Wednesday, 9 September 2026

Amartya Sen's stupid 'Description as Choice'.

I got a degree in 'Analytical & Descriptive Econ' at the LSE in 1982. It was explained to me that Descriptive Econ was like Accountancy. You have to give a true and fair view based on pre-specified objective criteria. If you are in Advertising or Marketing, you can select things to highlight in a subjective manner. But you can't do that as a Descriptive Economist or Accountant. 

Police officers are trained in observation. They are required to give a description of suspects. They do so by mentioning height, weight, build, colour of eyes etc. They are discouraged from saying things like 'what I choose to remember about the suspect was his air of elegant weariness. More than that, I can not say.' 

Analytical Econ, by contrast was about creating a Structural Causal Model and seeing how well it fits a particular data set. Again, if your purpose is alethic rather than polemical, there can be no question of subjective choice or whim or fancy regarding what observations you select and what you discard. 

A description of a sick man- or a society suffering some calamity- may move us to pity or anger at injustice. A completely fabricated and false description may be more effective, as propaganda, than alethic description. But stupid lies aren't 'descriptions'. They are crazy fantasies which only a fool would give credence to.

On the basis of a description, a diagnosis can be made and a prescription applied.  If the prescription succeeds completely, it may be that only one fact in the description was relevant. A description which omitted it would be useless. But, a description which hightlighs it and omits other things might still be acceptable. 

Positive Economics is Analytical. Descriptions of an economic situation may lead to the adpotion of a Structural Causal Model capable of diagnosing, prescribing or making testable predictions. However, the Model may not itself utilize or contain any information arising from the description. 

Consider the Marxist description of the Economy as involving Employers creating profit or surplus value by forcing workers to put in longer hours. It is false. However, it is true that 'capacity utilization' is linked to profit. But this 'analysis' (based on a false description) is highly mischievous. During the Great Depression, it would say 'reduce the power of Trade Unions so that money wages can fall and increased surplus value can be extracted.' But this would also be the recommendation of the believer's in Say's law! They would say, prices have to fall to compensate for the exogenous money supply shock. Trade Unions are evil because they create 'downward stickiness of wages'. 

Descriptively, this may have some truth though there is a wider problem of administered pricing, however, analytically, the thing was garbage because lowering all prices (including re-writing all rental agreements etc) wasn't feasible within a reasonable time-scale. 

Once re-armament started,there was increased capacity utilization but it went hand in hand with either  'repressed inflation' (i.e. longer queues & smaller rations) or hyperinflation unless a capital levy was politically feasible. Interestingly, two types of 'description'- one Marxian (about pressure to work longer hours) and one Keynesian (about aggregate demand & capacity utilization)- could happily coexist. This was because employers genuinely want to get more work out of those they pay (even if they are charitable institutions). Moreover, in making capacity utilitzation decisions, enterprises genuinely do look at aggregate demand. 

However, the analytical theory that sat on top of this dual descriptive econ broke down once the Phillips Curve started to shift or break down altogether. This was no great scandal for Econ because better descriptions supporting better analysis was possible through 'micro-foundations of Macro'. On the other hand, increased financialization meant that smart Economists got rich in the City. The Cloister contained the cretinous. 

Since very stupid and useless people like scolding, Normative Economics- which involves condemning or praising states of the world- got a boost around this time. 

Since scolding, ideally, applies to actual, observable behaviour, Normative Econ is linked to description in a direct manner which is not the case with Positive Economics. Sadly, no alethic descriptive econ supports any normative analysis. Thus paranoid fantasy has replaced 'descriptive economics'. 

 Still, speaking generally, a normative approach would prefer to rely on alethic, or plausibly alethic, descriptive statements- e.g. Capitalism caused 10.3 billion workers to starve to death as is recorded in the Census- rather than obviously crazy lies- e.g. Capitalism caused 10.3 billion workers to be sodomized to death by my Mum. Fuck you Mummy! Fuck you very much!

However, this is not a really important point. Normative Economists are perfectly comfortable repeating any type of lies. Since their purpose is to scold, they don't care that their work has no predictive power. It must be said, this is not a choice on their part. It is a pathology. They are stupid and useless & thus their purpose in life is to make a nuisance of themselves. 

In a 1980 paper, Amartya Sen wrote of 'Description as Choice'

Like much of his work, it was based on the logical fallacy of treating a predicate (a property, attribute, or description) as if it were a concrete object or an independent entity. This  is known as the fallacy of reification (also called hypostatization, the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, or concretism).

To compound the fallacy, Sen continually uses the word 'description' to refer to things which aren't descriptions at all.

In other words, his essay is vitiated by logical errors & sheer ignorance or wilful defiance of the rules of the English language. 

Bertrand Russell distinguished between 'Knowledge by Acquaintance' -  direct, sensory awareness of things- and 'Knowledge by Description'- indirect knowledge gained through conceptual descriptions.

Where knowledge is direct or immediate, scope for choice exists. Where it is indirect or 'by Description', such is not the case.  We may say that choices are made while describing a thing. But unless those choices render the description useless for conveying knowledge, no great scope for choice exists.

A quite separate point has to do with the Watanabe ugly duckling theorem which, in 1969, showed that statistical classification can't be free of bias. But this does not mean any honest, alethic, work in Statistics is based on giving free rein to subjective choice. 

The truth is no description, properly so called, is based on Choice. We may say there is a bias- but that is a pathology just like having cancer. No one chooses to have it. Moreover, it may be amenable to amelioration. 

DESCRIPTION is sometimes contrasted with prescription,

The description of a disease is different from the prescription for it. I can give a good description of my symptoms to my Doctor. I can't give myself the same prescription as he gives me because I lack medical training.  

and at other times with prediction.

A prediction may be based on a description. But they are entirely different things. Because of 'multiple realisability' the prediction may be the same for things which have very different descriptions.  

While the former differentiates descriptive statements from value judgments and imperatives,

It does not do so.  A prescription is not a value judgment if it is protocol bound & based on purely alethic propositions. Thus a Doctor who prescribes the correct medicine to me is not making the value-judgment that I should continue to live. He is merely doing his duty which has been specified in wholly positive, not normative, terms.  

the latter differentiates it from predictive statements.

There is no need to do so. If two people  jump off a cliff, we predict both will die even if their physical description are very different  

Philosophical discussions in the social sciences have tended to concentrate on prescriptive and predictive exercises, and as a consequence the methodological issues involved in description have remained largely unexplored.

Not all philosophical discussions are foolish. Social Sciences make progress when their methodology improves such that better observations are made possible and thus better descriptions become available. Sometimes such methodological improvements involve 'open questions' in Math and thus the subject is intrinsically philosophical (till some advance in STEM subjects closes the question).  

The object of this paper is to take up some of these issues. Boundaries are not always clear-cut between prescription and description,

They always are. No doubt, one may disguise the one as the other so as to give or avoid offence. Thus I I would say to Prof. Sen 'you are looking peaky. Do dine heartily on dog turds tonight so as to return to your usual ruddy good health.' This is neither a description nor a prescription. It is an insult. The suggestion is that Sen eagerly devours what emerges from the backsides of bow-wows.  

... I believe that boundary questions are sometimes taken to be more important than they are.

Observing boundaries lessens pointless conflict. That's important.  

Intellectual interest in these issues may distract attention from the fact that imprecision of boundaries can still leave vast regions without ambiguity.

That is wholly irrelevant.  

It is indeed possible to say a good deal about China and India without asserting that there are no ambiguities as to where the boundary between the two countries lies. 

Yet, it is only because there is an ambiguity regarding boundaries that both countries have squandered a lot of blood and treasure. The 1962 war had a disastrous impact on the Indian 5 year plan- as Sen knows very well.  

It is fair to say that description as an intellectual activity is typically not regarded as very challenging. To characterize a work in the social sciences as “purely descriptive’ would not normally be regarded as high praise.

Whereas Sen-tentious shite received high praise because he was a brown monkey.  

The reason for this—at least in part—must rest in the idea that description is largely a matter of mere observation and reporting, or reading other people’s reports and summarising—at best systematizing. Whether a descriptive statement is acceptable could be thought to be dependent on its correctness, and that could be resolved simply by observing. I would like to begin with what I think is a moderate claim, reserving the right to be controversial later on. Description isn’t just observing and reporting; it involves the exercise—possibly difficult—of selection.

Not to the diligent describer. They mention the thing because they believe it has objective salience. They may be wrong.  

For example, in judging F. M. Eden’s 1797 study The State of the Poor, or Frederich Engel’s The Condition of the Working-Class in England in 1844, or John and Barbara Hammonds’ The Village Labourer 1760-1832, a good deal more is involved than just checking the truth of the individual facts recorded.

That is all that is involved. Liking of disliking a thing is a matter quite separate from judging a descriptive work on the basis of its degree of accuracy and completeness.  

In fact, description can be characterized as choosing from the set of possibly true statements a subset on grounds of their relevance.

It is possibly true that Sen looks peaky. It is also possibly true that he likes eating dog turds. But my statement that Sen is looking peaky because he hasn't eaten enough dog turds is not descriptive. It is insulting. It is defamatory. Why? 

 'Possibly true' isn't enough. Verification of truth is required though one can specify that one's description is partial. 

Moreover, a description can be given by a policeman or Auditor in which no personal discretion or choice was involved in the gaining or information under pre-specified rubrics. 

Truth is—at best—a necessary but not sufficient condition for good description.
In philosophical logic, a slingshot argument is one of a group of arguments claiming to show that all true sentences stand for the same thing. We can't be sure there are any necessary or sufficient conditions on any true sentence (because it may be the same as all other true sentences). 
It is perhaps not an exaggeration to say that any conscious act of description contains some theory—usually implicit—about the relative importance of the various statements dealing with the subject matter. I shall call this the “choice basis of description’’.

One could equally say that one has no choice regarding one's biases. They are the cross you must bear.  

I might add in passing that recent developments in formal choice theory can be fruitfully used for studying the regularities of description, but I shall not pursue this suggestion in this lecture.’

Formal choice theory was nonsense. Either there is a choice sequence of a Brouwerian type or there is no actual choice.  

3 A description can be accurate without being a good description.

No. 

It could be unhelpful, even useless.

In which case it is not a description at all.  

We question the expert on the level of factory wages in India.

This is described by a statistical curve.  

He answers: “Oh, it varies from place to place.’

He has not given you the description you asked for.  

True enough, of course. We ask for more description, demanding precision. The expert now goes into details. ‘““The integer approximation of the national average wage in rupees,” he says, “‘is a prime number’’.

It isn't. That's just a lie.  

I won’t belabour the point further.

You haven't made any point whatsoever.  

 Your child asks you: “How large is China?’’, and you reply:

Geographically, it is three times the size of India and about the same size as the US.  

‘““Very large—it has 900 million people”.

Your child didn't ask you the size of China's population.  

Insofar as truth is a necessary condition of good description,

Accountants speak of 'materiality'. You can ignore stuff which doesn't materially alter the picture. Sen wouldn't have been such a fool if he had studied a bit of Accountancy.  

the concept of truth must be a broad one.

No. It must be utilitarian.  

The second problem is, I think, a good deal more complex. Description may have objectives the pursuit of which can be helped by departures from truth—even in the broad sense.

No. Models can ignore aspects of reality, or even falsify them. What matters is whether they produce good predictions.  

Milton Friedman (1953), in particular, has argued powerfully in favour of departing from truth in describing reality in the context of economic models, judging the merits of the assumptions not in terms of accuracy but in the light of their predictive usefulness.

This is Instrumentalism. Forecasting is separate from Analytical & Descriptive Econ.

I shall have something to say presently on Friedman’s methodological observations, and on Paul Samuelson’s critique of Friedman and the “F-twist’”

i.e. Friedman saying Positivism is about predictions not verisimiltude.  

but at this stage I would simply note that Friedman has drawn our attention to the important possibility that an unrealistic assumption giving an inaccurate description may nevertheless be a useful one for the purpose for which the description is intended.

No. Description is completely separate. I predict that Miss Smith will die because she is on a plane which is currently crashing into the Arctic Ocean. You ask me if Miss Smith is a blonde or brunette. I don't know. I haven't seen her. All I know is that she is on the doomed plane. 

Friedman was saying 'inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon'. Others were saying 'but my country is structurally different from any country you have studied! How can the outcome be the same?' Friedman would reply, 'for the same reason that Miss Smith will die whether on not she is a blonde.'  

Friedman restricts his attention to predictive usefulness only, but the point can be generalized, and objectives other than predictive success might also lead to a case for departing from the truth. Examples can be constructed such that truth of descriptions conflicts with usefulness for prescriptive exercises, or even for communication.

e.g. my description of Sen as looking peaky because he hasn't noshed on dog turds.  

4 A distinction must, however, be made

Sen has never made a useful distinction iin his life 

between a description of something being good in the sense of being a good one to give and it being a good description of that thing.

A 'good description' means a 'true & fair' account of the thing. 

The aspiring murderer demands from you a description of where his would-be victim has gone,

He is asking for information, not a description. Indeed, he may have to supply you with the description unless you too are already acquainted with the victim.  

and as you point at the wrong road he proceeds in that direction with a roar.

You didn't give a description. You gave false information.  

That description of where the would-be victim has gone is, I would agree, a good one to give,

Nobody has given any fucking description.  

but it can hardly be accepted as a good description of where the would-be victim has gone. The goodness of a description can be judged in terms of many alternative criteria,

No. It can only be judged in one way. It is a different matter that you may prefer to act capriciously rather than to judge the thing. Such behaviour can disqualify you from doing so.  

but in calling a description a good description of something, truth—in the broad sense—would seem to be a necessary condition.

Yet, such isn't the case. With respect to any type of descriptive work, there are experts in the field who judge what is good and is bad. If we don't have that expertise, we can't pronounce on the matter.  

There isn’t anything very puzzling here, even though the distinction has been frequently overlooked. A good description of something reflects reality about that thing is some straightforward sense, rather than distorting it.

I describe a good Amartya Sen who eats dog turds in a good manner.  To my mind, this reflects reality. However, I am not an expert on Sen's diet. It is possible that when Amartya Sen is good, he eats mice. When he is naughty, he feasts on camel droppings. 

  I turn now to the methodological dispute between Friedman and Samuelson.* Friedman argued that the appropriateness of an assumption must be judged not by its realism but by its predictive usefulness.

He was saying nothing about description 

Furthermore, Friedman saw an inverse relationship between realism of assumptions and its predictive contribution.

No. He said more significant theories may have less realistic assumptions. But an assumption is not a description. It is either itself a prediction or it a step towards getting a prediction. 

Insofar as a theory can be said to have ‘assumptions’ at all,

In Econ, every theory comes with a list of assumption

and insofar as their ‘realism’ can be judged independently of the validity of predictions,

they aren't meant to be realistic. 

the relation between the significance of a theory and the ‘realism’ of its assumptions is almost the opposite of that suggested by the view under criticism.

Sadly, Econ theories aren't significant at all. They are just shite you teach. Being able to correctly predict things, on the other hand, can make you very rich.   

Truly important and significant hypotheses will be found to have ‘assumptions’ that are widely inaccurate descriptive representations of reality, and, in general, the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions (in this sense).

An assumption is not a description and vice versa. Consider the assumption of perfect competition. We can't describe a world where it obtains. Indeed, such a world is 'incompossible'. It can't obey the laws of physics which obtain in the real world.

Characterizing the approach as “F-twist’”, Samuelson has attacked Friedman’s position sharply. “If the abstract models contain empirical falsities, we must jettison the models, not gloss over their inadequacies.”

& say goodbye to Physics, Chemistry, Biology- any nomothetic discipline.  

“The empirical harm done by the F-twist is this. In practice it leads to Humpty-Dumptiness. Lewis Carroll had Humpty-Dumpty use words any way he wanted to. I had in mind something different: Humpty-Dumpty uses the F-twist to say, “What I choose to call the admissable amount of unrealism and empirical invalidity is the tolerable amount of unrealism’”’.’

But if Humpty gives better predictions than any one else, we don't fucking care.  

I am not presently concerned with whether Friedman is correct in thinking that an inverse relationship tends to exist between accurate assumptions and predictive success.

He didn't think that. He merely said that if a model has better predictions,  and you gain by having better predictions, then you stick with it even if you find its assumptions unrealistic.  

The important point to note is that if such an inverse relationship were to obtain, Friedman would be quite willing to sacrifice accuracy.

Accuracy is not available. It is simply a fact that if what matters is prediction, accurate prediction is all that matters. If description is what matters, accurate description is all that matters. They are two separate things. 

Stanley Wong (1973) has pointed out that Samuelson’s critique takes insufficient note of the “instrumental” nature of Friedman’s methodological position, and the latter’s overriding concern with prediction. This, I believe, is indeed the case, but the two views of description differ on an issue that goes well beyond the question of the predictive focus.

There is only one view of description. Sen is making this shit up.  

No matter what the aim happens to be, as long as it is not—or does not include—making only accurate statements about observed facts, a conflict can conceivably arise between descriptive accuracy and the aim of the description.

No. Descriptive accuracy is objective. It is wholly independent of the subjective aim. 

The issue is a good deal more general than the so-called ‘“‘F-twist”, and concerns the conflict between aims of description and the truth of statements that can be used to further these aims. 

Description is a word. It is not a being with aims or dreams or preferences or a philosophy of life. Some descriptions have verisimilitude. If so, we say they are good. This does not mean that they regularly condemn Narendra Modi. It doesn't even mean that they offer gratuitous rape counselling to senior citizens. It just means that we are pleased with them.  

Another different motivation is involved in Nicholas Kaldor’s’ advocacy of departure from truthful description, in favour of what he calls “stylized facts”.

i.e. assumptions re. what would, approximately, be the case, ceteris paribus.  

These aren’t facts in the sense of being true, but they communicate rapidly certain things that are close enough to being true, but avoid a plethora of details.

that is what an approximation is.  

An example: that in the Western economies the capital output ratio remained stationary over many decades and so did the share of wages in national income.

This is clearly false because of the business cycle.  

Not exactly true for all the alluded economies. In fact, not exactly true for any of the alluded economies. Still, if the variations are relatively small in comparison with other, related variables, the simplification will have certain obvious advantages.

So will lying.  

I have to report that in this case the advantages were probably rather unequally shared, with the biggest share going to Kaldor himself, who used these stylized facts to illustrate his well-known models of growth and distribution. But that wasn’t all there was to it, and some of the stylized facts undoubtedly succeeded in enhancing comprehension, drawing attention to important observed regularities, even though they were not quite accurate. However, the important issue here isn’t whether these particular simplifications were all informative without being misleading but that the method of using “‘stylized facts’ can indeed have this property.

So can lying or spinning a yarn or telling a 'just-so' story.  

There is nothing exceptional to economics in making stylized facts a possible and potentially efficient method of understanding reality.

or lying that you do.  

Fiction is a general method of coming to grip with facts.

Only in the sense that lying is a general method of revealing the truth.  

There is nothing illegitimate in being helped by War and Peace to an understanding of the Napoleonic wars in Russia, or by Grapes of Wrath to digesting aspects of the Depression.

Nor is there anything legitimate about it. Tolstoy was completely wrong about Napoleon & Kutuzov. There is no aspect of the Depression illumined by Steinbeck. The fucker never even visited Oklahoma. Also American women didn't breastfeed starving strangers. 

There is no reason why descriptive statements in economics have to aspire after mechanical accuracy even when it conflicts with comprehension and absorption.

Descriptive Econ or Accountancy must be accurate. Otherwise it gets the fucking sack. What Sen did wasn't descriptive. It was masturbatory or time wasting.  

There is, of course, an obvious objection to presenting non-facts dressed up as facts, but there is no need to do this once non-facts are accepted as ligitimate descriptive instruments themselves.

Once you accept lies as truth, you don't need to bother with truth. Also, by accepting dog turds as tasty food, you can subsist wholly on dog turds.  

Such a description of something will be good in the sense of being useful, but—as already explained—must not be confused with its being a good—or realistic—description of that thing. 

I describe dog turds as tasty food. Sen is obliged to eat them.  

Samuelson’s argument that ‘we must jettison the models” that “contain empirical falsities’’ seems to be based on

stupidity. All models in the natural sciences 'contain empirical falsities'.  

a very narrow view of objectives of description. However, Samuelson wasn’t only objecting to the use of empirical falsities in models, but also disputing Friedman’s use of words.

No. He was saying that Friedman is making up his own criteria of success. This wasn't true. The criteria was that predictions got verified by outcomes.  

The reference to Humpty-Dumptiness deals with this. This relates closely to our distinction between a description that is good and a good description of something.

They are one and the same. The meaning is 'this description has high verisimilitude' or what Popper called 'truth-likeness'.  

Friedman not only defends the use of inaccurate assumption in predictive theory, but also employs a new concept of realism. It is “‘the test by prediction” in classifying alternative assumptions “‘as more or less realistic” that Friedman embraces and which he sees others being ‘‘necessarily driven” to accept (p. 33).

Sadly, when Friedman's predictions failed to materialize, his theory was abandoned. This what was happening around the time Sen published this.  

The predictive usefulness of an inaccurate description may well justify the choice of that description, but why does it make it a more realistic description?

We chose the prediction, not the description, if we are only concerned with the outcome. If we don't care about the outcome but for some reason want a picture of how things were, we go for the description.  

The “instrumental” nature of Friedman’s position may be adequate in defending the choice of such an assumption, but to call it “‘realistic” is a separate assertion, violating the important criterion that a description must be true, in the broad sense, to be realistic.

Sen assumes that it is easy to say which description is relistic. But, he himself seems to think that Tolstoy & Steinbeck gave realistic descriptions whereas, notoriously, the opposite was the case. Napoleon was a freakin' military genius. Okies weren't evicted by evil bankers. FDR's agricultural adjustment act incentivized landlords to eject tenants so as to lower their cotton acreage. Government subsidies enabled them to replace workers with tractors. About a quarter of all tenant farmers in the South West upped sticks during that decade for this reason. Thus Steinbeck was completely wrong about everything. Only a cretin like Sen would have bought into his crude propaganda.  

Samuelson’s objection to this violation cannot be dismissed by a pointer to the “instrumental” character of Friedman’s economic methodology.

Sure it can. Samuelson was wrong. Friedman was right. The Phillips curve didn't really represent a trade-off. Anyway, you can could always change the assumptions to make them more appealing to any particular audience. 'Micro-foundations' was a way to reverse engineer things.  

The defence that Friedman provides of this characterisation of ‘“‘realism”’ mainly takes the form of denying the viability of any alternative conception. A theory or its “assumptions” cannot possibly be thoroughly “realistic” in the immediate descriptive sense so often assigned to this term.

It must have lower Kolmogorov complexity than what it relates to. 

A completely “‘realistic” theory of the wheat market would have to include not only the conditions directly underlying the supply and demand for wheat but also the kind of coins or credit instruments used to make exchanges; the personal characteristics of wheattraders such as the colour of each trader’s hair and eyes, his antecedents and education, the number of members of his family, their characteristics, antecedents, and education, etc.; the kind of soil on which the wheat was grown, its physical and chemical characteristics, the weather prevailing during the growing season; the personal characteristics of the farmers growing the wheat and of the consumers who will ultimately use it; and so on indefinitely.

No. A particular market for wheat would indeed have particular determinants of Demand, Supply, etc. However, hair colour is never relevant. The question is whether outcomes in a particular wheat market depart too much from what the existing theory, absent any local knowledge, predicts. This does not mean, for some other purpose- e.g. ecological- that interference in a particular market might not be justified. 

Any attempt to move very far in achieving this kind of ‘‘realism” is certain to render a theory utterly useless.

No. But it isn't parsimonious or it needlessly adds noise to signal.  

In assessing this objection it is necessary to consider the distinction between realism in the sense of ‘“‘nothing but the truth” and that in the sense of ‘the whole truth”.

They are one and the same. Commission & omission arise in testimony. But the truth is not testimony. It is a predicate applicable to testimony. 

An assumption can be realistic in that it is true without the claim being made that it is exhaustive in capturing all aspects of the reality.

all relevant aspects. Truth means relevant truth.  

Advocates of realism in the sense of “nothing but the truth” need not demand “the whole truth’.

There really is no difference between the two. The truth of the matter is all relevant information. Selective testimony is not true testimony. It is biased.  

The dissatisfaction with Friedman’s position on the part of critics such as Samuelson does not arise from Friedman’s rejection of “the whole truth’, but from his rejection of “nothing but the truth’’.

No. He says neither matter. Only the quality of predictions is germane. Remember, it is only in a court of law- where a civil or criminal matter has to be adjudicated that testimony under oath of this type is required. But most matters are not justiciable.  

The distinction is important for Friedman’s discussion of departures from realism and the criteria of acceptability of such departures. What is the criterion by which to judge whether a particular departure from realism is or is not acceptable?

Unless the matter is justiciable, there re no such criteria. Friedman was right to say that all we care about is prediction. We don't need to know how the sausage is made. It could be done within a 'black box' for all we care.  

Why is it more “unrealistic” in analysing business behaviour to neglect the magnitude of businessmen’s costs than the colour of their eyes?

Because, in business 'costs' matter. Eye colour does not. Sen may suffer from some major mental malfunction such that he can't tell what is relevant and what is irrelevant for businesses. But this is a very rare malady indeed.  

The obvious answer is because the first makes more difference to business behaviour than the second; but there is no way of knowing that this is so simply by observing that businessmen do have costs of different magnitudes and eyes of different colour.

Only if there is no way of knowing what knowing is or what no is or what is is. The problem with appearing a fucking cretin is that others can be more cretinous yet.  

Clearly it can only be known by comparing the effect on the discrepancy between actual and predicted behaviour of taking one factor or the other into account.

No. It is known a priori and arises out of 'theory of mind'- much of which is hardwired.  

Even the most extreme proponents of realistic assumptions are thus necessarily driven to reject their own criterion and to accept the test by prediction when they classify alternative assumptions as more or less realistic."

There is no such compulsion. Friedman & Samuelson were featured in Newsweek. I suppose they wrote entertainingly enough, but- by 1980- the debate was over. Samuelson was wrong about the Phillips curve. Going forward you had increasingly arcane Fintech of a type senile shitheads like Sen could not follow.   

 However, Friedman’s concentration on predictive success as the only objective he considers,

for Positive Economics 

also makes his treatment of the choice basis of description a very limited one.

because Positive Econ has a limited aim. Sen's normative econ, wants descriptions (false or foolish ones) for a polemical purpose. Friedman is like a Doctor who wants to cure the patient. Sen is like a paranoid nutter who attributes the illness suffered by the patient to the Devil or Capitalism or the fact that Manmohan Singh is Prime Minister.  

Description may well be geared to some objective other than prediction, e.g., normative analysis,

lying and scolding 

or efficient communication,

in which case prediction is what matters. You use the descriptive term you predict will pick out the right object for your interlocutor. Schelling focal theory is the relevant solution concept.  

or even satisfying idle curiosity. Even the preference for concentrating on businessmen’s costs rather than on the colour of their eyes—to return to Friedman’s example—may arise from some non-predictive motivation. For example, within the normative perspective, the businessmen’s costs might be relevant to some notion of desert, e.g., a person deserves to get a reward for the costs he has undertaken,

I deserve to get a reward for phoning up Dr. Sen in the middle of the night to inform him of places where he can get fresh dog turds. This is because spending my time in this manner imposes an opportunity cost on me represented by money I could have earned doing something else.  

and this may give no place at all to the colour of the person’s eyes. The nature of economic questions reflects a variety of interests that the subject has to cater to. Has the distribution of income turned more unequal in country x?

Yes. Also Capitalists are invisibly sodomizing everybody. Manmohan Singh is the culprit. Fuck you Manmohan! Fuck you very much! 

Are the residents of country y better fed today than before?

No! They aren't eating enough dog turds.  

Is modern technology getting easily absorbed in country z?

Yes. Technology is easy to absorb- if you have a bit of cash.  

Has trade unionism influenced the distribution of income under capitalism?

This went into reverse during that period.  

Are there business cycles still in the Western economies?

This is about prediction and is positive 

How large is the Soviet Union’s international trade?

Descriptive Accountancy 

How should we plan the use of exhaustible resources?

Normative.  

Does progressive taxation affect incentives?

Predictive- thus Postivie 

Will the expansion of money supply—this one in honour of Milton Friedman—expand prices proportionately? ‘

Predictive- thus Positive 

This bag of assorted questions reflects a plurality of motivation that is not reducible to some kind of single “ultimate objective’.

Each motivation is reducible to one and only one objective.  This means a choice has to be made unless a pathology- like that of Sen's- supervenes such that only stupid lies and peurile scolding is produced. 

They represent predictive investigation, normative concern as well as curiosity related to a variety of interests from sympathy to satisfying one’s spirit of inquiry.

Only if they don't have an objective. But a motive without an objective isn't a motive at all. It is merely some incohate state productive of nothing.  

A monolithic characterization of the objective of description will leave us with a methodology ill-suited to the subject. 

No. It will enable Econ to be useful rather than a platform for a brown monkey to gas on endlessly.  

The multiplicity of motivation has been discussed so far in the particular context of departures from accuracy, but it is of course a much more central issue than this particular context might suggest. Even when no departures from truth are involved, there is—as already discussed—the problem of selection, choosing from the set of true statements a subset of relevant ones.

There is a feedback loop regulated by Occam's razor such that stuff with little predictive power gets deselected.  

Criteria of relevance are crucial to this choice basis of description going well beyond the issue of truth. Methodological discussions in economics have tended to concentrate on predictive and prescriptive concerns, and seem to have had the effect of ignoring other motivations that stimulate inquiry.'

E.g the motivation of brown monkey to just gas on and on and on in a completely useless and stupid manner.  

This bias has had a rather inpoverishing role on the descriptive traditions in economics. The choice basis of description may relate to the curiosity that precipitates inquiry, and this curiosity need not reflect predictive or prescriptive interests.

It may reflect the desire of a brown monkey to gas on endlessly.  

Indeed, even the use of language can relate to selection based on other types of curiosity. In response to the question: “Is China a large country?”’,

the answer is 'yes. By area, it is the third or fourth largest'.  

we accepted the answer: “Yes, it has 900 million people’,

This is the answer to the question 'does China have a large population?'. The answer, at that time, was 'yes. It is the most populous country in the world. ' 

basing the notion of the size of country on the size of its population. However, China has less surface area than Canada, fewer tigers than India, fewer polar bears than the Soviet Union, and—according to some early enthusiastic accounts—no flies at all.

All of which is irrelevant.  

The case for describing China as larger than Canada, India or the Soviet Union clearly rests in our greater interest in human beings than in square miles, tigers, polar bears and flies.

But China was smaller than the Soviet Union or even Russia by itself. Sen is simply repeating a lie. 

...The non-predictive, non-prescriptive motivations are particularly important to bear in mind in understanding the role of “theories of value” in economics, particularly the labour theory of value.

The thing was nonsense. We understand that shitheads have a motivation to talk bollocks but we can exclude that bollocks from the realm of Accountancy & Economics & Actuarial or Management Science.  

The labour theory can, in fact, be given various intrepretations related to the motivations involved.

So can the God theory or the Lesbian goat theory. Did you know that all these so called 'factories' and 'coal mines' and so forth are actually manned by Lesbian goats? Why are they being so pitilessly exploited? Is it because Manmohan Singh is secretly sodomizing the entire peasantry and proletariat of the world so incessantly that Capitalism has had to replace manpower with goatpower?  

One is that of a predictive theory—in particular that of relative prices and distribution, and it encompasses the so-called “law of value’. Another is normative, providing a theory of entitlements. A third, which is frequently missed, is a way of discriminating between different features of production and exchange by focussing on elements of human involvement.'

Lesbian Goat theory has all these properties to the same extent as the Labour theory of Value.  

Value, in Marx’s (1887) words, is ‘“‘a relation between persons expressed as a relation between things”.

only in the sense that a relation between lesbian goats and Neo-liberalism entails that shite. 

The last interpretation is frequently taken to be “metaphysical”, as Joan Robinson (1964) puts it, describing it also as “‘a mere rigmarole of words” (p. 39). Why so? Because it

is nonsense. Value is a predicate. It isn't a relation. We say 'diamonds have value'. We don's say 'Necessity is the mother-in-law of Value. Charity used to date Value's ex but has now decided to marry a Lesbian goat.'  

picks up from the description of production and exchange only some features as being specially significant, leaving the rest untouched? The discrimination makes the description arbitrary, as many critics have seen it. But, as I have already tried to argue, any description involves discrimination and selection, and the real question is the relevance of the selection process to the objectives of description.

To say 'to get to Victoria from Earls Court, take the District line' involves 'discrimination and selection'. But it is useful and 'Schelling focal'- i.e. is the 'natural' solution in the underlying coordination game. To say 'to get to Victoria from Earls Court, sodomize the ineluctability of the diagonalization of the Lesbian goat' also involves 'discrimination and selection'. But it isn't useful at all. Yet, that is what Sen is doing. 

I have claimed elsewhere’* that the methodological issue can be more easily understood by looking at other descriptive statements in which the discrimination involved cannot be reduced entirely to predictive or prescriptive interests. Consider the statement “Michaelangelo produced the statue of David”. There is an obvious sense in which this would be accepted as

true based on Kripke rigid designators 

a realistic description,

It is not a description.  

despite its being informationally selective and the selection process not being primarily motivated by prediction or prescription. The production process in making the statue actually involved not merely Michaelangelo, but his helpers, a huge block of stone, chisels, scaffoldings, etc., but the description quoted focusses on Michaelangelo only as the most relevant bit of information. Note that the discrimination cannot be based on any marginal productivity consideration in the usual neoclassical sense. Without Michaelangelo, no statue, but without stone, no statue either! But this does not give the same status to the two statements “Michaelangelo produced the statue of David’ and “this stone produced the statue of David” (or “‘this stone quarry produced the statue of David’’).

Nothing wrong with saying that. But these are not descriptive statements. They are based on 'rigid designation'. To be descriptive they would be of the form 'Michaelangelo produced the sculpture of David which is x metres high and which weighs y kilograms and which looks like the picture below

 


The selection process reflects other motivations, in particular, that of capturing the source of the imagination displayed in the statue.

This has nothing to do with description 

The labour theory of value, in its descrptive interpretation,

it has none. A theory is not a description.  

shows a similar—but not the same—type of discrimination, focussing—in this case—

which case? Michaelangelo?  

on the human effort directly and indirectly involved in the process of production and exchange of commodities.

Does Sen think the guy was working in a factory? 

In assessing the labour theory of value as a description of production and exchange,

which is like assessing the cat as a description of the dog. A theory is not  a description.  

it is the cogency of this focus that has to be assessed,

there is zero cogency. The cat is not a dog. The theory is not a description.  

including its ability, if any, to capture our interest compared with other methods of discrimination.

Why capture the interest of useless nutters?  

Examining only the theory’s predictive success, or its normative relevance, will not even begin to provide

Sen with nutritious dog turds.  

a complete assessment of the labour theory of value.

which is fully provided by saying the thing is dog shit.  

And to call it metaphysical because it is informationally discriminating

in favour of theses which are 'beyond physics' and thus metaphysical, is perfectly justified.

Sen's analysis 

involves a total failure to perceive the nature of description as an activity. 

Briefly, the nature of this activity is to map what is observed to means of expression such that a description is available at some later date or to some third party. Some pathology, or previous instruction, may cause only some parameters to be observed and described. But this is not a matter of Choice. By contrast, an 'impressionistic' or otherwise aesthetic or polemical or other non-alethic account may involve choice. 

I turn now to the other of the two great theories of value, viz., the utility theory.

Utility is a Tarskian primitive. 

Again, utility descriptions have predictive and normative interest,

There are no utility descriptions. There are imputations of utility of a ipse dixit type.  

but once again they do not exhaust the descriptive motivations.

They are wholly unrelated to them.  

The joys and sufferings of human beings and their deprivations and fulfilments have interest of their own.

No.  They are of no interest to anybody. Shitheads may pretend otherwise to virtue signal.  

Even classical political economists were much concerned with related—though not identical—features in their interset in use value.'* It is this part of the descriptive motivation that has been least well served by recent developments of utility theory, most notably by the theory of revealed preference.

Which came out in 1938 when Sen was 5 years old. How is that 'recent'?  

Focussing only on predicting behaviour, the richness of human psychology has been substantially ignored,

because Economists are ignorant of Psychology. You have to ignore what you haven't studied.  

refusing to see anything in utility or happiness other than choice. As the “‘father’’ of revealed preference theory, Paul Samuelson, puts it: behaviour is to be “explained in terms of preference, which are in turn defined only by behaviour.”’

Which is all that businesses and governments are interested in. Crazy people, on the other hand, may want to discuss the Labour theory of value or the Lesbian Goat theory of value or the psychological richness involved in being incessantly sodomized by invisible Netan-Yahoos.  

This has led to an approach that is—despite some predictive merits— remarkably mute about human joys and sufferings in which economics used to take a lot of interest.

Because it was useless and consisted only of scolding people rather than economising on the use of scarce resources.  

The result is a descriptive impoverishment from many perspectives

Brown monkey whose people were starving just six years ago worries about 'descriptive impoverishment'! Yet, thanks to Western technology like TV cameras, descriptions now are better than ever! 

, including—among others—normative relevance, since many of the common norms do relate precisely to the ignored descriptive features.'?

All the norms are dog shit which Sen must eagerly devour to overcome impoverishment.  

... There has been the proposition that every factual statement involves implicit values.

not to mention invisible Lesbian goats.  

In its original formulation and use, this claim, which I believe is false, may have played a challenging part in the dialectics with positivism. ‘“‘So you want facts only, no values, because they are illegitimate,” the argument ran, “but you can’t have facts without values. Touché!” But why must every factual statement involve values?

Invisible lesbian goats. They are very insistent on this point.  

The basis of the claim seems to rest uneasily on the belief, which is correct, that any description involves some selection.

Which could be random and thus unconnected with human intentionality or bias or values or interests. 

What is not correct is the further belief that the selection must be based on some explicit or implicit prescriptive criterion. The criteria used for selection, as I have been arguing, may be aimed at objectives other than prescription, e.g., catering to curiosity.

or sodomy or the ravenous devouring of dog turds. Since Economics is concerned with economising on the use of scarce resources, only descriptions which advance this objective are of interest to Economists. 

... few concluding remarks. First, description inevitably involves selection.

and selection inevitably involves description. So what? If the thing is inevitable, how are economists concerned with it?  

It can be usefully seen as a choice of a subset from a set of possible statements.

If there is no set, there can be no subset. 'Possible statements' does not have a well-defined extension. Thus it isn't a set. 

It is not useful to see a thing as something which it can't be.  

Second, truth is clearly not a sufficient condition for a description to be good.

So what? There is no necessary, sufficient, or other condition for anything to be anything save by arbitrary stipulation. But. by just such stipulation, Sen eats only dog turds.  

Third, nor is it a necessary condition. Friedman’s defence of departures from truth in choosing factual assumptions is a special case of a general argument in favour of judging description by its usefulness.

No. There are no descriptions in Friedman. There is data- e.g. relating to the Monetary base or the Price level or the velocity of ciriculation. But data, by itself, is not description.  What matters is whether Freidman's theory yielded the right predictions. In so far as the Phillips curve broke down- such was the case. But the prediction that inflationary pressure could be squeezed out purely by monetary policy without mass unemployment was soon belied. It turned out that Money wasn't truly exogenous. 

Friedman considers only predictive usefulness, but there are other objectives which lead to the same conclusion. Samuelson’s assertion of the need to “‘jettison”’ models that contain “‘empirical falsities’” seems to take a very narrow view of description as an activity.

I suppose one could say that those with more knowledge of actual monetary policy were aware that Friedman't fairy tale was too good to be true. Still, the truth is, Friedman was actually the most successful 'normative' economist of his generation. He made it okay to laugh heartily at mass unemployment in the Rust Belt while pulling in big bucks from a job in Finance. 

Fourth, Friedman’s attack on traditional notions of realism is based on a misunderstanding. His own suggestion about judging realism by ‘“‘the test by prediction”? seems to confound usefulness of a description with its realism.

The thing didn't matter greatly. Friedman & Hayek prevailed because those who embraced their ideas  and values did better for themselves thereby. Bleeding Heart Keynesianism put money in nobody's pocket ; it was simply a pain the arse.  

A description of something can be a good one to give without being a good description of that thing.

What Sen means is 'sometimes, it is better for you to tell a lie rather than the truth'.  

Fifth, description can be motivated by predictive interest or by prescriptive interest, but it may also have other motivations, and to confine attention only to predictive or prescriptive interest impoverishes the traditions of descriptive economics.

Lying your head off may make you rich. At the very least, as a liar, you can claim to have become wealthy.  

Finally, such impoverishment can be seen in recent developments in many different fields of economics, varying from interpretations of theories of “value” to the measurement of inequality and poverty.

People say 'poor Professor X. As an undergrad, he appeared so promising. Now everybody thinks he is a stupid liar. His books and papers are considered very poor quality work'.  This type of 'impoverishment' can be defeated, Sen believes, by telling even stupider, even more monumental, lies.  

The richness of descriptive motivations seems to have been sacrificed for consistency within an arbitrarily narrow conception of these motivations, or—to be more exact—for consistency respectively within two arbitrarily narrow conceptions of motivations.

The richness of fantasist and the luxuriance of the liar has been sacrificed by professional people who get rich by discoveritng and reporting the truth.  

This, I have argued, has been an unequal exchange: confounding the nature of description as an activity and unnecessarily weakening the theoretical underpinning of many legitimate and useful activities in the social sciences.

Normative economics is based on telling stupid lies. Thus Sen, attacking Thatcher a couple of years after this paper was published, said that the UK could suffer a big famine under her leadership. His colleagues discouraged this claim. Brown monkeys should stick to denouncing other brown monkeys. Thus they welcomed his outrageous libel that Manmohan Singh was trying to force horribly diseased, wholly illiterate, Indian people into modern factories and offices so as to turn Indian into an economic super-power. It was actually the 'Dobb-Sen' thesis which had envisaged confiscating productivity gains from the proletariat so as to invest in the capital good sector. 

A fair description of Sen's entire oeuvre would leave us with no choice but to declare him a useless, stupid, ignorant liar and virtue signalling hypocrite. We are welcome to enrich this description, in the manner he himself endorses, by making the ipse dixit stipulatiton that he eagerly devours dog turds. 

Monday, 7 September 2026

James Orr's 'no God, no powers'.

James Orr is an Associate Professor of Philosophy in the Divinity Faculty at Cambridge. Though right-wing & anti-immigration, I can't warm to him because, it seems to me, his metaphysics entails certain Christological errors which, however, can no more impugn than it can establish, his Faith. 

Consider this draft, available on Academia, of his paper titled- 

No God, No Powers: On Cartwright’s Escape Nancy Cartwright has recently claimed that analysing physical regularities as laws

which physicsts don't do 

– that is, as quasi-causal necessitation relations between universals

universals are intensions without fixed extensions. Even if there is a possible world where necessitation relations exist, there will always appear to be a possible world where it doesn't in our own world.  

–presupposes theistic commitment.

Anyone can presuppose any sort of commitment on the part of anybody else. My own fundamental ontic presupposition is that all beings are commited to an intense aesthetic appreciation of my farts even if they deny it and run away from me coz they iz jelly.  

To borrow her slogan: no God, no laws.

For the 'Enlightenment' it seemed likely that unicity or naturality or categoricity obtained in every discipline and thus a unique set of 'natural laws' regulated everything including the God who necessarily exists so as to promulgate them. 

Sadly, category theory itself suggests that naturality is far to seek. There are fundamental mathematical problems of complexity, concurrency, computability and so forth.  

She argues that the more plausible alternative for nomic realists who reject theism is to ground regularities in powers.

Why not in gods or archangels or prosopoi?

I argue that this alternative is in fact inconsistent with a core commitment of metaphysical naturalism.

Statistical regularities are natural. Laws aren't. They are things people talk about but which don't inhere in anything.  

I then examine and reject a platonic version of the powers account before concluding with a more promising theistic alternative. In slogan form: no God, no powers.

Since nothing can come from nothing either we are nothing or we come from God. The problem here is the Christological doctrine of kenosis arising from Phillipians 2.7 ἀλλὰ ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν μορφὴν δούλου λαβών, ἐν ὁμοιώματι ἀνθρώπων γενόμενος· καὶ σχήματι εὑρεθεὶς ὡς ἄνθρωπος (but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men). 

Here becoming nothing becomes the making of μορφὴν (morphēn) – form / shape. 


No God, No Laws Nancy Cartwright has recently claimed that the most coherent way to analyse physical regularities as laws of nature requires theistic commitment.

The most coherent way to analyze cats as dogs requires a God who turns cats into dogs for the purpose of analysis. 

Her specific target are those theories that ground regularities in quasi-causal necessitation relations between categorical properties.

No theory in physics does so. Regularities are grounded in time-series. A Structural Causal Model may posit categories and specify functors upon them. But positing is not grounding. 

The claim articulates a widespread suspicion not only among neo-Humeans who hold that every regularity is a contingent regularity,

every cat is a contingent cat 

but also among neo-Aristotelians who analyse regularities in terms of the causal powers of objects, where causal powers are construed as ‘pure’ or ‘ungrounded’ – that is, as dispositional properties that are not reducible to an underlying base of categorical properties.

This is a tempting route to escape from reductionism (what's more it has Heisenberg's imprimatur!)  but it hasn't yielded anything useful yet.  Still, we are seduced by things like the 'law of increasing functional information'. 

For reasons of space, I shall simply assume in what follows that Cartwright’s suspicions regarding the theistic implications of the relations-between-universals analysis are well-founded.

There are no such implications. Faith is founded on a mysterey.  

I shall focus instead on the dispositionalist analysis as the one option that Cartwright leaves open for those who share her realist intuitions about regularities and her rejection of theism. Let us call this proposal Cartwright’s Escape.

God is God because he is God.  

My aim in this paper is to show that although it is well-motivated, Cartwright’s Escape fails: the prospects of grounding a realist analysis of physical regularities within a non-theistic explanatory framework are dimmer than Cartwright supposes, while the prospects of grounding one in a theistic one are more promising than she realises.

If God exists he can ensure stupid shit you think corresponds to reality. If he doesn't, then nothing can redeed your thinking from incompossibility.  



Sunday, 6 September 2026

Guha's Cockroaches

Students in India have engaged in political activitiy because of their hopes or fears regarding securing employment in competition with other students who might speak a different language or enjoy a different habitus. 

There have also been some students recruited by revolutionary movements who engage in terrorism. Speaking generally, such students are slaughtered or quietly turn into gangsters under the patronage of some politician or bigger Mafia don.

From time to time some ex-students or underemployed youth, take part in some current political 'circus' (tamasha) which attracts media attention. The farm protests during COVID or the Shaheen Bagh anti-CAA demonstrations were examples. 

Could young people create such a protest about an issue only of interest to themselves? The answer- albeit on a small scale, was yes. Recently, the Central Government mishandled a case of possibly leaked exam papers by forcing a million 're-takes'. This was very foolish. Thus, the Media would be willing to give a lot of air-time to a 'Student' protest more particularly because there was no important State Election to cover. 

During a Supreme Court hearing on May 15, 2026, the Indian Chief Justice remarked: "There are youngsters like cockroaches, who don't get any employment and don't have any place in the profession. Some of them become media, some of them become social media, some of them become RTI activists, some of them become other activists, and they start attacking everyone.'

This led to a guy who had previously worked for Kejriwal's media cell to satirically tweet  about the creation of a 'Cockroach Jantata Party' for proud work-shy losers who nevertheless want to get rich in some corrupt manner connected to politics. 

The joke here is that some senile shitheads took the joke seriously. 
As a case in point, Ramachandra Guha writes in the Telegraph-
For 120 years, Indian students have fought to change politics and public life

He does not say that for three thousand years, Indian students have sought to serve the State in a more or less corrupt manner. 

What happened 120 years ago which caused Indian students to start fighting? 

The answer is that the Legislative Councils (founded in 1862) were expanded & more of the members were elected under the 1892 Indian Councils Act. Students could now go on to serve the State & enrich themselves through political activity rather than by discharging a clerical or judicial function. In Bengal, the Swadeshi movement to reverse the partition of the Province (thus ensuring more jobs for the educated Hindu)  attracted young foot-soldiers who folllowed the line of the revolutionaries who had set up the Anushilan Samitis and who published 'Jugantar'. One could say that both the Congress Seva Dal and the RSS were inspired by these Samitis. Many successful politicians began their career in the youth wing of a political party. However, the youth movements of different States had different aims though, speaking generally, this was linked to getting jobs.  In Tamil Nadu, imposition of Hindi was the issue which energised youth. Interestingly, Tamils believed they had a better chance, in competitive exams, with English than Hindi!  In Assam, the issue was Bengali immigration. In Punjab, issues related to the Sikh religion have greater salience while, in UP/Bihar, caste and creed were constitututive of politics. 

A short history of student movements, from the swadeshi agitation in Bengal to the Cockroach Janta Party-led protests.

The cockroach movement features ex-students who feel they haven't yet found a sufficiently lucrative berth in life. Its creator used to work for AAP media cell before that party imploded in Delhi. He was doing an MA in America when a tweet of his went viral. Like his former boss, he wants to make money as a strategic politicial consultant who might also manage Social Media campaigns for Corporate clients. This is a revolution which will be monetized one way or another.

In early July, as the students’ protests in Jantar Mantar were taking shape, the Trinamool Congress MP, Mahua Moitra, was one of the first politicians to show up in person and offer solidarity.

Her party had just lost West Bengal.  

Three weeks later, when the Union education minister, Dharmendra Pradhan, resigned, Moitra thanked the younger generation “for saving Indian democracy” by bringing “this fascist, arrogant government to its knees”.

It was Mamta & Mahua who had been brought to their knees. Pradhan wants to go back to Odisa which his party now rules.  

This, as she pointed out, was something the Opposition parties had not been able to do in the past 12 years.

Modi eases out people who haven't performed- e.g Harsh Vardhan over COVID. What is important is that Modi had been able to push Mamta out of power in West Bengal.  

Mahua Moitra’s praise was well merited.

It was foolish. What mattered was Akhilesh. He did visit Jantar Mantar. He is desperate to win in February next year. Otherwise it is a case of 'three strikes & you are out'.  Maybe he will align with Owaisi for the Muslim vote & hire some of the 'cockroaches' to rally the youth.  

The resignation of the education minister, the home minister’s prolonged absence from Parliament, the sacking of several senior BJP office-bearers, and – not least – the clumsy, late-night videos of the prime minister, all testified to a regime whose customary air of hubristic arrogance had (at least temporarily) given way to weakness and confusion

This is nonsense. The BJP did very well in elections earlier this year but it knows that February 2027 is when the fate of the nation will be decided. If Yogi gets a third term, he becomes Modi's successor. If Akhilesh & Rahul win, all bets are off. 2029 could go either way.  


It is too early to say whether the momentum that the student “cockroaches” have thus far generated can be sustained,

It can't. It is a silly season story.  

leading to a fuller renewal of the constitutional promises of liberty, equality and fraternity.

& sodomy for senior citizens like Guha 

Historians are not astrologers, so, instead of projecting forward, I shall here look backwards, exploring other times in the past when Indian students have sought to leave their impress on politics and public life.

After the Great War, Gandhi called for students to quit Government schools and Colleges.  Some did. The Government laughed heartily. Gandhi unilaterally surrendered and went meekly off to jail. Students had a choice- get Gandhian and go to jail or get Revoutionary and hanged by the neck. The safer course was to cram for your exams and then, thirty years later,  tell everybody you were actually a secret courier of some type. 

The first such occasion was 120 years ago, during the swadeshi movement in Bengal. As Sumit Sarkar observed in his book on that particular upsurge, “Students of every district came to study in Calcutta, and no doubt it was through them above all that the movement initially spread into the mofussil.”

It alienated the Muslims. Tagore was right to warn of the consequences of this.  

While the more prominent leaders came from the established professional and landed classes, writes Sarkar, “the volunteers themselves of course came largely from the student community, many of them of extremely tender years”.

Some ended up in New York or California or Berlin or Moscow.  

In subsequent years, students energetically participated in the movements against British colonial rule led by Mahatma Gandhi and the Indian National Congress.

From time to time. The thing went in cycles.  

Male students joined the Non-co-operation and Civil Disobedience movements in large numbers, organising demonstrations and courting arrest.

Some new 'Swadesi' educational institutions were created. 

Students were even more active in the Quit India movement, filling the jails in their thousands.

There were quite a few who did more than that.  

A feature of Quit India was the dynamic role played by young women. The stirring story of Usha Mehta, the Bombay University student who helped organise the underground “Congress radio”, has been documented in an excellent book by Usha Thakkar.

Usha Mehta became a Professor. Nanka Motwani, the owner of Chicago Radio, made the 'Congress Radio' possible. He provided the equipment and the technicians. Usha's father had been a judge and she was trustworthy. She had graduated and planning to sit the law exams at the time of 'Quit India'. In other words, she was a 22 year old woman, rather than a student, with considerable freedom of movement

But there were other notable (if now less known) examples too. A file I found in the archives, titled “Karnatak in Revolt”, narrates how the “most phenomenal feature” of the movement in this part of India was the response of the student community, which organised boycotts and hartals in Belgaum, Gadag, Bangalore, Mysore, Mangalore, Bijapur, Bellari, Sirsi and other places.

Student means 'young person with time on his hands'. But it also means 'young person who doesn't matter at all.' 

On October 23, 1942, two students from Dharwad, a Miss Shenolikar and a Miss Gulawadi, entered the district court, hoisted the national flag, told the district judge (who was present) that he was dismissed from his office, distributed leaflets, and disappeared. (There the archival trail runs out – one would love to know what happened to Miss Shenolikar and Miss Gulawadi in later life.)

They got married and had babies. I believe both came from Congress families & thus they were related to MLAs or Ministers. 

In the decades leading up to Independence, students were active in social and political movements.

Like the Pakistan movement.  

What of the years after India rid itself of colonial rule? In 1968, the American scholar, Philip G. Altbach, edited a book titled Turmoil and Transition: Higher Education and Student Politics in India. In his introduction, Altbach remarked that while “students played a key role in the struggle of Independence”, since 1947 “most student agitation has not been directly political, but has concerned non-ideological issues”.

1968 was the year the shit really hit the fan. The term 'student' went from meaning 'lazy shithead' to 'crazy hoodlum or homicidal Naxal'.  

The book’s case studies examined the “non-ideological issues” raised by students in the 1960s which included not only high fees and poor hostel facilities but also cultural activities such as music and theatre.

Within a year of this book’s publication, students had re-entered politics, playing a major role in

the Naxalite movement 

the movement for a separate state of Telangana which started in 1969, although it bore final fruition long afterwards. This was one of three regional movements in post-Independence India that have strongly featured students. The others were the Assam movement of the late 1970s/early 1980s and the Uttarakhand movement of the 2000s.

Every regional movement has featured students.  


Of the Assam agitation, the historian, Arupjyoti Saikia, writes that “the movement was largely in the hands of student leaders”, whose “idealism inspired large numbers; when they delivered their fiery speeches, crowds of both women and men listened in rapt attention”.

They were good at killing. I grant you that.  

The All Assam Students’ Union gave birth to the Asom Gana Parishad, which won an assembly election in 1985.

After the Nellie massacre in 1983. Congress saw there was no point in giving Bangladeshis the vote if the local people killed them before they could get to the ballot box.  

Three decades later, students also helped propel the Telangana Rashtra Samithi to power in that state.

All parties benefit from energetic student wings. Hopefully, there will be increased accountability such that educational outcomes match with employment opportunities.  

All these struggles form the unacknowledged prehistory of the movement currently underway.

None do. A tweet by a guy in America never caused a student movement in India. This whole thing has been cooked up by the Media because it is a slow news period.  

However, the most obvious precursor from the past is the “JP movement” of the mid 1970s

JP was 70 years old. He had been spoken of as a successor to Nehru. He was joining hands with the Old Congress in a bid to take down Indira Gandhi. In 1977 he succeeded.

The cockroaches themselves were trying to replicate the success of the Anna Hazare movement which gave birth to the AAP party. What they needed was some seventy or eighty year old Saint to grace the occassion. All they got was some dude from Ladakh who was the model for the character played by Aamir Khan in 'Three Idiots'. 

in which students played such a prominent part. In his book, Protest Movements in Two Indian States, Ghanshyam Shah carefully documents the course of the protests in Gujarat and Bihar.

Political parties were using both Trade Unions & Student organizations for their own purposes. The result was that less work was done & less education imparted.  

In both states, students played a leading role.

in turning both states to shit. 

In Gujarat, the Congress chief minister, Chimanbhai Patel, was widely seen as corrupt, becoming a prime target of youth anger.

The oil shock was inflationary on top of which there was a global food shortage in 1974 

Students attacked the then prime minister, Indira Gandhi, for protecting Chimanbhai and for not being able to stem price rise. The protests were by no means non-violent, featuring attacks on government property and the looting of shops.

Indira had brought in younger, poorer, more radical grass-roots politicians. The old guard was strking back. Indira then showed that India was not a 'soft state'. It was well hard. She jailed all her opponents and, soon enough, they were whimpering for mercy. 

Shah writes that, as in Gujarat, “students were the vanguard of the Bihar movement” of the 1970s.

& the RSS was in the vanguard of the ABVP which was in the vanguard of the student movement.  

However, unlike in Gujarat,

where a key leadership role was undertaken by Morarji Desai (aged 78) who launced an indefinite hunger strike in March 1974. Morarji had previously been Deputy Prime Minister. 

in Bihar one elderly individual played a key leadership role. This was Jayaprakash Narayan.

JP was only 72- six years younger than Morarji. JP made Morarji the PM in 1977.  

As Shah observes, “his concern for the poor, his moral stance, his simplicity and humility”, all contributed to the veteran freedom-fighter’s charisma.

But, in Gujarat, it was Morarji who mattered.  

JP appealed to the students to give up studies for a year to “save democracy”.

JP & Lohia had opened the door to the Jan Sangh (now known as BJP) joining anti-Congress coalitions and thus gaining national salience. Morarji was more circumspect.  

The students who flocked to his call included members of the right-wing Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad and also many young socialist activists.

The arrow of causation runs the other way. JP was looking for a way back into electoral politics (bhoodhan having proved a scam) and the RSS was only too eager to provide the organizational muscle and financial resources to sustain a mass movement.  


The present student upsurge

is opportunistic and merely cosmetic 

resembles the JP movement in one significant manner.

Everybody knows that if you aren't in the ABVP, they you are probably wasting your time.  

The principal targets of both have been authoritarianism and the cult of personality, as represented in the 1970s by Indira Gandhi and her party and by Narendra Modi and his party now.

Indira was authoritarian which is why she jailed her opponents. Modi is democratic, which is why he doesn't jail anybody.  

Yet there are also major differences. The ABVP was then against the ruling regime; now it is firmly on the side of the ruling regime.

It is the student wing of the ruling party.  

It does also seem that, compared to the JP movement, women students are more visible in the current protests, their idealism and courage reminiscent of the female satyagrahis of 1942.

They would be even more visible if they weren't as ugly as shit.  

The upsurge of the 1970s presented itself as

either anti-Indira or anti anyone who was anti Indira. Indira prevailed because the opposition had zero esprit de corps.  

a second freedom struggle, working to finally fulfil the failed promises of the first. In so far as it helped end one-party rule and brought about a fresh wind of democracy, the movement succeeded.

No. It failed. By 1980, India was condemned to dynastic rule. Interestingly, it did not initially feature primogeniture- Sanjay was the younger son- but Fate took care of that problem. Congress now belongs wholly to Rahul. His cousin, Varun, gets nothing. 

On the other hand, the JP movement also gave legitimacy to the forces of Hindutva, which have steadily gathered power and influence in the years that followed.

With hindsight, it was the RSS which gave JP political credibility. Otherwise, he'd have had to become more and more like Vinobha Bhave.  

To their credit, the student leaders of the present resolutely oppose both authoritarianism and religious bigotry.

But not opportunism and coprophagy.  

The invocation by them of Ambedkar, Gandhi and Nehru – all together – suggests that they

are as stupid as shit.  

see their movement as a third freedom struggle, working to finally fulfil the failed promises of the first and the second.

The first succeeded in getting rid of the House of Windsor. The second succeeded in getting rid of the House of Nehru (albeit helped along by an assassination or two). The third will succeed in getting rid of Modi because he is already 76 years old. The question is- who will succeed him? If Yogi gets a third term, my money is on him. But, if Akhilesh wins big- he becomes the kingmaker going into the next General Election.  

How far these ideals will be realised in the years ahead shall depend on the actions of countless individuals and organisations, many of whom who were not themselves present in Jantar Mantar during those heady days of June and July.

If the ideal is to get rid of Modi- it will fulfil itself through the natural process of ageing. If the ideal is to replace the BJP with some other party or coalition of parties then the first priority must be to win in February 2027 and thus get 'big mo' for the General Election.

Can students play a role in this? Sure. They can help with 'booth management' just as well as anybody else. However, it is the poorer woman- not the student- who remains the 'swing' voter, all parties must try to entice. 

One caveat. If the caste census is completed before the next general election, issues regarding reservations may take precedence. My gut feeling is that Akhilesh stands to benefit most. Sadly, I am always wrong. This means Yogi will win big in February. 

Friday, 4 September 2026

Descensus Christi as the descending chain condition on closed sets.



Either the body is a rental or you have no soul to sell.
Having nowhere to go means : Home is Hell
Sorrow is the sow fed by what it farrows
& Noetherian aught its Niketes harrows.


Envoi- 
Under the Sun, all toil, till under the soil, my son.
                                                                पुत्रकामो भूत्वा यत्रसायंगृहो भवेत्।


Thursday, 3 September 2026

Amartya Sen' choice of Communist technique.

Maurice Dobb was a Communist academic who recruited spies for the Soviet Union. In India, he is known as the mentor of Amartya Sen, who was 33 years his junior. The Dobb-Sen thesis 'is a foundational economic model regarding the choice of techniques in developing countries. Developed by Indian economist Amartya Sen under the supervision of Marxist economist Maurice Dobb at the University of Cambridge during the late 1950s, the thesis argues that developing nations should prioritize capital-intensive production methods over labor-intensive ones to maximize long-term economic growth and savings.'[1, 2, 3]

Put simply, the idea was to freeze real wages & plough back productivity gains into the capital goods sector. The problem here was that real wages would fall if agricultural growth did not keep pace with population growth (which it didn't because of lack of investment in agriculture and the fact that food aid depressed returns for farmers). This would affect morale and work effort. Productivity would stagnate. But this meant that the real rate of return on investment fell or became negative (because of depreciation of assets). 

This is not to say that private companies in India didn't adopt capital intensive methods or that it would have been wrong for them to do so. Some already had considerable experience of this and were attracting sufficient finance to expand. 

The plain fact is, Capitalists are good at capital-intesive production. Advanced Capitalist countries have a lot of Capitalists. Some such are willing to set up plants in poor countries where labour is cheap and there are semi-literate young people eager to learn accountancy and engineering and other middle management skills. They may also wish to issue shares in their enterprises which can be traded on local Stock Exchanges thus giving a higher rate of return to savers and encouraging the formation of indigenous financial capital which can be applied in ancilliary industries.

All this was obvious to Indians because there were foreign companies, British, Germany, Japanese, American- even Czech- which had factories in India. Local entrepreneurs, sometimes hiring foreign managers, had similar enterprises including in the Iron & Steel sector. One company led by a Bengali, received a large loan from the World Bank in the early Fifties to expand production of Steel. 

Dobb knew that Stalin had sold raw materials so as to bring in American companies, depserate to find new markets during the Great Depression, to build factories in the Soviet Union. But, India could not sell food when its people were starving because it was a Democracy. Moreover, its leaders didn't want to be subservient to foreign Capitalists whose representatives in India would live like 'Laat Sahibs' while employing hundreds and thousands of 'coolies'. Moreover, Nehru & his clique were wary even of the established Indian industrialists who had financed Congress and who owned some of the big newspapers. Thus, Nehru persuaded Congress to pursue a Socialist pattern of Society.  Capitalist development was off the table. 

It may be that Dobb thought the Soviet Union had mastered techniques of production (assisted by its spies in the West) and that it could do technology transfer. Sadly, though it was prepared to do this for Communist China in the Fifties, it could scarcely do so, on a comparable scale, for a Democratic, Non-Aligned, country. What it could offer was 'Rupee-Rouble' convertibility, on terms favourable to itself, so that India got some turnkey projects- which were actually quite profitable (but not as efficient as the private sector)  and the Soviets got some Indian raw materials and manufactured goods in return. This was a cozy enough arrangement but one conducive only to a 'Hindu rate of growth'- i.e. about one percent or two real growth in per capita income. Sadly, because agriculture was neglected so as to invest in shitty capital-intensive turnkey projects, the problem of hunger increased. India lost the ability to feed or defend itself.

What technique should a person or a country choose? The answer is, the one it knows or can master quickly, not the one it doesn't know and is utterly shit at. 

Why was this not obvious to Amartya Sen?

In his memoir, he writes

By June 1956, at the end of my first year as a research student, I had a set of chapters that looked as if they could form a dissertation. A substantial number of economists at various universities were work­ing then on different ways of choosing between techniques of production.

This was a matter of 'Operations Research'. Those best at it worked for big Enterprises or the Military Industrial complex. They were mathematicians though some also had a good knowledge of specific commercial specializations like Accountancy (e.g McNamara) or Actuarial Science or Production Economics (O.R).

What Sen meant was that some academic  Economists were establishing a mathematical formalism for didactic purposes. They weren't actually involved in choosing techniques for any enterprise any more than they were providing rules for democratic Social Choice. (which Arrow's theorem wrongly suggests is ab ovo impossible).

 Mathematicians, like Kolmogorov, came up with algorithms which could be applied to get better solutions for various O.R problems. Professors of Econ could give lectures on developments in O.R to Accountancy majors while Engineering graduates who wanted MBAs could be indoctrinated in a mathematical formalism (Arrow-Debreu) which ignored Knightian Uncertainty and thus was potentially very mischievous. (This gave rise to the observation that Arrow-Debreu securities were weapons of mass financial destruction).

In India, Nehru wanted to preempt the private sector getting World Bank loans, or using their own funds, to expand output of capital intensive goods. Since, 'leapfrogging'- i.e. adopting the newest technique- was most economical, the private sector had the right incentive though, obviously, it might prefer protection from competition and a quiet life as a monopolist. 

 Public Sector enterprises were constrained in choice of technique by political considerations. Politicians might prefer 'gifts' from foreign countries anxious to get rid of shitty capital goods but those gifts might turn out to be prohibitively expensive in the long run. The other problem was that if the 'Plan' was overambitious and the Government ran out of money, then the project would be left high and dry. It must be said, not all the public sector projects from the Fifties and Sixties turned into money-pits. Some, like the ONGC, diversified out of India and  'scaled up' quite well. Still, overall, the Public Sector was a drag in the Economy because it had no incentive to be efficient. Indeed, for political reasons, the opposite was the case. 

To be fair, few young academic economists foresaw such problems in the mid-Fifties. Nevertheless, for people from poverty stricken India, it was obvious that techniques applicable in advanced industrial economies were simply out of the question in most parts of the, still quite feudal, Indian hinterland.  

Some were particularly focused on maximising the total value of the output produced,

during the War, that was the priority in particular sectors- e.g. production of fighter planes during the Blitz.  

whereas others wanted to maximise the surplus that was generated, and there were also some profit maximisers.

Profit is surplus divided by funds applied.  

Analysing these – and other – approaches, and taking note of the fact that a higher surplus, when reinvested, could lead to a higher rate of growth and through that to a higher output in the future, the dif­ferent criteria could be compared through assessing alternative time series of outputs and consumption.

They really couldn't. Still, stupid undergrads could be taught some mathsy shite.  

I was sure that the unruly literature on all this could be sorted out and nicely disciplined through comparative evaluation of alternative time series, which turned out to be fun to do.

It was an exercise in futility.  

I called it the “time series approach”.

The term had been used since the 1890s. Planning is always planning for the future. The future hasn't happened yet. In time, it will. 

I was glad to be able to outline an easily discussable general methodology for the various alternative proposals that were being offered.

So, Sen wasn't writing about choice of technique. He was writing about how to teach people how to teach choice of technique to people who would never choose shit. They would either teach or be mindless bureaucratic drones.

I presented the general picture in an article that I sent to the Quarterly Journal of Economics (a leading journal in economics – then and now), which was kind enough to take the paper for immediate pub­lication.

All sorts of worthless journals had cropped up.  

They also accepted a second paper to come out not long after.

More and more Econ Departments were opening up recruiting more and more Professors who would spoon-feed shite to credential craving students.  

There were a few related concerns that were dealt with in separate papers, which also found their way to publication. By then, at the end of my first year of research, I started wondering whether I had – in the papers taken together – something like a doctoral dissertation. But I also worried whether this was a delusion of grandeur.

It was the delusion of a 'useful idiot' who didn't know that he was providing a justification for a Stalinist policy which had already failed.  

So I asked my teacher Maurice Dobb

not an O.R guy. Patrick Blackett, Nobel laureate in Physics & a great pal of Nehru, was the top OR man in the UK at that time. His influence on the Second Plan & India's food & defence position was deleterious. My point is, Sen was going with the Nehruvian flow- of utter shit. 

to have a quick look and give me his assess­ment. I had forgotten that for Dobb there was no such thing as having a quick look. At the end of two weeks I received from him an enor­mous set of helpful comments on how to improve my presentation. But there was also his comforting general conclusion that there was certainly more in my chapters than would be needed for a doctorate.

People who never produced anything got to advise on how Government money should be wasted.  Sen could have stayed in Cambridge to tart up the mathematical side of his thesis but Sraffa- another Communist- was prepared to let him go to Calcutta for two years where he would be under the nominal supervision of a family friend. This enabled Sen to take up a teaching appointment at 23 in Jadavpur. He worked hard- sometimes lecturing for 28 hours in a single week- and thus became a polished pedagogue with a knack for holding the interest of his students without taxing their intellect unduly. 

 In fact, I was learning so much from teaching that I felt convinced I could not really be sure of knowing a subject well

to know Economics well is to actually economise on the use of scarce resources. Teaching Econ isn't economical. Similarly, teaching Yogic levitation (which the Maharishi did) doesn't mean you actually are a Yogi with super-natural powers.

until I had tried to teach it to others.

At that time, all analytical econ could be taught through calculus. The Slutsky Income and Substitituon effect in the theory of Demand is just the substitution and scale effect in the theory of Production. What is odd, is that neither feature in Sen's 'choice of technique'.  

Consider the following extract from his article on choice of technique for East Asia-

SURPLUS LABOUR AND THE DEGREE OF MECHANIZATION

Surplus labour means less mechanisation is economic. Labour shortage means substitution of machine power for man-power. However, if there are 'non-convexities'- i.e. economies of scope and scale- it will be possible to borrow and profitably invest in both capital widening and deepening such that the capital-labour ratio rises even in a country with lots of people coming onto the job market. 

I may mention 'super-modularity' (i.e. complementary goods or 'external economies') which, however, was not known to be mathematically tractable at that time. 

THE object of this paper is to see whether we can make some general remarks about the nature and types of techniques of production that are likely to give what might be considered 'desirable' results in the so-called under-developed countries, particularly of East Asia.

With hindsight, we would say 'East Asians are as smart as fuck & happy to work their asses off. They can choose knowledge based techniques of production and rise up the value chain by endogenous change in habitus (i.e. they learn by doing and become more and more like their mimetic target).

 Obviously, if people of this sort went in for export led growth with foreign fdi, they would soon be able to borrow at increasingly competitive rates and rise in the value chain before themselves becoming capital exporters.

South Asia could not do this because of a paternalistic attitude to labour & a populist type of pseudo-Socialist politics. The contrast between the South Asian working class & the East Asian factory worker (leaving aside North Korea) has become quite stark. Thus a textile worker in the informal sector in India earns one third what the Chine textile worker earns. Club goods- like Government schools- are better in China. There can be no question about it. East Asia won. South Asia lost. 

Why? South Korea listened to Irma Adelman (Taiwan had its own Chinese American economists (from Cornell) to steer it towards export-led growth). India listened to useless Bengalis & British Marxists. 

To be fair, Adelman did support agricultural-demand-led industrialization (ADLI) in the Eighties which squares with Left Front policy which did boost agricultural output in West Bengal. Large agricultural countries unable or unwilling to adopt a Western habitus can get a lot of mileage out of this. They are bound to have some big cities and industrial conurbations. They just don't need to go the whole hog on the 'escape Asia, enter Europe' shtick (This was the late nineteenth-century Japanese slogan "Datsu-A Nyū-Ō" (脱亜入欧), ))

Sadly, it seems incomplete Tardean Mimetics (imitation of the superior) seems to entail a 'middle income trap' unless there are raw material exports whose terms of trade don't fall too much.

Before we proceed to examine the relevant economic information, we should perhaps say a few words on the nature of the problem itself. 

The problem is one understood by people who produce things. It has nothing to do with a teacher of worthless shite.  

Let us assume that the Government intends to make a certain amount of investment and is considering a number of alternative blueprints involving different techniques of production.

The Government hires guys with experience in turning investible funds into merchandisable output. Such people are known as 'business men'. They don't teach worthless shite.  

1 Of the alternatives some could possibly be rejected outright. If, for example, technique A leads to a smaller flow of output per year than does technique B, and if both sets of plants have the same gestation lag, the same length of life, and the same requirement of labour and other current inputs per year, then technique A is definitely 'inferior'.

But our people may only have the knowhow to implement A, not B. Also, there may be an embargo on getting B from an advanced country. You have to accept A.  

Similarly, if technique A leads to an equal flow of output per year over an equal life after an equal lag, as does technique B, and if it requires more labour, or other current inputs, per year, then again, A is distinctly 'inferior'. 

The problem here is 'Knightian Uncertainty'. We don't know all future states of the world and what probability each has. A may be more 'robust'. It is regret minimizing to choose it. 

When we find that an enterprise uses an 'inferior' technique but is profitable, chances are that there are qualitiative differences in inputs- including management expertise.  

In the same way, if technique A leads to an equal flow of output per year and has the same current input requirement per year, but has a shorter life of plants

(higher depreciation) 

with the same gestation lag, or a longer lag followed by an equal life, then it is, again, of not much use. We do not need much economics to reject these alternatives

Sadly, you can't reject them if you live in the real world. Moreover depreciation is 'endogenous'. You can keep antiquated capital stock- which is what happened in the Indian textile industry- though this means greater and greater accumulated inefficiency. 

Problems of real choice arise when one good thing clashes with another.

That is not a problem. It is the nature of choice. You can't have your cake and eat it too.  

The classic case of technological choice is the one where the ratio of the initial investment to the consequent output flow is reduced by raising the ratio of employment flow to investment.

No. This is a story about over-manning. Don't do it. Sadly, the Public Sector may be forced to do so for political reasons. It must be said, private firms in labour surplus countries may also do this for charitable, 'moral economy' or prudential reasons. But they can do things, collectively, to raise the productivity of these 'under-employed' workers. The German 'mittelstand' was able to gain local external economies and thus increase value added in niche markets.

In a primitive country, creating a labour pool with a habitus suitable for employment on assembly lines, might take time. I believe overmanning also reduces Trade Union militancy because many workers know they have low or zero marginal product. In this context, overmanning is salutary provided external economies are being captured. 

In practice, 'Duality' is likely to obtain. There is high productivity formal sector and a lower productivity ancilliary sector.  But, as in the case of Japan, this can cause structural problems at a later point. 

At first sight it looks as if the techniques chosen in economies with surplus labour should be such that

labour actually knows that technique and can perform it as well as the competition. One hundred years ago, English textile workers- including women- were more productive than Japanese or Indians because they had acquired advantages through learning effects & external economies. This didn't meant India or Japan couldn't compete in lower quality segments of the market. It did mean that, to rise up the value chain, they had to change the habitus of workers so as to increase their productivity. Japan did it. India did not. 

the ratio of output flow to capital investment is maximized

No. It looks like the guy doing the investment should choose the technique which makes him the biggest profit.  

(given the life of the plants, the gestation lag, and the requirement of raw materials), even if this involves a larger labour requirement, than some other alternatives.

This could cause a financial loss. If depreciation is not covered, the enterprise goes out of business or requires a subsidy.  

Labour is available, and must be fed anyway, so that employment of more labour does not seem to cost anything to the society.

If you get fed anyway, why work? 

This is, however, not quite the whole picture. Additional employment tends to produce additional consumption via the creation of additional wages bills. Total consumption may go up in two ways, viz., through an increase in the amount of consumption of the people who are newly employed and through that of the people who were previously supporting these unemployed people and have now more elbow room.

Poverty is reduced when people consume more. Sadly, Socialists don't want poor people to consume more.  

It is, thus, possible that while the choice of a more labour intensive technique will add to output, it will add more to consumption, reducing the volume of investible surplus.

How? Profit is calculated after wages, rents, cost of raw materials, depreciation, etc. Investible surplus is retained profit.  

Perhaps Sen meant that a command economy would have 'repressed inflation'- i.e. workers would have money wages which they couldn't spend because there was nothing in the shops for them to buy. This is the same as 'forced saving'. Shooting those who protest ensures that the Five Year Plan is over -fulfilled. 

If the policy objective is the maximization of the growth rate, we may choose more capital-intensive techniques

No. You may choose capital widening such that capital-intensivity decreases. For example, by putting surplus peasants into uniform and giving them a Kalashnikov, you can conquer territory & gain natural resources & slave labour- including people with scientific or management skills.  

than when it is the maximization of immediate output per unit of investment. If our objective is something intermediate between the maximization of immediate output and the maximization of the growth rate,

they are one and the same. I suppose Sen means 'maximization of consumption goods' but, as far as growth is concerned, all goods, consumption or capital or intermediate, count as part of total output.  

we might choose techniques that are in between these.

The problem is, you might lose the ability to choose anything at all because people think your objective is stupid.  

East Asia chose to go with exporting labour intensive goods before pivoting by the end of the Sixties to investing in state of the art heavy industries with the aim of tapping economies of scale so as to gain global markets. They chose techniques they could profit from and then profited from techniques which changed what they were capable of. Meanwhile India stagnated under a mountain of red tape. 

Returning to Sen's Memoir- 

In economics, this applies particularly to the clas­sificatory devices to be used in economic epistemology,

Sadly, it is impossible to say what is or isn't Capital or Consumption or Income or Wealth. Suppose you spend a lot of money on dressing like a dandy but, as a result, you get a high paying job, then your tailor's bill is 'investment' not 'consumption'. Equally, if you buy a sewing machine and cloth but are a shit tailor, you have spent money on a hobby- that is 'consumption'- it isn't investment because you did not make a profit from it.  

and that particular thought reminded me of my old friend, the grammarian and phonetician Panini from the third century BC whose classific­atory analysis had been very influential on my thinking.

Language may have an algorithmic description but language is not reality. One can say 'this sentence is not grammatically well formed' but the sentence would still be meaningful. If the King speaks ungrammatically and the Grammarian objects, it is the Grammarian who loses his job. Economics is about economising on scarce resources. It isn't about classifying stuff and talking ignorant bollocks.  

Given my youth and the widespread rumour that I had got the job at Jadavpur University through nepotism rather than merit, there was a predictable – and entirely understandable – storm of protest at my appointment.

Sen, like his supervisor, Amiya Dasgupta, was from East Bengal. Refugees tend to stick together and promote each other.  

On top of that there were grounds for political sus­picion because of my left­wing convictions – my days of active student politics in Presidency College had been only three years earlier. Among the sharpest attacks was a series of denunciations published in the right­wing magazine Jugabani.

Perhaps this explains Sen's life-long hatred of the Hindu Right.  

Amongst other things, I learned from them that, thanks to my appointment, the end of the world had become more imminent.

West Bengal's decline had become more probable. The rising generation would not be able to understand that burning buses won't increase the availability of buses nor will beating and chasing away industrialists cause more industries to come into existence. 

One of the attacks, which I have to confess I did enjoy, was illustrated by a skilfully drawn cartoon showing me being snatched from a cradle to be immediately made into a professor, standing in front of a blackboard, chalk in hand.

It was not unusual to have very young Economics lecturers. Jadavpur was strong in engineering and could certainly use a Professor who was up to date on OR. 

The chair of the department of history was Professor Sushobhan Sarkar,

who wrote the manifesto for the Communist Party of India 

In the faculty we also had a remarkably innovative historian, Ranajit Guha

who was believed to be close to the Kremlin 

Ranajitda was previously an active communist, but by the time I met him he had decided that this had been a mistake. He still remained a revolutionary – in a quiet and non­violent way – working for the neglected underdogs of society, but he had completely lost his faith in communist organisation, particularly Stalinism, which was very much in vogue in Calcutta at that time. Ranajitda was then married to Marta, who was of Polish origin with Jewish ancestry, and together they regularly hosted gatherings of friends.

Sen minimizes the Communist credentials of his associates at that period.  

Ranajitda was in the process, at that time, of writing his first book, A Rule of Property for Bengal, which would establish him as a histor­ian of unusual imagination and vision. The book investigates the intellectual background of Lord Cornwallis’s deadly Permanent Settle­ment of land tenure, imposed on Bengal in 1793, which did incredible harm to the economy.

  Cornwallis fixed rents in perpetuity. That meant the landlords and tenants had an incentive to improve the land and thus retain more money in their own pocket rather than hand it over to the State. How could this harm the economy? The answer is, if Bengalis were utterly shit and thus the State needed to wipe their bums, then the State needed to take more and more of the revenue of the State so as to pay for ass wiping. 


It was a work of quite profound originality, differing from standard works on British colonial policy in India by

refusing to engage with the historical record which was well known to the lawyers from whom Sen & Guha were descended.  

focusing on the role of ideas as opposed to greed and self­-interest (which had become the mainstay of critical his­tory at the time).

The idea was simple. If the Brits fix rents, then the landowners and other intermediaries have a strong incentive to support the Brits. A new ruler would raise rents. 

The British officers who had a voice in the choice of land rules in Bengal were motivated by

the desire for a quiet life. During the big famine after John Company took over the Diwani (tax farming franchise), people in London thought the Brits on the ground in Bengal were making massive profits by controlling the supply of food. That's why the Company took over the Nizamat (administration). This did improve matters. Whites- however greedy- weren't as shitty as Bengalis.  

their well-­considered views on how to improve Bengal agriculture. The ethics behind the rationale of permanent settlement, and on the reasoned and humane ideas that led to it, were actually different readings of good governance.

Nope. Governance of any sort depends on fiscal solvency. Putting down insurrections costs money. Governance is good enough if Governing can continue in a sedate manner. 


What is striking is that, despite their sincere attempts at doing good, the Per­manent Settlement agreement produced quite disastrous results.

Not for Sen's class nor for the Brits. 

Guha’s focus, unusually in colonial history, was not on imperial exploitation and the dominance of British interests over the concerns of the subjects, but the various well­meaning thoughts that led to a jumble of proposed arrangements for land settlement in Bengal – and their botched application.

It wasn't botched. It lasted 150 years. No doubt, some stupid people had written stupid articles at the end of the Eighteenth century, but the Settlement wasn't based on stupid ideas. It was a pragmatic business arrangement which drew upon the expertise of the indigenous clerical class, some of whom had become 'banyans' or 'vakils' for John Company.  

A Rule of Property for Bengal is not, however, the work for which Ranajit Guha is now most famous. That distinction goes to a series of publications under the generic title of Subaltern Studies, the product of a highly influential school of colonial and post­colonial history which he initiated and led. (As I noted in Chapter 4 it had some cor­respondence with my grandfather Kshiti Mohan’s giving precedence to those poems of Kabir which the poorer followers loved.)

In other words, two upper middle class East Bengalis were patting themselves on the back for taking an interest in the poor. Guha actually fucked off to Blighty and settlled there permanently a decade before Sen.  

The school of Subaltern Studies comprehensively disputed elitist interp­retations of history.

 These cunts considered themselves elite because they were Professors of useless shite. But the new elites in Democratic India- i.e. the politicians & technocrats- had their own historiography focussed on glorifying people of their own caste or creed. 

In his introduction to its first volume, published in 1982, Guha is deeply critical of the fact that the historiography of Indian nationalism had been, for a long time, dominated by both colonialist elitism and “bourgeois ­nationalist” elitism – which Rana­jitda did much to dis-establish.

There was a time when the Left ruled the roost in History Departments. But the Left has become history almost everywhere in India. Even West Bengal is now with the BJP

This was a big move to liberate the writing of Indian history – and by implication history everywhere – from a debilitating concentration on elitist perspectives.

It would be fair to say that vernacular language authors and scriptwriters, most of whom had little in the way of formal schooling, completely changed the type of history Indians consider important.  

Thus, nowadays, it is Birsa Munda who is important. There are big statues and airports and so forth named after this tribal leader. Sen & Guha only heard of the fellow after tribal people started becoming Ministers. Currently, the President of India is a tribal lady. She is of the elite. Professors of shitty subjects count for less than sub-inspectors of police or clerks in the Irrigation Department. 

Although Subaltern Studies had not yet been born when I first knew Ranajitda, our daily conversations made it clear that he was already thinking in terms of an anti­elitist reassessment of history.

Better done from elite campuses in places still ruled by Whites.  

Once I had settled into my new job and got to know the new students, I did not of course neglect my old haunt – the coffee house on College Street, opposite Presidency College and not far away from the base of Calcutta University. It was the summer of 1956 and among the vigor­ous debates going on then were the immediate reactions to Nikita Khrushchev’s revelations about Stalinist practices, in the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Some British Communists, like the great John Maynard Smith broke with the party at that time. Haldane, Smith's mentor, actually moved to India and took up Indian citizenship

The Congress had taken place in February 1956, a few months before I returned to Calcutta, and the implications of what had emerged were sinking in slowly in left­wing political circles there. When I asked one of the old loyalists I knew well what he thought, he told me immediately, “I hate Khrushchev more than any revolting little insect” and refused to have any further discussion. When I ventured that what Khrushchev had reported was shocking but completely unsurprising, I got a blast of political rebuke.
My own awakening to the tyranny of the Soviet system had come a decade earlier

in 1947? Sen would have been 14 years old.  

with my reading about the “show trials” and the Stalinist purges,

which killed 'Chatto'- a fellow Bengali 

including the treatment of Bukharin, the leading Leninist philosopher of his time, whose writings I knew well. So I did not see a sudden break in what was happening – only a change in what was being officially admitted.

Some British Communists, because of their Intelligence links, knew a lot about Stalinist excesses. They prepared their proteges for the revelations which were in the pipeline. 


In October and November 1956, as the shock of the Twentieth Congress was being absorbed by left­wing circles, the Hungarian upris­ing against Soviet rule occurred and was brutally suppressed by the Soviet Army. The Communist Party of India failed to denounce Soviet authoritarianism in the way various other communist parties (the Italian party in particular) had and it was becoming increasingly clear that the days of a united Leninist Communist movement in the world were coming to an end.

The Italian Communist party did not condemn the invasion of Hungary. Many Italians did leave the party, however.  

I was disturbed by the brutality of the Hun­garian suppression as well as by the shocking revelations in Khrushchev’s denunciation at the Twentieth Congress. The questions now being raised seemed to me to be issues that should have been addressed much earlier. While I was never in the Communist Party (nor ever tempted to join it), I did think that class­ based militancy had a very positive role to play in India, plagued as the country had been by long­standing inequalities and inequities.

The Workers & Peasants party had formed a Government in Bengal in 1937. There were plenty of such outfits in India. 

In that context, I tried to argue that the ability of a Communist Party to be effective and con­structive would be much enhanced if it took on seriously the kind of pro­democracy questions that were at last being aired in the 1950s.

The CPI had given up armed struggle. It participated in all post-Independence elections.  

The Communist movement in India did eventually take up the issue of its compatibility with India’s political democracy, and, while the process of response was painfully slow, it was good that the shocks of 1956 and later remained present in the political debates in the coun­ try.

Sen is delusional. The CPI had no choice but to enter electoral politics. Armed struggle was a ticket to jail or the grave. The Moscow-Beijing split caused a split in the CPI. But both sides supported Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in '68. 

If India abstained from condemning Soviet Invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia or Afghanistan, why the fuck would Communist parties do so?  

However, unlike the Communist parties in China, Vietnam and Cuba, the Indian party never became powerful enough to be a decisive political force,

it ruled West Bengal for 30 years.  

and it split several times, first in 1964.

By 1967, a Communist was able to do quite a bit of land reform in West Bengal because he was Land Revenue Minister.  

Perhaps if Sen had remained at Jadavpur he would have joined the CPM and held Ministerial office. It so happened that he got a Prize Fellowship for four years & decided to return to Cambridge. Later he was at the Delhi School of Economics and thus could not personally witness the rise to power of the CPM in Calcutta. Later, like Bhagvati, he fell in love with a colleague at DSE and had to leave the country to get a divorce. In the West, his work would necessarily be didactic and abstract. Thus, unlike a Manmohan, or Minhas, he could not acquire direct knowledge of why and how techniques should be chosen. Chinese Communism had a learning curve. It may be that Communism in Bengal could have improved over time. I'm kidding. Communism in Bengal was Bengali- i.e. crap.