Coordination failure of the Axis

 Fascism was a response to a perceived Bolshevik threat. Richer nations with long standing liberal institutions were not at risk of a Communist uprising, but many on the Right viewed Labour leaders and progressives as 'useful idiots' or a Trojan horse for International Communism. Thus there was always some sympathy for the Axis countries. After all, in Spain, the Republicans had committed atrocities. Nuns had been raped. There was 'workers' control' of factories in some places. Many were relieved that Franco, thanks to massive Italian & German military help, prevailed. Perhaps he would restore the Monarchy. At any rate, the Church was pleased. 

In France, there some who said 'rather Hitler than Blum' and here was genuine enthusiasm for the venerable Marshal Petain. Perhaps, the Vichy government could come to an arrangement with the Nazis. Perhaps, France would expand its colonial Empire with German support. The more pressing problem was to keep French Colonies from joining hands with De Gaulle & the Free French. The Communists, thanks to Stalin's pact with Hilter, halted armed resistance & focused on anti-British propaganda, while attempting to legally publish L’Humanité, This changed after Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union. But this meant there would be people on the Right who would want to support Vichy as a bulwark against Communism.

One awkward consequence of the Hitler-Stalin pact is that it came at the height of the Khalkin Gol battle. The Japanese felt betrayed. The Soviets & Mongolians defeated the Japanese who then decided to follow a Southern strategy. But this brought them into conflict with the US & triggered Pearl Harbour.  Hitler's decision to declare war on the US- though not obliged to do so by his pact with Tokyo- has been called his biggest strategic error. He may have hoped that Japan would join him in attacking the Soviets but, by then, Japan was committed to pushing into South East Asia to gain vital raw materials. 

Clearly, better coordination between the two- or, at the least, better communication- would have been mutually beneficial. After all, if both Japan & Germany are fighting the atheistic Soviets, many on the Right, even in liberal countries, would have considered them to be not wholly evil. 

Why did the Germans & Japanese not keep each other informed about their military plans? Japan had an excellent military attache (later Ambassador) in Berlin. Hiroshi Ōshima was 'more German than the Germans' & close to Ribbentrop & even Hitler. He was considered the main architect of the Anti-Comintern Pact on 25 November 1936  Pact. The Khalkin Gol battle (11 May – 16 September 1939) was its concrete expression. However, on August 25, 1939, the German government decided to conclude the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact and to suspend negotiations on a Japan-German alliance and defence agreement. This caused great turmoil in the Japanese government, contributing to the collapse of the Hiranuma Cabinet. Ōshima was recalled to Japan to take responsibility in September 1939, and was dismissed as an ambassador on December 27. He returned as Ambassador after Hitler invaded the Soviet Union and the Germans specifically requested he be sent. In other words, his position in Tokyo was much less strong as it had been before the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. 

Ironically, Oshima's great knowledge of German war aims & plans proved of benefit to the Allies because they had broken the Japanese diplomatic cypher. Meanwhile the German Ambassador in Tokyo was relying on Richard Sorge- a Soviet agent. His successor, in 1943, had helped conclude the Tripartite Pact but the thing was an empty letter. After Hitler ate a bullet, the Japanese interned him. 

Was Hitler's partiality for Oshima- who was a true believer in the Nazi ideology- responsible for his decision to declare war on the US? 

Erwin Rommel, arrived in North Africa in February 1941to help out the Italians. The British were heavily reliant on Indian troops. On 12 February 1941, Ōshima discussed the possibility of a joint German-Japanese initiative for war against the British Empire and the United States with Ribbentrop, agreeing with him the time was ripe to strike at the British Empire in Asia.

Though Hitler (unlike the Kaiser) didn't want Britain to lose India, it was obvious that taking half a million (it would rise to 2.5 million) Indian soldiers off the chess-board would be beneficial to Germany. If they could take Egypt & the Suez Canal, they might be able to press on to Iraq & the warm waters of the Gulf. The Palestinian Grand Mufti was on side & there was a pro-Axis regime in Baghdad. If Germany could control Persian oil, the British Navy would be weakened. In this context, Netaji Bose's arrival in Berlin in late March 1941, acquired considerable importance. Bose had been the President of the Indian National Congress. He was quite close to Mussolini & Da Valera (the Irish leader). After the fall of Singapore in February 1942. Britain's days in India appeared number. But without Indian troops they would have difficulty maintaining their power in Egypt, Palestine, Iraq etc. 

 It was in this context that, on 23 February 1941, Ribbentrop urged Oshima to press the Japanese government to attack British colonies in South East Asia.  Moreover, on 28 November 1941, in a conversation with German Foreign Minister, Ōshima was given an assurance that the Third Reich would join the Japanese government in case of war against the United States. However, the Japanese didn't think the Germans would keep their word. They felt they had been betrayed during the Khalkin Gol battle. Thus, in April 1941, they concluded a non-aggression pact with Moscow. When Hitler attacked Stalin in June, the Germans hoped the Japanese would help but they had not updated Ōshima about their plan. In a conversation held on 17 May 1941, Ernst von Weizsäcker, State Secretary in the German Foreign Office, denied that there was any tension with the Soviet government. This meant Oshima lost face in front of his own Government and, by extension, so did Germany. Moreover, they had arrested Sorge in October of 1941. Obviously, they would be more careful of sharing information with Berlin. 

I suppose, the vast distance between Germany & Japan meant that there couldn't be very much in the way of coordination or joint operations. What was tragic was the even worse diplomatic & military cooperation between the European countries which fell prey to Hitler.