Showing posts with label Chibber. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Chibber. Show all posts

Wednesday, 20 May 2026

Vivek Chibber on Friedman


Copilot tells me-
Neoliberalism differs from classical liberalism primarily in its historical context, policy emphasis, and role of the state. Classical liberalism (18th–19th century) focused on protecting individual rights and limiting state power, while neoliberalism (late 20th century) revived some of those ideas but pushed them further—especially in favor of deregulation, privatization, and globalized markets.

🧭 Core Differences at a Glance


1. Historical context

Classical liberalism emerged in the 18th–19th centuries as a reaction against monarchy and mercantilism,

Sometimes it was also anti-Clerical (i.e. against the overweening demands of the Established Church) and was critical of the militarized Aristocracy- e.g. Junkers in Germany
emphasizing individual rights and free markets.

If profit remains in private hands, it is less likely to end up financing an oppressive regime. The Marxist counter-argument was that private Capital could hold the working man hostage- forcing him to work longer hours for a bare subsistence.

The Marginal Revolution (which overturned Classical Economics) showed how monopoly or monopsony or cartels reduced allocative efficiency and imposed a 'dead weight' loss on society. Furthermore, since the rich gain less 'marginal utility' from an extra dollar, they may be happy to pay higher marginal tax rates so that the very poor can survive with a modicum of dignity. Furthermore, nuisances & demerit goods (e.g. pollution or addictive drugs) could be taxed and the revenue could be used to promote merit goods or to repair damage done to the Environment.

We may say that Neo-Liberalism flows from the Marginal Revolution. Unlike Classical Liberalism, it is not attached to the notion that Society needs a class of leisured gentlemen with a Country Estate and a Town House in Capital which they can stay in while attending Parliamentary Sessions.

Economics & Politics could develop in a meritocratic and technocratic manner.
Neoliberalism rose in the 1970s–1980s as a response to Keynesian economics

which gave the Government a big role in the economy. This was necessary during the War and for post-War recovery as well as the acquisition of new weapon systems- e.g. nuclear missiles, satellites etc.
and the welfare state,

which was now taxing the working class on behalf of unemployed 'Welfare Queens'. Worse, it was subsidising loss making industries which were being run inefficiently.
promoting market-driven reforms.

which also meant that particular Trade Unions could not hold the country to ransom.

2. Role of the state

Classical liberalism: The state should be minimal—protect property rights, enforce contracts, and maintain order.

This was like the British Raj. India was literally a 'nightwatchman state' where the only public officials most people ever saw was the 'chowkidar' (night-watchman) unless someone in the village was literate enough to receive a letter carried by the post-man.

Neoliberalism: The state should actively reshape society to promote markets—deregulate industries, privatize services, and enforce competition.

Thus, in the UK, Mrs. Thatcher broke up the cosy relationship between stock-brokers, stock-jobbers (market makers) and discount houses. Suddenly, 'a job in the City' didn't mean putting on a bowler hat and having long lunches before departing for the weekend huntin', fishin' or shootin' in the country. Instead, you had chaps with degrees from the LSE with unpleasant accents who considered it a virtue to eat a sandwich at their desk while poring over computer print-outs.
This is not “no state,” but a market‑enabling state.

where women & darkies could thrive if they worked harder or were smarter than the rest. The blue blooded Gentleman had been pushed out of Politics & Government Service on the grounds that he was an amateur. Then the Law had been taken over by ghastly oiks from Grammar Schools. Now, even the City of London had become hostile territory for the toff.

3. Economic policy

Classical liberalism: Free markets with minimal regulation; belief in the “invisible hand.”

As opposed to the local magistrate fixing the price of bread and then scratching his head when bread became unavailable.
Neoliberalism: Aggressive deregulation, privatization, free trade agreements, and reduced welfare spending—essentially “classical liberalism on steroids.”

No. During the Seventies, there was stagflation and negative real interest rates. The thing was unsustainable. Everybody kept going on strike- even the grave diggers & the garbage collectors. Society was tearing itself apart.

4. Globalization

Classical liberalism supports free trade but was not shaped by modern global capitalism.

Neoliberalism embraces globalization as a core strategy—NAFTA, WTO frameworks, and global supply chains.

The rise of Sanders & Trump in 2015/16 put the world on notice that 'globalization' might be rolled back.

5. Social welfare

Classical liberalism: Generally indifferent to welfare; assumes markets will produce fair outcomes.

Or that nothing much can be done for the poor for a reason Malthus explained. Doesn't Christ say in the Bible 'The poor ye shall have always with you'?
Neoliberalism: Often reduces welfare programs,

or seeks, ineffectually, from letting them grow
arguing markets allocate resources more efficiently.

than who? The Beloved Leader?

Remarkaby, the Marginal Revolution blog has praise for the following interview published in 'Jacobin'

Power, Not Economic Theory, Created Neoliberalism
Interview with Vivek Chibber

Neoliberalism didn’t win an intellectual argument — it won power.


Power was ebbing away from States with ever increasing Public Sector Borrowing Requirements. Either they could turn into Banana Republics racked by hyper-inflation, or they could reform their finances.
Vivek Chibber unpacks how employers and political elites in the 1970s and ’80s turned economic turmoil into an opportunity to reshape society on their terms.

There was a displacement of elites. Out went the toffs and the three-Martini lunch Corporate Executives, in came the asset-stripping 'private equity' maven backed by Institutional Investors who wanted to get a better return for Joe Lunch-pail who was paying into a Pension Fund or Insurance scheme.
 
Neoliberalism’s victory over Keynesianism wasn’t an intellectual revolution

Yes it was. Previously, the most that was claimed for the market was that under ideal conditions it could be as good- not better- than the best 'Command Economy' outcome. That's what the two fundamental theorems of Welfare Econ & the 'folk theorem' of repeated games say. Then towards the end of the Sixties you have a whole bunch of mathematical results re. concurrency, computability, complexity, categoricity etc. which showed that no algorithmic process can yield the optimal result. Markets may be non-deterministic. They may involve 'co-evolved' process which tame complexity. In any case, volatility isn't a bad thing in itself. The 'volatility smile' may drives liquidity by concentrating trading activity in a manner which is 'regret minimizing' for the system as a whole. After all, we live in a world where all future states of the world, and their probability, are not known.
— it was a class offensive.


Against WASP elites who went to the right schools though, no doubt, some of the more presentable Corporate Executives, who had begun life on the Accountancy coal-face, may have been tolerated.
 
To roll it back, the Left doesn’t need to win an argument so much as it needs to rebuild working-class institutions from the ground up.

That would be worth doing, in any case.

Chibber speaks of Keynes as 'a blue blood from the upper crust of British society'. This is not true. His family were brush manufacturers in Salisbury. They were not aristocrats, clergymen or Army officers. They didn't attend public schools or go to University. Keynes's father did study at quite a good private school and then went to London's University College which had only been around for 40 years or so. He then went to Cambridge & settled down as a Lecturer on Economics. His son won a scholarship to Eton and then a scholarship to Cambridge University. He excelled in Mathematics but was also popular for his charm and wit. Had he not been so smart, he might have ended up as a clerk in a brush making concern in a provincial town. As things were, he placed second in the Civil Service exam. Otto Niemeyer came first and thus got the Treasury. Keynes placed second and got the India Office which was boring and declining in importance. He quit after a couple of years. That is why Marshall could lure him back to Academia by using his own money to pay Keynes's salary. In a sense this was the making of him because he could write what he liked and say what he pleased. Thus he eclipsed Niemeyer during the War as an advisor to the Government from 1915 onward . They particularly liked his buccaneering approach which was similar to that of the seasoned stock-broker or noveau riche City financier.

Thus, put simply, Power needed Keynes at a time when it was having to raise vast sums to defend itself & prevent military defeat. However, he was opiniated & Ministers had cause to fear his sharp pen. Both 'Economic Consequences' of the Peace & (later) Winston Churchill were of interest to a wider reading public.

After markets failed to recover from the crash, all governments had to focus on economic policy. One way or another, there was increased intervention. Keynes stood out for providing a seemingly 'scientific' justification for ignoring the deficit and increasing Government expenditure. But this would happen anyway because of re-armament.

Chibber says-
It’s not just that Keynes’s ideas were revolutionary, and the right ideas at the right time, and therefore they were taken up.


Actually, it was Oswald Moseley (later to found the British Union of Fascists) who set the ball rolling with this Memorandum of 1930 which called for high tariffs to protect British industries from international finance and transform the British Empire into an autarkic trading bloc (the cry for Imperial Preference had been around for decades) , for state nationalisation of main industries, for higher school-leaving ages and pensions to reduce the labour surplus, and for a programme of public works to solve interwar poverty and unemployment.

Keynes liked it but struck a cautious note-
'I like the spirit which informs the document. A scheme of national economic planning to achieve a right, or at least a better, balance of our industries between the old and the new, between agriculture and manufacture, between home development and foreign investment; and wide executive powers to carry out the details of such a scheme. That is what it amounts to. ... [The] manifesto offers us a starting point for thought and action. ... It will shock—it must do so—the many good citizens of this country... who have laissez-faire in their craniums, their consciences, and their bones ... But how anyone professing and calling himself a socialist can keep away from the manifesto is a more obscure matter'

In other words, Keynes is saying, the majority of English people- who believe in thrift, hard work & the sanctity of private property will refuse to have anything to do with this scheme. Thus, it is unworkable. Still, crazy Socialists should be queuing up to support it.
 
If Keynes had been working at a community college somewhere or a technical institute, nobody would have ever known who he is.

Hardly anybody had heard of Otto Niemeyer though he probably did have his hand on the economic levers for at least some of that period. Keynes had a gift for self-publicity. Moreover he moved easily between the 'aesthetic' Bloomsbury set & Whitehall & the City of London. Meanwhile, mathematical economics was developing rapidly. After the crash, in America the Cowles Foundation was set up in 1932. Economics might be like engineering. Get in mathematicians to figure out how to raise efficiency. Talk of Class was old hat. Even in the Soviet Union, a similar mathematical economics was coming into existence. Indeed, there seemed a 'convergence' between the results being produced on both sides of what Churchill would call 'the iron curtain'.

Would what we call Keynesianism have prevailed even if Keynes himself repudiated it? Yes. Why? Rearmament did in fact put an end to the Depression. FDRs more Socialist methods had faltered & finally puttered out.
 
What he also had going for him was that he was the editor of the Economic Journal, which was the most influential journal at the time, the key journal of economics.


It would be fair to say that, because Keynes was Marshall's anointed successor, two generations of economists who had learnt the subject from the latter's 'Principles', could not dismiss Keynes out of hand. But, Marshall himself knew that nobody cares very much for Academic Economists. Keynes had the added glamour of combining the persona of a Government Adviser with that of Stock Market buccaneer.
He was also positioned at Cambridge University, which automatically made him extremely influential.


No. Plenty of dons wanted no political influence though they dearly loved to be seen with a Dowager Duchess.
And he had been moving in policy circles for twenty years already.

It would be fair to say that Keynes's students or collaborators had a vested interest in promoting his Gospel. During the War anyone who could claim some sort of economic expertise could get a cushy government job. Sadly, this remained the case after the war because of rationing & the need to acquire nuclear weapons & space rockets.
So, this is an instance where somebody who is a blue blood, who was in the halls of power, who has tremendous influence, bolts from economic orthodoxy, and presents ideas that at the time are very iconoclastic,

One might say that Keynes, because of his prominence, was under pressure to champion common sense. Thrift is a good thing in an individual. If the whole of Society becomes more thrifty, it becomes poorer. In logic, this is the 'fallacy of composition'.  

which go against the received wisdom but are very appealing to policymakers who are looking for a way to justify breaking with policy orthodoxy. The combination of his being very well-positioned, very influential already, and then making an extremely elegant argument, put his ideas in a place where they could actually be used. Otherwise nobody would have known who he was
No. This is an instance of Marshall's anointed heir doing the needful so deficits could grow without sober, hardworking, people growing suspicious that this was some sort of plutocratic swindle. There were plenty of people who believed that all the Bolsheviks were Jews in league with their cousins in Wall Street.

It may be, if Frank Ramsey had lived, then the whole Keynesian theory could have been given a 'canonical' representation.   

The thing about Alfred Marshall was that he represented late Victorian ultra-respectability. Keynes might be a bit flashy, but he isn't a Jew-boy. His people were brush-makers in Salisbury.

Chibber mentions 'bastard Keynesianism'. This is the idea that money wages are downwardly sticky. Workers are too stupid to understand the 'real balance effect'. Thus the government needs to prevent deflation which would set off a vicious cycle of unemployment leading to lower aggregate demand leading to more unemployment.

However, all sorts of prices are 'sticky' or 'administered. There is a combination of fix-price & flex-price markets. In the former excess supply or demand goes up or down. In the latter, prices go up and down so there all markets clear.

Chibber isn't saying 'if you teach in a top College you will have influence'.
even if Milton Friedman had not existed, even if Hayek had not existed, you would have still had a turn to neoliberalism, and that’s the key. This is what the Left needs to understand.

i.e. that they were wrong to keep gassing on about class conflict. Don't print too much money & then expect a price/wage freeze to eliminate inflation. That's all Friedman said. Once this became blindingly obvious, he could take the credit for it while Galbraith, who had been the previous cock of the walk, had to take a back seat. Hayek was part of a wider network of European and American intellectuals who wanted 'small government'. It was irksome that Americans could not own gold or that European tourists could only draw a limited amount of foreign exchange.  There were too many well-paid civil servants doing nothing productive while inflation eroded the standard of living of people who had worked hard for their pensions. 

It would be fair to say that magazines & TV shows were able to communicate economic ideas to the much better educated post-War voter than even FDR's 'fireside chats'. In Britain, you had Brian Walden on TV methodically tearing down the older sort of Cabinet Minister who repeated 'Butskellite' cliches. But what mattered most was fiscal drag. Inflation meant your pay packet went up but you were dragged into the tax net. Suddenly, you started to hate the 'scroungers' and 'welfare queens'. Self-employed people were furious that feather-bedded Unions were holding the nation to ransom while they were having to work harder and harder just to maintain their standard of living

There are only two key players when it comes to policy changes of this kind.

There is only one player. Financial markets. If they think your policy is shit, they sell, sell, sell. Look at Liz Truss. She was popular but she only lasted 50 days as Prime Minister. Things are different in America but if markets are in turmoil Congress grows restive and you lose the mid-terms.  

The key players are the politicians, because they’re the ones who are pulling the levers. But then, it’s the key constituency that actually has influence over the politicians.

The least important part is intellectuals. You might say voters have some degree of influence, but really, in a money-driven system like the United States, it’s investors, it’s capitalists — it’s big capital.

Financial markets rather than this capitalist or that capitalist.  

They’re the ones who are pushing for these changes.

That means that if you want to understand where neoliberalism comes from, or rather if you want to understand why it came about, the answer is, it came about because capitalists ceased to tolerate the welfare state.

Markets pay for the welfare state. If they take fright, you borrow at higher and higher real rates of interest to finance transfers. This 'crowds out' private spending and investment leading to stagnant productivity & excess capacity- which means more people are on the dole and thus transfer spending has to go up yet again. This is a vicious circle which everybody became aware of during the Seventies.  


Now, why did they tolerate the welfare state at all? Most people on the Left understand the welfare state was brought about through massive trade union mobilization and labor mobilizations and was kept in place as long as the trade union movement had some kind of presence within the Democratic Party, within the economy more generally, because those unions were powerful enough, employers had to figure out a way of living with them.

The way to do this was to threaten to shut down unless they got a Government bail-out. So you have Labour on the dole & Capital on the dole & the self-employed either emigrating or shifting to the black economy. This is the Latin American solution. Your cab-driver has a government job as an engineer but the pay isn't enough to buy groceries. So he bunks off work (there is no work for him to do, because the money in the budget has run out) to drive a cab. At night he waits tables. He is trying to get his hands on some dollars so as to be able to emigrate.  

Part of what they did to live with the trade unions was to agree to a certain measure of redistribution and a certain kind of welfare state.

The reverse is the case. The Unions need the welfare state otherwise desperate non-Union workers will be 'black-legs'. But they won't be happy. The Communist Party will grow till some crazy Fascists gain power and you get a gangster regime.  

As long as that was the case, politicians kept the welfare state going.

It is still going. Work-fare was popular with African Americans because they want strong families- not Welfare Queens.  

This is why, in that era from the mid-1930s to the mid-1970s, Keynesianism or the economics of state intervention of some kind was the hegemonic economic theory.

Re-armament, War, Post-War reconstruction, and then the Cold War meant that the Public sector didn't get scaled back. On the one hand, 'state capacity' had increased. But there were diseconomies of scale to bureaucracy.  

The theory became hegemonic because it was given respectability by virtue of the fact that everybody in power was using it. Because it’s being used by people in power, it has great respectability.

No. So long as unemployment was low and prices weren't rising too much, politicians pretended that they were very wise or, at least, that they listened to very wise men.  

This is why, in the 1950s and ’60s, Milton Friedman was in the wilderness — same guy, same ideas, equally intellectually attractive, equally technically sophisticated, but he was in the wilderness.

No. He said that he was in the Academic wilderness in the Forties- i.e. before McCarthy & Eisenhower. But his mathematical skills permitted his employment by the Federal Government. He designed the payroll withholding Tax scheme needed to fund the War. He was a reputable economist but it was his articles for Newsweek from '66 onward which really pushed him into the limelight. Like Galbraith, he wrote well and his 'Free to Choose' TV series from 1980 onward made him a celebrity. Sadly, his theories weren't working out too well for Thatcher & Reagan both of whom did a quiet U-turn. 


In fact, I’ll tell you a little story. I was in the archives in India when I was researching my first book on planning. And lo and behold, I find a letter from an International Monetary Fund economist. That letter is a three-page letter sent to the Planning Commission of India on how to plan effectively, on how to do price controls correctly, on how to manage demand conditions. It seems like it’s coming from some dyed-in-the-wool Keynesian economist. The author was Milton Friedman.

This is nonsense.  

In 1955, the Indian government was engaged in preparing its Second Five Year Plan and, because the US was a big donor, it  asked the Eisenhower administration for assistance. It sent Friedman & Neil Jacoby- a right-wing advisor to the Republican administration. Friedman went to India in the fall of 1955 under the auspices of the U.S. International Cooperation Administration (as the foreign aid agency was dubbed at the time). Once in New Delhi, Friedman was assigned to advise Mr. C. D. Deshmukh, the Minister of Finance- a right-wing ICS man who resented the powers usurped by the Planning Commission. His memo reflects the thinking of centre-right Indians who wanted light industry- e.g. textiles-  to expand and to earn foreign currency to pay for investment in heavy industyr. 

Friedman wrote- 'The chief problem in the Indian program that impresses on the tendency to concentrate investment in heavy industry at one extreme and handicrafts at the other, at the expense of small and moderate size industry. This policy threatens an inefficient use of capital at the one extreme by combining it with too little labour and an inefficient use of labour at the other extreme by combining it with too little capital. The presumption for an economy like India’s is that the best use of capital is in general somewhere in between, that heavy industry can best develop and be built upon a widely diversified and much expanded light industry. We may hasten to add that this is only a general presumption which may well admit of special exceptions. Perhaps, for example, the steel industry is one exception in India.' 

This was what Indian industrialists were thinking at the time. Maybe the Soviets & East Germans & so forth can set up good steel plants which make a profit. The steel can then be used in construction and for making 'wage-goods' e.g. bicycles which we can export. Friedman knew little of India but he was talking to Oxbridge educated people- some with a business background, others from elite Government cadres. He is saying what they- and Deshmukh- want him to say- viz. ' Cutting off particular investment projects may not make resources available for other uses but may simply eliminate savings that would otherwise have been available. Much saving is made to finance specific investment projects. If it cannot be used for that purpose, it may well be directed to consumption or to the accumulation of bullion or its equivalent.' This paints a vivid picture to an Indian but not to an American (who was forbidden to hold gold at that time). 

Why is Friedman writing this letter in the language of a mid-century technocrat committed to state control?

There is no such letter. Deshmukh wanted him to say what he actually did say. He didn't want to linger in India. The climate is horrible. You get dysentery. If you want to help the poor, go to Israel which was very poor at the time.  

He was seeking entrée. He knew that “if I want to be relevant, if I want to be heard, I’m going to have to give them advice of the kind they want to hear.”

He was saying what the Finance Minister wanted him to say. Sadly, Nehru wasn't interested.  

I’m not saying he sold out. I think he believed what he believed, but he said, “My ideas don’t have a chance in hell right now. So here’s what I’m going to do: I’m going to do the best I can, given the filters that are in place.” And the filters in India at that time were, “We don’t want to hear from you anti-planners. We’re going to do planning. If you want to be of use to us, tell us how to plan better.” Friedman said, “OK, my free market stuff is out the window. I’m going to be as good a planning economist as possible.”

This simply isn't true. He had helped Deshmukh put the Finance Ministry's view- stuff like switching  to value added taxation to get more revenue & less disincentive for the organised sector (which it is cheaper and more convenient to tax) . But Nehru was the head of the Planning Commission. He didn't understand that, for poor people, only Budgets matter.  

That little story tells you something. What it says is ideas that are going into the halls of power go through certain filters. And the filters are essentially the policy priorities that the politicians have already committed to. Now, what creates those priorities? It’s the balance of class power. Social forces are setting the agenda.

What was setting the agenda in India was stupidity- that of Nehru & Mahalanobis. The second 5 year plan ran out of money very quickly.  

If the social forces, that is, say, trade unions and community organizations, have set the agenda for politicians such that they think the only rational thing to do is to institute a welfare state, then they will bring in economists who help them design a welfare state. That gives intellectual influence to those economists. Economists who are saying “Get rid of this whole thing” are cast out into the wilderness. That’s how it works.

I suppose you could say that a lot of sensible economists in India were 'cast into the wilderness'- i.e. they emigrated to the US or UK. But they made more money. 

In the 1970s and ’80s, those policy priorities — that is to say, the New Deal as a priority — changed for reasons that have nothing to do with intellectual influence.

In other words, the goal of minimizing unemployment was given up. One reason was that 'transfers' (i.e. how much you could get on the dole) had risen. Why get a job in the factory when you could strum your guitar & plan for how to spend your millions after you became a pop star? 

The change came about when the American government was now committed to rolling back and dismantling the welfare state and giving more rein to free markets.

It turned out voters would tolerate mass unemployment on a scale not seen since the Great Depression. All they cared about was real wages- i.e. inflation was Public Enemy number one. The elderly were able to organize themselves politically so as to get a pretty sweet deal. Nobody gave a shit about trailer trash or the Projects. 

Once that happens, this little guy who was out in the wilderness for thirty years

He was doing well in Chicago. Had Goldwater won, he'd have been in clover. Nixon, sadly, was the first and last avowed Keynesian. Had Reagan, not Ford, taken the Republican ticket and defeated Carter, Friedman would have been in clover. As it was, Carter appointed Volcker who was a monetarist of a sort. But Friedman's  ideas were gaining influence even in the British Labour Party.  

named Milton Friedman suddenly comes to the center of the halls of power and his ideas now get circulation. They get circulation because politicians now are willing to hear him. That’s what drives it.

If a guy calls the market right and the market knows the guy did so, it makes sense to pretend to be doing what that guy tells you to do because his prophesies might be 'self-fulfilling'. But this is true in many other fields. The guy famous for predicting a war or an epidemic or whatever is the guy everybody wants to be chummy with. 


Therefore, when I said previously that Friedman had won the debate by the end of the 1970s, I mean that he won out because the political anchor that had sustained the Keynesian economists had come loose.

In other words, higher inflation wasn't reducing Inflation. There was Stagflation.  

What happened was that the ship was now being redirected in the direction of neoliberalism.

No. Raising inflation was now itself raising unemployment for a reason Friedman explained in his Nobel lecture. Countries which continued to do stupid shit had hyperinflation and began to look more and more like banana republics. 

Ideas can have power, but only if they’re attached to agencies with power.

Agencies with power look for ideas which will enable them to keep that power or else they lose it sooner rather than later. The same is true of Agencies with money or Agencies with great fashion sense or Agencies that are very good at making people laugh so hard they shit themselves. 

In and of themselves, free-floating ideas only have power if people who have an interest in seeing those ideas fulfilled and have the power to then effectuate those ideas take them on.

This happens, if they are ideas which yield greater power. Consider Islam. Iranians like it but nobody thought it could yield power in this world rather than felicity in the next. Ayatollah Khomeini's dynamite idea was 'velayet-e-faqih', guys like himself should extend their duty to help the poor to taking over the entire state. Many Ayatollahs became billionaires.  Those who didn't like them were beaten or killed or ran the fuck away. 

These are the two key things. They have to be attached to agencies of some kind: social forces, organizations, institutions with power.

A Trade Union is an institution. It may have a lot of power. But, if it overplays its hand & the industry shuts down, then it has no members and no money.  

And then those institutions and agencies have to see their own interests as being expressed and aligned with the ideas.

No. They have to get money to stay operational.  


So let’s go back to neoliberalism. How did the free-market ideas attain influence?

Markets are useful. We buy and sell stuff on them. That's how ideas about them gained influence. Sadly, some of those ideas were stupid. Others weren't and enabled 'market makers' to become very fucking rich.  

It’s because capitalists and wealthy people in the United States pushed for a shift away from the welfare state for reasons that had nothing to do with the appeal of the ideas.

Women pushed for a shift away from rape for reasons that had nothing to do with the appeal of the idea to rapist scumbags.  

Chibber's basic point has to do with Galbraith's 'countervailing power' argument for Trade unions. Faced with a monopsony (single buyer), maybe a monopoly (single seller) improves allocative efficiency. If employers are 'cartelised' let there be 'collective bargaining' with a single Union. Sadly, technology changes, tastes change, the fucking A-rabs put oil prices up, wars in distant countries start costing us blood and treasure. What worked 50 years ago doesn't work now- e.g. my penis. 

Why can't we go back to the way things used to be? I'll tell you the answer. Compound interest. The passage of time causes the interest accruing to Capitalists to go on increasing. That is why, when Biden said 'let me put the calendar back to 1972' the Capitalists said 'No! Then we'd have to give back all the compound interest we have collected! Kindly, take one for the team and just turn senile already.'

That's the only reason Trump is now POTUS


Thursday, 29 January 2026

Chibber vs the Subalterns

 After the Great War and the beginnings of electoral politics in India, educationally backward or otherwise underprivileged communities began to rise up. Dalit leaders challenged untouchability. So called 'criminal' castes and tribes demanded 'denotification'. Almost everybody demanded affirmative action quotas. By and large, these movements succeeded. More and more Legislators and then Ministers and then Chief Ministers came from the previously 'backward' castes which had little voice in the administration. There were some false starts. Naxalites (extreme Maoists) thought they could use Tribals & Dalits as cannon fodder so as to come to power by 'encircling the cities'. They failed, factionalized and most of them joined mainstream politics. 

The 'Subaltern Studies' clique pretended they were giving voice to the tribals & Dalits in a manner which would promote the Maoist cause. This was glamourous on some Campuses but it was wholly delusional. Still, one could get a PhD by writing nonsense in the illiterate idiom of those cretins. Nobody cared. Smart people don't study useless shite at Uni more particularly because genuine 'Subalterns' were becoming Chief Ministers, founding dynasties, and getting as rich as fuck. They had their own propagandists who wrote in the vernacular language. They didn't need- or even know about- stupid Professors teaching nonsense on Western Campuses.

A Swedish meatball- Axel Andersson- didn't get the memo. As late as 2013, he wrote an article in the LARB titled-

Obscuring Capitalism: Vivek Chibber’s Critique of Subaltern Studies

Chibber is from India. He knows Subaltern Studies is shit. Naxals don't want it. Indian Communist Parties have no use for it. The thing is a waste of time.  

Vivek Chibber's latest book challenges the theoretical fundaments

fundament can also mean anus 

of the

utterly useless, not 

influential Indian Subaltern School.

THE AIM OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY sociology professor Vivek Chibber’s latest book Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital (Verso, 2013) is to challenge the theoretical fundaments of the influential Indian Subaltern School.

it has zero influence in Indian politics. Thus it is useless shite.  

This new departure in South Asian historiography was an attempt to write a “history from below,”

Those from below were making history by taking over politics & the perks of office. They could manufacture their own mythology easily enough. They didn't need stupid Bengali Kayasthas or Baidyas or Brahmins to do it for them. But those darkies might be able to get a bit of affirmative action on Western Campuses. Then the Left Front in Bengal collapsed and these guys were shown to be useless tossers with zero support in their native countries.  

unburdened by colonial biases.

Different Brits had different biases. It was easy enough for an Indian from a particular community to pick the British official who had praised it while disparaging its rivals.  

In particular it sought to re-interpret the subcontinent’s tortured road to industrialization

Slow, not 'tortured'. The truth is, Indian industrialists were a bit crap and, in any case, successive Governments showed little interest in helping them flourish.  

and inclusion in the modern capitalist economy.

That happened long ago. The East India Company was Capitalist and pretty fucking modern. British India was the first truly secular administration in world history. Holyoake, the guy who invented the word 'Secularism' pointed this out about a century after British rule in India got off the ground.  

Subaltern Studies rose to prominence in the 1980s

when the Left Front had taken power in West Bengal. Would the CPM be replaced by the CPML? No. The Naxals had shit for brains.  

and was part of a wave of postcolonial critique of an ongoing essentializing gaze

which is wholly imaginary like the little old lady who thinks muscular men are trying to get into her bathroom to see her naked.  

used when discussing formerly colonized cultures.

Whining about being a darkie is all very well if you live in a White majority country. It is utterly mad if you live in a country populated by darkies from which Whites had run away long ago.  

Chibber formulates his critique of the critique (by way of Karl Marx) through the affirmation of Enlightenment universals.

Fuck off! Enlightenment thinkers like Hume, Smith, Kant etc. thought darkies had shit for brains. The big question facing them was whether Catholic Irishmen or Slavic people had brains. The answer was- not fucking likely, mate.  

He argues that we are all endowed with reason and that this is not merely a “Western” construct.

Even Swedish meatballs can reason. Sadly, they lose that ability if they have a PhD in shit.

It was a book that he did not want to write, as he admits in the preface, believing that there was no space in “intellectual culture” for a “serious engagement with postcolonial theory.”

Because it is shit. But so is Chibber's Marxism.  

But he wrote it all the same. The result is not without its ironies: parts of Chibber’s language and arguments are not so far from the postcolonial theory he attacks.

Shit is like other shit. That isn't ironic at all. It's simply a fact everybody discovers by the time they are about two years old.  

His text, both engrossing and at times infuriating, mounts an eminently useful barrage of arguments against Subaltern Studies and raises the stakes of the debate. It is not the first such attack, but it is maybe the most forceful in its curious combination of erudition and, on the other hand, a tendentiously narrow definition of the subject matter.

It is tendentious to say shit is shit just because it issued from a fundament. Maybe it is chocolate cake.  

Let me begin with a story that does not feature in Chibber’s book, even if “Postcolonial Theory” makes up the first and most important half of its title.

Meatball's story is about Colonialism, not Post-Colonialism.  

The Joinville psychiatric hospital at Blida, Algeria,

which was a French Colony 

constituted a society on the margins of the surrounding one, without for that reason being very different.

No. It was very different because its inmates were mad.  

It was a city within the city.

It was a lunatic asylum, not a city.  

An unmistakably colonial air hung over

an un-mistakeable French colony 

the whitewashed buildings, from the patients’ pavilions to the staff villas and the grand main entrance, and permeated the institution’s organization. Two thousand patients were separated according to sex but also according to ethnicity. Algerian inmates were in the “native,” or, later “Muslim” wings. But French-Algerian and native alike were united in the misery of their situation and condition.

Because they were mentally ill.  

The incarceration of the ill of Joinville was accompanied with a brutality that raised the question of how punishment could exist so freely without crime.

No it didn't. Asylums were like prisons or concentration camps. Inmates could be dangerous. Punishment was dished out pour encourager les autres.  


Frantz Fanon

a black man from Martinique which chose to remain with France in 1946. That was a sensible decision.  

arrived in Joinville in 1953 with a rare display of sartorial elegance, monogrammed handkerchiefs ready to wipe his brow, and progressive notions of mental illness. He was black, from Martinique, and a recently graduated psychiatrist who had not yet turned 30.

He had studied nonsense and was trying to write in the style of Sartre. What he should have done was research lithium salts.  

He had, however, the previous year published his groundbreaking Peau noire, masques blancs (Black Skin, White Masks), an analysis of the dehumanizing effects of colonial racial discourses in which the “native” others had to wear the “mask” of whiteness to succeed.

In other words, guys from Martinique were only black on the outside. Inside, they were trying to control their natural inclination to rape and rob just like White Frenchmen. This is called 'civilization'. 

Already during the introductory tour of Blida-Joinville Fanon criticized the wide array of repressive measures wielded at the hapless patients. The new colleagues observed him with curiosity. What mattered more than his history and style of radical engagement was that he was a newcomer, green, for all intents and purposes a Frankaoui (a term with locally flavored Arab ending used by the Franco-Algerians to describe their kin from the mainland) in foreign waters. His enthusiasm would soon succumb to the blistering sun

Martinique gets pretty hot. It isn't on the same latitude as Sweden.  

and the reality on the ground.

as opposed to the reality underneath it.  

Influenced by the work of François Tosquelles at the asylum of Saint-Albain in Lozère, Fanon began with a program of “sociotheraphy” in the European women’s wing under his charge, in order to break the confinement and apathy of the patients. A number of collective activities were organized. Religious holidays were celebrated, workshops started and cultural events offered. There were also meetings with doctors, nurses and patients in which all were allowed to raise their concerns. The turn from repression and isolation to social engagement, to the irritation of his upstaged colleagues, soon proved to have been a success. Already after one month a large and elaborate Christmas celebration took place with staff and patients.

Fuck has this to do with 'subaltern studies' or post-colonial theory?  


The subsequent move to repeat the experiment with the native men under his charge proved more difficult, as Alice Cherki chronicled in her Fanon biography from 2000 (in English translation 2006). Fanon spoke neither Arabic nor Kabyle and had to resort to an interpreter when explaining his project to the interns who remained impassive as the activities got underway. The detractors among his colleagues saw it as a clear case of not understanding an inherent backwardness of the Muslim mind. Fanon soon realized the problem: he had insensitively implemented a Western program on a society whose difference he did not grasp.

Did he resign and fuck off back to some place where everybody spoke French? No. I suppose he was already trying to help the Algerian liberation movement.  

The political situation compounded the challenge as Fanon’s invitation was easily understood as a colonial imposition. The Muslim men had interpreted the experiment as a call to live up to a western model of behavior by the dominant power and preferred, Bartleby-style, not to participate. Fanon concluded that there was nothing atavistic in this reaction; it was a sign of resistance.

It was sensible. It was obvious that this guy couldn't help them. Muslim dudes- like Christian dudes- like Doctors who give them a pill which makes them feel better. They aren't interested in childish games. 

As Fanon continued his explorations at Blida-Joinville the surrounding society was thrown into turmoil by the nascent war of Algerian independence. The fallout soon reached the institution. More and more of the patients became those having suffered torture at the hand of the French authorities, neatly mirrored by an influx of torturers who had suffered as a consequence of their trade.

That's the problem with torture. Shooting people is cheaper and more effective.  

Fanon began working with the clandestine opposition to colonial rule and eventually quit his post at Joinville in 1956, two years into the bloody war.

Why be a psychiatrist when you can get paid to be a crazy politician?  

Though he had only a few years left to live before succumbing to leukemia in 1961

he was smart enough to go to the US for medical treatment 

he wrote the important works L’An V de la révolution algérienne (A Dying Colonialism) and Les damnés de la terre (The Wretched of the Earth).

Lots of Muslim Algerians became more wretched after Independence. The smart ones emigrated to France. Fanon's white wife stayed behind. She killed herself.  

Fanon’s analysis of the racially divided universe of colonialism and the forms of resistance against its formidable physical and noetic power would form one of the building blocks in “postcolonial” thought.

No.  Postcolonial thought is what succeeded Anti-colonial thought. In the Fifties, it was expressed by things like the Bandung Conference or opposition to the Suez invasion. Fanon was irrelevant. People noticed that Martinique had chosen to stay with France. 

His world was drastically changing and these, often violent, upheavals would have far-reaching political and intellectual consequences.

Anticolonial agitators became post-colonial administrators or intellectuals unless the wrong faction gained power and they had to run away to somewhere still ruled by Whites.  

Political maps were entirely redrawn.

Some were as portions of a former colony broke away- e.g. Pakistan from India. Most were not- e.g. Algeria, though there was a brief 'Sand War' with Morocco which ended when Cuban troops landed in Algeria.  

The 19th-century scramble for colonizing the Global South had reached such frantic levels that by 1900 more than 90 percent of Africa, 56 percent of Asia and 99 percent of the Pacific was under colonial rule.

Which led to anti-colonial movements which began establishing relations with each other such that a common anti-colonial ideology came into existence. This continued to burgeon as post-colonial ideology in places like Algiers, New Delhi & Djakarta.  

The movement began to reverse after World War I and the reversal intensified after the World War II. By the late 1970s formal territorial colonialism was practically over, mostly thanks to wars of liberation like the one in Algeria.

No. Algeria was unusual because it had a lot of French settlers. In most other places there was a peaceful transition of the Indian sort. Dutch Indonesia and French Vietnam and Portuguese African possessions were exceptions.  

The human cost of both colonialism and its dissolution begs belief.

beggars not begs.  

In one of the most infamous cases, the Belgian Congo,

no. That was the 'Free State of Congo'. Once Belgium established direct rule, things got better.  

between 10 and 13 millions Africans died.

sadly, Independence didn't do much to help the people though their kleptocratic leaders got very rich. 

Today the poverty of the Global South remains as the deep scars in the landscape through which the disaster traveled.

There are no such scars.  

The work of understanding colonialism

was done by economists and military strategists.  

and the process of decolonization that

was presided over by lawyers, politicians and administrators 

Fanon had been so instrumental in developing

Fanon didn't develop shit. He wrote hysterical Sartrean shite.  

would take an unexpected turn when Edward Said published Orientalism in 1978.

The departure of the Brits turned out to be a fucking disaster for Palestinians- especially Protestant ones like Said.  

The volume on the construction of the image of the “Orient” by Western scholars at first seemed so marginal that Said had difficulties interesting a serious publisher.

The book was shit. It referenced French dudes like Massignon whom nobody had heard of.  

It appeared as a highly specialized discussion apt to only interest the experts in the field.

It was nonsense. Still, at that time Arafat & the PLO seemed very important. The Americans were trying to get Israel to return to the pre-67 borders. Anyway, his book might piss off the Jews. Nobody really likes them you know.  

In a matter of a few years, however, the colonial “other” and the process of “othering” became commonplace in academic parlance.

Because only very stupid people were doing PhDs in that shite. Back in the 50s & even the 60s, a Phd on a shithole country could get you a gig with the State Dept. Then, it was discovered, shithole countries don't matter. Even if they turn Commie, they will need to export raw materials to get hard currency. Still, Oil Sheikhs had plenty of that commodity. If they liked Said, why not promote him? After all, he went to the right Schools & Colleges and fantasized that he'd slept with Candice Bergen.  

At the same time literatures from previously colonized areas were read more extensively and analyzed in the West as a counter-canon, a means to question the continuing “hegemony” (after the Italian Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci) of the “occidental” logic that had underpinned the colonial enterprise.

No. What happened was that illiterate kids who needed a Comp Lit credit could be spoon fed the childish scribblings of darkies from shithole countries. Previously, Comp Lit meant actually reading a French or Spanish book in the original. 

The colonial reality of the majority of the world would in earnest become part of the discussions of Western academia, thanks to pioneers such as Said who had studied and challenged the previously reigning stereotypes of the colonized mind.

In other words, you could pretend that you were the equal of Vasco da Gama coz you had read a story by R.K Narayan and thus had discovered India all over again.  

A returning question became: who was it that had been denied a voice

Dumb people. Nobody else. Under Colonialism, there were law courts. If you witnessed a murder, you were supposed to provide testimony before the Magistrate.  

and had only been spoken for?

Spivak pretended that her great-aunty hanged herself while on her period because she was actually a Ninja assassin but couldn't say so. The truth is, Aunty was pissed off with her Daddy because he hadn't married her off, as is required by Hindu scripture, and was sending her to skool instead.  

Marxist “history from below” was, importantly, given a new lease on life as it turned to the vast, poor and oppressed underbelly of the Global South.

If there was oppression, it was a case of darkies doing it to darkies. Incidentally, plenty of the new leaders came from poor families- e.g. Idi Amin, Emperor Bokassa, etc.  

The vague and empathic posture that had characterized the Third-Worldism of the 1960s and 1970s

The Fifties and Sixties was characterized by 'Developmentalism'- i.e. economists, agronomists etc. advising on how to raise productivity. The problem was 'immeserizing poverty'- i.e. demand for primary products can be inelastic and thus raised output lowers revenue. Could a global 'North-South' deal be done to improve the terms of trade for the poorer countries? No. Thus, over the course of the Seventies, Developmentalism curled up and died. Stupid shitheads were welcome to teach paranoid nonsense under the pretense of engaging with Turd World countries. This involved saying 'my research shows that in 1875, a White dude said 'darkies suck ass big time'. This caused darkies to become utterly shit because they had been 'objectified' as the alterity of the catachresis of the constipation of the oesophagus of Neo-fucking-Liberalism.'   

was replaced by seemingly more refined theoretical tools that also helped uncover continuing colonialism in a way of thinking:

Indians had been doing that since about 1757. It involved saying 'that dude drinks wine rather than desi daru. This shows his brain has been colonized. Also, he probably takes it up the arse from Governor General Sahib.'

the Western essentialising of natives, which could be as present in the metropole as among the Western educated postcolonial elites themselves.

Boko Haram is right to demand the banning of books. Why? Books are Western. If you read a book your brain will be colonized and you will end up sucking Donald Trump's dick.  

Formal independence had not been enough to free either the west or the former colonies from a legacy that showed a remarkable resilience and still shaped the relationship between north and south.

In 1963, President Kennedy failed to wipe my bum probably due to I iz bleck. This terrible crime still haunts America and has caused the election of the Donald. I should be paid billions in reparations.  

According to Vivek Chibber, it was around this time, the early 1980s, that everything started going wrong.

By then, everybody knew that Communism doesn't work for a Hayekian reason.  Not just Thatcher & Reagan, even Mitterand, elected with Communist support, went in for a tournant de la rigueur- i.e. an economic U-turn. The Left was dead in the water. 

Chibber does not pretend to supply an intellectual history of the larger field of “postcolonial theory,”

I have done so. The thing is easy enough.  

but there is a mini-history of origins that places its occurrence at the “cultural turn” in academia in which anthropologists and historians started to interest themselves in a brand of cultural analysis focused on the discursive formation of reality, taking the cue form literary theory.

Why? It is because 'Developmentalists' had given up because their dog wouldn't hunt. Crazy nutters were welcome to move in and squat in the condemned building they had evacuated. Incidentally, at one time 'anthropologist' didn't mean drug-addled, unemployable, shithead.  

Postcolonial theory had first reached academia through departments of literature and cultural studies.

Because Professors of Literature had become wholly illiterate. Said had pointed out that when he was young a Lit Professor knew two Classical and half a dozen modern European languages. By the Seventies, you had Eng Lit Professors who hadn't even read Hamlet.  

Chibber would have preferred it not to spread from there. He reduces its role to having brought literature from previously colonized and marginalized voices into the canon.

Sir William Jones brought Hafiz and Kalidasa into the Western canon in the eighteenth century. That was a big factor in the Romantic movement. What was unusual about the Eighties was that shite writers- not good ones- gained acclaim amongst a narrow academic coterie. But Tagore was popular everywhere. Mahashweta Devi, who wrote like shite, was not. 

This he calls a “salutary achievement.”

It was meaningless. Good wine needs no bush. People read Marquez & Borges because they were good.  

But the leakage of models and techniques from literature departments into its more socially scientific minded neighbors spelled trouble.

No. Sociology, Anthropology etc. had already turned to shite. There were some stupid Marxist Economists but they taught Econometrics which can be quite useful.  

The postcolonial theories did not only claim to analyze but also to guide political action.

Useless people boycotting shite aren't engaged in political action. They are merely making a nuisance of themselves.  

This familiar combination made it possible for its proponents to take over an academic Marxism that had found itself in a rut in the 1980s.

It had failed and everybody was abandoning it.  

Although profoundly Marxian in background, many postcolonial scholars took issue with the universalist assumptions of historical materialism

Post-modernists took the extra step and questioned the universalist assumptions of Physics. Why are so few Voodoo practitioners getting Nobel Prizes? Is it because they iz bleck?  

To believe that capitalism would function in the same way in the south and the north was,

not an assumption any Development Economist made after about 1965. Corrupt shitholes would have more rent seeking.  

according to many, another result of the arrogant Western assumption that its models and history were the blueprints for the rest.

Marx may have assumed something like this. Mill did not. Why? Darkies must have shit for brains- right?  

The agenda of bringing excluded voices into the discussion

we must bring the excluded voice of the Dalit woman into the discussion. What's that? Mayawati is a Dalit Woman and has been Chief Minister of India's largest province four times? Oh. Well, in that case, why bother?  

or, at least, questioning the existence of such exclusion

which ceased to exist before these cunts got to Collidge.  

gives much of the field of postcolonial theory its most important justification.

It existed so as to get credentials to cretins.  

Its proponents argue, however, that the colonial wound does not constitute a historical wrong that can be cured just by the admittedly political act of adjusting the canon and the reading lists and bringing into visibility the previously oppressed.

Reading lists for shite subjects are shite. Nobody cares about them. On the other hand, it is very important that schizophrenic hobos read Mahashweta Devi as translated by Gayatri Spivak.  Otherwise they would be guilty of excluding a shittier and stupider voice than any of the ones they already have in their heads. That's fucking Racist mate. 

Chibber surely does not believe so either, but still puts his money on a standard Marxist approach to a world that Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has called “post-colonial” and at the same time “neo-colonized”.

Because she is stupid. Still, it is true that, when she was a little girl, some stupid Commies said 'Nehru is the puppet of Wall Street. Let us kill all the kulaks so as to achieve true independence'. Sadly, since soldiers are the sons of kulaks, they were quickly beaten into submission.. 

He fears that the Enlightenment universal of reason will become collateral damage in the postcolonial critique of “Western” epistemic dominance, that such theories will undermine their own instruments of radical critique when they move from a study of culture to political activism.

In other words, saying 'Whitey be debil' won't help you in a White majority country. Sadly, it won't help you in Hindu majority India either unless you add 'Muslims be debil'.  

However, his premise that postcolonial theory can be kept in neat isolation in literature departments is erroneous.

Because it is a virus endemic amongst the terminally stupid- i.e. the only kind of student these cretins get to teach.  

Fanon, to begin with, would tell us that psychiatry was politics,

It is no such thing. It is about medication and/or stuff like CBT.  

especially so in the colonial context.

Never in that context. It was a disease like leukemia which has a genetic component. 

Said would add that academic practices were equally permeated by colonial politics.

I suppose there were former colonial administrators or experts who were still alive and who had tenure back then. But that was long ago.  

To be fair, Jewish Professors of the period probably weren't greatly enamoured with Arabs more particularly after they had got as rich as fuck. 

But this evidently does not automatically mean that postcolonial research, whatever discipline it might find itself in, should be excused any inconsistencies just because of its politics.

There is no post-colonial research. There was, however, some State sponsored post-colonial ideology and praxis underpinning various 'South-South' or 'Non-Aligned' institutions. Some Universities in the capital city would have retired diplomats etc. holding Professional Chairs for this purpose.  

The “salutary achievement” of Chibber’s book lies exactly in highlighting some of the failures of postcolonial theory,

Post-colonialism could have been useful if a 'North-South' deal to more equitably share the gains from trade had been feasible. But if even the Bretton Woods straitjacket broke down (i.e. exchange rates could not remain fixed) then what hope was there for something far more elaborate?  

although this does not mean that this theory should retreat to the implied “fussy world” of the humanities.

shitty world of the sub-humanities.  

Chibber will unwittingly drive the second point home himself.

Let it simply die already.  

If there is one true adversary in Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital it is a use of postcolonial thought in India.

It is used as a way to escape India and gain affirmative action on a Western Campus.  

The author shares many of its concerns, having worked on the topic of the country’s industrialization,

which depends on getting rural girls into giant factory dormitories- though Chibber won't say so.  

explaining more directly this need to write a book that he did not want to write. The theories under attack came into being in relation to the annual series Subaltern Studies that was first published in 1982. The main thinkers associated with the school were, to name a few, Ranajit Guha, Partha Chatterjee, Dipesh Chakrabarty, Homi Bhabba and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak.

all of whom emigrated as soon as they could 

They had all come of age in post-independence India, completing their first degree there before moving on to western academia (Guha, born 1928, being the exception).

Bengal became autonomous when he was 9 years old.  

Both Subaltern Studies and the individual volumes on Indian historiography produced by the members would have a profound impact on postcolonial theory.

In other words, the guys doing that stupid shit had a profound impact on that same stupid shit.  

Chibber directs his critique mainly against Guha’s Dominance Without Hegemony from 1997

The Brits had hegemony in directly ruled territory. That's why Guha spoke English. 

and Chakrabarty’s Provincializing Europe from 2000.

Europe was provincialized by the US after it tore itself apart in two bloody wars.  

He stealthily avoids direct confrontation with Spivak

she is crazy 

and her engagement with poststructuralist French theory,

which was crazy 

though he indirectly delivers a familiar incrimination of concept creation and neologisms in general. Orwell’s advice in “Politics and the English Language” from 1946 hovers menacingly in the background as yet another specter.

It is irrelevant. Chibber is an old fashioned Marxist- i.e. retarded rather than crazy.  

Subaltern Studies tried to understand the divergent developmental paths of India 

India didn't go in for oceanic trade. The West did. So did the Japs and then the Koreans and now the Chinese. They are the biggest ship builders in the world. By contrast, India has only now achieved parity with Colombo port which ranks only about 25th in the global ranking.  

and the West and argue that the model of capital’s universalizing drive fails in India,

because Capital neither has a drive nor a hive. Countries fail if they are lazy or if they do stupid shit. India was both lazy and inclined to do stupid shit. 

leaving a different image of the power relations created by capitalism.

Money can only create 'power relations' if it isn't stolen or confiscated by the State. Still, we get that Chibber, being Indian, wants to blame some abstraction rather than India's laziness or stupidity for its currently being as poor as shit.  

The implication is that the Western model of studying the nation’s development has to be questioned as it is permeated by Eurocentric assumptions.

Like the assumption that people will work hard and do sensible stuff? But immigrants to the West do both where and when it is 'incentive compatible' to do so.  

The main among these assumptions is that part of capital’s universalizing tendency is to bring with it political and cultural changes all around the world.

That happens through 'Tardean mimetics' which itself is associated with higher productivity leading to superior status.  

Guha and other subaltern theorists agree that this happened in Europe where a capitalist bourgeoisie rose to hegemony,

Fuck that. What happened was that the parts of Europe which did well had more incentive compatible mechanisms. Sadly, it was shit at resolving conflicts peacefully and thus got 'provincialized' by two world wars. America, after its Civil War, didn't have this problem.  

the position of being able to represent all the other classes like the proletariat, overturned the feudal order and moved towards liberal democracy.

This is magical thinking. Incentives matter. Ways of classifying people don't.  

If this supposedly happened in Europe, it did not happen in India.

Because Indians didn't and still don't give a shit about incentive compatibility. It is a 'scarcity economy' where the big political issue is reservations for a paltry number of shitty Government jobs.  

The native bourgeoisie failed to press for revolution,

Why didn't they demand the slitting of their own throats? Plenty of bourgeois dudes supported land reform and always bought land, if permitted to do so, when big estates were broken up. 

worked alongside the landed classes,

The bourgeoisie owned land. It was a safe enough investment. Everybody who is anybody has a bit of land in his portfolio. That's why Amitabh Bacchan was classed as an 'agriculturist' for legal and administrative purposes. 

and did not take it upon themselves to speak for those without a voice, the subalterns (following Gramsci’s terminology).

Nonsense. Many a middle class lawyer set up as a Trade Unionist because that was a profitable business.  

Capitalism was implemented not through bourgeois hegemony but by colonial dominance,

As Gandhi pointed out, plenty of Indian 'banias' were happy to lend to the East India Company because their hoondis (bills of exchange) were highly liquid. But then, many a General or Prince was happy to surrender to the Brits in return for a pension. BTW tax farming (zamindari) is a capitalist enterprise. That's how Tagores and Guhas got rich.   

physical force in other words.

You can buy plenty of 'physical force' with money.  

Dominance without hegemony came to identify the colonial condition,

even though there was hegemony even when there wasn't much display of 'dominance'- e.g. in Princely States or big zamindaris. 

and by extension, also the postcolonial.

How? The Brits had fucked off. They couldn't dominate shit. Did they have 'hegemony'? No. If McMillan said 'suck my cock', Nehru would tell him to fuck the fuck off.  

The evident ironies in Guha’s position are not lost on Chibber. Guha puts forward a critique of the liberal idea of universalizing categories,

there were none such. Classical Liberalism wanted a restricted franchise. Let those who actually paid the property or income tax decide how that money should be spent. One proviso. Voters must have a penis.  

that produce the exclusion of the subaltern,

Not having the vote excluded them.  

through a decidedly Whiggish argument that it is the bourgeoisie that necessarily creates liberal politics.

Swedish meatball doesn't know that the Whigs were big landed magnates. Tories were smaller squires.  

But the premise, in Subaltern Studies, that the European revolutions were the result of a capitalist bourgeoisie that started to reform society in a more democratic direction is not correct.

i.e. they were ignorant shitheads who knew nothing of either India or Europe or anywhere else.  

The long-lasting effect of the British Civil War

There was an English Civil War not a British one. Swedish meatball is as ignorant as shit.  

and the French revolution was, as Chibber points out, to strengthen the state rather than capitalism or democracy.

No. The Brits weakened the State and curbed Stuart absolutism by bringing in stupid Hanoverians to rule the country. Napoleon strengthened the French State but France ended up weaker than under the Sun King.  

The advances towards democracy were the result of

rising productivity (higher tax yield from workers)  or conscription (equal sacrifice) as well as rival parties striving to outflank each other. Once you had universal franchise, after the Great War in the case of UK, the Liberal party was displaced by the Labour party. 

the subaltern working classes rising and pressuring the bourgeoisie rather than following their lead.

Fuck off! The Earl of Derby was persuaded by Disraeli that doubling the franchise would benefit the Tories. He wasn't pressured by his stable-boy. Short run, Disraeli's gambit appeared to have boomeranged but, long term, it was a brilliant piece of strategy. Similarly the Tories gained long term from universal franchise. Workers & women tend to be quite sensible and nationalistic. 

The subaltern studies vision of the universalizing drive of capital

which doesn't exist.                                

is flawed and there is thus no reason to say that it does not apply to India.

There is no reason for cretins to talk about India- a country they know nothing about, even if they are Indian by birth.  

Chibber convincingly argues that capital’s universalizing drive exists, but that it is merely a matter of capital extending to more and more markets.

If there is a market, there is a market-maker (arbitrageur) and thus a Capitalist.  

Capitalism is not supposed to bring democracy, capitalists are happiest the more control they have over their workforce.

Managers want to control workers whether they work in the public or private sector. Capitalists are concerned with the rate of return, volatility, beta, etc.  

The preeminent example of the nature of capital’s universalizing drive to make all local markets dependent on it,

Capital runs away from 'local markets' which aren't profitable.  

we might add, is obviously China.

In 2013, when this meatball wrote this, China was a net Capital importer to the tune of a quarter of a trillion dollars. Now it is a capital exporter to the tune of half a trillion. 

Capitalism fits perfectly with state communism as has been made evident for all to see.

We think the opposite now. Can Xi rebalance the economy? We don't know. 

The difference between the ex-colonies and the West was

they had been colonized by people from a different continent. Still, if they did sensible things, they could overtake the West. Look at Singapore. Its nominal per capita income is about 70 percent higher than the UK. It is double in purchasing power terms.  

thus not that capitalism failed to universalize.

The UK got lazy and did stupid shit. Thus it fell behind Singapore. Brexit as motivated by the desire to create a 'Singapore-on-Thames'. It failed miserably. Dyson, who supported Brexit ended up moving his operations to Singapore.  

Rather, the colonial problem was that it was allowed to universalize all too well.

Colonies differed greatly from each other. Nothing can be 'universalized' where things are ideographic, not nomothetic.  

If capitalists only rule by consensus when forced to, otherwise being quite at ease in relying on coercion, the key question is, as Chibber points out, that of subaltern agency, given that it is only this class that can force politics to take a radical direction.

Yet, it has never actually done so partly because 'radical directions' cause poor to die of starvation.  

But this thesis becomes problematic in the framework of Subaltern Studies, where the psychology of the Indian peasant is heralded as impossible to comprehend through western, and falsely universal, categories.

That was a myth exploded by econometric work on the 'rational peasant' which, in the case of India, was proved by the Green Revolution in the Sixties. Even the fucking Sociologists knew about it by 1979. 

The discipline has described the Indian subaltern as motivated by a sense of community rather than utilitarian calculations.

Because it was ignorant.  

It is these kinds of statements that Chibber dismissively refers to as “canards” with such frequency as to risk his narrative sounding like a culinary digression.

He is right. Peasants were known to be rational by the time he grew out of short pants.  

Familiar with the topic, he convincingly argues that the Indian peasantry was motivated by the same range of material concerns that can be found all around the world. The arguments of Subaltern Studies on the contrary, and this is Chibber’s coup de grâce, contributes to an orientalising image of the “East.”

It is backward shite from the Fifties. Nehru firmly believed that peasants were as stupid as shit. If they got hold of some money they would blow it on a big wedding or religious feast.  


The charge of postcolonial orientalism becomes even more pronounced in Chibber’s discussion of Dipesh Chakrabarty’s Provincializing Europe. Chakrabarty sought to contrast two ways of understanding history. The first was dominated by universal categories framed in “Western” discourses of rationality.

From which the East was excluded.  

According to this model the postcolonial world will reach the same level of modernity and industrialization as the West, eventually.

Fuck off! Some Eastern countries will rise higher- unless they have done so already. This became obvious at the Tokyo Olympics back in the Sixties. 

It just got on a later train.

Japan's bullet train was the fastest in the world. It was launched in 1964. China & Japan are now way ahead in developing mag-lev.  

All local dissonances and particularities that do not fit in with this universal trajectory will be shed at some point or another as the world homogenizes.

Lazy peeps can chose to remain poor.  

But this idea is based on a specific notion of how capitalism should spread. Having rejected capital’s universalizing tendency, the subaltern scholars turned to a study of the particularities of the lower classes of India, the second mode of understanding history, contributing to a descent to what Chibber calls a “seemingly fascination endless with religion, ritual, spirits, indigeneity, and so on.”

Ignorant shitheads made up stories about people they considered more ignorant yet. But those dudes were becoming Chief Ministers of newly created States. They were also getting very rich.  

If they had placed more emphasis on the relationship between capitalism and dominance, rather than hegemony, in both the Global North and the Global South, the analysis might have looked very different.

It would still have been shit because they had shit for brains.  

Subaltern Studies would not have had the same need to insist on the Eurocentric, and colonial, nature of rationality and all-universal theories.

Yes they did. If anyone said 'you are stupid', they could reply 'I can't help being a darkie. Darkies have shit for brains, mate. Boo hoo! Kindly give me tenure for the sake of DEI.' 

The critique of the post-independence nationalist leaders might also have been different. Nehru did not press for “industrialization, scientific research, modern administration techniques, and similar practices” because he was in the thrall of a colonial Enlightenment rationality, as Chibber objects, there was simply no way to feasibly make an alternative path outside of capitalism.

Yes there was. It involved Stalinist 5 year plans. Sadly, Nehru couldn't do collectivization of land which would have killed off half the population. 

It is hard not to sympathize with Chibber’s two charges against Subaltern Studies of “obscuring capitalism” and “resurrecting orientalism.”

Why not simply admit that the thing was stupid, ignorant, shit?  

His case is well argued and the notion of a shared rationality makes possible any kind of meaningful dialog about arguments in the first place. But Chibber also neatly trips himself up in his attempt to indict the entirety of postcolonial theory through the specific example of Subaltern Studies. His insistence on the pitfalls related to idealizing the European bourgeoisie as harbingers of democracy and orientalising the Indian peasantry as community and tradition oriented subalterns outside of the Western logic is an eminently postcolonial analysis made possible through postcolonial practices.

Chibber is a Mohyal Brahmin. He knows very well that the Brits kept gassing on about how productive the Punjabi peasant was. Indeed Punjab was a big wheat exporter between 1880-1910. The Brits wanted to settle Punjabis in Canada and other agricultural regions. Those who settled in California did very well. Bengali cunts may have thought the Indian peasant was shitty. Punjabis know different and, what's more, they know the Brits both knew and said different.  

Arguments about the impenetrable divide between the West and the East belong to the murky Manichean universe of colonialism.

No. They belong to boring Bengali blathershites. Kipling identified with the Punjab. He said West & East meet when strong men work together doing something useful.  

Exploring “othering” only makes sense

if you think everybody is saying mean things about you behind your back and refusing to invite you to orgies.  

with the presupposition of a shared humanity. Chibber thus proves that postcolonial theory is well able to formulate its own debates, even by employing those voices that, like his, profess to stand outside the field of the same postcolonial theory.

Julian Go is a sociologiest within it. He is shit. So is Chibber but Chibber is Punjabi- i.e. a bit thick- whereas Go is the smart sort of Asian.  


Chibber does a good and important job criticizing some of the fundaments of Subaltern Studies. Postcolonial Theory is a book that should be read by all engaging with postcolonial theory,

i.e. shitheads 

though keeping in mind that the biggest canard in Chibber’s text is that postcolonial theory would necessarily have to stand in antagonism with Enlightenment rationality.

Very true. It could get down on its knees and suck it off.  

It is on the contrary the case that postcolonial critiques often deal with colonial failures to extend notions of the universal to the colonial world,

or to extend them to women and poorer workers in their own country. 40 percent of men didn't have the vote in the UK in 1914. Middle class darkies, on the other hand, couldn't just vote in the UK, they could stand for Parliament. Two Indians got elected to Westminster before the Great War.  

instead treating this world as an economic, political and ethical exception. It also points to the fact that all colonial, and postcolonial, interactions have to undergo complicated processes of translations and mediations because of the history of violent colonial domination.

Not in India. There wasn't a lot of violence while the Brits were around.  

These processes of translation often have the aim, as in the example of Fanon at Joinville with which I began, of repairing the application of universal systems of values that colonial systems have interrupted.

Fuck off! Fanon didn't repair shit. He should have resigned because he was unqualified to treat Arabs. Incidentally putting lunatics in asylums aint an Arab practice. Let them wander around as 'fools for God'. They'll be well enough looked after.  


Fanon, faced by the refusal of the Muslim patients of Blida-Joinville to participate in his sociotheraphy, did not content himself with the colleagues’ explanation that it was the consequence of an “oriental” Muslim mind.

They knew that if they were simply allowed to wander around, they'd get enough to eat and have a higher quality of life. The sad thing is that 'Franz Fanon hospital' expanded during the Sixties and Seventies at a time when European asylums were being shut down and 'care in the community' was gaining favour. Apparently, the place is quite horrible now.  

After first concluding that it was rather a healthy resistance against a colonial imposition Fanon began to reflect over his own program together with the local nurses and his co-worker Jacques Azoulay. The holidays around which he had proposed that the patients celebrate held no meaning for them. They had not wanted to participate in the choir because singers were seen as itinerants and outcasts. Basket weaving was a female activity and therefore problematic for them. Fanon revised the program and built up a traditional teahouse for the patients, replicating the meeting place of the men in society. He also started to celebrate Muslim holidays and brought in troubadours from the outside. His idea of therapeutics was both rational and universal but it had to take into account cultural difference as well as the wound of colonial domination.

No. Fanon was merely catering to the tastes of his patients. Medicine is a service industry. Since he was shit at it, it is fortunate that he gave up the profession quite soon.  


Postcolonial theory naturally reflects the society around it, much like Blida-Joinville.

Now called the Franz Fanon Hospital.  

It exists in a world, a shared universe, preoccupied with the vexed notions of difference and translation just as Fanon’s clinical work was.

The vexed question is where the money is supposed to come from. When oil prices were high, conditions were better in the hospital. When they fell or when money had to be diverted to fighting the rebels, it deteriorated.  

Chibber’s Postcolonial Theory and the Spectre of Capital is an important engagement with Subaltern Studies.

Why engage with shit? Just pull the flush already.  

Rather than negating the premise for the analytical framework of postcolonial theory, however, it reinforces its raison d’être.

Darkies have shit for brains. Thus the raison d'etre for Whining about Whitey or Capitalism or Neo-Liberalism. What else can darkies do if they have shit for brains?  

The categories developed in postcolonial scholarship, instigated by forerunners such as Fanon

who was a French citizen and would have remained so had he lived into our own day 

and Said,

an American citizen. Neither was 'post-colonial' save in the sense that Said's country had once consisted of 13 Colonies.  

have given invaluable tools to probe failed drives to universalize and identify those that show more promise to be able to take colonial history into account.

That was done long ago by people like Macaulay.  

In a twisted final irony it is the postcolonial term ‘orientalism’ that will colonize Chibber’s language and argumentation, inscribing him in a tradition whose breadth and importance he underestimates.

That's not so bad. What Chibber should worry about is the word 'canard' turning into a Muscovy duck and roosting up his fundament.  

Thursday, 18 December 2025

Chibber's Class Matrix

Antipode- a journal of radical geography- has a review of Chibber's new book here. 

With The Class Matrix, Vivek Chibber has turned the argument for capitalism’s “stability” on its head.

Capitalism means a system where Capital is allocated by Capital Markets. It is stable if Enterprises are profitable and thus, shareowners receive a reward for their investment. Marx thought that the rate of profit would fall to zero and so shareowners would get no dividends. Thus their shares would become worthless. Capitalism would collapse. 

Clearly, this was nonsense. Profit is the reward for taking on risk which itself is associated with 'Knightian Uncertainty'- i.e. the unpredictability of future states of the world. It won't go to zero unless the future becomes perfectly predictable. What about the interest rate? The answer is that it could become negative, in real terms, without Capitalism collapsing. We all have to save for our old age or for College fees or to buy property. 

Suppose, over all, the economy begins to shrink. More and more enterprises go bust because they are making losses. Will Capitalism survive? Yes. Even if the economy is shrinking, entrepreneurs will be rewarded for combining the other factors of production. Of course, the enterprises which keep making losses will go bust and thus, overall, aggregate profits will keep falling. But those who don't go bust will still see positive profits. It is likely that there will be a 'flight to quality'. Successful enterprises will have high Price/Earnings ratios. The Stock jobber and the rentier won't wholly disappear.

There was some silly notion that 'culture' would keep Capitalism and Racism and Sexual Violence against Women in place. Thus everybody should study literary theory or film Semiotics to change culture. Sadly, those who did so ended up babbling nonsense. Chibber tried to point this out.

Its stability lies not in the proverbial superstructure, in culture, but in the very base that was meant to bring about capitalism’s end.

How? Marx thought some silly formula would ensure it would happen automatically. Can Chibber suggest an alternative formula? 

Accordingly, not only have proponents of cultural explanations got it wrong but so too have “classical Marxists misunderstood the implications of their own theory” . It is the material constraints of capitalism’s class structure that make it so difficult to supplant, contra culturalist explanations of workers’ indoctrination.

Very true. Workers are materially constrained from flapping their arms and flying away like birds.  

But Chibber does not completely throw out the cultural turn’s “very exciting … tectonic shift in social analysis” (p.4) and argues that it is only through culture that the structure’s constraints can be overcome.

Culture has magic powers. Cool. 

The critical difference, however, is Chibber’s assertion of the “explanatory primacy” of the structure, not culture . In The Class Matrix, he decisively demonstrates this. Chibber’s reassertion of class, while retaining certain key insights of the cultural turn, will be welcomed by geographers, labour geographers especially, who’ve attempted to defend class—and Marxism more broadly—from the discipline’s post-structural and postMarxist critiques.

This is reasonable. A particular region can be Socialist or Traditionalist or Fascist or anything else it likes. However it may decline relative to other areas if Capital allocation is screwed up or if 'incentive incompatibility' arises. But this can also happen in Capitalist regions where peeps do stupid shite.  

. The relegation of class coincided with questioning the relevance of trade unions

Trade Unions can help make 'incomplete contracts' more, not less, incentive compatible and thus enable enterprises to internalize externalities better. The same can be said of fiscal authorities. Indeed, we would expect to see a range of 'Tiebout models' with different political and enterprise cultures offering different different tax and public good combinations. 

and outright rejections of Marxist “totalisations” and “metanarratives” of capitalism.

These would have to be recast in terms of Econophysics. Volatility is key here. There may be a Goldilocks conditions for Volatility as a driver for financial markets. Without this, to employ a Baldwinian term, there won't be enough 'capacitance diversity' in the system to make it 'robust'- which is all we can hope for, not stability. 

Still, it must be said, particular regions may go into long run decline and 'Culture' may curate or manage that decline. But, at the margin, there will be regime replacement- at least as far as capital allocation goes. 

Geographers have 1 Chibber (p.ix) distinguishes between two broad understandings of culture. Raymond Williams’ “an entire ‘way of life’—the gamut of social practices that distinguish one social formation or one epoch from another” and the narrower definition that denotes “ideology, discourse, normative codes, and so on—together comprising the interpretive dimension of social practices”. For practical purposes, he and this review only refer to the latter. 2 For Chibber, a base/superstructure model asserting that the economic base rolls over “all other social relations … subsuming them under its own logic” is “obviously unsustainable (p.129). He rather advances an updated version of G.A. Cohen’s “restricted historical materialism” whereby the base only “transforms those aspects of the surrounding institutions that interfere with it” (p.132).

The silicon chip is part of the 'base', not the superstructure. Has it transformed only engineering and management? Has culture, more broadly speaking, been affected? 

The answer is that, at the margin, Culture has been fundamentally affected. But, this also means there is more 'Tiebout sorting' within Regions- indeed, the thing is 'fractal'. Mummy and Daddy belong to one type of economy while the kids upstairs inhabit Virtual Reality. 

1 preferred the local and particular, over “the universalizing claims of traditional class theory” (Chibber 2017:27), and it’s not clear that the critiques of the former raised by Noel Castree (2005) have been addressed. Too often geographers deploy the concept of class as a “construction of agential identities” (Chibber 2017:28)—just one such identity among many “differences”, rather than as a materialist social relation based upon the “biggest binary of all: the division between capital and labor” (Houston and Pulido 2002:404).

The rise of the institutional investor erased that distinction. You worked for a company which was largely owned by your own Pension and Insurance and other such Funds. Trade Unions can work with Management and Local Government & Education & Skill providers- as happens in Germany- and so wages and profits can both fall during a downturn only to rise more rapidly during an upswing. 

Proper theorisation and deployment of class analysis can provide a sophisticated and translatable way “for comparing apparently similar (or different) cases [of neoliberalism]” (Castree 2005:4). With the rich winning a class war, Raju Das’ (2012)

which is what happens when drunken hobos are not addressed as 'Your Majesty' 

call for reinvigorated “class analysis” within geography surely needs to be taken up. That said, while: “[a] revived concern with the structure of capitalism is to be welcomed, … to return to the status quo ante—to resume a theorization of class structure as if the turn to culture had never happened—would be a mistake. 

That turn to culture was shit. Grievance Studies alienates blue collar types.  

We need class analysis, but it needs the update provided by The Class Matrix. In The Class Matrix Chibber is principally concerned with the debate on what “the fundamental source of stability” for capitalism is.

The fundamental source of stability for Socialism was Racial homogeneity. Immigrants may start at the bottom of the ladder but they tend to move up it whereas those currently on top move downward. 'Reversion to the mean' applies.  

And the stakes are high. Karl Marx’s prediction of the expropriators being expropriated has not materialised,

 There have been Revolutions and National Liberation struggles in plenty. It's just that markets allocate capital better, that's all.  

and over 150 years later, capitalism, while it may be in question, has shrugged off recent challenges and crises. Contrary to the revolutionary fervour that surrounded Marx, Lenin, and Luxemburg, the New Left of the 1960s saw a relatively organised labour movement seemingly consent to its exploitation or, even with militant confrontation (like the UK miners), collapse to the neoliberal turn.

The Labor share of National Income did rise till workers came into the Income Tax net and stagflation created 'fiscal drag' such that workers were paying 'Corporate Welfare'- i.e. tax on wages paid Corporations to employ workers. Add in immigration and the demand for 'solidarity wages' and proles turned to Reagan and Thatcher. The 'baby boom' played a role in this. As they aged, the 'rentier' returned because, in retirement, everybody is a rentier.  

For many, the working class could no longer be counted on as revolutionary agents,

Coz they're constantly going on strike- right?

refuting classical Marxism altogether. Others, such as Edward Thompson and Stuart Hall, were unwilling to abandon the working class.

Who kept telling them to fuck off back to posh-shire. 

Retaining “the basic anchor in class” they sought explanations in the “superstructure” and elevated “culture from its subordinate role to one of central importance” (p.79). But as Chibber points out, such a search for an explanation in culture retains the classical Marxist mistake of believing that the class structure “ought to incite the working class into action” .

Very true. You discover you are working and immediately go on strike coz only losers labor. 

It does the reverse. In Chapter 1 Chibber demonstrates how a capitalist class structure is different from a religious one.

Women and Jews and Darkies can be Capitalists. They can't become Cardinals. 

Both structures require that the various actors accept their roles.

An actor, under Capitalism, who insists on playing Ophelia when he was hired to play Hamlet, won't get paid. But then a Cardinal who keeps dancing the can can might get de-frocked.  

This means that a structure will fail if an actor does not “adequately understand the details of the role” or if an actor chooses to “reject the role attached to the structure” (p.27).

Nope. The structure remains the same even if some enterprises or agents working within it fuck up because of stupidity or a bolshie attitude.  

For culturalists, structures therefore require meaning formation, which in turn is vulnerable to rejection and “hence highly contingent” (p.28).

So much the worse for 'culturalists'. They would stop being any such thing if they didn't get paid or were told to go clean the toilets.  

For the religious congregation, an actor might not understand the rituals, or the priest may fail in properly conveying them.

This doesn't matter provided they get paid or have private means. 

So too might an actor reject certain teachings, and find comfort in a different religion. But this is not the case for actors in the class structure.

Yes it is. You don't want to be a worker- fine! Suck cock or crack skulls.  

Starting with the working class, a peasant, someone who previously had access to their means of subsistence, is highly unlikely to not understand their role.

Understanding doesn't matter. What matters is doing stuff which keeps you fed.  

“[E]very premodern culture with settled agriculture already has the codes needed to assimilate to” the demands of wage labour (p.31).

or those of sucking cock or cracking skulls etc. 

What is more likely is that they reject their status as a labourer.

In which case, labor comes in from elsewhere- if it is profitable to do so.  

But once proletarianised, to reject this status is to starve.

unless you can get by by sucking cock or cracking skulls etc.  

So too the class structure “exercises its own discipline” on the capitalist (p.36).

No it doesn't. A Capitalist doesn't have to wear a top hat and a frock coat. Chibber should know this. There were plenty of Indian Capitalists who wore oriental garb.  

The capitalist is also dependent on the market in having to purchase inputs and generate sufficient revenue to stave off competition.

to stave off insolvency. Nothing can stave off competition save barriers to entry. 

The cost-cutting this requires inevitably leads to suppressing wages,

nope. Solvency requires your not paying mad money to your workers.  

and the market “selects against … drives out … and replaces” any capitalist that does not do so (p.37).

Nope. It selects for those who internalize externalities or access 'non-convexities'. These guys are totes ignorant of economics.  

This reality of the class structure accepts that it requires cultural meaning acquisition by agents,

Fuck off! Saudi sheikhs don't need to know shit about the culture of the various countries in which they own enterprises. Balance sheets and Stock Market indices provide all relevant information.  

but rejects “the latter an explanatory primacy over structure” (p.38). It is the class structure “shaping the cultural codes” towards its own requirements that “radically reduces the contingency” of the structure’s activation by what cultural codes remain (p.40).

Sheer nonsense. Capitalism- which is about how investment is allocated through markets- is about stuff that happens at the margin where no fucking cultural codes have hegemony. At one time, if you wanted to work in IT, you had to dress like an IBM executive. By the Seventies, you could look like a hippie, drop acid, and still attract VC funding. 

Certainly, there will be actors who reject capitalism’s oppressive norms,

it has none. If you are allocating resources more efficiently people don't care if you marry a goat.  But this is also true of smart peeps wot can find cure for cancer etc. 

but “the structure will simply weed them out—they will not survive” (p.40-41). Chibber’s argument is: … a less ambitious claim—for the class structure being independent of culture but not determinative of it. This does require of it the power to overturn some aspects of 3 the surrounding culture—but not all of them. It only requires that class structure transform and subordinate those components of actors’ meaning orientation that block or interfere with their ability to participate in it. (p.130)

Meaningless jibber jabber. Meaning orientation does not matter. You are upper class if you are as rich as fuck. You are working class if you are washing dishes so as to get a square meal. 

Classical Marxists were correct in expounding that capitalism locks workers and capitalists into conflict.

It may lock workers and employers into conflict but employers aren't capitalists. They are managers working to a budget. A Capitalist decides what to invest in. The choice of manager might be made by somebody else hired to do so by reason of their expert knowledge or charisma or social prestige. 

But in Chapter 2 Chibber shows where they were critically wrong, namely in arguing that such conflict would generate working class formation and collective organisation.

Collective organization can raise allocative and dynamic efficiency. In particular, getting rid of 'piece-work' reduces administrative costs. Indeed, because of Knightian Uncertainty, successful enterprises are likely to signal this by paying 'efficiency wages' higher than marginal product. 

The class structure does the opposite. The same compulsions for the worker to accept their role as a wage labourer account for the exceptional risks of taking collective action.

Not if there is a strike fund- without which industrial action is silly.  

The prospective loss of income and employment makes “[i]ndividual contestation … the norm and collective action the deviation from it” (p.48).

No. Individual contestation rises if there is a prospective gain from 'search unemployment'. Otherwise only a collective threat point obtains.

This leads Chibber back in Chapter 3 to the post-war debates of hegemony and ideology and “their anchor in the work of Antonio Gramsci” (p.82).

Who understood shit.  

Gramsci’s proposition that capitalist stability required consent from the working class

was like saying saying gravitational stability requires consent from massive objects. Either there is Capitalism- in which case consent is irrelevant- or there isn't because the locals be kray kray.  

fit with their participation in the post-war capitalist order, and such consent was acquired through culture.

Nope. Open a factory somewhere viable and if the locals won't work there coz of their culture of being lazy bums, immigrants will turn up- provided the wages are high enough. These immigrants may have a hundred different cultures of their own. But if they do what they get paid to do, that is irrelevant. Sometimes, an employer- like Henry Ford- might force these immigrants to adopt a particular culture, but this changed nothing.  

Chibber covers the widely held culturalist reading of Gramsci which reversed the materialist understanding so that ideology constructed interests and thus “hegemony was based on consent, and consent was secured through culture” (p.85). But since such accounts accept the exploitative “elements of the employment relation”, they are suggesting that ideology “can inure workers” to such elements (p.90). This leaves culturalists: … in the embarrassing position of claiming implicitly that while they can discern the exploitative—and hence unjust—character of the employment relation, the actors who are, in fact, being exploited, who are experiencing its brute facts, are not capable of doing so. (p.91)

But Marxists are indeed in this embarrassing position more particularly if they have names like Vivek. Americans say to them, 'why not fuck off back to your own shithole country were there are no Capitalists to exploit you because Tigers have eaten them or Elephants have shat on them?'

Chibber rather focuses on the materialist accounts of ideology, using Adam Przeworski’s Capitalism and Social Democracy (1986) and Gramsci himself. These argue that while “consent was articulated through an ideology … [i]ts foundation was always and everywhere  economic” (p.92).

Coz either the foundation of the ideology was economic or the economy of the foundation was ideological or some other such shite.

However, Chibber still finds fault in their accounts. Przeworski’s proposition is that “workers offer their consent when they are able to bind capitalists to using a portion of current profits to generate future gains for them” (p.93).

This is reasonable. It is the sort of thing incomplete contract theory has clarified. The techies not getting laid off at the moment are the ones who were smart enough to pick AI where, they could see, investment was increasing.  

But this requires organisations such as trade unions which “leaves much of the global experience of capitalism out of its scope” (p.94).

Nope. Smart peeps can work this out on their own. Get in on the ground floor of a field which can grow exponentially.  

Gramsci does not require an organised working class.

But that organization would happen by itself unless brutally suppressed.  

The capitalist class acquires consent “by the prestige (and consequent confidence) … [it] enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production” (Gramsci 1971: 12).

It acquires consent by paying for it. Governments want tax revenue. Workers want wages. The Capitalist can provide both provided the enterprise is sound.  

The interests of the capitalist class prevail, “but only up to a certain point, i.e. stopping short of narrowly corporate economic interest”, where capitalists still coordinate “with the general interests of subordinate groups” (Gramsci 1971: 182). For Chibber, “this is the most convincing account” for consent (p.99).

Everybody has an interest in getting money. Even if market transactions are illegal, there will be a black market because the police can be paid off. Look at the bootleggers during Prohibition.  

But history demonstrates that economic growth can generate strike action since improvements in productivity (and wages) can be offset by the “dramatic intensification of work” this entails (p.101).

This was Marx's notion that bosses will want to raise profits by continually increasing the work load. The problem is that rival enterprises may offer superior wages and working conditions. However, Capitalists might themselves agree to put a floor under wages rather than engage in 'wasteful competition' and a race to the bottom. President Hoover was a great champion of this type of cartelization.  

Further, the neoliberal era has overwhelmingly been a period characterised by “narrow corporate interests”. But Chibber’s principal critique of Gramsci’s account is that the stability of capitalism doesn’t even require consent. Consent is present and depending on the conjuncture, can play a significant role. But capitalism’s stability is rooted in the “silent compulsion of economic relations [that] sets the seal on the domination of the capitalist over the worker” (Marx 1976: 899).

The silent compulsion to get money so as to buy nice shiny things is indeed very wicked and evil.  

Workers “can neither opt out of their structural location nor overthrow it as and when they desire” (p.108).

In North Korea, maybe. Otherwise, workers can emigrate.  

Rather than consent, it is workers’ resignation to this reality that is the basis of capitalist stability. It is somewhat unfortunate that Chibber does not engage with geography’s debates on the cultural turn, most especially because of the rich contributions by Marxist geographers. Chibber’s argument fits with much of Don Mitchell’s in “There’s No Such Thing as Culture”, where “‘culture’ is an idea through which the various machinations of the ‘political economy’ are represented as culture” (1995: 110). A central argument of Chibber’s is that the universal tendency of capitalism to “naturalize and smooth out differences in the name of a certain social order [the market]” in a “differentiated society” (Mitchell 1995: 111).

Very true. That is why, under Manmohan Singh, Tamils started speaking Punjabi.  

Harvey’s (1990) 5 The Condition of Postmodernity is entirely absent.3 But geographers must engage The Class Matrix. Chapter 4 is especially pertinent to labour geography’s agency debates. While Chibber’s is a structuralist account, he maintains “it is a fuller account of how agency unfolds in a world of constraints” (p.123). I can imagine Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2011) nodding in agreement where Chibber states: Indeed, where actors are, in fact, structurally constrained, such that they formulate their strategies in order to navigate those constraints, a structural theory does not efface agency so much as it helps us understand it. (p.125)

Only if the structures it posits actually exists. But, in that case, people could make a lot of money by investigating those structures. If nobody is making money out of some structure you think exists, chances are it doesn't exist. Take 'Neo-Liberalism'. I thought it must exist and so I made an AI generated fake video showing Neo-Liberalism taking it up the arse from Paleo-Conservatism. I then emailed Neo-Liberalism demanding a lot of money in return for deleting the video. Sadly, it turned out that Neo-Liberalism doesn't exist. Either that or it doesn't have any money or doesn't care if people think it is renting out its arse to Paleo-Conservatism.  

This necessitates “closely examining the actual constraints that labor faces”

e.g. having only two arms and one head 

if they are to be overcome.

Cretins can't overcome shit. 

At that point, it’s back to culture, in developing “the collective identity … the cultural accompaniment to class struggle” which the class structure incessantly dispels (p.69).

The cultural accompaniment to class struggle either makes money for itself or is confined to lunatics.  

On this Chibber also offers valuable insights. Reports of neoliberalism’s death are greatly exaggerated.

So are reports of its raping trillions of transgender women of colour in Nicaragua.  

The Class Matrix makes it clear we cannot get beyond it without a revival of the Left.

Or Trump tanks the economy.  

Its reinvigoration of class analysis, by retaining the best while rejecting the “excesses of the cultural turn”, is essential reading

For morons.