

but all historians everywhere are low IQ shitheads. Nothing is gained by juxtaposing shite with shite.  

as well as studying regional variations within different parts of India itself. And he was a fine prose stylist, which took his scholarship beyond the confines of the academy.

No. He had a pedestrian style.  


These attributes, so rare in combination, are what made Sumit Sarkar an enduringly influential historian.

People thought there might be something to him forty years ago. Then they read him and discovered he was a fucking cretin.  

He was in addition an inspirational teacher; as the journalist, Ravish Kumar, who attended Sarkar’s classes, has remarked, his pedagogical approach was “Gandhian and democratic”.

His work was the enema he administered to himself to produce yet more of the stuff.  

He himself acknowledged learning much from his students, and perhaps even more from his life’s companion, the distinguished feminist historian, Tanika Sarkar, whose influence is manifest in much of her husband’s later work.

He also learnt much from Billy the Cat- a feline historian who stresses the role of tabby cats in the Freedom Struggle.  

The historian whom Sumit Sarkar most admired was EP Thompson, like him a very heterodox Marxist with no party affiliation.

Thompson was writing for his own people. Sumit wasn't.  Incidentally, Thompson left the British Communist party after Kruschev's secret speech. 

Sarkar once wrote that Thompson’s books as well as “the many discussions, political and historical, with him over the years inspired me as nothing else had ever done before or has since”. I re­call how, after EP Thompson died in September 1993,

nobody in the UK noticed. The general feeling was that the working class could kiss my arse. I work in privaate equity. 

Sarkar spoke movingly about him at a memorial meeting held at the India International Centre in Delhi. The other speakers were the historians, Partha Sarathi Gupta and Neeladri Bhattacharya, and the literary scholar, Harish Trivedi. They all had known Thompson too, and, like Sarkar, spoke brilliantly on the day.

Did they masturbate while doing so? I hope not.  

It remains a matter of abiding regret that no recording of that meeting exists.

So, masturbation did occur.  

Sumit Sarkar was one of a number of prabasi Bengali intellectuals who helped make my alma mater, Delhi University, the epicentre of social science and humanities scholarship in India from the 1960s through the 2000s.

There was no such scholarship anywhere in the world. Some kids who went to Uni were able to get into stand-up comedy or acting or novel writing.  

Among the others were the economists, Sukhamoy Chakravarty

he had died three years previously.  

and Mrinal Datta Chaudhuri, the legal scholar, Lotika Sarkar, the polymathic literary historian, RK Das Gupta, and the sociologist, André Béteille, all of whom are now dead.

like Sukhamoy. But that won't stop them turning up on to commemorate some dead White dude.  


Their collective contribution to Delhi University was immense, yet it must also be said that the university gave a great deal to them in return. Had these individuals remained in Calcutta, they may never have emerged as the scholars they eventually became.

ie. they'd have spent their time chatting rather than writing worthless shite.  

In their home milieu, their colleagues and students would almost all have been fellow Bengalis. Here, they were exposed as in no other university in India to the staggering social and cultural diversity of our country.

Fuck off. There is no diversity in Delhi. There are bureaucrats and those who want to be bureaucrats and those who have to bribe bureaucrats.  


Besides, whereas in Calcutta or indeed in the capital’s Jawaharlal Nehru University, the ideology of Marxism was dominant, the professoriat in Delhi University had many more contending currents, with the non-Marxists and anti-Marxists being as numerous, as articulate, and as admired as the Marxists. The exchange of ideas with intellectuals of diverse orientations from his surely enriched Sarkar’s scholarship.

You have to have ideas before you can exchange them.  


What I say about these Bengali scholars also holds true for the Tamils, Maharashtrians, Kannadigas, Odi­yas, Biharis, Punjabis and so on who taught in Delhi University.

They were looked down on by the bureaucrats. Some economists did manage to get on to the Planning Commission. But nobody gave a fuck about historians.  

Adding to the all-India character of its students and staff were the juxtaposition within a single campus of first-rate undergraduate colleges and outstanding graduate faculties in the sciences, the humanities, law, and even music.

Indian universities declined greatly relative to those in the West. Those who could, emigrated.  It must be said, 'Subaltern Studies' & Post-Colonial theory did in fact create a fair number of jobs in the West.  Oddly, it was Priyamvada Gopal, an Englis Lit graduate from Delhi, who appears to have made the most money with her worthless books.