Showing posts with label Sanjay Subhramanyam. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sanjay Subhramanyam. Show all posts

Thursday, 21 May 2026

Sanjay Subhramanyam's Granta interview

 Granta has the following interview with Sanjay Subhramanyam- the brother of India's Foreign Minister. Strangely, at one time, Sanju was considered the brainier of the two. That was because nobody actually read his books. 

Editor:

What modern Indian literature made an impression in your youth?

None. People like me and Sanju read Enid Blyton.  

Did someone like R.K. Narayan matter to you? Did you develop any relationship to the Tamil intellectual world?

Sanju would have been about six or seven years old when the anti-Hindi movement in Tamil Nadu led to Congress being replaced by the anti-Brahmin DMK. Tambrams began thinking of settling in the North or even emigrating. 

RK Narayan was ahead of the curve in that he wrote for the paper associated with the anti-Brahmin Justice Party.

... The fear that haunts many people is of a genuine linguistic impoverishment, when groups in search of social and economic mobility will let go of their grasp of their mother tongues, fail to properly enter the Anglosphere, and remain in a kind of linguistic limbo or no man’s land.

In some states there is resentment that even second or third generation immigrants aren't learning the State language. What if our own urban youth follow this fashion? 

I hope this proves an exaggerated fear, though it is a legitimate one. These were issues that the post-independence modernizers failed to grapple with adequately.

Different States had different approaches and different success rates in spreading literacy. The Central Government did enter the educational field but its impact was limited. 

Editor:

Were they too concerned about further cracks and break-aways from the nation under construction

linguistic reorganization of the States went through. 

or was it more the inertia of a largely English-speaking bureaucracy that they were inheriting?

Bureaucrats played second fiddle to politicians. In any case, all civil servants learn the language of the State in which they serve. 

Did they have other options?

No. A Democracy can't impose a single language on a vast population.  

Subrahmanyam:

There were certainly no easy options, and still are none, but the matter required sustained political and intellectual engagement.

It required resources which Socialist India lacked.  

Certainly not the iron fist used in the Soviet Union to impose Russification and Cyrillization. In the first two decades after Independence, the southern states were probably not given enough of a voice in these discussions, as many of the dominant politicians on the national stage came from the ‘Hindi belt’.

Sadly Tamil politicians like Kamraj & Bhaktavatsalam were pro-Hindi. But Rajaji too had tried to make Hindi compulsory in schools when he formed a Ministry in Madras in 1937. This gave great impetus to what would become the DMK which took power in Tamil Nadu towards the end of the Sixties. Indira Gandhi had been careful to conciliate them and they supported her after she split from Congress. Kamraj's political career was finished.

After Nehru’s death, there were the violent anti-Hindi agitations and the invention in 1968 of what came to be called the ‘three-language formula’ – a national educational policy that mandated students learn English, Hindi, and one regional language – which was in turn perceived as asymmetric in the burdens it placed. In sum, the question remains a sort of open sore, albeit not the only one.

It didn't greatly matter. The problem facing most students was that the English teacher didn't know English. After the failure of Gandhi's 'Wardha Scheme' (Nai Talim), the Central Government became wary of the education issue. That's why the useless Maulana Azad was put in charge of it in the Fifties. 

Editor:

You were too young for the first major dosage of Maoism injected into Indian intellectuals, peasants, and tribals in the 1960s.

Would Mao & Ayub Khan arm and train the Naxals in the Siliguri gap? If the Chinese invaded and conquered Bengal they would reward their sycophants. The other question was whether the CPML could replace the CPM. The answer was no. If you shell out a little money, people will come forward to slit the throats of the Naxals.  

Nevertheless, at an intellectual level, especially in your field of history, the prominent presence of Marxists is unmistakable.

Indira Gandhi supported the Leftist historians and they ruled the roost from the Seventies onward.  

What was the source of the appeal of Marxism to Indian intellectual elites in the 1950s and 1960s and later?

Most people believed that Stalin had turned Russia into an industrial and scientific giant in the space of a generation. Could India achieve the same thing? Probably not. Still, why not pretend otherwise?

Subrahmanyam:

India was not that different in this respect from many other parts of the non-Western world, where Marxism was very appealing in the middle decades of the twentieth century, whether in Turkey, Japan, or Latin America. Further, after 1947, there was no sustained repression against Marxist intellectuals, as happened elsewhere.

The more militant ones were punished. Stalin himself advised the Indian Communists to ally with 'progressive forces' to achieve land reform. Since Communists had been doing quite well in elections in the Thirties, in some States, it made sense to follow the 'Browder thesis' and seek to take power through the ballot box. In 1957, the Left came to power in Kerala- this was hailed as the first time Communism had prevailed by democratic means.  

They were even able to assert themselves and become a kind of lobby, supporting and promoting each other, until a major factional struggle broke out, which it did in the 1960s.

Because of the Sino-Soviet split.  

The appeal of Marxism was of course its claim to unsentimental rigor, its concern for real social change, where the Congress by the 1950s had begun to lose credibility, even among its erstwhile supporters.

Congress had shown that it could do a worse job of running the country than the Brits. The Commies should be given a chance to show that they are even shittier than Congress.  

Eventually, the establishment Marxists allied to the Soviet Union’s line were outflanked on the left by the Maoists with their more radical agenda, but they still remained important.

The CPM prevailed over the 'Maoist' Naxals.  

There were also disparate groups of intellectuals who claimed to be ‘liberals’, but as the analyses by Ram Guha and Chris Bayly have shown, this is a term that is very difficult to make clear sense of in the Indian context.

It is easy enough. Either you are for free-markets or you aren't.  Rajaji's Swatantra party stands out as being for the free-market. But it was seen as reactionary and out of touch. A currency crisis forced Indira Gandhi to devalue & bend the knee to IMF 'structural adjustment'. This was deeply unpopular and was one reason the country moved to the Left. It must be said, the Vietnam war was another factor. The US seemed to be propping up all sorts of corrupt Dictators while the Left was on the side of the toiling masses in those countries. 

Some liberals were in favor of a free market and for less state intervention, while others were just ecumenical in their intellectual tastes,

they were culturally liberal & opposed to some orthodox practices.  

so that ‘liberal’ came to mean someone who was in her/his own view not doctrinaire.

There was little enthusiasm for the thing.  After all, the British Liberal party had declined greatly. 

The difficulty that the Marxists faced was that along with some remarkably creative minds like the great ancient historian D.D. Kosambi,

he was a mathematician 

or Ranajit Guha,

too stupid to get a PhD 

or Susobhan and Sumit Sarkar,

sound enough scholars connected to the Communist party.  

they also attracted many people who were extremely rigid, repetitive, and doctrinaire, and this became even more evident when they were the ones to call the shots in the institutional landscape.

Only the very stupid studied history. The even stupider taught it.  


Editor:

But there must be something more exceptional about the Indian situation.

It was a Democracy. Communist parties could come to power by winning elections. Also, the Soviet Union was a strong friend of India.  

Marxism made more headway in India than it did in many other former British colonies. The conditions seem to have been more propitious for its reception than, say, Pakistan with its larger, more formidable land-owning class.

Islam has good reason to hate Communism. Still, the State was happy to use some Communist intellectuals for its own purposes.  

Is part of the reason that the Congress, with its acquiescence toward landlords,

Mao himself had to be nice to landlords and 'kulaks'. They alone had the food surplus to feed his men. It is easy to say 'get rid of landlords. Get rid of caste.' but the result would be a power vacuum in the districts. Sooner or later, gangs of various types will fight each other for control.  

left itself vulnerable to criticism about persistent caste inequalities and the like?

Different castes could form their own parties and seek to build alliances so as to win elections and take power.  


Subrahmanyam:

From a certain point of view, the resentments created by Pakistan’s class structure should have helped the Marxists, except that by the late 1950s there was already a US-backed Army rule.

The crackdown on the Commies had occurred earlier.  To be fair, most Leftists were sound enough patriots. 

In India, while there was periodic repression, it was more limited, and the communist parties found a place in the system but at the price of a great deal of compromise.

They had to stop pretending they could win an armed struggle.  

They may have had a social and economic agenda, but their leadership was very much drawn from the upper castes. And in the case of West Bengal, over several decades of rule, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) became a machine for the distribution of patronage and thoroughly entrenched in a corrupt rural politics.

The CPM did do a certain amount of land-reform. About 2.3 million acres were redistributed. Hilariously, about 13 'surplus'  acres were taken from the widow of Charu Mazumdar (leader of the Naxals).  

Leaving aside the Maoists, who are not concerned with governing, the two other main parties have gradually been ‘normalized’. Concerns about caste-based inequality are now carried mainly by other parties.

Those 'concerns' are a license to loot the state.  

Editor:

You have recently written with reserved respect of the founder of Subaltern Studies, Ranajit Guha,

at one time people thought he was close to the big-shots in Moscow. He had attended a Communist Youth Conference in Paris after the war which was organised by the man who would become head of the KGB. 

a shadowy yet central figure in the writing of Indian history. But how do you judge the collective over time and as a whole?

People from 'backward' and Scheduled tribes and castes were becoming Chief Ministers at precisely the time when these cretins were pretending that the 'subaltern' can't speak.  

Why do Guha’s incisive raids on historiography — lucid, cutting, brimming with insight no matter how one judges them ultimately — appear so much stronger than later contributions of Subaltern Studies?

Guha was writing nonsense. He thought that the 'European Enlightenment' had a single theory of property. It didn't. It was aware that there were many different types of property regime. Sometimes they coexisted in the same District.  

What happened along the way?

Everybody emigrated. Their students were stupid and mad. Having to read dissertations written by imbeciles is no fun even if you are an imbecile yourself.  

Editor:

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has now been in power for more than a decade. Do you think there is anything like a right-wing intellectual milieu in the country?

Smart people aren't intellectual. Intellectuals aren't smart. 

Subrahmanyam:

There are relatively few historians, sociologists or anthropologists of quality in India today

or elsewhere.  

who both have genuine scholarly stature, and openly sympathize with the BJP. To be sure, there are now such people like Sanjeev Sanyal

an economist and former Banker 

who have penetrated the market for popular history and biography with some degree of success. But this is easy enough with the backing of trade presses and their marketing machinery, even if one writes slapdash and derivative books.

rather than stupid nonsense. 

Editor:

Writing about Indian liberalism has become an academic cottage industry. Some, like Christopher Bayly, have argued that it exercised ‘hegemony’ over Indian thought from the end of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth.

Indian liberals were liberal. Indian conservatives were conservative. The Viceroyalty of Ripon was the high water mark of liberalism. But Ripon's attempt to 'devolve' more power to local authorities failed. District Collectors simply filled the Council with yes-men. 

 Liberalism could not take root at the grassroots level. Religion, on the other hand, did enable 'mass contact'.  Caste and language too were important. Nobody really cared if one or two barrister joined the Viceroy's Council. 

But weren’t other ways of thinking in the country more important than this relatively small kernel?

Yes. Religion was way more important.  Sanju won't admit this obvious fact. 


Subrahmanyam:

Intellectual history in India, and the history of political thought more particularly, is still a fledgling field.

Nope. We know all about it. There really isn't very much to it.  

Bayly and Ram Guha were amongst those who gave it a real push,

Bayly, maybe. Guha- no. He had a 'great man' theory of history. Edward Shils, the American Sociologist, did some quite extensive field-work but few Indians read his work. On the other hand, many relied on Marcus Franda's book on the Naxals. I may mention, the French philosopher Bernard Henri Levi came to India and then Bangladesh because he was enthused by the story of a heroic Maoist movement in rural Bengal. He was chucked out of Bangladesh after published an interview with a Maoist who derided Sheikh Mujib as the tool of Moscow. Pakistan's Yayha Khan was close to Beijing and thus should have been allowed to massacre Bengalis.  

and now there have been other contributions, by historians as well as philosophers and literary scholars. But the difficulty remains the focus on a narrow band of Indian thinkers who mostly wrote in English. And even these are often treated superficially. I wa s quite surprised to see how badly Bayly misunderstood someone like K.M. Panikkar, a

brilliant historian and writer who rose high in the politics of the Princely states before becoming a diplomat 

gadfly and mercenary who became a strange sort of Nehruvian ideologue.

No. He wrote well and was interesting to read but he wasn't an ideologue.  Some in the Indian security establishment- perhaps Sanju's own daddy- thought he had been soft on China. 

What is obviously needed is a set of studies of different regional traditions on the one hand, and a debate on the adequacy of categories like ‘reformers’, ‘conservatives’, ‘liberals’ and ‘secularists’ on the other.

There is no need to waste more time on this. There are negative returns to this sort of mindless 'research'.  

Editor:

For the past few decades India has been remarkably stable compared to its neighbors, where there have been either dramatic regime changes and collapses or ongoing instability.

India has always been stable- even during 'Quit India' the Government prevailed though the enemy was at the gate.  

What kind of effect do you think this stability has had on Indian intellectual and literary culture?

There wasn't very much of it and what there was was boring shite.  

Subrahmanyam:

There has not been any drastic regime change in India comparable to Pakistan or Bangladesh, or a civil war as has happened in Sri Lanka with the Tamil separatist movement. There is no doubt that such changes and upheavals have had a major effect on cultural life in those countries. Meanwhile in India, even though national elections have been regularly held every five years since 1999, the political changes have been more subtle and their effects on intellectual and literary culture have been harder to discern. One turning point was

Rahul's refusing to take over as PM and lead his party to victory in 2014. The result was that 'Hindutva' nationalism has taken over from Nehruvian 'Secular Socialism'.  

the emergence of the BJP as the dominant national party in 2014, a position it continues to hold.

Thanks to Modi. The big surprise is that the BJP has won a big majority in West Bengal. The intellectual climate has changed even in Calcutta. 

This has led to the withdrawal of state patronage to many groups and individuals on the intellectual and cultural scene who had been important in earlier periods of Congress dominance, though some have cleverly navigated the transition.

They hadn't been important. They had been sleeping peacefully while cosseted by the government.  

This has gone hand in hand with the dismantling of some key educational institutions, including universities.

They couldn't be made any shittier.  

Paradoxically, one effect of this has been to reduce the importance of Delhi as a pole, in relation to many of the regional centres.

Delhi is much more affluent now and has acquired a distinct identity. The rise of the AAP party showed that the 'common man' now had much higher aspirations.  

At the same time, the obvious growth in religious and communitarian tensions

they are much less than they were in 1947. Why pretend otherwise?  

has meant an expansion of subjects considered to be taboo, which are not addressed because of self-censorship.

Do you want some jihadis to turn up and chop your hand off? No? Then shut the fuck up.  

The media, both in print and electronic, has particularly been affected by this, though there are some refreshing new trends like the rise of political stand-up comedy.

The CM of Punjab is a comedian.  

Some participants and observers now hope that new sources of cultural and intellectual patronage will emerge, for example from the newly rich in the corporate world. But nothing guarantees either the good taste or the sound ethical orientation of such actors. If anything, my experience with them tells me to be very skeptical.

The newly rich want to get richer. That means investing in STEM subjects and skills training not wasting money on stupid historians.  

Editor:

Historically, a great deal of what became Indian literary culture flowed from Bengal.

Then Bengalis took over from the Brits and wrecked the place. 

When one turns to contemporary India and power, it’s unmistakable how much flows out of Gujarat.

The Arya Samaj was founded by a Gujarati. Parsis are Gujarati. Both Jinnah & Nehru's daughter married Parsis. Jinnah's descendants are Parsis not Muslims.  

Not only the leader of the country but also two of its wealthiest businessmen.

There are plenty of very wealthy Parsi businessmen- e.g. Jinnah's descendants. 

It seems like no accident that Gujaratis occupy a unique place in the Indian state and business. How do you account for this recent resurgence or prominence of Gujaratis in modern Indian society or has it just always been there, starting with Gandhi himself?

Starting with Dayanand Saraswati.  

Subrahmanyam:

Not only Gandhi but Jinnah was from Gujarat, and Gujaratis played a key role in the emergence of Bombay (Mumbai) as India’s leading metropolis in the second half of the nineteenth century. Earlier, between about 1400 and 1800, Gujarat was in many ways a key hub of Indian Ocean commerce, with Gujaratis playing a trading role from the Red Sea and East Africa, to Java and south-eastern China.

Gandhi himself says that his own 'banyan' class helped finance the expansion of the East India Company.  

The Gujarati intellectual and religious tradition was also quite unique, combining orthodox and heterodox forms of Islam, with Hinduism, Jainism and Zoroastrianism.

They all shared a strong work-ethic. Moreover, they believed that character was the true source of wealth. This promoted 'high trust' business networks.  

During the period of the British Empire, the Gujarati diaspora spread further, and in the second half of the twentieth century, they came to settle in increasing numbers in the UK and US. Perhaps because of their reputation as astute business people, the intellectual and cultural role of Gujaratis has been neglected,

but not their religious role. The Swaminarayan movement is Gujarati. Some of the best temples around the world are run by them.  

leaving aside the Parsis (or Zoroastrians). In recent decades, the region’s reputation has also been marred by important incidents of religious violence such as the pogrom carried out against Muslims in 2002.

After Muslims massacred Hindu pilgrims.  

In any event, we know Bengal’s intellectual prominence after 1860 was not based on any corresponding economic prosperity.

Calcutta continued to flourish. The University of Calcutta, set up in 1857, aimed for excellence and did in fact create a large class of graduates with broad intellectual and aesthetic tastes. It must be said, the Bengali 'bhadralok' retain this to this day- though they may be living far away from Bengal.  

It remains to be seen if Gujarat’s economic surge will have an intellectual counterpart.

i.e. will Gujarat produce a class of over-credentialized cretins who demand that the country destroy its economy and surrender to Pakistan?  The answer is- no. Don't be silly. 

Editor:

How would you characterize or describe Indian capitalism today?

There is too little of it in some of the most densely populated parts of the country.  

Someone like Amartya Sen lobs praise at earlier generations of capitalists, such as the Tata family, who – like the Carnegies – build scientific institutes and ‘gave back’ to Indian society. The new capitalists like Gautam Adani

are Hindu. Hindus are very evil.  

seem different, but also perfectly compatible with the Hindutva program of the BJP. Has a break of any kind transpired?

Subrahmanyam:

I have an abiding interest in the long history of capitalism in India, in its many manifestations and from early modern times onwards. The Tatas were very good at managing their public image and papering over some of the more unsavory aspects of their history, with regard to the opium trade or financing British colonial expeditions.

The Parsis rose thanks to the British. What is remarkable is that some Parsis took the lead in Nationalist politics. One reason for this may have been police indifference to Muslim violence targeting Parsi neighbourhoods. Often, the cause of the attack was some article published by a Parsi intellectual.  

But they did provide a certain model of philanthropy and personal frugality, which was then adopted by members of groups like Infosys, as distinct from the ostentatious vulgarity of the Ambanis, for example. 

Even worse is the rise of the middle class more particularly if they are Hindu. Also, why has Modi not surrendered to Pakistan and converted to Islam? Is it because Gujarat has failed to produce a class of intellectuals?  

The real problem of the last three or four decades has been the explosion of the dollar billionaire class (of whom there are now nearly three hundred), who often practice versions of pretty open crony capitalism.

This was the case in Nehru's India- or Jyoti Basu's Bengal.  

Of course, this happened elsewhere too, as David Cannadine’s study of Andrew Mellon in the US shows

Which Indian businessman was appointed Finance Minister? TTK. But that was under Nehru.  

The real question is whether it will be possible to produce a capitalism with a real emphasis on smaller entrepreneurs, and markets that are competitive rather than manipulated and monopolized by Indian ‘robber barons’.

In other words, Sanju wants a capitalism in which the capitalist has no fucking capital and thus can't gain economies of scope and scale.  

The issue also remains whether this is a process in which participation will go beyond the usual suspects, which is to say the mercantile castes and Brahmins.

Patels are agriculturists. So are Jat Sikhs. They seem to do very well in business.  

Some significant counterexamples do exist of course. I note that some analysts are still optimistic about this ‘trickle-down’, as works on India’s ‘new capitalists’ suggest. However, the jury is still out.

The jury ran away when they discovered that nobody would pay them. 


Editor:

When one listens to the BJP home minister Amit Shah talk about the greatest threats facing India, it can sometimes be difficult to tell whether he and the rest of the BJP think it’s Naxalites, Khalistan supporters, farmers, human rights activists and western NGOs, or Pakistan.

It is Pakistan. Them guys have nukes.  

Then there is the matter of trying to maneuver between the US and China.

The US has told India to fuck off. It has to find a modus vivendi with China.  

What do you think the greatest strategic dangers to India actually are?

Pakistan. They are bound to try some stupid shit. 


Subrahmanyam:

As Tzvetan Todorov wrote in his book The Fear of Barbarians (2008), many forms of nationalism generate paranoia, and see enemies everywhere, both within and without.

Communist paranoia is worse. Todorov was Bulgarian.  

To me, one can translate this into a different language. There is obviously concern on the part of the Indian state that with a form of accelerated economic growth that is accompanied by widening inequalities, various sizeable groups of disenfranchised people – whether the urban poor, or marginal peasants and footloose rural labor, or tribals whose lands have been expropriated – will want better political representation and living conditions.

Such people aren't 'disenfranchised'. They have the vote and know how to use it to get 'last mile delivery' of essential items.  

These struggles could turn violent in India, as elsewhere.

What would be the point? Killing the golden goose means no more golden eggs which can be sold to finance the welfare system.  

That is undoubtedly a long-term threat to the viability of the political system as it stands, and it needs more than band-aids as a response.

What it doesn't need is advise from a cretin.  

On the external front, the focus has been on threats from Pakistan and China for decades now. But it has turned out that in the short to medium term, the real ‘rogue’ polity is the US, which cannot be counted on as an ally either by India, or even by Europe, or Japan.

India had hoped that something would come of the 'Quad'- i.e. a naval alliance against China. 

The emergent new world order of which my father – the defense strategist K. Subrahmanyam – wrote, in the years before his passing in 2011, seems hopelessly optimistic now. India will have to brace itself for a rough ride, but so will the rest of the world.

Indeed. India will have to defund non-STEM subjects and focus on imparting work-skills. It will need to create more and more Marshallian industrial districts capable of doing their own R&D. Raise general purpose productivity and supply becomes more elastic. But you also have to fix the Justice system so total factor productivity can rise. This is stuff Sanjeev Sanyal understands. Sanju, sadly, has wasted his life. If you can't understand the present, you can't understand the past.  

Thursday, 29 January 2026

Sanjay Subhramanyam on Veer Savarkar


What is wrong with Indian historiography? Why can't it see the wood for the trees? The answer, I'm afraid, is that it attracts stupid people who have little interest in or knowledge of India. 

Take the case of Veer Savarkar. He was the younger, more intellectual, brother of Ganesh Savarkar who was inspired by the Chapekar brothers who had assassinated a British official in 1897. They, in turn, had been inspired by Phadke and Salve who had led an insurrection less than two decades previously. Veer Savarkar was given a scholarship to study in London by Shyamji Krishnavarma and, the leader of the Garam Dal, Bal Gangadhar Tilak. However, it wasn't his ideas or his writings which mattered. It was his connection with revolutionaries in India. Once the Brits decided to transfer power, the revolutionary path became pointless. The door was open. The question was who could get through it first and bolt it behind them. Still, Indians retain respect for the pre-First World War revolutionaries regardless of their ideology or subsequent trajectory.

Sanjay Subhramanyam, reviewing two recent books on Savarkar- Vinayak Chaturvedi's 'Hindutva and Violence: V. D. Savarkar and the Politics of History' & Janaki Bakhle's 'Savarkar and the Making of Hindutva'- doesn't make the obvious point that Hindutva was associated with ecumenical religion and anti-Imperialist patriotism. It was indigenous and based on prior revolutionary movements of a wholly vernacular type. 

Instead, Sanju writes of 

Blood and Bombast

Shedding blood doesn't involve bombast though, no doubt, one might go in for it when incarcerated or in exile.  

The last two decades have seen a marked uptick in projects of Indian—or more broadly, South Asian—intellectual history,

Intellect is needed to do 'intellectual history'. Indian historians have none. All that has happened is that shitheads have written shitty books.  

often using a biographical lens. While stimulating in some ways, these writings have also been surprisingly narrow in their ambitions.

They are stupid because they have been written in a mechanical manner by stupid people.  

A significant landmark was Recovering Liberties: Indian Thought in the Age of Liberalism and Empire (2011), by the late Cambridge historian C. A. Bayly.

Bayly wasn't Indian and thus had a brain even though he was a historian 

Published in Cambridge University Press’s celebrated ‘Ideas in Context’ series, the book attracted some attention outside the field of Indian history. But it could be argued that Bayly was not so much an innovator as the consolidator of a trend which had been emerging since the 1980s and 1990s, with the appearance of a number of works on the intellectual history of nationalism

it doesn't have an intellectual history. Some intellectuals were nationalists. Some weren't. One might as well write an intellectual history of flatulence.  

in South Asia by political theorists such as Partha Chatterjee and Sudipta Kaviraj,

Bengali shitheads 

both of whom were associated with the group called Subaltern Studies.

Nutters who wrote nonsense while actual 'subalterns' were becoming Chief Ministers and founding political dynasties. 

In contrast, studies of intellectual themes unrelated to nationalism in its various incarnations have been few and far between, and largely limited to the period before 1750.

Such studies were shit.  

It apparently remains difficult to interest the larger reading public in the writings of a major fifteenth-century Telugu poet like Srinatha,

who is popular with Telugu people because he was good at writing Telugu.  

or the abhanga poems and songs of Bahina Bai,

quite popular with Marathas because she wrote in Marathi 

the woman mystic from seventeenth-century Maharashtra. In India, as in many parts of the decolonized world, nationalism remains the regular refuge of historians,

No. It is an affiliation. It isn't a place they go for a crafty wank.  

even if (as an old song goes) ‘every form of refuge has its price’.

It has benefits- e.g. not getting killed. True, there may be a charge for availing of it.  

The two books under consideration here review the career and writings of a particularly

distinguished patriot 

sulphurous figure

Why didn't he convert to Islam or demand that Hindus be denied the vote?  

in the history of Indian nationalism, Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883–1966), whose life intersected with those of many other figures in the nationalist pantheon.

He was what he was because of his elder brother who was what he was because of the Chapekar brothers who were what they were because of Phadke & Salve who in turn were inspired by the great Maharashtrian warriors and patriots.  

Hindutva and Violence by Vinayak Chaturvedi, a disciple of Bayly, and Savarkar and the Making of Hindutva by Janaki Bakhle, a former student of Chatterjee, bring contrasting approaches to the subject.

Both are shit. Some Indian families were patriotic. Others weren't.  

Though he has long been the object of a cult-like veneration,

not really. People want to like him but there was something chilly about his personality. The one thing he got right was that Islam was a threat to Hindus. But even Rabindranath Tagore understood this.  

Savarkar has become far more prominent since the rise to power of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (bjp),

No. The Jan Sangh (ancestral to the BJP) was formed when the RSS backed the son of Sir Ashutosh Mukherjee when he broke with the Hindu Mahasabha in which Savarkar played a role. It should be mentioned, Savarkar was actually less orthodox than Nehru and this repelled people. In any case, it was Nehru & Congress which was kicking Muslim & Commie ass. Thus Congress was the muscular Hindu party which was seizing Muslim property on the grounds that the owners might be thinking of moving to Pakistan. 

which sees him as one of its spiritual ancestors.

Only if they don't read his shite. What is important is that he and his brother were considered very dangerous revolutionaries by the British.  

This increased prominence, along with the outbreak of communal violence in Gujarat in 2002,

Muslims attacked Hindus and then got stomped by the majority. But it was Congress which was better at mob violence. Sadly, they failed to kill Veer and had to be content with killing his younger brother. 

seem in part to have led Vinayak Chaturvedi to his subject, as well as a strange autobiographical coincidence: Chaturvedi was named after Savarkar, one of whose disciples happened to be his doctor as an infant.

Vinayak is another name for Lord Ganesh.  It is an auspicious name. 

On the anniversary of Savarkar’s death in February 2024, Prime Minister Narendra Modi wrote on social media: ‘India will forever remember his valiant spirit and unwavering dedication to our nation’s freedom and integrity. His contributions inspire us to strive for the development and prosperity of our country’.

So what? Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had said, when he died, that he was 'a great figure of contemporary India. His name was a byword for daring and patriotism. Mr Savarkar was cast in the mould of a classical revolutionary and countless people drew inspiration from him.' 

The man himself was not quite as anodyne as these phrases might have one believe, however.

He was a patriot. Anti-National historians, teaching in America, hate him.  

His career was one of twists and turns,

No. It was a straight line. Perhaps if the French had granted him asylum, he would have moved to the Left like some of the Jugantar revolutionaries. As things were, he remained a devotee of 'Harbhat Pendse' (Herbert Spencer).  

which make him far more than just the father of ‘Hindutva’,

He was the younger brother of a typical Hindutvadi revolutionary. But such people could be found across the length and breadth of India.  

a term he popularized and reinterpreted but did not invent.

One might say there was initially some tension between 'Sanatan Dharma' which people like Gandhi believed upheld the caste system and the more ecumenical and anti-casteist 'Hindutva' (i.e. essence of Hinduism such as might exist in a better world without hereditary hierarchies).  

Savarkar was born in 1883 in the Nashik region of Maharashtra, formerly Bombay Presidency, into a modest family of Chitpavan Brahmins.

The Brits spread the canard that the Chitpavans wanted to establish their own hegemony in a revived Maratha Empire. They suspected that Gokhale and Tilak (who were opponents) were secretly in cahoots because both were Chitpavan.  

This was a regional sub-caste of warrior-administrators that had been closely associated with the consolidation of Maratha power in the eighteenth century: they had for an extended period held the key ministerial post of Peshwa and acted, not as the actual sovereigns, but as the shoguns based in Pune. After several conflicts with the East India Company, the Peshwas and their allies were diplomatically outmanoeuvred and dealt a severe defeat in the Third Anglo-Maratha War of 1817–19, permitting the durable consolidation of British rule in western India. Though some of the Maratha sardars accepted this outcome, others seized the occasion of the Great Rebellion of 1857–58 to mount one further stand against the Company.

People like Nana Saheb (a Deccani Brahmin) & Tatya Tope (Deshastha) & the Rani of Jhansi (Karhada).  

After the bloody suppression of this revolt, the descendants of the erstwhile elites associated with the Marathas may have nursed their grievances, but they came to terms with colonial dominance.

Phadke & Salve didn't.  

This included acculturation into European mores and participation in the institutions of Western-style higher education that were set up after 1860.

Phadke helped found what would become the Maharashtra Education Society in that year.  

Among these was the well-known Fergusson College in Pune, founded in 1885, where Savarkar enrolled as a student in 1902.

His elder brother made sacrifices for his sibling's education.  

As Chaturvedi notes, Savarkar’s early years are difficult to reconstruct with clarity;

if you ignore his elder brother- sure.  

little direct evidence survives from that time and his own later writings must be treated as somewhat slanted and unreliable. It would seem that he was regarded as intelligent, possessing a remarkable memory and a gift for languages. By his later teens, he had a good level of Sanskrit and wrote a somewhat florid version of Victorian English, as well as Marathi and the lingua franca of Hindustani (it is unclear whether he learned Persian, as the Chitpavans of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries often did).

Persian is easy to learn.  

This early education gave him a grounding in a traditional form of philology

i.e. he learnt his mother tongue properly.  

that he would later put to use.

He wrote well in different languages. 

He also read a certain amount of popular history in English, such as the ‘Story of the Nations’ series which included volumes on Greece, Holland, Mexico and so on. It was during his years at Fergusson that Savarkar became obviously politicized,

he was politicized by his brother and his milieu.  

joining secret societies and beginning to publish articles in Marathi that attracted the attention of prominent nationalists such as Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856–1920), also a Chitpavan Brahmin.

Like Gokhale. But the money was provided by Shyamji Krishnavarma who was from the Bhanushali agricultural community in Kutch. Incidentally Shyamji rose through his excellence in Sanskrit. Monier Williams took him to Oxford to help him with his dictionary. Thus he was able to graduate and qualify as a barrister.  

Tilak and other patrons facilitated and financed Savarkar’s passage to London to study law at Gray’s Inn,

ostensibly. However, the real aim was to form a revolutionary cell amongst the Indian students there. The younger brother was doing the same work in London that the elder was doing back home.  

where he arrived in early 1906. A clearer picture emerges of the man from his time in London, partly because he produced a flurry of writings.

Shyamji & Guy Aldred were running the 'Indian Sociologist' in London. Savarkar was part of a cosmopolitan revolutionary sub-culture.  

These included translations of the essays of Giuseppe Mazzini, a figure of fascination for Indian and many other Asian nationalists in these years,

He had been an exile in London and was highly regarded there.  

and an original work on the 1857–58 rebellion titled The Indian War of Independence of 1857 (1909) which remains one of his most widely read books, especially among Indian nationalists of various stripes.

That may have been true of earlier generations.  

It announced Savarkar’s claim to be a historian, not one with an academic bent or an inclination to work with archives and documents, but rather a popularizer who deployed his rhetorical skills in charged emotional prose. Here was a history full of heroes and villains, but above all of ‘martyrs’ to the cause of the nation.

His book wasn't boring shite. Sanju disapproves.  

London in the years preceding World War I, teeming with students and foreign visitors, was a hotbed of political activity, with Lenin visiting on several occasions.

The Brits were keeping tabs on the Indian students. They didn't give a fuck about Lenin. 

Savarkar’s base was India House in Highgate, which was frequented by a number of figures with diverse political leanings (its library, as Chaturvedi notes, contained the first three volumes of Mazzini’s collected works, which Savarkar said he devoured ‘over a single week’). It was in this setting that Savarkar engaged in a celebrated debate with Mohandas Gandhi, who had by this time emerged as a charismatic public figure after his stint in South Africa.

Gandhi was with Gokhale. Savarkar was with Tilak.  

The subject was somewhat arcane,

germane, not arcane. The Ramayana is a sacred text for Hindus. Nobody told Sanju.  

namely their contrasting interpretations of the ancient epic the Ramayana, which Gandhi read in a spiritual mode and Savarkar more as a call to violent action against the forces of evil.

Gandhi, quite rightly, saw the Brits as good. They kept the peace. But the political ascendancy of the Boers, despite their defeat, showed that the colonies would be self-administering and self-garrisoning. The question was which ethnic or linguistic or confessional group would dominate. The Brits hoped to create Federations to which they could transfer power. Sadly, in India this was not possible. Savarkar regained salience by pointing to this inevitability.  

Gandhi apparently also realized that Savarkar’s reading of Mazzini differed substantially from his own

Gandhi didn't want the Brits to leave. Savarkar did. Gandhi's reading of everything was coloured by this. His big idea was that Indians should serve the Brits without asking for any reward because they had a duty to do so.  

and even took it upon himself to try and refute Savarkar’s position (without naming him) in his work Hind Swaraj (1909),

inspired by Chesterton's article saying the Indians were wrong to want Parliaments because Parliaments were European. Sadly, that fat fuck didn't draw the conclusion that the Brits should give up Christianity and revert to Druidism because Christ was Jewish and lived in Asia.  

staging a dialogue between the Editor (who speaks for Gandhi) and a revolutionary interlocutor, who supports the idea of a violent struggle for independence. ‘Whom do you suppose to free by assassination?’, the Editor asks. ‘The millions of India do not desire it. Those who are intoxicated by the wretched modern civilization think these things. Those who will rise to power by murder will certainly not make the nation happy’.

Gandhi's family couldn't become Diwans so long as the threat of war remained because they were 'banias'- businessmen, not warriors. Thanks to Pax Brittanica, his grandfather and father had risen. Gandhi himself would be awarded the Kaiser-e-Hind medal for supporting British rule and trying to recruit soldiers for their army during the Great War. 

By contrast, Maharashtians have martial qualities. They were happy to fight. Gandhi was happy to surrender.  

Besides such real and imagined exchanges, which had the effect of burnishing Savarkar’s credentials as a polemicist,

It was actions not words which the young found inspiring.  

he was also active in groups that supported violent anti-colonial actions both in India and in Britain.

Because he was a revolutionary. Sanju, shithead that he is, thinks he was an intellectual. Why was he a patriot? Must be because he read Mazzini. How else could a Maratha man get the idea that loving your own country is a good thing?  

One of his associates, Madan Lal Dhingra, eventually acted on these plans, in early July 1909 assassinating a colonial official in London, as well as a Parsi doctor who intervened. Dhingra was summarily tried and hanged, but the trail took the police to Savarkar, who had already been under surveillance for some time.

But what Savarkar was charged with was abetting the killing of Nasik District Collector A.M.T. Jackson in 1909. To get rid of foreign rule, you have to kill foreigners not in their country but in yours. 

This led to what might be considered the key phase of Savarkar’s life—his arrest, trial and imprisonment, which gave him the aura of a true hero (or vir) of the nationalist movement.

Like his brother. Indeed, Jackson was killed in retaliation for the sentencing of Ganesh Savarkar to life long incarceration in the Andamans.  

This aura would act as a lasting shield, ensuring that more moderate nationalists flinched from dealing with him or treated him with exaggerated courtesy and deference.

No. The Brits remained suspicious of him and thus limited his political role. You can be courteous to a guy who is not your rival 

Savarkar was arrested in London in early 1910, then shipped to Bombay to stand trial. En route, he managed to wriggle out of a porthole and swim ashore at Marseille only to be detained again having been mistakenly handed back to the British by a local French policeman in what became something of an international cause célèbre.

Savarkar should not have returned to London from Paris. He probably had an exaggerated idea of the virtues of British justice- at least in England.  

The French government sympathized with his cause, and his case was considered at The Hague but all to no avail. Once in India, he was tried for various offences, in particular the so-called Nasik Conspiracy, in which he was accused of shipping pistols from Europe that were used in the assassination of an English magistrate. Savarkar was sentenced to two life-terms at the Cellular Jail in the penal colony of the Andamans, an unduly harsh punishment by most accounts. He would remain there for ten years, including a substantial period in solitary confinement. The library of the Cellular Jail contained two thousand volumes, so Savarkar was at least able to read. Following repeated petitions his sentence was commuted, and he spent a longer period in a more limited form of confinement in India, first in Pune and then Ratnagiri, before eventually being released in 1937, after twenty-seven years in prison.

In other words, unlike Gandhi & Nehru etc. the Brits considered him a genuine threat. This has nothing to do with 'intellectual history'. It was a political reality. Revolutionary cells could have driven out the Brits. But, in that case, power would have passed to the revolutionaries, not the verbose lawyers. Thanks to the Gandhian policy of spending time in jail together with fellow party members, Congress developed esprit de corps and, under Nehru's leadership, was able to give the country stability even under conditions of multi-party democracy. Savarkar was an isolated, provincial, figure. Still, Nehru had to be cautious in dealing with him because there was a risk that some of the Hindu Princely States would rally under his banner and oppose the emergence of a unitary polity with a strong centre. As this danger faded, Savarkar lost salience. He himself started using Socialistic language and thus it was Rajaji who presided over the first and last genuinely Right Wing party in post-Independence India. It failed and its remnants joined one of the other new caste based Socialist parties. Meanwhile the RSS- because it remained a voluntary organization with decent people (rather than a bunch of thugs & careerists)- was able to provide some fairly competent leaders who weren't all as corrupt as fuck. But the dynasty would still rule had assassination not so tempered autocracy that Rahul turned gun-shy. Sadly, he is a dog in the manger who will neither rule not appoint some technocrat to do the job for him. This alone explains the BJP's metamorphosis into the default party of governance- at least, at the centre. 

Monday, 15 May 2023

Sanjay Subhramanyam on Ranajit Guha

Ranajit Guha was one of the first non-STEM subject academics to understand that it was better and safer to emigrate to the West if one wanted to pose as knowledgeable about India and were concerned with promoting a Communist ideology- or, more accurately, appearing to do so.

Sanjay Subhramanian, who is as useless as Guha, writes in NLR


Ranajit Guha, who died recently in the suburbs of Vienna where he spent the last decades of his life,

he had emigrated to England in 1959 

was undoubtedly one of the most influential intellectuals on the Indian left in the twentieth century,

he had no influence. He was part of an academic availability cascade or citation cartel of singular futility. 

whose shadow fell well beyond the confines of the subcontinent.

The Naxalites briefly made it plausible that tribal people would be in the vanguard of a Maoist revolution. But Indira Gandhi killed off that possibility. India would veer between Dynasticism and Hindutva. India has thrown no shadow beyond its confines- though, no doubt, it exported one or two Godmen. 

As the founder and guru (or ‘pope’, as some facetiously called him) of the historiographical movement known as Subaltern Studies,

which was useless. As far as I know only one- Ajay Skaria- is under 60. But he is as stupid as shit and teaches cows in Minnesota. 

his relatively modest body of written work was read and misread in many parts of the world,

by cretins. The whole idea behind the Left's 'long march through the institutions' was to influence the younger generation and thus shape the future. All that Subaltern Studies did was write pseudo-Hegelian or Foucauldian garbage and lower the prestige of History as an academic discipline.  

eventually becoming a part of the canon of postcolonial studies.

which was stupid shit. What works is whining about Whitey not pretending that tribals are going to encircle the Cities and impose a Maoist regime. On the other hand, the Khalqis did come to power in Afghanistan- briefly. Even the Soviets wouldn't tolerate their murderous stupidity. Afghanistan's future lay with the Prophet Muhammad, not Chairman Mao.  

Guha relished the cut and thrust of intellectual confrontations for much of his academic career,

he abused everybody except his chums as 'elitists', though he was careful to do it as far as away from India as possible.  

though he became somewhat quietist in the last quarter of his life, when he took a surprising metaphysical turn that attempted to combine his readings of Martin Heidegger and classical Indian philosophy.

To be fair, he was interested in Hegel- which is okay for a Marxist- but got confused easily. 

This confrontational style brought him both fiercely loyal followers and virulent detractors, the latter including many among the mainstream left in India and abroad.

Subaltern shite had some salience so long as the Left Front ruled West Bengal. It was not beyond the bounds of possibility that their replacement would be Maoist not Mamta.  


Guha was never one to tread the beaten path, despite the circumstances of relative social privilege into which he was born. His family was one of rentiers in the eastern part of riverine Bengal (today’s Bangladesh),

these guys had to run away from the Muslims. After the Brits left they needed some other group of Whites to worship. 

beneficiaries of the Permanent Settlement instituted by Lord Cornwallis in 1793.

beneficiaries of the Brits who kept Muslims from slitting their throats 

The area of Bakarganj (or Barisal) from which he hailed was also the birthplace of another Bengali historian, Tapan Raychaudhuri (1926-2014)

who actually knew some history 

from a similar zamindar background. Raychaudhuri was himself a complex figure, a raconteur and bon viveur with a melancholy streak, who was destined to play Porthos to Guha’s Aramis.

on separate continents. These Musketeers were shit at fighting.  

Guha was sent to Kolkata (Calcutta) for his schooling in the 1930s, where he attended the prestigious Presidency College in that city, and soon became active as a Communist. It would have been in these years that he acquired his violent aversion to the ‘comprador’ Gandhi and his version of nationalist politics, which accompanied him for much of his life.

The buddhijivi bhadralok hated anyone who was preventing them from slitting their own throats.  

He also came under the influence of an important Marxist historian of the time, Sushobhan Sarkar,

who wrote the manifesto of the CPI and who did influence two generations of Bengali students. Sumit Sarkar is his son.  

while at the same time developing a stormy relationship with another leading figure, Narendra Krishna Sinha (not at all a Marxist), under whose supervision he was meant to work on a thesis concerning colonial economic history in Bengal, which was never completed.

Because Sinha insisted that PhD students do actual research in the archives. They weren't allowed to write any old garbled shite. 

Around the time of Indian independence, Guha left Kolkata briefly for Mumbai, and in December 1947 travelled to Paris as a representative to the World Federation of Democratic Youth, led for a time by the controversial Aleksandr Shelepin.

a hard line KGB officer who brought down Krushchev.  I suppose this is why Guha was assumed to be a proper Communist working to some secret master-plan. The fact that he wrote nonsense was just 'cover'. 

Over the next few years, until his return to Kolkata in 1953, Guha travelled widely in Eastern Europe, the western Islamic world, and even China; this included a two-year sojourn in Poland, where he met and married his first wife.

So he must have been a properly vetted Commie agent.  

On his return to India, he was already accompanied by ‘an aura of heroism’ (as one of his friends wrote) and exercised a degree of charisma and mystique over younger colleagues that would serve him well later.

They thought he was Stalin's agent plotting the destruction of democratic India. Naturally, this appealed to Bengali Hindus who wanted to be killed not just by Muslims but also by the proletariat and the peasantry so that the Russians or the Chinese could take over the country.

After a brief stint as a union organizer in Kolkata,

i.e the sort of thing which would have put him on the path to a seat in the State Cabinet. But that would be too high profile a job for a sleeper agent.  

he embarked on a peripatetic career in undergraduate teaching and began publishing his first essays on the origins of the Permanent Settlement in the mid-1950s.

So, this academic stuff was just 'cover'.  

But these years also saw Guha’s estrangement from the Communist establishment, since – as for many of his generation – the Hungarian crisis of 1956 proved a turning point.

The real turning point was Kruschchev's visit to India in 1955. The Soviets decided that India was too shitty to go Communist. Nehru was a good enough stooge.  

Though his plans to defend a doctoral thesis never came to fruition,

standards have fallen since then- thanks to his ilk 

he was eventually able to find a position in 1958 at the newly founded Jadavpur University, under the wing of his former teacher Sarkar. But he quickly abandoned this post to move first to Manchester and then to Sussex University, where he then spent nearly two decades.

There were plenty of Commies in Britain. They looked after their own.  

There is much about this phase of his career around 1960 that remains obscure, including how a barely published historian managed to obtain these positions in the United Kingdom,

Sanju is shy of telling us what is bleeding obvious. Guha was supposed to be Shelepin's sleeper agent. No doubt, in an emergency- e.g. if an atomic scientist had to be got out of the country- he would be activated. Cool!  

where few other Indian historians had penetrated.

Because Indian history is best studied in India, not Manchester. Also if you want to influence Indian students to become Communists, you need to actually be in India.

Oral tradition has it that he was also proposed for a position in Paris, at the VIe Section of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, apparently at the initiative of the American economic historian Daniel Thorner

a good man who spent a decade doing useful research in India. Probably not a Communist spy. He simply refused to name names.  

(himself a refugee in Paris from McCarthyite persecution). It was also Thorner who helped arrange the publication through Mouton & Co of Guha’s first book, A Rule of Property for Bengal (1963).

Thorner knew India was moving to the Left. He needed the imprimatur of supposed KGB agents like Guha so as to be able to continue to visit the country after he himself took up a job back in the States.  


This work remains something of a puzzle six decades after its first publication.

It was shit because Guha had shit for brains. There is no puzzle.  

Though begun as a work of economic history, it eventually became what is quite clearly an exercise in the history of ideas.

i.e. it had no content because Guha knew nothing and wanted to know nothing. Still, if he published such worthless shite, he must be a high level Soviet 'sleeper'.  

Driving it at a basic level was Guha’s own childhood experience in a rural context where the Cornwallis Permanent Settlement had set the rules of the game,

but Fazl ul Haq had changed those rules when Guha was a teenager.  

eventually leading (in some views) to the progressive agrarian decline of Bengal over a century and a half.

British officials, like A.O Hume- founder of the Indian National Congress- had been demanding its replacement since the 1870s. The Government was getting very little revenue while a vast parasitic class of intermediaries were crushing the cultivators.  

But rather than analyzing class relations or related questions, Guha instead turned to debates among East India Company administrators in Bengal in the 1770s and 1780s over how the agrarian resources of the province were to be managed.

Because the relevant archives were within easy reach of the red-brick, or white-tile, University where he taught.  

This was presented as a complex struggle between different tendencies in political economy, influenced on the one hand by the Physiocrats in all their variety and splendour, and on the other by adherents of the Scottish Enlightenment (to which Governor-General Warren Hastings was attached).

All this was sheer nonsense. The Brits took over the existing system but increased security of tenure.  A comprador class of clerks who doubled as money-lenders rigged things in their own favor. What happened in Bengal was only different from what happened in Madras or Bombay because the pre-existing system was different.  

Demonstrating an impressive talent for close reading, Guha took apart the minutes, proposals and counterproposals that were presented and debated in the administrative councils of the time.

This is pure farce. John Company was a commercial enterprise. Debates were concerned with what could be done, how cheaply it could be done, and how much money this would make.  

A central figure who emerged in all this was the Dublin-born Philip Francis.

A political appointee and a randy bugger who had an affair with the lady whom Napoleon forced Talleyrand to marry. He was shot in a duel and returned to England. His malice created plenty of problems for Hastings but nobody at that time believed the fellow gave a shit about darkies or had any genuine convictions- though he wrote well. 

While the opposition between Francis and Hastings had usually been read simply through the prism of factional politics, Guha was able to elevate the differences to a genuine intellectual debate, with lasting consequences for Bengal.

In other words, Guha read what he wanted to read. He distorted the truth. This was fine with the Brits because they were laughing at the brown monkey.  

At the same time, it may be said that the work showed little or no concern with the ‘ground realities’ of eighteenth-century Bengal, and even less with the complex property regimes that had been in place before Company rule.

Because Guha was as ignorant as shit.  

This would have required Guha to engage with Mughal history and issues of Hanafite Muslim law, which were rather distant from his inclinations.

Fuck Mughal history, Guha didn't want to engage with India, period.

Furthermore, there is little in A Rule of Property to suggest that it is a Marxist history, however broadly one wishes to interpret this term. Reviewers at the time often compared it with another work that had appeared a few years earlier, Eric Stokes’s The English Utilitarians and India (1959),

Stokes was to modify his views after visiting India. It became obvious that Indian reality had nothing to do with what some clerk in the India Office wrote to some other clerk.  

probably to Guha’s chagrin. Stokes painted with a broader brush and embraced a larger chronology, but also showed less talent for the close reading of texts.

Because those texts were shit.  

But there is probably more that unites these books than separates them. While Stokes’s work was quite widely acclaimed, Guha’s somewhat unfairly languished for a time in obscurity.

Not unfairly at all. Back then, there were plenty of third or fourth generation lawyers who weren't illiterate thugs. They knew that Guha was writing nonsense.  

It is noticeable that for the remainder of the 1960s, Guha more or less ceased to publish, and when he did so in 1969 (in the form of a review of a long-forgotten edited volume on Indian nationalism) it was a bitter attack on the Indian history practiced in England, including Sussex University, ‘where the students are inducted into the rationale of […] thinly disguised imperialist procedure’.

In other words, the brown monkey started biting the hand that fed him.  

It was around this time that Guha decided to spend a sabbatical year in India, based at the Delhi School of Economics through the mediation of his friend Raychaudhuri who was teaching there.

By then, Indira had moved to the Left. A pact with the Soviets was in the offing and the CPI had been squared.  


The communist movement in India to which Guha had been attached in the 1940s and early 1950s had by now undergone considerable changes. The pro-Soviet Communist Party of India (CPI) had in 1964 split to produce the CPI(M), which was initially more oriented to Chinese communism and far more hostile to the ruling Indian Congress party.

Bengali buddhijivis, quite naturally, turned to Mao after he attacked India. If the Naxals could enable foreigners to conquer the country, they must be supported- right? 

However, in 1967, a further splintering occurred in the context of a rural uprising in north Bengal, to produce the CPI(ML), which eschewed parliamentary politics in favour of a strategy of armed peasant and student mobilization.

i.e. killing policemen and judges and so on with the result that nobody raised a peep when those rabid dogs were put down. 

Radical student groups in cities such as Kolkata and Delhi formed in support of the tendency, generally known in Indian parlance as ‘Naxalites’.

The CPI was thought to be keen on fostering these 'Left Adventurists' to counter the CPM.  

Guha, a visitor to Delhi in 1970-71, found this new movement attractive given his own pro-Maoist thinking and began to frequent these student groups.

By then people like Joan Robinson had become propagandists for the Cultural Revolution. Also, Maoists in the French Academy were entrenching themselves.  

A handful of memoirs have gone over this ground, including a recent one by the development economist Pranab Bardhan. Owing to his fieldwork, Bardhan had a good grasp of Indian rural problems and was less than impressed with what he saw at a rather cloak-and-dagger meeting orchestrated by Guha,

his mystique hinged on the notion that he was some sort of secret agent.  

describing it in Charaiveti (2021-22) as a ‘collection of clichés’, with speakers ‘regurgitating rhetoric … learned from some cheap pamphlet’.

as opposed to regurgitating garbage learned from the Delhi School of Economics.  

Nevertheless, some of these students not only became activists but also historians, drawing directly on Guha’s formulations for inspiration.

They were soon inspired to emigrate because, thanks to Leftist policies, India was becoming an ever shittier shithole. Why be a Maoist in Mumbai when it pays better to be a Maoist in Manhattan?

The first of Guha’s renewed historical interventions was an essay, first published in 1972 but with subsequent incarnations, on the Indigo rebellion of 1860 in Bengal.

1859. By 1860, a Government Commission had addressed the grievances of the cultivators.  

This was accompanied in the same years by several texts of political commentary concerning the Congress and its political profile as well as state repression and democracy in India.

The RSS helped put an end to Indira's experiment with Fascism. Peasants were organizing under their own leaders- people like Charan Singh. West Bengal was a bit backward in that respect but Bangladesh was suffering famine thanks to Mujib's doctrinaire Socialist policies. 

Still, it was hilarious that this elitist nutter was babbling about the 'subaltern' when, in State after State in India, 'backward caste' leaders were taking over the Administration. 

Amid the political turbulence of the decade (symbolized by the infamous period of Emergency declared by Indira Gandhi), Guha’s intellectual influence began to spread.

Fuck off! What spread was the belief that Socialism was shitty. China turned from Marx to the Market. Gorby tanked the Soviet Union. True, the Left Front remained in power in West Bengal but that was a testimony to the utter uselessness of Bengali politicians- more particularly the 'barristocratic' type.  

In part, this was aided by the move of Raychaudhuri to a position in Oxford; several of Raychaudhuri’s doctoral students came to be advised in reality by Guha, acting as a sort of éminence grise based in Brighton.

Bengalis are work-shy. The farm out work to unqualified people- Guha didn't have a PhD.  

This eventually led to a series of informal meetings in the UK in 1979-80, where a collective decision was made to launch the movement called ‘Subaltern Studies’, using a term drawn from Antonio Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks.

This was because these elitists didn't want genuine proles gate-crashing their party. The fact is, the Italian term 'subalterno' doesn't mean the same thing as the English word 'subaltern'. In the former, the meaning is what we would call an NCO- i.e. a prole who might rise by ability up to a point- whereas in English the meaning is 'a young chap from the officer class who will be rapidly promoted'. Churchill started off as a subaltern. He was the grandson of a Duke and his father had been a senior Cabinet Minister. 

The first volume with this title appeared to considerable fanfare in 1982

This was a clique promoting itself for careerist reasons. One result of their rise was that illiterate nutters could get a PhD in History without doing any genuine research. Also, maybe this shit had something to do with 'bio-politics' and saying 'boo to Neoliberalism!'. Then Gayatri Spivak stuck her oar in and people realized they could pretend that some great-aunt who hanged herself because her parents insisted she stay in skool rather than get married was actually saying 'boo to Neo-Liberalism' in the only way the dumb bint could do so.  

and was followed a year later by Guha’s second book, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India.

This was hilarious. By then the CIA knew everything there was to know about such insurgencies. But, since peasant insurgencies don't matter, they quickly forgot. Meanwhile in India, a farmer's leader had become PM (albeit briefly) and mass mobilization of farmers would soon become a very effective tool to force concessions from the Government.  

This, after roughly two decades of relative occlusion, was the moment of Guha’s second coming. In an opening salvo in the first volume of Subaltern Studies, Guha railed against the ‘long-standing tradition of elitism in South Asian studies’,

i.e. some Professors (mainly Whites) actually studied South Asia. This was very wicked of them. Brown monkeys don't need to study South Asia. They should be given tenure and left in peace to scribble nonsense.  

and after listing various elements which composed the foreign and indigenous elites, summarily declared that the ‘subalterns’ were the ‘demographic difference between the total Indian population and all those we have described as the “elite”’.

This was Charan Singh's point. Then people discovered that his son had been quietly working for IBM in America rather than collecting cow-dung in some remote rural fastness. Jats lost their bid for leadership of the 'backward' classes to people like Lalu Yadav whose wife's qualification for becoming Chief Minister was that she was completely illiterate.  

He further argued that the ‘subalterns’ or ‘people’ had their own ‘autonomous domain’ of political action,

in India, these were caste based 'Samajwadi' parties or older formations like the Lok Dal or Janata Dal.  

and that an elitist view of Indian nationalism had led to a consensual narrative which laid aside ‘the contribution made by the people on their own,

The elite didn't want to admit that it had been comprador. But then, because India had turned to shit on their watch, their kids emigrated. Sad.  

that is, independently of the elite to the making and development of this nationalism’.

This is what British newspapers in India had been saying since the Eighteen fucking Eighties!  

This open attack on not only British historians but Indian ones was the occasion for a set of violent exchanges, particularly with historians attached to the CPI(M), as well as more conventional nationalists.

There were also a couple of guys who cared about historiography. They soon learnt to keep quiet.  

These debates occupied much of the 1980s, by which time Guha had moved to his last academic position at the Australian National University.

Australia has always been very kind to its aborigines.  

By the end of the decade, and the publication of six volumes under Guha’s stewardship, Subaltern Studies had established itself as the dominant force in the study of modern Indian history.

Only because nobody was studying Indian history. Like Sanju, they were just writing any tendentious nonsense which came into their little heads.  


This was despite the doubt cast on the originality of the project itself, given earlier forms of history-from-below, as well as issues related to the highly uneven contents of the six volumes. Intellectual fatigue with the standard left-nationalist historiography may explain some of this triumph,

No. The Left had shat the bed. The only question was whether Commies could- like Vijayan in Kerala now claims to have done- embrace Deng Xiaoping's policies and hand the country over to the Corporates.  

but the novel jargon of the new school also played a part.

Spivak played a part. If you have a useless PhD in Eng Lit, you could write Subaltern shite without knowing the first thing about Indian history.  

Suppose my granny tells me her granny, as a little girl, had a puppy dog which bit her hand and that this left a scar still visible to her dying day. I could write a dissertation about how the Viceroy and the Secretary of State for India were complicit in the judicial soul-murder of the sodomized subaltern under the sign of Neo-Liberal catachresis because puppy dogs are cute and shouldn't bite nice people.  

During the 1990s, the main thrust of the project as a contribution to radical social history became progressively diluted, and the group itself began to fragment and disperse, with some bitter recriminations from erstwhile participants.

By then, genuinely 'subaltern' people like Mulayam Singh and Mayawati were becoming Chief Ministers.  

By the time of the twelfth volume, published in 2005, the project had largely lost shape and become mired in a fruitless engagement with deconstructionism on the one hand, and cultural essentialism on the other.

Because these guys had gained tenure and were alarmed that they were having to supervise illiterate nutjobs. That's what happens if you turn your subject to shit. You are condemned to teaching shite to shitheads.  

Returning to the original moment of 1982-83, however, several peculiar features of Guha’s stance are worth mentioning. One was his insistent adherence to a particular reading of the structuralism that had been popular in the 1960s, not so much the structural anthropology of Claude Lévi-Strauss as the reinterpretation of Saussurian linguistics by figures like Roland Barthes.

This 'reinterpretation' involved ignoring what the author had written and imposing some crazy shite of your own on his text.  

As we know, Barthes’s own position shifted considerably in the years after his ‘Introduction à l’analyse structurale des récits’ (1966), but Guha did not follow him in this trajectory.

Barthes suddenly realized that Marxism, Freudianism,  and Structuralism where all just as bourgeois as Madison Avenue. 

Instead, he stuck to certain strikingly simple ideas based on a binary division between elites and subalterns.

Then Mayawati started erecting statues of herself all over the place and living large. There was only one binary division- viz. that between those who are as rich as fuck and guys who do shitty jobs- like teach cretins worthless shite.  

This is turn became the basis of another article of faith, namely that the voice and perspective of the subaltern could alchemically be extracted from colonial records of repression through certain protocols of translation.

So, if an Indian peasant says 'I want higher minimum support prices' we should translate his statement as 'the grandiosity of the Planetary Technology of the Hegelian bad infinite as counterposed to the catachresis of the grandiosity of the Shandesh my Mummy used to prepare is the historically inevitable victory of the catachresis of the grandiosity of the Shandesh which I wish somebody would bring me just now only.' 

These ideas, expressed by Guha in some form in the first volumes of Subaltern Studies, can also be found in some of the essays by his disciples. But they are laid out at greatest length in his Elementary Aspects, which provides us with another example of the long (and ultimately unsuccessful) struggle to reconcile structuralism and historical materialism.

Some Structural Causal Model must fit the data set provided by material historiography. But it can't be based on the blathering of a Bengali gobshite. 

Friendly critics such as Walter Hauser

who did proper research in India from the Fifties onward. Back then, Americans were interested in finding out the truth about how agrarian Asian nations worked. But there was no point doing so. The thing didn't matter in the slightest.  

were distressed to find in the work an unmistakable strain of elitist hectoring and a somewhat unsubtle flattening out of the complexity of peasant societies, while nevertheless recognizing Guha’s importance in the renewal of peasant history.

There was no such renewal. Back in the Fifties and the Sixties, the CIA took an interest in such things. Then, everybody understood that peasants don't matter. Let them grab what they want or, better yet, fuck off to the Cities and begin to rise.  

There were also issues raised by historians of the longue durée like Burton Stein over whether Guha had not confounded distinct categories such as hunter-gatherers and peasants through his adherence to the logic of binarism.

Guha was saying 'I am the only member of the true elite coz the rest of you are a bunch of monkeys. Just take my word for it already.'  Meanwhile, Mahesh Yogi had made billions teaching credulous Westerners how to levitate. 

In the years that followed, Guha’s most influential writings took the form of essays, many of which were collected in a volume entitled Dominance without Hegemony (1997), which argued that the colonial political system in India (unlike the British metropolitan polity) was one in which open coercion outweighed persuasion, and that the Indian state after independence had continued to practice a version of the same nakedly coercive politics.

Independent India could do extra-judicial killing on an industrial scale. British officials had to be more circumspect otherwise they might not get a gong on retirement. 

He also developed his somewhat problematic reflections on historiography, which appeared in their final incarnation as a set of published lectures, History at the Limit of World-History (2002).

It was senile shite.  

In some of these later essays, we find Guha moving away from his structuralist position to try out other approaches. One of the most successful and widely cited is ‘Chandra’s Death’ (1987), in which Guha presents a very close reading of a small body of legal documents from 1849 in Birbhum, concerning a botched abortion leading to the death of a young woman.

Guha, a Kayastha, had praised Ramram Basu- also a Kayastha- to the skies but ignored the fact that he procured abortions for his mistresses.  

It is foolish to suggest that an abortion occasioned by an illicit love affair between people related by marriage involved any 'structural' forces operating on Society. It was believed that the abortifacient remedy available was safe and that the whole matter could be managed discreetly without scandal to the community. Sadly, the lady died. There was a judicial investigation. Still, suppose the man involved had really loved the woman, they could have eloped and joined the Baishnob sect and lived happily ever after. 

On the other hand, it is true that a very grave systemic injustice occurs if men have dicks. The real cause of dicks is Neo-liberalism. Say 'boo to Neo-liberalism'! If you don't, you are a Fascist- unless you are actually a Fascist, in which case, have a nice day. 

Here, we see Guha deploying his intimate knowledge of rural Bengal, as well as his hermeneutic skills dealing with materials written in a ‘rustic Bengali’ possessing an ‘awkward mixture of country idiom and Persianized phrases’.

Rustics in Bengal would have spoken rustic Bengali even if, a century later, some fucking elitist cunt didn't like it.  

Though interspersed with genuflection to Michel Foucault, these are moments when Guha comes closest to the spirit of Italian microstoria, an approach he never formally engaged with.

did he informally suck its cock? These are the sorts of questions a truly subaltern historiography must concern itself with. 

In contrast, the lectures on historiography take a very different tack, espousing the by-then fashionable Nietzschean critique of the Enlightenment and claims for the superiority of literature to history. We also encounter the introduction and defence of the concept of ‘historicality’ as a manner of re-enchanting the past.

Telling lies about it. Why not? Maybe the thing will be picked up by the History Channel. Or we could have a Netflix series like Bridgerton but with plenty of Bengali vampires and British werewolves and evil Capitalist cannibals wearing silk top-hats.  

This would lead, almost ineluctably, to the last phase of Guha’s career, where he would largely turn to literary criticism written in Bengali and focusing for the most part on the usual suspects of the Bengali literary pantheon.

He was very very old. It warms the cockles of our hearts to think of this imbecile returning to the literature which first sparked his interest in writing vacuous, worthless, shite.  


Unsurprisingly then, over the lifespan of nearly a century, Ranajit Guha’s trajectory was one of many unexpected twists and turns.

No it wasn't. Guys who had to run away from Muslims prefer to relocate to Europe which has a history of slaughtering Semites. Also, India pherry hot.  

The ‘biographical illusion’, as Pierre Bourdieu termed it, may call for a neater form of emplotment than what this life affords us.

There was a plot by stupid Leftists which resulted in their discipline turning to shit. That may not be neat, it may not be elegant, but that's all that happened here.  

This is despite the fact that we are dealing with someone with a powerful drive, not to career and careerism, but to a more complex form of charismatic self-fashioning

self-aggrandizement.  

in which Guha largely eschewed the limelight,

he was lazy 

which he left to some of his younger disciples. Perhaps the secretive habits of his early adult years proved hard to shake off.

If he was a Soviet agent he was being paid by Europeans then. What is certain is that he preferred to be paid by White people and to reside thousands of miles away from shitty sub-continental subalterns.  

Nevertheless, by choosing the fringes of the academic world, Guha managed to exercise a greater influence than many of those who held the great seats of academic power. In this, he showed that he did indeed have a consummate understanding of politics and its workings.

Academic politics matters not a jot more especially if victory means turning your subject into shit. Those who won't learn from history are condemned to teach it.  

Saturday, 19 October 2019

Is Ussama Makdisi stupider than Sanjay Subhramamanyam?

Update- following Makdisi's post a twitter campaign has been started- sadly, by  just me -coz this Makdisi fucker is a Professor at Rice- i.e a campus which was grabbed from indigenous people by White colonialists- and fucking lives in a house on similarly grabbed land. Yet this cunt pretends that the tender care other White Great Powers took of his amcestors' White Ass was actually morally equivalent to what happened to non Whites- or people seen as non-White, like the Jews or Iyers (who are being systematically genocided by Iyengars). Fuck you Makdisi! You are shit- like every other Makdisi, Said or Sirhan Sirhan America has promoted. How dare you challenge Indian Professors for the title of most imbecilic creature on the planet? 

Indian historians are no longer the indisputably stupidest on the planet.  They have competition from Ussama Makdisi- a Professor at Rice. Can he write a single sentence which isn't egregiously false or utterly foolish? Let us examine an essay of his in Aeon magazine to find out.
The Arab East was among the last regions in the world to be colonised by Western powers.
Nonsense! It was among the first to be colonized- the Crusader Kingdoms lasted from 1099 to 1291. The Portuguese occupied Muscat from 1507 to 1650. However, unlike Algeria or Libya, the Levant was not colonized by European nation states.
It was also the first to be colonised in the name of self-determination.
Rubbish! A League of Nations mandate was not a colony. Some Europeans did settle in Egypt and had to flee from Nasser, but none settled in the Levant save one or two eccentrics.
An iconic photograph from September 1920 of the French colonial general Henri Gouraud dressed in a splendid white uniform and flanked by two ‘native’ religious figures captures this moment.
What moment? A moment of colonization? Nothing of sort occurred.  Gouraud commanded the Fourth Army and liberated Strasbourg. To call his a 'colonial general' is as silly as calling Wellington a 'sepoy general'. The suggestio falsi here is that France was hoodwinking the League of Nations and planned to do to Syria what it had done to Algeria ninety years previously.
Seated to one side is the Patriarch of the Maronite Church, an Eastern Christian Catholic sect.
This is true. But why refer to the guy as 'native' in inverted commas? He was a native of the place. It would have been peculiar if he were from Norway or Ecuador.
On the other side is the Sunni Muslim Mufti of Beirut.
Equally true- but how is this sinister? Gouraud represented the Mandatory power. The two clergymen represented the indigenous religions. They were not assenting to French conquest or colonialism. Rather they were accepting French help to become fully sovereign members of the League on an equal footing with France.
Gouraud’s proclamation of the state of Greater Lebanon, or Grand Liban, which was carved out of the lands of the defeated Ottoman empire, served as the occasion.
The Ottomans had been defeated, in part, by Arabs. The suggestio falsi here is that the victors were carving up spoils of war.
With Britain’s blessing, France had occupied Syria two months earlier and overthrown the short-lived, constitutional Arab Kingdom of Syria.
It was the League of Nations which conferred the mandate for Syria and Lebanon on the French. King Feisal agreed to depend solely on the French and it is possible that the Arab Kingdom could have survived a little longer on this basis. However, his hot headed Defence Minister attacked the French with a tiny force. Thus Feisal was chucked out of Syria, though the Brits found him a throne in Iraq while his brother got Jordan- which crown the Hashemites retain to this day. The father was less lucky, losing Hejaz to the Ibn Saud because he had antagonized the Brits. He assumed the title of Caliph but nobody took any notice of him. His own son lost patience with him and so the old man was an exile in Cyprus till he had a stroke and was able to return to Jordan to die.  The real story about the 'constitutional' Kingdom of Syria is that it was a mirage. It had no local support. The Hashemites were outsiders. In Jordan and Iraq, they were able to survive by accepting British help. Indeed, Jordon which remained a British Mandate longest, had the best Army in the Arab League. In Syria, Feisal could have survived by depending on the French. What was impossible for the Hashemites was to sustain themselves on any throne anywhere, even their native Mecca, without Great Power help.
The pretext offered for this late colonialism was one that continues to be used today.
Really? Is the United Nations handing out Mandates to the great powers?
The alleged object of France in the Orient was not to aggrandise itself, but to lead its inhabitants, particularly its diverse and significant minority populations of Lebanon, towards freedom and independence.
Which is precisely what happened. This is no allegation. It is a precise statement of fact.
France separated the Christian-dominated state of Lebanon from the rest of geographic Syria, which itself was parcelled out along sectarian Alawi, Druze and Sunni polities under overarching French dominion.
In other words, France respected the principle of self-determination. It may not have had the British flair for doing things cheaply- France had 30,000 in Syria while Britain had only a few hundred in Iraq- but what it was doing was not colonialism but Nation building. The fact is Sunnis don't seem to like Alawis- which is why Syria is such a mess. Lebanon has been a mess for even longer because even the Maronites don't get along with each other. The Shias were an underclass who have now asserted themselves. Out of all the successor states to the League of Nations Mandates, Israel alone is in good shape.
This late colonialism was allegedly meant to liberate the peoples of the Arab world from the tyranny of the Ottoman Muslim ‘Turk’ and from the depredations of notionally age-old sectarian hatreds.
Why is 'Turk' in inverted commas? The Ottomans were Turks and the Young Turks spoke Turkish and were Pan-Turanian nationalists. They had alienated the Arabs which is why many Arabs supported the Allies. However, the Arabs were in no position to rule themselves. They needed help. Even Ibn Saud took a British subsidy and did a deal with the Americans.

Why does the author speak of 'notionally age-old sectarian hatreds'? These hatreds are all too real and continue to operate in an increasingly virulent form to this very day. This is not the fault of the Brits or the French but, rather, is the fault of Arab politicians and clerics.
Thus General Gouraud appeared in the photograph not as a vanquisher of supposedly barbarous native tribes; he was neither a modern Hernán Cortés toppling the Aztec Montezuma nor a French reincarnation of Andrew Jackson destroying the Seminoles of Florida.
Nor was he a can-can dancer. Why saw what he was not in order to suggest that he was indeed that very thing?
The French colonial general who had served in Niger, Chad and Morocco was portrayed as an indispensable peacemaker and benevolent arbiter between what the Europeans claimed to be the antagonistic communities of the Orient.
This French general's exploits in Africa pale into insignificance compared to his leading the Fourth Army against the Germans. The 'inhabitants of the Orient' were and are deeply antagonistic to each other. If this were not the case, the place would be easy to rule.
The colonisation of the Arab East had come after that of the Americas, South and Southeastern Asia, and Africa.
Muscat is Arab and in the East. It came under Portuguese control at the start of the Sixteenth Century. The Brits had Aden from 1839 to 1967 while the U.A.E became independent in 1971 after about a century and a half of British paramountcy.
This last great spurt of colonial conquest ostensibly repudiated the brutal and rapacious rule of the kind that King Leopold of Belgium had visited upon the Congo in the late-19th century.
Because it was not colonial conquest at all. France received a Mandate which it discharged in a reasonable manner.
Instead, after the First World War, Europeans ruled through euphemism: a so-called ‘mandate’ system dominated by ‘advanced’ powers was established by the new British-and-French-dominated League of Nations to aid less-able nations.
Nonsense! Europeans ruled their colonies one way. They ruled mandates somewhat differently. Thus there was never any question of permanent White settlement in the Tanganyika mandate, whereas at one time the Brits did think of keeping Kenya, which had become a Crown Colony at around the same time.
The new Lebanese and Syrian states blessed by the League were ‘provisionally’ independent, yet subject to mandatory European tutelage.
Yes, unlike African mandates, these were 'Class A mandates' being fast tracked to full independence- which is precisely what happened.

The Somalis chose to accept Italy as the mandatory power after the Second World War precisely because they could see that Mandates worked as advertised. Still, they made the wrong choice. The Brits were offering Greater Somalia but the Somalis distrusted them.
Drawing on the British experience of ‘indirect’ rule in Africa, the victorious powers cultivated a native facade to obscure the coloniser’s hand.
Rubbish! The Mandatory power sought to magnify, not obscure, its military power. It was not cultivating a facade because, once the Americans turned isolationist, there was nothing stopping them from dropping any pretense in this regard. Had the Americans stayed in, then it is possible that France would have lost its Syria mandate because of local opposition to it as reported by the King-Crane commission.

British 'indirect rule' required traditional Kings or Chieftains who had at least some grass-roots  support. This is what was lacking in Syria for the Hashemites. However, in Iraq, King Feisal was able to arrive at a modus vivendi with various tribal leaders and local magnates so Iraq became independent in 1931.
Perhaps most importantly, this late colonialism claimed to respect the new ideals of the US president Woodrow Wilson, the presumptive father of so-called ‘self-determination’ of peoples around the world.
French and British Mandates did become independent. Unlike German concessions in China which Japan seized and never had any intention of leaving, the European mandatory powers played by the book. However, they found the thing an expensive pain in the ass. Indeed, the whole world has now come to look upon this region as massive headache.
Throughout modern history, the weight of Western colonialism in the name of freedom and religious liberty has distorted the nature of the Middle East.
But not so much as those lovely guys have distorted the fuck out of each other with any weapon they can lay their hands on.
It has transformed the political geography of the region by creating a series of small and dependent Middle Eastern states and emirates where once stood a large interconnected Ottoman sultanate.
Which was loathed by all even more than they loathed each other. The Ottomans neglected their Arab provinces and their paramountcy was merely nominal along the coast and wholly notional among the scattered oases of the peninsula. The Young Turks were nationalists- indeed there were Jews among their number- and this alienated the Muslim Arabs.

Not content with pretending that the Ottoman Caliphate was 'interconnected', our Professor now says something more startling yet-
It introduced a new – and still unresolved – conflict between ‘Arab’ and ‘Jew’ in Palestine just when a new Arab identity that included Muslim, Christian and Jewish Arabs appeared most promising.
This is utterly mad! Political Islam- as opposed to hereditary Islamic potentates- has proved time and time again to be utterly lethal not just to non Muslims but also to the wrong sort of Muslims.

To be clear, Palestinians only recently gained an identity as 'Arab'. But the distinction between 'Muslim' and 'Jew' goes back 1500 years. Furthermore, 'quawmiyya'- pan-Arab nationalism- as opposed to 'wataniya' patriotism- has always had a Religious tinge. The Muslims are the purer Arabs and non-Muslims have a subordinate position.
This late – last – Western colonialism has obscured the fact that the shift from Ottoman imperial rule to post-Ottoman Arab national rule was neither natural nor inevitable.
Why not? Were the Arabs incapable of throwing out occupiers? If so, why? Do they have some genetic defect or is their culture inferior in some way? If they could conquer the Persians and the Byzantines fifteen hundred years ago, why could they not overthrow corrupt and incompetent Turks or Franks or anyone else?
European colonialism abruptly interrupted and reshaped a vital anti-sectarian Arab cultural and political path that had begun to take shape during the last century of Ottoman rule.
Nonsense! The Arabs had risen up by themselves but still had a way to go in terms of forming stable governments. Thus, they were good candidates to be 'Class A' Mandates and did become independent within a couple of decades unlike the UAE which became independent almost thirty years after Syria.

We can see why having a Mandatory power could fast-track a country to full effective sovereignty by comparing Saudi Arabia with Syria or Iraq. The latter had superior administrative and military capacity till very recently. It took a long time for Saudi Arabia to become self-assertive in the same way and it is by no means certain that it will succeed.
Despite European colonialism, the ecumenical ideal, and the dream of creating sovereign societies greater than the sum of their communal or sectarian parts, survived well into the 20th-century Arab world.
Survived? These ideas arose in the 1860's and found European sponsors- like W.S Blunt- but there was a hidden agenda to this. Ottoman reform was being castigated as 'un-Islamic'. 'The sick man of Europe' was supposed to turn into a European puppet- like the Nizam of Hyderabad. Meanwhile, the Italians had helped themselves to Libya, which they, like the French in Algeria, regarded as a permanent colony to be settled by their own people. Italy also had its eye on Albania. After the War, Clemanceau and Lloyd George tried to give Smyrna and the littoral to the Greeks, confining the Turks to the Anatolian plateau but, under Ataturk, this plan was defeated. By contrast, Syria and Iraq and Lebanon were never meant to become the permanent property of any European power.
The ‘sick man of Europe’ – the condescending European sobriquet for the sultanate – was not, in fact, in terminal decline at all in the early 20th century.
So how come it kept getting thrashed by everybody?
Contrary to hoary stories of Turkish rapacity and decline, or romanticised glorifications of Ottoman rule, the truth is that the final Ottoman century saw a new age of coexistence at the same time as it also ushered in competing ethnoreligious nationalisms, war and oppression in the shadow of Western domination.
Nonsense! That century of military defeats culminated in the Armenian genocide- a marvelous example of 'coexistence', which is why the Syrian Kurds now prefer Assad to Erdogan.
The violent part of the story is well-known; the far richer ecumenical one, barely at all.
Because, though it is a fantasy, it does not feature a super cool Genie who grants wishes or even a flying carpet.
Along with almost every other non-Western polity in the 19th century, the Ottoman empire retreated in the face of relentless European aggression.
But it was itself European and treated its Arab portions worse than the Brits treated the Indians.
Anyway, the Ottomans established themselves by relentless aggression and fell because their military capacity declined for purely internal reasons.
The empire grappled with how to maintain sovereignty and accommodate itself to 19th-century ideas of equal citizenship.
Its attempts at reform failed and it came under debt-slavery. What kept its carcass together was the mutual rivalries and jealousies of the predators.
It was hobbled by the rise of separatist Balkan nationalist movements that enjoyed support from different European powers.
But it was Egypt's victories over it, not Greece's liberation, which made its decline inevitable. If the Caliph could not hold Muslims together, what hope did he have of resisting the warlike Christian nations of the Balkans?
The Ottomans were at war in virtually every decade of the 19th century.
This was also true in the seventeenth century. But now they were losing what they had previously gained.
If the Ottomans fretted about how to preserve the territorial integrity of their once-great empire, they also invested in reforming and refashioning it in almost every way, from its military and politics to its architecture and society.
They did this on borrowed money and thus ended up with less effective sovereignty, not more.
The empire had long discriminated between Muslim and non-Muslim in the name of defending the faith and honour of Islam.
That was its strong point. Once it ceased to do so- at least formally- its doom was certain.
It also discriminated against heterodox Muslims.
By killing them.
Over centuries, it had built an imperial system that enshrined Ottoman Muslim primacy over all other groups.
Which is why it was hated by everybody who was not an Ottoman Turk.
In the 19th century, Ottoman sultans fitfully refashioned their empire as a ‘civilised’ and ecumenical Muslim sultanate that professed equality of all subjects irrespective of their religious affiliation.
But nobody was taken in by this fantasy.
Muslim, Christian and Jewish subjects adopted the red fez as a sign of their shared modern Ottomanism.
Does the author not get that the fact that if everybody abandons the turban or whatever headgear is normative in their religion then this is evidence that there is no 'equality' or 'liberty' whatsoever? This is a dangerous, hypocritical, despotism in terminal decline.
During the Tanzimat era (1839-1876), the Ottoman empire officially espoused a policy of nondiscrimination between Muslim and non-Muslim.
What happened next? Did the Turks not go back to their bad old ways when it came to Armenians or Assyrians or any other type of Christian they could lay their hands on?
The idea of equality between Muslim and non-Muslim in the empire acquired the force of social sanction and law with the promulgation of the Ottoman constitution of 1876, which declared the equality of all Ottoman citizens.
This led to a backlash against unarmed Christians by furious Muslims, some of whom were refugees from areas lost to the enemy. Thus non-Muslims did not welcome the Tanzimat reforms. However, 'Abdul the Damned' turned out to be an even more vicious foe.

No matter how much the Ottomans secularised their empire, Britain, France, Austria and Russia demanded more concessions.
The Ottomans failed to reform their economy and to win the loyalty of nationalities over whom they ruled. That is why they could not resist predators. In the end, they were so useless that they were overthrown by Turkish patriots.

By contrast, the Austrians did a deal with the Hungarians and gained a new lease of life. However, absorbing more Southern Slavs proved a bad idea. The Hapsburgs lost their throne because of their taste for the flesh of Europe's sick man.
Each European power claimed to protect one or another native Christian or other minority community, each coveted a part of the Ottoman domains, and each jealously sought to negate their rivals’ influence in the Orient.
The French and Russians did so. But the English and Germans stood aloof.
This diplomatic wrangle was referred to at the time as the ‘Eastern Question’. The breaking up of the ideological and legal privileging of Muslims over non-Muslims in the empire was not without controversy, especially because European powers consistently intervened in the empire along sectarian lines.
What the Professor means is that irate Muslims would kill any unarmed Christians in the vicinity.
The Ottomans, for example, abolished the medieval jizya tax on non-Muslims but pledged to Europe in 1856 to respect the ‘privileges and spiritual immunities’ of the Christian churches;
Because of the Crimean War.
while they exempted non-Muslims from military service in return for a tax, they conscripted Muslim subjects to fight in seemingly endless wars; they opened Ottoman markets to an influx of European goods and tolerated Western missionary proselytisation of the empire’s non-Muslims.
Which is why life for non-Muslims got so much worse thanks to Tanzimat.
In July 1860, an anti-Christian riot erupted in Damascus.
Tragic. But our Professor can turn even tragedy into comedy-
Despite the edicts promulgating nondiscrimination, a Muslim mob rampaged through the city, pillaging churches and terrorising the city’s Christian inhabitants. Newspapers in London and Paris and missionary societies condemned what they saw as ‘Mohammedan’ fanaticism.
As opposed to what? Islamic moderation?
The French emperor Napoleon III sent a French army to the Orient, allegedly to aid the sultan to restore order in his Arab provinces.
That same French Emperor had, with British help, stopped the Russian Tzar from gobbling up a large part of the Turkish Empire. He alleged he was doing this because he was the protector of the Catholics, against the Orthodox, in Jerusalem- but this was just the old Franco-Turkish alliance against, not the Hapsburgs this time, but the Rooskies.

Anyway, the Damascus massacres were the outcome of a Christian vs Druze battle.
European powers set up a commission of inquiry to investigate the massacres of 1860.
Which they needed to do coz back then nobody knew a Druze from a dromedary.
Their humanitarian motives, however, were conditional and political.
The motives of politicians are always political. Statesman don't do things unconditionally.
No corresponding commission, after all, was formed to investigate the US oppression and persecution of people of African descent or its extermination of Native Americans, the decades of French colonial terror in Algeria, or the British suppression of the anticolonial uprising in India in 1857. 
But the US or the French or the Brits had the power to fuck up anyone who fucked with them. The Ottomans were weak and had been saved from the Rooskis by the Brits and the French just a couple of years previously.
Despite being singled out by Western observers as a peculiarly non-Western and even Muslim problem, the massacres of 1860 reflected a global struggle to reconcile equality, diversity and sovereignty that manifested across the world in very different contexts.
I suppose what the Professor means is that the Christian peasant who started the revolt was opposed to both the Druze as well the Maronite elite. Thus, he could be considered a forerunner of the Communist Revolutionary- if Communists demand that Shiah Muslims convert to Christianity. The Druze proved better fighters and prevailed. However many innocent Christians in other cities- like Damascus were massacred. France's intervention has been described as the first humanitarian initiative of a type familiar to us today. They restored peace and left within a year.
So while the Ottomans were facing a genuine crisis about how to reform and maintain their grip over a heterogeneous multiethnic, multilinguistic and multireligious population, halfway across the world, the US was simultaneously fighting the deadliest war in the 19th-century Western world over slavery, racism and citizenship.
The US was very strong militarily and economically. The Ottoman Empire was a walking corpse.  France did intervene in Mexico, taking advantage of the Civil War, but they soon ran away before the Americans could kick their heads in. Thus, it was the Prussians who got to rid them of their 'Second Empire'.
The Damascus riot occurred just after the last illegal cargo of enslaved and brutalised Africans was unloaded from the schooner Clotilda on the Alabama coast.
So what? What is the connection between these two events? The last caravan of brutalised African slaves entering the heart of the Ottoman Empire did so some some 50 years later. Prior to 1908 you could buy yourself a black slave in Constantinople. In nominally Turkish territory, the slave trade did not cease till much later. However, by 1970, slavery had been abolished in almost all Arab countries.
The anti-Christian riots of 1860 in Damascus were terrible, but they reflected only one aspect of the contemporary Ottoman empire.
A reflection which must have been of great consolation to those who were slaughtered.
Far less noted than the episodes of violence sensationalised in Europe was a noticeable and widespread accommodation, if not an active embrace, by many Ottoman subjects of secularisation and modernisation.
Actually, this was noticed. Why? These modernized Turks visited Europe. If they hadn't created a favorable impression the Caliphate wouldn't have been able to borrow the money it needed to keep up a semblance of life.
The empire constituted a vital laboratory for modern coexistence between Muslim and non-Muslim that had no parallel anywhere else in the world.
Says a historian of Arab descent who, obviously, does not know that Queen Victoria had more Muslim subjects than the Caliph.
Nowhere was this coexistence more evident than in the cities of the Arab Mashriq. From Cairo to Beirut to Baghdad, Arabs of all faiths shared a common language and showed little inclination to separate politically from the Ottoman empire.
Cairo had already separated itself. If the Brits hadn't forced the Egyptians to hand back Beirut, it too would have separated itself. Baghdad was a shithole under the Ottomans. Kurdish Jews, however, were doing well there because they were useful to the Administration.
After the events of 1860, the Protestant Christian convert Butrus al-Bustani opened a ‘national’ school in Beirut.
He had helped the Ottomans regain control of Syria from the Egyptians. Furthermore, he was aligned against the Maronite elites. Finally, he was close to the Americans whose missionaries had medical and technical skills greatly in demand.
At a time when American missionaries in the Levant still rejected the idea of genuinely secular education, al-Bustani’s school was both antisectarian and respectful of religious difference.
American missionaries were missionaries- d'uh! This guy was doing something political which won him favor with the authorities. But once Tanzimat was over, he closed his school and died a few years later.
During an era when Africans and Asians were enduring gross racial subordination in European empires,
as well as in Arab and Turkish lands
when Jews were being subjected to pogroms in Russia
and Muslim lands
, and when white Americans were embracing racial segregation across the US South,
while Muslims enslaved blacks and also some White Christians
excluding Asians from US citizenship
just as Saudi Arabia excludes Asians from Saudi citizenship
, and herding the surviving Native Americans into pitiable reservations,
as opposed to massacring Armenians and Assyrians and so forth
the Ottoman empire encouraged – or did not stand in the way of – the opening of new inclusive ‘national’ schools, municipalities, journals, newspapers and theatres.
Except when it changed its mind and guys like Al Bustani quickly abandoned any such activity.
A new army was built in the name of national unity and sovereignty.
But it was still shit till the Germans got involved.
All these reforms were made more urgent by successive Ottoman military defeats against Russia and in the Balkans, and Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II’s resistance to constitutional change.
Yup, Abdul the damned sure was a peach.
In 1908, the Young Turk Revolution deposed the sultan and promised a new constitutional period of Ottoman liberty and fraternity among the various Turkish, Armenian, Albanian, Jewish and Arab elements of the Ottoman empire – not simply the absence of discrimination.
Hilarious! These are the guys who massacred the Armenians! When an Armenian killed Talat Pasha in Berlin, a German court acquitted him even though Turkey had been their ally.
Most of the secularising national reforms were far more enthusiastically pronounced than practised.
They were eye-wash- a P.R exercise designed to keep the loans rolling in.
They were implemented unevenly and piecemeal across the empire. 
Coz the empire was a walking corpse.
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the events of 1860, many Arab Muslims, Christians and Jews in the Mashriq believed they were participating in an ecumenical ‘renaissance’ or nahda that could be expressed in different Ottoman, Arab, religious, secular, political and cultural terms.
Nonsense! This is a highly tendentious availability cascade. Why not simply say that many European Jews and Slavs believed they were participating in an ecumenical 'nada' under Hitler's benign Third Reich? After all, cowards, cretins and collaborators can always be found. Diplomats in Assad's Syria would be encouraged to meet Jews and Christians and Communists who wept with emotion as they extolled the wondrous nature of the Ba'athist Republic.
They understood collectively that they were heading into a potentially brighter, and certainly more scientific, and more ‘civilised’ future.
They could only have understood this if their understanding was congenitally defective. 'Preference falsification'- to use a term invented by a Turkish economist- better describes this sort of gobshiterry.
To be sure, from Egypt to Iraq, this nahda was dominated by urban and educated men who believed that they spoke for their respective ‘nations’.
Till those 'nations' kicked them in the goolies.
It was a renaissance in the making, not an accomplished goal or even a unitary social or political project.
Very true! It produced great scientists like...urm...Einstein? and great artists like...Pablo Picasso and Salvador Dali. In Film, it produced Charlie Chaplin and Eisenstein. In Music, it produced Stravinsky and Shostokovich. Truly, the Nahda produced nada.
The nahda luminaries did not necessarily agree on the precise contours of their shared Ottoman nation any more than Americans then – or now – agree on what constitutes ideal or representative Americans.
Our professor has hit the nail on the head! Just as Americans can't agree as to whether Hawaii is or is not part of the United States, so too did nada luminaries disagree over whether or not their heads were up their own or each others' arses.
The balance between the ecumenism of Ottoman reforms and the harsh imperative to maintain effective sovereignty was delicate.
The Ottomans did not maintain effective sovereignty over Arab lands. True, the Brits made the Egyptians hand back Syria and Palestine, but Ottoman control over these places wasn't effective at all. As for the Tanzimat, the last Caliph who believed in it was barking mad and had to be deposed after a few weeks.
The ‘Eastern Question’ politicised the future of non-Muslim communities – eventually called ‘minorities’ – because they became simultaneously objects of European solicitude and pretexts for political and military aggression against the Ottomans.
Non-Muslim communities in Muslim majority areas get short shrift. Such 'minorities' decline and finally disappear. Nobody, prior to 1918 needed any pretext for robbing a corpse or annexing territory that was weakly defended. True, 'Balance of Power' considerations were a constraint. But 'pretexts' couldn't enable one to evade it.

Why is this cretin pretending that there was a United Nations and International Court of Justice way back then? Is he truly as utterly ignorant of History as a Professor at JNU? No. But he thinks Aeon readers are. Fair play to him. In the age of Trump, he is our Thucydides.
The emergence of ethnoreligious nationalisms in the Balkans exacerbated the problem when Christian Greek, Serbian, Macedonian and Bulgarian nationalists appealed to Russian, Austrian or British support seeking to break away from Ottoman control.
This sentiment was always there coz nobody likes being fucked over by rapacious conquerors who are shit at running a country.
Ottoman leaders, in turn, regarded the Turkish-speaking Muslim population as the essential core of their empire.
OMG! Prof said something which is true! How the fuck did such a miracle happen! The answer of course is, 'even Homer nods'.
In the last quarter of the 19th century, Armenian revolutionaries sought to emulate Balkan Christian nationalists.
Yes. The Congress of Berlin was the turning point. However, it was the Tanzimat era Armenian schools which prepared the ground. The Tzarist portion of Armenia gave material support. Thus, the Turks rightly feared an existential threat- though, it turned out, the Smyrna Greeks were equally dangerous.

Of course if there ever had been a genuine Ottoman 'wataniyya' identity, these problems would never have arisen. In other words, this Professor has been writing bollocks.
They appealed for European support to achieve autonomy; the Ottoman state responded with persecution.
Persecution? We are speaking of genocide.
Ottoman modernity in the shadow of Western colonialism could be both powerfully ecumenical and uncompromisingly violent.
The West had modernity but this modernity was stunted by the shadow of Ottoman colonialism. The destruction of Ottoman power turned out to be a good thing for Turkish modernity just as much as it was a good thing for the modernization of all the other territories they misruled.
It promised both a multiethnic and multireligious sovereign future and a xenophobic world without minorities.
No it didn't. It was a walking corpse. I may point out that two opposite promises can't be simultaneously believed. If a guy says 'I will rob and kill you' as well as 'I'll keep you safe', nobody in their right mind would say that he has promised to do two mutually exclusive things.
In the Balkans and Anatolia, the imperative of sovereignty clearly trumped the commitment to ecumenism, while in the Arab Mashriq ecumenical Ottomanism flourished more easily.
Then why did Egypt go its own way and, later on, why did the Arabs revolt? The answer is that there was no 'ecumenical Ottomanism'. There was a wholly ineffective government propped up by European powers.
In the Balkans, Christians often became implacably opposed to Muslims (and other Christians) amid clashing ethnoreligious nationalisms, while in the Mashriq the Arab Christians and Muslims and Jews more easily made common cause.
Against the Turks. But, once the Turks were out of the picture, their own conflicts could play out unimpeded by Great Power intervention. This, at any rate, is the continuing story of the Levant- more especially since the 'Arab Spring' which, no doubt, the author thinks was highly 'ecumenical'.
One key difference was the absence of separatist nationalisms in the Mashriq.
Because under Ottoman rule, the place had so run to seed that social conflicts were of a tribal nature.
Although Britain occupied Egypt in 1882, in the rest of the Mashriq Ottoman rule remained viable.
Which is why Palestine and Lebanon and Syria saw easily defeated the British and French armies. Ottoman rule was not viable in these areas coz the inhabitants could not defend these territories not because of lack of blood-lust but because they only wanted to kill each other as part of a tribal vendetta.
The shared Arabic language helped Arab Christians and Jews play important roles in the Arabic press, theatre, professional and women’s associations and municipalities.
But the Arab press, theater, professional and women's associations and municipalities could gain little purchase till Ottoman misrule was swept away.
The leading Egyptian daily Al-Ahram, for example, was founded by a Syrian Christian émigré.
So, this guy had to run away from Ottoman misrule to come under the protection of Britain, before he could contribute to the Arab press.
Nor was it out of place that the Jewish journalist Esther Moyal would advocate for an ecumenical ‘Eastern Arab’ identity.
She did so when her family relocated from Cairo to Jaffa where it made sense to publish something called 'Voice of the Ottomanites' so as to get a bit of Government advertising and subscriptions but she soon packed it in and settled in France.
The gradual alienation and decimation of the Armenian Christian community of Anatolia unfolded at the same time when Arab Christians and Jews coexisted with their Muslim brethren in cities such as Beirut, Haifa, Aleppo, Baghdad, as well as in British-occupied Cairo and Alexandria.
In other words, that particular genocide was a Turkish and Kurdish affair. In cities which could be shelled by European warships, Christians were safe.
The Ottoman era ended with the calamity of the First World War.
Which it joined of its own free will.
Wartime Ottoman Turkish rulers callously turned their back on the ecumenical spirit of Ottomanism at the same time as they embraced its darker statist side.
When had the embraced that spirit? Never. How could they turn their backs, that too in a callous manner, when they had never seen it or approached it or even heard about it?
In the name of national survival, these Ottomans commenced genocidal policies against Armenians.
No. They just hunted them down and killed them- often relying on Kurdish irregulars to do the dirty work.
They also hanged those they considered Arab traitors in Beirut and Damascus.
And were sometimes killed by others Arabs who weren't traitors to the Arab cause.
While a famine ravaged Mount Lebanon, Ottoman forces retreated before a British military invasion of Palestine. Jerusalem fell in December 1917.
Unlike the disastrous campaign in Iraq, mismanaged by the Indian Army, the Palestine invasion was a British Army operation which received some not wholly inconsequential support from Takritis and Hashemites and so forth. Interestingly, Indian Muslim soldiers in Iraq often defected or were not trusted whereas the British Army had superb Islamic propagandists- including an ex ICS Indian Muslim- who depicted the Young Turks, with some truth, as un-Islamic.
Almost a year later, the empire surrendered ignominiously.
The Caliph thus became available to become a British puppet. The Ottoman legacy was to be a British pension.
When the victorious Allied statesmen of Britain, France and the US assembled in Paris in 1919 to decide the future of the defeated Ottoman empire, they intervened in an empire that had been substantially transformed over the preceding century.
It had been dismembered and none regretted its passing.
The victors of the First World War ignored the ecumenical heritage of the late Ottoman empire.
Because it had never existed.
Instead, they sensationalised the empire’s obvious defects and were determined to divide it up. In 1919, President Wilson blessed the partition of the Ottoman empire.
As he had that of the Hapsburg, the German and the Tzarist Empire. What was he supposed to do? Wail and gnash his teeth and rend his clothing?
The Greek invasion of Izmir set off a bloody war that led eventually to the victory of a new Turkey under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, later known as Atatürk. This new Turkey secularised itself dramatically but was also draconian in its rejection of its own ecumenical Ottoman heritage.
Because no such thing had ever existed.
In 1923, Turkey concluded an agreement with Greece to forcibly evict – ‘exchange’ was the euphemism used – more than a million Greeks from the new Turkey. In turn, Greece evicted hundreds of thousands of Greek-speaking Muslims. The new Turkish republic then suppressed dissenting Kurds.
So what? These sorts of population exchanges were going on across the length and breadth of Europe. The Palestinians, in the shape of Grand Mufti Husseini, cuddled up with Hitler and hoped for the complete annihilation of the Jewish people. Hitler lost. Thus- just like Germans in Sudetenland or East Prussia- the Palestinians lost territory. It may have been hard cheese for them- but that's why losing wars aint fun.
The Allies, in the meantime, decided the future of the Arab Mashriq.
How could they do so? They hadn't been able to decide the future of Russia or Turkey or anywhere at all where the people were sufficiently cohesive to fight back. What made the Levant different? The answer is that though it had a few windbags who prattled 'ecumenical' shite, it was so under-developed that it was just a patchwork of tribes and warring clans. Even after the end of the French or British mandates, the Area took a long time finding its feet before spectacularly falling over them again and again.
As early as 1915, Britain had pledged to support expansive Arab Hashemite ambitions to rule an independent Arab kingdom across much of the Arab East in return for their revolt against Ottoman rule. A year later in 1916, Britain and France then secretly agreed to divide the Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire between them in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. And in 1917, prompted by Zionist lobbying, the British government pledged to support the creation of a Jewish ‘national home’ in Palestine that was overwhelmingly Arab in its demographic, social and linguistic composition.
We have seen the Sykes-Picot treaty and the Balfour declaration. Where is the agreement with the Hashemites? All we have is an exchange of letters between a High Commissioner and a non sovereign party who had fielded a couple of thousand fighters as against a British million.

 Even if the Brits said it was a treaty, by their own laws, it could be no such thing. The price paid by the Hashemites for insisting the thing was a treaty was that they lost their own ancestral seat because the Brits withdrew their support. Thus the Hashemites changed tune and kept Jordan and Iraq as British clients.
To add insult to injury, at the Paris peace conference in 1919, Britain and France blocked native Arab and Egyptian nationalists from presenting their cases for independence directly.
But what would have been the result of their 'presenting their case'? Would anyone have helped them defeat and throw out these two Great Powers? No. Of course not. Why pretend that the Peace Conference was not the Justice of the Victors? Who was listening to those who had been defeated or those who had been subjugated and atomized long ago?
They permitted, however, the Hashemite Emir Faisal, son of Sharif Hussein, to plead with the Allies to fulfil their wartime pledges to his father.
This was a concession to T.E Lawrence- the war hero traipsing around in Arab robes- just as the Cairo Conference, where his pals got their thrones was a sop to a master of English prose. However it was St. John Philby who had made the better bet sucking up to Ibn Saud.
They also allowed European Zionists to present their vision for colonising Palestine and transforming it into a Jewish state led by settlers from eastern and central Europe.
Because the Jews were important.

We now come to the crux of this author's delusion. Judging by his surname, he may be a Protestant Christian with Palestinian or Lebanese roots. Like every other atavistic ancestor worshiper he harks back to a just-so story about how the Holy Land ought to have been his people's- with American help.
And they heard from Howard Bliss, the son of an American missionary and the president of the Syrian Protestant College (today, the American University of Beirut). Bliss was allowed to speak on behalf of the inhabitants of Syria. While paternalistic to the Syrians, he was sensitive to the political mood in the former provinces of the Ottoman empire and recommended an impartial fact-finding inquiry be dispatched to the Middle East to document the political aspirations of its inhabitants by self-determination. The French were horrified by the idea of an impartial commission, and the British embarrassed, because neither had any intention of granting independence to the Arabs. Wilson himself, however, was the key interlocutor between the old and new forms of colonialism. He was deeply sympathetic to the American missionary enterprise. He also endorsed the idea of a commission.
‘In Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants’
The resulting American Section of the 1919 Inter-Allied Commission on Mandates in Turkey was known simply as the King-Crane Commission after the two Americans who led it: Henry King, the president of Oberlin College in Ohio, and the philanthropist Charles Crane. Unlike the 1860 international commission that was established in the Ottoman empire, this one actually polled people in the region – and the commission collected numerous telegrams, petitions and letters from the inhabitants of the erstwhile Ottoman provinces and held hundreds of meetings with them. Neither King nor Crane were anticolonial in any revolutionary sense, but they also both genuinely believed that it was important to record accurately the wishes of the indigenous peoples of the region. They appeared to take Wilson’s commitment to self-determination as self-evident.
After a gruelling tour through Palestine, Lebanon and Syria in July 1919, King and Crane reached several bold conclusions regarding the Arab East. They recognised that most of the inhabitants of the region spoke a common language and shared a rich ecumenical culture.
i.e. the culture only people like this guy's grand-daddies represented by reason of being Protestant and pro-American.
They admitted that the political desire of most of the native population was overwhelmingly for independence. They recommended strongly that a single Syrian state that included Palestine and Lebanon be created under an American mandate (and failing that, a British one), with robust protection for minorities.
Which could only happen if the entire region were ruled by people named Makdisi who might, at any moment, write Saidian shite about Orientalism on the slightest provocation.
Most importantly, they said that if the Wilsonian principle of self-determination was to be taken seriously, and the voice of the native Arab majority was to be heard, the project of colonial Zionism in Palestine had to be curtailed. ‘Decisions, requiring armies to carry out, are sometimes necessary,’ they wrote, ‘but they are surely not gratuitously to be taken in the interests of a serious injustice. For the initial claim, often submitted by Zionist representatives, that they have a “right” to Palestine, based on an occupation of 2,000 years ago, can hardly be seriously considered.’
And yet, the Zionist State has established that right more securely than its eastern neighbors. Jordan had to call in Pakistani pilots to fly Saudi planes to drop American bombs on Palestinian refugee camps, whereas Israel, at its very formation, could hold its own against all comers.
The commissioners submitted their final report to President Wilson in August 1919, but their recommendations were ignored. Their predictions about Palestine, however, proved prophetic.
The Zionists didn't get any help to establish their state. America only started supporting them after they fucked over all their enemies.  Crane & King weren't prophets. The Holy Land developed in a manner diametrically opposite to their 'findings'.
The US repudiated any emancipatory anticolonial interpretation of self-determination, for Wilson himself never believed in the idea that all peoples were equal or immediately deserving sovereignty. Britain and France proceeded to partition the region as if the King-Crane commission had never been sent. The British foreign minister Arthur Balfour was, at least, candid on this point. The inhabitants of Syria, he said, ‘may freely choose, but it is Hobson’s choice after all’. France was going to rule Syria and Lebanon. And Britain was going to open Palestine to colonial Zionism. ‘For in Palestine,’ Balfour wrote in August 1919, ‘we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country, though the American [King-Crane] Commission has been going through the form of asking what they are.’
No matter how intently the last colonialism of the world sold itself as a purveyor of self-determination, its Western proponents knew better.
We all know better than this cretin. Syria and Egypt and Iraq were supposed to join together in a United Arab Republic- indeed, Syria and Egypt did have a short lived union while one between the two Ba'athist countries had been agreed in the late Seventies. What happened to that type of initiative? The answer is, it was just idle talk and inflated rhetoric- shite of the sort that Edward Said or this cretin indulge in.

The real tragedy of the region is that fuckers like this fuckwit blame Whitey for all their troubles, yet are White themselves. I mean, the thing is cool when I do it coz I also put a bone through my nose and wear a grass skirt, but this guy is like totally White Bread and Ivy League.
The real tragedy, however, lay not in deceit but in the divisions that this deceit exacerbated and engendered. Colonial Europe claimed to arbitrate age-old religious difference in the Middle East. In reality, it encouraged sectarian politics. The consequences of this last colonialism reverberate until today.
Only because, according to this writer, Turkish colonialism ended thus causing the spirit of Ottoman ecumenicism to evaporate.  Britain and France may have created modern nation states in Jordan- which is still stable under a Hashemite King- Iraq which turned to shit under 'ecumenical' Ba'athists thanks to Saddam- Syria, which turned to shit under even more secular Ba'athists thanks to the Arab Spring- and Lebanon which survives but has a garbage crisis like you wouldn't believe.

On the other hand, Israel isn't shit at all. Why? It wasn't something nurtured into existence by the Brits or the French or anybody else. Its justice system does owe something to the Brits and in this matter it is like Cyprus. But everything else is indigenous. Zionism emerged at the same time, or a little later, than the Arab Nadha. But it wasn't vacuous shite. Initially, it featured kibbutzes not just kibitzing. Now it is a knowledge economy, with the Army being the biggest tech incubator. Meanwhile Professors like this cretin are, very unfairly, trying to compete with Indian savants for the title or most ignorant historian ever.

I suggest to him that he read the works of Sanjay Subhramanyam or Ramachandra Guha and pray to be reborn as an Iyer in his next life. Then and only then will he attain his aim.