Friday, 10 July 2026

Amartya Sen's entitled inedia.

Amartya Sen published the following paper in the Cambridge Journal of Economics in March 1977.

Starvation and exchange entitlements:

Starvation is not a matter of entitlement. It is a matter of food availability. If there is enough to go around, no one starves. If there isn't, either there is rationing or some excess mortality.  


a general approach and its application to the great Bengal famine

In 1974, there had been a second big famine in Bangladesh. It was obvious that transition to democracy meant increased corruption. In particular, food procured for the public distribution system was diverted to the black market so that some politicians and crony capitalists (e.g. the Ispahanis in the 1940s) made a lot of money.  


... Several authors have recently argued that there is evidence of increasing starvation for the world as a whole, and there has been quite an outburst of alarm about the 'food crisis of the world'

Real food prices tended to rise during the Seventies but fell thereafer.  

René Dumont has gone so far as to say that 'the biggest famine in history has just begun'. 

He was wrong.  About everything. 

It is with this context in mind that I shall examine the history of the Bengal famine
of 1943—possibly the biggest famine in the last hundred years.

The man-made Chinese famine of the early Sixties was the biggest in world history.  

I believe the analysis presented here relates to a key issue in development theory today, viz. the political economy of starvation.

The key issue was corruption. Darkies are as corrupt as fuck. The polite way to say this is 'weak institutions'.  

While a variety of causes have been considered in understanding the so-called 'world
wide famine', the most common approach has been that of 'too many mouths and
too little food'. 

Only if people were too polite to say 'darkies are greedy bastards. They will beg us for food to feed their starving people but then sell the stuff on the black market. Look at Bengal. They had a big famine on the two occassions when they transitioned to Elected Governments. Military generals did better than Bengali Muslim demagogues.'  

In this paper ... I would like to examine whether food availability per capita is a good way of viewing the problem

It isn't if neither the numerator nor the denominator are known. In a poor country, nobody knows either the total number of people nor the total amount of food available. True, some numbers could be made up but everybody would know they didn't mean shit. 

I shall argue tha framework within which the problems of famine seriously deficient.

Not having enough food is a serious problem. A deficient framework for studying the probelm of feeling a bit peckish is not a serious problem. It is stupid shit. People will spend good money to alleviate suffering. But money spent on measuring the measuring of suffering is money wasted. 

The traditional—and in some ways the most obvious—approach to famines is in terms
of variation of food availability:

both food supply and demand are inelastic butt the former, not the latter, is subjected to exogenous shocks- e.g. drought, disruption of trade routes by war, plant disease etc.  

This approach of 'food availability decline' I shall call for brevity (not premature
disrespect) the FAD view.

FAD works best when much of the food eaten by a family happens to be grown by
it without being acquired through exchange. 

No. Subsistence farmers eat the 'normal' crop (e.g. wheat or rice) while feeding the 'inferior' crop (e.g. oats or barley) are fed to livestock. In a bad year, humans eat the inferior crop. There is no food availability decline. Rather there is a change in relative prices causing an income as well as a substitution effect- i.e. people spend more in good years and retrench in bad years. One could say that Britain, under Wartime rationing, did not see much decline in food availability though 'superior' goods (e.g. butter, eggs, beef) were rationed. 

In an exchange economy, however, the terms of exchange constitute a factor of some importance of its own,

only if a large percentage of income goes on food. But, in that case, the State is likely to be weak (because there isn't enough food to feed bureaucrats) and thus nothing can be done about famine or epidemics or marauding bands of homicidal sodomites.  

and a family's ability to buy food depends on the rates at which its labour and commodity possessions can be exchanged into food.

i.e., its income and wealth. But credit too is important as is access to charitable, philanthropic or social insurance schemes. 

While food availability will clearly be an important influence on these terms of exchange,

It is the only influence 

other forces are also involved,

No. 

and famines can thus arise from causes other than food availability decline.

This has never happened.  

In an exchange economy, whether a family will starve or not will depend on what it has to sell,

Amartya Sen was living in the UK which has long been an 'exchange economy'. There had been no famine since 1620. The 'Poor Law' was a type of 'risk pooling' which also raised total factor productivity.  

whether it can sell them, and at what prices, and also on the price of food.

No. If you are spending a large portion of your income on food, then and only then are you at risk of starvation. If you spend less that ten percent of disposable income on food, you are at zero risk save if there is a massive exogenous shock- e.g. earthquake, tsunami, military invasion etc.  

An economy in a state of comparative tranquillity may develop a famine if there is a sudden shake-up of the system of rewards for exchange of labour, commodities and other possessions, even without a 'sudden, sharp reduction in the food supply'.

No. There has to be a sudden sharp reduction in the food supply. This could happen if land is collectivized and so peasants no longer have an incentive to work hard.  

An exchange economy implies 'entitlements' related to one's endowments;

No. The fact that you can sell or buy at a particular market price is not, generally speaking, an 'entitlement'. True, this may be undermined by legislation- e.g. you may not be permitted to sell to or buy from only people of a particular race- but there is no 'entitlement'. This is why you can't sell or otherwise alienate the underlying Hohfeldian incident. 

Consider the following scenario. I go into a cake shop and ask to buy a chocolate cake. The shop keeper says 'I am sorry. We have run out of chocolate cake.'  I reply 'I have the money to purchase the chocolate cake. Thus I am entitled to a chocolate cake. You must give me a chocolate cake or else I will prosecute you.' The shopkeeper tells you to fuck off. He bars you from entering his shop. You go to the police, who tell you to fuck off. At great expense, you bring a law suit against the cake shop owner. You explain to the judge that Prof. Sen says you have an entitlement to chocolate cake'. The Judge says the law recognises no such thing. Nor does Economics. An 'exchange economy' can be 'fix-price' rather than 'flex-price'. 

it gives people the ability to change a unit of commodity x into a certain amount of commodity  y.

Markets or market-makers confer this ability- up to a point.  

These are, of course, not 'rights' in the normative sense (contrast Nozick's 'entitlement theory' of justice).

Rights are wholly normative. Suppose I go into a cakeshop and order a chocolate cake. A bystander says 'what gives you the right to come in here demanding cake you fat freak?' My reply is that I have the money to pay for it. If I am refused service because of some 'protected' trait I have- e.g. being black- then I may have an action in law.  

They represent actual possibilities.

It is actually possible that I will commit murder. But I don't have the right to kill anyone.  

With an initial endowment x of commodities (including labour),

sadly, what this is can't be known. There are many types of labour I can perform of which I am unaware. 

the exchange entitlements offered by a particular set of market configurations

For a set to exist, all its elements must be known. Nobody can know what the set of market configurations is. Thus there is no such set.  

(in addition to direct production possibilities) can be seen as the set S(x) of all commodity bundles that can be acquired starting from x.

Sen is assuming no one can borrow or get charity or is covered by any type of social insurance scheme. This is highly unrealistic. Suppose you actually live in such a place. Then, you would seek 'hedges' such that you can get out of the place quickly when things turn to shit. Consider the Dutch "Hunger Marches" (Hongertochten) in 1944. Smarter, richer, people got out quicker and survived. 

(Formally, therefore, the set of exchange entitlements can be seen as a mapping S(.) from a given person's endowment vectors to availability sets of commodity vectors.)

Nobody knows their own endowment vector or what commodity vectors are available. One may say 'relative to a particular state of ignorance' such and such vectors and sets are plausible. But they are not unique. Moreover, the moment anybody's knowledge-base changes, the 'naive' set changes. That is why it is epistemic and thus can't be well-defined- i.e. can't be a set. 

If S(x) for the relevant x does not include any combination of goods that would give this person (or the family) enough food, starvation will occur.

No. An orphaned infant won't starve. He or she will be adopted or otherwise incorporated into a family or group. Human oikeiosis is highly plastic.  

The exchange entitlements

are unknowable because they 

depend not merely on the relevant exchange rates, but also on market imperfections and
other institutional barriers,

which will only become known after the fact 

as well as on the actual ability to sell or buy the com modities in question (e.g. a frustrated sale of labour resulting in unemployment is not to be ruled out).

Which is why nobody knows what exchange entitlements actually are. Arbitrageurs (market makers) may specialize in getting better information about this but they may make the wrong call.  


To analyse the Bengal famine within the limits of the information available,
 I shall

ask my daddy or Uncle B.R Sen who was in charge of food in '43? They would tell you that Suhrawardy, as Minister of Supply, gave 20 million Rupees to the Ispahanis to procure food for the public distribution system. A lot of this was sold on the black market. The Ispahanis then financed the Muslim League election campaign which is one reason Suhrawardy became Premier of Bengal in 1946.  

have to concentrate mainly on exchange rates (even they pose data problems), supple
menting them in a frankly ad hoc way with whatever other relevant information we
have, e.g. on unemployment. (There were, of course, no unemployment benefits.)

Because the country was as poor as shit. Since it was an agricultural country, this meant that agricultural productivity was very low. That's why the great mass of its people were visibly malnourished. What Bengal needed to do was to follow B.R Sen's (or Sen's own father's )  recommendations to raise agricultural yields. Bangladesh produced only about 11 million tons of food in 1974- which is why there was a big famine. In subsequent decades, output quadrupled while populatiion only doubled because of declinging fertility. A Malthusian disaster was averted. 

Famines can be the result of fluctuations of exchange entitlements

Sen means that poor people can starve to death if food prices go up. But the reason they go up is an exogenous supply shock- e.g. a flood or drought or America refusing to send food aid.  

altering the rules of the game on which the survival of different occupation groups depends.

The rule remains the same- viz. if you have enough cash you can enough food unless the country is Communist or occupied by an enemy army.  

For example, the 1974 floods in Bangladesh, which destroyed some of the crop, immediate agricultural labour hard, by drastically reducing the demand for labour and al the exchange possibilities open to labourers, through the development of wide unemployment.

In other words, the fact that there was less food meant that guys couldn't get work in return for food. But the real problem was corruption which led to 'compassion fatigue'. Also, Bangladesh's decision to sell jute to Cuba pissed off Uncle Sam.  

This, in fact, ushered in the famine

the floods- i.e. exogenous supply shock- did the ushering in. Bangladesh was Socialist. The Government didn't feed the people because it was corrupt and incompetent. Democracy creates famine in Muslim majority Bengal. Oddly, Military dictators did a better job.

Bengal, in 1943, wasn't a market economy. It was a war economy with price controls & extensive State control of resources. Even wealth White people found their Air Conditioners were requisitioned by the Army. Sen does not understand this.

Concluding remarks This paper has been concerned partly with economic history and partly with economic analysis of problems of relevance today.

To whom? Socialist countries. Not market economies.  

The tradition of analysing starvation and famines in terms of over-all food availability, which can be criticised in a general way (see section 1 and also Sen, 1976B), turns out to be particularly unhelpful in under standing the Bengal famine of 1943.

It was very helpful. People understood the need to get food into Bengal and distributing it to poor people through 'langars' (communal kitchens) and 'food for work' programs. Giving tax-payer money to Ispahani did no good. It just enriched the ruling party. 

Indeed, contrary to the conclusion of the official report on the Bengal famine and the often-asserted description of it as arising from a decline of over-all food supply in Bengal, 'food availability decline' seems to fail altogether in explaining the famine (see section 3).

Sen admits that reduced food availability caused prices to rise. This meant that a lot of people starved. The solution was to bring in and distribute a lot of food till output recovered.  

I have tried to focus instead on what I have called 'exchange entitlements', which include the opportunities the market offers to a person to exchange other commodities into food.

But the market wasn't allowed to function because the whole of India was a 'war-economy'.  

For those who do not grow food themselves (e.g. artisans or barbers),

or Sen's daddy & mummy  

or those who do grow food but do not possess the food they grow (e.g. cash-wage agri cultural labourers), the vagaries of the market can have a decisive influence on their ability (and that of their families) to survive.

Sen describes how civil servants as well  a lot of workers in war-related industries were covered under various procurement schemes. In a war-economy, food is given to those who advance the war effort. It may be denied to those who are too weak or unskilled to be helpful. 

There seem to have been sharp movements in exchange entitlements

a ration is not an 'exchange entitlement'. You can't sell your ration book on the open market.  

with respect to food in Bengal during 1942 and 1943, both in terms of the saleability of the commodity to be exchanged (especially rural labour)

demand for 'normal goods' fall when income falls. During a war, the real income of almost everybody falls because resources are diverted to the military. 

as well as the exchange rates vis-à-vis rice (the principal food),

Sen is saying 'the black market price went up'.  

indicating a growing cause for starvation for several occupation groups.

because less food was available 

The observed occupational pattern of destitution is consistent with the expected pattern of destitution based on observed shifts in exchange entitlements.

because less food was available 

Some preliminary attempts at going one step behind, viz. into the causation of exchange entitlement shifts, have also been presented (see section 6).

Sen admits less food was available 

The failure of the government to anticipate the famine,

It anticipated it but didn't give a toss. Bengalis are like that you know. They wouldn't even bury their own dead preferring to leave that job to White soldiers.  

and even to recognize it when it revealed itself, seems to have been the result largely of erroneous theories of famine causation,

Everyone knows the true theory- viz not enough food. Everyone also knows that Bengali Muslim politicians will steal all the money allocated to famine relief. At any rate, that is what happened in 1943 and 1974.  

rather than mistakes about facts dealing with food availability.

The official statistics were made up. Ian Stephenson, editor of the Statesman, says so in his book 'Monsoon mornings'. Sen had met Stephenson.  

Later the facts were squared with theory by 'revising' the facts, by introducing mythical variations in the unobserved item called 'the carry-over from previous years'.

There were no facts. The official figures were made up. Poor countries can't afford to count their population or figure out how much food there is.  

The approach of exchange entitlements applied to famines and starvation

is stupid & useless. Sen was pissed off that his Uncle, B.R. Sen, a former head of F.A.O, was getting publicity for helping end global hunger by focussing on the supply side. Why should there not be a UN organization for looking at the Demand side? The Green Revolution was about increasing availability of food. Why not have a Sen-tentious Revolution which focussed on telling people to eat some food otherwise they might starve to death? Indeed, Sen did warn that UK was at risk of a major famine under Mrs. Thatcher! After all, she was a 'milk-snatcher'- right?  

directs us towards general interdependences that hold in a market economy,

In 1943, Bengal was a War Economy. In 1974, it was a Socialist economy.  In England, since Tudor times, food for the poorest was supplied outside the market. Sen wasn't just stupid, he was wholly ignorant.  

away from the focus only on the supply of food, as in the alternative FAD approach.

Smart people- like Sen's dad- a soil scientist- can increase the supply of food. There is no need to tell people to eat some food. Thus the demand side looks after itself.  

As B.R. Sen had made clear, the world had the excess food supply & means of transportation to ensure there need be no more big famines. Obviously, a Communist country or other sort of Dictatorship might have one for its own reasons. After all, one can always blame 'class enemies' or 'saboteurs' for famine. 

 I would like to suggest that the exchange entitlements approach has become more relevant to famines and starvation in recent years because of the growth of the importance of exchange in developing economies.

i.e. markets were expanding as transport improved  

There seems to exist an intermediate phase of development in which the dependence on the market increases sharply (given the breakdown of the traditional peasant economy)

Sen forgets that the Great Bengal Famine of 1770 wiped out 3 times as many people

and in which guaranteed entitle ments in the form of social security benefits have yet to emerge:

sadly, such 'entitlements' can collapse if there is a severe enough supply shock. That's why you need smart soil scientists and agronomists to ensure there is a healthy margin to maintain buffer stocks.  

An important develop ment in this phase of transition is the emergence of labour-power as a commodity,

this emerged at least ten thousand years ago.  

with neither the protection of the family system of peasant agriculture,

It didn't protect 10 million Bengalis in 1770 

nor the insurance of unemployment compensation

which didn't protect Dutch people under Nazi occupation 

—nor, of course, the guarantee of the right to work at a living wage.

  Which Soviet citizens & Chinese citizens had, in theory, at precisely the time when tens of millions of them starved to death. 


Wednesday, 8 July 2026

Molina's middle knowledge & free market ideology

 Luis de Molina, a prominent member of the School of Salamanca which some see as originating laissez faire ideology, also proposed that God has 'middle knowledge' - scientia media- i.e. the power of knowing future contingent events. One might say, 'an expert chess player or arbitrageur may be able to predict how others will react to a series of events. Moreover, if others have equally 'rational expectations', then those outcomes will be inevitable. Thus, we see one grandmaster resigning to another once he sees his defeat is inevitable. It is 'common knowledge' that there would be no point in  moving the pieces till the foreordained conclusion is reached.'

 Similarly, we may find that 'cobwebs' arising from 'adaptive expectations' disappear as all agents expect the outcome predicted by the right economic theory. We may say, following Samuelson, that 'ergodicity' prevails over 'hysteresis'. 

We may also believe that there is something like 'natural law' or 'spontaneous order' or a 'reflective equilibrium' must exist such that there is a Social Contract which all rational people will commit themselves to even absent the passing of any type of consideration.

 Molinism is also a way of reconciling free-will & God's omnipotence (or, indeed, His being the only efficient cause). What ties Molina's theology & economics together is faith that there is a 'mysterious economy' or 'invisible hand' which solves coordination problems and prevents 'combinatory explosion' of the underlying configuration space.

Sadly, by the end of the Sixties, there were purely mathematical reasons to do with complexity, computability, concurrency & categoricity such that any type of 'compatibilism' or chaos free co-evolution appeared vanishingly unlikely. Put another way, 'naturality' seemed ever further to seek. Even if there is an objective function, the thing being optimized is arbitrary to some degree. Moreover, uncorrelated asymmetries would drive Eusocial 'bourgeois strategies'.

 One such asymmetry is thinking your God or ideology or culture is superior to all others. This puts paid to the Thomist dream of getting rid of an angry, arbitrary, God or, if that was always impossible, at least, asserting that the Katechon might be nice even if the Eschaton is going to be fucking horrible.

 Molinist 'middle knowledge' has been described as-  'God's pre-volitional knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom—hypothetical scenarios exploring what free agents would do in any given set of circumstances'. This is another way of saying every Brouwer choice-sequence is actually 'lawful' though the reverse may appear to be the case for a finite intelligence. 

Suppose 'middle knowledge' was 'volitional'. Then we might say God is a 'creative subject' in the Brouwerian sense. But then Troelstka's paradox would arise. One way around it would be to reject Markov's principle on the grounds that God, or his Knowledge, is neither possible nor impossible.

 But the thing would still come across as weak sauce. Equally, non-volitional knowledge sounds fatalistic. If the being is strong and has a will, then the thing is virtually empty or trivial. 

But the same can be said of free market ideology or natural law or Enlightened Humanism or the project of everybody being so filled with empathy as to incessantly offer gratuitious rape-counselling to all sentient beings. 

Religion has no obligation to feel at home in the world. Nor, indeed, do some positional goods and services in the commodity space. Ontological dysphoria isn't a scandal- a stumbling block- to either Faith or Enterprise or Thrift or whatever. The best Molinist would be Mayavaad. 



Tuesday, 7 July 2026

Spivak on Naxalbari

 Spivak, like other ex-pat buddhijivis, learned about Naxalbari from American academics like Marcus Franda. To be fair, Spivak was teaching European literature. She had no knowledge of Bengali politics. She still does not. Last year, she wrote a gushing letter to Mamta- who had beaten the Communists into utter political oblivion some 15 years previously- without realising that her thuggish regime was on the point of collapse.

In 2017, she wrote as follows in Frontier magazine which was founded by Samar Sen and which was initially sympathetic to the Naxalites (and thus against the mainstream CPM). I should mention, Congress would have been happy to encourage this second split within the Communist party. 


A Few Words About Naxalbari
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak

It is hard to think that fifty years have passed since the first confrontation in Naxalbari.

The CPM had become part of the ruling coalition in 1967. The leading Communist ideologue, Hare Krishna Koner had become the Minister for Land Revenue. This meant that he could take 'surplus land' and redistribute it to party loyalits. Hilariously, the Naxal leader, Charu Mazumdar, lost 13 acres  in this way. This impoverished his widow.  

I was both too far and too close.

She was far away. The reason Naxalbari happened was because both China and Pakistan wanted to choke off India's 'chicken neck'- i.e. the narrow strip of land connecting the bulk of the country to the 'seven sisters' in the North East. Since Bengali intellectuals hate Hindus and Hindu majority India, many- quite naturally- wanted to support the country's enemies.   

One of my cousins, with whom I had gone to school every day as a child, was deeply involved.

Why? The answer is that hardcore 'anti-Browderists' were angry that the CPM had fought and won elections. The Naxals believed that Communists should only rule after they have killed all 'class enemies' and have gotten rid of Parliaments and Courts of Law and so forth.  

And one of our batchmates let loose unbelievable mass brutality upon young men lining a street, asking householders to close their windows.

No. The batchmate was useless. Some lowly policemen and some hired goons killed kids who might plausibly be taken for Naxals. This was a good thing. Sadly, the mainstream CPM was doing a great job fucking over the economy. 

Rumours, before cable television (we had a small black and white),

TV broadcasting in Calcutta only began in 1975- by which time the Naxals had been crushed. The first colour broadcast was in 1982. The CPM was firmly in the saddle in West Bengal by then. This was because it continued to redistribute 'surplus' land & enhance the property rights of share-croppers and tenants. 

before the internet, before satellite telephone. I was tucked away at the University of Iowa, a young Assistant Professor quite set in with the anti-Vietnam War struggle earlier, and with the diasporic support of the Bangladesh upheaval later,

there was no such 'diasporic support'. Incidentally, the Bangladeshi equivalent of the Naxals supported Pakistan over the Mukhi Bahini. Why? Pakistan was allied with China. Sheikh Mujib, like Indira, was considered Moscow's puppet.  

but about Naxalbari was caught in helpless hearsay.

She relied on Marcus Franda's book which came out in 1971. Sadly, it was shit. The truth is, firstly there was no on-going 'Federalising' process in India at the time. Secondly, Hare Krishna Konar had discovered that colonial law gave the Revenue Ministry considerable discretionary powers in redistributing land to 'loyalists'. This is what transformed Bengali politics. 

Hadn't enough money to go home until 1972, only then to realise the depth and breadth of the wounded polity.

Siddhartha Shankar Ray became CM towards the end of March. By July, Naxalism had been crushed. Stupid foreign academics who thought India was a 'soft state' were revealed to be ignorant cunts.  

But, and I say this with some embarrassment, an old cynical woman now, some of us had romanticised the fact that the first shot was an arrow.

It was fired by a tribal woman whose people had emigrated to the region about a century and half previously. She killed a police officer belonging to the erstwhile Bhutia ruling class. Would the Centre support the Naxals as a way to split the CPM? No. Naxalbari was next to the 'Siliguri gap'. Thus National Security concerns trumped petty provincial politics.  

My best understanding of the entire movement still comes from Sumanta Banerjee's In the Woke of Naxalbari.

Sumanta was a journalist who quit the Statesman in 1973 & went over to the Naxals. But they had already been crushed. I think Bhabani Choudhury, who was helpful to Samar Sen, was an influence. Prof. Ruth Glass- an urban sociologist from London University- was close to Jyoti Basu and used to visit once a year. In other words, we are speaking of some useless journalists and academics who had jumped on a bandwagon which had ceased to have any meaningful existence. Still, any Naxal faction (there were dozens of them) which joined mainstream politics, could be used to split the CPM vote (on a caste basis) and thus could be useful to Congress. It was around this time that Mamta was beginning her rise, as a street-fighter- for the Youth Congress in Calcutta. At a later point, the CPM would accuse her of working with the Naxals in places like Singur (where some agricultural land had been given to ig industrialists) . 

Sumanta's book, which came out in 1980, though glorifying Charu Mazumdar, focussed on the land question and thus the Left Front government had no great objection to it. But neither did Congress which Indira had successfully taken to the Left. The collapse of the Janata Morcha & Indira's return to power meant that pretty much everybody was on the same page. Either 'landlords' could transform themselves into gangsters or they would be preyed on by gangsters. In either case, nobody gave a fuck about them.  

I have learnt some Chinese since then, enough to teach some Mao Zedong with the help of graduate students in Chinese.

She knows about as much Chinese as she does about European literature.  

It seems at this distance that, although Charu Mazumder's general inspiration from Mao was certainly enormously effective and moving,

it was useless. Hare Krishna Konar had met all the top Chinese leaders during his 1960 trip to Beijing. Incidentally, it was Ho Chi Minh who confirmed to him that the breach between the Chinese & the Soviets was permanent. But, since China was much poorer than Russia, this meant that whatever arms Mao could give you would be wholly ineffective compared to what the Soviets could supply Indira with. Pakistan's defeat in Bangladesh meant that the Siliguri gap was no longer vulnerable. Naxalism was welcome to retreat into remote forests so as to fuck over tribal people there.

it was the at least temporary conscientisation

a term from Paulo Frere's 'pedagogy of the oppressed'.  

of Left intellectuals that seemed most impressive to us. In 1968, when French university students joined hands with the working class,

The working class decided they preferred De Gaulle to a German Jew like Cohn-Bendit.  

the Naxalbari phenomenon seemed to us, from far away, a greater political achievement.

Because Spivak had shit for brains.  

It is no doubt a function of my base abroad that I cannot readily perceive continuity between the Naxalbari movement and what is called Maoism now in India.

The CPM was pro-China. The Naxals were supporters of the Cultural Revolution which was utterly disasterous. The CPM was able to rule West Bengal for thirty years on the basis of land-reform & clientism. Could they break their own 'iron rice-bowl' and emulate Deng? No. Their cadres were criminalized and corrupt.  

It could also be a function of the horror of violence

unleashed by the Left Front? 

among my co-workers from the landless SCST-s (this is the descriptive they commonly use) on the border of Birbhum and Jharkhand. It nay also be because I have personally encountered ex-Naxals in Purulia, completely given over to hands-on work for agricultural justice; I have inevitably thought of swords and ploughshares.

Swords don't matter. Guns do. The government can give pensions to those who shoot Naxals. Thus Naxalism was bound to disappear as tribal people gained political control of their own ancestral territory. 

Compare Mahashweta's 'Duoupati'- a Santhal woman whose job is to get beaten and raped by the police- with Prespident Draupati Murmu. Two Bengali Brahmin women- Mahua and Mamta- attacked her for visiting Dajeeling last year. Now it is Mahua & Mamta who fear jail while Murmu remains Head of State. Will a Santhali speaking State be carved out for her people? I suppose so. 


I am a literary critic and a translator. In 1981, I translated Mahasweta Devi's "Draupadi". That story rather than the novel The Mother of 1084, set the seal on Naxalbari for me, as it will for generations to come.

Mahashweta- like Spivak, Mahua & Mamta- was a Bengali Brahmin woman. They may have looked down on Santhal women named 'Draupadi', but it is the Santhal woman who has prevailed. Centuries from now, school kids will chant the name of the 15th President of the Republic. Nobody will remember Mahashitter.  

Saturday, 4 July 2026

Iyer's report on Experience


Contra Waugh, Charm isn't the weapon of the weak
Nor, pace Greene, Pity a Pan ruinous to let speak
Both were qualities England ever & yet lacks
Tho' now overrun by Lezzas & Blacks.


Wednesday, 1 July 2026

Telos' Tetelestai sub imperio Donaldi


Utile the self-domesticating Elitism Paideia yet posits
Futile the Monothelitism our current Caesar cossets 
In Telos' Tetelestai either all Energy ends
Or the Godhead's geodesic to self-sodomy bends

Envoi- 
Not lawless the choice sequence by which Donna, Daisy, fucks. 

Riposte- 
Aught intensional has an uncountable infinity of parts
Elohim's hindquarters aren't its own farts.

Sidhantha
I get it. Because Jews remain God's 'volitional' choice
Fucked is Molina or 'Hirschman' Voice.














Monday, 29 June 2026

Amie L. Thomasson on Ontology vs Aetiology

Contemporary academic philosophy consists of asking questions of the form 'Why do so many contemporary philosophers order salad at the cafetaria when, everybody agrees, nothing but one's own shit can be, or ought to be, eaten'? It is pointless to complain that nobody thinks coprophagy is a good thing. Why? Because this shows you aren't an academic- let alone a philosopher. 

As a case in point, Amie L. Thomasson, whom some consider one of our greatest living philosophers- which is like saying my neighbour's cat is the most proficient living alchemist- has a recent paper titled-

SHOULD ONTOLOGY BE EXPLANATORY?

The answer is no. 

 'What' questions are ontological. 'Why' questions are aetiological.  A particular discipline or discourse seeks to discover, invent or otherwise posit as existing, particular types of things. Those types are its ontology.  

Why a thing arises is a question about causation and is aetiological because the Greek word for 'cause' is aitia (αἰτíα).

Abstract. The central question of ontology has long been thought to be ‘What is there?’.
The central way of answering it has been to consider which entities we must posit as part
of a best total explanatory theory.

This begs the question- be it central or peripheral- as to whether thoughts exist. We may, for certain purposes, posit their existences just as we can posit other things- e.g. cuddliness- but nothing is explained by saying 'the cuddliness of the baby causes me to cuddle the baby' or ' thought cause us to think there are thoughts'.  

This paper argues against this ‘explanatory’ conception of metaphysics,

Nobody thinks of metaphysics (literally 'what is beyond natural science') as aetiological. Diseases have aetiologies and curing diseases by understanding their causes is useful and noble. Philosophy is jejune and useless.  

by showing that it relies on an unarticulated assumption that all the terms at issue in these metaphysical debates serve an explanatory function.

If so academic philosophy is even shittier than we imagine it to be.  

Making use of work in systemic functional linguistics

can't help unless philosophers suffer some sort of nuerological disorder when it comees to language processing. 

enables us to identify the many different functions played by terms of interest in metaphysics.

The functions of interest to metaphysics are metaphysical. But language- it now appears- isn't beyond physics at all.  

And that makes it clear that ‘contribution of explanatory power’ should be rejected as an across-the-board criterion in ontology.

Who accepted it? Name & shame the cunts!  

This work in functional linguistics also enables us to see why it is useful to have a language that entitles us to use redundant inferences

e.g. 'that utterly cunty cunt' 

to introduce terms for properties, numbers,

e.g. cunty cunt as opposed 'not that cunty cunt, I meant the other cunty cunt'

and the like, giving us new reason to accept ‘easy’ inferences that there are such things.

cunty cunts?  

As a result, we should give up thinking that ‘what is there?’ provides a deep and interesting question for a discipline called ‘ontology’ to answer,

Quantum onlology- sure. But that's high IQ stuff. What this lady is doing is finger painting with her own faeces.  

and give up thinking that the task for ontology is to determine which entities to ‘posit’ as part of a best total explanatory theory.

Since we don't know what that is- but are pretty sure the best one we have will soon be superseded- nobody has ever applied themselves to any such task. 

The central question of ontology, as Quine presented it, could be expressed in three
words: “What is there?”

Quine was wrong. To find out what there is, you need to get out of your armchair & go look. For a example, to find out what is in the cupboard, I have to open the cupboard door. OMG! It's a ga..ga..ga ghost! I shut the door quickly. But that doesn't mean a ghost exists in the cupboard. I have to apply various verification protocols. 

Ontology is what you must content yourself with because neither direct obversvation nor verification are possible. Equally, it may be purely dogmatic- what in Sanskrit is called 'matam' as opposed to 'vigyan'. 

But those who aim to answer this question

are either doing 'vigyan' (science) or else they are talking about how many angels can dance upon the point of a pin.  

generally do not take their goal as simply to generate a list or inventory,

Physicists would love to have an inventory of elementary particles or to find out whether hypothetical ones- e.g. gravitons- can be verifiably produced in the laboratory or detected in the cosmos.  

and tend to deny that answers are easy to come by. Instead, the project of ontology has been
thought of

by whom? Usless shitheads.  

as a matter of determining what entities we should or must ‘posit’ as part of
a best total explanatory theory.

which is that these cunty cunts are copraphogous cunty cunts.  

Amie's paper shows a complete absence of thought. This is a sample-


Here is the idea. In early language—both developmentally and evolutionarily

we know nothing about 'evolutionarily' early language. As for 'developmentally' early language- all we can say is that infants are different from mature people. If some fundamental change occurs in our fitness landscape, we have no idea how language will 'develop'. Overy my own lifetime it has become much more mathematical.  

(and across languages)—we begin with ‘congruent’ meanings: nouns for things, verbs
for processes. . . (Halliday 2009, 117).

but anything can be a gerund or a denominal verb or whatever. What is certain is that philosophy is now only taught and studied by those who are developmentally challenged. 



Saturday, 27 June 2026

Lyly's Campaspe


Since to every rouged & rutting Phyllis
& our rude waking to what her bill is
Entelechy accords an Appelles
Tho' of suet her titties & sausage rings her bellies

Nathless, so hard has that whore ridden Aristotle
None can prove wine isn't its own bottle
Or Sherlock's smoke, Home's desiccating dottle
 Cupid's dick- Campaspe's demographic throttle.

Envoi- 
Turk! For its gate was greater,  Myndos fled through it
Brick up Mercy's- lest Kristos' dead rue it. 

Riposte
Tho' Homonoia's incarnate anointment
aint, for haemorrhoids, an ointment
Grieve who it will
It suffices to gate any City on a Hill. 

Siddhantha-
Euphuism sublates its own Erudition- rendering both so silly
Only an old darkie like me bothers with John Lyly.