Showing posts with label Myrdal. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Myrdal. Show all posts

Tuesday, 9 September 2025

Hayek vs Myrdal

In 1974, the Nobel Prize for Economics was awarded to two men- Gunnar Myrdal & Friedrich Hayek. Two women, Indira Gandhi & Margaret Thatcher caused a dramatic change in the reputation of both men. Myrdal's status fell when Indira Gandhi proved India was a 'hard', not a 'soft' state, while Thatcher openly said 'there is no such thing as Society'- thus demolishing the premise of Myrdal's Institutionalism- and that Hayek was right- only markets could efficiently aggregate information.

In his Nobel lecture, Myrdal said-

Our knowledge, as well as our ignorance, at any time and on every issue, tends to be opportunistically conditioned,

i.e. they are determined by incentives 

and thus brought to deviate from full truth.

Which is why the Market approach is better than the Institutionalist approach. Open Markets are almost instantaneously updated and hence 'error accumulation' is lower. 

In every epoch and every problem, this opportunistic tendency operates also in our scientific work, if not critically scrutinized.

Even if scrutinized. If you say to an Economist 'you only focus on the Stock Market because there's a lot of money there. There's no money to be made in studying the market for second hand farts which is why you avoid my own specialty' he will happily agree that he gets paid quite well precisely because he focuses on the Stock Market rather than at what price my farts are resold. (I bet it is very high. That's why it is so generous of me to give them away for free.)

This view dawned upon me more than forty years ago, when I analyzed the political element in the development of economic theory.

When you leave University, you realize there is a market for Economic theories of various types. Sadly, the price for your own specialization may be negative.  

I have then over the years found this hypothesis confirmed by my studies in many different fields and, of course, during my ten years as Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, responsible for operational work in relations with governments, as well as for research.

He who pays the piper calls the tune. But if the tune is horrible people run away and the guy paying the piper finds he is regarded as a pariah. Nobody buys stuff from him. He goes bankrupt. 

This is why 'Conventional Wisdom', in Econ, isn't 'Institutional'. It is Market driven. As markets were liberated from the Bretton Woods strait-jacket, Hayek's star rose while Myrdal's fell.  

When I am now working on a study of the broad social and economic dynamics of race relations in the United States

nobody was interested in what this elderly Swede or Turnip had to say. Back in the Thirties, he had a little salience coz he was as White as Fuck. Also, his policy recommendations back in Sweden were proto-Keynesian. Thus, in New Deal America, this sedulous student of American Institutionalists like John R Commons, was encouraged to write a book about 'Negros'.

since the time, more than thirty years ago, when I wrote An American Dilemma

the Carnegie Corporation spent a quarter of a million dollars on this. Myrdal was brought in because hee had studied in America and was a Swedish statesman of some repute. Ralph Bunche, who received the Nobel Peace prize in 1950, did much of the research for the book.  

it has struck me how different the whole outlook on the world could be during the late Roosevelt era, compared with now. In most respects the world issues seemed to be, and in a sense were then, simpler, much less complex.

Get the police to beat up and incarcerate Commie nutters. Don't rely on black-shirts or brown-shirts to do it. Them guys be kray kray.  

Leaving all other differences aside, what then was referred to by the static term the “backward regions” were held at rest, within the colonial power structure.

Nonsense! Many industrialized countries had 'backward regions' where squirrel hunting and sister fucking were the two main occupations. They were welcome to supply cheap labour to filthy Mill towns.  

Their continued economic stagnation in great poverty was taken for granted,

Rubbish! People could see that factories were coming up in Bombay and Shanghai and so forth. There was already an anti 'Sweated Labour' lobby in England in the Twenties. But, even prior to that there had been 'Yellow Peril' legislation against the influx of coolie labour in the US. 

without exerting much interest on the part of the public in the rich countries, nor among their economic scientists.

No. Missionaries were always gassing on about how to raise productivity amongst those you converted in 'backward areas'. The 'rice bag' Christian must be trained to earn more and more money otherwise the proselytization of his country will fail for lack of endogenously generated resources. Interestingly, one text the Missionaries translated and circulated had to do with the manner in which Ninomiya had raised productivity in rural, bakufu, Japan. Perhaps, they believed Ninomiya belonged to Japan's 'underground' Christian tradition. 

Perhaps the most important effect of World War II was the rapid dissolution of that power structure – although not having been part of the war aims of any belligerent country

the USSR always supported de-colonization. 

and not expected anywhere.

by a stupid Swede or Turnip. The fact is America had decided to pull out of the Philippines in the Thirties while the Tory 1935 Government of India Act permitted de facto Dominion Status if the Indians managed to agree to form a Federal Government at the Centre.  

Beginning with the quasivoluntary decolonization of the British dependencies on the Indian subcontinent and the rest of South Asia,

France and Holland tried to keep their colonies in South East Asia. But the game was not worth the candle. The Portuguese too tried to hang on to their colonies thus falling behind even Franco's Spain.  

it swept over the globe like a hurricane, reaching also regions where there had been virtually no indigenous liberation movement foreboding and, in some measure, preparing for the change. The result was the coming into existence in a rapid sequence of a great number of new, politically independent countries, which all were very poor and mostly stagnant, economically and socially, but where the educated elite, who thought and acted on their behalf, now raised the demand for development.

From whom? If you have become 'independent' you can't demand that your former master return and 'develop' you. I suppose what Myrdal means is that under Bretton Woods, because capital flows were regulated by Governments, some multi-lateral mechanism was required to take the place of Free Market f.d.i. & technology transfer. Some hapless bureaucrat, like Myrdal, would have to meet darkies who demanded 'Development'- i.e. turnkey projects- and do some virtue signalling as part of his job. 

In turn, as a subsequent effect of that political change the general public in the Western countries were suddenly forced to become aware of the huge income gap as between the poor majority of mankind and the rich minority,

They were already well aware of it- which is why 'Yellow Peril' arguments worked. The UK put up immigration barriers against Russian Jews precisely because they were poor and their arrival might drive down wages. In America, the White working man had been told for many decades that the thrifty 'Asiatic' was habituated to getting by on one tenth of the average wage. Clearly, if there was unrestricted immigration of Asiatics, wages would be driven down.  In France during the Great War and in the inter-war years, there were in fact Chinese 'guest-workers'. My point is, there was an acute awareness of the poverty of Asia & Africa. Indeed, after the Great War, one motivation for setting up an International Labour Organization was to prevent 'low wage' competition from such countries. Incidentally, Japan was as poor as fuck when it first entered global manufacturing markets. 

as well as the further fact that this income gap is continually widening, as indeed it had been doing for more than a century. An isolating wall of inattention, and an ignorance made possible by that opportunistic bent of mind, had been broken through.

Rubbish! The Churches which sent out Missionaries made a point of indoctrinating little kiddies back home that they should hand over a portion of their pocket money not just to save the souls of little brown babies but also to keep them alive with a little gruel. It must be said, back then doing 'Development' in Africa/Asia meant moving there and sharing the discomforts of the local people. This was fine if there was a Heavenly reward but it did not enthuse bureaucrats with PhDs in Econ. They wanted a way to virtue signal without having to stray very far from home comforts or such luxuries as 5 star hotels in Third World countries could provide.  

The poverty of what now came to be known as “underdeveloped countries”,

like Russia. Stalin was admired because he had turned a backward, agricultural, nation troubled by famine in the 1890s, into a Super-Power with nukes and Sputniks. 

a dynamic term, became recognized to be a problem. This represented a momentous redirection of public interest.

Not really. Working people may have looked askance at 'Overseas Aid' but their leaders explained to them that the thing was a con. If you had a shitty industry, you got the taxpayer to pay for it so as to preserve jobs, and then gave the shit away to darkies who didn't know it was shit. 

Within this movement there went also an equally radical redirection of economic research, for the first time giving importance to these countries’ abject poverty and also to the policy methods, which could initiate progress there by planning for development.

There was a Cold War aspect to Aid. If you were helping a smart country- Japan, South Korea, Taiwan etc- then their industrial rise meant you gained a bigger arsenal for a cheaper price. If you were pretending to help a stupid country- you could send them Myrdal or some such virtue signalling cretin.  

This new awareness of the poverty in underdeveloped countries was bound to be morally disturbing in the Western world, where, particularly since Enlightenment, the ideal of greater equality has had an honored place in social philosophy.

Political equality- maybe. Economic equality would have meant nobody could afford University fees and there would be no elite of any type. Also, Churches would be suppressed. Enlightened people don't believe in God or Heaven or Hell.  

In economic science it had even been “proven” and placed at the basis of economic theory.

Perhaps Myrdal means that the 'diminishing marginal utility of money' implied consent to progressive taxation. Sadly, you can only tax factors in inelastic supply- i.e. rents can be redistributed though the process of redistribution itself yields rents and rent contestation. Anne Kreuger who began to visit India towards the end of the Sixties saw nothing but rent-seeking there. Myrdal hadn't seen it at all. Why? Anne talked to Indian businessmen. Myrdal talked to Nehru and repeated his silly ideas in a speech to the Lok Sabha. Perhaps, that was part of his job. But it was a shitty job.  

The influence on practical policy of that recognized ideal had been minor, however, until towards the end of the last century economic conditions and power relations in one Western country after another began to make possible gradually to turn them into “welfare states.”

because they also needed to be 'warfare states'. The proletariat serves the State only by reproducing itself. The moment warfare can't be left to a professional warrior caste and conscription and 'careers open to talent' in the military become absolutely vital to national security, the industrial proletariat must be vested with rents so as to have an incentive to protect the regime. (The agricultural worker can be bought off with a bit of 'land reform'. Peasant proprietors have a stake in Society.) 

This process also implied greater awareness of existing inequalities.

i.e. having eyes in your head.  

From the beginning we find also that among the new policy proposals of economists aimed at instigating development in the underdeveloped countries, besides the prescriptions for economic planning, there was included a demand for economic assistance from the developed countries.

Because of the Bretton Woods strait-jacket. Most countries had Exchange Controls. Sweden only got rid of its foreign currency controls in 1989.  

In fact, much of the writings of economists in that early stage of the postwar era, as in many cases even later, became focused upon urging the politicians and the general public in the developed countries to be prepared to come forward with technical assistance, capital aid, and commercial concessions.

Otherwise, more and more countries would accept 'Socialist division of labour' and trade with the Soviet bloc. Vital raw materials might be denied to NATO. 

The real 'demand' of the 'Global South' was for fairer terms of trade. They could secure this only through cartelization as OPEC showed. But that meant curtains for Bretton Woods. It also meant curtains for the Soviet Union. Rooskis woke up to the fact that they could get rich trading on open markets rather than swopping oil for Cuban sugar so as to keep Castro comfortable 

This was a new element in Western thinking. Until then, the colonial power system had served as a protective shield for consciences in Western developed countries.

No. Colonial power had meant direct control of raw materials. That shield was gone. Some transfers were necessary to prevent countries signing up with the Kremlin. But the bigger threat was cartelization by primary producers. Consider Iran. It had suffered two famines during two world wars because Britain needed its oil. This was also the reason Mossadegh was toppled. But what was the upshot? The Shah became a prime mover in the creation of OPEC. The tables were turned.  Suddenly India- which had supplied Britain with the soldiers they had used in Iran during both World Wars- was tying up with Iran to develop Kudremukh. Bilateral Development projects didn't need to pretend to be about equality or democracy or being nice to darkies. 

There anyhow existed no political basis for sensing any degree of collective international responsibility for what happened in the colonial dependiencies of some West European countries, for instance no surge for a discussion in the League of Nations about how to help them to develop.

The League was useless. But there was developmental thinking in UK by the late Thirties. This increased during the War. Why? Resources were needed to defeat Hitler & Tojo and, after the War, resources would be needed to maintain threat points during the Cold War. British soldiers helped Malaysia rid itself of Commies. The Malaysian five year plans were perfectly sensible. Their current one focuses on AI.  

And the otherwise highly idealistic charter of the United Nations, drawn up before the end of World War II, had little to say about the right to political independence for the peoples in the “backward regions.” The Charter was still less outspoken about how to spur and aid development in the underdeveloped countries that would come to emerge.

Fuck the UN. It was always useless. Way too many Scandinavian shitheads ended up in its bureaucracy.  

But almost from the beginning, the United Nations and its specialized agencies became now the sounding boards for demands, raised by the representatives of the underdeveloped countries, for aid from, and commercial considerations of the developed countries.

Against the backdrop of the Cold War. Consider Pakistan. Its PM got invited to the US after Stalin invited him to Moscow. Talk of 'Development' was just cover for buying support in the newly independent nations. You never knew when their territory or resources might become strategically important. Pakistan got a lot of aid because it provided bases for American U2 flights over the Soviet Union. America needed to know how successful the Soviet nuclear program was. But the Soviets wanted the Americans to know the truth and what's more wanted the Americans to know the Soviets knew they American knew. The World had become game-theoretic. Myrdal was a walking dinosaur.  

During the three decades of its existence, the effectiveness of the United Nations has, on the whole, tended to decrease, particularly in the field of peace and security and, more generally, all issues in which the developed countries feel they have important stakes. But this whole system of intergovernmental organizations has more and more become agencies for discussing, analyzing, and promoting development in underdeveloped countries.

Is the UNDP any good? No. Still, it provides jobs to some nice people. It is important to remember that all countries have some useless diplomats and other bureaucrats who can't be sacked. But they can be shunted off to the UN. Also small countries need some place safe to store their useless ex-leaders. Again, International Organizations come in handy.  The alternative is Tony Blair or BoJo jetting around the place making money off shady Dictators. 

Their secretariats produce statistics and studies aimed at ascertaining, analyzing, demonstrating, and publicizing the pertinent elements of their poverty and the possible means of lifting them out of it. This is part of the process through which a compelling awareness of their plight has been engendered in the postwar period and forced itself upon every alert person.

Hilarious! Alert peeps know Statistics be shite. Still, it is true that Joe Lunchpail spends a lot time examining Econometric evidence that starving peeps in shithole countries aren't doing well economically. 

Myrdal says he wasn't always stupid- 

in the middle of the Fifties, I delivered a series of lectures in Cairo focused on the same topic as my present lecture (later published in a volume, Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions), and in spite of my already then having attempted to redirect my thinking in an institutional direction, I could assert:

“What is needed is not primarily a redistribution of wealth and incomes. Indeed, aid can only be a very small part of a rational international equalization program… None of the schemes which have been propounded for capital aid for development of underdeveloped countries has ever amounted to taking away more than a tiny fraction of the yearly increase of national income per head in the richer countries, which implied that no real sacrifice has ever been envisaged… A wholesale income equalization by redistribution between nations is both impossible and, I am inclined to believe, an unimportant objective.”

Nobody had any such objective anymore than it was their stated aim that billionaires submit to buggery by beggars.  

My theory is that the selfish national interests, particularly as they so often turn out to have been spurious and misconceived, do not appeal to ordinary people, who in our type of countries determine the course of public policy over the years, while a motivation in moral terms carries weight.

The Abolitionists were moral and did carry weight. People did subscribe to Charities which were known to help starving people in distant places. Herbert Hoover had done much in this field. He became POTUS. A guy helping lepers in darkest Africa was considered a saint. Money flowed to Charities of this sort. It was only when the State (because of the War, or post-War reconstruction) took over more of the economy that what had previously been done by privately had to be done publicly. But there was no good reason why the Public Sector should not be pruned back so that 'consumer sovereignty' could be restored. Indeed, Myrdal's own Sweden would regret not having taken this course earlier.

A few of the underdeveloped countries, those having oil for export, have succeeded to form an effective cartel, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, raising the price of oil four and a half to six and a half times the earlier price, depending upon what base year is chosen for comparison. They have suddenly become immensely rich. Except a few of them, like Nigeria and Indonesia, they were among the richer of the underdeveloped countries already before, or at least not so poor.

Some OPEC countries would import labour and remittances would loosen the foreign currency constraint for the countries where they came from. Also remittances were often used by families to improve health, educational and housing outcomes. This boosted the service sector and had a multiplier effect leading to higher 'Human Development' indices and positive 'mimetic' effects.  


 the other commodity exporting underdeveloped countries will probably not succeed to follow the same pattern to any considerable extent.

But they can try to add value at home and then export- e.g. Kerala exporting sea-food and other 'ready meals' to migrants in the Gulf and elsewhere. Labour mobility by itself creates some Capital, Enterprise and Technology mobility.  Intriguingly, the networks thus created may be broader and more agile than that of established elites. 

Myrdal shows awareness of the food deficit in India & Bangladesh. It is estimated that there may have been half a million to a million and a half famine deaths in Bangladesh in that year. Sheikh Mujib's Socialist policies certainly worsened the effect of the food availability deficit. Since then Bangladesh has quadrupled food output and greatly raised the participation rate for women in manufacturing. In the early Eighties they even did a bit of 'privatisation'. Myint & Bauer, not Myrdal, were on the right side of this debate. 

Myrdal expresses distaste for 

 the concept “triage” (from the French “trier”: to soft), following out an analogy from the practice in the allied medical tents during the trench warfare slaughters of World War I. With resources limited, a distinction had been made between those likely to die no matter what was done to them, those who would probably recover even if untreated, and those who would survive if cared for. The third group alone received attention. The others were left to live, or to die, on their own.

What was the alternative? France was fighting for its life. Only those soldiers who could return to the battlefield were helped- unless they would recover anyway in which case they were left to get on with it.  


Based on such an analogy, India is in this literature commonly counted as belonging to the first group,

It was obvious that it was in the third group. Pretending an agricultural country can't feed itself is silly. Still, the ruling party didn't want dominant peasant castes to start rising in prosperity through the use of hybrid seeds, fertilizers, tractors etc. Why? They would vote for their own people not dudes who went to Cambridge.  

which should be left unaided, but also many other very poor countries. Not giving them food aid is more “ethical” so the argument runs, because those who would be saved will breed, and in the end still more millions will ultimately be starving and dying. In the longer run, aid creates more misery than it alleviates.

Also Aid can work like a 'resource curse'. It can have a substantial 'crowding out' effect.  On the other hand, aid to people suffering the effects of war or natural disaster is simply a case of 'risk pooling'. Also, it makes sense to over-supply essential items so 'buffer stocks' are available. Run them down from time to time. This is a simple case of 'regret minimization'. As I have explained elsewhere, if the people of Sodom & Gomorrah had been rational, they would have had a rule to help- not refuse to help- the needy. You can only be sure there is an effective buffer stock, if it is drawn upon to feed 'outsiders'. True, if there is a deficit, those outsiders will starve. But you will be fed. Entitlements are always defeasible. But so are norms. Under exigent circumstances, benefits are rationed with 'insiders' getting everything and 'outsiders' getting nothing. 

The triage theory is not advocating less aid from the rich countries, only that it be distributed more wisely by cutting out from consideration those that are helpless.

No harm in dumping buffer stocks on the hopeless. This enables the stock to be replenished. In this case Aid is not a curse since there was no possibility that its recipients could have grown their own food. Only when we face a supply shock will we laugh heartily while they starve to death. They have served our purpose and are now welcome to perish.  

It has often been wrongly assumed that farming in underdeveloped countries is labor intensive, as an inference from the very large portion of the total labor force sustained in agriculture – in India, which is not selfsupporting in food, about 70 per cent.

Thanks to Borlaug & Swaminathan it did become so by about 1977.  

In fact their farming is extensive. Too few work at all, those who work do it for too short periods during the day, week, month and year, and they work too inefficiently.

Unless their labour is better remunerated. The Green Revolution made manual labour in agriculture better paid. This meant the transfer of earnings of manual workers went up. This then meant alternative employment had to have higher marginal product- i.e. productivity there had to rise- with the result that real wages for all physical labour tended to rise. There were plenty of comments about how 'uppity' rural workers were becoming back then. But they were also more productive. If you actually do something useful in return for higher pay, you can go elsewhere and do that work for almost the same pay without having to say 'Ji Huzoor' to the boss. Moreover, to retain labour you had to pay a premium even to the chap who looks you in the eye and thinks you are no better than he is. But, because your profits have increased, you no longer care about being 'Ji Huzoored'. You are now focussed on 'keeping up with the Joneses'. 

In the 1950s, Albert Mayer's Etawah project succeeded because it introduced a new higher yielding crop strain. Sadly, this was not obvious to some economists. They thought the key was 'community organization' or some such shibboleth. The truth is, A.O Hume (later the founder of the Indian National Congress) had been the Collector of Etawah. He had started many schools, a couple of newspapers, and encouraged new agricultural techniques. The support of the Administration did make a difference to outcomes. But when a less intelligent or hard working Collector was posted, Etawah sank back. Hulme understood that Indian notables in the District should provide the continuity to ensure incremental progress. His pal Mayo and then Ripon agreed. In the 1880s there was a scheme for local government boards with educated Indians taking on more and more tasks. Again in 1920, there was a 'devolution' scheme. The problem was the ruling Party. If it could win without doing 'development', why bother with it? The moment local politics becomes a matter of deciding whether to build a school or spend the money on irrigation, talk of 'Ahimsa' or 'Shoshialism' becomes otiose. Furthermore, your caste/communal vote-bank politics might be challenged by cadre-based parties which recruit smart people who want the value of their property in the district to go up. To be clear, that is FASCISM! It is very evil. If trains run on time, Mussolini has won! If a municipality does smart things and property values rise, incomes rise, the place stinks a little less- then FASCISM has triumphed! Furthermore, in a Hindu area, it will be noticeable that those who have benefited most are well-off Hindus! This shows that Muslims have been secretly slaughtered. 

There were good Chief Ministers who, because of their own social background, helped improve matters. Prakash Singh Kairon got an MA in Poli Sci from US. It was USeless. But the manual work he did on farms there paid off. He helped turn East Punjab from a food deficit shithole to a granary with mushrooming light industry. Maybe he was corrupt, nepotistic etc (he was killed because he was believed to have pressurised a Judge to send a man to jail) but there was no reason why the good things he did should not have been emulated. I recall asking a Sikh economist, back in the Nineties, whether there was any monograph on Kairon's contribution I could read. He didn't know. But he told me a story of the late British economist, Ajith Singh, having been denied the Student President post because some nephew of Kairon wanted it. This caused the young Ajith to quit the country and go off to America. This was a pity. Sikh economists have served India well. Swedes or Turnips haven't. 

Already without any other technology than what is already known and applied by some of the farmers in a district, yields could be increased substantially by raising the labor input and its efficiency.

Because you don't have to pay labour. You can just tell it to input more of itself and it will be happy to oblige.  

A large part of that labor input should rationally be directed upon cooperative public work, improving the land, building more and better roads,

launching Spacecraft so as to benefit research in Astrophysics 

constructing wells, irrigation ditches and storage facilities, and generally ameliorating the environment for life and work in the villages.

Why stop there? Why not raise the input of labour in an Indian village to a level where the inhabitants of distant planets are provided with stylish flying saucers?  

Jan Myrdal, Gunnar's son, has thrown a harsh light on his parents personalities and activities. I think he himself linked this to the early Swedish 'National Socialist' and 'geopolitical' theories of Rudolph Kjellen. This is the substructure to Gunnar's systematic stupidity which was disguised by his thorough self-education in Economics (his original qualification was in law) and what appeared to be a 'positivist' eagerness to do field-work, compile statistics, and so forth. His later 'development' work could be dismissed as a case of 'the White Man's burden'. But such was not the case. As his Nobel lecture makes clear he actually had shit for brains. 

Instead of a summary of his contribution to Economics- i.e. a succinct statement of axioms, theorems, policy recommendations & Statistical evidence- we have hysterical drivel about 'the Equality issue in World Development' as if poor countries were demanding a World Government which would redistribute income. The truth is inequality is a driver for mimetics which is how 'low hanging fruit' are plucked by the poorer who grow more quickly in consequence. Their relative Income rises but real income in the rich countries rises because more stuff is being produced more cheaply. There may also be a wealth effect in the rich country which invests in the poor country. There may be convergence or even over-taking. In other words, the same thing happens globally as happens within a country or, indeed, a district. 

Myrdal concludes thus-

As an institutional economist, compelled to conceive of development as a movement of a whole political, social and economic system

Myrdal should have followed Commons by looking at the legal basis of Indian society. This meant looking at property title, contract enforcement, legal penalties for malfeasance in financial and other markets, speed of criminal proceedings etc. The Indian judiciary was already in decline but 'institutional' fixes could have been suggested. Indian industry faced a problem of Mundhra type speculators and shady deals enabling 'capital flight' and asset stripping or fraudulent conversion in firms which were taken over in an illegal manner. The Congress party was itself an institution which could have reformed itself from below rather than by the 'Kamraj plan' which was disastrous. In this way the political incentive to back the Green Revolution and then to back industrialization and urbanization would have been created. Development means you can have a much bigger 'rent' while the excess burden of the restriction or regulation which creates the rent is small. Moreover, welfare schemes based on 'risk pooling' reduce uncertainty and boost economic activity. Institutions for this- themselves creating clerical jobs- could more than 'pay for themselves'. In other words instead of wasting money on virtue signalling, institutions could have set in motion 'virtuous circles'. 

Sadly, Myrdal's Manichaean morality forbade any such thing. 

and having tried to deal with the problems in a world setting, I have had to express judgments on a very wide variety of human conditions.

e.g. be nice! It is wrong to let darkies starve! 

Although I have put labor into basing these judgments upon a more intensive realistic study than I can account for in this lecture, most of them remain tentative and anyhow far from being certain, exact and precise.

They were nonsense.  

This is not my fault but is due, first, to the fact that many of the conditions I have been speaking of are difficult already to define appropriately,

it is your fault if you, as an economist, chose to talk about stuff which is difficult to quantify 

and the further fact that the coefficients of interrelations between all changes of conditions within the system are very seldom known with quantitative precision.

Which is why, in these matters, we may as well consult a mystic rather than waste money hiring an economist 

The analyst is left to use whatever knowledge he can acquire, even if it is not in the precise form that economists have been trying to attain. When dealing with wider issues they often achieve it by limiting the scope of inquiry. This, of course, only makes the analysis less relevant, adequate and realistic, particularly in the present world tumult.

By contrast Hayek's analysis had become relevant. His lecture is titled '

The Pretence of Knowledge

An analysis which is 'less relevant, adequate and realistic' isn't knowledge. It is mere pretence.  

The particular occasion of this lecture, combined with the chief practical problem which economists have to face today, have made the choice of its topic almost inevitable. On the one hand the still recent establishment of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science marks a significant step in the process by which, in the opinion of the general public, economics has been conceded some of the dignity and prestige of the physical sciences. On the other hand, the economists are at this moment called upon to say how to extricate the free world from the serious threat of accelerating inflation which, it must be admitted, has been brought about by policies which the majority of economists recommended and even urged governments to pursue.

One could say the same of the sub-continent's food crisis. It was a 'supply side' not an 'institutional' problem. Supplying cheap inputs so high yielding strains could be cultivated was the solution. Sciencey guys & Accountants could get on with the job.  

We have indeed at the moment little cause for pride: as a profession we have made a mess of things.

Unless, they were in the private sector making millions. I'm kidding. Having a PhD in Econ made you stupid. Soros did have an MSc from the LSE. But it was in Philosophy. He got his start as a clerk in a Merchant Bank. 

Hayek ends his lecture on a positive note. There is no need for gloom- just a bit of humility. 

The recognition of the insuperable limits to his knowledge ought indeed to teach the student of society a lesson of humility which should guard him against becoming an accomplice in men’s fatal striving to control society

or to claim to understand it as the Institutionalists do. The fact is an 'evolutionary' process can't be understood as it unfolds because the fitness landscape features Knightian Uncertainty- and in any case there is hysteresis because of 'co-evolution'. Thus, the Institutionalist economist is engaging in a dismal type of  theology. He is not concerned with making the world a better place. He is scolding any Heaven we can envisage because maybe it won't be equal enough or diverse enough or offer sufficient opportunities for breast-beating. 

– a striving which makes him not only a tyrant over his fellows,

i.e. the fucking eggheads on the Planning Commission  

but which may well make him the destroyer of a civilization which no brain has designed but which has grown from the free efforts of millions of individuals.

Institutions, too, are the creation of such 'free efforts'. Sad. 

Myrdal too strikes a note of hope as he concludes his lecture. But what he hopes for is yet more doom and gloom and breast beating.  

Even though my world view must be gloomy, I am hopeful about the development of our science.

It can become shittier.  

We can by immanent criticism in logical terms challenge our own thinking and cleanse it from opportunistic conformism.

Gunnar had been well paid to visit India, talk to Nehru, address the Lok Sabha, and write a big fat book about it. It would have been 'conformism' for him to do have done something to help the country. Still, he took the opportunity presented by his Nobel lecture to suggest that 750 million Indians would starve to death unless something more than 'triage' was offered them. This is because Indians are shit. Fuck can Institutional Econ do about shit?  

And we can widen our perspective. Everything can be studied. We are free to expand and perfect our knowledge about the world, only restricted by the number of scientists working and, of course, the degree of their diligence, brightness and their openness to fresh approaches.

Hayek ends his lecture by talking about ordinary people. It is their actions which create the economy. Economists might be helpful if they are humble and find some useful correlation to improve mechanism design or forecasting or simply save money. Myrdal ends his lecture by talking about 'scientists' like himself. He hopes there will be more such shitheads. That way the entire world will be fucked up and so his gloomy worldview will have been shown to be justified. 



Kaushik Basu on Gunnar Myrdal

 In 1974, the Nobel Prize for Economics was shared by Hayek & Myrdal. The latter had called India a 'soft state'. In 1975, Indira showed it was well hard. In the UK, Heath's Emergency failed. The head of the Civil Service had a nervous breakdown. There was the 'three day week'.  India's Emergency succeeded. Economic growth went up.

In 'Asian drama' Myrdal wrote-

If in a country like India the government were really determined to change the prevailing attitudes and institutions,

it would try to kill or incarcerate or chase away those with attitudes or institutions it didn't like. Where  now was the White Sahib who refused to permit darkies to enter his Club or Railway Compartment? Gone never to return. Why? Their Government didn't have the means or the motive to shoot darkies and get rid of any political parties or other institutions which the Viceroy didn't like. That is why Wavell insisted the British evacuate the place. 

What about the Muslim League clamouring for reserved seats? They too were gone or cowed into submission. The ethnic cleansing that accompanied Partition had shown the Government was determined not to tolerate any such shenanigans. Communists were dealt with the same way till they learnt to play nice.

Once Indira showed she was determined to perpetuate a dynastic autocracy, even if it meant locking up lots of people, she got her way because it turned out none of her rivals could hold down her job without being stabbed in the back by a colleague.

It may be asked why Hindus like elections even if political parties turn dynastic. The answer is that Hindus don't like having to kill Daddy or Uncle to inherit power. Anyway, who is to say some cousin mightn't kill you? Elections are a non-violent way of solving such problems. Also when there are two rivals from the same caste group, rather than their being internecine war disastrous for the community, the matter can be resolved by seeing who gets more votes. 

and had the courage to take the necessary steps and accept the consequences, then these would include the effective abolition of caste,

It had been abolished. Perhaps Myrdal meant 'make inter-caste marriage compulsory'. The problem was that your own body-guard might shoot you if you were making him marry some ugly slut. 

prescribed by the constitution, […] land reform and tenancy legislation, […] the eradication of corruption at all levels [,] forceful attack on the problem of the educated unemployed and their refusal to do manual work, and so on. (Myrdal 1968: 3681 ).

Myrdal was clearly a nutter. Nobody 'refused to do manual work' and starved to death in consequence. Either they got fed without doing it, or their sort disappeared from our branch of evolutionary history. Still, Myrdal and his wife did believe in sterilizing disabled people. There was a eugenic as well as an autarkic aspect to Swedish Welfarism. 

Kaushik Basu, in a paper titled ' A short history of India's economy A chapter in the Asian drama', comments on Myrdal's observation. 

One senses in this a pessimism that is deep. It is a concerned pessimism,

it is a rancid Swedish meatball 

one that stems almost from a frustration with a test case of a nation—in this case India—breaking out of the stranglehold of colonialism,

Colonialism wasn't economically viable. It couldn't strangle shit. That's why it disappeared.  

and one he wishes would succeed and become a prototype for others.

Nonsense! He chose to write about a shit-hole country only because it was a shit-hole country.  

This commitment deserves appreciation,

No. It deserved derision.  

but the remark also suggests an inadequate understanding of the complexity of interaction between economics and politics and the troublesome idea of the endogeneity of institutions.

Meaningless jibber-jabber. The feedback loop between policy decisions and economic outcomes is simple, not complex. Either an institution is indigenous or it isn't. The East India Company wasn't. The Indian Parliament is. What's so fucking troublesome about that? 

His questioning ‘If […] the government were really determined’ and suggestion that the ‘abolition of caste’ and ‘eradication of corruption’ are matters of choice by an agent called government or by individuals that constitute the government reveals a rather simplistic view of government as an exogenous institution.

No. His question was simply stupid. It was like saying 'if the Swedish Government were really determined to enforce 'solidarity wages' then they would have reduced the 'apanage' to the Royal Family to the same level as the welfare benefit to a unemployed couple with the same number of children.' In other words, it is mere rhetoric of a virtue signalling sort.   

This is a common presumption in economics.

Basu means that Government spending is exogenous in some economic models. But it isn't in reality. It is endogenous. That is why the Royal Government of Iyerland can't exogenously spend a single dollar. It has no tax revenue and can't borrow for that reason. Also, the currency I issue is not accepted in payment for goods and services by anybody. Why? My Kingdom of Iyerland is endogenously shit which is why its Government too is endogenously shit.  

We would not, for instance, say that the market’s failure shows that consumers are not determined.

Yes we would. If consumers were determined that the market failure should not occur, then it won't. Nobody would buy from the monopolist till he puts the price down to the free market equilibrium.  

It is arguable that the level of determination a government exhibits is not an exogenous variable. 

unless the place is a colony. Even then determination is a function of cost vs. benefit. The higher the cost or the lower the benefit, the less determination will be shown. 

and, even if it were, it is not clear that governments have within their wherewithal the ability to control many of the social ills like discrimination and corruption.

Nor is it clear that they don't. What matters is resources. There we are on firmer ground. What resources can the Government command? What is the associated opportunity cost? These are questions for economists to answer.  

The persistence of these ills is not necessarily evidence of political leaders condoning them, even though it often is.

The problem may lie with the judiciary or the police etc. But, again, this is a question of resources and costs and benefits.  

We have to use more sophisticated analysis to separate out the cases where the corruption is being condoned or even encouraged, and where it is being haplessly suffered because its mitigation is beyond the leader’s reach—or any individual’s reach, for that matter.

I suppose Basu means corruption which 'greases the wheels' vs. pure rent extraction.  

Many of our worst social ills are collective traps.

No. They are a matter of perspective. The public visibility of immigrants or homosexuals or even unveiled women may be considered a 'social ill' as may the fact that the King of Sweden doesn't have to mop floors for a living. Also, how come Trump hasn't undergone compulsory gender reassignment surgery? Is it because he is a misogynist? 

Fortunately, economics has moved on since then and even taken some small steps to reach out to the neighbouring disciplines of politics, psychology, and sociology by trying to conceptualize institutions as endogenous structures.

There has long been an 'Institutionalist' school of Econ dating back to Veblen & Commons. The German Historical school could be considered its precursor. 

While Myrdal deserves credit for venturing out to some of these, rather treacherous, multi-disciplinary terrains so early,

it was old when he was young 

the social sciences at that time did not have the tools and theoretical constructs to do justice to such inter-disciplinary trespassing.

Myrdal & Ostrom were from the Institutionalist school and got Nobel prizes. Galbraith too could be said to be in that tradition. These weren't 'trespassers'.  

As a consequence, we can now share the concern that Myrdal had for the theatre of Asia and at the same time bring some of the more contemporary, multi-disciplinary social science methods to bear on the project.

Basu can do no such thing. He is too stupid and ignorant.  

 From the vantage point of hindsight, it seems quite remarkable that India did what no other newly independent developing country did. It invested in politics first—establishing democracy, free speech, independent media, and equal rights for all citizens.

The Brits did that, in so far as it was done at all, in all its South and South East Asian colonies.  Sri Lanka had universal suffrage since 1931. India could have got it too if minorities had permitted it.

At one level all progressive leaders around the world tried this.

Nonsense! Either the Brits had bequeathed a system which worked and continued to work or Big Men went in for one-party rule or 'guided democracy' or something of that sort. 

After the end of World War II, as nations broke from the yoke of imperialism and became independent, we had not just Jawaharlal Nehru in India,

who kept winning elections from 1937 till his death. After that his daughter won elections till 1977. The British system worked well for them.  

but Bung Karno Sukarno in Indonesia,

He held one election in 1955 but within two years he decided 'guided democracy' was better.  

Mohammad Ali Jinnah in Pakistan,

who died soon after taking office. A full and fair election was only held in 1970 with the result that the country split in two.  

Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana,

The Brits held election in 1951. Nkrumah won. Another election in 1954 was held on the principle of direct representation and yet another in 1957 to signify approval of the new constitution and complete independence. The last election was in 1960 for the Presidency after which the country was completely sovereign. But there were no more elections till 1979. Nkrumah was deposed by a coup in 1966.  

Julius Nyerere in Tanzania,

it was a one-party state till 1992 when the constitution was amended. 

and several other leaders trying to put their nation on an even keel politically, and build political institutions to promote inclusive economic development.

With the exception of Indonesia, which was ruled by the Dutch, these countries had multi-party elections under the Brits. India and Sri Lanka kept that system. Many other ex-British colonies did not.  

But in most cases it did not last.

Nehru was cool with multi-party democracy. The others were not. But Nehru's dynasty was more successful. Dynasticism isn't exactly a characteristic feature

 of parliamentary democracy.  

Coups, chaotic responses, and the lust for power caused democracy to collapse in one nation after another, bringing in military rule and conflict.

No. It was the preference of the leader. Nkrumah and Nyrere probably would have been re-elected.  

A map of democracy around the world 3 in 1985 would show a bleak landscape in virtually all developing and emerging nations. India was the exception.

A bad one. The new PM was a pilot who had inherited office from his Mummy. She had only become PM because her Daddy had been PM.  

While a large part of the credit for this does go to the early political leaders, Mahatma Gandhi, Nehru, and Ambedkar,

none does. They never intended the house of Nehru to replace the house of Windsor. I personally give much of the credit to piss-drinker Morarji Desai. He was so hated that Indira was made PM in 1966. At the age of 80, he did achieve his ambition and became PM. But he was so hated that his coalition could not last. Mrs Gandhi returned to power in 1980. After she was killed, the throne passed to her son. After he was killed it could have gone to his widow. Rahul says he could have become PM in 1995, when he turned 25 and thus could get elected to Parliament.  

and to progressive writers and intellectuals like Rabindranath Tagore, Periyar E.V. Ramaswamy, and Sarojini Naidu, as in all matters of history, luck also plays a role.

The Brits created the institutions which Nehru and his descendants found it worth their while to keep up. Credit goes to the Brits not Mahatma Periyar or Sarojini Tagore.  

And India had it in ample measure. In any case, the upshot was that in terms of political design and structure, with regular elections, a progressive constitution, secularism, free media, and an empowered supreme court, India resembled an advanced nation, and in this respect had very few peers in the developing world. 

Very true. The current leader of the Tory party in the UK is the heir, by primogeniture, to Sir Robert Walpole. The Labour Party is headed by the descendant of Keir Hardie.  

India’s downside turned out to be its economy.

not to mention its Bengali economists 

With growth sluggish, large swathes of population living in abject poverty, and widespread illiteracy, the country trudged along decade after decade, while several other nations, like South Korea, Taiwan,

which rose under military dictatorship 

Singapore,

which rose under an authoritarian leader 

and Hong Kong,

which rose under a Hayekian Governor 

starting from roughly the same level of economic prosperity in the 1950s, took off in spectacular ways. Some would argue that this sluggishness was in part caused by India’s democracy and progressive politics,

No. They would say 'import substitution' is stooooopid. Export led growth is the way to go.  Also tell Leftists to go fuck themselves. Look at what Mrs. Bandarnaike did to Ceylon. 

and that, if there had been a dictator, he or she would have pulled the economy out of the vicious circle of poverty.

Suharto was a dictator. I suppose Indonesia did better under him but it has done even better as a democracy.  

I will comment on this later. But the fact remains that whether or not this causal explanation from politics to economics has any merit, two things do stand out: early India’s remarkable political achievements

based entirely on British creations. Even the Indian National Congress was launched by a British Civil Servant.  

and the persistent economic stagnation for at least three decades after its independence.

Because of stupid Socialists aided and abetted by Bengali economists like Sukhomoy Chakrabarty.  

 Luckily, the Emergency lasted just under two years and, unlike most dictatorships, it was brought to an end by an election, called by Indira Gandhi herself, in 1977, when she was roundly defeated. It remains a mystery why she behaved so differently from other dictators—namely, calling an election and then not rigging it.

Because the opposition wasn't a threat to her life. Her son's chums might be.  

One theory, to which I subscribe, is that she was troubled by the fact of having destroyed her father’s legacy of a vibrant democracy,

where sonny boy takes over from Mummy?  

wanted the legitimacy of an election, and was prepared to (and some have argued that she even expected to) lose.

Sanjay had given a magazine interview denouncing Socialism. What if the CIA bumped her off, so Sanjay could take over? No doubt, they could get one of his pals to arrange matters. Would he himself be tipped the wink? Perhaps. That's how Imperial Delhi had always worked- save under the rule of British Viceroys.  

The other hypothesis is hubris, namely, that she was confident that, though the opposition and much of the media cried foul, she would win and then she would consolidate her power.

Or the opposition would come to power and prove utterly shit. Then, she could return with Sanjay old enough to take a seat in parliament.  

In any case, fortunately for all supporters of democracy,

provided they also supported Dynasty 

she was defeated. When Indira Gandhi returned to power in the 1980s, India’s policies began to change. I would argue that unlike her father, Jawaharlal Nehru, she did not have an innate economic ideology.

She was a Socialist but not doctrinaire enough to enjoy watching millions starve to death 

While she had strong political convictions, which she backed up with an enormous strength of personality, on matters of economics, she had few deep convictions.

All Indians were deeply convinced that Lefty Bengali mathematical economists had shit for brains. Punjabis like Minhas, Manmohan or Montek were fine.  

 Nehru’s own ideology was broadly Fabian socialist, with an instinctive internationalism. As he wrote to Amiya Chakravarty in a letter dated 29 November 1935, ‘I have far more in common with English and other non-Indian socialists than I have with non-socialists in India.’

This explains why Nehru stuck with parliamentary democracy. He saw his job as that of slowly persuading everybody in his party to become Socialist. If they didn't like it they could fuck off to some other party in which case they'd either lose their seat or be confined to the opposition benches.  

And later, when he was Prime Minister of the country, he had joked with the US ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith, that, to understand India, Galbraith ought to realize that Nehru was ‘the last Englishman to be ruling over India’.

in the English way- i.e. via parliament.  

His socialist instinct—the belief that there should be vastly greater equality of income and wealth—was genuine. Commenting on what differentiates Western and Indian political thinking, Myrdal had written, ‘Another fact is South Asia’s commitment to egalitarianism, which is an integral part of their ideology of planning.’ (Myrdal 1968: 120).

This is mad. Because of World Wars, many Western countries had had to go in for genuine egalitarianism- including equal rations and equality of opportunity so merit might rise in vital STEM subjects. Indeed, even women had got the vote and were increasingly drafted into senior roles. India did not face an existential threat and thus didn't need to go in for egalitarianism. Talking about it, however, was fine. It was a nice change from having to talk about God and Spirituality.  

Despite this, Nehru balked at the centralization of power that he saw in China and the Soviet Union.

So much so that he created a Planning Commission to centralize power.  

Questions remain about whether these two instincts are compatible. In the end, the form of socialism India followed is best described as

nationalizing for the sake of nationalizing. This included the acquisition of 'sick' formerly British firms which Marwari speculators had, more or less fraudulently, acquired, and run into the ground either through stupidity or because they were misappropriating company money or a combination of both factors.  Presumably, there were substantial pay-offs to concerned officials and the ruling party. There may also have been an element of 'capital flight'- i.e. turning a 'stranded asset' into a 'sick' unit by getting speculators involved was part and parcel of repatriating money while getting the fuck away from a Socialist shithole. But that desire was not confined to Whites. 

state capitalism.

Capitalists have to make a profit. Nationalized industries can run at a loss.  There were over 300,000 sick/weak units whose losses were being covered by the Government some 25 years ago. Nobody knows the number now. 

A few large public sector firms and banks were established, there were lots of private firms and enterprises, with some polarization between the very large and very small (with a missing middle), the state tried to command and direct from the top, and, finally, all this was wrapped up in a profuse rhetoric of socialism.

When money is lacking, rhetoric must do.  

It is interesting to note that Myrdal (1968) himself had toiled to make sense of India’s ‘socialism’ and observed how this effort involved a certain amount of ‘verbal jugglery’.

Lying? Not necessarily. Sometimes people said 'there is x' when the truth was that 'there is evidence that x obtains but verifiable information enabling us to reduce x through legal means does not exist.' 

The evidence that much of it was verbal jugglery comes from the fact that enormous income and wealth inequality prevails in India.

Sadly, people may lie about their income or wealth. Also it is difficult to establish who owns what. Court cases regarding property title can drag on for decades. Thus, we may observe there is a lot of inequality but we may find that people who are clearly as rich as fuck are actually humble 'agriculturists' who are exempt from paying Income Tax.  

India never practised socialism in the sense of having a centralized ownership of the means of production in the hands of the state,

it did and does in certain sectors. India is described as a Socialist Republic in its Constitution.  

though using the term  socialism had become mandatory in all government documents and declarations pertaining to the economy, well into the 1990s. What India meant by the term socialism (and pursued—that too without much success) was a kind of welfare state, in which there would be support for the poor in terms of healthcare, education, and basic food.

That was a British policy. Sadly elected politicians in Bengal weren't as diligent or honest as ICS men in dealing with Famine etc. A.O Hume, the founder of the Indian National Congress, had made very good provision for education, food etc. in Etawah where he was District Collector. Under Nehru, an American architect made a good contribution there. Sadly, the thing could not be scaled up by the bureaucracy.

But even this was more often present in writings emerging from the government than in actual action. In terms of the government owning the means of production, India was nowhere near a socialist state:

which is why it hadn't had a bigger famine than China 

India had roughly 14 per cent of GDP coming from state-owned enterprises, whereas for China this was 40 per cent.

see above 

These data are not easy to compute and there is indeed a big margin for error (see Basu 2009) but the large difference is significant. In her early years, Indira Gandhi pursued a policy similar to that of Nehru, the nationalization of banks in 1969 being the most aggressive move along those lines. By the time she returned to power in the 1980s,

everybody around the world understood that nationalization meant inefficiency and accumulated losses. Bangladesh was in such poor shape it even had to do a bit of privatization. In India, shutting down loss making public sector units, even if they don't produce anything, is difficult because of strong labour laws. 

three years after her electoral defeat in 1977, her strategy had shifted, this time under the influence of, primarily, her younger son, Sanjay Gandhi, and later of Rajiv Gandhi, which would have large implications for India’s economic trajectory, the story of the next section.

Rajiv, as PM, would soon realize exactly why Mummy and Grandpa had created this corrupt system. Company owners had minimal equity stakes in their enterprises. Government owned institutions provided the Capital. This meant, on the one hand, the risk of hostile takeover- e.g. the one Swaraj Paul launched against two prominent companies. It is said that R.K Dhawan was helping Paul because he had some family grievance of his own against one of the promoters. However, after Indira's assassination, Rajiv side-lined Dhawan on the basis of gossip. Perhaps, if he had kept Dhawan, he wouldn't have fallen victim to his own cabinet colleagues. Still, my point is, Socialism may suck ass but it increases the power of the PM. This is particularly important if you have an otherwise unemployable son and thus must make arrangements for him to inherit your office. 

Indira Gandhi was also a deep influence on India’s politics and the nature of the state. Even leaving aside the Emergency, she had centralized power, often in her own hands, much more than Nehru.

He set the ball rolling. What is interesting is that the Janata Morcha did nothing to reverse this.  

As Kothari (1977) argued, this in turn tended to take away power and initiative from the grassroots level,

Kothari had seen for himself, as a boy, how much power and initiative there was at the grassroots level- viz. none at all. That is why foreigners ruled the country. 

and resulted in a centralization of power that Nehru had resisted.

No. His claim to fame is that he reversed the British policy of devolving power first to Municipalities and Districts and then granting Provincial Autonomy to be followed by the creation of a Federation with a relatively weak centre. The first step was the integration of the Princely States and then the setting up of a Planning Commission etc. 

According to Kothari (though there is scope to contest his view), this had a negative effect on economic growth. Similar issues arise in evaluating India’s democracy. Thanks to the adoption of the principle of ‘one person, one vote’, independent India established representative government right from the start,

Ceylon got it from the Brits 20 years previously. The price was strong minority protection (which turned out to be meaningless).  

but questions remain about how ‘responsive’ India’s ‘representative’ state is.

Very- to the majority of the elected representatives. That's how Parliamentary Democracy works.  

In a compelling essay, Mehta (2012) examines these questions.

He is a cretin.  

Echoing Myrdal’s view that distant histories can have deep influences on the nature of contemporary politics and institutions, Mehta points to the social inequalities that go far back into Indian history, having legacy effects on the nature of democracy.

The cretin doesn't get that such 'legacy effects' existed in England and France etc.  

One of the principal historical sources of social inequality in India is its caste system.

How? The Brits didn't give a fuck what caste you were. Under their rule, darkies were lower than Europeans. True, in a village or a Princely State, the dominant group might mistreat weaker groups, but this had to do with differences in power and wealth.  

While in itself caste is a deplorable inheritance

In which case, endogamy should be banned the same way brother sister incest is banned.  

—and, at least in speech, most founding political leaders of India spoke out against it—it has been argued by some that the castes have played a role in nurturing India’s democracy by providing focal points of coalition and political mobilization for disadvantaged groups (see Varshney 2013).

Religion trumps caste. Pakistan was formed on that basis. They have caste (biradari) but don't seem to have caste based politics. Perhaps, this is because Islam is a unifying factor- like 'Hindutva'.  

What complicates the story is that many of these caste identities are local and regional, which has thwarted mobilization across the nation—an outcome that has both plusses and minuses.

Brahmins are found pretty much everywhere.  

It must also be recorded that the nature of India’s politics has changed much since the mid-1970s.

Not really. The one difference is that Rahul is a mooncalf.  

The domination of a few big parties and in particular the Congress has diminished vastly. Regional parties have sprung up all over the nation and India has seen the rise of coalition politics also on the national stage,

This happened in 1969, when- after Congress split- Indira ruled with the help of the Communists and the DMK (a Tamil Nadu based party).  

as parties have had to reach out to others to make sure they have the majority necessary to form a government.

Indira had to do that.  

This has put a new set of brakes and challenges on policy experimentation,

No. It has increased scope for it.  

and, at the same time, brought a certain agility to politics, as all parties that matter have had to master the art of accommodation and compromise.

Nobody needs to do so. Sharing spoils- i.e. allocating money making portfolios- is a bargaining problem. The solution concept was supplied by Shapley etc.  

Despite all these caveats, despite the two-year retreat from 1975 to 1977 caused by the Emergency, and despite its complicated and many-splendored manifestation, democracy is a remarkable achievement for India.

It really isn't. As in Sri Lanka, the Army could not take power though able to deal with Commie or other insurrections. One might say India was an elective autocracy. Sadly, autocracy can be tempered by assassination.  

While research and activism must persist in analysing and correcting the weaknesses of India’s democracy,

both are utterly useless 

it needs to be appreciated that this, like good infrastructure, is an institutional and political investment that modern India has inherited

from the Brits 

and it would be folly to damage it just when the nation has reached a stage where it is able to take advantage of and build on it to power its economy, promote development, and even step up the GDP growth rate.

This involved judicial reform from the grassroots upward. An autocracy can have a better judiciary than a democracy. The two things aren't connected in any way.  

While this is not the central concern of this paper, the political story that I have laid out in this section is of considerable relevance. There is a small but undeniable build-up of opinion in India that is questioning the value of India’s early commitment to cultural and political openness,

the First Amendment shows the reverse was the case 

secularism,

Which is why there is no such thing as Pakistan. Also, Punjab was created purely so as to give Sikhs a State where they were the majority.  

and commitment to freedom of speech, for the media and also for individuals—from university campuses to the street-corner coffee house.

even Rahul Gandhi could be sentenced to two years in jail for saying 'why are all the crooks named Modi?'  

It is regrettable that there are now forces that would like to reverse this.

This cretin thinks such 'forces' didn't previously exist. Still, we understand that he served the Dynasty and is angry they are no longer in charge.  

I believe that democracy, cultural openness, and secularism are traits that

make it obvious that Soniaji should rule due to she is nice Italian lady.  

make for a better society and also more growth, at least of a sustainable kind.

Rahul should have a baby so succession is ensured. This is called 'sustainability'.  

Whether or not India’s early investment in this kind of politics was the right choice at that time

or whether the Brits got it wrong 

(I believe it was but am aware that this is not beyond contestation), to squander this social and political capital just as the economy is taking off would be a mistake of enormous proportions, akin to making early investment in large ports, roadways, and railways, and then deciding not to use them.

because cheaper transport is available? This is the sort of stupidity which caused the Government to takeover sick/weak units and keep them running even when they produced nothing.  

Basu explains the low 'Hindu rate of growth' not by the need to ensure that the ruling party got the lion's share of donations from industrialists and that dominant agricultural castes didn't become prosperous and thus too big for their boots, thus- 

I believe this initial sluggishness was, in part, a consequence of the nature of Indian politics. Democracy with a vibrant media and regular elections makes governments wary of policy experiments, because the politicians are likely to be out of office if the policies backfire.

Congress really wasn't worried about 'being out of office'. If either the Left or the Right started gaining traction, it could always itself go in that direction. Indeed, that is what Indira did when the Third Plan produced only 2.5 percent growth. She split off the supposed 'right wing' of her party and stayed in power with the help of the Left and the Dravidian parties (her Tamil opponent, Kamaraj, had supported adoption of Hindi, even though he didn't speak it!) 

So what Park Chung Hi could do in South Korea, or Mao Zedong could in China, or Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore was not feasible for leaders in India’s democratic setting. 

The Army had shown it was happy to kill Commies or other insurgents. India could do what Park did. Nobody could do what Mao or Stalin did because the soldiers were the sons of 'kulaks'. Any notion of collectivizing land was quietly dropped.  

All this is well reflected in the anecdotes of history and comparative statistics. In the 1950s, South Korea and India were almost equally poor and, in fact, most advanced nations treated South Korea as the basket case that would need support and aid to prevent major suffering but there was not much hope of a growth surge, whereas India was treated as ready to take off. However, Park Chung Hi took commanding control of the economy and made some daring policy decisions, some of which backfired massively and had to be retracted (see Krueger 1998).

Park devalued and went for export led growth in the Taiwanese manner. He forced the corrupt to invest their wealth in the new conglomerates. One reason he prevailed was that the US might abandon the country. There was an existential threat. That's also the reason the Koreans sent so many troops to Vietnam. Incidentally, the New Village Campaign was a direct response to the Cultural Revolution.  

Maybe because of this policy agility, the economy stumbled a few times but also grew at a remarkable clip.

Trade Unions were brutally treated. Teenagers caught on the streets could be caught and transported to an island prison camp. This was a police state. Could India have gone down this road? In places, yes. If the workers were lower caste or from another state, nobody would have cared. But, that's what happens anyway with migrant labour. That's why you don't need a police state. This is spontaneous order. But it is also the reason India could have done export led growth. The problem is that the businessmen getting rich might have given their money to 'communal' parties. Indeed, they might themselves have joined the RSS. That's why the Dynasty was against the country rising up through commerce.  

As Table 1 shows, South Koreans are now a little more than 17 times as rich as Indians, in per capita income terms, which shows what a combination of good policies and institutions can do.

Dictatorship is not a good institution. Anyway, Park was killed by his own Intelligence Chief.  

Turning to China, in contrast to India, we find it, all the way up to 1976, experiencing fluctuations in growth that would have been unimaginable, and also intolerable, in India.

Those 'fluctuations' and famines were what enabled Mao to tighten his grip on power. His party owes everything to his ruthlessness.  

The broad picture of India’s growth captured in Table 2 reflects this relative tranquillity, which is in sharp contrast to the situation in China.

Why wait for a famine which triggers a peasant uprising as previous Emperor's had done? Create a man-made famine and you have taught the peasants their place. Apparently the villages did start rising in productivity by the end of the Sixties. But, politically, they were as quiet as Church mice.  

In 1961, following the Great Leap Forward and the famine it unleashed— arguably the biggest famine in world history—China had a negative growth of 27 per cent. That is, more than a quarter of its GDP disappeared. The Cultural Revolution would again result in a drop in growth much greater than India ever saw. On the other hand, China had several years of double-digit growth during the 1960s and 1970s.

Malthusian solutions can be very effective. Kill off the less productive. The rest will get the message. China still has a very high savings rate.  

India could have had higher growth over the last thirty years. Democracy really isn't about doing stupid shit endlessly PROVIDED you have a quick, effective, judicial system and a capacious doctrine of political question. That way the Govt. can arrange to compensate losers out of the expected value of the tax take on 'winners' and thus permit Hicks/Kaldor improvements. Sadly, the lethargic justice system creates hold out problems and the Supreme Court might decide that the policy is itself against the 'basic structure' of the Constitution. Lawfare- i.e. Public Interest Litigation launched by crazy people who think Neo-Liberalism is very evil and the World Bank is Satan himself can gain fame and fortune by preventing infrastructure projects. In Gujarat, a mass agitation against Medha Patkar drove her out of the state. The Narmada dam went ahead. The farmers got their water. Modi also got them to give up 'free electricity' for actual, usable, electricity at a decent price. 

Myrdal's first degree was in the Law. Perhaps Swedish law, back then, was straightforward and quick to dispose of cases. Indian law, even under the Brits, was dilatory and relied extensively on 'professional' witnesses- i.e. liars. Indeed, not to lie your head off in the witness box was considered irreligious. Gandhi had some idea of setting up a parallel court system on the Sinn Fein pattern. Perhaps, if the scheme had taken off, the lawyer politicians of India would have focused their minds on streamlining judicial administration and increasing the utility of the courts. My impression is that the Bench itself has been open to such ideas but has always had too much on its plate. Perhaps, reform will come through new technology and local initiatives. Perhaps not. What is truly important, as Prof Basu points out is to celebrate magic properties of Democracyji and Secularismji and pray to Socialismji to speed the day when the boy Rahul finally consents to become Prime Minister. Then and only then will our cup of joy overflow. 


Thursday, 20 May 2010

Jan Myrdal on Mahakavi Sri Sri

Jan Myrdal is the son of Gunnar and Ava Myrdal both of whom won Nobel Prizes (Gunnar for Econ, Ava for Peace). Jan reckons they were crappy parents. His Mom was a big supporter of forced Sterilization (those fun loving Swedes kept up the practice till '75) but, unfortunately, failed to tie her own tubes before squeezing out little Jan.
He himself embraced far left politics and was an uncritical admirer of Mao's China and Pol Pot's Kampuchea both of which he actually visited. Needless to say he hates democratic India coz it's like real oppressive? and y'know kind'o genociding the poor people? and being nasty to those nice little Naxals in Lalgarh who just want to establish a truly equal society by beheading everybody.

Anyway, young Jan has uttered an encomium on the Telugu poet and Cine artist (himself an admirer of Sarojini Naidu's younger brother whose most memorable film role was as the 'gadi babu' (the guy  who went around winding up the clocks in the big haveli) in Sahib Bibi and Ghulam.
Click here to read it.
You'd never guess, from Myrdal's account, that this great supposed Naxalite poet endorsed the Emergency. Or that he was all for N.T Rama Rao in the 1982 elections.
Fuck is wrong with Jan Myrdal?