Plato, though comfortably off, wanted to set up a College, like Isocrates- the successful teacher of rhetoric. Why did Plato want to become a rector? Was it because he was interested in the rectums of young boys? This is the disarming explanation he offers in his Socratic dialogues- like the Phaedrus- which, on the surface, is about how to get a young lad- who might be richer, bigger and stronger than you- to let you fuck him in the ass by telling him you don't love him rather than that you do and will die of grief unless he bend over right away.
Clearly this sort of literary production, written in graceful prose, would have a ready, if narrow, market. People would say- 'Cool! Plato is setting up an Academy so as to fuck rich young hunks for free. He's a smart fellow! We should get in on the action'.
Actually Plato had a hidden agenda. He wanted kids to study Math and contribute to Knowledge, not just learn Rhetoric so as to make a lot of money as advocates.
No doubt, vulgar people may be able to benefit from the discoveries this enables us to make, but by defining philosophy as a type of love which has no goal or bliss point whatsoever, we remain unstained by the circumstance. Our Academy has differentiated itself from the Agora- Town & Gown have been set at odds- there is a 'costly signal' giving rise to a 'separating equilibrium' which henceforth can be used to circumvent an information asymmetry problem in the market for 'domain-general' brain workers or, more realistically, to propagate this 'noble lie'.
Philosophy, it must be said, can carry on as a Scientific Research Project, or as its own species of literary Art- and all Art, Rorty's trajectory reminds us, but Daedalean wing'd aspires, to that thinning of the ether where only its pure Science, or Techne, suspires- id est that Schopenhauerian perfection of Music we now term revenge porn- and so pedants will continue to write books in the hope of being cited by those whose brains they've buggered to buggery but who, it is hurtful to acknowledge, yet will forgetfully breed, despite themselves being the unwitting internet vectors of that by which they are named and shamed.
This last, raises a question in my mind.
Suppose Ramanujan had access to a first rate Mathematical Library.
On the evidence, yes.
Ramanujan stayed with a forefather of mine in Madras and did have access to a pretty good library.
It wasn't enough.
I don't know.
This solitary Yoga, God his own Guru, is the opposite of Grothedieck's or the Gita's.
Well, if it requires a similar number of steps to solve a problem as it does to verify the solution then Math can be completely mechanised. What's more, such a math would be both the physics and the metaphysics of Aristotle in that the Time Class of its solutions and verifications would be the same- i.e. they would feature a broadly commensurable number of steps.
The same point, without loss of generality, might be made about philology and hermeneutics. Why? How so? Well, if a Hermeneutic is non-dissipative of Philology then something like Noether's theorem applies. Essentially a differentiable symmetry must be present and therefore some conserved law or property of the system must be equally available to both. As I've pointed out elsewhere, two symmetries, those of karma and dharma, are a covering set for the Mahabharata and, what's more, its internal author fathers their reciprocal collapse because the very parrot beak of his text's repetition yet is as the unfurling of meta-erotic wings mentioned in the Phaedrus, such that Life, that ultimate of dissipative systems, gives everything a shove and calls it Love. Why is Life so beastly? The answer is that that it is a fractal Red Queen race- if Philology is something living then Hermeneutics has an algorithmic method for creating new texts more or less 'as good' as any text it claims to have an interpretation for. In other words, if hermeneutics can have an 'oracular' property with respect to a text, it can also be its Creator God who is the opposite of otiose. This is a stronger claim than that a poet, like Mutanabb
i, can be a prophet. It is that a pedant can be a poet.
Since Hermeneutics does the same thing as 'verification' in complexity theory, we can appeal to the notion of 'relativization'
and draw the conclusion that some interpretive solutions must be philologically unimplementable save adventiously or by an almost infinite sequence of steps.
Aesthetics, properly speaking is unaffected by such considerations. There can always be a 'Intuitionist' Brouwerian choice sequence between solution and verification, or implementation and interpretation, such that their 'light cones' coincide and univocity is retained. However, the thing can't be codified or reduced to a formula.
We can also dismiss certain supposedly philosophical approaches to Aesthetics which claim supervenience on what we know to be incompossible physical processes. They can't be Hermeneutic interventions but, at best, are Philological hypotheses of a historicist type.
For example, we know that one-way functions
can't exist, and since Maths can
be a Metaphysics featuring strict Aristotelian Time, we can't affirm that there is any logical reason to assume that anything like a hermeneutic of 'metaphysical closure' could have ever spontaneously obtained at any point in history before such a doctrine was explicitly uttered. Rather, the natural reading of Plato and Aristotle is one in keeping with the current state of play in Mathematics and thus features 'oracles' or 'kairos' which are wondrous because they are the precise opposite of the menstrual wound of Heideggerian wonder and give rise to, if not that
labour which maiuetics addresses, then at the very least all such useful work as Mathematics immeasurably advances. This, at any rate, is my reading of the Theaetetus.
What this means, put bluntly, for my view of the Mahabharata, is that karma and dharma have to prove so bogus, precisely because symmetries are continuous, that only the Veda gives Life or rather, by Life's exponential-time usurpation of everything merely polynomial, it becomes the mise en abyme
of its own Yagnya, that black fire, or hole, in which karma collapses into dharma and dharma into Veda's yet emptier, for Indian all too Indian, giving.
Come to think of it, this is Socrates' first argument in the Phaedo.
Anyway, the above, by reason of its prurience or peurility, is still a positivist view.
You will be relieved to hear, it is not one Adluri endorses.
Of course, it is nonsense to suggest that Phaedrus was an iconoclast. Defacing the statues of Hermes- castrating the father of the City's Tyche
, or Luck- on the eve of the departure of the expedition against Sicily, was a political not ideological act. Its purpose was to change what might otherwise be a windfall victory for the Commons into a, 'Manifest Destiny', Imperialist capturing of rents for the Elite. Andocides'
part in this is well known- nowhere in his orations on the subject can we find any notion of rationalist iconoclasm as a motivating force. Still, rich kids, like Phaedrus and Alcibiades were, quite properly in the latter case, objects of suspicion. Their overweening ambition recklessly endangered the commonwealth. Plato, here as elsewhere, shows Socrates as a sobering influence, not a 'corrupter' of these influential young men.
Adluri- or Derrida for that matter- does not die in the myth after being carried off by Boreas. She becomes the mother of various other mythological figures. She is not a 'stand in' for Persephone at all. Rather, this Attic lass's marriage to Boreas turns him into the son-in-law and saviour of Athens, which is why he destroyed the Persian fleet at Cape Sepias- a firmly held belief, which continued to boost Athenian military morale.
Socrates's inspired speech, at the place where Orithuia was raptured, is meant to serve a similar protective function for his fellow Citizens.
What confused Adluri was Socrates offering an Euhemerist explanation- some girl fell to her death off a rock and so the traumatised community spoke of her as being carried off by the North Wind- but Plato's Socrates, the pharmakos, or scapegoat sacrifice, for his City, is speaking with amphiboly.
On the surface, he is taking an urbane dig at the Sophists. However, in view of his tragic end, we know he is speaking of himself as the fated sacrifice who, though still an ordinary mortal, already partakes of the mystery of the Divine. Thus, Orithuia's girl friend is named as Pharmaceia- sacrificial death being a medicine for both the Philosopher's nescience as well as the misology of the Polis. But we only know this through a prophetic foreshadowing made possible by Phaedrus's presence- the Platonic love this evokes- which causes Lysisas's 'book' to act as a Uranian Galehaut
or ecstatic drug such as might be used by an oracle. But Plato's dialogues are also such books. Improperly used, as for example by pedants, they are but the burgeoning of an insatiably gay nescience. However, if taken seriously as testifying to their own virtual worthlessness, they are a sobering cure, or prophylactic amulet, against programmatic stupidity, like Derrida's or Girard's, or even Adluri's, motivated by a false mimesis of their phrarmakon's apparent amphiboly. Not so apparent, actually, if we remember Soma quickens childbirth and that the Platonic pharmakon is essentially maiuetic- though constrained to a couvade.
In the Phaedrus, Socrates puts forward something we might call the theory of 'bracketing', if not epoche, such that the greater mystery of the self puts at nought the endless task of rationalizing myths.
Later, Socrates elaborates a theory about how the soul is affected by the God one associates with and develops a theory or re-birth on this basis. For himself, it is as though he has been seized by the amorous wind god while performing a mimesis of Lsysias's speech, but forewarned by some prompting of his genius, he stops in his tracks and utter a palinode that reverses the argument. Love is madness, it is divine possession, it is the opposite of self-control and superior in the manner that an NP 'oracle' is superior to an algorithm in P. Why? Because the self must always find it most difficult to know what it is that seeks to control. This is in conformity with what we know about Control theory so this is a positive, not historicist, reading. Notice, it would cease to be so the moment someone proves P=NP. However, so long as that problem is open, this reading poses no scandal for philology. What does pose a scandal is glaring errors of fact- e.g. Adluri saying that, for Plato, Phaedrus is free to act iconoclastically. This isn't the case at all. Socrates would have had to make a citizen's arrest of any hermokopidai
he caught in the act. Why? Socrates was bound by the law- even at the cost of his own life.
Adluri knows this very well for he later quotes the Phaedo and comes to this conclusion-
All this is nonsense. Antilogikos means debate or more narrowly Zeno's method of paradox. The Phaedrus says that if you can formulate a counter argument to whatever you are urging, you have gone beyond rhetoric and have become a philosopher. This is the familiar dialectical method which no civilisation doesn't have a version of. Obviously, a guy who says 'OMG there's a counter-argument to everything! We're all truly fucked' is brain dead.
What does Adluri mean by saying- 'the argument for the immortality of the soul which is compared to Ariadne's thread?' Socrates gives 4 different arguments for the immortality of the Soul, but does so in a sequence suggestive of some larger mystery or path-dependence, and Phaedo's narrative thread is conventionally compared to Ariadne's as delivering us from the labyrinth of hysteresis ridden philosophical nihilism in a manner it would defy any art we possess to ever ourselves reconstruct or make sense of. This mythopoeic undercurrent in the Phaedo, suggested by the circumstance under which Socrates's death sentence was delayed, reinforces our image of the Philosopher as a sort of Man-god who offers himself as a scapegoat to deliver us from the fear of death. However, this has nothing to at all to do with logos
reasoning and hating to reason, or navigating between the two, like Odysseus between Scylla and Charybdis. Rather, there is a connection we can't see between Socrates's four different arguments which however would be perfectly clear if we could view them from a higher dimension. It is easy to solve a maze shown to you in two dimensions- as happens when viewed from above. It is quite a different thing to do so when you are trapped within it, in a smoky darkness punctuated by guttering torches with a bull headed monster bellowing for your blood.
Philology, as opposed to Hermeneutics, faces no great problem in all this as is proved by the fact that Plato is almost infinitely legible to us, not despite the great lapse of years but because of continuous philological labour from his time to our own.
Facing an aporia- or open problem in mathematics- Philology has no reason to faint or draw back. Hermeneutics might, but not Philology. I suppose a truly misologic philology- like Adluri's- or is it Bagchi? or some minatour composed of both?- can represent Phaedrus as a proto-scientific iconoclast but so can ordinary ignorance or extraordinary stupidity. Nothing very wonderful is happening here.
Arjuna, in the Gita,
does not say that mortal life is meaningless. Draupati does say it has something which is the reverse of meaning, it has anti-meaning, if God is the impassable 'mayin' or bloodless puppet-master of an occasionalist universe. Remorse is delusional. Only God is stained by the evil men do. Yuddhishtra, like Draupati, makes a similar statement at the end of the Epic. God's Justice is injustice and so even if God is the sole Reality, the sole source of Meaning, yet Virtuality and anti-meaning are the hermeneutic horizon mortality must chose as truly moral.
This is not Arjuna's view. He is an Agent not a Principal and is appalled by the foreknowledge that his duty will lead him to perform acts which his Principal will consider morally disastrous.
Yet, as Krishna points out, ethical action- in the sense of action which will change your ethos by some subtle 'aashravic' process- is impossible to avoid if we are 'yantra aaroodhani
', mounted on molecular machines. Non-action too is action.
Since both Krishna and Arjuna are Agents , not Principals, there can't be any confrontation of the type Adluri suggests in the Gita.
Thus the paradigm Adluri proposes to use in connection with German Indologists doesn't exist.
What does exist is the hermeneutic coprolites those industrious donkeys left us.
Adluri, believing himself a second Uttanka
, feeds on that fossilised donkey shit thinking it amrita.
The turd he protrudes as text, being, to his mind, the ouroborous by which he is fed.
Uttanka, though vouchsafed the theophany of Krishna, tries to exterminate the snakes.
Chthonic oracles, symbolised by the snake, gained salience with the spread of agriculture.
The watcher of the Sky still determined 'kairos'- or sought power over the rain cloud.
The aquifer, on the other hand, was a type of security outside Timeliness.
The Sky watching augur, surveying the fitness landscape from above, provides substantive solutions.
But their real time 'interpretation' or simulation might be non deterministic.
The chthonic oracle showed the labyrinth need not be solved immediately.
One can always go underground.
Delphi, was an Apollonian omphalos which claimed to combine both augury and oracle.
But it only broke concurrency deadlock at the price of indeterminacy in interpretation.
Socrates offered the Self as an underground labyrinth from whose safety one could bracket that of the Minotaur while not ceasing to solve it.
NP oracles must be like snakes, not ladders, or else deadlock mounts into exponential Time.
Uttanka, untaught by Krishna's Visvarupa, urges the extermination of the snakes.
Thus the Mahabharata originates, and like everything else in it, this origination is doubled, but only so as to preserve the snakes' occulted labyrinths. Why? Well, the Mahabharata is unique among Epics in that it says the Just King, who is a Principal, not an Agent, must learn Statistics and Game Theory in order to overcome his Vishada (Depression or abulia). But we now know no one throughout history could have a good reason to believe P=NP. Thus, the snakes must be preserved- like the Kauravas and the Pandavas, like the Tigers and the Forest, like Pythia and Apollo, so too with Garuda and Takshaka- there is a relationship of interdependence here. If the one perishes the other can not survive.
This is a positive reading. It's not the one that Gokhale, a Professor of Statistics, had- Game Theory hadn't yet been formalised nor had Hannan come to India- so we can't blame the poor fellow too much for not warning the Servants of India in blunt enough terms to shun the idiot Gandhi.
Adluri might not be a Gokhale, but he must have seen videos of Indian poverty.
They are the Visvarupa of Gandhian hypocrisy & bien pensant Nehruvian Olympianism.
Yet, Adluri writes as though Gandhi's spinning wheel was not as economically worthless as the Brahminical Yagynya was soteriologically worthless, at least in the eyes of the Gita.
He ends his book reproving stupid, but industrious, Germans, thus-
That's what happened.
Actually, Vinobha Bhave tried the experiment of living upon what he could earn from the chakhri. His conclusion was that he'd starve to death if he persisted. Everybody knows that Gandhian khaddar was not a solution to India's problems. It was a vector for corrupt rent seeking, rabid communalization and secular impoverishment.
Still, it's good to know that us P.O.I desis can be just as stupid as goras.
My worry is that Adluri is intellectually under-powered.
He doesn't yet spew entirely solipsistic, self regarding, shite like Spivak, Sen, Bhabha et al.
Well, his first PhD was supervised by Reiner Shurmann- who wrote in French.
His second Doctorate was from Germany.
Screw Sanskrit, them fucking furriners can't even do English misology proper like wot we can.
Trump will settle their hash, sho nuff.
They dun took our jobs!