Showing posts with label ethics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ethics. Show all posts

Thursday, 3 October 2024

Anna Gotlib on why you should publish your Bank password

Anna Gotlib writes in Aeon of what we used to call egotism or self-centered Narcissism. Apparently it is now known as-

‘main character syndrome’ (MCS) or, perhaps more annoyingly, ‘main character energy’. Not a clinical diagnosis but more a way of locating oneself in relation to others, and popularised by a number of social media platforms, MCS is a tendency to view one’s life as a story in which one stars in the central role, with everyone else a side character at best.

So, it means being very self-centered and egotistic and thinking other people only exist to do your bidding or to advance your interests. I suppose, small children go through something like this more particularly because they are so dependent on their Mummies.  

Only the star’s perspectives, desires, loves, hatreds and opinions matter, while those of others in supporting roles are relegated to the periphery of awareness. Main characters act while everyone else reacts. Main characters demand attention and the rest of us had better obey.

There may be some developmental advantage in small kids going through this phase. After all, they really are very important. They represent the future of their family and community. Anyway, once they get to skool, they generally learn how to play nice with other kids. 

Still, there are some kids who have leadership qualities such that they take charge of organizing games. That too may be a good thing. We do need leaders who see events from their own subjective perspective. In later life, they may lead revolutions or movements of social reform. 

You have probably heard of MC behaviour – or perhaps even witnessed it online or in person. A TikToker and her followers physically push aside those inconvenient extras ‘ruining’ their selfies – and then post their grievances on social media. A man on a crowded subway watches a loud sports broadcast without headphones while ignoring other commuters’ requests to turn it down a bit. This is no mere rudeness: in the narrowly circumscribed world of main characters, the rest of us are merely the insignificant ghosts who happen to intrude on their spaces.

But ghosts can kick your head in. I suppose the dude without headphones thinks he is well hard. He may be. I decide discretion is the better part of valor.  

Akin to chess pieces, or perhaps to animatronic figures, we have agency only in the development of the MC’s story. In current parlance, we are non-player characters (or NPCs) – a term that originated in traditional tabletop games to describe characters not controlled by a player but rather by the ‘dungeon master’.

One complaint we have against urban life is that, very often, in our jobs, we really are nothing but automatons. But, sometimes we feel this is also true in our private lives. The problem with refusing to be a NPC is that you may have nobody to interact with. This causes you to become more and more introverted and unemployable. You end up behaving in a rude and inconsiderate manner because you have become de-socialized. You have lost 'impulse control'. Today you are listening to music without headphones. Tomorrow you soil yourself while seated on the subway. 

On the other hand, in the 2021 film 'Free Guy' an actual NPC in an online computer game achieves autonomy and helps a player find evidence that the CEO of the company stole the player's 'source code' for the game.  

In video games, NPCs are characters with a predetermined (or algorithmically determined) set of behaviours controlled by the computer. Rather than agents with a will and intent, NPCs are there to help the MC in his quest, to intersect with the MC in preset ways, or to simply remain silent – a kind of prop, or perhaps human-shaped furniture, a part of the scenery. Another way to view NPCs is to imagine what the philosopher David Chalmers calls a philosophical zombie, or p-zombie, a being that, while physically identical to a normal human being, does not have conscious experience.

NPCs aren't p-zombies because their repertoire is very limited. A p-zombie can exhibit novel behavior. There is no way for an observer to tell that they lack consciousness. Indeed, their existence makes the very notion of consciousness problematic. By contrast, when you interact with an NPC you soon find it's range of response is very limited. 

If a p-zombie laughs, it’s not because it finds anything funny – its behaviour is purely imitative of the real (main character!) individual. For someone convinced of their MC identity, the rest of us are, perhaps, just so many zombies.

This is where the analogy falls down. The egotist knows other people have their own inner lives and feelings. He just doesn't care.  


While Chalmers’s p-zombie is a part of a philosophical hypothetical concerned with the nature of mind and consciousness, the non-philosophical take on people as NPCs is deeply morally worrying.

There may be mentally ill people who believe everybody else is a robot. But the boorish egoist is not such a person. He just doesn't care about other people. True, if he keeps getting the shit kicked out of him, he may dissimulate this callousness. But so would a sociopath.  

Having taught and written for a number of years in the areas of ethics and moral psychology, one of the central ideas that I have tried to explain and make more vivid is that morality is something that we do together,

We can be perfectly moral while all alone. A Kantian would resist the temptation to masturbate. Indeed, he may go to the toilet to fart even if he lives all alone and doesn't mind the smell of his own farts. 

By contrast, when engaging with others, we may suppress our own sense of morality. Indeed, we may find that doing so is more productive of good outcomes. Indeed, the Bible itself advises us not to be 'judgmental' or think we are morally superior beings.  

that our ideas about who we are require each other’s engaged participation, and that an empathetic openness not only to each other’s moral agency, but to each other’s emotional states, is central to our shared lifeworld. We must see others as fully human, and be engaged with each other as moral beings to understand who we are, and who we are in relation to others and to the world.

If this were true, people who grew up in horrible circumstances, interacting only with evil sociopaths, would all turn out badly. It appears this isn't the case. We find plenty of people from good and loving families doing gratuitous evil, while those who have suffered greatly show greater caritas to all who are in need. 

But the main character narrative denies all these possibilities.

It also denies the possibility that a person from a relatively disadvantaged background can rise far above others in some noble and worthwhile endeavor. We want to read the auto-biography of such people provided it is told from a MCN perspective. We understand that Einstein studied under great Mathematicians and Physicists but we are thrilled when we read of his finding something completely unexpected and unprecedented through his own 'gedanken' or thought experiment. We realize that if we focus our mind on a fundamental problem on our train ride to work, we may hit upon some better way of doing things. The fact that we didn't interact with very clever people the way Einstein did, is no obstacle to our achieving something worthwhile. 

No doubt, when doing the job we are paid to, or when looking after a family member, we must put the needs of others first, but it is equally important for us to have a sense of autonomy as the main character in our own life-story.  

It is destructive to views of human beings as fundamentally relational and interdependent,

No. It is complementary to that view. To some extent we are interdependent but, equally, we are autonomous or must seek to become so for a eusocial purpose.  

and poses a threat to two important experiences of being human: the first is connection to others; the second is love.

The opposite is the case. If I follow the g.f around like a moon-calf, she will decide I am 'high maintenance' or 'too needy'. She wants a partner who will be affectionate and supportive but who has his own life and interests.  

To counter objections that my worries are a simple case of generational misalignment – a confused Gen Xer misunderstanding Gen Z perspectives – I suggest that MCS is dangerous precisely because it seems to be no passing fad, and is not limited to any one generation’s political perspective, or social group – indeed, its influence extends far beyond TikTok, and is found within the business world, in academia and in the halls of power.

There have always been selfish ass-holes. But some such don't think they are Main Characters at all. They think they are doing the will of God, or the Fuhrer, or selflessly serving their Religion or Race or Ideology and if that means trampling over others- so be it. Eichmann actually thought he was following Kantian morality! 

As a philosopher and a narrativist, I am an unabashed supporter of the view that selves are something that we create together, through shared stories.

This may be true of some small children.  But, if I am an ignorant asshole, that is entirely my own fault. I chose not to study anything difficult and remained content to pick at only the sunny side of literature's peach. The result is that I am probably the worse poet in the English speaking world. This is my own achievement. Nobody helped me in any way.

What is a narrative? In short, anything that can be read, spoken, heard, written, viewed or otherwise expressed – and this certainly includes social media. In telling stories, we create and reveal who we think we are; in listening to the stories of others, we help to mould and sustain them as persons.

We may be called upon to supply a narrative when being interviewed for a job or when applying to an American University. But, then again, we may not. Our credentials or work achievements may speak for themselves. Our behavior, not the stories we tell about ourselves, reveal the truth about ourselves. I once spent half an hour lecturing an elderly man on monetary economics. Then I discovered he had made billions as an arbitrageur and funded countless charities. I suppose, he got something valuable out of my ignorant rant. He himself would have had to work very hard to discover how stupid people cognize 'chrematistic' processes. 

Stories are thus foundational to how we view the world and our place in it,

Not really. Stories are entertaining. When I was a kid, I had a friend who was even uglier and weedier than me. But he could tell fantastic stories about his sexual escapades with stars of stage and screen. I tried my hand at this but I'd end up marrying Mary Poppins but then having to go to Japan to prevent Blofeld triggering World War III.  

and through them we can make ourselves morally intelligible to ourselves and to others.

What we actually do matters not the stories we tell- unless we are JK Rowling-level smart.  

And this is also where we run into a problem. Setting aside critiques within philosophy itself of a narrative view of morality as epistemically unreliable and without any foundational principles,

It is founded on the notion that 'selves' are 'socially constructed' by interactions and 'grand narratives'. Thus, but for the fact that 'Society' considers all bleck peeps- like me- to be a type of monkey, I could have rivalled the achievements of Manjul Bhargava or Kamala Harris.  

there are also worries that bear more directly on our current topic: if social media is a kind of narrative,

It isn't. It is a type of communication.  

can narrativists, such as myself, defend it on the same grounds as other narrative ways of understanding ourselves and the world? And if the answer is ‘yes’, then why am I spending all this time worrying about main character syndrome and its many stories?

The obvious answer is 'MCS is imbricated in Neo-Liberalism and Patriarchy and trillions of innocent Netan-Yahos being incessantly sodomized by Joe Biden whose criminal refusal to undergo gender reassignment surgery is due to he is White and Whitey be debil'.  

Did you know that Indian people didn't have any gender till White British peeps constructed a narrative about how dudes have dicks while women have vaginas? Read Lord Macaulay's 'Minute on Education' if you don't believe me. He clearly states 'unless we teach the Hindoooos to read narratives by Shakespeare and Lawn Tennyson, they will continue to lack dicks or vaginas. Queen Victoria will not be amused.' 


The answer has something to do with the kinds of stories MCS offers. On the one hand, narrative approaches to morality and identity centre both speaking and hearing – sharing and uptake – emphasising the importance of multivocality, of shared discourse, of mutual intelligibility. They point toward the moral significance not just of one’s own stories, but of the narratives of others as guides to understanding the fundamental interdependence of human identities.

Which is why we must ban White Male identities. Once those disappear, everybody could braid each others' hair and Beyonce will attend my birthday party and we will become Best Friends forever and ever. 

On the other hand, narratives spun by the main character have little interest in, or patience for, the stories of others; they are anything but interdependent.

Nonsense! The Main Character wants to make love to a mysterious stranger- actually a Princess from a galaxy far far away- and to meet mystic sages and evil warlocks etc.  

They care nothing for mutual intelligibility. Only the main character, his perspective, his story and his solitary self, matter.

Nobody wants to be Robinson Crusoe alone on his island.  

In this version of narrative selfhood, there is room only for the singular speaker, and his singularly important chronicle.

Even Crusoe had his Man Friday.  

Yet, as narrativists will often note, not all narratives are good, or desirable, or to be encouraged.

This lady's narrative falls into that class. 


In fact, as the feminist philosopher and bioethicist Hilde Lindemann argues, some narratives can create spaces of moral damage that are detrimental to the identities of both the speaker and his audience, and destructive to the possibility of a shared moral universe.

Which is why we need to 'cancel' everybody more particularly if, like Hilde, they speak of toxic master-narratives. 

Did you know that little boys are encouraged to tell stories about their having dicks rather than vaginas? Moreover, they are forced by a misogynistic master-narrative to send those dicks into hyperspace where they sodomize trillions of Netan-Yahoos. This prevents Beyonce from attending my birthday party. 

I suggest that narratives emerging out of the MCS phenomenon are precisely of this damaging kind.

Stories about 'toxic master-narratives' are brain damaged, if not the outcome of severe mental illness.  

MCS offers the wrong kinds of stories: harmful, isolating, solipsistic, amoral.

The notion of a 'master-narrative' is all of those things.  

And it begins, in large part, with the assumed superiority of the main character’s self-conception.

That is an assumption this silly lady makes. Actual 'main character narratives' feature a young person against whom the odds are stacked who finds ingenious ways around them and who is helped by various wonderful people. A story about a super-genius who inherits a great Empire at birth and who goes on to crush everybody who is weaker aren't interesting at all. That's why we are interested in the story of a carpenter's son but exhibit little curiosity about the life and times of All-Mighty God.  

While main characters are singularly important beings in their own minds,

People should be important to themselves.  

this importance comes in many flavours. Let’s begin with the usual culprit – entertainment and social media – where they can be often found in their native environment. The ‘main character’ hashtag has been viewed, mostly approvingly, millions of times on TikTok and on Instagram, and #maincharacter accompanies tens of thousands of posts. Daily, social media denizens are sold the idea that becoming the heroes of their lives is the only thing that matters.

This is very toxic. Everybody should be the villain of their own lives. Also they should read shitty books by stupid psilosophers.  

But it is not just social media: so many of our films – especially those targeting younger viewers – focus on the central quest of the hero, who must overcome, outsmart, outrun, outperform and, in the end, glory in her victory.

Why don't big budget films feature a hero who is actually a turd which is flushed down the toilet?  

This hero’s journey, this monomyth, is on full display in The Hunger Games movies (2012-23), the Divergent film series (2014-16), the Spider-Man universe (2018-24), and The Maze Runner films (2014-18), which are but a handful of relatively recent examples.

They show courageous young people besting a corrupt and unjust social order. This is highly 'toxic'. Spiderman should be depicted as a turd produced by a victim of epistemic sexual-abuse who flushes it down the toilet while saying 'Toxic master-narratives suck ass big time!' 

There are sidekicks and other characters, to be sure – but, in the end, to quote the much older film Highlander (1986), ‘there can be only one’.

Why was Sean Connery not playing the part of a turd? The answer is obvious. Under Reagan, toxic master-narratives were in control of Hollywood. My own screenplay for 'Turd getting flushed down the toilet even though it is actually Superman' was rejected by all the major studios probably because I wouldn't go down on Harvey Weinstein. 

Absorbing these messages and mimicking the voiceovers of lead characters in films and other media, we also try to narrate our lives – often, directly into our smart phones – and share with the world all the ways in which our paths, our storylines, our perspectives, are the ones that matter, the ones worth paying attention to; our voices the voices that are worth hearing. We demand from others, both directly and indirectly: ‘Stop everything, and watch me – the hero!’

Did you know Obama wrote a big fat book about himself? That was when he made his first run for political office. No doubt, the author feels 'toxic master-narratives' authored by darkies should be banned otherwise they might end up in the White House. 

But isn’t it a bit too easy to blame media for our growing obsession with our own importance?

It is mad. Still, we understand that this lady is getting old and hates having to teach young people. Campuses would be wonderful places if only we could keep adolescents out of them.  

Long before the internet, let alone social media, people have shared their narratives in diaries, autobiographies, poems and so on, bringing their lives to centre stage.

Emily Dickinson was very evil. Why did she have to write stuff down? Did she not understand that some Professors would have teach that shite? As for Jane Austen- don't get me started, mate.  

Generations of Americans have been taught to pursue happiness

Britishers were taught to be as miserable as fuck 

– individual, personal happiness – above all else. There have always been solipsists, narcissists, sociopaths and simple attention-seekers – social media did not invent the me-first typology.

But maybe young peeps will read this article if you mention 'Social Media' and hashtags to show you are  hip and 'with it'.  

And yet, can we help ourselves in this time of global access to others, and to ourselves? Can we – well, some of us, anyway – resist demanding an audience when one is always there, ready to be engaged?

I think we should try to make ourselves more interesting to those who, for whatever reason, take an interest in us. Thus, one may prepare a self-disparaging anecdote to tell your dentist in the hope that this makes a routine procedure a little less boring for him. Our relatives or friends may have nice Social Media posts showing they are getting about and enjoying themselves. This reassures us as to their health and happiness.  

Perhaps not. As the clinical psychologist Michael G Wetter said in a Newsweek interview in 2021, main character syndrome is:

the inevitable consequence of the natural human desire to be recognized and validated

if we are doing good or decent things. We don't want to be recognized or validated if we happen to soil ourselves while drunk off our heads.  

merging with the rapidly evolving technology that allows for immediate and widespread self-promotion …

In some cases, there is a 'product' which is being promoted. In others, a particular person is ensuring her friends and families are reassured about her health and happiness. I was once part of a fitness group during COVID. We would post selfies of ourselves showing how far we had walked on a particular day. We were motivating each other to get needful exercise during a grim and lonely period.  

Those who exhibit characteristics consistent with the experience of main character syndrome tend to want to create a narrative that is dependent on an audience to validate their story. What good is a story or movie if there is no audience?

My blog is read by hardly anybody. Yet, I find it a good enough way to while away the time while binge-watching Netflix series about vampires and werewolves who are always either getting naked or biting each other. Since I am Indian, I feel I need to get 'paisa vasool'- i.e. value for money- for my subscription even if this means having to sit through that dreck.  

Media, social and otherwise, has made it easier, cheaper and, importantly, more socially acceptable to act out our MC monomyths.

Keeping a diary or writing stories or poems can be helpful in itself. The more you write, the better you get at writing.  

Alternatively, by chronicling the mundane, we may end up creating art. Harvey Pekar's 'American Splendor' comic strip started coming out in the Seventies. It was turned into a movie starring Paul Giamatti in 2003. 

We can upload photos, videos, entire films about ourselves – and we can choose how we are perceived through clever tricks of light and angles, apps and filters that tell exactly the stories we want told.

If we have talent, this may open career opportunities for us. I suppose a guy who is good at Social Media, could get a well paid job promoting some commercial product on it.  

All this because we want to get noticed, we want to be seen

or we want to use some cool new tech which has suddenly become affordable for us.  

– and seen as someone who matters, as the main someone who matters. As the influencer Ashley Ward noted on TikTok in 2020:

You have to start romanticising your life. You have to start thinking of yourself as the main character because, if you don’t, life will continue to pass you by, and all the little things that make it so beautiful will continue to go unnoticed.

To be interesting to other people, you need to take an interest in yourself. Find funny or illuminating or pathos ridden things in your own life. Your friends and relatives will find it less of a bore to have to spend time with you. 


Not being seen, not being noticed as someone who matters means relegating oneself to NPC-dom – a nobody, a nothing, a mannequin without a personal story or agency, going through a prewritten script of a grey, insignificant life.

Nope. You could be a secret agent or something cool of that sort.  

To be seen, on the other hand, is to be happy.

If you are doing something creditable- sure. Nobody wants to be watched when they are on the toilet.  

This happiness requires making sure that others know that one is happy, successful, better than those NPCs – in other words, it calls for constant curation of one’s image, one’s narrative, one’s self.

Your friends and family will appreciate it if you do this. Then they can pick and chose topics of conversation which will be interesting to both of you.  

If one is not the MC, someone else surely will be. This is, for many, simply an intolerable fate.

Nothing wrong with choosing someone else as the MC of your Social Media presence. I'd subscribe to a blog about Von Neumann or John Wheeler. I may not understand everything in it, but I'd get some vicarious satisfaction from being exposed to great thinkers.

Of course, blaming all media, or only social media, for MCS would be inaccurate.

It would be mad. 

Perhaps unsurprisingly, main characters have emerged in places where psychopathy and narcissism have always reigned: in politics, academia and other public-facing institutions.

Actually, they are a feature of totalitarian regimes helmed by brutal dictators.  

From a US president who claims that ‘I alone can fix’ the nation’s many crises,

but no POTUS can have you killed for saying you think he is stupid or evil 

to news and manipulative media personalities who insist that they and only they are telling the truth,

but who may have to pay millions in damages to those they defame 

to politicians who cannot – or do not wish to – tell the difference between being famous and being effective, MCS is becoming the norm.

No. Politicians have to pretend to care about issues. STEM subject academics can't just publish any old self-aggrandizing shite. This is also the case for News Media which are subscription based and which feature market or other objective information. You may 'editorialize' but otherwise you have to present news not views. Competitive markets ensure this.  

There are worse offenders still. As an academic, I would be remiss if I did not include those within academia, or those solipsistic enough to call themselves ‘social leaders’ or, even worse, ‘thought leaders’.

For any given industry, there are indeed 'thought leaders' who emit 'public signals' which promote better correlated equilibria or provide Schelling focal solutions to coordination or discoordination problems.  

Specifically, main character energy seems to be especially strong among a subgroup of academics, and the philanthropists who fund them, who like to call themselves ‘longtermists’ or ‘effective altruists’.

They were shit. That's true enough. On the other hand, there are plenty of people in the non-profit sector whom few have heard of who are highly effective. Look at Mohammad Yunus who is currently running Bangladesh. It so happened that the Ford Foundation gave his Grameen Bank a grant and they were very happy with the outcome. True, at a later point (after Yunus appeared ready to enter politics) the regime turned against him and accused him of self-aggrandizement or even embezzlement. But I know plenty of development economists who deny that Yunus was a vain man. Had he been so, then, at the height of his international fame, he could have endorsed 'for-profit' Microfinance and made a killing on the IPO. 

Moved to action in significant part by the philosopher Peter Singer’s essay ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’ (1972), which argues that we are morally obligated to maximise our impact by focusing on causes that bring about the greatest quality-of-life improvements, effective altruists claim that all of us have a moral responsibility to do good in the most effective way possible – in other words, we must provide the greatest benefit to the greatest number of people that we can, regardless of where they might be located.

This is bog standard Utilitarianism of a type which triumphed with the Indian Famine Code. I would say Binoy Ranjan Sen- of the FAO- was the man who got the world to understand that famine was avoidable. Other UN agencies showed that various contagious diseases could be virtually eliminated from regions where they were endemic. I recall being vaccinated against small pox as a child in Africa. However, this type of altruism had appeared in the late nineteenth century and was carried forward by philanthropists like Herbert Hoover. 

Longtermism takes this utilitarian ethos many steps further, arguing that its goal is to lessen the threat of ‘existential risks’ to humanity: climate change, nuclear war, destructive asteroids and other catastrophes from space, the revenge effects of AI, and so on; longtermists extend this responsibility to future people as humanity’s major ethical priority.

What they need to do is abandon 'expected utility maximization' for 'regret minimization' because of Knightian Uncertainty. Incidentally 'FOMO' (fear of missing out) which drives us to new types of Social Media, is 'Hannan consistent' or 'regret minimizing'. But so is investing in ontologically dysphoric goods and services. It turns out, Utilitarian can be more 'deontic' or metaphysical than Kantianism.  


One of the leaders of the movement, the moral philosopher William MacAskill,

whom I have taken down here 

argues precisely this in his book What We Owe the Future: A Million-Year View (2022), and is echoed by the researchers in the now-defunct Future of Humanity Institute (FHI) at the University of Oxford, founded by another longtermist philosopher, Nick Bostrom. The message is generally this: we might recognise the tragedy of rationing scarce resources to the current population. However, if doing so means improving the chance of both survival and wellbeing of future generations – of which there will be innumerably more than today – then not doing so constitutes a moral crime.

It is a moral crime to waste scarce resources on 'second order public goods' (i.e. demanding more first order public goods) because the former can crowd out the latter. If you want to make the world a better place, just do so already. Others will imitate you. You don't need to do a PhD in worthless shite or write nonsense.  

So, what is the problem – and how do these academic do-gooders, and their financial backers, fit the MCS criteria?

They are seeking 'obligatory passage point status' for themselves. This may be 'rent seeking' behavior though it is also possible that some billionaires have superior organizational or other technocratic skills.  

The answer lies in two necessary assumptions that effective altruists and longtermists have to make. First, because of the utilitarian calculus that underwrites both worldviews, the possibility of a vastly larger human population in the future

which seems unlikely because as a Society becomes more affluent, the birthrate falls below the replacement rate.  

seems to justify the NPC-ification of any humans alive at the moment.

Actually, certain gene-lines are the MCs and others, which will disappear soon, are the NPCs.  

Indeed, they tell us, our suffering might be the only thing to save the future!

Though if our having fun means we have fewer babies, maybe that's what saves the future.  

Second, since the wellbeing of the (much smaller) current generations matters so relatively little, the longtermists consider themselves to be justified in manipulating us so that we do the right thing.

They aren't manipulating us. They are just talking.  

Choose the right professions, contribute to the right causes, suffer the right deprivations, and so on. Because such manipulation is permitted – in fact, morally required – the agency and inherent value of Earth’s current inhabitants is not merely ignored but discounted as a morally relevant consideration.

by cretins. But it is easy enough to show they have shit for brains.  

And on top of the whole scheme stands the main character whose monomyth not only grants them the moral perception to understand what really matters, but (ostensibly) the means to bring their vision to fruition, all the NPCs be damned. There can be only one, indeed.

This lady has a monomyth about why she is superior to some of her colleagues. So what? She's just talking is all.  

But mattering to each other still matters. The epigraph in E M Forster’s novel Howards End (1910) is ‘Only connect!’

get Gay with each other.  

In an emerging modern world seemingly bent on destroying whatever humanity and interconnectedness remains,

according to this lady's 'master-narrative'.  

we are urged to connect the disparate parts of our own psyches and, most importantly, to connect with each other.

Nobody is urging me to do any such thing. This is because I read out my poems to boring people till they run away.  

Yet, we seem to be adrift in a world that is becoming a stage upon which increasing numbers of us choose to strut, preen, and not only declare our need to be seen and admired, but also insist that others subordinate themselves to our personas.

She is also adrift in a world where I urge everybody to get gender reassignment surgery at least once a week. My point is, anybody can talk bollocks.  

We have reasons to despair – but haven’t we always had them? The social media revolution, with its vast reach and siren songs of the hero’s journey

I have come across no such thing. There are cute girls whom I do follow because they give me valuable tips on how to apply make up and shake my booty. But that is because I want to take up twerking after I retire.  

or else with its cruder versions that overtly demand constant attention, is merely the current incarnation of a longstanding preoccupation with the self, with one’s identity, with one’s importance.

If one thinks one is important, one will end up writing nonsense for Aeon.  

But this is our time, our moment, and it seems that it is fitting that we respond in the best way we know how.

i.e. talking bollocks.  

So, while I do not pretend to have the answer – perhaps not even an answer – to addressing the moral harms of the MCS phenomenon, I do think that we can begin by asking what we are losing, and why there are reasons to try to salvage it.

Why not begin by asking where the toilet is? That way, you can broach the topic of how gay everybody should be getting with each other. Anyway, that's what I think happens at Academic Symposiums.  


I take self-creating narratives to be fundamental to who we are – by telling and hearing stories about ourselves, about others and about the world, we come to understand who, why and how we might be.

What story did this lady tell about herself which made her so stupid and boring? I think it had something to do with her being a NPC in a really sordid online sex game. Main characters kept jizzing on her to win points.  

Yet the kind of main-character storytelling that is presently ascendant does very little to form mutually constructed identities and, instead, reduces the complexity of human relationships to simplistic binaries of ‘me’ and ‘not me’, ‘them’ and ‘us’, ‘hero’ and ‘villain’.

Not to mention the incessantly jizzed upon. Still, things could be worse. Trillions of Netan-Yahoos are currently being sodomized in Joe Biden's master-narrative.  

Instead of co-creators and co-authors of each other’s selves,

Which we aren't though, it is true, some of us make babies and there is a short period of time when the stories we tell them may affect their psychological sense of self. Thus, I grew up hearing stories from the Ramayana and Mahabharata which stressed that God and Nature and most people in general were really nice. Also there were plenty of talking animals. This made me feel this was a nice world and I was a nice enough part of it.  

what remains is an anxiety-producing, shallow, consumerist competition for the ring of the one true self, the one true main character.

There really is no such competition. Even in Tolkein, the ring only exists so as to be destroyed by an arduous and epic journey into a land of dread.  

We thus become rivals, competitors and players in what looks like a zero-sum game of winners and losers.

Social Media is positive sum. There is always room for another 'influencer'. Indeed, there can be synergy between such stars.  

As the possibility of interdependently created identities disappears, we feel more alone, unheard, unseen – perhaps un-personed.

Nobody wants an 'interdependently created identity' because perverts will want that identity to feature getting jizzed on a lot.  

The MCS narratives lack what psychologists and philosophers call a ‘theory of mind’ – the idea that we experience other people as having the same kind of mental states that we do, rather than playing bit parts in the monomyth of our lives.

This is not the case. Speaking generally, the Main Characters learns different things from different types of beings. They may also tell him of legends of a 'chosen one'- in other words, he may find he is part of a bigger story. At the end of the epic- as happens in Buffy the Vampire Slayer- everyone with the potential to be the Chosen One becomes a full fledged slayer.  

This lack of an attunement to others as moral persons equal to oneself bears a family resemblance to narcissism.

It may be a stage in the psychological development of an infant. Equally it may be something we regress to when unable to cope.  

This sense of ‘family resemblance’, an idea put forth by Ludwig Wittgenstein, argues that various practices and ideas can be connected by a series of overlapping similarities.

Even when there are no similarities. Anyone can talk bollocks about anything at all.  


The family resemblance between MCS and narcissism lies in what the philosopher Aleksandar Fatic in 2023 called a kind of ‘moral incompetence’ – ‘the incompetence to experience the moral emotions, such as empathy, solidarity, loyalty, or love’.

Or the insufferable stupidity of those who claim to detect such sociopathic traits in us. My answer is 'it takes one to know one'.  

MCS and narcissism connect in their rejection of our interdependence:

Nonsense! My wife found me very clingy and dependent. But I was also vain and self-centered. At some point she realized that she didn't have to stay with me because we hadn't been married in a Catholic church.  

not only do they mock meaningful connections with others, but they make such mockery into a virtue.

At this point, the lady's friends ask 'who hurt you?' meaning 'why are you so damaged? Is it because you studied shite at Collidge?'  

Because moral incompetence inhibits connection, MCS, and its close cousin, narcissism, are suggestive of the moral failure against which Forster’s epigraph warned.

The moral failure had to do with not having lots of gay sex. But this had to do with draconian laws against sodomy. 

But there is that other word: love. Albert Camus, in his Notebooks (1935-42), confesses that: 'If I had to write a book on morality, it would have a hundred pages and ninety-nine would be blank. On the last page I should write: ‘I recognize only one duty, and that is to love.’

Camus should have gotten gay with lots of Nazis. Instead he joined the Resistance.  


More recently, the philosopher Harry Frankfurt, in The Reasons of Love (2004), tells us that love is both necessary and dangerous, making us infinitely vulnerable to each other.

Only if we play Russian Roulette while kissing or cuddling. But this is an infrequent occurrence in middle class Tambram households.  

Although many of those under the spell of MCS are motivated by a desire to be adored,

Nonsense! We want to have exciting adventures. We don't want to be followed around by adoring crowds like Brian in the Monty Python film.  

their very practices strain the possibilities of love. By love, I do not only mean romantic love, but the kind of tender sentiments that are present among friends, family and sometimes even more distant others. This kind of other-directed love requires an openness to mutual vulnerabilities, differences and a non-instrumental conception of the beloved.

Fuck off! Nobody wants to be slobbered over by some nutter who gasses on about our 'vulnerabilities'. For most of us, love is what flows from a working partnership and is based on a recognition of mutual strengths and capabilities. If you thought your wife was 'infinitely vulnerable', the last thing you'd want to do is give her a baby. The opposite is also true. If hubby is clingy and infantile, you can't have a baby because that would interfere with the care and attention that fat fool demands.  

Yet, MCS promotes the opposite: a kind of othering, a turning of human beings into abstract entities and instrumentally useful (or not so useful) mannequins.

This is a pathology independent of whether or not the person thinks of herself in narratological terms.  

Is there a ‘duty to love’ that MCS betrays?

Nope. At one time there was a stereotype of the 'gamer' who is a virgin and a computer nerd. But all the lads in 'Big Bang Theory' married strong successful women.  

We might side with Immanuel Kant, and say that, at the very least, we must never treat people as a mere means to our own ends. But that seems insufficient when considering Camus’s declaration. To love is, in a sense, to enter into a mystery – a kind of connection with the other that offers no guarantees, no personal glory, no safe outcomes, and certainly no winners and losers.

No. To love is to seek a partnership involving some type of work. Our emotions are 'Darwinian algorithms of the mind'. They have survival value.  

To love is to face uncertainty about who we are – and about who the other might be.

No. To be in a bad relationship is to face such uncertainty. Good relationships are about security, confidence and the certainty that the other person has your back.  

Emmanuel Levinas argued that ‘alterity’ – the uncertainty born of the otherness of others – is the beginning of all morality.

He was wrong. We may be uncertain about our 'ipseity'- what we are in and for ourselves- because we don't know our capabilities. The otherness of others is what makes their capabilities apparent to us. Through affectionate relationships we gain mimetic models and this changes what we can do and achieve. Consider Churchill. He was a very promising, very charismatic, rising politician. But he had little money. Why did he not marry an heiress? The answer, I think, is that he saw that Clementine had certain social skills which he lacked. There's was a true partnership. Clementine would always get her husband to apologize and smooth things over when his acerbic tongue had wounded the feelings of some colleague. 

It might also be the beginning of all love. The other challenges us, makes demands on us, and holds us responsible.

Only when we are going in the wrong direction. Domestic life isn't a boxing match.  

The other forces us out of our self-referential solipsism, and into the awe of connection.

Only if the other is a rapist whose violent assault shakes us out of catatonia. 

Look at the other’s face, Levinas tells us. In seeing the face of another, we begin to grasp what it might mean to be vulnerable, to be accountable.

Only if the other's face betrays great fear or anxiety. This allows us to grasp that it is a mistake to rush naked at strangers with an erect cock and a meat cleaver in our hand.  

This is a million miles from faceless ‘Likes’, subscribers or fans.

Because you are not rushing at them with an erect cock and a meat cleaver in your hand.

Many attracted to life as a main character are seeking some kind of love, or approval, or reassurance that they matter.

They may be seeking promotion or business success so as to better provide for their family. JK Rowling was once quite poor. She started writing Harry Potter for her daughter but must have quickly realized she had immense literary talent.  

They are looking for a feeling, a vibe. But love is more than an affective stance. Erich Fromm, in The Art of Loving (1956), defines love as an artistic practice, noting that ‘individual love cannot be attained without the capacity to love one’s neighbour, without true humility, courage, faith and discipline.’

Fromm was lying. My neighbors hate me but are very affectionate to their own families and friends. Perhaps, I should stop answering the front door bell while naked and holding a meat cleaver.  

For him, love is ‘an activity, not a passive affect’ – in order to truly love, it is insufficient to merely feel; what is required is responsibility for the care of the beloved.

Baby doesn't love Mummy because it can't be responsible for her care. Fromm was fucked in the head.  

Yet MCS denies us the ability to do exactly that – to genuinely, humbly love anyone or anything.

If she suffers from that syndrome, there may be something to what she says. But if she doesn't, then her testimony is worthless.  

To the conquering hero, all interactions are transactional, all awe self-directed.

No. Plenty of 'conquering heroes' have been humble and self-effacing. 

Where does this leave us? MCS is not a puzzle to be solved via a ‘do and don’t’ listicle. It is not a social problem against which laws can be passed. Instead, it calls on us to engage in what Joseph Campbell, among others, called a ‘dark night of the soul’.

Important people- like Mother Theresa may have such things. Ordinary people can rest content with being cheerful and, occasionally, emitting a witty fart.  

This might mean sitting with our anonymity, solitude, boredom and lostness;

If you are doing this at home, you aren't lost at all. Also, nothing wrong with having a wank now and then. 

pushing back on the equivocation between performance and authentic connections; making ourselves vulnerable to others, and thus to failure.

This lady makes herself vulnerable to others by publishing her Bank Account details and password on Social Media- I don't think.  

It might mean seeing ourselves as always incomplete – and recognising that fulfilment might not be in the cards, that life is not a triumphant monomyth, and others are not here to be cast in supporting roles.

Also, they won't come and do your washing up. Sad.  

Myself, I tend to turn to Samuel Beckett’s play Endgame (1957), where a character reminds us: ‘You’re on earth, there’s no cure for that!’

That was a couple of years before Sputnik and Yuri Gagarin and so forth.  

Sounds about right – let’s begin there.

Let's not. Instead of funding non-STEM subjects, lets focus on getting kids to learn about Astrophysics and cold fusion and nano-technology. Let future generations explore the galaxy rather than write shite about the need to make ourselves vulnerable to others by publishing our computer password or other financial details.  

Wednesday, 30 November 2022

Matilal's relativism- tatparya & nirnayaka

Was Matilal utterly stupid? He was a Professor of a shite subject- so the pro tanto answer must be yes. But Matilal attended the Calcutta Sanskrit College which had a navya nayaya theory of 'tatparya' or 'intention'. Moreover, intuition as 'synoida' would have a buck-stopper or 'witness' in the 'nirnayaka' interpretation. Bearing this in mind, Matilal was merely as stupid as his profession required him to be- nothing more or less, pace Nicolas Bommarito & Alex King who write-

Matilal argues against cultural relativism, which he characterizes essentially as the view that there are no cross-cultural moral standards.

If so, Matilal is foolish. Cultural relativism says that a person's beliefs and practices should be understood based on that person's own culture. A Cultural relativist can believe that there are 'natural' or 'non arbitrary' moral standards while affirming that no existing culture has evolved sufficiently to have adopted such standards. Equally, a person may believe that 'moral standards' are hypocritical nonsense while also affirming that culture doesn't matter in the slightest. Only economic motives explain behavior. As for beliefs, they are strategic solutions to Newcomb type problems. 

He bases his objections on two principles. The first he calls the Impossibility of the Individuation of Cultures (or IIC).

Which is foolish. We 'individuate' cultures all the time. People refer to me as an uncultured swine. By contrast, they consider other members of my family to be courteous and refined.  

Real cultures, Matilal thinks, are not “dead watertight compartments”;

nobody said they were. We differentiate Smith from Jones though neither is dead or watertight. Indeed, Smith may now have a kidney Jones very generously donated to him.  

rather, they flow into each other.

Jones is bumming Smith. So what?  

The second principle is a relatively familiar one. It says that, if relativism were true, we would have to call the intuitively worst moral offenses morally right, as long as the offenders behaved according to the norms of their own culture.

This is nonsense. We would only have to do so if that is what our culture required us to do. But that's not how cultures work. Ours is always best while other cultures are about nasty furriners bumming each other incessantly.  

The best we can do is to call them wrong “from our point of view”.

Only if that is what our culture requires of us. A cultural relativist is welcome to belong to a particular culture- or none at all if he don't got no friends and was brought up by wolves or Republicans.  

Matilal calls this the Repugnant Consequence (or RC).

What's so repugnant about not incessantly passing judgments on furriners wot bum each other incessantly because they don't know any better?  

Matilal distinguishes two species of cultural relativism, which he calls soft relativism and hard relativism.

Matilal had an obsession with 'rigid' vs 'flaccid'. As I get on in years, I am beginning to understand why.  

Both claim that there are no cross-cultural moral standards.

Neither necessarily does. It depends on their own culture which may consider making claims of an obviously inutile sort to be the conduct of a boorish pedant whose place is well below the salt.  

He sometimes puts this in terms of mutual incommensurability: there is no fact about whether one culture’s standards are superior to another’s.

There is an uncorrelated asymmetry. That's all that is required for a bourgeois strategy to be eusocial.  

So both forms of relativism share an anti-realist metaphysics of value.

Not necessarily. Anyway, any anti-realist ontology can always be recast in realist terms by the introduction of virtual particles.  

They are differentiated by their epistemic claims.

Not if they don't make epistemic claims- which only boorish pedants do because teaching rich kids makes you stupider than God intended.  

According to soft relativism, the moral standards set in a culture different from one’s own are nevertheless still intelligible or comprehensible.

But, within any culture there will always be certain shibboleths or mysteries which remain unintelligible or are incomprehensible. If this were not the case, Universities could guarantee to turn out alumni who have so mastered a specific culture as to be able to produce literary and artistic works instantly recognizable as rivalling that of that culture's greatest poets and sages.  

According to hard relativism, moral standards in different cultures are mutually incomprehensible.

But, the way acculturation proceeds in any culture is in one recognizing that there is a grading principle within it and not comprehending how to rise in grade till, without knowing how, one suddenly finds one has indeed ascended.  

The hard relativist thinks that the moral standards of a culture different from our own are forever foreign objects, untranslatable into our own concepts or paradigms. On such a view, this mutual unintelligibility underwrites the mutual incommensurability. We cannot rank one culture’s moral standards against another’s because we cannot even get the two to be talking in the same terms.

But this also applies within a culture. Eliza Doolittle was very smart. Thus she could become a cultured lady. Sadly, no Professor Higgins could turn me into a darker complexioned version of Her Very Gracious Majesty the Queen- Gor' bless 'er.  

Matilal’s two main targets are the sophisticated versions of relativism endorsed by Bernard Williams and Gilbert Harman. Before really addressing these, though, he first dispenses with a form of relativism that Williams calls vulgar relativism.

Because it was a form of relativism which used to expose its buttocks to him saying 'you are shit, you are.'  He'd reply, 'Mum, do you have to be so vulgar more especially now your daughter-in-law, Shirley is in Callaghan's Cabinet?' 

Vulgar relativism claims that (1) we ought to tolerate other cultures’ moral perspectives, since (2) terms like ‘right’ just mean ‘right for a given society’ – in other words, ‘right for them’.

Nothing wrong with that if we also tolerate them guys living among us or else feel as strong desire to take over their territory.  

Matilal here simply defers to Williams’s own refutation of vulgar relativism, one that contemporary readers will likely recognize. In saying (1), we implicitly endorse a universal, nonrelative moral claim, namely that we should tolerate the views of other cultures.

No. We may only be implicitly endorsing a utilitarian thesis- e.g. if we want smart peeps to live among us, let them keep up their own traditions- e.g. not eating their first born 

But (2) bars us from endorsing any non-relative moral claims.

No it doesn't. The fact is, any society which keeps doing stupid shit will go extinct. Nature itself doesn't tolerate cultures which make it normative to eat all your babies. 

So the view looks incoherent. The version of relativism that Williams defends is more restricted. For Williams, there are two ways in which cultures confront or come into contact with each other.

Williams was real smart. He could count up to two.  

There are real confrontations and notional confrontations.

A real confrontation can be notional and notional confrontations can get real very very quickly.  

A real confrontation occurs when one culture’s moral system is a real option for members of another culture.

This is foolish. Williams came of a stock which had completely wiped out members of other cultures who happened to be living on land on which White people could thrive.  

And a moral system counts as a real option for someone when they could adopt that system and “not engage in extensive self-deception”,

Extensive self-deception is a feature of cultured living. The fact is people only invite me to dinner parties because of my uncontrollable flatulence. Yet I have to deceive myself this is not the case because otherwise I'd turn up wearing adult diapers rather than a dinner jacket.  

“retain their hold on reality”, and perhaps even make retrospective sense of their conversion. What Williams means here is not at all clear,

it is clear enough. The man's wife was a politician. He'd had to suffer through dinner parties featuring gormless donors.  

but that need not distract us, as this is not the point that Matilal takes issue with. What is important is that, if one culture’s system is not a real option for members of another culture, then those two cultures can confront one another only notionally.

But all confrontation has a notional component- even if it is wholly imaginary.  

As examples, Williams offers the moral systems of bygone eras: Bronze Age chiefs

whose code was similar to that of Gangland Godfathers 

and medieval samurai,

upon whom the Yakuza model themselves 

as well as traditional societies whose systems and ways of life are incompatible with current, irreversible technological advancements.

They are perfectly compatible provided some innovation and adaptation is permitted.  

Whatever exactly counts as a real option, those moral systems are simply inaccessible to us.

Only in the sense that all moral systems are inaccessible to those who hold them.  

Finally, it’s only in the context of notional confrontations that we face relativism.

But there is no confrontation unless there is a notion of confrontation. I angrily confronted the door which was refusing to open for me because it was under the impression that I was drunk. But the door didn't think it was confronting me at all. It was incapable of having any such notion.  

When two cultures can really confront each other rather than merely notionally confront each other, we aren’t pushed to relativistic conclusions.

A convenient doctrine if you belong to a race which, in the recent past, had committed genocide on distant continents. However, most young British people today feel that in the 'real' confrontation with indigenous peoples that occurred, some of their own ancestors acted wickedly. 

Williams writes that it is only in real confrontations that the language of appraisal – good, bad, right, wrong, and so on – can be applied to [the other moral system]; in notional confrontations, this kind of appraisal is seen as inappropriate, and no judgments are made.

He was wrong. When Britain had to confront the Luftwaffe, it didn't bother with moral appraisal. It concentrated on getting the technically inferior Spitfire into the air in numbers that overwhelmed the  Messerschmitt.

He calls his view the relativism of distance.

It was foolish. On the other hand, he'd actually flown Spitfires during this stint of National Service. 

Matilal counts this view as a form of relativism because two moral systems that can only notionally confront each other are incommensurable, that is, we cannot think that one is better than the other.

Sure we can. We do so all the time when we amend laws or do 'mechanism design'.  

Furthermore, he counts it as a form of soft relativism, since Williams nowhere claims that systems that allow for only notional confrontation must also be mutually unintelligible.

Because one can have a notional confrontation with a door that refuses to open for you coz it thinks you are drunk off your head- which is a total lie coz, for religious reasons, I have always been a complete teetotaler.  

Matilal presents two worries for this view. First, he argues that it’s unclear why we should think that any moral system is not a real option for any culture. We can’t literally go back and be Bronze Age chiefs. But surely that isn’t all that Williams means. He seems to be saying something stronger, such as that some cultures are so conceptually or socially distant that only notional confrontation is possible. But why think that we couldn’t, for example, disavow our modern technologies and opt for life in a traditional society? The only barriers to this are practical (if there actually aren’t any such communities left) or epistemic (if we don’t know enough about its moral system). Aside from these philosophically uninteresting senses in which bygone cultures are inaccessible, there’s no further sense in which they are. Moreover, any living culture is a real option for any other living culture. No actual culture is a windowless monad perfectly sealed off from the rest of the world. This is Matilal’s IIC principle, the Impossibility of the Individuation of Cultures.

There is no principle here. There is merely loose talk. For any particular purpose, anything at all can be individuated well enough. This is also why Witlesstein's private language argument fails. 

His second objection provisionally grants that some cultures can only confront each other notionally but denies that this entails their mutual incommensurability.

because nonsense entails nothing. The fact is, culture is itself a notion. Any predicate applied to it is notional.  

First, it is question-begging to suppose that such cultures couldn’t apply non-relative standards to each other.

One 'non-relative' standard involves the existential predicate. If the thing doesn't exist we can't be sure it might possibly have done so or will do so.  

Moreover, this supposition conflicts with the linguistic data: we do in fact apply appraising language when talking about bygone moral systems. We say that slavery was wrong, for example, and that our current system is better.

Unless were are African patriots who realize that the slave trade helped African kingdoms maintain their independence from the likes of King Leopold's rapacious minions.  

And if we deny this, we must face RC, the Repugnant Consequence.

Why not face the true Repugnant Consequence which is that studying or teaching Philosophy makes you as stupid as shit?  

Matilal then turns to Harman’s relativism, according to which our judgments (and statements) about how people ought to act or which actions are wrong are relativized to groups that have formed agreements or have come to understandings with each other.

This is descriptive of what actually obtains.  

Harman offers a few examples, involving Martians, a band of cannibals, a mob-like group called ‘Murder, Incorporated’, and Hitler. Harman thinks that, whatever we might say of members of these groups – that they behave unjustly, that it is a bad thing for them to go around killing others, even that they are evil – we fall short of saying that they ought not kill others or that it is wrong for them to do so.

We too avail of a right to self-defense.  Uncorrelated asymmetries give rise to eusocial bourgeois strategies. Why do you wipe your own bum but not go around wiping the bums of everybody? The answer is that your bum is yours. That's an uncorrelated asymmetry. 

Such statements strike Harman as sounding very odd because such agents are “beyond the motivational reach of the relevant moral considerations”. They are simply beyond the pale – creatures that we, in some deep way, just cannot make sense of.

Unless we read John Maynard Smith and understand why Professors of Moral Philosophy only wipe their own bums not those of all who stand in need of such services.  

There are three objections Matilal offers here. First, he thinks that Harman, like Williams, unfairly represents the linguistic situation. We hear people call Hitler’s and the mob’s actions wrong all the time.

No we don't. We only give a hearing to people who say nice or useful things to us.  

More importantly, though, Matilal argues that Harman runs afoul of both IIC and RC.

But so does Matilal himself. He has no way of individuating Harman's claim and thus can come to no conclusion about it.  

Harman’s choice of Martians is telling.

I suppose he means 'a class of beings with whom we can't come to any agreement'. But there may be a 'Schelling focal' solution to a coordination or discoordination problem. That's all that is required. Agreement is otiose and doesn't actually exist in any actual society. There is only Schelling focality.  

As others have more recently argued, it’s hard to know what to make of these bizarre cases. It’s not clear how reliable our linguistic or metaethical intuitions concerning them are. This is because real cultures are not hermetically sealed things,

but they may have a Kripkean rigid designator. That's all that matters.  

and imagining cultures this way will not, Matilal thinks, be philosophically revealing.

Philosophy reveals that philosophers have shit for brains.  

In order to get Harman’s relativist intuitions we have to imagine cases of Martians, that is, literal aliens, or else “monsters (Hitler), mentally deranged or impaired persons (Murder, Inc), or subhumans”. In short, these cases implicitly try to circumvent IIC.

No they don't. If cultures can't be individuated, nothing can. It is enough for a sentence to have a reference for IIC to be circumvented.  

But real cultures do flow into each other, and no culture is so sealed off that we have no moral purchase on it.

We don't know that. There may be people who can say that I am really uncultured relative to the rest of Britain or Tamil Nadu but nobody can say if I am not really cultured according to some other lights.  

Last, Harman effectively attempts to avoid RC by allowing that we can call a figure like Hitler evil –

if we get paid to do so- or gain some other benefit- sure.  

it’s just that we can’t call his actions wrong

He ended up eating a bullet. His actions were wrong. Don't declare war on the US of A. Don't fight the Russians on their own soil during Winter. Flatter the French. They make marvelous cheese. 

or say that he did things that he ought not to have done. But in giving up these latter claims, Harman still says something quite repugnant.

Stick with 'judge not lest ye be judged' or else 'answer a fool according to his folly'. 

Matilal’s insights about culture draw on

the fact that Culture (Samskriti) is a Samskar- i.e is conventional and lacking any deep ontological property. Still, there is a 'vigyan' such that all doctrines (matam) are observationally equivalent. Perhaps there is 'aashrav' of karma-binding particles which are merely virtual. Who knows? Who cares? Just don't sleep with your Guru's wife- more especially if your Guru is me. 

an important concept from classical Indian philosophy, the Buddhist notion of emptiness (in Sanskrit, śūnyatā). Matilal draws on this idea in claiming that it is impossible for any culture to be completely isolated and self-reliant.

But Buddhist sunyata implies kshanikavada- momentariness. Every thing is isolated and self-generated. That's why only intention (cetana) matters.  

Emptiness is most closely associated with the Madhyamaka school of Buddhism and its founder Nāgārjuna (~150–250 CE), who makes frequent appearances in Matilal’s writings.

But, hopefully, not in his toilet. Apparitions of that type are a leading cause of constipation. 

Nāgārjuna famously claimed that everything is empty. But what does that mean? Being empty does not mean simply not existing; emptiness is not to be understood as nothingness. To be empty is to be empty of something. The mug on my desk is empty of coffee but not of air. In the context of Buddhist philosophy, what all things are empty of is a static and independent nature (in Sanskrit, svabhāva).

Nope. They lack a kinetic or dynamic nature. That's where Jainism scores. But low IQ peeps like me are perfectly content with devotional Buddhism or Hinduism or Sufism or ecumenical Christianity. In matters of Faith, it is us cretins who are privileged. Sadly, we often get into confrontations with our door which has somehow got the idea that I get drunk at the pub. I don't. I only go there to hold philosophical conversations with people- till they punch my head repeatedly. 


One way that a thing can be empty is temporal. Think of the spoke on a bicycle wheel.

It is where it belongs. Don't stick it up your bum.  

Though it may seem to be a singular object, it is really a collection of particles organized in a certain way.

but not, sadly, for the purpose of being stuck up your bum. 

So to say that it has no static essence

is meaningless if the predicate 'no static essence' is incompossible.  

isn’t just to say that it is, for example, slowly corroding or turning to rust. There is no spoke to corrode, a spoke just is the relational interplay between the particles that make it up.

Nor is there anyone to speak or to hear or to feed Buddhist monks who therefore starve to death or else have to get proper jobs.  

What appears to us as the spoke rusting is just the particles that make it up changing their relations.

Nope. The relations stay the same. The particles undergo oxidization.  

There’s no thing that went from shiny to rusty.

Only no things exist.  

But there is also another, non-temporal way in which the spoke is empty.

No there isn't.  

Even at any instant, it exists only relationally.

in which case it isn't empty. Nothing is relational to what is no thing.  

To be a spoke is to have a kind of relational identity, one that is dependent on other things.

but not in the instant and, because there is nothing before or after the instant, anywhere else.  

What it means to be a spoke is to play a certain role in a wheel and in a bicycle.

But this also the meaning of everything which isn't a spoke in the bicycle including that meaning or meaninglessness.  

And what it means to be a bicycle is to play a certain role for humans, to ride around and travel places.

But that's not what it means to be my bicycle.  There are lots of people like me who make New Year's resolutions and buy bikes and then let them rust away in the garage. 

So a spoke, to be what it is, depends on its relations to other things, on its place in a larger content.

Which is how come my bike has turned into an ornamental fish tank. It wants to improve its relations to other things- especially fish.  

This, according to Madhyamaka philosophy, is true of everything: spokes, the particles making it up, bicycles, people, toads, helium, even emptiness itself.

Not to mention its own doctrine.  

Everything depends on everything else to be what it is.

Unless it doesn't and quits Skool to get a proper job.  

This is not to say that Matilal fully endorses this Buddhist view.

Nor is it to say that he isn't a gerbil. All things that are are gerbils.  

You can, however, see the influence of this idea of emptiness in his discussion of culture.

You can see that his head was empty of everything except shit.  

Just as a spoke is a constantly changing collection which depends on other things

some other things 

to be what it is, so too do cultures. So we find Matilal taking Bernard Williams to task for assuming that cultures interact like billiard balls, as independent things that occasionally crash into each other.

But crashing billiard balls exchange some particles. So do cultures. 

As someone with a multicultural background,

i.e. the guy did not always take a lota of water with him in order to shit in the fields.  

Matilal saw clearly that though the atomistic, billiard ball way of seeing things might be useful, it isn’t how reality works:

Reality can't find work in India so it emigrates.  

But in practice, in today’s world, cultures and sub-cultures do flow into each other, interacting both visibly and invisibly, eventually effecting value-rejection and value-modification at every stage.

Sadly, this isn't the case. Nobody thinks people like me combine Western and Eastern culture. They are merely grateful if I don't take to shitting in their gardens.  

This shows the vitality of cultures, which are like living organisms, in which internal and external changes are incontrovertible facts.

Very true. The cat flows into me when it sits on my lap. That is why I spend a lot of time trying to clean my own arse with my tongue.  

 To be clear, Matilal does not explicitly claim that cultures are empty, but the lesson is similar. His choice of metaphor is telling; he pictures cultures as liquids flowing into each other.

In Indian culture, a swan's wing can separate water from milk. But nobody trusted the 'doodhwallah'.  

Cultures, like liquids, are dynamic, changing entities with vague borders. Thinking of ‘Indian’ or ‘Italian’ culture as something singular, static, and independent, as something with a non-relational essence is a mistake.

No it isn't. You can make money gassing on about Indian or Italian culture. Nobody will pay you to pretend Italian culture is actually Chinese. 

Not only do they change over time, but they are deeply relational, intertwined and dependent upon other cultures in ways that are subtle and difficult to see.

because they don't exist.  

Views about cultures that ignore these facts are doomed to fail

yet no such view has failed yet.  

because they treat a complex living thing as if it were a fossil.

this is more especially true if you are trying to add a hefty gang-bagger to your fossil collection. Still, if you shoot the fellow in the head repeatedly, your views of culture are not doomed to fail. Indeed, you could become rich.  

Matilal uses this insight to highlight how philosophers wishing to see cultures as static and independent must lean heavily on semi-fictionalized examples of past cultures and science fiction.

They don't have to lean on shit. They can just gas on about 'essences'.  

These artificial examples of cultures with independent essences are then generalized, giving the illusion

to whom? Guys who want that illusion for some purpose of their own. It is the purpose that matters.  

that all cultures work this way. One need not accept Nāgārjuna’s more radical metaphysical stance to see this, though it can help illuminate Matilal’s lesson: real-life cultures just don’t work that way.

But Mahayana Buddhist culture did work that way in Tibet- till the Dalai Lama was forced to run away.  

Given his

stupid 

denial of relativism, it may be unsurprising that Matilal endorses

stupid shit 

a version of moral realism, according to which there are universal moral facts.

You can always find an existence proof for them- but they may be inaccessible.  

Matilal does not, however, consider other views that have become commonplace in contemporary metaethics, views like speaker subjectivism,

Whitey be debil!  

error theory,

why evaluate what is a priori false? That's not a theory, it's a reason for not getting out of bed. 

or expressivism.

which forbids itself any reference 

Instead, he contrasts cultural relativism with what he calls singularism, the view that there is only one set of moral standards for everyone,

there is no necessary opposition between the two. Our culture is the right one. Those whom God hates are born into other cultures. Even good foreigners are constantly bumming each other.  

and introduces his rival view, pluralism, in terms of this contrast.

But 'singularism' can be 'plural' by subscribing to a type theory.  

He characterizes singularism (sometimes calling it monism) as the view that there is only one set of moral standards to which everybody should conform, and it is possible to discover this singular standard of universal morality through rational means.

But rationality is a movable feast. Nothing prevents a relativist from saying that his own culture was especially chosen by God or represents a privileged frame of reference for some pseudo-scientific reason.  

Like soft and hard relativism, singularism consists of both a metaphysical and epistemic thesis.

Only if you hold them down and shove those theses up their arse while they scream their lungs out.  

Metaphysically,

or materially 

it posits a set of standards that apply to everyone, making it a view sometimes called absolutism in contemporary parlance. Epistemically, it claims that this set of standards is rationally accessible to us all. In essence, if we each thought about morality long enough and clearly enough, we would discover the universal moral truth of the matter.

Sadly, mathematical logic has moved on greatly. Such truths may not be accessible even at the 'end of Time'.  

He has in his sights arch rationalists, and in this he follows fellow pluralist Isaiah Berlin, who characterizes singularism in the following way:
first, that all men have one true purpose, and one only, that of rational self-direction; second, that the ends of all rational beings must of necessity fit into a single universal, harmonious pattern . . .; third, that all conflict, and consequently all tragedy, is due solely to the clash of reason with the irrational.

This is a wholly arbitrary characterization. Why not say 'singularism involves shitting into your hands and flinging your feces about.'

Rejecting singularism makes Matilal sound like a relativist.

whereas actually the guy just didn't want to be the target of Isaiah Berlin's flung feces.  

Though we won’t cover all of the details here, it’s worth noting that he argues that not all divergence is the result of irrationality. Sometimes it is the result of completely reasonable, understandable diversity of moral opinion. In fact, Matilal is keenly concerned to take seriously the fact of moral diversity. It’s this seriousness that leads him to pluralism.

It was okay for Radhakrishnan to fling his feces about. But when Akeel Bilgrami does it, it's so not cool.

Pluralism holds that there are multiple, potentially incompatible, moral standards.

It can hold what it likes except my penis.  

Still, it’s possible that some are better, i.e., to be prioritized, over others. In other words, Matilal accepts a certain amount of diversity of moral standards but denies that this commits him to relativism.

Sadly, relatives is the reason most Indians want to emigrate. But there is no escape from that type of relativism. Wherever you go, you will find some Mamaji who will suddenly turn up on your doorstep with a marriage proposal to a nice sanskari girl with an astonishing resemblance to a camel. 

He takes diversity to be compatible with an underlying moral realism. This metaphysical picture may sound a bit like W.D. Ross’s view.

Though the Indians arrived at it through Navya Nyaya linguistic analysis. The 'tatparya' intention is associated with 'the good' but there is some lack in it such that a separate consideration of what is right arises.  

For Ross, there is a listable plurality of goods, and these different goods are not reducible to one another.

save for some specific purpose. 

We can even think of Matilal’s standards as continuous with Ross’s goods (justice, non-maleficence, etc.).

but they are hermeneutic or purely linguistic, not ontological in any way.  

However, Ross thinks that there is always, in each situation, a particular right thing to do. Matilal disagrees.

The good is multiply realizable. Considerations of right are secondary and arise by some lack or unrealizability in the intention.  

First, Matilal leaves it open that these different standards or goods are simply incompatible.

for some purposes, they may be.  

That is, there might be cases where we cannot comply with all of the standards or realize all of the varying goods.

But only for the same reason that we can't say everything while speaking correctly.  

Second, Matilal leaves it open that these different standards or goods cannot be prioritized – that they are incommensurable.

but can always be made so for some particular purpose.  

So he thinks that we might be unable to fully realize all of the plural goods, and that we might furthermore be unable to even weigh the different goods against each other.

Why do it if it doesn't pay to do it?  

By contrast, while Ross thinks it doesn’t make sense to prioritize the goods in the abstract, he thinks that they can be properly ordered in any particular situation.

which is true enough. The Szpilrajn extension theorem explains why.  

In these ways, Matilal’s form of pluralism is more thoroughgoing than Ross’s.

If it existed- but did it? Why not admit that Matilal was in a linguistic, not ontological, tradition?  

Matilal doesn’t claim that moral standards definitely are incompatible. Instead, he leaves these possibilities open. This brings us to Matilal’s epistemic thesis, which unfortunately is not always clear.

Unless you iz Hindu and know about tatparya and how, by God's grace, a 'nirnayaka' can always clarify or certify what is intended.  

He generally sounds quite skeptical about compatibility and commensurability, denying that there is any way to determinately rank moral standards.

Save by God's grace which may be operating in even a cretin like me.  

But even though we might never be certain about our rankings, they are (justifiably) important to us.

Or not. Generally not. Adolescents may spend a lot of time ranking supermodels they want to sleep with. Then they get married and find the thought of cuddling with anybody else laughable or repugnant. 

That said, he does offer an account of how we come to know the different particular moral standards, as well as how we can come to know the universal moral standards. Given all this, it’s still not clear how exactly we should understand his pluralist account. Fleshing it out will be the job of the rest of the chapter.

The rest of the chapter is tedious shite. See for yourself-

 

Matilal’s pluralism appears in an incipient form the Indian notion of dharma.

Only if you are as stupid as shit. Matilal was Ind-fucking-ian. Any dharmic notion of his must build on some highly developed dharmic notions. How the fuck could he have a doctrine anterior to, or an incipient form of, stuff he learnt in his mother's lap and then at Sanskrit College? 

The term dharma is one of the most important in Indian philosophy; it is also one of the most complex, having many, many meanings.

It has a rigid designation for Europe. The Greeks translated it as 'eusebia' which is the Latin 'pietas'. Dharma has the sense of pious upholding which, by metonymy, can extend to what has been ordained to subsist by its own conatus or 'svadharma'.  

Built on a root meaning to hold up or to support, it sometimes means teachings or instructions; this sense is typically capitalized in English, as when people write about the Buddhist Dharma. It is also commonly used in a metaphysical way,  referring to something like instantaneous experience events.

Only under kshanikavada. In that case everything is instantaneous because there is no future or past- there is only this bare and empty moment illumined by the lightning flash of the intention. 

The term also has an important normative sense, referring to social, ritual, legal, and moral obligations. There are many distinctions made within this sense, but here we will focus on one that distinguishes two different levels of obligation.

ordinary and special- sadharan and vishesha. Uncorrelated asymmetries means there's one person- e.g. the guy who owns the property- who is special and who must be treated differently, or must act differently, from ordinary folk. 

One level is contingent and specific; these are called viśeṣa dharmas, literally particular or individual dharmas.  ... which  are contrasted with universal duties, known as sādhāraṇa dharma. Literally meaning general or common dharma, these are obligations that apply to all people everywhere. As you might imagine, what exactly is included in this category is a substantive ethical question.

For whom? Only the nirnayaka or 'buck stopper' who decides or certifies what was intended or should be intended.  The substantive question which is resolved when what obtains as de dicto is deemed de re. 

It commonly includes things like telling the truth, not stealing, and not hurting others. These apply to everyone regardless of their job, social role, or relationships. As we’ll see, Matilal has this in mind when he talks about the ‘basic moral fabric’ – general obligations that are not relativized to any particular person or place.

These are niyams which are positive- be clean, content etc. 

It’s not that sādhāraṇa dharma is real and viśeṣa dharma is not, nor do viśeṣa dharmas always reduce to sādhāraṇa dharmas.

But can be made to do so by the nirnayaka. 

Many Indian philosophers assume that there are multiple distinct types of value.

Indians assume all philosophers are shit. 

Naturally, there are disagreements about whether different values can conflict and, if they can, which ones override others.

There are disagreements where there is scarcity- i.e. where not everything everyone wants can be done. But meaning arises only in the same way. Otherwise any statement can mean everything.  

The classic example of this comes from a critical scene in the Bhagavad Gītā, a part of the much longer epic called the Mahābhārata. In it Arjuna, the best archer in the world, finds himself looking out over a battlefield just before the fighting is about to start. Because of a complicated web of promises, he must fight against his relatives and teachers.

No. Arjuna has two choices. Either be an agent- in which case he takes orders from the guy whom he thinks is his eldest brother- or else he could be an autonomous principal. The duty of the agent is to do what he is told. But an agent can decide to be a principal and do whatever the fuck he wants.  

Arjuna experiences intense inner conflict.

Why? The answer is he knows his side will win and his Guru and 'Grandsire' and lots of cousins will be killed. How does he know? After all, his Guru and 'Grandsire' have the boon of immortality- though they can lay down their lives by their own wish. There is no conflict here whatsoever- unless Arjuna, by supernatural means, is certain of the outcome and, what's more, this is 'common knowledge' which Krishna shares.  

As a warrior and as royalty it is his duty to fight. On the other hand, he also feels the more general duty to avoid bloodshed.

This is nonsense. The guy has been doing nothing but shedding blood- like the Vyadha (butcher) in the Vyadha Gita. Indeed, the two Gitas are 'dual' but the Vyadha deals with the duty of the principal while the Bhagvad deals with the duty of the agent- who, in this case, happens to be a Vaishnavite theist.  

These are known as satya, asteya, and ahiṃsā respectively. 24 Matilal (1991a/2002, 255ff.). 

Matilal was as stupid as shit. Satya means truth. A warrior is welcome to change occupation and become a farmer or an ascetic. That's the truth. Asteya just means not stealing. It is irrelevant in this context. Ahimsa means non-harming but, in an Occasionalist Universe- which is what the Vaishnavite inhabits- only God is an efficient cause.  

For an overview see the discussion in Perrett (2016, 29ff.) of what he calls ‘Value Pluralism’ in Indian philosophy.

It is stupid shit.  

Though his focus is on the puruṣārthas, the four main goals in life (morality, wealth, pleasure, and spiritual liberation) the point about a plurality of values is the same.  Spoiler alert: Arjuna’s charioteer is the god Kṛṣṇa, who convinces him that he should fight after all. Matilal often wrote about this famous scene, particularly in the context of moral dilemmas.

Because the man had shit for brains but had to make out to Whitey that he was a savant of some ghastly heathen sort 

So we find him writing: The situation is this: As a human being, as a loving member of the royal family, he feels that the killing of a grandfather and other relatives is bad; but as a kṣatriya [member of the warrior caste] he is told that it is his sacred duty to fight and kill – a classic case of moral conflict, which tends to inspire moral skepticism. (1989b/2002, 14)

This is hilarious! Prince William, as a human being, as a loving member of the British Royal Family, feels that killing the Duke of Edinburgh is wrong- more particularly if it involves chopping off his head and shoving it up his rectum. But, as a European Royal (i.e. a member of the caste descended from reigning European monarch), he is told- by some cretinous Matilal or Bhattilal- that it is his sacred duty to fight and kill and decapitate and shove his gramps' head up his rectum. This is not a classic case of moral conflict. It is stupid shit. What writing nonsense of this sort inspires in Indians is not 'moral skepticism'. It is utter contempt for Professors of Moral Philosophy. 

A full understanding of the scene would require contextualizing it in the much longer epic.

But Matilal was too stupid to do so. He didn't realize that a Gandharva had given Arjuna the boon to see anything he wanted to see in the manner he wanted to see it. But Arjuna didn't take the boon so it was unvested- asvamika svatva. But, due to 'vishada' Arjuna himself became 'asvamika'- i.e. not in control of himself- and so the boon vested temporarily but such that Arjuna's tatparya was under the regulation of Krishna as nirnayaka.  

What is important for our purposes is that Matilal reads this scene as demonstrating a case of a genuine moral dilemma.

When what it actually is, is great drama, great poetry. It simply isn't true that Arjuna would have suffered any reproach if he, like Krishna's elder brother Balram, had quit the battlefield taking with him a plough, on one shoulder, and, on the other, a big pot of wine.  Alternatively, he could have become an ascetic. The drama of the Gita arises because Arjuna's true eldest brother, Karna, wants the battle to go ahead though it can only do so if Arjuna does not know he is the true eldest brother. By a series of dramatic turns and twists, the Gita shows how the providential outcome is achieved. 

The conflict is not merely apparent

there was no fucking conflict. This is a superbly plotted, highly dramatic, poem.  

and the values in question cannot be satisfactorily reconciled. He finds that accepting the possibility of such a case does not threaten moral realism. 

What threatens realism is the fact that we know shit about reality.  

highlights that values and duties must be flexible and dynamic but nevertheless real.

Why not say, vampires and werewolves must be flexible and dynamic but nevertheless real? In this way, one can be a vampire while being a mail carrier while moonlighting as a werewolf who never actually wolfs out but just delivers pizza.  

To see why, it is helpful to look to his discussion of metaethics itself. 

Metaethics must be flexible and dynamic and do the fucking washing up. Otherwise, it and its bum-chum, Ethics, will be dropped from the curriculum.  

 Matilal’s discussion of the Mahābhārata reveals a deep sympathy to the relativist’s recognition of moral diversity.

But Matilal stopped short of giving it a pity fuck. That's what we should focus on. Stupid savants can reveal deep sympathy for cretinous shite but that does not mean they necessarily put out.  

So while he doesn’t think that diversity proves relativism, Matilal thinks the relativist gets some important things right.

if by 'important things' you mean useless nonsense- sure.  

Recall that on Matilal’s pluralist picture, there are multiple potentially incompatible moral standards,

Only to the same extent that they are actually perfectly compatible. That's the problem with pluralism. The thing is anything goes because dialethia is on the table.  

a fact we see revealed in Arjuna’s dilemma.

There is no dilemma. Arjuna want's theophany as the gratuitous gift of the God and that's what comes to pass. One may as well speak of Spiderman's dilemma in that if he doesn't get bitten by a radio-active spider he can't be a web-slinger.  

How this could be compatible with realism, however, is not obvious.

The answer, obviously, that vampires and werewolves and values and everything else should be very flexible and dynamic and thus, though wholly imaginary, yet perfectly real.  

To elucidate his view, he draws on the notions of sādhāraṇa dharma and viśeṣa dharma, which he compares to Stuart Hampshire’s “two faces of morality”.  For Hampshire, morality admits of a rational side and a less-than-fully rational side.

Whereas the two ass cheeks of morality display heart and soul respectively.  

The former side is broadly continuous with singularist views, such as the familiar Kantian view on which morality is both rational and absolute.

by arbitrary stipulation- sure.  

The latter side involves those aspects of morality that are contingent: historically, geographically, and perhaps in other social ways.

so there is 'hysteresis' or path dependence. But analysis can reveal the underlying ergodics. This must focus on uncorrelated asymmetries to get to the 'bourgeois strategies' which are eusocial. That's the whole story here. Philosophy can only shit on what Econ has clairified. 

This side of morality is typically not fully articulated and may not be fully articulable,

Paetian 'residues and derivatives' ae as articulable as anything else.  

whereas the rational side is at least articulable.

No. Our math isn't good enough. It may never be. Till then all we can have is a tatparya for nirnayaka- if that's the sort of waste of time we are into.