Sunday, 16 March 2025

Iris Marion Young & the five faces of Imbecility

Strangely, this blog has never commented on Iris Marion Young. She sought to turn the traditional American notion that justice must focus, not on individual desert- such as even a 'Red Indian' or 'Negro' might possess- but, rather, on Social Groups- e.g. WASP dudes whom God, in his infinite justice, had placed above all others. Indeed, in the Bibble, it is clearly stated that Moses told the Jews to go fuck themselves. God had promised all land to the White Anglo Saxon Protestant who will never be parted from his foreskin, selah! 

In her essay

Five Faces of Oppression

she quoted the nutter Simone Weil- 

Someone who does not see a pane of glass does not know that he does not see it.

No. He sees it but does not realize it is a pane of glass. What the silly bint meant was that a person who does not notice something, does not notice that thing.  

Someone who, being placed differently does see it, does not know the other does not see it.

Sure they do. They see the distracted dude striding towards the pane of glass and warn him to stop. He could hurt himself very badly if he walks through the pane of glass.  

When our will finds expression outside ourselves in actions performed by others we do not waste our time and our power of attention in examining whether they have consented to this.

Only if we are as stupid as shit. Weil lived at a time when dudes like Hitler and Stalin spent a lot of time and attention checking if their lackeys were obedient because of fear or because they were true believers. The former could be trusted because they were already shitting themselves with fear. The latter might have to be purged. Churchill and Roosevelt faced the opposite problem. They paid a lot of time and attention to getting consent and commitment from those who worked their will. 

This is true for all of us.

No. There may be some stupid sociopaths of the type this crazy lady described. For most of us, to get others to do what we want involves constantly monitoring their morale and seeking to reinforce their motivation to do what we consider to be right.  

Our attention, given entirely to the success of the undertaking, is not claimed by them as long as they are docile. . . .

 If we are shitty managers. 

Rape is a terrible caricature of love from which consent is absent.

It has nothing to do with love- even in France.  

After rape, oppression is the second horror of human existence.

but torture is cool. Good to know.  

It is a terrible caricature of obedience. 

Simone Weil was a terrible caricature of an obedient but, alas!, utterly useless idiot.  

I have proposed an enabling conception of justice.

the lynch mob had such a conception.  Iris Young shared it with the Grand Wizard of the KKK

Justice should refer not only to distribution, but also to the institutional conditions necessary for the development and exercise of individual capacities and collective communication and cooperation.

a good example is Jim Crow. It would be terribly unjust for a White man to get paid less than an African American woman just because the woman is far smarter and more productive. 

Under this conception of justice, injustice refers primarily to two forms of disabling constraints, oppression and domination.

Iris and her ilk wanted to oppress and dominate Society's institutions. Sadly, women hate women and pull their hair out and try to scratch out their eyes. Women rose through their own hard work, enterprise, and ability to tell Third Wave Feminists to go stick their heads up their own fannies. 

While these constraints include distributive patterns, they also involve matters

e.g. slut shaming or peeps suggesting you shower more often.

that cannot easily be assimilated to the logic of distribution: decision-making procedures, division of labor, and culture.

e.g. feeling miffed coz some peeps don't have to sit down to pee. How is that fair?  

Many people in the United States would not choose the term oppression to name injustice in our society.

We don't say muggers who shoot us and run off with our wallet are oppressing us unless the only remedy available to us is hiring seven Samurai to come and slice and dice those muggers. 

For contemporary emancipatory social movements, on the other hand—socialists,

crazy ranters only useful for splitting the Dem vote.

radical feminists,

lesbian TERFs 

American Indian activists,

who are cool. It is Indian American activists that we want to seen deported.  

Black activists,

Samuel L Jackson was one such. He's totes cool.  

gay and lesbian activists—oppression is a central category of political discourse.

this is also true of masturbation and coprophagy activists. Why is there still a taboo on Kamala Harris fisting herself  or eating her own shit while presiding over the deliberations of the Senate? Is it coz she iz bleck? No! It is coz she don't got a dick. Fuck you Biden! Fuck you very much!

 My starting point is reflection on the conditions of the groups said by these movements to be oppressed: among others women,

men, who previously were expected to marry girls they got pregnant.  

Blacks,

Whites, who previously were expected to get slaughtered in foreign wars. Let darkies do it. We want to take drugs. Come to think of it, darkies can probably supply them to us faster and cheaper than anybody else.  

Chicanos, Puerto Ricans and other Spanish speaking Americans,

who wanted to rise by their own thrift, industry, enterprise and sound religious and family values.  

American Indians, Jews, lesbians, gay men, Arabs, Asians, old people, working-class people, and the physically and mentally disabled.

and rich white dudes who weren't allowed to own gold because of a stupid law passed by FDR. Also, how come my taxes are so high? That's fucking oppression, mate!  

The fact is the very rich feel terribly oppressed. Look at Trump. As he will soon point out USAID sent ten trillion dollars to South Sudan to help them with their problem of obesity. Now that many of them are fashionably emaciated, there is the suggestion that America should send food! Trump is a generous man and may send them a cheeseburger or two but South Sudan must first hand over ten trillion dollars worth of 'raw earth' and other valuable minerals. America has been oppressed by all sorts of 'poor' countries for far too long! 

I aim to systematize the meaning of the concept of oppression as used by these diverse political movements,

That is easily done. People who claim to be oppressed or exploited or metaphorically ass-raped, want more money and power even if they already have more than their fair share of both. However, it is those who hand over money and power who are truly oppressed. 

and to provide normative argument to clarify the wrongs the term names.

Normative arguments are stupid lies. Anyone can tell them.  

Obviously the above-named groups are not oppressed to the same extent or in the same ways.

They aren't oppressed. The fact that nobody likes me does not mean I am oppressed. It just means that I am not very likable.  

In the most general sense, all oppressed people suffer some inhibition of their ability to develop and exercise their capacities and express their needs, thoughts, and feelings.

Nonsense! A great poet may have this capacity to a greater degree than anyone else. Yet he may be being beaten and ass-raped in a prison cell because he is suspected of wanting the tyrant to stop robbing and killing his people. 

The tyrant may not have the capacity to express himself in any way other than killing and raping and robbing. But he is the oppressor. 

In that abstract sense all oppressed people face a common condition.

In that wholly mendacious and false sense- sure.  

Beyond that, in any more specific sense, it is not possible to define a single set of criteria that describe the condition of oppression of the above groups.

If a group is oppressed then resources are being expended on inflicting harm on it. It is being exploited if the reward for its economic activity is much less than would arise by the free working of the market. If neither of these conditions are met, it is not oppressed; it is not exploited. It may be disadvantaged by reason of bigotry or the operation of an unfair law or social practice.  

Consequently, attempts by theorists and activists to discover a common description or the essential causes of the oppression of all these groups have frequently led to fruitless disputes about whose oppression is more fundamental or more grave.

Only if those 'theorists and activists' are utterly shit. If there is genuine oppression or exploitation, it is easy to identify a law or social practice which gives rise to the thing. Neither 'theorists' nor 'activists' are needed because those adversely affected have a compelling motivation for collective action.  

The contexts in which members of these groups use the term oppression to describe the injustices of their situation suggest that oppression names, in fact, a family of concepts and conditions, which I divide into five categories: 
exploitation. You can't exploit those who have nothing and who produce nothing. It is the rich and the productive who feel exploited. They can take active steps to reduce transfers from themselves to the less productive. 
marginalization.  The exceptionally able, like the exceptionally useless, are 'at the margin'. If the burden on the top increases, they may exit the jurisdiction by emigrating. If the lot of poorest worsens they may exit the jurisdiction by dying. 
powerlessness, The rich and highly productive may feel they have little power relative to their ability and may exit the jurisdiction. But the possibility that they will do so may endow them with more and more power. A 'Capital strike' can be more effective than a strike of unskilled workers. 

Are you oppressed if somebody else gains something you don't have? Yes. If you get a degree in mathematics, which I can't do because I am stupid as shit, they you are oppressing me and exploiting me and ass-raping me and shitting on my tits. 

Speaking generally, if a person is given power to do something which is socially beneficial then no oppression or injustice arises. I may think it unfair that I can't sentence the Judge to death but there's a good reason he has that power and I don't.  

cultural imperialism, Any country can be accused of this. Why do people expect me to speak English in England? Why does nobody take the trouble to decipher my miaow miaow noises? 
and violence. Why is it that in every country under the Sun, there is an Army which shoots invaders and a police force which uses violence to prevent oppressed people like me from knifing passers-by?

In the old days, ass-rape was defined as people beating you and forcibly shoving their dicks, or other objects, up your ass. New social movements of a liberative type, have a more nuanced concept of ass-rape such that if you are ass-raping a person, you are in fact the one being ass-raped by Cultural Imperialism and Christian Morality and the fact that people think that ass-raping your pillow isn't just as macho a thing to do as ass-raping Putin. Clearly we need a new Structural Concept of ass-raping which draws on the works of Merleau-Ponty, Simone Boudoir, and that pillow of mine which I have ass-raped the fuck out of. 

Oppression as a Structural Concept One reason that many people would not use the term oppression to describe injustice in our society is

because they know English. In Law, an  oppressive clause in a contract is one that is deemed unfairly restrictive, one-sided, or unconscionable, potentially leading to a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations. It may not be enforceable for this reason. Oppression is a Legal concept. The Law can deem a particular social group as having lower immunities and entitlements. But if it does so, the Law is oppressive. Those oppressed by it may exit the jurisdiction or find ways to disintermediate the Law Courts.  

In any given society, there are actual structures- e.g. Law Courts and Police Stations. There may also be fairy tales told by stupid pedagogues. But those fairy tales have no 'Structural component' because they do not correspond to any actual 'Structure'. They correspond to madness.  

that they do not understand the term in the same way as do new social movements. In its traditional usage, oppression means the exercise of tyranny by a ruling group.

Not necessarily. Courts might find a clause in a contract to be onerous, unconscionable or oppressive.  

Thus many Americans would agree with radicals in applying the term oppression to the situation of Black South Africans under apartheid.

What about White South Africans under majority rule? Elon Musk seems very exercised about this. The US has just declared the South African Ambassador persona non grata.  

Oppression also traditionally carries a strong connotation of conquest and colonial domination.

It may carry the reverse connotation. The 'White Man's burden' was to remove the oppression previously exercised by local tyrants and witch-doctors. Those bastards even put an end to the slave trade. The argument for self-determination did not depend on establishing that colonial rule was oppressive. It was based on the notion that people should learn the arts of responsible self-government.  

The Hebrews were oppressed in Egypt,

they were slaves 

and many uses of the term oppression in the West invoke this paradigm. Dominant political discourse may use the term oppression to describe societies other than our own, usually Communist or purportedly Communist societies.

Whereas the term should be used to describe rapists and murderers provided they are raping decent, hardworking, Christian folk. Clearly, if you have a job and are raising a God-fearing family you are oppressing the fuck out of Satanists who should be permitted to sodomize and kill your little children. 

Within this anti-Communist rhetoric both tyrannical and colonialist implications of the term appear. For the anti-Communist, Communism denotes precisely the exercise of brutal tyranny over a whole people by a few rulers and the will to conquer the world, bringing hitherto independent peoples under that tyranny. In dominant political discourse it is not legitimate to use the term oppression to describe our society, because oppression is the evil perpetrated by the Others.

Nonsense! Anybody at all can go to court to challenge a law or a clause in a contract they feel is oppressive. Suppose a firm insists that all female workers have a hysterectomy as a condition of employment. This is oppressive. The Courts will force the firm to change its policies and to compensate women who were affected by this oppressive condition of employment.  

New left social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, however, shifted the meaning of the concept of oppression.

They told stupid lies similar to the equal and opposite lies told by the KKK. These 'theorists' were no better, or worse, than the Grand Wizards. However, their activities led a greater back-lash as voters turned against these crazy liars.  

In its new usage oppression designates the disadvantage and injustice some people suffer not because a tyrannical power coerces them, but because of the everyday practices of a well-intentioned liberal society.

A well-intentioned clause in a contract may still be oppressive.  

In this new left usage, the tyranny of a ruling group over another as in South Africa, must certainly be called oppressive.

In which case, majority rule in Africa is oppressive. 

But oppression also refers to systemic constraints on groups that are not necessarily the result of the intentions of a tyrant. Oppression in this sense is structural,

e.g rich people having to pay more in tax.  

rather than the result of a few people’s choices or policies. Its causes are embedded in unquestioned norms, habits, and symbols, in the assumptions underlying institutional rules and the collective consequences of following those rules. It names, as Marilyn Frye puts it, “an enclosing structure of forces and barriers which tends to the immobilization and reduction of a group or category of people” (Frye, 1983a, p. 11).

The IRS is oppressing the fuck out of the rich. How come hobos aren't subject to tax audits? When was the last time you heard of a beggar ending up in jail for tax evasion?  

In this extended structural sense oppression refers to

anything at all. I am oppressed because I told the Sun to shine. It refused. Fuck you Sun! Fuck you very much! I bet, if I was a blonde eighteen year old with big tits you would have happily shone on me even at midnight!  

the vast and deep injustices some groups suffer as a consequence of often unconscious assumptions and reactions of well-meaning people in ordinary interactions, media and cultural stereotypes, and structural features of bureaucratic hierarchies and market mechanisms— in short the normal processes of everyday life.

Very true. My University oppressed the fuck out of me by refusing to give me a PhD in Mathematics even though I submitted a thesis which consisted entirely of doodles of cats fighting crime in costumes of my own devising.  

We cannot eliminate this structural oppression by getting rid of the rulers or making some new laws, because oppressions are systematically reproduced in major economic, political, and cultural institutions.

A good example is Society's refusal to pay unemployment benefit to dead people. It is totes oppressive that death has not been abolished.  

The systemic character of oppression implies that an oppressed group need not have a correlate oppressing group.

Paranoia can easily supply that deficiency. Did you know that the Nicaraguan horcrux of my neighbour's cat is emitting 'mind rays' which prevent Governments from abolishing death? That's truly fucked up, dude!  

While structural oppression involves relations among groups, these relations do not always fit the paradigm of conscious and intentional oppression of one group by another. Foucault (1977) suggests that to understand the meaning and operation of power in modern society we must look beyond the model of power as “sovereignty,” a dyadic relation of ruler and subject, and instead analyze the exercise of power as the effect of often liberal and “humane” practices of education, bureaucratic administration, production, and distribution of consumer goods, medicine, and so on.

Foucault could not understand why those with power were not using it to inflict torture on all and sundry. What's the point of being President of France if you aren't shoving pineapples up the rectums of Notaries while the Pope, dressed in a gimp suit, stands by laughing maniacally?  What he didn't understand was that this was because of 'mind rays' emitted by my neighbour's cat's Nicaraguan horcrux.  

The conscious actions of many individuals daily contribute to maintaining and reproducing oppression, but those people are usually simply doing their jobs or living their lives, and do not understand themselves as agents of oppression.

Because of evil mind rays emitting from a feline horcrux in Nicaragua. Wake up sheeple! Ensure that the leaders you put in office spend all their time shoving pineapples up rectums. If you don't like the Pope, get in an Ayatollah to wear the gimp suit and laugh maniacally. 

I do not mean to suggest that within a system of oppression individual persons do not intentionally harm others in oppressed groups. The raped woman, the beaten Black youth,

who raped the woman while she was sleeping. Sadly, she woke up and beat the fuck out of him.  

the locked-out worker, 

not to mention the rapist locked out of other people's houses.  

the gay man harassed on the street are victims of intentional actions by identifiable agents.

Plenty of decent people get harassed by 'Social Justice warriors' on Campus. It seems Trump is deporting some foreign students who do this at places like Columbia University.  

I also do not mean to deny that specific groups are beneficiaries of the oppression of other groups,

the clique of 'Woke' nutters benefit by creating a climate of fear on Campus- till there is a back-lash.  

and thus have an interest in their continued oppression. Indeed, for every oppressed group there is a group that is privileged in relation to that group. The concept of oppression has been current among radicals since the 1960s, partly

because they took a lot of drugs and became completely paranoid.  

in reaction to Marxist attempts to reduce the injustices of racism and sexism,

by sending everybody who looked 'intellectual' to a fucking Gulag 

for example, to the effects of class domination or bourgeois ideology.

Stuff like not raping your daughter every time you get drunk. That totes bougie.  

Racism, sexism, ageism, homophobia,

Wokeism 

some social movements asserted, are distinct forms of oppression with their own dynamics apart from the dynamics of class, even though they may interact with class oppression.

DOGE will fuck up the dynamics of that class of woke academo-bureaucrats who use DEI to bully corporations.  

From often heated discussions among socialists, feminists, and antiracism activists in the last ten years, a consensus is emerging that many different groups must be said to be oppressed in our society, and that no single form of oppression can be assigned causal or moral primacy (see Gottlieb, 1987).

This is the rainbow coalition which includes both Hamas and the Homosexuals  

The Law has a notion of a 'class' which can bring a 'class action suit'. Here anybody and everybody adversely affected by an oppressive or unconscionable practice is a member of the class and may receive damages if the action is successful. This is useful because the class is well defined. 'Social Group' is not well defined. If it is used as a proxy for a class, there will be injustice- e.g. the benefits of affirmative action, for a Group which is disadvantaged, may be monopolized by people who are highly privileged and who suffer no handicap relative to the rest of the population. 

The Concept of a Social Group Oppression refers to structural phenomena that immobilize or diminish a group.

It may do. But one member of a group may oppress another member of that group.  

But what is a group? Our ordinary discourse differentiates people according to social groups such as women and men,

this gender. Women do not form a Social Group. Many live with a Man and their children may all be male.  

age groups,

this is a class, not a group. However, we may say the residents of an old age home or the pupils in a kindergarten form a Social Group.  

racial and ethnic groups,

if they self-segregate- sure.  

religious groups,

if they turn up for congregational worship, they are a group at least one day of the week.  

and so on. Social groups of this sort are not simply collections of people, for they are more fundamentally intertwined with the identities of the people described as belonging to them.

No. A class is constituted by possession of a particular trait. But no 'fundamental intertwining' is involved. Traits may change over time or else they may cease to have salience.  

They are a specific kind of collectivity, with specific consequences for how people understand one another and themselves. Yet neither social theory nor philosophy has a clear and developed concept of the social group (see Turner et al., 1987).

So what? Both are shit.  

A social group is a collective of persons differentiated from at least one other group by cultural forms, practices, or way of life.

No. Members of one social group may also be members of another. Moreover, there may be no trait which picks out all and only members of the group. A class is a different matter. This is why the Law and Public policy are concerned with Classes not Groups. Politically, however, the latter notion may have salience precisely because group membership is associated with something like 'kin-selective' altruism or Dawkins' 'extended phenotype' principle.  

Members of a group have a specific affinity with one another because of their similar experience or way of life, which prompts them to associate with one another more than with those not identified with the group, or in a different way.

They may do. They may not. But so long as there is something like group selective altruism, groups have salience. Consider the person who by birth is Irish Catholic but who keeps away from Irish people and who dislikes Catholicism. Such a person may still feel a sort of tribal loyalty to both groups and politicians have to take that into consideration.  

Groups are an expression of social relations; a group exists only in relation to at least one other group.

There is no such requirement. You can be a Humanist or a Mystical Theist while also retaining fondness for plants, animals, rocks and distant stars.  

Group identification arises,

through social or moral entrepreneurialism. A particular person or set of people may seek 'interessement' and 'obligatory passage point status' and, towards that end, may 'enrol' people thus creating a group.  

that is, in the encounter and interaction between social collectivities that experience some differences in their way of life and forms of association, even if they also regard themselves as belonging to the same society.

Nonsense! Political parties and other Social groups- e.g. the Masons- recruit from the same families. Of a pair of identical twins, one may be enrolled in one party or social group, while the other has been enrolled by a different party or group. Some years back, I went into a pub in a small town in Haryana. I was astonished to see that half of the hefty yokels there were cheering for Manchester United, while the other half were equally fanatical in their devotion to Chelsea.  

As long as they associated solely among themselves, for example, an American Indian group thought of themselves only as “the people.”

No. They retained an awareness that they had split off from other tribes with whom, nevertheless, they shared common ancestors.  

The encounter with other American Indians created an awareness of difference: the others were named as a group and the first group came to see themselves as a group.

Quite false. The American Indians, like the Indian Indians and the ancient Greeks and so forth, had legends of origin which emphasized how and why they split off from other groups. But, we see that in the Bible. The Jews were descended from Sarah, the Arabs from Hagar. But Abraham was their common ancestor.  

But social groups do not arise only from an encounter between different societies.

They arise by a form of social entrepreneurialism. America's founding fathers had relatives who were loyalists or who still resided in England. They had economic and political grievances and mobilized their fellow Americans to fight for Independence. After that was achieved, loyalists were expelled.  

Social processes also differentiate groups within a single society. The sexual division of labor,

occurred hundreds of millions of years ago 

for example, has created social groups of women and men in all known societies.

No. Men and women have created all known societies. But before there were men or women there were male and female apes who had baby apes. 

Members of each gender have a certain affinity with

those of the opposite gender- though a minority may be asexual or homosexual.  

others in their group because of what they do or experience, and differentiate themselves from the other gender, even when members of each gender consider that they have much in common with members of the other, and consider that they belong to the same society.

Women philosophers felt that they must differentiate themselves from male philosophers by telling stupid lies. Sadly, male philosophers were already doing so. Only stupid liars go in for useless subjects.  

Political philosophy typically has no place for a specific concept of the social group.

It has always done so. What it didn't say was that Society created gender.  

When philosophers and political theorists discuss groups they tend to conceive them either on the model of aggregates or on the model of associations, both of which are methodologically individualist concepts.

Science is very naughty and bougie because it is methodologically individualist. So is Econ and the Law and Medicine and even Theology. Female philosophers must tell all such subjects to fuck the fuck off. 

To arrive at a specific concept of the social group it is thus useful to contrast social groups with both aggregates and associations. An aggregate is any classification of persons according to some attribute.

No. A classification creates a class on the basis of which data can be aggregated.  

Persons can be aggregated according to any to number of attributes—eye color, the make of car they drive, the street they live on.

No. They can be classified in this manner. Aggregation requires the deployment of resources to gather data.  

Some people interpret the groups that have emotional and social salience in our society as aggregates, as arbitrary classifications of persons according to such attributes as skin color, genitals, or age.

Nonsense! We may feel loyalty to our kin even if nobody has bothered to trace out our family tree.  

George Sher, for example, treats social groups as aggregates, and uses the arbitrariness of aggregate classification as a reason not to give special attention to groups. “There are really as many groups as there are combinations of people and if we are going to ascribe claims to equal treatment to racial, sexual, and other groups with high visibility, it will be mere favoritism not to ascribe similar claims to these other groups as well” (Sher, 1987a, p. 256).

Classification is arbitrary. The Wanatabe 'ugly duckling theorem' shows that classification is not really possible without some sort of bias (i.e. arbitrariness). 'Essentialism' thought there may be non-arbitrary classes. But 'Essentialism' shat the bed. Spivak proposed 'strategic essentialism' as a way to keep lying in a bed which has already been thoroughly shat in. 

But “highly visible” social groups such as Blacks or women are different from aggregates, or mere “combinations of people” (see French, 1975; Friedman and May, 1985; May, 1987, chap. 1).

Where there is a difficult to disguise trait, there is a danger of price, wage or service provision discrimination. The Law has developed tools to deal with this. Political philosophy has merely shat the bed more and more profusely. 'Methodological individualism' is a good thing. It means legal remedies become available. Talking paranoid bollocks is a bad thing. If you do it, the other side will retaliate in like terms.  

A social group is defined not primarily by a set of shared attributes, but by a sense of identity. What defines Black Americans as a social group is not primarily their skin color; some persons whose skin color is fairly light, for example, identify themselves as Black.

As do some Professors who are completely white. Then, they are found out and have to resign.  

Though sometimes objective attributes are a necessary condition for classifying oneself or others as belonging to a certain social group, it is identification with a certain social status, the common history that social status produces, and self-identification that define the group as a group.

No. It is social or moral or political entrepreneurialism. Members of the 'Aryan Nation' aren't exactly expert philologists with a sound knowledge of Proto Indo-European.  

Social groups are not entities that exist apart from individuals

they may do. A Church or a University may have legal personality as a corporation.  

but neither are they merely arbitrary classifications of individuals according to attributes that are external to or accidental to their identities.

They may start out that way. Social entrepreneurialism, or even the workings of the market (as Thomas Schelling showed for 'self-segregation'), may bring it about.  

Admitting the reality of social groups does not commit one to reifying collectivities,

unless you are a Judge or a legislator. Suppose I get sacked for wearing a teapot on my head. If I can persuade a Judge that this is a requirement of my religion then my employer may be forced to take me back or else pay heavy damages. Here, the religion I claim to belong to has been 'reified'. It is treated as an object with in rem entitlements and immunities. 

as some might argue. Group meanings partially constitute people’s identities in terms of cultural forms, social situation, and history that group members know as theirs because these meanings have been either forced on them or forged by them or both (cf. Fiss, 1976). Groups are real not as substances, but as forms of social relations (cf. May, 1987, pp. 22–23).

We don't know if there are any substances. Everything may be purely relational.  

Moral theorists and political philosophers

do stupid shit 

tend to elide social groups more often with associations than with aggregates (e.g., French, 1975; May, 1987, chap. 1). By an association I mean a formally organized institution, such as a club, corporation, political party, church, college, or union.

If they have legal personality, it does not matter if they have no human members. They exist in law even if they don't exist in Society.  

Unlike the aggregate model of groups, the association model recognizes that groups are defined by specific practices and forms of association.

So, the association model recognizes associations. What's next? A disassociation model which recognizes dissociation? How about a model which recognizes models? Political Philosophy can keep making more and more such wonderful discoveries.  

Nevertheless it shares a problem with the aggregate model.

It is stupid and useless. The Law is useful.  

The aggregate model conceives the individual as prior to the collective

which came first? The chicken or the egg? The answer is cocks come first. That's why my wife left me.  

because it reduces the social group to a mere set of attributes attached to individuals.

No. It says the members of a class have a particular trait. It may be wrong.  

The association model also implicitly conceives the individual as ontologically prior to the collective,

Anyone can say everybody else conceives of their own shit as ontologically prior to food. You can then go on, as I did, while at the LSE, to using Kakutani's fixed point theorem to prove that Amartya Sen eats only dog turds.  

as making up, or constituting groups. A contract model of social relations is appropriate for conceiving associations,

Nope. At best, the thing is an 'incomplete contract', but anything and everything could be called an incomplete contract.  

but not groups. Individuals constitute associations; they come to together as already formed persons and set them up, establishing rules, positions, and offices.

They may do. They may not. The Institution may pre-exist but may be taken over and repurposed.  

The relationship of persons to associations is usually voluntary,

unless there is a 'closed shop' or the Professional Association has a monopoly established by law on granting and revoking work-credentials.  

and even when it is not, the person has nevertheless usually entered the association.

Or has been born into it- e.g. 'the Firm' as the late Duke of Edinburgh called the British Royal Family.  

The person is prior to the association also in that the person’s identity and sense of self are usually regarded as prior to and relatively independent of association membership. Groups, on the other hand, constitute individuals.

Nope. Mummy and Daddy did so. But they are not a 'group'. Indeed, Mummy may not know Daddy's name because she was drunk off her head when she jumped his bones.  

A person’s particular sense of history, affinity, and separateness, even the person’s mode of reasoning, evaluating, and expressing feeling, are constituted partly by her or his group affinities.

Philosophers, as a group, are stupid and useless. Don't associate with them even if you have an affinity for being stupid and useless.  

This neither means that persons have no individual styles, nor are unable to transcend or reject a group identity. Nor does it preclude persons from having many aspects that are independent of these group identities.

In other words, this shite doesn't mean anything at all.  

The social ontology underlying many contemporary theories of justice is methodologically individualist or atomist.

There is no 'social ontology' in such theories. If there were, then there would be an account of the aetiology of beings of various types. The Bible has this. John Rawls does not.  

It presumes that the individual is ontologically prior to the social.

No. This is a methodological, not an ontological, assumption. Where does it come from? The theory of contracts.  

This individualistic social ontology usually goes together with a normative conception of the self as independent.

No. It is an empirical conception. Either there is coercion or people act of their own volition.  

The authentic self is autonomous, unified, free, and self-made,

There is no assumption of 'authenticity' in Social Contract theory. Indeed, 'representative agents' are 'cloned' in such models. 

standing apart from history and affiliations, choosing its life plan entirely for itself.

There is no such assumption. The Social Contract is a contract of adhesion.  

One of the main contributions of poststructuralist philosophy has been to

shit the bed already shat in by structuralist philosophy 

expose as illusory this metaphysics of a unified self-making subjectivity,

there is no such metaphysics. Social Contract theory is empirical and falsifiable. Harsanyi pointed out that Rawls had made an error in his mathematics. However, the bigger problem was that the silly man had neglected Knightian Uncertainty as had Arrow-Debreu. Getting insurance is 'regret minimizing'. Agreeing to cut the cake so the least well off are prioritized will destroy the economy. 

which posits the subject as an autonomous origin or an underlying substance to which attributes of gender, nationality, family role, intellectual disposition, and so on might attach.

No. The 'subject' has mutable, or defeasible, traits of an empirically verifiable kind. But these can change. A son may be disinherited. He may change his nationality or even his gender. He may move from the far Left to the far Right as he grows older. He may become rich and then lose all his money. Finally, he goes from being alive to being dead.  

Conceiving the subject in this fashion implies conceiving consciousness as outside of and prior to language and the context of social interaction, which the subject enters.

No it doesn't. A computer program could do the job. Any way, the Young Hegelian, or Chomskian, notion that man is super-duper special because dudes can talk has been well and truly exploded.  

Several currents of recent philosophy challenge this deeply held Cartesian assumption.

So do several currents of schizophrenia.  

Lacanian psychoanalysis,

was stupid and fraudulent 

for example, stood by the social and philosophical theory influenced by Cartesian assumptions, which conceived the self as an achievement of linguistic positioning that is always contextualized in concrete relations with other persons, with mixed identities (Coward and Ellis, 1977).

Language speaks us. But what La-con spoke was shit. This wasn't the fault of the French language. Foucault's psychiatrist was good at his job. Apparently he was a pioneer in the use of lithium salts. The Maoists drove him out of the profession.  

The self is a product of social processes, not their origin.

Some 'selves' initiate 'social processes' and change history. But they don't study or teach useless shit.  

From a rather different perspective,

that of a stupid Kraut 

Habermas indicates that a theory of communicative action

which is what guys who make billions out of speech-recognition and generative AI have 

also must challenge the “philosophy of consciousness,” which locates intentional egos as the ontological origins of social relations.

Why challenge shit by shitting? Do something useful and you will get rich and pay lots in taxes.  

A theory of communicative action conceives individual identity not as an origin but as a product of linguistic and practical interaction (Habermas, 1987, pp. 3–10).

But linguistic interaction probably only started a few hundred thousand years ago. It can't be the origin of anything because it is itself the product of a much longer evolutionary process. Apparently, some mice have now been given the language gene. This has changed the way they squeak.  

As Stephen Epstein describes it, identity is “a socialized sense of individuality,

Nonsense! A guy in a coma still has the same identity.  

an internal organization of self-perception concerning one’s relationship to social categories that also incorporates views of the self perceived to be held by others. Identity is constituted relationally, through involvement with—and incorporation of—significant others and integration into communities” (Epstein, 1987, p. 29).

Nope. Identity remains the same even though interactions change. I suppose what this cretin means is 'self-image' is affected by how others see you. Fortunately, I continue to see myself as a younger version of Beyonce even though everybody treats me like a fat, bald, smelly, old man.  

Group categorization and norms are major constituents of individual identity (see Turner et al., 1987). A person joins an association, and even if membership in it fundamentally affects one’s life, one does not take that membership to define one’s very identity, in the way, for example, being Navaho might.

If you are Navaho you will feel a compulsion to hunt buffalo with your tomahawk.  

Group affinity, on the other hand, has the character of what Martin Heidegger (1962) calls “thrownness”: one finds oneself as a member of a group, which one experiences as always already having been.

Nonsense! We may feel 'thrownness' with respect to having to live on a really shitty planet instead of being a flying unicorn grazing upon the rings of Uranus. Group affinity however is volitional and feels 'elective'. That's why it makes us feel special and appreciated for our own sake. True, we may join a very ancient group- e.g. the Catholic church- but, for us, everything about it seems novel and 'made new'.  

For our identities are defined in relation to how others identify us,

If only other people didn't identity philosophers as useless shitheads, they wouldn't be useless shitheads. They would invent time-travel.  

and they do so in terms of groups that are always already associated with specific attributes, stereotypes, and norms. From the thrownness of group affinity it does not follow that one cannot leave groups and enter new ones.

In which case there is no fucking 'thrownness'. By contrast, it is difficult to turn into a flying unicorn and say goodbye to this planet.  

Many women become lesbians after first identifying as heterosexual.

So do many men. Sadly, the local dykes give me a wide berth. Sad.  

Anyone who lives long enough becomes old.

and dies.  Geworfenheit isn't so bad compared to the alternative which is pushing up daisies. I like to think I was a ball thrown for a nice puppy dog to pick up and bring back to God. 

These cases exemplify thrownness precisely because such changes in group affinity are experienced as transformations in one’s identity.

You identity doesn't change. Your ethos may do so.  

Nor does it follow from the thrownness of group affinity that one cannot define the meaning of group identity for oneself; those who identify with a group can redefine the meaning and norms of groups’ identity. Indeed, oppressed groups have sought to confront their oppression by engaging in just such redefinition.

So have oppressing groups who, however, complain bitterly of being oppressed and exploited. The problem with taking over the paranoid arguments of the KKK to push a woke agenda is that Trumpistas can steal your clothes and use the same paranoid arguments to pursue a purge of Professors and students of useless subjects. 

Groups, I have said, exist only in relation to other groups.

No. They come into existence if there is a collective action problem even if no other groups exist. 

A group may be identified by outsiders without those so identified having any specific consciousness of themselves as at group.

Paranoid people can identify all sorts of non-existent groups just as well as Professors of useless shit.  

Sometimes a group comes to exist only because one group excludes and labels a category of persons, and those labeled come to understand themselves as group members only slowly, on the basis of their shared oppression. In Vichy France, for example, Jews who had been so assimilated that they had no specifically Jewish identity were marked as Jews by others and given a specific social status by them.

There was a long history of French anti-Semitism. Still, some Jews claimed to have felt great surprise when the Vichy government showed great vim and vigour in implementing Hitler's policy. 

These people “discovered” themselves as Jews and then formed a group identity and affinity with one another (see Sartre, 1948).

No. They already had this. Edmond de Rothschild was a great Zionist. The anti-Dreufus agitation had been a wake-up call. 

Turning to 'exploitation', Iris writes-

Thus, the mystery of capitalism arises: When everyone is formally free, how can there be class domination?

Domination may be informal or even illegal.  

Why do class distinctions persist between the wealthy, who own the means of production, and the mass of people, who work for them?

This is a distinction of wealth, not of class.  

The theory of exploitation answers this question.

No. The theory of capital accumulation answers it. Exploitation has been defined by Morishima's fundamental theorem of Marxist Economics. If even one firm makes a profit, there is exploitation. The Feminist version is, if even one dick enters a vagina, all women are exploited coz dicks really really like vaginas. Vaginas. on the other hand, hate dicks. They are icky and leave you sticky. Ban dicks immediately. 

Profit, the basis of capitalist power and wealth, is a mystery if we assume that in the market goods exchange at their values.

Only if we deny that the role played by the entrepreneur and the arbitrager has any economic value.  

The labor theory of value dispels this mystery.

It is nonsense.  

Every commodity’s value is a function of the labor time necessary for its production.

Entrepreneurs and arbitragers spend a lot of time taking risks and making markets.  

Labor power is the one commodity that in the process of being consumed produces new value.

So does Land and Capital and Entrepreneurship and the Government.  

Profit comes from the difference between the value of the labor performed and the value of the capacity to labor which the capitalist purchases.

Because the capitalist doesn't have to pay rent, interest,  or taxes. He gets raw materials and electricity for free. 

Profit is possible only because the owner of capital appropriates any realized surplus value.

Why don't the workers start up a producer's cooperative? That way they can keep the 'surplus value' for themselves. Don't forget, there is no rent, or interest or taxes and all raw materials are free.  

In recent years, Marxist scholars have engaged in considerable controversy about the viability of the labor theory of value this account of exploitation relies on (see Wolff, 1984, chap. 4). John Roemer (1982), for example, developed a theory of exploitation that claims to preserve the theoretical and practical purposes of Marx’s theory, but without assuming a distinction between values and prices and without being restricted to a concept of abstract, homogeneous labor. My purpose here is not to engage in technical economic disputes, but to indicate the place of a concept of exploitation in a conception of oppression.
Roemer says that if you take home less than the value of what you produce, you are exploited. The silly man didn't get that every net contributor to the Treasury is in this boat. The rich are being exploited by 'Welfare Queens'! End this oppression now! Abolish the IRS! 

Roemer's Class Exploitation Correspondence Principle (CECP), states that individuals who optimize by hiring labor are necessarily exploiters, and those who optimize by selling labor are exploited. Thus if your frail and elderly grandmother pays a cleaning-service out of her exiguous pension, she is an exploiter. Fuck you Granny! Fuck you very much! Old people are oppressing and exploiting the young! Kill all of them! As for Elon Musk- who is selling his labour for the low low price of 56 billion dollars to Tesla- he truly is one of the most oppressed and exploited creatures on the planet. 

There is one person whom we have all oppressed and exploited. Her name is Mummy. 

Christine Delphy (1984) describes marriage as a class relation in which women’s labor benefits men without comparable remuneration.

 Women should not marry. Indeed, many don't. But the real problem is babies. They will exploit you mercilessly. Get your tubes tied. Do it now. 

She makes it clear that the exploitation consists not in the sort of work that women do in the home, for this might include various kinds of tasks, but in the fact that they perform tasks for someone on whom they are dependent.

Those are the lucky ones. Many women have to support a lazy good-for-nothing husband because at least he can play with the kids. Men have very low IQs and thus enjoy the intellectual companionship only a baby can provide.  

Interestingly, high female participation in the economy correlates with much lower fertility and even marriage. Affluent countries are now being forced to give mothers a better deal. The alternative is to import workers from developing countries. But this raises the bogeyman of 'demographic replacement'. 

More than two centuries ago, Condorcet described a liberal utopia. Malthus pointed out that such a paradise would be vulnerable to invasion or immigration and thus population growth would erode such affluence as had been attained. A country may decide that everybody is oppressed and thus should get more from the State than they put in. It may be able to run a deficit because of 'capital flight' from more unstable parts of the world. But more and more of the unpleasant jobs will be done by immigrants. In order to take advantage of more abundant social capital and natural resources, they are likely to have high fertility. But as they grown in numbers, their political power may increase. They may consider the bien pensant intellectual as a hypocrite with her head in the clouds. They may prefer Old Testament morality and fiscal conservatism. I suppose, this is the reality of Trump's America which, sadly, Iris did not live to see. I may deplore the fact that the Donald wields power which I wanted Kamala to wield. But there was a free and fair contest between them and the better candidate, in the opinion of the majority, won the prize. 

Powerlessness As I have indicated, the Marxist idea of class is important because it helps reveal the structure of exploitation: that some people have their power and wealth because they profit from the labors of others.

Pensioners are exploiting working people. Kill the elderly! 

For this reason I reject the claim some make that a traditional class exploitation model fails to capture the structure of contemporary society.

Most pensioners wear silk top-hats and monocles. Their names tend to be Rockefeller or Rothschild.  

It remains the case that the labor of most people in the society augments the power of relatively few.

Power isn't wealth. Biden's net worth is about 10 million. Still, it is a fact that he was very old and thus must have been draining power, vampire fashion, from those of working age.   

Despite their differences from nonprofessional workers, most professional workers are still not members of the capitalist class.

Everyone with a private pension is a capitalist. In America that covers 136 million people. Professionals are likely to have a private pension. Incidentally, many public sector pension funds are heavily invested in the Stock Market. The retired cop or teacher is a Capitalist because she is the beneficial owner of stocks and shares.  

Professional labor either involves exploitative transfers to capitalists or supplies important conditions for such transfers.

Which is why people with pensions don't starve once they become too old to work.  

Professional workers are in an ambiguous class position, it is true, because they also benefit from the exploitation of nonprofessional workers.

People claiming unemployment benefit are exploiting their working brethren. Institutional investors (pension funds, insurance companies, etc.) own about 80 percent of all US equities. Charitable foundations own about 10 percent. There may be as much as 4 percent of the population with sufficient inherited wealth not to have to work. But most do because three million in the bank will only get you a basic middle class lifestyle- till you fall victim to a Madoff or a gold-digger.  

 Professionals are privileged in relation to nonprofessionals, by virtue of

specialist skill and credentials enabling them to do higher value adding work.  

their position in the division of labor and the status it carries. Nonprofessionals suffer a form of oppression in addition to exploitation, which I call powerlessness.

In which case, the Trustafarian with a PhD in useless shite is exploited by reason of powerlessness.  

In the United States, as in other advanced capitalist countries, most workplaces are not organized democratically,

this is also the case in backward shitholes.  

direct participation in public policy decisions is rare, and policy implementation is, for the most part, hierarchical, imposing rules on bureaucrats and citizens.

If you are only allowed to do what the rules say, then you don't have any power of your own. You are merely doing a job.  

Thus, most people in these societies do not regularly participate in making decisions that affect the conditions of their lives and actions, and in this sense, most people lack significant power.

This would still be the case if they participated in making decisions with the result that the enterprise goes bankrupt.  

At the same time, domination in modern society is enacted through the widely dispersed powers of many agents mediating the decisions of others.

In which case, there is no domination. One may as well say that Capitalism is sodomizing everybody with an invisible cock. That is why Hamas is so angry. 

The powerless have little or no work autonomy,

just like the powerful. Suppose President Trump decides to run around the White House naked and with a radish up his bum. He would lose office under the Twenty-Fifth amendment. The more power you have, the less 'autonomy' you have.  

exercise little creativity or judgment in their work, have no technical expertise or authority, express themselves awkwardly, especially in public or bureaucratic settings, and do not command respect.

This is certainly true of Professors of Philosophy.  Woke pedagogues may want power but their stupidity creates a backlash. Still, since they do a shitty job, they may be left to get on with it. It may be a good thing, for young people to be inoculated against Wokeism in adolescence. 

Friday, 14 March 2025

Tarski's error & Arrow's imbecility

 Ken Arrow was Tarski's student. He proofread Tarski's 'introduction to Logic' which states

a general and very important principle, which must be retained if a language is to be usefully employed. According to this principle, whenever we wish to state a sentence about a certain object, we have to use in this sentence not the object itself, but its name or designation.

This is nonsense. We can use the object or its name or point to it or leave it to the other party to work out what is being referred to. 

However, for a logical operation, what is important is that the name, or intension, has a fixed, well defined, 'extension'- i.e. the set of things which have all the properties corresponding to the named object is easily specifiable and is not subject to change as more becomes known. 

The application of this principle does not give rise to any problems as long as the object in question is not a word or a symbol or, more generally, an expression of a language.

That does not matter. It is fine to say that £ is the same thing as 'pound sterling'  

Let us imagine, for example, that we have a small blue stone in front of us, and that we write the following sentence: 'this stone is blue'.  

You need to put the scrap of paper with that inscription together with the stone. That way, at a later point, it would be know which stone we thought was blue or how our notion of blue was different from other people's. 

To no one, presumably, would it occur to replace in this sentence the words "this stone" (which together constitute the designation of the object) by the object itself, that is to say, to blot or cut these words out and to place in their stead the stone.

Tarski was clearly wrong.  

For, in doing so, we would arrive at a whole consisting partly of a stone and partly of words, and therefore at something which would not be a linguistic expression, and all the more, would not be a true sentence.

Fuck off! Museums are full of things with descriptions of them attached- e.g. 'This is a Sumerian seal' 

This principle, however, is frequently violated if the object which is talked about happens to be a word or a symbol.

There is no principle here. There is only an arbitrary and wholly foolish assertion. 

And yet the application of the principle is indispensable also in this case; for otherwise we would arrive at a whole which, though being a linguistic expression, would fail to convey the thought intended by us, and might even be a meaningless aggregate of words.

The sentence 'this is blue' is meaningless if we don't have the stone it was referring to.  

Let us consider, for example, the following two words: good, Mary.

Both are highly meaningful, in context.  

Clearly, the first consists of four letters,

That is not clear at all. This stupid cunt forgets that shorthand can be used to transcribe an English sentence. But so can Arabic or Russian script.

and the second is a proper name.

It may be. It may not. In Australia, at that time,  'mary' was a derogatory word signifying an aboriginal woman. 

But let us suppose that we would express these thoughts, which are quite correct, in the following manner: (1) good consists of four letters;

this is quite wrong. Tarski wasn't a native English speaker. I suppose, as a refugee, he needed to earn money by teaching or writing any old shite he could get away with. But Arrow was a native English speaker. He could have got a job as an Accountant or an Actuary. Why did he waste his time and destroy his intelligence on this stripe of shite?  

(2) Mary is a proper name;

sometimes, yes. Sometimes, no.  

then, in talking about words, we would be using the words themselves and not their names.

Nothing wrong with that. Very few 'intensions' have well defined 'extensions'. Set theory and Logic can't be used in a naive manner or they quickly degenerate into nonsense. The proper way to proceed is to look at things where we have some assurance that we have a well defined set or graph of a function. Then we can do set theory and relation algebra and use logical calculi. But, almost all of the time, we can't and even when we can, as our knowledge base grows, we will find that we have to 'restrict comprehension' of any given eligible intension or else employ a type theory etc. This is because epistemic or impredicative intensions can't have clear cut extensions. They don't obey Liebniz's laws of identity. Tarski is introducing Arrow not to Logic but to Stupidity and an algorithmic method for generating mischievous nonsense. 

And if we examine expressions (1) and (2) more closely, we must admit that the first is not a sentence at all, since the subject of a sentence can only be a noun and not an adjective;

No. The subject of a sentence is supplied by its context. I draw a picture. Teechur says 'Good'. The meaning is my drawing is good.  

the second might be considered a meaningful sentence, but, at any rate, would be a false

It is true of some uses of the word and false of others. The law of the excluded middle does not apply to epistemic intensions- e.g. words in natural language where both semantics and pragmatics are knowledge based and change as that base changes.  

one since no woman is a proper name.

Plenty are- e.g. imaginary ones whom a novelist hasn't yet fleshed out in his mind.  

In order to clarify these situations, we have to realize that when the words "good" and "Mary" occur in such contexts as those of (1) and (2), then their meanings differ from the usual ones, and that here these words function as their own names.

We realize much more than this. That's why we aren't impressed by logical aporias or paradoxes. Indeed, our instinct is to consider logic a type of stupidity. Verification matters. Deduction does not.  

In generalizing this viewpoint, we should have to admit that any word may, at times, function as its own name;

but any element of a naive set may be impredicative or dependent on other elements such that we can't assume the set has a unique extension. 

to use the terminology of medieval logic, we may say that in such a case the word is used in SUPPOSITIO MATERIALIS, as opposed to its use in SUPPOSITIO FORMALIS, that is, in its ordinary meaning.

Even then, what matters is that the thing being referred to has a well defined extension which stays fixed. But this just means 'be sure you are talking about the same thing. If you are talking about different things, you will get contradictions.'

Consider Blau (1957) on Arrow's Social Welfare Function

The starting point is a set a of (possibly infinitely many) objects of unspecified nature, called alternatives.

This is not a set. Depending on the knowledge base, some things appear to be alternatives though they may be complementary, interdependent, or, indeed, the same thing under a different name.

They may be thought of as candidates, or alternative economic states, or alternative courses of action.

Arbitrarily, a person or group of persons can stipulate for a particular set of alternatives and then stipulate there is an ordering upon them. But, they may find that they were wrong because alternatives are epistemic and thinking about a thing changes it. There is no set. There is no identity (a given alternative isn't even the same thing as itself). There is no relations or orderings or graphs of functions. This is because our arbitrary stipulation is nonsense.  

A weak ordering (hereafter called merely an ordering) of the set a is a reflexive, connected, and transitive relation R defined on (t; that is, (I) For each (not necessarily distinct) pair x, y of alternatives, at least one of the following is true: x R y, y R x. (Connected and reflexive.)  (II) For each (not necessarily distinct) triple x, y, z of alternatives, x R y and y R z imply x R z. (Transitive.)

We will see that xRx is impossible for anything epistemic unless nothing in the knowledge base is affected by anything else in it. But, if that were the case, a knowledge unit would be itself a material object. It would be a chattel which could be transferred. Its production and distribution and extinction would be outside the mind. Thus it couldn't be mental. It couldn't be knowledge. Relations too are mental- i.e. epistemic. They too don't 'coincide with themselves'. Moreover they can be impredicative- e.g. preferred preference or meta-preference. This is a relation which isn't identical to itself because my preferences (which are slobbish) are different from my meta-preferences (I'd prefer to have snobbish preferences). 

Now consider the definition-

 A social welfare function (SWF) is a function whose domain D is a subset of the set of all ordered n-tuples 6R = (R1, R2, * **, R.) of orderings of A(set of Alternatives).

The Domain is not well-defined. It is not a set. There can't be any such function. Now you may say, we can talk about things which can't exist- 'e.g. the cat which is a dog because it isn't a dog'.  Indeed, we could agree to worship or execrate such things. We could say 'there is an impossibility result such that the cat which is a dog because it isn't a dog can't have properties we want it to have- e.g. the ability to be eaten as a hot-dog in a baseball stadium.' But we could equally say the opposite or just fart vociferously and claim that our fart proves, mathematically, that the cat which is a dog just proved the Reimann hypothesis. In some mystical sense, this may be regarded as true. But only because it is also false and true only because it is false and false only because it truly is the fart of the cat which is a dog.

What is going on in the previous paragraph is 'ex falso quodlibet' or the 'principle of explosion'- i.e. the notion that from what is false any and every nonsense can be logically deduced. Tarski throws the baby out with the bath-water when he deals with this problem by declaring erroneously that a language can't contain its own truth-predicate. Consider the law courts. Clearly, they do have a protocol bound, buck stopped, method of doing this for themselves. True, most issues are not justiciable. But 'completeness' is not required. Only utility is. If a particular type of language 'pays its way', that's all we ask of it. 

Still, within Tarski's (or any other mathematical) framework, the first requirement when using set theory or relation algebra is that you ensure that you are actually dealing with well defined sets and relations. If they are epistemic or impredicative then the intensional fallacy arises and you can't assume Liebniz's laws of identity or the principle of excluded middle. Similarly, when dealing with dogs- which is what the good folks at Crufts do- the judges have strict protocols re. what is a dog. That's why my g.f. didn't win a prize though she is a basic enough bitch. 

Ordinary people use natural language and are seldom troubled by intensional fallacies or 'ex falso' because we quickly converge to a good enough 'extension' for any word used. Moreover, in any useful field- e.g. the 'higher faculties' in a University (viz. those that deal with Law, Divinity & Medicine) there are strict protocols which assign well defined 'buck stopped' extensions to intensions. This is not in the case of lower faculties where you get a Doctorate in Philosophy even if you write wholly fallacious Arrowvian or Sen-tentious shite. 

It is a separate matter that Arrow's nonsense could lead you to inaccessible cardinals or other such topics in the foundations of set theory. But those foundations have deeper foundations yet and themselves represent the set of alternatives for a type of Social Choice- viz. that with which mathsy peeps might be genuinely concerned or to which they might themselves contribute. 

Voting theory, auction theory, preference revelations mechanisms etc. can proceed well enough and may even 'pay their way' in certain narrow contexts. What will be lacking is canonicity, naturality, categoricity, universality, completeness etc. Math can be useful. Mathsy masturbation is mischievous shite. 

 


Thursday, 13 March 2025

Statistical Induction, Logical Deduction & Sen-tentious Ass-suction

Inductive reasoning goes from the particular to the general. Deductive reasoning goes from the general to the particular. Amartya Sen's reasoning doesn't go anywhere. It just sucks ass endlessly. 

Tadashi Hiraia and Yukio Ikemotob have a paper titled 'Sen’s Economics in The Idea of Justice: Induction vs Deduction'
ABSTRACT

In The Idea of Justice, Amartya Sen revealingly differentiates his capability approach from the mainstream in terms of structure: comparative vis-à-vis transcendental.
In Philosophy, a "transcendental idea" is a concept or idea that is purely rational and necessary for understanding experience, but whose object (what it refers to) cannot be experienced directly, as it transcends our capacity for sensory and cognitive experience. The idea of Justice or Beauty or Truth is transcendental in that we can's see or touch or measure the thing itself. We can merely say, based on existing knowledge base- 'I think this is more beautiful or true or just than that.' Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, examined the nature of such ideas, arguing that while they are useful for organizing our thoughts and pushing our understanding, they are ultimately unverifiable and exist in a realm beyond human experience. We are not obliged to go that far. We merely say that Justice and Beauty and Capability are 'intensions' whose extensions change as the knowledge base changes. This means there is no set or mathematical function which corresponds to them because they are not well defined.

We can't compare things whose 'extensions' (i.e. the list of things which have the property named by the 'intension') are unknown. We can arbitrarily assert that we think they are wrong or right. But this is like saying 'I think God will damn you to Hell!' We haven't seen God or Hell and all we mean is that we hate the person we are talking to.                   
 
Instead of constructing models based on fundamental principles and questing for perfection,

In which case, we have to change the model the moment someone spots an imperfection in it. That's a good thing. It is how Maths and Physics and Engineering and Economics have made great progress.  

Sen seeks to compare feasible options and to choose one from among them.

People already do this in every activity they undertake. Sen might as well seek to breathe in and then breathe out so as not to suffocate.  

What lies behind this strategy is respect for a plurality of values and reasoning in society.

People who seek to create perfect models- e.g. mathematicians- may be even more respectful of pluralism. But, it is wholly irrelevant.  

In this context description plays a key role in this approach, given that plural values and reasoning can be reflected only in an inductive manner which requires rich description.

No. They are reflected in an 'imperative' manner- i.e. they are 'value judgments'. No 'inference' or induction is involved. 

The purpose of this article is to examine how Sen’s approach is related to the Cambridge tradition, which typically embraces inductive methods of reasoning, with a particular focus on the influence of Maurice Dobb.

A Marxist who thought there was a universal law at work in human history. He was not a pluralist. Indeed, we could say he was a teleologist or determinist.  Sen did collaborate with Dobb in his youth. The Dobb-Sen thesis was Stalinist. The fruits of productivity gains must be confiscated from the proletariat so as to invest in heavy industry. This can't be done in a democratic country. 

Sen (2009) addresses the “idea” and not the “theory” of justice.

He does neither. He is talking of economic policy- stuff done by politicians and bureaucrats- not Justice which is the province of the Courts. True, in India, there was a time when some pretended that the Supreme Court had 'inherent power' to order the Government to do anything it liked. But this was not true. The Executive ignored orders it didn't like and took its revenge on the Bench till it backed down.  

Although the traditional and orthodox theories of justice tend to answer the question “What is justice?”,

No. It is a Tarskian primitive. Judges and Courts already exist. The question is whether there is some superior principle- e.g. Utility, Liberty, Income Redistribution, promotion of one class or race or gender above another, etc.- which Courts should base their ratios on.  

the perfect answer that they pursue has not been found in the long history of humankind.

Yes it has. Justice is a service industry. It must pay for itself by raising productivity. If it fails to do so, it will either be disintermediated or else the country may decline in relative terms and end up getting invaded or facing an insurrection.  

What is more realistic and important is to locate areas of agreement on the ways to improve our society.

Politicians do this all the time. Indeed, we all do.  

Our main challenge here is to compare feasible options and to choose the best one from among them.

We don't know the feasible options. Also, unless you are a Dictator, with plenty of secret policemen under your command, the only things you can choose are things you yourself can pay for. 

To do so, our argument needs to be grounded in reality and thus start with real-life problems, not the creation of models.

Professors aren't concerned with 'real-life' problems. They are glorified child-minders.  

Sen employs this approach and calls it comparative. It can be seen in his argument on “missing women” and famines, developed by using existing data.

bad data. Everyone in Bengal knew that statistics for food output in the early Forties were wholly fictional. Sen pretended this wasn't the case. As for 'missing women', the Brits in India knew about female infanticide in the 1780's. Sex-selective abortion was promoted by International Agencies in the Seventies. Sen came late to that particular party.  

In contrast, both orthodox economics and Rawls’ theory of justice are transcendental, to the extent that they make assumptions about human behaviours, construct models based on fundamental principles, and draw conclusions by focusing on the models while setting reality aside.

No. Orthodox economics is 'positive'- i.e. focussed on empirically verifiable predictions. Rawls's theory was simply wrong as Harsanyi pointed out. He wasn't a mathematician. Also, he didn't know about Insurance.  

The rationale of this dichotomy (i.e. ‘transcendental institutionalism’

Rawls proposes a rule to be followed. He does not mention any institution. In Kantian terms a 'transcendental institution' would be one which is a priori and which must be presupposed for any experience to be possible. I suppose, a Theist might say, that transcendental Institution is Heaven with its angels ruled over by God Almighty.  It was God and his angels who created our species and our planet and our Galaxy. 

versus the ‘realisation-focused comparison’ proposed in The Idea of Justice) goes back to his partitioning of the arguments into formal and informal chapters in Sen’s (1970) earlier study, in that the formal chapters were written for readers who are concerned with formal statement and technical derivation while the informal chapters were written for those who are concerned with the relevance of the results.

Sen worked within an Arrow-Debreu framework without Knightian Uncertainty and no mathematical problems of concurrency, complexity, computability etc. In such a world, there would be no need for language or politics or education or scientific or other types of research. The price vector would encode all information. Suppose I want to find out if I am capable of becoming a successful ballet dancer. I look up the price of ballet training for me with a money back guarantee. Suppose it is one trillion dollars then I know that though the thing is possible, it will be very very difficult to achieve. I don't really have the capability to become a ballet dancer because I am fat and clumsy. This is not the 'real' world. It is a fairy tale based on the wholesale misuse of mathematics and what in logic is known as the 'intensional fallacy'.  

This classification in turn seems to correspond to the two types of reasoning, deduction and induction, to the extent that transcendental institutionalism requires certain frameworks/models constructed in advance for pursuing perfect justice in a deductive manner,

No. Rawls uses induction- in particular backward induction- to arrive at his conclusion re. what people would chose in the 'original position'. Had he used a 'deductive' method, he would have realized that no contract is binding without the passing of consideration. What can be deduced from this is that anything agreed in the original position will not be enforceable in real life.  

whereas realisation-focused comparison pays attention to fact and evidence in order to compare realities so as to identify manifest injustice in an inductive manner.

Sen does not do so. Suppose I feel that a rich man gained his wealth by unjust means. I would need to find a 'base case' where there was unjust enrichment and then I would have to show that profit was gained from it in the subsequent period. After that it would be enough to show that at time n, there was wealth arising from that unjust enrichment and this directly lead to the existence of unjustly acquired wealth at time n+1. This is the principle of induction and is used by prosecutors. But 'manifest injustice' is something which is directly perceivable as unjust. Consider a thief who has in his sack the very valuable crown of the King of England. It is manifest that this is 'unjust enrichment'. But we can't be sure that a respectable banker worth a billion dollars came by his wealth unjustly. We would have to find him stealing money from a client when he was 20 and then investing that money and thus accumulating a fortune. 

The backbone of Sen’s approach to justice is the reflection of plurality in our reasoning.

Judges are used to different parties to a suit giving different reasons for why they should prevail. What makes Judges and Law Courts special is that they have protocol bound methods of arriving at a decision such that even if the parties were different, the outcome would be the same. 

In contrast to orthodox economics and contemporary political philosophy, which claim the unique choice of one particular set of principles based on a single dominant rationale (i.e. a theory), he argues that reasoning can take many different forms which nonetheless make room for some points shared by all.

People will pay for 'unique' answers which don't change depending on who says what. They won't pay for a guy who says 'well, all of you are right in your own way. One thing we can all agree on is that we should breathe in and then breathe out. Isn't that a marvellous discovery? Incidentally, I am a brown monkey from a shithole country. Please give me Nobel Prize.'  

Indeed, illustrated with an example of three (respectively egalitarian, utilitarian and libertarian) children with a flute, he proposes competing rationales for social justice and yet raises the possibility of reaching a partial agreement.

This case should be decided on the basis of an uncorrelated asymmetry- viz. who made the flute. The poorest child is not uniquely identified. Another poorer child may come along, in which case Bob loses the flute and cries and cries. Neither is 'best flute player' uniquely identified. Anna loses the flute because Agnes, the internationally renowned flautist, turns up. She too cries and cries. John Maynard Smith showed how uncorrelated asymmetries promote eusocial 'bourgeois strategies'. Sen doesn't seem to have heard of him.  

The bottom line is that ‘we cannot reduce all the things we have reason to value into one homogeneous magnitude’ (Sen 2009, p. 239).

No. The bottom line is that, at the margin, everything we value is turned into a homogenous magnitude- viz. dollars and cents. You trade off aesthetic and utilitarian considerations by buying not the most beautiful or the cheapest car but one which looks quite nice and which is affordable and fit for purpose.  

What he presents is therefore ‘the approach to justice … [which] makes room for pervasive plurality as a constituent feature of the assessment of justice’ (Sen 2009, p. 309).

This is not an approach to justice. It is an approach to talking endless bollocks- preferably in return for a hefty salary from some UN agency.  

The difference between plural and single reasoning corresponds to the information employed by each approach. Whereas, for example, contemporary welfare economics and political philosophy focus respectively on utility and resources (including primary goods) as the dominant information for a social arrangement, and with other information ignored or at best undervalued, Sen proposes instead—of such a narrow view—to expand the informational space for the direct consideration of plural features of our lives and concerns.

Thus endlessly prolonging discussion and never coming to a conclusion. This may suit bureaucrats and academics of a wholly useless sort.  

Consequently, he takes particular note of capability, or ‘our ability to achieve various combinations of functionings that we can compare and judge against each other in terms of what we have reason to value’

We don't know our capabilities or those of anybody else. 

, while not discounting the significance of other informational spaces. An advantage of drawing on capability is to represent irreducible diversities in our lives, our concerns, and thus our reasoning, which in turn allow us to reach partial agreements.

About what? We already have complete agreement that a judge who won't deliver a decision but just talks endlessly ought to be sacked.  

In addressing the significance of public discussion for justice, Sen distinguishes two lines of reasoning: transcendental institutionalism (the transcendental approach) and realisation-focused comparisons (the comparative approach).

Jurists do this all the time. Thus, when the French felt they were losing business to Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions, they considered changing their approach to contract law, etc. Justice is a service industry. Even the Ayatollahs who, I imagine, trace their judicial institutions to the Divinely inspired Prophet, are happy to admit innovations originating in the Christian West- e.g. Codification- though, no doubt, they may find precedents for it in their own annals.  

Sen supports the latter.

No. He isn't doing empirical studies of different legal systems and establishing whether they promote or retard progress.  

Sen has studied set theory. Yet he says ‘[t]here would be something deeply odd in a general belief that a comparison of any two alternatives cannot be sensibly made without a prior identification of a supreme alternative’ .

Does he not know that there is no highest cardinality?  

To illustrate this point, he raises the possibility of comparing the peak heights of Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount McKinley while disregarding the fact that Mount Everest is the highest mountain in the world.

Kilimanjaro is higher if you measure from the centre of the earth.  

What is more realistic and important is thus to find areas of agreement en route to the advancement of or retreat from justice.

The agreement is to go to court or to an arbitrator to settle the dispute.  

This leads to Sen’s focus on the identification of manifest injustice

e.g. that women have to sit down to pee 

rather than the search for a non-existent perfect justice, as clearly stated at the beginning of the Preface: ‘What moves us, reasonably enough, is not the realization that the world falls short of being completely just – which few of us expect – but that there are clearly remediable injustices around us which we want to eliminate’ .

Some people are remedying those injustices. Sen isn't. That's an 'overlapping consensus' right there. The problem with pluralism is that decision spaces become multi-dimensional and, by McKelvey Chaos theorem, there is a struggle for agenda control with highly mischievous results.


Vikram Seth's Sampati.

Some decades ago, Granta was considered a good literary magazine. It published the following poem by Vikram Seth titled 'Sampati'.  

A Petrarchan sonnet based on a character in the Ramayana

‘Why
do
you
cry?’
‘I
flew
too
high.
Un-
done,
all
see
me
fall.’

An explanation is given in a footnote

In the magic forest of the Ramayana, the early Indian epic, Sampati, ‘the king of the vultures’, tells the story of how he lost his wings, in a tale that resembles the Greek myth of Icarus.

Icarus cried very loudly when he fell out of the sky. His daddy, Daedalus, asked him why he was crying so loudly. Icarus replied, 'I'm fucking dead mate. That's what happens when you fall out of the fucking sky. I wasn't crying at all. Fuck the fuck off!'  

My brother and I were racing each other and we flew up to the sun. Higher and higher we flew, faster and faster in spirals. When the sun had reached the middle of the sky, Jatayu grew tired. I saw that he was almost fainting from the heat, so I spread my wings over him and shielded him. My wings were burned off and I fell here atop this mountain.

No one saw him fall and thus none could tell Jatayu where to find his brother.  

Since then I have been hoping to hear word of my brother. 

Shakuntala, abandoned as a baby in the forest, was sheltered from the Sun by the winged 'Shakun' bird. A nice German lady asked my Mum what sort of bird it was. 'Vulture' Daddy replied brutally. German lady was unhappy. I was pleased. Then I learned that, very sadly, some ancient Indian dude or dudess rescued the baby so the vulture was denied a tasty morsel. 

Anyway, the point to this story is that Shakuntala was the mother of Emperor Bharata from whom Lord Ram was descended. Thus there was a special relationship between vultures and the royal line. I may mention that Huma- the Iranian 'bird of fortune', the touch of whose shadow confers Empery- too is a vulture. Clearly this is an ancient Aryan belief. I suppose, the role of vultures in de-fleshing the cadaver for the purpose of 'sky burial', gave them ritual significance at some very early date.

 When Lord Ram's wife was abducted, Jatayu tried to rescue her and was killed by Ravana. Meanwhile. his elder brother, who was living in a cave, was hoping for news of him. Sampati was a tough old bird and hadn't howled or wailed or bawled like a baby because he fell from the sky. He felt sad but did not weep when he heard his beloved brother had died. Why? Jatayu had been slain in battle while upholding the dharma of the warrior- viz. the duty to help the weak. Thus, Jatayu had gained Heaven. Sampati himself had been given the boon that his wings would grow back when he helped those who were seeking Sita. He was intending to eat the monkeys who were engaged in that task. However, they had a message for him and he had a message for them and so the monkeys were neither eaten nor condemned to death by their King for failing in their task. This shows that food is a message (sandesh) but a message is also food- indeed, it may be the Gospel encapsulated in the Eucharist. 

In Sanskrit, the word 'sam' means 'with, together, completely, absolutely'  while 'pat' has the meaning descending or falling. Sampaati fell upon a mountain (but Indra had previously cut the wings off mountains) and we feel sympathy for those whose doom we dimly intuit as our own.

But what good is sympathy? The answer is, so the Buddhists say- it becomes effectual at the opportune moment- i.e. kshana-sampati. 

But that is every moment at which we recall winged were the mountains ere our fall. There is a message here, which, to attain, is, like Hanuman, to alight upon the only mountain to retain the power of flight. 

 At the very least, we can say, the moral of the story of Jatayu & Sampaati is that to give life or limb to protect others is to gain both more amply. Seth thinks otherwise. Still, it is good to know, he butchered Valmiki before he laid rough hands on Tulsidas. Give him time. He will shit on Veda itself. Tonbridge School must be so proud. 


 

Kant's lowly faculty & its lousy morality

 

Pedants who lived centuries ago didn't have access to Wikipedia. We are more fortunate. There is no reason why we should not draw on advances in Mathematics, Logic, the Natural and Social Sciences as well as the Science of Law, to see how and why those pedants went wrong. In doing so, we stand on surer ground in deriding and reviling those pedants and public intellectuals who, relying on obsolete arguments and imbecilic availability cascades, continue to make a nuisance of themselves.

As a case in point, consider Kant's claim that the only innate right is freedom- 'Freedom (independence from the constraint of another’s will), insofar as it is compatible with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law, is the one sole and original right that belongs to every human being by virtue of his humanity.' Sadly, Kant meant that this 'right' only existed if his categorical imperative was true. It wasn't. It was stupid shit. What more could you expect from Kant who- as he said- was a member of a 'lower faculty' (Philosophy) looked down on by those in higher faculties (Medicine, Law, Divinity). 

Since Socioproctology is so high a faculty that, as yet, no University has attained an altitude where even its highest faculty could afford it hospitality, it follows that my categorical imperative is greatly superior to that of Kant. Briefly, it states that everybody should do what is best for me. This is because I am super special. If everybody believed me- or if this wasn't an obviously stupid claim- I'd be better off or at least not considered a moron. 

Kant's categorical imperative runs thus-

“Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.” 

Thus if you are raping and decapitating a person, be sure that you enjoy raping and killing that particular person rather than regard killing and raping simply as a means to pass the time. 

Kant believed that

 “[I]t is manifest that a violator of the rights of man intends to use the person of others merely as means without taking into consideration that, as rational beings, they ought always at the same time to be rated as ends….” 

This is not manifest at all. People violate rights accidentally, negligently, or with the best of intentions. Moreover, it is a violation of rights to rape and kill a person even if the end you aim at is that the person gains a senior position on the staff of his Satanic Majesty and thus would be very grateful to you. 

Kant writes-

Any opposition that counteracts the hindrance of an effect promotes that effect and is consistent with it.

Sadly that same opposition may counteract both the hindrance and the effect itself. Only time will reveal what forces are 'consistent' with each other. 

Now, everything that is unjust is a hindrance to freedom according to universal laws.

Everything that is just may be. We don't know. Only time will tell. It would be nice if things we like are all mutually compatible and consistent. The reason I hesitate to invite Beyonce and Rihanna for a sleepover is because though I am sure both will want to be my best friends forever and ever, they may not get on with each other. Beyonce will want to braid my hair- which is fine with me- but what if Rihanna isn't content to do my nails? There could be tears before bedtime.  

Coercion, however, is a hindrance or opposition to freedom.

It may be. It may not.  

Consequently, if a certain use of freedom is itself a hindrance to freedom according to universal laws (that is, is unjust),

then you can be sure those laws aren't universal.  

then the use of coercion to counteract it, inasmuch as it is the preservation of a hindrance to freedom, is consistent with freedom according to universal laws; in other words, this use of coercion is just.

In other words, the Prussian King should suppress the fuck out of any Revolution on the French, or even the American, model.  

It follows by the law of contradiction

which does not apply to epistemic objects because the 'intension' has no well-defined extension. Thus, Borges isn't Borges precisely because he is Borges. Indeed, nothing is what it is from some point of view.

that justice [a right]

is epistemic and changes as the knowledge base changes such that it forbids the very act that it previously enjoined or, like 'halachah vein morin kein' forbids the action iff it is known that the action is required. 

is united with the authorization to use coercion against anyone who violates justice [or a right]

Authorization flows from Authority. It may be delegated to Judges or Executives or Legislators. The latter may affirm but do not establish Authority. In the US, the People are the source of authority. In the UK it is the Crown in Parliament. There is no 'authorization' to use coercion even in self-defence. There is a defeasible 'immunity' which a Court of Law may accept on the basis of delegated authority. 

Kant

 distinguishes a duty of virtue from a juridical duty (by) the fact that external compulsion to a juridical duty is morally possible, whereas a duty of virtue is based on free self-​constraint.

Any system of morality can permit 'external compulsion' in any situation simply by stipulating for different facts in the case. Even if a moral theory is categorical, i.e. has a unique model quid juris, still the person holding the theory is free to decide, quid facti, that coercion even of an extreme type is justified. In other words there has to be categoricity both re. principles and re. facts. This does obtain in plenty of things. We agree that is an elephant and this is a mouse. But nothing becomes justiciable unless there is a dispute either about facts or about what law or principle applies. More generally, Kant's theory is useless when it isn't mischievous because it is 'anything goes'. 

Consider freedom of thought or expression. Should the State be allowed to use coercive methods to curb this? In 'the conflict of the faculties', Kant admits that in the higher University faculties (Law, Medicine and Divinity) are vital to the State and thus must be strictly supervised but, he says, the lower faculties (e.g. Philosophy & Natural Science) aren't important and thus can be given more freedom to speculate. But this also explains why the 'natural law' of the philosopher is lower than 'positive' law (i.e. law as command). The latter matters. It is vital to the state and the safety of the population. Natural law &  natural religion don't matter. They are just things pedagogues in lower faculties talk about to adolescents who, if they are smart, will go on to a higher faculty. If they are stupid, however, they may be school teachers or tutors to rich kids. 

To be fair, Kant had to write the way he did because he was a subject of the Russian King and a 'beamte' civil servant by virtue of his employment as a Professor. He hints at his own views when he quotes the story of a French politician Minister who asks a group of leading merchants to suggest ways of stimulating trade. The younger merchants make various suggestions. Then the old merchant speaks up. He says build good roads, mint sound money, have good laws and, for the rest, leave us alone!

This isn't exactly 'laissez faire' and there were already Listian arguments for 'infant industry' protection. Still, this was the 'common sense' the Scots were propounding. But the Scots were safe from invasion or oppression by a tyrant. Prussians were not. Beamteliberalismus- the liberalism of the civil servants- couldn't be too full throated. As with Justice, Liberty too must cut its coat according to its cloth. 

Kant applies a common judicial tool in considering the most salient motive for an action as the motive that must be considered. If you do a thing mainly because it is profitable, though you also know it is morally the right thing to do, then your motive is profit not morality. Where Kant goes wrong is that he thinks what is moral is always what is dictated by a principle- that too one that is 'universalizable' or symmetric in every way. This is not the case. It may be that we may get to general principles by induction but those principles will evolve as our knowledge and experience increases. True, we can deduce things from axioms which may, at one time, seem intuitively true. Sadly, those intuitions are misleading. There are no such things as apodictic synthetic a priori judgments. One reason is the 'intensional fallacy'. Saying 'x is x' is false if x is 'epistemic'. It does not coincide with itself because it changes as the knowledge base changes. 

Wednesday, 12 March 2025

Satyajit Ray on 'National Styles in Cinema'

Which author wrote the novels on which the highest grossing, the third highest grossing and the seventh highest grossing films in Bengali Cinema were based? The answer is Bibhuti Bhushan. He is known to the wider world as the creator of Apu- the protagonist of Satyajit Ray's trilogy. However, this is only the seventh highest grossing of Bibhuti's novels to be filmed. The first and the third are his Rider Haggard like adventure stories set in Africa. 

Bibhuti wasn't a wealthy aesthete. He was a smart young man from a rather poor, semi-rural, family who rose by his own efforts. Properly considered, his works are about character and drive. They aren't miserabilist or pseudo-Marxist. Bibhuti began by writing about his own milieu but then branched out into adventure stories and tales of the occult. Not having been born with a silver spoon in his mouth, he did not disdain the entertaining or the wondrous. 

The plain fact is, 'need for achievement' drives enterprise of all types. Sometimes, a new representational technology, like cinema, enables people to achieve success duplicating an art form which isn't about the need for achievement. It may be about spiritual or aesthetic or cultural or political values. However, when that new technology expresses its own need for achievement, there is a qualitative change. At that point, we could speak of a 'national style' in the use of that technology. Otherwise, what you have is National values being reflected in a particular representational technology. The 'style' only develops as virtuosity becomes an end in itself. Sadly, that style may be deeply boring- because National cultures tend to be a great big yawn. It ceases to be so when it takes as its subject matter the need for achievement of various National 'types'. Thus Hong Kong Cinema, benefiting from the KMT's, politically motivated, disapproval of depictions of Kung Fu, moved beyond the limits of Peking Opera when it began to focus on protagonists belonging to different social strata who need to acquire high level fighting skills so as to overcome a tyrant or a villain. The Hong Kong style of martial arts quickly spread around the world because it became synonymous with 'need for achievement'.

Bengal, responding to the stimulus provided by British commerce and administration, did not lack 'need for achievement'. H.M Bose, a Bengali entrepreneur, was the first Indian to manufacture gramophone records. He was a close friend of Rabindranath Tagore. His son, the great director, Nitin Bose, who pioneered the use of playback singing in Indian movies, was the cinematographer on Tagore's solitary venture into film. Nitin's mother was the sister of Satyajit Ray's father and was also related to Ray's cousin, herself a playback singer and actress, who would become his wife. 

Thanks to Nitin Bose, Music became Indian Cinema's USP. The quality of film song & dance sequences improved rapidly. Often, it was music sales, rather than box-office receipts, which made a film profitable. Consider 'Rajnigandha'. It had a good theme song and so the film was successful. Its producer could then afford to finance Ray's horrible 'Chess Players'. A movie which features a Nawab who was a great patron of the arts and a composer of thumris, should have had dynamite songs. The receipts on LP sales would have ensured it made a shedload of money. 

It should be remembered that, even in the Silent Era, the live piano accompaniment matched the action on the screen. Cinema was already a Wagnerian Gesamtkunstwerk- i.e. a 'total' work of art. 

Yet Ray writes- 

'Cinema being first and foremost a pictorial medium,

Pictures are pictorial. Cinema is kinetic. It is about action. It is theatrical. That's why we speak of a Cinema Theatre, not a Cinema Gallery. Cinema benefits from good Art Direction. But the mise en scene is merely the backdrop. There has to be drama. But for drama to develop qualitatively, the driver has to be the need for achievement of the protagonists. That is what motivates virtuosity as an end in itself in a kinetic medium.

and the integrity of atmosphere being the first essential of a good film,

the background music, or the song that is sung by the actor, must match the mood that is being evoked by the action on screen.  But, once again, this does not drive qualitative improvement in the medium. Need for achievement is what matters. Where, from film to film, from decade to decade, protagonists have this need, then there is a 'Red Queen Race' such that the obstacles they face, too, have to become more complex and nuanced. A good film is only good if its genre, or the producer's oeuvre, has internalized this 'need for achievement'. Ray started quite well. But his was a need to bore the pants of the audience. For the upper-class buddhijivi, being a bigoted scold is considered the highest achievement. 

the problem which faced Renoir and which his painter’s eye was able to solve with comparative ease was that of selecting the visual elements which would be pictorially effective, and at the same time truly evocative of the spirit of Bengal.

Rumer Godden's book wasn't concerned with the spirit of Bengal. Nor was Renoir's film.  

And because the narrative technique of cinema admits of dawdling, these elements had to be the quintessential ones so that the director could make his points and create his atmosphere with a minimum of film footage.

If he is 'dawdling' there will be a lot of film footage. Also, Directors who are making a point are working either in advertising or in propaganda. There need be no point to either Art or Entertainment. Both are ends in themselves. 

 In searching for locations, therefore, Renoir was also searching for a style.

He already had a style. Sadly, it was as boring as shit. 

But being an alien and a European, there is a limit to which he could probe into the complexity that is India.

Rumer Godden was very much alive. It was her complexity that required probing. Her book 'Black Narcissus' had been a big hit in 1948 probably because the American league of Decency objected to it.  

The most he could do was to concentrate on the external aspect and leave the rest to his own French sensibility.

The French didn't have Ango-American hang-ups about sex. That's why Powell-Pressburger succeeded where Renoir failed. It is difficult to evoke an atmosphere of repressed sexual passion if you come from a place where everybody is having affairs with everybody and any barnyard animals they might own.   

In cinema, as in any other art, the truly indigenous style can be evolved only by a director working in his own country, in the full awareness of his past heritage and present environment.

Since Indians didn't invent movies, they can't make movies. Why is it that an American- Ellis Dungan- was able to make very good Tamil movies though he did not speak Tamil?  

In the days of the silent cinema, the film-makers of the world formed one large family.

No. Some- e.g. most Indian movies or Japanese movies of that time- had only a local audience. There were global stars like Charlie Chaplin or Douglas Fairbanks.  

Using the technique of mime, which is a more or less universally understood language, they turned the cinema into a truly international medium.

Mime is a quite separate art-form. Everybody hates that shite. What made cinema international was action, excitement, thrills and spills, slapstick and melodrama and impossibly good looking people dressed up as Arab Sheikhs or European Princes.  

With the coming of sound, mime gave way to the spoken word

No. Spoken words replaced dialogue cards. Authors did not mime emotions. They 'registered' them. But, they spoke to each other in a histrionic style and then the dialogue card was flashed on the screen. Sometimes, the guy providing the piano accompaniment read out the cards for the benefit of illiterate members of the audience.  

and a new technique of realistic acting was evolved to suit the requirements of the medium. Not that stylization had to go. As Chaplin has demonstrated in Monsieur Verdoux, an Englishman can make a film about a Frenchman in an American studio, and yet invest it with a basic universal appeal.

The Americans didn't like it. The French did. The plain fact is, the Second World War wasn't waged for profit. Bankers don't kill lonely widows to steal their savings. We get that some men prefer little girls and are revolted by women of their own age. But murder still is murder. It isn't an imitatio dei of the Great God of the Bourse. 

But the main contribution of sound was an enormous advance towards realism, and a consequent enrichment of the medium as an expression of the ethos of a particular country.

Silent movies already did that. People understood cowboys were only found in the American West, just as skyscrapers were abundant in American, not European, cities.  

For is there a truer reflection of a nation’s inner life than the American cinema? The average American film is a slick, shallow, diverting and completely inconsequential thing.

The average movie aims to entertain and earn a profit. If there is a commercial cinema, most films will be of this type. But Dictators too may want entertaining movies to be churned out to keep the Masses from thinking too much. 

Its rhythm is that of jazz,

Sometimes. But the Americans enjoyed all sorts of music. Mario Lanza was a big star. Jazz musicians only began entering studio orchestras in the Fifties. 

its tempo that of the automobile and the rollercoaster,

both of which existed elsewhere. Apparently the rollercoaster was invented in Russia. 

and its streaks of nostalgia and sentimentality have their ancestry in the Blues and ‘Way down upon the Swanee river’.

Nonsense! Most Hollywood film music is descended directly from the great European Romantic composers. 

Yet it must be reckoned with, as jazz is real and the machine is real. And because cinema has the unique property of absorbing and alchemizing the influence of inferior arts,

American cinema was able to absorb pretty much anything which worked elsewhere. This was because they had a vast and very well organized market.  

some American films are good, and some more than good. The reason why some notable European directors have failed in Hollywood is their inability to effect a synthesis between jazz and their native European idioms.

Nonsense! The complaint, made by Jewish intellectuals, was that Hollywood was too Jewy. It's taste was for schmaltz. 

Those who have retained the integrity of their style

like Hitchcock.  

have done better.

Because there's much more to America than Jazz.  

We may mention the films of Ernst Lubitsch and Fritz Lang, and one of the very best, Renoir’s The Southerner, which is American in content but completely French in feeling. 

It is faithful to the book. The cinematographer was of French origin but had worked in Hollywood for more than 30 years. 

Ray was a great admirer of French avant garde cinema. The truth is, they could and can make very entertaining movies. I suppose the size of the market limited their productivity.

 Possessing neither the subtlety and emotional candour of the French, nor the bravado of the American, the British cinema had to go through a particularly ignominious period until the war,

Hungarian Jews gave it a shot in the arm. The truth is Britishers were well served by the theatre and the music hall and an endless supply of American cowboy or gangster films.  

and the consequent expansion of the documentary gave the needed impetus. Since then we have had films like Brief Encounter, The Way Ahead and This Happy Breed which have caught the national character admirably.

Thankfully, that wasn't the national character at all. While these films were being made, Peter Sellers and Spike Milligan were perfecting their art. In the latter case, this commenced with the lighting of farts in the barrack room.  

But the fondness for half-shades and other genteel qualities we recognize as British is not exactly conducive to good cinema.

Hitchcock was as British as fish & chips. The problem with the British film industry was that it was under-financed. Talent fled to Hollywood. But Calcutta too had a brain drain to Bombay.

Hence the frequent falling on fantasy (Michael Powell and Emeric Pressburger), on Shakespeare (Laurence Olivier), on Dickens (David Lean).

Britain had a huge acting talent pool. But British studios had very much smaller budgets and limited distribution channels. However, they could do well in particular genres- e.g. historical 'bodice rippers' or Horror movies set in the late nineteenth century. But the 'quota quickies' of an earlier period had damaged the reputation of the industry. Still, people like Carol Reed learned their craft at that time. 

At present the future well-being of the British cinema lies in the hands of a handful of directors gifted enough to overcome the ethnological handicaps.

David Lean's 'Passage to India' came out at about the same time as Ray's 'Home and the World'. Both starred Victor Bannerjee who was incandescent in 'Passage'. Sadly, 'Home' was unwatchable.  

But what of our own Indian cinema? Where is our national style?

There were three sources for it. Firstly an Indo-Persianate 'Indrasabha' style of musical theatre popularised by a Parsi touring company. Secondly, a Hindu 'kathakalakshepam' religious style found both in Madras and Pune. In the former instance, it developed into the politically radical cinema of the Dravidian parties which took power from Congress by the end of the Sixties. This was perhaps the first time 'Reel Society' took over 'Real Society'. Ray preferred to wholly ignore the South. He was, after all, a bigoted upper-class Bengali Hindu. Ray also ignored a third strand- that of the Progressive Theatre Association- which understood the need to entertain poorer people while seeking to guide their thinking. Consider Prithviraj Kapoor, who had got his first break in Calcutta and was a good friend of Nitin Bose. The Kapoor clan and the great Dilip Kumar (who had worked with Nitin) were part and parcel of this third trend in Indian cinema. Ray, however, stood outside all three. He was a European forced to make films in Bengal because of an accident of birth. 

Where is the inspiration to transform the material of our life to the material of cinema?

I have mentioned the three types of inspiration which had already made Indian Cinema commercially viable. The constraints it faced were financial.  

Still, a faithful adaptation of a good novel written by a wholly 'emic' Indian would do well. Pather Panchali did well because it was faithful. Aparajito was not faithful. It did not do well. Ray says

Ray, like Mrinal, had started off writing about cinema. Ray says he planned a book on 'Lady from Shanghai' showing it to be the first 'atonal' film. But it was his own films which would become 'atonal' as he himself did the music and departed more and more from 'emic' narratives upon which the Indian reading public had set their imprimatur. But this meant that Ray's art became extrinsic or formal or mannerist. It had no intrinsic alethic, or even emotional, core. 
Apparently, even the external truth which Renoir was striving after has not bothered our film-makers.

Indians did make art movies but they bombed at the box office or, like a Chetan Anand film which won a prize at Cannes in 1946, weren't even released there. I don't suppose it occurred to Ray that Renoir, in India, needed to film scenes typical of that country to establish 'external truth'. It must be said, Renoir was brave to cast an Indian lady in the 'bi-racial' role. I suppose the French had less colour prejudice than Anglo-America at that time.  

Of our film-producing provinces, Bombay

and Madras 

has devised a perfect formula to entice and amuse the illiterate multitude that forms the bulk of our film audiences. Bengal has no such formula, nor the technical finesse which marks the products of Bombay.

Bengal was exporting talent to Bombay. There was more entrepreneurial capital available there.  

But Bengal has pretensions.

Some Bengalis were pretentious. But most were highly capable. They said goodbye to pretention and did great work in Bombay.  

And the average Bengali film is not a fumbling effort. It is something worse. It is a nameless concoction devised in the firm conviction that Great Art is being fashioned.

 There were plenty of Bengali movies which were remade in other languages. Incidentally, Nitin Bose had worked on the very first 'Devdas' in 1928. Sharat & Tagore provided the stories for umpteen Bollywood movies. Come to think of it, two of Bibhuti's Rider Haggard style adventure stories have been turned into Bengali blockbusters in recent years. 

In it the arts have not fused and given birth to a new art.

Perhaps Ray is taking a dig at Uday Shankar's 'Kalpana'. 

Rather they have remained as incongruous and clashing elements, refusing to coalesce into the stuff that is cinema.

'Pyaasa' is perfect. The theme is universal. The poet Vijay, like Christ, returns to life but is denied by the Caiaphas custodians of his own cultus.  

And so painting finds its expression in backdrops, music in the spasmodic injection in ‘song numbers’,

Uncle Nitin, I hate you.  

literature in the unending rhetoric of the idealist hero, theatre in the total artificiality of acting and décor.

Shakespeare is totes shit. Instead of portraying Hamlet as a Prince of Denmark, Shakespeare Sahib should have depicted him as a trainee Cost and Management Accountant who becomes amorously involved with a Japanese photocopier.  He is sacked after being caught in flagrante delicto. Capitalism is very evil. 

The few freakish exceptions do not make amends and do not matter. The pity is that there are few countries more filled with opportunities for film-making.

Just keep filming stuff from Kipling's Jungle Book. Everybody likes animals.  

Evidently it is the imagination to exploit these opportunities that is lacking.

Money was lacking. Also, animals shit all over the place. Whatever you might think of Durga Khote, at least she was potty trained.  

But there is some cause for optimism. Except in some superficial technical aspects,

Uncle Nitin's playback singing 

our films have made no progress since the first silent picture was produced thirty-five years ago, which means that there is time to learn anew and begin from the beginning.

Invent photography. Then invent the movie camera.  

So let us start by looking for that clump of bananas, that boat in the river and that temple on the bank. The results may be, in the words of Renoir, fantastic.

No. The results will be the same as looking out of the window of your railway carriage. Renoir wanted his audience, which was not Indian, to remember that his film was set in a far away country. Indian directors when shooting scenes in Paris are careful to include shots of the Eiffel tower. But there's nothing 'fantastic' about that. It's just routine. 

The plain fact is that if a film director from a particular country hires actors from that country and uses a story from that country and shoots the movie in that country, it is inevitable that the film will have the imprint of one or more of the styles found in that Nation. Ray's films were boring and bigoted because his class thought that being boring and bigoted was a sign of high culture. Making money is vulgar. Scolding people is virtuous.

Sunday, 9 March 2025

Jing Chen spotting the flaw in Arrow Debreu

76 years ago, Arrow & Debreu wrote the paper which claimed to prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium for an integrated model of production, exchange and consumption

The main results of this paper are two theorems stating very general conditions under which a competitive equilibrium will exist.

This was false. A competitive economy is in equilibrium if all markets clear and the price vector doesn't change much day to day. Speaking generally, what people expect is the outcome they get. The conditions for this happening is that expectations align with outcomes and no material change in determinants of supply and demand occur. Interestingly, it is enough for 'market-makers' (arbitrageurs) to have rational expectations- i.e. know the predictions of the correct economic theory- for there to be fairly robust convergence to the competitive equilibrium. But it still won't have 'naturality' or 'categoricity'. There is an arbitrary element and a degree of path dependence based on 'opening prices'. 

A defender of Arrow-Debreu might say, 'you are talking about equilibrium in a real economy. We are interested in an abstract economy. We want to know whether the price vector which clears all markets is unique and optimal in various ways. That's what this paper does. ' 

Sadly, the two theorems in this paper are mathematical nonsense. They pretend things which can't be sets or functions (because they are epistemic and impredicative thus giving rise to the intensional fallacy) actually are sets or functions so as to be able to use the Kakutani fixed point theorem. But to do so is wholly illicit. 

Moreover, there is no guarantee of uniqueness. A fixed point theorem merely says there is at least one solution. If there is a whole host of solution we can't say any one of them won the competition. They are equilibria but they are not competitive equilibria. There is no way of distinguishing who should win or how we can put in place a mechanism whereby the best solution is in fact the solution arrived at. 

Loosely speaking, the first theorem asserts that if every individual has initially some positive quantity of every commodity available for sale,

in other words, everybody is an arbitrageur participating in every market 

then a competitive equilibrium will exist.

under various assumptions. In particular, there must be no speculative demand or supply. But if so, why are there arbitragers? What is their incentive? Equally, there can't be entrepreneurs supplying something new 'on spec'. 

As a matter of fact, arbitragers can be infected by 'animals spirits' and drive up all asset prices before there is a crash and a bit shake out. Entrepreneurs too can take a bath if they are wrong about what people will buy.

 If you assume there are no animal spirits and no speculative demand or supply, why would there be any arbitragers or entrepreneurs?  Yet, if neither exist, there is nothing 'competitive' about equilibrium. 

The second theorem asserts the existence of competitive equilibrium if there are some types of labor with the following two properties: (1) each individual can supply some positive amount of at least one such type of labor;

I suppose arbitrage is a type of labour. Guys who do that for a living tend to wear Rolex watches and drive sports cars.  

and (2) each such type of labor has a positive usefulness in the production of desired commodities.

I suppose 'market makers' are useful if they don't get infected by irrational optimism or pessimism. However, that isn't what Arrow-Debreu mean. They are saying marginal physical product is never zero or negative. This is unrealistic. The supply of coal miners does not immediately disappear the moment all the coal has been mined. Moreover hiring more and more cooks means that they get in each other's way and so the output of the kitchen falls.  

The conditions of the second theorem, particularly, may be expected to be satisfied in a wide variety of actual situations,

Not unless labor is highly mobile between occupations and industries with positive returns can scale up quickly and costlessly. These certainly weren't the conditions faced by people over the previous four decades. 

though not, for example, if there is insufficient substitutability in the structure of production

Which was certainly the case for all extant economies. Arrow-Debreu were describing the economy of Fairy-land. 

Worse, they were saying something which could not be a set (because the 'intension' was epistemic and thus not well defined. This is the intensional fallacy) was actually a set.

 For each production unit j, there is a set Y j of possible production plans.

If there is such a set, then all future technological and scientific advances are already known today which is why there is a set Yj known to each firm. What is more every member of the firm already knows the date of their death and the date of the birth of their great-great-grand daughter which is why they can order their grave-stone today and also arrange for a birthday card to be sent to their distant descendants. 

The truth is there is no set Yj. There may be a set of production plans currently thought to be feasible by such and such person. But such plans don't matter. After all, every enterprise does have a plan. Sadly, it keeps having to be revised because sales didn't meet the target or there were unexpected supply problems or the CEO had a mental breakdown. 

If there are no sets, there are no subsets and no vectors or matrices or topology of any kind. Convexity and continuity and so forth can't arise. Mathematics has nothing to work with. 

Arrow/Debreu have a bizarre notion of diminishing returns (which arises because factors of production, with given technology, can't be substituted for each other. Thus, if there is no more coal to be found, hiring more coal miners won't increase coal production). They say- 'The existence of factors private to the firm is the standard justification in economic theory for diminishing returns to scale'. This is nonsense. Coal productivity in the UK fell because, with existing technology, access to good quality coal seams was decreasing. Britain would have to transfer coal miners into other occupations. The General Strike of 1926 could not magically raise the productivity of coal mines. True, rationalization- maybe even nationalization- could tap financial, management, and other economies of scope and scale. It could fund research into productivity enhancing technology. But it could not prevent, in the short to medium term for the Coal industry, diminishing returns to Labor, and hence much lower wages than had been paid during the War. What is true is that if a particular firm earns higher profit, we say there is a rent or return accruing on something non-fungible owned by the firm- e.g. the big, big, brain of the Manager. 

Assumption 1.a. implies non-increasing returns to scale- in other words, what is doing the heavy lifting is good old fashioned diminishing returns. Talk of 'convexity' is misleading because there is no underlying set. 

1.b. says that one cannot have an aggregate production possibility vector with a positive component unless at least one component is negative. I.e., it is impossible to have any output unless there is some input. This rules out discoveries & windfalls or inventions which have the same effect as windfalls. Yet Arrow-Debreu had already witnessed just such discoveries. Enormous energy could be gained by splitting the atom. 

1.c. asserts the impossibility of two production possibility vectors which exactly cancel each other, in the sense that the outputs of one are exactly the inputs of the other. 

This means you can't have autarkic islands or a wholly isolated subsistence sector. 

The simplest justification for 1.c. is to note that some type of labor is necessary for any production activity, while labor cannot be produced by production-units.

Because a farm which produces all the food and woollen yarn and fuel the family living on it needs isn't itself that family. But it is a family farm. Labor produced it and it produced that Labor in the sense of permitting the laborers to marry and have kids who, in turn, would provide labor. 

Arrow/Debreu mention Koopmans 'impossibility of the land of Cockaigne'- i.e. one where there is no scarcity. It isn't impossible at all. The snake in that Eden is either Malthusian overpopulation or invasion or immigration. 

Other assumptions are tantamount to

1) no bliss point (non-satiation)

2) no speculative demand or hedging 

3) negligible income effects- i.e. high substitutability for all goods. The last two taken together are what makes General Equilibrium 'anything goes'- i.e. there is no uniqueness or categoricity or even 'naturality' re. spotting the optimum. 

The problem here is that if all these hold, why would agents be arbitragers? Essentially what Arrow-Debreu are saying is 'if everybody was a market maker without a motive to be a market maker then, if they behave exactly as we say they will behave, we conclude by misusing mathematics that there will be a competitive equilibrium'. Why not simply say 'if everybody did just as I want them to, then I would get what I want. Euclid proved this long ago.' ?

The second half of 1V.a. asserts in effect that every individual could consume out of his initial stock in some feasible way and still have a positive amount of each commodity available for trading in the market.

In a recent paper, 'Thermo-economist' Jing Chen has pointed out that (Arrow/Debreu) 'assumes that every individual possesses an initial stock that satisfies all his current and future consumption. In effect, Arrow Debreu model indicates that equilibrium only exists in a system (where) no one needs to do anything

 This assumption is clearly unrealistic. However, the necessity of this assumption or some parallel one for the validity of the existence theorem points up an important principle; to have equilibrium, it is necessary that each individual possess some asset or be capable of supplying some labor service which commands a positive price at equilibrium.

In other words, the fact that poor people who are old or sick or disabled have nothing to supply must not stop us from assuming this is not the case. Otherwise, equilibrium would mean that a portion of the population starves to death. After all, that's what happens to animals. Ethologists have no qualms in explaining why animal populations will fluctuate greatly. Economists, however, should have some qualms about engaging in mathsy masturbation in order to say something nice, but wholly untrue, about the free market system. 

I suppose you could say 'Arrow Debreu can easily put in compulsory collective insurance'- i.e. a 'Social Minimum'. Why didn't they do so? The answer is that it would screw up the Math. Essentially, the scheme has to be 'backstopped' by arbitrary redistribution or periodic entitlement failure. But both arise outside the market from a Public Sector. In other words, you can't model the thing in a pure market economy. Even if you do persist, you won't have convexity and fixed points. This is actually quite interesting. Essentially, there are going to be holes in the decision space and 'topological dictators'. Also, there will be retractions of a 'holographic' type- i.e. instead of a 'fixed point' reflective equilibrium, there will be information available at the boundary for disequilibrium dynamics. Why settle for boring old equilibrium theory- which requires you to make dismal assumptions about diminishing returns- when you could be getting rich as an arbitrageur of far from equilibrium chrematistics? 

Jing Chen, who uses advanced math to teach 'quants',  quotes Kaldor (1985)

Returning to prevailing theory, as far as I understand it, the axioms of equilibrium theory were originally chosen in order to secure the desired result, in other words, the assumptions required for proving the existence of a unique and possibly stable general equilibrium. But its authors were motivated by the belief that they were only laying the foundations of an explanation of how a market economy works, an initial stage of the analysis which is in the nature of "scaffolding": it has to be erected before the permanent building can be built, but will be removed step by step as the permanent building nears completion. However, since Walras first wrote down his system of equations over 100 years ago, progress has definitely been backwards not forwards in the sense that the present set of axioms are far more restrictive than those of the original Walrasian model. The ship is no nearer to the shore, but considerably farther off, though in a logical, mathematical sense, the present system of derived tautologies is enormously superior to Walras' s original effort.

Arrow-Debreu securities, though 'weapons of financial mass destruction', are useful enough precisely because they raise volatility and thus liquidity as well as 'shake outs' and hence 'Creative Destruction'. 

Still, the true argument for competitive markets has to do with mimetic effects raising general purpose productivity and creating co-evolved mechanisms (e.g. futures markets) which tame Knightian Uncertainty. That's what the Chinese realized back in the Eighties. Sadly, Sen-tentious Indians will continue to stick their heads, like ostriches, into the quicksand of Arrow-Debreu and the belief that Knightian Uncertainty does not exist. We know all possible future states of the world and our Pundits can pick from them in the same way that they pick food items from a restaurant menu. 

In a game, the pay-off to each player depends upon the strategies chosen by all, but the domain from which strategies are to be chosen is given to each player independently of the strategies chosen by other players.

In life, Tardean mimetics obtains. Your choice of strategy is determined by what guys smarter and more successful than you are doing. True, you may fail to emulate them. Still, it is 'regret minimizing' to try. It is one thing to try and fail to get a good job. To never have tried, is to live with the knowledge that you yourself think you are shit. In the old days in India people would describe themselves as B.A (fail). This showed they had self-belief and wanted to rise in the world. Maybe they weren't good at academics. Perhaps they would be good at business. What was important was that they wanted to better themselves.  

An abstract economy, then, may be characterized as a generalization of a game in which the choice of an action by one agent affects both the pay-off and the domain of actions of other agents.

This is not an economy. It is also not a competitive economy where all agents are price takers and hence no choice of action by one agent has any material effect on any other.  

The need for this generalization in the development of an abstract model of the economic system arises from the special position of the consumer.

Consumers are predictable. It is Investment which is volatile.  

His "actions" can be regarded as alternative consumption vectors; but these are restricted by the budget restraint that the cost of the goods chosen at current prices not exceed his income.

You can borrow. There is a market for that.  

But the prices and possibly some or all of the components of his income are determined by choices made by other agents. 

Prices for consumers are likely to be stable for all sorts of reasons. It is investment and speculative demand where 'impredicativity' becomes a problem and equilibrium becomes far to seek. 

Why was Arrow so utterly crap at Econ? The answer is that he didn't study Econ. He studied Math. But he wasn't a great mathematician. Koopmans & Kantorovich were first class mathematicians but they too didn't get that the Economy is about mimetics on the one hand and 'market making' arbitrage on the other. I have analyzed Arrow's Nobel lecture elsewhere and thus will end this blog post by pointing to a final absurdity in the Arrow-Debreu paper

  Assumption VII plays a key role in the following proof. Part (a) simply asserts that no labor service, at least of those included in 6, can be produced by a production unit. 

It is very strange that an American (who knew the great role played by American industry and the American army in turning agricultural workers from the old world into a highly skilled industrial class) should say that enterprises don't themselves create the types of labor they need. 

Stranger yet, is what follows-

A case where VII might not hold is an economic system with fixed technological coefficients where production requiring a given type of labor also requires, directly or indirectly, some complementary factors. It is easy to see intuitively in this case how an equilibrium may be impossible. Given the amount of complementary resources initially available, there will be a maximum to the quantity of labor that can be employed in the sense that no further increase in the labor force will increase the output of any commodity. Now, as is well known, the supply of labor may vary either way as real wages vary and broadly speaking is rather inelastic with respect to real wages.

 Arrow-Debreu forget that they made each labor contract independent of every other. What happens at the margin does not matter because of the assumption they made.

In particular, as real wages tend to zero,

the marginal wage. You may still get some takers- e.g. unpaid 'interns'.  

the supply will not necessarily become zero; on the contrary, as real incomes decrease, the necessity of satisfying more and more pressing needs may even work in the direction of increasing the willingness to work despite the increasingly less favorable terms offered.

That occurs after existing contracts have expired.  

It is, therefore, quite possible that for any positive level of real wages, the supply of labor will exceed the maximum employable and hence a fortiori the demand by firms.

but they have individual contracts in their model. What is impossible is to have competitive markets which 'clear' because of the 'iron law of wages', Trade Unions, efficiency wage arguments etc.  There is too much hysteresis. Ergodicity would be far to seek.