Prof. Douglas Portmore asks if
Moral Reasons (are) Morally Overriding?
If reasons of a certain sort can be partially ordered, then we may say that they can override those ranked below themselves. But only a well defined set has this property. If morality is 'epistemic' (i.e. depends on our knowledge base) then impredicativity is likely to arise. Still, the axiom of regularity is satisfied if there is one disjoint element in the set. But 'pairing' would also be required- i.e. there has to be some unique (by 'extentionality) set which contains it & one and only one of every other element. It is certainly possible to arbitrarily construct a disjoint element & pairing principle. But there is a moral reason to reject arbitrariness & hope for 'naturality'. That is why, save by some arbitrary 'buck stopping' mechanism (as happens where you have a Supreme Court or Supreme Pontiff or sovereign Legislature) , the answer to Portmore's question must be negative.
IN THIS PAPER, I present an argument that poses the following dilemma for moral theorists: either (a) reject at least one of three of our most firmly held moral convictions
in which case there is no partial ordering. 'Overriding' is arbitrary
or (b) reject the view that moral reasons are morally overriding,
i.e. there is no partial ordering
that is, reject the view that moral reasons always defeat non-moral reasons in the determination of an act’s deontic status (e.g., morally permissible or impermissible).
This is unnecessary. Morality can admit some realm higher than itself- e.g. doing what God tells you to do even if seems immoral (like sacrifice your first born).
I then argue that we should opt for the second horn of this dilemma.
Which is what we actually do. What is permitted is one thing. What is commanded is another.
If I’m right, if non-moral reasons are relevant to determining what is and isn’t morally permissible, then it would seem that moral theorists have their work cut out for them.
Just accept that law can be positive- i.e. a command which creates a superior duty or obligation.
Not only will they need to determine what the fundamental right-making and wrong-making features of actions are, but they will also need to determine what non-moral reasons are relevant to determining an act’s deontic status.
This isn't particularly hard. Just say 'God' or 'Necessity' or whatever.
And moral theorists will have to account for how these two very different sorts of reasons (moral and nonmoral) “come together” to determine an act’s deontic status.
Again, this is easily done. The trouble is that there is an arbitrary element to it.
By the term “reasons,” I’ll mean “practical reasons,” i.e., reasons for action. As I see it, reasons for action are considerations that can count in favor or against performing an action. Such considerations are not always decisive, as countervailing reasons can defeat them, but in the absence of an undefeated countervailing reason, they are decisive.
Which is fine if menu choice is exogenous. The problem is that what we chose to do, more often than not, is what we think will have some particular effect. In other words, something epistemic interposes itself between the reason and the action.
Second, I’ll use the phrase “undefeated reason” such that: if a person, P, has an undefeated reason to perform an act, x, it follows that P does not have better reason to perform some other available act.
Which would only be the case if there is a partial ordering. But there isn't really. So, this is 'ex falso quodlibet'. Asserting something false & then logically deducing any old cobblers from it.
Note that this allows that there are various ways in which a reason can be defeated.
No. There is only one. It is arbitrarily downgraded. This is convenient but not compelling.
For instance, a reason can be defeated because it is overridden by some other weightier reason,
by an arbitrary action
and a reason can be defeated because it is trumped, silenced, undermined, excluded, or bracketed by some other reason.
it can also be slut shamed even if it is actually a virgin . Arbitrary actions are like that only.
3 Note also that I’ve said, “does not have better reason” as opposed to “has as good a reason.”4 The former is broader, allowing for the additional possibility that P’s reason to perform x is undefeated because it is incommensurate with P’s reasons to perform some other available alternative such that there is no fact as to whether P has better reason, worse reason, or just as good a reason to perform x than/as to perform this other alternative. In what follows, I’ll want to distinguish an undefeated reason from a morally undefeated reason. Accordingly, I offer the following definitions: D1 A person, P, has a morally undefeated reason to perform an act, x, if and only if P does not have better moral reason to perform some other available act.
But this depends of P's knowledge base & our knowledge base regarding P & maybe that which is 'common knowledge' in the relevant society.
With these definitions in hand, I’m now in a position to say what moral reasons are. Moral reasons are, of course, a proper subset of reasons for action;
A subset must have a well defined extension. It frequently happens that something we do as a matter of habit is discovered to us as having a basis in customary or scriptural morality from an earlier period. Equally, a thing which is considered 'moral' may be discovered to have a purely economic explanation from an earlier period. Why do Jews & Muslims avoid pork? Currently, it is a matter of religious commandment. But some suggest that this convention was adopted because pork uses up more water than chicken. Similarly the Hindu prohibition on beef may be for an agronomic reason. (Indeed, that was the argument used at the time when cow protection was made a Directive Principle in the Indian Constitution). The Indian notion of 'untouchability' may arise from primitive pathogen avoidance theory. It is no accident that progress in allopathic medicine is killing the thing off even in the villages.
specifically, moral reasons are those reasons that can give rise to a moral ought, where “ought” is understood broadly to express either obligation or advisability.
But 'oughts' arise in purely economic contracts or transactions. You ought to buy low & sell high- otherwise you are likely to go bankrupt. But this is a question of commercial good sense- not morality.
Thus moral reasons are reasons that can give rise to an act’s being either morally obligatory or morally supererogatory.
But morality may have evolved as a set of heuristics which are actually economic in origin.
But when does a moral reason give rise to a moral ought?
Surely, that depends on the person? Two people may do the same thing- one for an economic, the other for a moral reason. Indeed, they may justify their action differently to different people. Thus a Jain vegetarian may justify vegetarianism for moral reasons to a fellow Jain, but mention ecological or economic reasons when speaking to a person of a different religion.
This much is clear: absent either an undefeated or a morally undefeated reason to do something else, there is nothing to prevent the moral reason P has to perform x from being decisive— decisive not only relative to other moral reasons but also relative to reasons generally.
There is a problem of impredicativity here. The antinomian Christian or Malamati Sufi may do the opposite to what is morally right, because transgression causes one to depend more on the gratuitous grace of God. One may say the higher morality is to defy the lower morality. Obviously, this may cause the more antinomian-than-thou antinomian to become hyper-orthodox so as to show himself higher than the run of the mill antinomian.
My point is that since there is no 'naturality' in constructing a partially ordered set for deontics, the thing can only be done arbitrarily & in an inconsistent or ad hoc manner.
And, surely, if P has a morally, and all-things-considered, decisive moral reason to perform x, then P morally ought to perform x—
unless antinomianism is a superior morality.
that is, P’s performing x is at least morally supererogatory if not morally obligatory. More formally, I offer the following definition: D3 P has a moral reason to perform x if and only if, absent either an undefeated or a morally undefeated reason to perform some other available act, P’s performing x is either morally obligatory or morally supererogatory.
Provided there is no impredicativity in moral reasons- e.g. thinking it immoral to do what is moral so as to depend more fully on God's grace.
As D3 implies, not only do facts that give rise to an act’s being morally obligatory constitute moral reasons, but so do facts that give rise to an act’s being morally supererogatory.
This assumes that morality can't restrict admissibility or change the valency of what are considered 'de facti'. Anglo Saxon jurisdictions, in theory, separate out determinations of fact to Juries and determinations of Law to Judges. But Judges can direct juries to disregard certain facts or to deem them to have a different valency to what they might 'naturally' consider them to be.
So, for instance, a moral theory that inextricably ties moral obligations to rights will still count the fact that your performing x will benefit someone who has no right to your beneficence as a moral reason for you to perform x if the theory holds that your benefiting someone who has no right to your beneficence is supererogatory (even if not obligatory).
If morality is epistemic- i.e. changes as the knowledge base changes- then what is supererogatory is a movable feast.
Thus there are two types of facts
by reason of some arbitrary decision re admissibility
that constitute moral reasons,
Facts don't constitute reasons. We may say 'some facts are relevant (admissible) others aren't'.
and this implies that there are two types of moral reasons: those that give rise to moral obligations when they are both morally and all-things-considered decisive dont'.
Sadly nobody can attain the 'all-things-considered' (omniscient Benthamite Planner's) perspective.
(There is a (very real possibility that non-moral reasons might be relevant to the determination of an act’s deontic status.
If we evolved on an uncertain fitness landscape then it is likely that morality 'evolved'. But, for robustness, it is likely that there will be a non-moral basis on which to come to the same conclusion. Religious thinker have grappled with the conundrum that there is always a just as good non-moral reason to do what morality counsels. 'It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.'
Note that this allows for the possibility that a moral reason gives rise to a moral ought whenever a morally undefeated reason is absent, for it may be that what one morally ought to do is a function of solely moral reasons.
This would be true of purely ritual actions which are known to have no effect on anything which matters. This is the 'Purva Mimamsa' view. Vedic ritualism is moral precisely because it has not utilitarian value whatsoever. Sadly, saying this, reduces the incentive to stick with orthopraxy.
Nevertheless, even if this is the case, it will still be true to say that a moral reason gives rise to a moral ought absent either an undefeated or a morally undefeated reason to act otherwise.
Who can say such a reason does not exist? The fact that we can't think of it, at this moment, doesn't mean it doesn't exist. Under Knightian Uncertainty, we choose a 'regret minimizing' strategy- i.e. err on the side of caution some of the time while also indulging in FOMO (fear of missing out). If everybody is doing it, you may regret not getting with the program. The truth is, a lot of morality & ethics is about Tardean Mimetics- i.e. imitating what the superior does or is supposed to do.
For if a moral reason to perform x gives rise to x’s being morally obligatory/supererogatory if there isn’t a morally undefeated reason to do something else, then it will also give rise to x’s being morally obligatory/supererogatory if there is neither an undefeated nor a morally undefeated reason to do something else.
Because arbitrary actions have that quality. They lack 'nautrality'- i.e. aren't based on all relevant 'reasons'.
Note also that D3 is compatible with a particularist conception of moral reasons, where certain facts can be relevant
but are they discoverable in a canonical manner or are they arbitrarily stipulated?
to how one morally ought to act on one occasion but not another and can even count in favor of performing an action on one occasion but against performing that action on another.
Or just doing what you like.
Even on this particularist conception, it will still be true to say that some facts are capable of making a difference to how one morally ought to act and that some are not.
Truth does not matter. Informativity does. The sentence given above is non-informative.
Accordingly, I offer the following distinction and corresponding definitions: D4 P has a deontic moral reason to perform x if and only if, absent either an undefeated or a morally undefeated reason to perform some other available act, P’s performing x is morally obligatory.
This begs the question as to whether we can distinguish a 'deontic moral reason' in a canonical or non-arbitrary way. Otherwise D4 is non informative. It is like saying 'we have a leprechaun up our anus if no one can tell what is or isn't a leprechaun. Also, anything at all can be our anus.
D5 P has a non-deontic moral reason to perform x if and only if, absent either an undefeated or a morally undefeated reason to perform some other available act, P’s performing x is not morally obligatory, but merely morally supererogatory.
This assumes that actions are dictated by 'reasons' of various sorts. We may make this arbitrary stipulation but we may equally arbitrarily speak of what the invisible leprechaun up our anus is making us do.
So, on the rights-based theory described above, the fact that your performing x will benefit someone who has no right to your beneficence would constitute a non-deontic moral reason for you to perform x, whereas, on utilitarianism, the fact your performing x will benefit someone (even yourself) constitutes a deontic moral reason for you to perform x.
But what is deontic for you (i.e. what you consider to be your duty) is up to you. You may feel it your duty to attribute all your actions- or that of Donald Trump- to invisible leprechauns lodged in the rectum of Peter Mandelson.
Lastly, I’ll define a moral option as follows: D6 P has a moral option to perform either x or y if and only if it is both morally permissible for P to perform x and morally permissible for P to perform y. 2.
& if the invisible leprechaun lodged in Mandelson's anus brought about this situation.
The argument With these definitions in hand, we’re now in a position to consider what I take to be a very troubling argument, which I present in standard form below. Assume that the variable “P” ranges over agents who must choose between acting so as to secure a considerable benefit for themselves and acting so as to secure a slightly more considerable benefit for some stranger.
or because such is the invisible of Mandelson's anal leprechaun.
Let’s call the former “s” since it’s a self-regarding act and the latter “o” since it’s an other-regarding act.
But it is the self which decides the issue. The fact that I fart noisily so as to show solidarity with Hamas doesn't stop people think I do it because I like stinking up the room.
Assume that there are no other morally relevant facts. So, for instance, assume that whatever it is that P would be doing were she to perform s, it would not entail breaking a promise, causing someone harm, or anything of the sort.
This is like assuming Mandelson's anal leprechaun is the only efficient cause. It is arbitrary. It is also non-informative. The fact is we can never be sure our actions don't cause harm.
And assume, for the sake of simplicity, that s and o are the only available options and that they are mutually exclusive.
You are assuming there is no Knightian Uncertainty. All possible states of the world are known. Evolution must be wrong. So must Cosmology & Geology etc. All is as Mandelson's invisible anal leprechaun wills it.
What is the practical consequence for ethics of Portmore's argument.
(We) should be highly suspicious of many people’s untutored intuition that it is permissible for those who enjoy the kind of affluence that is so common in industrialized nations to spend large portions of their surplus income on luxury items
thus creating jobs in the luxury sector. Moreover, as economies of scope & scale become available, luxuries turn into necessities- stuff like tooth paste & soap were once (in India) considered luxuries & subject to heavy taxes. This was not a smart economic policy.
when there are so many children in developing countries who are dying easily preventable deaths.
They only became preventable because the rich had the luxury of financing expensive medical research which initially was only available to them.
But the fact that some of our commonsense moral intuitions seem suspect upon careful reflection
Posmore uses the phrase 'careful reflection' in the spirit of pure farce.
casts no doubt on the idea that our moral theories should comport with the moral convictions we have after careful reflection.
on orders from an invisible anal leprechaun- right?
Thus it’s important to note that neither Singer’s arguments nor Unger’s arguments speak against our considered moral conviction that forgoing a benefit for oneself in order to provide someone else with an only slightly larger benefit is morally optional, not morally required.
It is irrelevant if we are useless tossers teaching shite to shitheads.
Up to this point, I’ve merely asserted, not argued, that P2, P4, and P6 represent three of our most firmly held moral convictions.
Only in the sense that faith in an omnipotent invisible anal leprechaun is part & parcel of some nutter's moral convictions. Indeed to deny such is the case is homophobic & reveals a bigotry against very short Irish people.
To illustrate, let’s suppose that the specifics are as follows. P is currently accessing her savings account via the Internet, and she is about to transfer the entire balance to her escrow company so as to purchase her dream home. She can do so by clicking on button A. However, there’s an alternative. By clicking on button B instead, her savings will be transferred not to her escrow company, but to some stranger who will benefit slightly more from the money than she would.
John Maynard Smith showed why 'bourgeois strategies' based on 'uncorrelated asymmetries' (e.g. the money in my savings account is mine & is intended to help me) is 'eusocial'- i.e. everybody benefits more if they are followed. The fact is a society where it is normative to click B will be as poor as shit. It won't be using scarce resources efficiently. This doesn't mean that there isn't a collective action problem to do with assisting the worst off. But that is a matter of economics & politics- i.e. 'ways & means'- not morality as such.
Clearly, given the tremendous sacrifice involved, our considered moral conviction is that P is not morally required to perform o— that is, P is not morally required to click on button B. But it is equally clear that the fact that her doing so would provide the stranger with a considerable benefit constitutes a deontic moral reason for her to click on button B.
It isn't deontic. It is consequentialist.
Indeed, were it not for the costs involved, she would be required to click on button B.
If she is a consequentialist of a particular sort.
To see this, consider the following variant on the above case. In this case, P can transfer the money to her escrow company by clicking on either button A or button B, and, in this case, a very rich man has agreed to transfer an equivalent sum of his own money to the stranger if, and only if, she clicks on button B. So, in either case, she’ll get her dream home, but, by clicking on button B, she’ll also secure a considerable benefit for the stranger.
So, this is a 'Newcombe problem'. Believe some shite if that is helpful to you.
Assume that there are no other relevant facts. Assume that in this case she’ll still have the small apartment that she’s been renting to come home to. Surely, in this case, P is morally required to click on button B, for there is no reason why she shouldn’t do so. By clicking on button B, she can purchase her dream home while also providing a considerable benefit for the stranger, and she can do so at no cost to herself, at minimal cost to the rich man (who, given the diminishing marginal utility of money, has more money than he can effectively use to benefit himself), and at absolutely no cost to anyone else. If you think that beneficence is only required when the would-be beneficiary is below a certain threshold of well-being, then assume that both you and the stranger are below that threshold. Given that we think that the reason P has to click on button B gives rise to a moral requirement in the absence of either an undefeated or a morally undefeated reason to do otherwise, we must conclude that it is a deontic moral reason.
We don't have to conclude shit. Alternatively, we can conclude any old shit if such is the will of our invisible anal leprechaun.
All moral reasons must be either deontic or non-deontic,
Nonsense! They may be concerned with changing one's own ethos or doing what is pleasing to the invisible anal leprechaun.
and since this moral reason is the kind of moral reason that can give rise to a moral obligation, it must be the former.
No. The lady may want to change what she is for herself- i.e. to have a different ethos. Thinking she is giving away her hard earned money is her first step to coming out as a Lesbian who wants to live in an agrarian commune rather than work in Corporate Finance.
If, to the contrary, P’s reason to click on button B were a non-deontic moral reason, it could not generate a moral requirement to do so.
She might disagree. She could say 'Mum, you don't understand. I felt I had to click B. It was like... I'd be killing a baby if I didn't. Morally, I could not do otherwise. Also, I don't like cocks. Vaginas are magical. I shall devote my life to kissing them.'
Portmore's paper is based on arbitrary ipse dixit assertions or stipulations. But anybody can come up with such things even without appealing to an invisible anal leprechaun.
... I’ve stipulated from the start that the choice between benefiting oneself and benefiting the stranger is to be a mutually exclusive one.
More importantly, Portmore is assuming no Knightian Uncertainty. All states of the world are distinguishable & known in advance- i.e. Evolution is a lie.
And, as I’ve stipulated, the choice between s or o is between furthering one’s own interests and sacrificing those interests for the sake of doing more to promote the impersonal good. Therefore, by stipulation, o must be a self-sacrificing act, and so the ethical egoist must consider o to be morally impermissible.
Nope. There may be a greater reputational benefit. Alternatively, there may be a future state of the world where not having any money is better than being a bougie property owner.
Portmore's conclusion is
we must accept, contrary to the philosophical orthodoxy, that moral reasons are not the only reasons relevant to the determination of an acts deontic status.
Sadly, this conclusion is based on arbitrary & foolish stipulations. Speaking generally, Societies possess Courts of Law (or, at the very least, Public Opinion) which determine deontic status. This may be 'buck-stopped' in the short run, but mutable in the medium to long term. Of course, any one at all can make any type of deontic claim (e.g. my self-imposed obligation to fart noisily to express solidarity with Hamas). One may as well ascribe the thing to the actions of an invisible anal leprechaun as pretend that logical analysis can add informativity to what is merely arbitrary- though, in certain cases, useful enough to solve coordination or discoordination problems encountered in collective action problems.
One final point. Godel's later work shows (it seems to me) that you have to have an 'absolute proof' or a 'divine axiom' to have an independent logic for a particular discourse. Anal-tickle philosophy failed to monitor developments in mathematical logic over the course of the late Sixties & Seventies with the result that it turned into a cul de sac for credentialized cretins.
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