Friday, 3 March 2023

How stupid was Hannah Arendt?

German critical philosophy arose in the context of a class of Civil Servants (Beamter) arriving at a common view of things by rational, 'enlightened', discussion and then implementing a socio-economic plan such that the realm achieve 'catch-up growth' and thus become strong enough to resist the economic and military might of France. The Scottish Enlightenment, equally concerned with catch-up growth relative to England, was a big influence on Beamtenliberalismus. However, once actual fighting started, a more 'Nationalist' type of philosophy- e.g. that of Fichte- gained salience. Hegel's philosophy went a step further in conciliating Church and State while also motivating some Scientific investigation. However, it was developments in Mathematics and the applications of such developments to Economic and Scientific investigation which increasingly occupied the smarter sort of academic. Husserl originally looked quite Mathsy. Sadly, Phenomenology turned out to be worthless. Still, for spoiled Catholics, Brentano had opened a door towards Husserl's tedious shite not to mention Heidegger's craziness. Meanwhile, pragmatism or instrumentalism triumphed. Catch-up growth is all very well- it is simply a matter of mimetics- but further innovation requires a 'discovery' process involving different views of the world rather than a bunch of Civil Servants with a common view of things working to the same plan. 

Prof. Michael Weinman, writing in the Hedgehog Review, has an article titled 'Hannah Arendt and the Loss of a Common World- Thinking in Concert Against Theory'. It is certainly true that the Beamter Professor/Civil Servant had lost a common view of things and thus a common world because the German General Staff kept starting ruinous wars, but there was a 'Common World' available to non-savant Germans. It was one in which Germany stopped trying to dominate Europe and just concentrated on eating sausages, drinking beer and making nice cameras or cars or whatever. The mathematical economics of either Kantorovich or Samuelson was the common world which, truth to be told, had first been explored by Hermann Heinrich Gossen- truly a prophet without honor.

Weinman takes a different view.

What is the matter with theory?

Stupid theories are stupid. They attract increasingly brain damaged savants. Smart theories have cash value. They more than pay for themselves. If your theory gets you a better Structural Causal Model which then enables you to better predict or improve outcomes, then you end up with more authority in the sense that, by reason of authoritative knowledge, you provide a focal solution to a coordination game and so, essentially, people are doing what you say. 

More specifically, what does a distinctively modern approach to theorizing have to do with the prevalence of the kind of conspiracist thinking that thrives in our era of post-truth politics?

Nothing at all. If the Left-Liberals spend money on academic research of an utterly shite type so as to tell stupid lies, everybody else tells even stupider lies without doing any fucking academic research. The Left Liberals then totally lose their shit.  

To find answers to that question, political and cultural analysts have recently returned to the work of Hannah Arendt—and for good reason.

She was as stupid as shit and therefore easy to understand.  

Despite her training as a

shite 

philosopher in her native Germany, the brilliant Jewish émigré thinker (1906–75) was

shittier than Ayn Rand.  

not only not a theorist but even something of an anti-theorist,

i.e. a hysterical feuilletonist earning a little money by catering to middle-brow Americans

a practitioner of exercises of political thinking

which wasn't political at all. Ayn Rand was way more successful.  

that were never theoretical in the usual sense. Ranging from her magisterial Origins of Totalitarianism

Which was nonsense from start to finish. Totalitarianism exists where a State is geared to total War- not otherwise. This may initially be an internal war- e.g. Spartans keeping helots in check- but it is bound to become aggressive for fiscal reasons. There was a Hobbesian view of radix malorum- Men as being naturally inclined to radical evil- but it was obvious that this could be kept in check by limited government based on civil society as happened in England. Kant was merely giving a theological, Lutheran, color to this notion. He wasn't writing about Totalitarianism- which, after all, his own 'Enlightened Despot' might resort to under exigent circumstances. Arendt's book is a hodgepodge of silly ideas which, however, in a Cold War context would feather her nest and advance her reputation. In any case, she didn't have a penis and thus would be excused for writing hysterical bollocks. 

and The Human Condition to her many essays, reviews, and works of analytical reportage (notably in Eichmann in Jerusalem), her oeuvre might best be characterized as a form of

hysterical journalism which paid the bills. 

praxis, of thought in action.

or stupidity in the service of earning a buck. 

Grounded in the common world, this form of political thinking aims to support continued and active engagement in that world.

by getting paid and invited to nice parties- right?  

The core insight to which commentators on Arendt have returned in recent years is her sense of the loss of the common world.

for those who studied stupid shite at Uni. By contrast, if you were a Scientist or even a good Economist- there was a common world which was your oyster.

That world could exist, she believed, only if “differences of position and the resulting variety of perspectives notwithstanding, everybody is always concerned with the same object.”

This was Kantian. The Beamter should, by rational discussion, get on to the same page and then implement a plan which would enable some backward part of Germany to rise up through 'catch-up growth'.  

 As our lives are increasingly shaped by the hyperpolarization of political communication

of a stupid or paranoid type 

and the online silos in and through which we interact with others, any activities that might otherwise have prompted us to enter and participate fully and freely in a shared civic realm have all but vanished.

Unless you have a good structural causal model of the Polity and can earn big bucks getting candidates elected. If you are smart and do useful stuff you have access to a 'common world'. If you are stupid and talk bollocks, you resent having to talk to nutters as worthless as yourself while everybody else jeers at you on Twitter.  

Integral to Arendt’s picture of a healthy or at least decent polity is her conviction that such a “space of public appearance”—a public forum in which all citizens can exercise their distinctive human qualities—is possible only when there is a common world, shared by everyone on the basis of a common sense and the common object of perception that serves as its ground.

There will always be overlapping consensus re. utile 'coordination games'. This is the 'common world' of financial markets and Law Courts and Legislatures where Social Choice occurs.  

A common world is maintained, she held, both through the actions of those who inhabit the space of appearance

as opposed to the cupboard of disappearance- right? 

and through their steady and cumulative judgments on the features of this civic realm.

Such judgments don't need to be steady or cumulative. We are welcome to completely change our minds. 

The problem, of course, particularly in recent years and even more in the wake of the COVID pandemic, is that we lack the “common object” of perception that is required for a common world.

Fuck off! COVID showed we have a 'common object'- viz. not dying of a horrible disease. Also, we don't want the economy to collapse.  

Lacking this, more and more of us are open to the influence of those who wish to propagate “alternative facts.”

What fucking facts can cretins teaching shite come up with? The truth is we were all taken by surprise by how utterly shite the CDC and the WHO turned out to be.  

For many readers of Arendt, then, the salient feature of her account of worldlessness, and the sense of isolation and loneliness that comes with it, is a general susceptibility to propaganda and manipulation by nefarious political actors.

Don't read Arendt. You will become susceptible to voting for Trump even though your Mummy told you not to.  

While this reading is not wrong, I wish to point to another dimension of the lack of the “common object,” one that is critical for understanding the alienation that she believed follows from the loss of the common world. Namely, I want to emphasize the solipsism that is endemic to two forms of life that are directly opposed to public life and the “condition of plurality” that is both necessary for and a result of such life. One is the solitary life of the lover of wisdom (the philosopher).

Why should it be solitary? A mathematician who cuts himself off from others of his trade runs the risk of ending up babbling nonsense. You need peer-review otherwise you might as well become a socioproctologist.  

The other is the lonely life of the lover of goodness (the saint).

Saints aint lonely. They are busy looking after Life's walking wounded when they aint doing my washing-up. Seriously, Saint dude, just do my fucking washing up already.  

Both the philosopher and the saint stand, and understand themselves to stand, alone and apart from others, without whom it is impossible to share a “common object.”

The opposite must be the case. Weinman is thinking of wankers who stand alone, apart from each other, jizzing into the empty air. On the other hand they may share a 'common object' through Pornhub.  

Arendt holds that while the philosopher and the saint share the experience of isolation from their neighbors, the political and societal salience of these forms of separation differ significantly. They do because the “goodness and loneliness” of the saint are “of much greater relevance to politics” than the “wisdom and solitude” of the philosopher.

Goodness may be relevant to politics. Loneliness isn't.  

This matters, Arendt concludes, because while no one can endure the loneliness of the saint “for any length of time,” it is possible for the solitude of the philosopher to “become an authentic way of life.

Unless the fucker slips and falls and breaks his neck while strolling down some Holzwege.  


The afterlife of the classical figure of the philosopher and the late antique figure of the saint

is combined in such figures as Mahatma Gandhi or various Catholic or Buddhist or Sufi preceptors who also run charitable organizations of various types. 

might seem a world apart from today’s conspiracy theorist in his basement lair. But Arendt’s worries about alienation and worldlessness and her antipathy to high theorizing and the “circle of philosophers” (among whom she unquestionably intended to include her former mentor, Martin Heidegger), with whom she famously, if contentiously, sought to distance herself, suggest that the figures of the philosopher and the saint explain a great deal about our present predicament. As she sees things, the “professional thinker” in the modern age—the theorist operating in academe—has forged an amalgam of the dispassionate and disinterested pursuit of wisdom performed by the solitary philosopher and the passionate and profoundly interested pursuit of pure, unworldly, goodness performed by the lonely saint. What is destroyed in that powerful amalgam—for which Arendt (quoting Alfred North Whitehead) gives ultimate credit to René Descartes and Cartesian radical doubt—is the very possibility of common sense: “Cartesian reason is entirely based ‘on the implicit assumption that the mind can only know that which it has itself produced’…. For common sense, which once had been the one by which all other senses [were] fitted into the common world…now became an inner faculty without any world relationship. The sense now was called common merely because it happened to be common to all.”

But Anglo-Saxon philosophy is Baconian. Thomas Reid argued strongly against the Cartesian theory of Ideas. Scottish 'Common Sense' philosophy had a big market in post-Kantian Konigsberg- which is where Arendt herself grew up.  

 In other words, Arendt argues, with the triumph of Descartes,

in France maybe. But England was better.  

the common of “common sense” diametrically shifts from the world to its opposite, the inner faculty—thought—that forms the object that the sense perceives. Quite literally, modern Cartesian individuals become a world unto themselves: Small wonder that the prevalence of alternative facts becomes an ever more salient issue.

But Cartesian meat-machines are monads which must be in pre-established harmony. Some Cartesians were full blown Occasionalists. 

Since Descartes, then, the professional thinker—self-reliant and indeed a world unto himself, the gender of that pronoun surely intended—has stood against the world whenever he stands for himself.

Nonsense. Descartes was not a professional thinker. People paid to think had to do useful stuff. Because scarcity is ubiquitous, Utility brings all minds under its yoke save in so far as madness or mischief supervenes.  

In this way, the classical “consolation of philosophy” as articulated by Boethius, a bridge between the antique and medieval moments of what Arendt sees as “the tradition,” is forever lost to the thinker in the modern age.

Unless that thinker relocates to a Christian campus. Actually, even that is unnecessary. One can follow Boethius in between doing Yoga and adoring the Dalai Lama.  

To explain what she meant by that lost tradition, Arendt invoked her friend and fellow exile Walter Benjamin’s image of the pearl diver: We have, as a legacy, the treasures of cultural production from antiquity and the Middle Ages, and we can appreciate their luster and value their rarity. But the inner meaning and values these pearls held for those who participated in the cultures that produced them are lost to us on the other side of the historical breach introduced by the Cartesian revolution.

Arendt hadn't noticed that there are still plenty of Churches and Christian Seminaries and Catholic Universities and monastic orders. There was no fucking 'Cartesian revolution' at least for the Anglophone. A 'Baconian revolution'- maybe. 

Consequently, if we are to restore the world to the practice of thinking,

coz cretins teaching worthless shite can restore 'the practice of thinking'- right? 

we need an alternative to this uniquely pernicious brand of solipsism that Arendt derides as “professional thinking,” and which we can call simply theory, as Arendt understands it.

Theory is only solipsistic if it has no predictive or informative power. But such theory is termed shite.  

Opposed to self-regarding theory of this kind, Arendt advocates dialectical thinking, a form of thought that embraces plurality and is both in and of the world.

like a turd protruded from an anus. Still, Arendt was able to make a little money from her 'dialectical' bullshit. Good for her. Ayn Rand made more money and Gary Cooper starred in a movie based on one of her books.  

She explicates this positive form of thinking in the world through a unique reconstruction of Immanuel Kant’s account of the faculty of judgment, which she thinks of as Kant’s unwritten political philosophy.

We know what Kant's actual political philosophy was. He thought Beamten savants like himself should hold free and rational discussions amongst themselves and then advise the Prince on how to do what we would call Gerschenkron type catch up growth.  

How, then, might this account offer an antidote to the illness of our alienation and the loss of a common object of perception?

The answer is that we must roll up our copy of Arendt's Human Condition and use it as a suppository.  

Much of our incessant handwringing about a post-truth media environment and a public discourse based on “alternative facts” is prompted by the question of objectivity and whether it is an attainable norm in the human sciences and civil society. Arendt argues that while objectivity, as the view from nowhere, might be both an impossible and undesirable aim, there has been ever since Homer

why Homer?  

an achievable norm for the making of claims in public debate over matters of fact that can be established.

Before Homer, you could claim, in a public debate, to be able to levitate and shit on the heads of your opponents from a great height. Sadly, Homer put a stop to this.  

What is more, this norm can underlie the claims we make about, say, events leading up to a massive armed conflict just as much as it does about arguments concerning the fabric of the physical world.

But only since Homer. Otherwise the underlying norm involved levitating and shitting on your opponents from a great height. 

Take the question that motivated Thucydides: “Why did the Spartans and their allies find war with the Athenians inevitable?”

The answer was the same as that for any other conflict made inevitable by uncertainty re. the payoff matrix.  

Or consider the question that motivated Arendt’s investigation of the conflict between truth and politics. As Arendt argues, the fact that it is not possible to arrive at a rational consensus concerning “the question of guilt for the outbreak of the First World War”

Fuck off! The Germans were guilty. Why? They deeply regret going down that extremely stupid road. It makes sense to feel guilt and shame for doing stupid shit which really fucks up you and yours. By contrast, the victors didn't feel guilt. They felt vindication.  Anyway, the Germans signed the War Guilt clause. No backsies- mein Herr!

means two things: first, that objectivity as classically defined is impossible when it comes to matters of fact (or value?) such as these;

No. Objectivity is possible. Proof of objectivity is impossible save under arbitrary protocols.  

second, and nevertheless, that “no less than a power monopoly over the entire civilized world” would be required “to eliminate from the record the fact that on the night of August 4, 1914, German troops crossed the frontier into Belgium.”

Not really. New records may come to light showing that the Belgian Guides Regiment had encountered a German advance guard on the second of August.  


Indeed, Arendt argues not only that we may aspire to impartiality in asking and attempting to answer questions such as whom to hold accountable for the outbreak of the Great War, but that we must do so.

This is foolish. It is an objective fact that Germany admitted war guilt and agreed to pay reparations. True, they went back on this but after being defeated again they once again admitted war guilt. This is a legal matter. A lawyer does not need to be impartial to uncover the facts of the case. On the other hand, there are types of discourse which are not protocol bound or alethic in any sense. In such discourse, a person could say Germany didn't have any war guilt because Dracula had hypnotized Spiderman whom Dr. Strange had sent back in time. This caused my neighbor's cat to disguise itself as General Schlieffen. The rest, as the say, is History- Comic Book History that is.  

If we abjure this responsibility, then we accept that the social sciences will be

useful 

nothing more than technique, a manner of modeling historical and contemporary phenomena of the human condition and social interaction that does not so much attempt to account for who we are

more especially if we have been bitten by a radio-active spider and hypnotized by Dracula.  

and what we do as to “prescribe conditions, conditions to human behavior.”

 Fuck off.  Social Science doesn't need to prescribe shit. Prediction is good enough more particularly if the Structural Causal Model permits improved mechanism design.

 The sciences, both human (historical and social) and exact, are techniques:

No. They involve the use of techniques and tools and instruments of various sorts. 

Never concerned simply with objective observation,

No. They are always concerned with objective observations. An economist doesn't say 'this time-series is totes gay.' 

they are actually forms of human activity that attempt to bring about certain “artificial” conditions.

Bullshit! The aim is to do something useful.  

While Arendt originally made this claim about the work of the cruder behavioralists of the mid-twentieth century, the universally recognized failure of Homo economicus in the proliferation of models of economic and voting behavior based on rational choice theory in the face of the Great Recession and the shock results of Brexit and the 2016 US presidential election make for excellent examples of what she has in mind.

No they don't. People using rational choice theory made money out of such 'shock results'. Brexit was a boon for volatility traders. Trump's victory was actually good for America. Biden's was a fucking disaster for the entire West. Yet Biden is a nice guy while Trump is a sociopath.  

Arendt concludes that when it comes to questions studied in what we call the social sciences, the issue at hand “is no longer a question of academic objectivity”;

It could be. Consider the “Gerschenkron effect”- i.e. the recognition that when intertemporal price and quantity are negatively correlated an “early-weighted” aggregate will grow faster than a “late-weighted” aggregate. If we suspect a particular index has been constructed for some partisan purpose, we will check for 'Laspeyres bias'. 

The plain fact is Arnedt had studied stupid shit and, in an entrepreneurial fashion, made a bit of money out of writing stupid bollocks. This was cool coz she'd fucked Heidegger and back then peeps without penises were supposed to be as stupid as shit. 

rather, what truly brings about our crisis is that “everything is possible not only in the realm of ideas, but in the field of reality itself.”

This simply isn't true. Dracula can't hypnotize Spiderman coz Tony Stark put an anti-hypnosis filter in the eyepiece of the Spidey suit.  


The situation in which “everything is possible” is, indeed, Arendt’s diagnosis of what is distinctly totalizing in totalitarian dictatorship.

Nonsense! What is isn't possible is precisely Hayekian spontaneous order such that a disaggregated non-deterministic discovery process is better than a substantive solution. This is why the Soviets fell behind the Americans in IT though, in 1970, the reverse appeared to be the case. Come to think of it, France's 'Minitel'- launched in 1980- was predicted to give it the advantage in getting to an online economy faster. They only retired the thing in 2012. 

It is the world-historically unique manifestation of the human capacity to will a world existing “only in ideas” (ideology) into actual reality.

The American Revolution willed into existence something which previously existed only in ideas. But it wasn't totalitarian.  

If we fail to achieve a sense of impartiality—what Arendt calls a “common sense”—then what is lost, along with the democratic warrant for the pursuit of truth (factual as well as rational), is the common world altogether.

No. Uncorrelated asymmetries dictating bourgeois strategies are eusocial. Public signals should support this type of correlated equilibrium. Everybody should be partial in their own cause. Enlightened self-interest supports 'common knowledge' solutions to coordination problems. 

There is no democratic warrant to pursue anything save enlightened self-interest. You are not entitled to discover the truth about the size of my dick- or even the President's dick.  

In a Lonely Place

Fear of this loss is precisely what motivated Arendt in writing Eichmann in Jerusalem.

She got paid to do so. But she messed up.  

As she explained more directly in “Personal Responsibility Under Dictatorship,” a lecture written in response to the initial controversy surrounding her five-part 1963 “report on the banality of evil” in The New Yorker, the central object of that work was to challenge her readers—and all members of a democratic society—to accept responsibility for passing judgment, in this instance on Adolf Eichmann.

Why not challenge them to prove the Reimann hypothesis instead? We don't greatly care what the Israelis get up to though it must be said, kidnapping and killing Eichmann was badass.

She saw this responsibility as citizens’ foremost duty

one's foremost duty is to do the fucking job you are paid to do- not listening to nutters like Hannah's Aunt.  

for the sake of preserving both the space of appearance and the durability of the common world that the National Socialist regime and its genocidal ideology had attempted to annihilate.

But the 'common world' annihilated that regime by killing Nazis. That's the only thing which works. Taking responsibility for Eichmann's inadequate access to toilet paper when he was shitting himself for fear of the hangman's noose may help pass the time- but only if you have way way too much time on your hands.  

Instead of pleading “Who am I to judge?” each and every one of us should be

fisting ourselves vigorously? Would that satisfy this nutter? 

asking, “If not me, then who shall pass judgment?”

The Judge. That's what he gets paid to do.  

Concluding her lecture, Arendt said, “In the situation of radical world-alienation,

coz plain, garden variety, world-alienation simply won't do- right?  

neither history nor nature is at all conceivable.

unless you shove a chili pepper up your arse. Seriously, anytime you are in a situation of radical world-alienation and find you can't conceive history or geography or whatever, simply find a Scotch bonnet and shove it up your arse. It's what Heidegger would do. Trust me on this. 

This twofold loss of the world…has left behind it a society of men who, without a common world which would at once relate and separate them, either live in desperate lonely separation or pressed together in a mass.”

worse, everybody has to fit into the same pair of underpants.  

We thus arrive, through a different route from the usual one

there's a usual route to this shite? 

through Arendt’s discussion of truth and lying in politics,

which turned out to be bullshitting 

at a familiar but differently focused Arendtian story about the isolated nightmare version of the Selbstdenker—people who think for themselves

and quickly emigrate to Amrika coz thinking is better paid there 

—whether in the form of academic theorists who attack windmills of their own fantastic projection or full-blown conspiracy theorists raving about extraterrestrial pederasts.

but neither necessarily 'thinks for herself'. Some isolated thinkers- e.g. Srinivas Ramanujan proving theorems which were already known to professional mathematicians- were perfectly sane while some mathematicians who went mad worked as part of a team.  

What is this nightmare vision in which the academic as professional thinker and the crazed conspiracy theorist converge?

It is nonsense.  


Here we can think of how Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s often-cited and academically respectable claim about the concentration camp as the paradigm of the late modern technocratic state’s use of biopolitics to control citizens,

a ludicrous claim. Concentration camps did not contain 'citizens'. Jews etc. were subjects stripped of citizenship. The actual paradigm of biopolitics is the British National Health Service which built on the country's war time experience. 

even (and perhaps especially) in advanced liberal democracies, led rather directly to his widely, and rightfully, disparaged COVID denialism.

David Icke had more impact in this respect.  

Theologian Adam Kotsko

ambitious but Jason Brennan level stupid 

has written perceptively about Agamben’s public claims about the pandemic: “I am a scholar and translator of Agamben’s work, which has deeply influenced my own. Though we are not personally close, we are in contact, and I first learned of his turn to COVID skepticism when he asked me to translate some of his blog posts. I agreed, hoping to present the best version of his argument while trying (and ultimately failing) to get him to reconsider his position. In the end, I regretted inserting myself into this embarrassing affair, and began to wonder whether his paranoid pandemic writings called the rest of his work into question. The more I waded into them, the darker my outlook became.” Why so? Because, as Kotsko explained, “Agamben’s new arguments about coronavirus restrictions are explicitly grounded in the book that made him most famous.” It is even more alarming that there is little clear difference between Agamben’s exaggerated use of his respectable theory of the “state of exception” in his irresponsible blog posts and the extravagant claims of a QAnon true believer.

Schmitt, like Heidi, was a spoiled Catholic and thus was rehabilitated for Cold War reasons. Foucault was simply mad. Agamben was stupid and paranoid. David Icke, on the other hand, has made money out of his mental illness. Why? I suppose his craziness is based on the popular TV Sci-Fi series 'V' which had hot women who were actually lizards.  


If we continue to unravel this thread through Arendt’s two “crisis” essays collected in Between Past and Future, “The Crisis in Education” and “The Crisis in Culture,”

There was no crisis in Education or Culture but there was a Cuban Missile Crisis. Nobody asked Hannah's Aunt to write about it coz she was as stupid as shit.  

we see how she understands the oscillation between the lonely isolation of a nightmare version of the Selbstdenker such as Agamben and mass movements such as that of the COVID denialists in Germany who explicitly compared pandemic-related restrictions to the National Socialist regime, using slogans like “Wir sind die Jüden” (“We are the Jews”) and wearing yellow armbands marked with the Star of David. This likely unintended synergy undermines our trust in public discourse, which itself leads to our loss of a common world.

No. We know that anybody who talks about Nazis is a hysterical nutcase- or Putin.  

In “The Crisis in Education,” Arendt writes that “whenever in political questions sound human reason fails

why should it do so? The Law has a 'doctrine of political question' and Social Choice theory has a mathematical elucidation of why there may be 'holes' in political decision spaces but the relative autonomy of the political realm does not represent any scandal for human reason. 

or gives up the attempt to supply answers we are faced by a crisis;

why? There are plenty of mathematical and other questions to which we can't supply answers but this does not cause any crisis 

for this kind of reason is really that common sense by virtue of which we and our five individual senses are fitted into a single world common to us all and by the aid of which we move around in it.” By this means, she concludes, “a piece of the world, something common to us all, is destroyed.

Very true. Atlantis was a big continent where lots of peeps used to go for their holidays. Then Hitler caused some sort of political or educational or cultural crisis. Atlantis suddenly disappeared. The same thing could happen to Kansas if Trump is re-elected.  

In “The Crisis in Culture,” Arendt argues most emphatically for the vital and irreplaceable role of a common sense.

But people with common sense don't argue emphatically for it. Why not argue for the vital and irreplaceable role of respiration instead? 

Here, turning to the wider “crisis in culture” of which the crisis in education is a symptom, she writes that common sense “discloses to us the nature of the world insofar as it is a common world.”

No. A person with common sense who enters a different world- e.g. the underwater world of scuba diving- can still make sensible decisions. Common sense just means a type of practical ability which exists independently of anything epistemic.  

She claims that this is possible only because “our strictly private and ‘subjective’ five senses and their sensory data can adjust themselves to a nonsubjective and ‘objective’ world which we have in common and share with others.”

but those others include cats and dogs and birds and plants. The fact is, we evolved in the same way as other life forms. If we have 'senses' it is because they have survival value. Colin Wilson in his sci fi novel about Space Vampires, gives a Husserlian account of how consciousness creates reality. When humans thought Pi was 3.14 the world's circumference was less than when that ratio was more accurately calculated! Arendt had a lower IQ than Colin Wilson. But, her political theory was Space Vampires level puerile. 

The character of common sense as common owes

to Baldwinian 'channelization'. However some will lack it entirely. That's what the math of evolutionary biology says.  

not to something subjective about the individual human being’s consciousness or perceptual faculties but to the intersubjective adjudication of human beings passing judgment in our inescapable plurality.

No. Talking doesn't change reality. The fact is 'the intersubjective' can be as stupid as shit without this impairing practical ability. Even Arendt, with her ridiculous beliefs, could cross the road safely.  

For this reason, Arendt concludes, judgment is the central “activity in which this sharing-the-world-with-others comes to pass.”

Very true. If baby doesn't make lots of judgments it won't be able to latch to Mummy's nipple. Also it won't be able to poop.  

What killed off the Scottish common sense school was the fact that if you don't get paid to gas on about common sense it is stupid to do so. The Scots are a canny lot. 

Here, at last, this foray into the essays of Between Past and Future comes to a positively framed conclusion: There is a possible answer to the mass democratic inclination toward (what we call today) post-truth politics

Politics has always featured strategic, not alethic, arguments. The great mass of voters aint as stupid as Arendt or people who read her. There is no 'post truth' politics. There is a strategic reason to appear unreasonable, if that is what serves your interests best.  Also, if the other guys keep banging on about how meat is murder, it feels good to start talking about how the Post Office is actually a Zombie cult run by the neighbour's cat. 

and the loss of a common world,

apparently, these nutters lose their common world- at minimum some large continent disappears- if some of us don't vote they way do or think the way they do.  

an answer to the opposed tendencies toward loneliness in our (increasingly online) silos

why not choose the Teleparty option on Netflix? 

or aggregation into masses that can easily be mobilized as mobs.

This guy keeps getting aggregated into a mob. Hopefully, it's just one of those flash mobs which assembles to lip sync to 'we will rock you' rather than anything more sinister.  

This answer, inspired by Arendt’s exercises in political thinking,

which is about how continents suddenly disappear if people vote for Trump or Brexit. Still, at least these guys do flash mob versions of Queen.  

is the enactment of democratic citizenship as the exercising of judgment.

these cretins are incapable of exercising shit.  

While we tend to believe that we are being good pluralists by refraining from expressing our judgments about controversial matters with neighbors with whom we might disagree, Arendt challenges us to do exactly that, and precisely with those who are least likely to see things just as we do.

Cool. These guys are rapping with the Aryan Brotherhood.  That's bound to end well.

Consensus is unlikely to result from entering into an exchange of conflicting judgments about, say, the proper role of government in reproductive health, the prudence of affirmative action in university admissions, or the best way to administer local elections.

Exchanging judgments, as opposed to information, is pointless. A judgment only maters if it can be enforced or has to be appealed. What a Judge decides at the end of a law suit is a judgment. What people think of the judgment is merely an opinion. 

Such engagement, however, might do something to restore the conviction that members of our society with whom we have deep differences at least live in the same, common, world.

The vast majority of people know that we live in the same world. Only a small minority think they actually live on Mars.  

To be sure, the pathway is narrow, bumpy, and difficult.

Only if you are convinced you live on Mars and need lots and lots of therapy and anti-psychotics to accept that you're just an earth bound mortal like everybody else.  

The practice of exercising judgment requires that very common sense upon which a common world is based.

No. Judgment is a protocol bound process. A Judge may know that a guy is guilty but still has to set him free because relevant evidence is inadmissible. Juristic reasoning is 'artificial reason' and has nothing to do with 'common sense' or 'natural deduction'. However, questions of fact may be decided on the basis of practical reason.  But, even here, the standard is that of a reasonable man, not what you yourself believe. 

And that common sense, in turn, requires a shared understanding of impartiality as the basis of claim making.

There can be no shared understanding of impartiality though there may be a set of protocols such that partiality is assumed and the judge must recuse himself even if he knows himself to be impartial. 

Yet it is precisely this sense of impartiality that seems lost to us as we interminably rehash assertions about the subjectivity and objectivity of knowledge claims.

Knowledge claims are either protocol bound or capable of being made so or else they are not informative if not, as with this guy's shite, utterly nonsensical.  

Thinking in Concert Against Theory

A way out of this crisis, and this moment of disintegration, requires of humanists in particular (with whom Arendt here identifies herself) that we relearn to assert some sense of authority, grounded in the freedom of thought, that is not opposed to political freedom but actually alone can safeguard it:

The US and the UK- which contained plenty of humanists in positions of authority- were kicking ass and taking names. Hannah's Aunt had nothing to teach them. She was a refugee with a PhD in stupid shite.

“As humanists, we can rise above these conflicts between the statesman and the artist

Hitler was an artist. But Churchill too painted pictures. But that's not why there was a conflict between them. 

as we can rise in freedom above the specialties which we all must learn and pursue.… Then we shall know how to reply to those who so frequently tell us that Plato or some other great author of the past has been superseded.”

Okay, perhaps I'm being harsh on these cretins. I'd go a bit mental myself if random dudes kept coming up to me and saying 'Plato has been superseded. Deal with it.' 


Arendt argued that, faced with the possibility of a people that is really a “band of brothers”

Henry V's phrase at Agincourt 

set up against its excluded “others,” whether in the form of fascism, National Socialism, Bolshevism,

Yankees, Brits, French folk 

or, in the present moment, white nationalism,

Black Nationalism, Chinese nationalism, Taliban Nationalism.  

we must be especially vigilant about “high” theory,

which shat the bed long ago 

with its tendency toward a “tyranny of truth.”

 not to mention the despotism of little white lies or the totalitarianism of farting and then holding your nose and looking at me accusingly. 

How can this tendency toward tyrannical solutions be resisted, if not overcome?

Fist yourself. Alternatively just shove a Scotch Bonnet up your arse.  

About a decade ago, John Levi Martin

who, strangely enough, isn't shite at all 

wrote an important book in which he aimed to explain how sociologists—but not only sociologists—devise explanations, often poorly founded and gratuitously obscure, for how and why people do things.

Sociology is what stupid kids study so as to become social workers.  

His analysis resonates strongly with Arendt’s central frustration with high theory and the increasingly behavioralist social sciences of the 1950s and 1960s: that is, the refusal to make clear distinctions and an inability to define terms in a rigorous manner.

Tarskian primitives mustn't be defined. Social phenomena are highly complex. 

She sees in this a danger not only for the possibilities of communication in the political realm

but politicians don't bother with 'high theory'. LBJ wasn't sitting on the john thumbing through Talcott Parsons.  

but for the constitution of the common world.

Crazy nonsense can indeed gain currency in a community, or be forced down its throat, but once people start starving to death or escaping across the border, that crazy nonsense subsides. It is the fitness landscape which weeds out the danger Arendt speaks of.

In “What Is Authority?” Arendt  notices that we increasingly grant social and political scholars the “curious right” to ignore distinctions and define terms sloppily.

They enjoy a Hohfeldian immunity in that respect just as we do. Did Arendt think that anytime anybody farted, she had personally accorded that right to that person? Possibly. Fucking Heidegger must rot the brain something fierce. 

She gives the examples of “tyranny,” “authority,” and “totalitarianism.” The result, Arendt argues, is that when “we assure ourselves that we still understand each other, we do not mean that together we understand a world common to us all, but that we understand…the process of argumentation in its sheer formality.”

Reality is ideographic. Theory is nomothetic. We understand that when we are argue about a model, we are not speaking of something real.  Still, the thing may be useful. 

We might, for instance, be able to carry on a conversation about the perniciousness of “alternative facts” without ever bothering to ensure that we share an understanding of what it means to take a claim to be factual.

or an understanding of what understanding means and so forth. 

Similarly, individuals might concur that “privacy” is a basic right, with inherent value, without clarifying, even among themselves, what the term privacy means or what a right to privacy entails.

That's fine. What matters is that the thing has been pronounced justiciable. It is up to the Courts, or the Legislature, to work out the relevant Hohfeldian incidents. 

In arguing against this tendency,                         `1
Arendt’s goal is pointedly not the formulation of a fixed theory but, rather,

to just bullshit endlessly so as to get paid a little money.  

understanding: an actualized thinking about the common world and its affairs, which can and must be taken up repeatedly in order to account for even more new perspectives.

Why? Surely, if your thinking is properly actualized it can additively accommodate different perspectives? Suppose I am cooking dinner and the g.f says she's bringing two extra guests- one is a vegan and the other has severe nut allergy. If I am a good cook, I should be able to accommodate the new guests without having to start from scratch with a new menu.                                                                                    

This project to correct the arbitrary definition of terms in the social sciences, without any anchor in the common sense of the other stakeholders and the world that can be built and inhabited in common only with and through them, is by no means only of academic concern.

The arbitrary actions of a group are only of concern to that group unless that group has considerable influence or authority. But Germans with PhDs in shite had no fucking influence or authority back in the Fifties or Sixties- or ever.  

Academic debates about tyranny, totalitarianism, or authority (and indeed authoritarianism) do not

occur where those things exist and are utterly futile where they don't 

simply end in isolated scholarly discourses

of immense stupidity 

that lack any shared basis for judgment;

because what is being discussed is far away and cartoon like 

they reverberate in hotly contested elections for local school boards,

The Maoists are battling the Aryan Brotherhood for control of the local nursery school. 

in calls for parental ownership of reading lists in middle and high schools and parental control of displays and holdings in school libraries,

That's totes Fascist! 

and in a wave of new legislation proposed in state legislatures around “academic freedom” and the teaching of critical race theory.

Liberal Professors are being sent to Gulags. This is causing the other inmates to kill themselves because academics smell bad.  

Arendt argues that the ability to act politically—in principle given to all human beings by virtue of their birth—is constrained by

political ability. Some peeps have it. Others don't. This is true now and it was true thousands of years ago.  

the conditions of modern life, with professionalization and its compartmentalization as one key element of that constraint.

That's how come a real estate developer can't become President- right? 

To act responsibly, human beings

unlike parrots 

require a practical capacity to make themselves visible to their fellows

which is only a problem if you happen to be a ghost 

in order, together, to open up the shared world in their unique ways.

Fuck off! You don't have to be be visible or audible or even identifiable to act responsibly or politically or whatever.  

Such reflexivity

which is a type of thinking 

is facilitated by the ability to think politically,

which is a type of thinking 

if only that ability is actually practiced,

so , thinking is facilitated by thinking only if some thinking is actually done. What an amazing discovery! 

such that reflective judgment is actually exercised in public.

Nonsense! You can do your reflective judgment while taking a dump all by yourself.  

For Arendt, this is both the means and the end of her own “exercises in political thinking,” which are intended to help political actors understand the common world and communicate in it in a common political language.

Did any 'political actors' find her shite useful? No. She was simply wrong about how politics works. The thing is about making deals and building coalitions and log rolling and...most importantly, raising money. 

These exercises are the ongoing practice of reflection in which we engage together with her as we read, accept, reject, and modify her judgments in conversation with her work and that of others. When we do so, we and she are not “doing theory”; rather, we are thinking in concert against theory.

That is itself a theory- a stupid one.  

If we acknowledge that for Arendt, theorizing was an attempt to think about and understand phenomena of the world,

and that she failed because she was as stupid as shit 

and that her judging was more a practice than a theory, we notice that she aimed not to display a theory of judgment for others to implement but to

earn a little money writing hysterical shite 

describe a lived experience of judging as political thinking and to explore ways we can make the common world better.

But she didn't make the world better. She wrote stupid shite. 

Or, of course, fail in the attempt to do so. The core of this experience is uncertainty.

In which case we should adopt a regret minimizing course. Don't make judgments unless you are paid to do so.  

There is no human being in the world who always makes the right judgment.

The right judgment is not to judge unless that is what you are paid to do in which case you follow the relevant protocols.  

We never know in a particular present moment if our judgment is “right” or if the future will confirm its truthfulness.

We don't know if our expectations are correct. But judgments aren't expectations.  


Unlike that human birthright, action, the ability to judge

Judging is an action. Don't do it if you aren't paid to do it. 

requires development and improvement.

all types of actions- walking, pissing, talking- require development and improvement which is why babies can't get jobs in Cost and Management Accountancy till they are at least nine months old.  

Since the common world is a political space

No. The common world is not a political space. It is a social space. The political space is much smaller and few of us interact with it over the course of a lifetime. Good mechanism design- checks and balances etc- reduce the salience of the political. Belgium can go for without a government for a year or two without any major problem.  

that people share with one another in its plurality,

Fuck off! Why would we want to share boring shite about fiscal and monetary policy and endless rounds of trade negotiations?  

and since this world is by definition subject to constant change and development, the potential exercise of political judgment is never fully actualized.

A hundred years ago, some nutters thought workers would like to run the factories where they worked. They didn't. Business management is boring. But Politics is even more boring. The smaller the number of people who have to do it, the better.  

The wealth of perspectives that can be taken into account expands again and again,

Lots and lots of shitty points of view don't represent 'wealth'. A big pile of shit is just shit piled high.  

and varies depending on the question the person making the judgment aims to address.

The point about judging is that the judge is told what to address and is paid, one way or another, to follow the relevant protocols.  

Political thinking is therefore not a competence acquired once and for all, but must be grasped in its shifting dynamics. All this, though, is merely one judgment. What, Arendt asks, is yours?

Our judgment is that Arendt was stupid and had nothing to say but needed to earn a bit of money by writing in a hysterical manner. After all, she didn't have a penis and thus- in the America of Doris Day and Rock Hudson- was perfectly cast as the dim bint with a German PhD who, reassuringly, had less brain than boobage.  

Thursday, 2 March 2023

Was Abu Hanifa really 'Murji'ah?

To whom has God granted a Son not more wholly Hanif?
Scripture, for aye, turns o'er Revelation's new Leaf
For delay- murji'ah- is a but mujra-e-tashbih-e-jam
Say, to whom calleth out of Seir, 'Return! Come!'


Maadu Meikkum Kanne: Rukmini Vijayakumar

Rukmini Vijayakumar shows a highly naturalistic 'abhinay' which astonishes me for so faithfully recreating the spirit and mise en scene of Bharat Natyam when it was still associated with an Agraharam filled with kids and cows and adventures to some better end than Academic obscurity or impotence.

I copy and paste a transliteration and translation from this valuable site.  

Madu meykkum kanne

By

Oothukadu Venkata Subba Iyer

Translated by

P.R.Ramachander
(This song is written as a conversation between Yasodha and the toddler Lord Krishna)

Raga Sahana
Thala

Pallavi

Madu meykkum kanne, nee poga vendam chonnen
Poga Vendum thaye , thadai chollathe neeye

Charanam

1.Kaichina Palum Tharen
Karkandu Cheeni Tharen
Kaiyil Vennai Urutti Tharen
Veiyyilile Poga Vendam

2.Kaichina Paalum Vendam
Karkandu Cheeni Vendam
Ullasamai Maadu Meithu
Oru Nodiyil Thirumbiduven

3.Yamuna Nadhi Karayil Eppozhudum Kalvar Bhayam,
Kalvar Vandu Unai Adithal Kalangiduvai Kanmaniye

4. Kalvarukku Kalvarundo Kandadhundo Sollum Amma ,
Kalvar Vandhu Yenai Adithal Kanda Thundam Aakiduven

5. Govardhana Giriyil Ghoramana Mrigangal Undu
Singam Puli Karadi Vandhal Kalangiduvai Kanmaniye

6. Kaatu Mrigangal Ellam Ennai Kandal Odi Varum,
Kootamaga Odi Vandal Vettai Aadi Venriduven

7. Priyamulla Nanda Gopar Baalan Enge Enru Kettal ,
Ennavenru Solliduven Yekkamudan Thediduvar

8. Veediyile Baalrudan Pandhu Vilayadugiran ,
Kanne Enru Nee Kural Koduthal
Oodi Vandu Ninriduven

English translation

Pallavi

Oh cowherd darling, I told you not to go,
But mummy, I have to go, please do not stop me.

Charanam

1. I would give you well boiled milk,
I would give you sugar and Sugar candy,
I would roll butter and give you in your hands,
Please do not go in this Sun.

2. I do not want well boiled milk,
I do not want sugar and Sugar Candy,
I would joyously herd the cows,
And return within no time.

3. There is always fear of robbers in the shores of Yamuna,
And Oh darling, you will get afraid, if they come and beat you.

4. Are there thieves for thieves, have you seen mummy,
If the robber comes and beats me, I will make them in to pieces.

5. In the Govardhana Mountain, there are fierce animals,
And oh darling, if lion, tiger and bear come, you will be afraid.

6. All wild animals would come running, when they see me,
And when they come as a crowd, I would hunt and win over them.

7. When the loving Nanda gopa asks me where the child is,
What shall I reply him and he would search for you with anguish.

8. I would be playing ball in the streets with boys,
And when you call me darling,
I would run and come back.

Posted by Raja Thatha at 2:50 AM

Wednesday, 1 March 2023

Shyam Ranganathan's startling stupidity- part II

Prof. Shyam Ranganathan of York University has staked a claim to be the stupidest academic to write nonsense about the Gita.

It appears that he combines the stupid notion of a 'moral parasite' with an imbecilic theory re. 'just war. 

Consider the following- 

India’s forceful reclamation of Goa from Portuguese rule (1961) was just; the Portuguese as colonizers

They established their rule in 1510! That was nine years before Babur first invaded India. The fact is, Goa had only come under Muslim rule a couple of centuries previously. The Portuguese killed the Muslims and appointed a Hindu Governor. More importantly, the Portuguese trade networks brought commercial opportunities.  

were participating in the breakdown of conventional morality by the imposition of their laws as a means of controlling the local population.

But that had happened four hundred years ago! The fact is, Nehru had to invade only because JP was making a nuisance of himself on this issue. But Nehru got his comeuppance when the Chinese invaded to, as they said, take back territory that the Brits had grabbed from their feudatories.  

Portuguese control of Goa was hence unjust,

It was foolish. Salazar should have done a deal with Nehru the same way the French had done.  

and the Portuguese were hence not justified in resisting Indian takeover,

they couldn't put up much resistance. 

which had the effect of returning local South Asian control to Goa. India’s military intercession in Bangladesh’s liberation from Pakistan (1971) was similarly justified;

Pakistan initiated hostilities. 

West Pakistan’s violent attempt to wrest control of East Bengal,

It had control. The Mukti Bahini was trying to wrest control from the Punjabi/Pakhtoon dominated Army. 

after a history of marginalization and imperial rule from the west, not only justified Bangladesh’s break

Success justified it.  

but also India’s intercession on behalf of the breakaway East Bengal to establish unconservatism and self-governance for all concerned.

Bangladesh suffered a big famine, worsened by massive corruption, and became a military dictatorship and Islamic Republic quickly enough. What fucking 'unconservatism' was achieved? Hindus had to run away from the place. Their population share has more than halved since 1971. 

From the Indian point of view, the War was justified because it removed a threat to the Siliguri gap such that a Pak/Chinese joint operation might capture Kashmir and the North East. However, if the Pak Army had not committed genocide and if American diplomats hadn't noticed this, then India would not have been able to act. As things were, Nixon tried to bluff Indira that he would 'nuke Calcutta'. Who knows what would have happened if the Pak Army hadn't surrendered so quickly? 

 To be fair, Ranganathan is too young to remember the Bangladesh War. But he can remember the War on Terror during which he wrote-

Jeff McMahan in his remarkable Killing in War

makes the novel distinction of 'just combatant' as opposed to 'unjust combatant'. We might say, a suicide bomber whose Mum was killed by American troops is a 'just combatant'. But some teenager from Bradford or Baltimore who thinks it would be fun to go to Syria and live large as an executioner for the Caliphate is an 'unjust combatant'.  

draws a distinction between two senses of “war.”

Ranganathan is too stupid to understand McMahan. 

In the first sense, war stands for a conflict between opposing parties.

This cretin does not understand that there is no fucking war unless there is murderous conflict between parties who oppose each other. If they support each other, you are witnessing a sado-masochistic orgy. Get out while you can.  

In the second sense, war is party relative, and some side may have a right of war (jus ad bellum), whereas others lack justification for war.

But this is true of every type of activity! Eating ice-cream is party relative. One side may have the right to eat the ice-cream. The other side may have stolen the ice-cream from a child which is now weeping copiously.  

In this sense, some parties fight a just war, whereas others fight an unjust war.

A thing is just only if it is justiciable. But different jurisdictions may disagree on what is justiciable or what is just. War can extend one jurisdiction and extinguish another. 'Trial by Combat' was one method of determining who had justice on her side.

According to McMahan, there is no radical difference between the moral considerations that operate outside of war and in war;

Only if there is no radical difference between any type of moral consideration, which may indeed be the case for armchair moral philosophers, till some punks rape and kill their wives after which they buy a 44 Magnum and turn into Charles Bronson. 

Moral considerations are either urgent and action motivating or they are cheap talk. 

the same moral considerations apply in both cases. Those who violate moral considerations fight an unjust war,

Why not just get rich on the black-market? Those who like violating moral considerations don't want to go to the battlefield where the enemy shoots at them. They would prefer to gangrape the wife of a moral philosopher- unless he is known to own a 44 Magnum and has a big Die Hard Video collection. 

whereas those who do not violate moral considerations fight a just war. Whereas Michael Walzer defended the idea that there is a logical independence between the considerations that justify going to war and the considerations pertaining to just conduct in war

Nonsense! The justification for going to war must include a plan for winning it. Nobody goes to war if defeat is inevitable unless, of course, the thing is purely pro forma.  

—and the related idea that there is a moral equality among combatants such that fighting for the wrong side does not entail wrongdoing in the conduct of war—he argues that one’s conduct in war does not count as just (jus in bello) if one fights for the wrong side and that one has no right to fight those whose cause is just.

All this is purely arbitrary stipulation. McMahan was writing at a time when the West thought it would win the war on terror. Consider the following

 This of course leaves open the question of what may be done when an adversary who has fought without justification demands as a condition of surrender something to which they are not entitled, yet the demand is also of a type that it would not be permissible to resist by means of war. Suppose, for example, that an adversary who has been largely defeated militarily demands as a condition of surrender that they be allowed to continue certain unjust domestic practices, such as certain forms of religious discrimination (for example, providing state funding for schools that promulgate the state religion, but not for others). Just as it may be necessary for an individual not to resist certain forms of wrongdoing when the only effective response would be inappropriate or excessive in relation to the offense, so it may be necessary in war to grant certain undeserved concessions when the only alternative is to continue to fight without sufficient justification.


Biden decided that fighting might cause American soldiers to suffer ouchies. Thus American won't fight any more. They may cheer Ukrainians on from a safe distance. But then again they may not.

Ranganathan's stupid paper asks us to
consider what may be the most famous argument for just war defended in the Bhagavad Gītā (where the philosopher–deity Krishna provides an extended pep talk on just war and moral theory to his cousin Arjuna on the battlefield before the commencement of war) and implicitly explored in the wider epic from which it is from, the Mahābhārata. 

There is no 'just war' argument in the Gita. Yuddhishtra had previously decided, on the basis of Krishna's advise,  that it was just to go to war. But, by then, he had learnt statistical game theory (in the Nalophkhyanam) and thus this was a strategic decision. Though militarily weaker, the Pandava coalition was more cohesive and adopted better tactics. 

This epic about a fratricidal war provides grounds for rejecting the idea that the justice of a war is elucidated by the fidelity of combatants to conventional standards of morality.

No. It is obvious that there is a superior correlated equilibrium such that both sides fight according to the rules. Still, there is a doctrine of exigent circumstances- apadh dharma- which however involves humiliation or else entails bad karmic consequences.

Rather, the need for war arises from

the need for territory. If land is a free good, it would be foolish to go to war. No scarcity, no war, because there can be no Stationary Bandit.  

a breakdown of conventional morality,

very true. If people commit adultery, a terrible war will break out.  

which identifies ethical considerations with the good.

though pornographic considerations may be better.  

Such conventional moral considerations break down when they provide shelter for parties who endorse conventional morality as a weapon to undermine the conventionally moral, the conventionally moral whose cause is prima facie just must hence depart from conventional morality to rid themselves of this hostility and reset the moral order.

Nonsense! Resetting the moral order involves proselytization and exhortation. It is perfectly compatible with conventional morality. Preachers who get us to give up adultery and arson and farting loudly in the faces of commuters are not doing anything anybody considers wrong. 

Yet, according to the alternative moral paradigm that resets the moral order, the Gītā entails that we can agree with McMahan: the side of those whose cause is just have a right to fight, and those whose cause is unjust have no such right and do wrong by engaging in conflict.

This is wholly false. Krishna sends his troops to fight for the bad guys. But Drona and Bhishma aint evil for fighting on the wrong side. Indeed, the Bhishma Parva, which is very very long, shows that the dude was considered the foremost authority on dharma.  

Those who fight for a just cause do not get their hands dirty by way of transcendent conditions of justice,

nor do those who fight for an unjust cause. There are no 'transcendent conditions of justice'. There is only God who may be the efficient cause of everything in Creation.  

though they get their hands dirty by conventional moral expectations.

Killing peeps tends to get your hands dirty. Also, you may poop your pants. War can be very scary.  

The point of convergence between the argument from the Gītā and McMahan is noteworthy, as is their divergence.

There is no convergence. McMahan isn't an occasionalist. He's just a silly man teaching worthless shite. 

Consider the following

 Suppose that country A is about to be unjustly invaded by a ruthless and more powerful country, B.

In that case, A needs to get allies or else develop an offensive doctrine to 'front load' pain on B. This means get nukes and have a delivery system so B loses a couple of Cities. If this is not possible, A needs to prepare defensive positions and mobilize the entire population. It should also be applying 'scorched earth' and 'materiel denial' policies. 

McMahan, cretin that he is, suggests A should invade some third country C. 

 A’s only hope of successful defense is to station forces in the territory of a smaller, weaker, neighboring country, C,

which will ally with B and kick the shit out of A.  

in order to be able to attack B’s forces from prepared positions as they approach A along the border between B and C.

But B will roll over C the moment hostilities commence. A's supply lines will get extended and so its own defensive doctrine will be compromised.  

A’s government requests permission from the government of C to deploy its forces on C’s territory for this purpose, but C’s government, foreseeing that allowing A to use its territory in this way would result in considerable destruction, denies the request. Suppose that C is within its rights to deny A the use of its territory but that, all things considered, it is nonetheless justifiable for A to avoid an otherwise inevitable defeat at the hands of B by going to war against C in order to be able to deploy troops there, provided that it will withdraw immediately after fighting off the invading forces from A. (One historical case

is the Anglo-American invasion of Vichy North Africa. Eisenhower found it very difficult to understand why the first target of the Allies had to be French. The answer, of course, is if you want to win a War first shit on cheese-eating surrender monkeys.  

that approximates this scenario is Russia’s war against Finland in 1939–40.

The Finns did offer to cede some territory to make Leningrad safer. Stalin mistakenly thought that his troops would quickly overrun Finland. The miserable performance of the Soviet forces probably strengthened Hitler's resolve to attack the Soviet Union before making peace with the Brits.  

The Russian government believed that control of Finnish territory within artillery range of Leningrad was necessary to protect the city from Nazi bombardment. It offered the Finns an exchange of territory, but the offer was refused, and the Russians then went to war to capture the territory they thought was necessary as a buffer against the Nazis. One reason this is only an approximation of my hypothetical example is that the Finns had good reason not to trust Stalin’s assurances that Russia’s aims were limited, since, among other things, Russia had only a short time earlier collaborated with the Germans in carving up Poland.)

Stalin kept denouncing the Finnish regime as 'Fascist'. There is nothing novel about what Putin is up to.  

Given that C is not morally required to sacrifice its territory for the sake of A, it seems that C does nothing to make itself liable to attack by A. On the account I have offered, therefore, A does not have a just cause for war against C. Yet if A is nevertheless morally justified in going to war against C, it must be possible for there to be wars that are morally justified yet unjust.

This is the case with any type of action. Moral justification arises even where there is no justiciability. Where there is justiciability, and jurisprudence is protocol bound, morality may conflict with justice. But this is true of farting or eating ice-cream just as much as it may be true of making war or concluding peace.  

A war is just when there is a just cause

No. A war is just if the matter is justiciable. But the cause of the war is a highly contested matter. However, if no protocol bound juristic process can alter the outcome of the war, then the matter is not really justiciable though it may become so.

and all other relevant conditions of justification are also satisfied.

by arbitrary stipulation.  

But, while all just wars are morally justified,

None are- save by arbitrary stipulation. 

it seems that not all morally justified wars are just wars.

save by arbitrary stipulation. This isn't philosophy it is bigotry. 

As the example of A, B, and C suggests, there seem to be wars that are morally justified

in the sense that killing and eating your kids is morally justified- by you because you keep saying so 

despite their requiring the targeting of those who are innocent in the relevant sense, so that at least some necessary phases of the war, and perhaps indeed all of its phases, lack a just cause. 

Telling moral philosophers that they are stupid and should shut the fuck up is a just and morally compelling cause. But why bother? If shite is taught, why not let shitheads teach it?

Ranganathan clearly fits the bill- 

My approach is distinct from the standard approach to talking about Indian thought

i.e. the approach taken by thoughtful Indians  

in general.  I recommend  that reading philosophy is about isolating perspectives

which is impossible if intersubjectivity obtains. How do we know what portion of our perspective is determined by our position in society and what portion arises out of our addiction to cough syrup?  

and that we treat each perspective P as entailing a theory T

But perspectives don't entail theories nor do theories give rise to perspectives. One may say that such and such theory altered one's perspective or that such and such ideologue's perspectives modified their exposition of such and such theory. But this does not mean theories entail perspectives or vice versa.  

about its controversial t claims and understanding the concept t as what competing theories of T disagree about.

But competing theories may have the same understanding of key concepts. They differ as to how those concepts interact.  

For instance, to read philosophy is to identify distinct perspectives in a dialectic or tract;

No. It is to identify different arguments and separate out de facti assertions from what may be called de juri deductions.  

An argument is dialectical from a single perspective though it may change over time. When climbing a mountain, one's perspective changes from being 'worm's eye view to that of a soaring eagle. But it still remains our own perspective. 

identify a perspective’s theory that entails all its claims about a topic, such as ethics; and identify the common concept of ethics as what competing theories of ethics disagree about.

This man is as stupid as shit.  

This approach contrasts with interpretation,

Mimansa or hermeneutics 

which is explanation by way of what one takes to be true.

Nope. Interpretation is not explanation. An interpreter speaks two languages and translates from one to the other. The diplomat who employs the interpreter supplies his own explanation for why his counterpart is lying his ass off.  

In my preferred approach, which I call explication, we can remain agnostic about all substantive matters as we pursue research in philosophy.

more particularly if we are actually scratching our butt rather than researching shite. 

One of the outcomes of explication is that we acknowledge that the various uses of the term “dharma”

which the Greeks translated as 'eusebia'- i.e. pietas. A pious observance is part of dharma. 

in Indian thought serve to articulate theories of dharma;

Because a theory of x uses the word x. What an amazing discovery.  

the common concept of dharma is the Right or the Good; and, moreover, if we apply this method to contemporary philosophy in the Western tradition, we find that “ethics” has the same conceptual content.

Ethics is about doing the right thing. Who knew? 

The contrary unprincipled approach is to treat one’s perspective (and beliefs) as a frame to study Indian thought, and uses of terms, such as “dharma,” are correlated with distinctions that we subjectively draw;

we are perfectly entitled to do so. Plenty of Christians have had their faith deepened after reading the Gita. 

this results in the multiplication of meanings associated with “dharma” and the ubiquitous claim that it is difficult to translate this term into English or any other language.

Eusebia that is pietas is a rigid Kripkean designator for dharma.  

In endorsing explication, we are in a position to understand the dialectic of the Mahābhārata’s and the Gītā’s account of just war. The governing moral theory is what we could call yoga (i.e., discipline)

No. Anushasan is discipline. The aim of Yoga- samadhi- can be achieved without any discipline. 

or bhakti (i.e., devotion).

Bhakti means Faith of a soteriologically efficacious type. But Virodha Bhakti which is oppositional can be superior to Maryada Bhakti.

According to this theory,

Which theory? Samkhya-Yoga? But it does not have a 'sittlichkeit'. It is wholly soteriological and aims to still 'the whirlpool of consciousness' so that samadhi is attained.  

the right action is defined by a regulative or procedural ideal

Nonsense! Samadi is substantive. It doesn't matter how you get there. What matters is to get there. There are lots and lots of Yogas- including 'vishada yoga'. 

(the Lord, defined by the characteristics of unconservatism and self-governance, which in the story is the character Krishna)

But Samkhya-Yoga can be atheistic. Indeed, older philosophy text-books made that claim.  

, and the good is the perfection of the practice of devotion to the ideal.

No. One may aim at perfect 'daksha' dexterity in the performance of ritual activities but devotion is not a mere ritualism.  

Yoga not only provides the moral standards and practice to reestablish a moral order when conventional morality breaks down;

In which case, this Ranganathan dude must be a fan of Yogi Adityanath- right?  

it also reestablishes the moral order by dissolving the distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello;

No such thing occurs. There is a doctrine of exigent circumstances- of apadh dharma- but the distinction remains.  

what justifies action is this approximation to the regulative or procedural ideal,

No. Nothing justifies actions relating to non justiciable matters. But justiciability arises only where there is a mechanism to implement the solution of a coordination game. Samkhya is mathematical and Game theory is a branch of math.  

and what makes it right is the same approximation.

This is only true of a protocol bound juristic system. But such a system can have 'equitable' exceptions or wholly arbitrary 'tie-breaking' or 'buck stopping'.  

The Mahabharata is the only epic which explicitly states that the Just King must learn mathematical game theory. As a matter of fact, the village barber can give us a good enough 'Shapley value' for members of the ruling coalition in the district though, obviously, the heavy duty math behind it is post-war. 

Ranganathan, cretin that he is, doesn't understand either game theory or the Epic most Indian origin folk have known and loved since childhood. 

It was conventional morality that made it possible for the Kauravas to exercise their hostility against the Pāṇḍavas

No.  Yuddhishtra had a gambling addiction. This caused his 'vishada' which was only dispelled by the 'Vyadha Gita' & 'Nalophkyanam'. 

by restricting and constraining the Pāṇḍavas. The Pāṇḍavas could have rid themselves of the Kauravas by killing them

in which case most Princes would have turned against them and have hunted them down.  

at any number of earlier times when they had the chance in times of peace, and everyone who survived would have been better off for having been rid of moral parasites as rulers

Duryodhana was a good enough King. That's why he had a lot of allies. But he mishandled the War and the negotiations leading up to it.  

and having the benevolent Pāṇḍavas instead. They could have accomplished this most easily by assassinating the Kauravas in secret or perhaps openly in public when they were not expecting it because the Kauravas never worried about nor protected themselves from such a threat, owing to the virtue of the Pāṇḍavas, whom they counted on.

This is foolish. Yuddhishtra wanted to transition from a thymotic type of regime to a metic friendly, mercantile type of 'homonoia'. The age of heroes was drawing to a close. What would follow would give more scope to industry and commerce and transnational mercantile guilds. 

There is a good reason why every oikumene will have rules of war- basically, if you do bad shit, the other side does worse shit- and a notion of 'just cause' to launch a war such that your allies feel they can join in without sending the wrong signal. 

Rangathan is too stupid to understand this.  

And yet the Pāṇḍavas’ fidelity to conventional morality created a context for the Kauravas to ply their trade of deceit and hostility.

Nonsense! Guys who aint addicted to gambling tell those who propose a dice game to go fuck themselves.  

The game of dice that snared the Pāṇḍavas is a metaphor for conventional morality itself:

Only in the sense that an invitation to a homosexual orgy is a metaphor for quantum mechanics 

a social practice justified by prospects of a good outcome (consequentialism),

this nutter thinks gambling has good outcomes. I suggest he take up Russian roulette.  

organized around good rules that make the participation of all possible (deontology),

deontology deals with claims regarding duty. But few have any relevant duties in any given context. That is why, when a Doctor discharges his medical duty by operating on a patient, a random nutjob is not allowed to participate even if he has brought his own scalpel.  

and actions that follow from the courage and strength of its participants (virtue ethics).

no action necessarily follows from courage or strength neither of which are virtues in and of themselves. 

The lesson of the Mahābhārata generalizes;

be nice to your cousins even if they have crowns on their heads. This was the lesson the Kaiser should have learned. He shouldn't have got jealous of his cousin the King Emperor or allowed his Generals to undermine the Tzar by sending Lenin to Russia.  

conventional morality places constraints on people who are conventionally moral,

in which case they experience no constraint on themselves. It is not the case that I feel constrained by morality not to beat or rape passersby. This is because my morality is wholly conventional in this respect.  

and this enables the maleficence of those who act to undermine conventional morality by undermining those who bind themselves with it.

This simply isn't true. We follow Tit for Tat. That's conventional morality. Something higher might be demanded by Theistic religion. But, there is a reputational benefit for conforming to sittlichkeit and a big big penalty for transgressing it.  

Call the latter, who use conventional morality as a weapon against the conventionally moral, moral parasites (Kauravas)

they weren't parasites. They were a kick ass bunch of warriors who had bound valuable allies- like Karna- to themselves by their generosity. 

and the former, who are happy to be bound by conventional morality, moral conventionalists (Pāṇḍavas).

But the Pandavas well knew that the tradition of their house was for the rightful heir (who would have been Karna, in any case) to yield the throne to a cadet branch. That's what Bhishma did.  

The moral parasite is someone who, for instance, wishes you to be honest and to abide by conventions of transparency so they can steal from you.

In which case you name and shame the fellow and then everybody gangs up on him and the fellow turns into a social leper.  

The moral parasite is someone who, for instance, wishes for you to behave in a manner that is courteous, kind, and accommodating so they can assault you, without resistance.

At which point you kick the cunt's head in.  

The only way to end this relationship of parasitism is for the conventionally moral to give up on conventional morality

conventional morality is a 'separating equilibrium' based on a costly, reputational, signal. There may be some higher type of morality based on turning the other cheek but that involves a Heavenly reward. Sinners, meanwhile, will be burning for eternity in Hell fire. 

and engage moral parasites in war. This would be a just war—dharmyaṃ yuddham—

dharma yuddha- rules of engagement for Kshatriya warfare . They don't arise if the enemy is non-Hindu.  

and the essence of a just war

an essence is something true in all possible worlds. But dharma-yuddha in Mahabharata is specific to a particular place and time when it made sense to have rules about elephants not attacking cavalry and so forth. 

because the cause would be to rid the world of moral parasites.

Just beating them and chasing them away is enough. Prasites aint known for their martial spirit or military genius.  Fuck does this stupid American think was happening during the War on Terror? Did he think Osama Bin Laden said to Bush 'If you are a true Christian, you will let my homeboys crash some planes into the World Trade Center and the White House and the Pentagon. Believe me, Jesus Christ would have been totes cool with that.' Bush was all like 'Are you sure? Is that really in the Bible?' and Osama is like 'Dude! Its in Revelations. Crack the Holy Book sometime!' Then Blair told Bush that Osama had been lying. There's nothing in the Bible about having to let A-rabs crash planes in your country. 

Ranga quotes McMahan

As I have presented it, the alternative conception of innocence is

guilty of being as stupid as shit 

that one is innocent if one is neither morally responsible for nor guilty of a wrong.

but both are arbitrary stipulations. 

While the classical just war theorists focused on guilt, I think we should focus instead on moral responsibility.

while jerking off. Otherwise, why bother? Moral responsibility can arise by arbitrary stipulation. Everybody could be morally responsible for anything. There is no 'natural' or non-arbitrary way to assign moral responsibility precisely because morality is unnatural if not ontologically dysphoric- i.e. not at home in this world.  

It is, I think, a mistake to suppose that noninnocence in the sense of moral guilt or culpability is necessary for liability to attack in war.

Not having nukes and a delivery system and being as weak as fuck is what attracts that liability.  

Something less is sufficient: namely, moral responsibility for a wrong, particularly an objectively unjustified threat of harm. . . .

In which case, it is objectively justified to attack fuck up any country with nukes and ballistic missiles- at least, if you take the word of this cretin.

[P]osing an objectively unjustified threat is not sufficient for liability in the absence of moral responsibility for that threat.

Only if the people of that country have a very very fucking low IQ. Otherwise, they'd have figured out that they pose an objectively unjustified threat.  But a race of morons who pose an existential threat will be wiped out anyway. 

In short, the criterion of liability to attack in war is moral responsibility for an objectively unjustified threat of harm. 

 No it isn't. A bunch of drooling cretins playing with a doomsday device should be attacked and put under restraint. Indeed, a place whose people can't have 'moral responsibility' is a terra fucking nullis. 

What the Gītā and Mahābhārata show, however, is that this threshold is too high.

Why? Coz Indians are stupider than cows?  

Moral parasites do something objectively wrong by being moral parasites, but the wrong is much less than a threat of harm;

Actually, a weaker country which drags its treaty allies into an apocalyptic war could be termed a moral parasite. The problem is that once blood and treasure start getting expended, the parasite is abandoned and the nuisance is curbed.  

it is merely the imposition of conventional moral standards on others as a means of hostility.

Disapproval does not fall under the heading of military hostilities. Ranganathan doesn't understand that war is about killing people.  

 In the Mahābhārata itself, it is most important that Krishna, the adviser of the Pāṇḍavas, steps in as their representative when they return from their exile and pursues peace and compromise to its logical extent. Krishna attempts to broker that the Pāṇḍavas should be given five villages for them to live in so that they can each sustain themselves as professional rulers of these communities. The Kauravas refuse, though they only took hold of the land in trust while the Pāṇḍavas were in exile.

If the Kauravas feared that the Pandavas would use any territory ceded to them to build up a hostile coalition then their strategy is sensible. But, the fact is, their calculation than they would prevail in an immediate conflict proved to be wrong.  

But now a new set of conventions has been created, with the Kauravas in charge of everything, and it is the imposition of this convention that constitutes the Kauravas’ final assault as moral parasites.

Nonsense! Possession is nine tenths of the law. The Kauravas were asserting their superior strength. They weren't appealing to some higher court or paramount power or making out that they possessed superior virtue.

It is important to remember that the right to rule a territory was predicated on one's ability to defend it. If the Kshatriya clan ruling your territory couldn't defeat a rival claimant, their legitimacy was established. War was not just the 'sport of Kings'. It was the final arbiter of their rival territorial or other claims.  

In this case, it is difficult for the Pāṇḍavas to see the move as an imposition of conventional morality (because it excludes them),

It was a challenge to battle of a type perfectly compatible with conventional morality of the military aristocracy of the period. 

and perhaps for this reason the Pāṇḍavas are inclined to fight. But the real reason war is inevitable is not for lack of conciliation on the part of the Pāṇḍavas but by virtue of the parasitism of the Kauravas.

Over confident belligerence- not parasitism. 

Ranganathan believes that in the Gita

1) Krishna first appeals to a 'form of deontology he calls karma yoga,

which is '"selfless action performed for the benefit of others" not

 the discipline of action.

which includes any disciplined action befitting even a mercenary soldier 

Action is itself purposeful, and the discipline of action is a practice of perfecting purposeful action. The argument is delivered generally as an argument for correct action in the face of uncertainty: no matter who you are, something counts as your duty, and the perfection of this duty is itself a good that relieves one from trouble. 

This simply isn't true. If you do your duty for the sake of the associated reward you are not doing 'karma yoga' at all.  

Moreover, all people who uphold a transcendental moral order (including Krishna, who is depicted here as the Lord—the procedural ideal of right action,

Krishna is not a 'procedural ideal' which is why devotees of Krishna don't have thousands of lovers who are gopis.  

which in its essence is both unconservatism and self-governance) participate in this moral order by doing their duty.

Hinduism makes no such stipulation. A Sadhu- i.e. ascetic may have no duty or obligation whatsoever. Yet such a person may uphold a transcendental moral order.  

Krishna too, the procedural ideal, must participate in dutiful behavior,

No. Nothing compels the Godhead. Grace is a purely gratuitous gift.

and the Lord’s duties include lokasaṃgraha (the maintenance of the welfare of the world)

No. That is a predicate. It is not a Hohfeldian incident of any type.  

 and to reestablish the moral order when it declines

This is 'matam' or doctrine (as opposed to vigyan) and is similar to 'vidhi'. It concerns a predicate of the Lord which we have no mundane method of elucidating. We can't say 'God had a duty to do x. Let's sue Him for negligence.' This is because law suits are mundane but predicates of the Lord found in Revealed Scripture convey no mundane information. 

The next step is bhakti yoga,

 devotion to the incarnate Lord as one's personal God and Savior. 

the discipline of devotion. Here, right action is defined by its conformity to a regulative ideal—Krishna himself—

No. If the action is impelled by devotion it is right or, at any rate, has no evil consequence for the doer because the Lord takes that evil upon himself. Krishna is not a 'regulative ideal'. He is a full incarnation of the Lord. 

and, in doing what is right, we sacrifice a concern for the outcome as a means of worshipping the procedural ideal.

This has nothing to do with theistic devotion. There may be a procedural ideal in Purva Mimamsa. There is none in the Gita which is classed as an Upanishad and thus part of Uttara-Mimamsa. 

This same theory is found elsewhere, articulated more clearly in the Yoga Sūtra; it is the moral theory of yoga (discipline) or bhakti.

Rubbish! There is no mention of bhakti. However, us Theists consider its mention of Ishvar as type of Purusha (purusha-vishesha) to license our belief that Lord Krishna, as Yogishvara, can grant us liberation by his own gratuitous gift without any effort or discipline on our part. Of course, as we grow in devotion, we wouldn't want liberation. We would only want to humbly serve.  

According to this account, right action is defined by a procedural ideal—unconservatism and self-governance—and perfecting our practice of the right is the good.

fuck is 'unconservatism'? I suppose Ranganathan has been perfecting his practice of the rite of masturbation with the result that has brain has softened. 

This theory differs from deontology in an important respect.

There is no duty to wank. 

Whereas deontology treats our duty as itself a good,

No it doesn't. Something has to be added to deontology- Theism or Deism or the Hegelian Geist- for this to be the case. On the other hand, the argument could be made that Deontology is 'Regret-Minimizing' or has some other valuable game-theoretic property. But duty can't itself be a good because otherwise we can exponentially increase good simply by relabeling everything as a duty or meta-duty or meta-meta duty. 

justified by procedural considerations only, in yoga/bhakti, the right is defined by a procedural ideal,

No. Yoga is synonymous with 'samadhi' towards which there may be a procedure but which is also realizable by the gratuitous gift of Grace though it may also be spontaneously and instantaneously achieved.  

and hence we do not need to understand our moral practice in terms of the good. 

No. Our moral practice involves a pragmatics of 'good' and 'nice' vs. 'bad' and 'naughty'.  

In contrast to virtue ethics, consequentialism, and deontology,

the path of devotional piety can incorporate a virtue ethics as well as a consequentialist calculus or a deontology which, au fond, is merely a rules based utilitarianism such as a 'bonus paterfamilias' might adopt to avoid culpa levis in abstracto type torts. 

it alone accounts for morality without recourse to the good.

Fuck off! God is good. Getting with God is the Holy Grail. 

The good is not a primitive notion, here, but one definable by way of the perfection

but perfection means becoming more and more good at something till one is maximally good. This cretin doesn't get that though the good can be a Tarskian primitive, perfection or optimality can't.  

of the right. So, whereas conventional morality is structured around the good, bhakti dispenses with the good.

Nope. We are devoted to the Lord because God is good.  

A third moral practice that Krishna recommends is jñāna yoga:

self-realization through metaphysical discrimination between what is real and what is illusory 

the discipline of thoughtfulness or knowledge. Jñāna yoga is the critical appreciation of the framework of moral action,

it is unconnected to it. Having the correct doctrine or teaching ( मतम् ) may be enough. Saivites opine that a jivanmukta can exist. It is perfectly possible that a thief or a prostitute has this quality. 

which complements karma yoga’s disinterest in trying to understand action as justified by outcome.

Karma yoga is concerned with outcomes for other people. It only requires the agent not to focus on his own gratification. Ranganathan is a moral imbecile. 

It is the metaethical component of the shift away from conventional morality to a fully procedural approach to ethics.

Why bother having a procedural approach to stupid shite? There is some point studying medicine or chemistry. There is none in bullshitting about ethics. The thing is part and parcel of 'maya'- delusion.  

Is Ranganathan the stupidest academic to have commented on the Gita? I suppose his IQ is markedly inferior to others I've mentioned on this blog. Still, it is interesting that he so loathes 'moral parasites'- i.e. virtue signaling, 'woke', nutters. Perhaps, he is a Hindutvavadi at heart. The other explanation is that he is simply an ambitious academic who understands that writing the stupidest and craziest shite possible is the only way to get ahead in non-STEM subjects. Still, he will have to up his game if he wants to compete with Amia Srinivasan. 


Shyam Ranganathan's startling stupidity- part 1

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy has an entry dedicated to the Bhagvad Gita where I found this oxymoronic gem of nescience-  

Just War and the Suppression of the Good

This shite appears to be the work of one Shyam Ranganathan- a handsome young American of truly startling stupidity. York University employs this moron. 

The Gītā and the Mahābhārata have garnered attention for their contribution to discussions of Just War theory.

The Mahabharata is set in the Dvapara Yuga which ended long ago. Nothing in it helps us decide what is or isn't a Just War now in Kali Yuga. 

Indeed, Justice is merely a service industry or 'conventional' (samskari) solution to a coordination game. If you are paid to fight in a 'Just War'- do so. But what is or isn't Just is a game theoretical matter involving 'uncorrelated asymmetries' and Shapley Values and degenerative Nash equilibria and so forth. 

To be clear, War is about winning. It is never just to go to war if you are bound to lose. The question of morality only arises to the extent that it may attract or deter allies or affect the morale of the other side. 

Yet, as most accounts of South Asian thought are fuelled by an interpretive approach that attempts to understand the South Asian contribution by way of familiar examples from the Western tradition, the clarity of such accounts leaves much to be desired.

Because the people giving such accounts are as stupid as shit. A smart guy can always give a good enough account. But no smart people study or teach Ranganathan's stripe of shite. 

Explicated, with a focus on the logic of the arguments and theories explored as a contribution to philosophical disagreement—and not by way of substantive beliefs about plausible positions—we see that the Mahābhārata teaches us that the prospects of just war arise when moral parasites

in this context, a 'free rider' or agent who takes advantage of the superior moral commitment of others. However, if War is a possibility, no moral parasite can exist precisely because the people you are trying to take advantage of are on the point of killing you and grabbing your cool stuff. 

inflict conventional morality on the conventionally moral

who, conventionally, kill them of threaten them till they fuck off 

as a means of hostility.

Nothing of the sort happens in the Mahabharata. There is a dice game where one party cheats but the fact remains that the cheated party had a weakness (hamartia) for gambling. He overcomes this by learning statistical game theory.  

Gambling is immoral. So is taking drugs. An immoral parasite may get you to take drugs or to gamble but then your Mummy may beat or kills such peeps, so the problem tends to diminish.

Parasites effect this hostility by acting belligerently against the conventionally moral, while relying on the goodness of the conventionally moral to protect them from retaliation in response to their belligerence.

This can only happen if the 'mechanism' in question is faulty. Better game theory is needed to eliminate the pathology. Alternatively, 'equitable remedies'- e.g. estoppel- may be provided so that the guy who is trying to game the system is frustrated and hoist by his own petard. 

The Mahabharata is about hefty Iron Age warriors deeply invested in a Thymotic Code of a type unfit for an emerging Pan Indian market where merchants- like the meat vendor in the Vyadha Gita- have increasing importance. The Kurukshetra holocaust or purgative 'vishodhana' marks the transition to our more commercial age based on 'universal' homonoia.  

Any such retaliation would be contrary to the goodness of conventional morality and hence out of character for the conventionally moral.

Fixing a fault in a mechanism aint 'retaliation'. It is just good housekeeping on the part of Civil Society is all.  

The paradox here is that, from the perspective of the conventionally moral, this imposition of conventional moral standards is not wrong and is good.

Nonsense! An imposition is irksome, more particularly if it is wholly otiose. The fact is, I don't incessantly masturbate while in the office. I would resent my boss imposing a regime of surveillance and exhortation  in this regard even though I genuinely don't want anybody to wank in the workplace. You may say, 'Vivek, if such indeed is the case why do you constantly raise the issue of anti-masturbation vigilance at Staff Meetings?' My answer is that if some cunt proposes 'Racial Sensitivity training', I retaliate by expatiating on hazards posed by the incessant squirting of jizz all over the place to older Black workers who may slip and break their fucking necks. As for yet more copious vaginal secretions or 'squirting'- don't get me fucking started mate.

However, it is the means by which moral parasites exercise their hostility to the disadvantage of the conventionally moral.

The conventionally moral don't have any trouble telling useless tossers to go fuck themselves. I think what the anonymous author is getting at is virtue signalling cunts who- being parasites themselves- have to put up with a like annoyance as that which they themselves cause.

But, that's the Coasian solution to the problem of 'nuisance goods'- viz. encourage nuisances to be nuisances to each other till they cancel each other out. 

As Jonathan Swift put it-

The Vermin only teaze and pinch
Their Foes superior by an Inch.
So, Nat'ralists observe, a Flea
Hath smaller Fleas that on him prey,
And these have smaller yet to bite 'em,
And so proceed ad infinitum:

Prima facie, it would be just for the conventionally moral to retaliate as moral parasites act out of the bounds of morality.

Fuck off! Conventional morality has nothing to do with 'retaliation'. It is enough to say 'go fuck yourself you hypocritical, virtue signalling, utterly worthless tosser'. Telling the truth ain't 'retaliation' unless you yourself are just as bad as the flea that preys on your own parasitic existence.  

However, the moment that the conventionally moral engage such parasites in war,

they must launch a superior propaganda war in parallel to a superior 'kill-rate' offensive doctrine. Otherwise, running away is better than fighting.

they have departed from action as set out by conventional morality,

Fuck off! Conventional morality is about kicking in the fucking head of pedo scumbags- or saying so down the Pub on a Friday night after the girls gave you the slip and moved on to the Disco with them fucking I-fucking-talian waiters wot were giving them the fucking eye, mate! 

and it would appear that they thereby lack justification.

There can be no justification where there is no justiciability. But justiciability is a matter of economia, not akribeia, and economia is always ideographic. Universals obtain purely nominally and  'universalizability' is always only a type theoretic, or bootstrapped, heuristic, business which either pays for itself or turns paranoid and bankrupts its sponsors. 

This standing relative to conventional moral expectations is the same as the parasite’s.

Only if you ignore 'uncorrelated asymmetries'. But only an Amartya Sen would be that fucking stupid.  

This was Arjuna’s problem at the start of the Gītā. Arjuna indeed explicitly laments that fighting moral parasites would render him no better (Gītā 1.38-39).

Fuck off! Arjuna's true eldest brother is Karna who is best pals with Duryodhana- the bad guy. If Arjuna, using the Gandharva he defeated's boon of chaksuchi vidya, divines this truth for himself- then there is no War and he himself, in a state of 'Manyu' (dark anger) won't kill his true liege Lord (under primogeniture of the sort that still obtains in the Indian National Congress). Of course, Karna could refuse to be a 'Pandava'. But he doesn't. His stipulation is that, whatever happens, the number of Pandavas will be conserved. That's Noether's fucking theorem right there!  


A procedural approach to ethics, such as we find in the Gītā,

Fuck off! The Gita is great poetry! Would this cunt say 'there is a procedural approach to ethics in Shakespeare's Hamlet'? 

Perhaps. The man is a moral and intellectual parasite.  

transcends conventional morality especially as it deprioritizes the importance of the good (karma yoga).

WTF! Karma Yoga just means doing your duty- including ritual 'karma kanda' if you happen to be a Brahmin and that's how you get money to feed your kids.  

Indeed, it rejects the good as a primitive moral notion in favour of the right (bhakti yoga)

This is nonsense. If you are devoted to God you can do what you like. The Creator does not greatly care about minute differences in 'morality'. This also means God loves you even if you are very flatulent and everybody gives you a wide berth. I'm not talking about myself. I'm talking about this bloke I know. We were in the S.A.S together so I can't tell you his name. 

and thereby provides an account of the justice of those who wage war on moral parasites:

You don't wage war on parasites. You tell them to fuck off. 

The justice of the war of Arjuna and other devotees of Sovereignty should be measured by their fidelity to procedural considerations of the right, and not to considerations of the good.

So if some guy whose name is Arjun kills your family then you should fist yourself vigorously while measuring fidelity to procedural considerations of some nonsensical type. 

Arjuna and other just combatants fight as part of their devotion to Sovereignty and hence conform their behavior to an ultimate ideal of justice: that all concerned should be sovereign and thus made whole.

Nonsense! Arjuna and others were fighting to gain or retain territory.  

Hence, just war (jus ad bellum) and just conduct in war (jus in bello) come to the same thing:

Not for Kshatriyas in Dwapara Yuga. Basically, if you get an invite to a big battle you show up regardless of which side invited you. War was a competitive sport. After the war, the winning coalition might decide to restore territory to the main loser for reasons of justice or to preserve the balance of power.  

For the just cause is devotion to the ideal, and right action is the same.

Nonsense! Devotion is wholly independent of action or justiciability. Ranganathan is truly as stupid as shit. 

In contrast, those who are not devoted to the regulative ideal fail to have a just cause, or just action in war.

Absolutely false. If a matter is justiciable- e.g. the UN decides that a specific military action is the crime of 'aggression' under international law and if mercenaries are recruited to enforce the UN resolution, then those mercenaries have a just cause and their military actions attract no penalty of law. 

Jeff McMahan’s conclusion in his Killing in War (2009), that those who fight an unjust cause do wrong by fighting those whose cause is just, is entailed by bhakti yoga.

No it isn't. Oikeiosis determines which side a Kshatriya fights on. That is perfectly just and in conformity with bhakti yoga. Krishna is a non-combatant but his followers fight for the Kauravas. They don't fall into 'adharma' by doing so.  

However, McMahan appears to claim that the justice of a war is accounted for not by a special set of moral considerations that come into effect during war, but the same considerations we endorse during times of peace.

A thing is just only if it is justiciable. People who avoid injustice most of the time are mindful of the relevant considerations. When they transgress, a judicial decision may be taken such that they are punished- or the attempt to punish them is made.  

Yet in times of peace it appears that conventional morality wins the day, vitiates against war, and all parties depart from it when they wage war—or at least, this seems to be the analysis of the Mahābhārata.

Rubbish! Kshatriyas had a duty to turn up if invited to fight on one side or another in a war. Soldiers learn their craft by participating in Wars. In early modern Europe, when most Wars were wars between cousins- just like Kururkshetra- it was quite usual for ambitious officers to get permission to join one side or the other in a distant War. They were permitted to take part in combat and, if captured, would be paroled and sent back to their own countries. There were also plenty of aristocratic Soldiers of Fortune. 

It is because there are two competing moral frames—conventional morality of the good and the proceduralism of the right, or Yoga/Bhakti—

This is nonsense. Conventional morality is 'aachar' which is perfectly compatible with Bhakti. However, those who dedicate themselves to Yoga adopt a stricter code of conduct.

that we can continue to monitor the justice of war past the breakdown of conventional moral standards (for more on the just war theory here, see Ranganathan 2019).

Ranganathan- who is as American as apple pie- has written a Divya Dwiwedi level crazy paper which can be found here.  

It is because of the two standards that Yoga/Bhakti can constitute an ultimate standard of moral criticism

Rubbish! Yoga is different from Bhakti. Both come in many different flavors. One could say that a particular type of devotional theism is 'Bhakti Yoga' but it has nothing to say about which wars are just or not unless the King being attacked belongs to our sect. But that is 'oikeiosis'. Anyway, lots of theists run away when Crusaders or Jihadis or whatever invade. This is because they know their own Princes are shitty and crap at fighting. 

of the right even as the conventional moral standards of the good that characterize peace deteriorate under the malfeasance of parasites.

This is nonsense. Parasites don't matter. Heavily armed invaders put an end to peace. Hindus found that surrendering to the Brits tended to make their lives better- at least in South India.  


With respect to success, we see that the Gītā also has a story to tell about which side wins the war.

The Gita is occasionalist. God is the only efficient cause. But God only cared about Kurukshetra. There were plenty of other Wars which God didn't fix in advance. 

As the bhakti yogi is committed to a process of devotion to sovereignty, their behavior becomes sovereign in the long run

Fuck off! I have been devoted to Sarah Michelle Gellar in Buffy the Vampire Slayer for a quarter of a century. But my behavior is not becoming that of a 17 year old cheerleader. 

Maybe Ranganathan thinks that the Vaishnavite hopes to himself become God like. But theosis is off the table for that sect. Their only wish to to be reborn so as to serve the Lord more humbly. 

and hence their success is assured.

This man is a nutter. Being devoted to Mummy won't turn you into Mummy in the long run. 

Moral parasites, in contrast, are not engaged in an activity of self-improvement.

They may be. Their parasitism may be tactical.  

Their only means of survival—taking advantage of the conventionally moral—now lacking (as the conventionally moral have renounced conventional morality to become devotees of Sovereignty), renders them vulnerable to defeat by devotees of Sovereignty.

Parasites aren't 'defeated', they are told to fuck the fuck off.  

Moral parasites only have the one trick of taking advantage of the conventionally moral, and the transition to bhakti yoga on the part of the formerly conventionally moral deprives parasites of their victims and source of sustenance.

The Vyadha Gita, which is the dual of the Bhagvad Gita, shows that anybody at all- a housewife, a butcher- can tell Princes and Prelates to fuck the fuck off. Yet they can gain the honeyed wisdom of the Chandogya.