Saturday, 14 May 2022

Sen's multiple identities as my neighbor's cat

Amartya Sen confuses predicate (i.e. a property that an object has) with 'identity' (which means  inter-changeability for some particular purpose. Thus though I don't look like the baby I once was, any property gifted to that baby remains mine unless I have sold it or lost it. On the other hand, suppose I received admission to a nursery school when I was 3, I can't now go and demand to attend classes because I am now an elderly man)

Oikeiosis is a Greek word which means belonging. You belong to such and such family and such and such neighborhood and such and such nation. Things given or taken from an oikos affect all the individuals who compose it. This alters their behavior in a predictable way. The same can be said of any identity class where inter-changeability obtains. Doctors are inter-changeable for a particular purpose. If some Doctors are punished for malpractice all Doctors change their behavior. Equally increased pay and prestige for some Doctors affects the rest. They are emboldened to claim higher status and remuneration.

Sen says-

"People have been made to fight each other to serve the imagined demands of their allegedly single identity, effectively along the lines of race, religion, ethnicity, nationality, expressing itself in ways like communal slaughter, political butchery and wars," 

Conscripts are 'made to fight'- that's true enough. But volunteers fight of their own volition. The alternative to fighting for your race, religion or nationality is enslavement, forcible conversion or ethnic cleansing. Sen should know this. His people had to flee East Bengal.

Collective bargaining- e.g. by Trade Unions- is considered a good thing in Economic theory. It can reduce economic rent, increase output and improve allocative efficiency. Clearly, 'Identity' as the basis of collective action has many benefits. Notice that having a 'threat point' of a symmetric type is enough for a particular identity class to avoid 'communal slaughter or political butchery'. Indeed, to preserve law and order from psychopaths, the law abiding identity class needs to pay taxes and employ policemen and judges. 


This single identity is currently "increasingly taking the form of containing a hard and allegedly impenetrable division along the lines of religion or religion-based understanding of civilization," he explained.

This was certainly true of political Islam of a militant type. It wasn't true of the coalition against the terrorists. Some Muslim regimes were part of that coalition as were some Socialists and Christians and so on.  

But, Sen noted, that has not always been the case. At the beginning of the 20th century, in World War I, the Germans, the British and the French were all Christians. Nationality, not religion, was the great divider at that time.

Sen does not appear to be aware that the cause of the War was the parlous state of multi-national Empires- that of the Hapsburgs, the Ottomans and the Tzar- none of which survived the war. British and French patriotism enabled both countries to progress towards Social Democracy- including decolonization. American patriotism has been a great force for the good- at least for those, like Sen, who live and work there.  

On the other hand, the dissolution of the British Empire in India did mean Sen's people had to run away from Muslim majority East Bengal.


It's important to remember that history, Sen said,

But what that history teaches is that multi-national Empires are fragile. Nationalism is a good thing provided there is collective security- e.g. NATO. Ukraine and Finland and Sweden have learnt that lesson.  

because narrow-mindedness "can take many, many different forms. And if you have one kind of narrow-mindedness, another narrow-mindedness is a remedy for that."

This is not just 'narrow-minded', it is deeply silly.  

Sen criticized "the presumption that the people of the world can be uniquely categorized according to some singular and overarching system of partition."

Every person can be uniquely identified by a long enough list of predicates- e.g. 59 year old Tamil man residing at such and such address, uniquely identifies me. 

What is the alternative to having this unique type of categorization? The police come to arrest me for shitting on Sen's doorstep but they mistake the neighbour's cat for me and thus it is the cat which goes to jail. 


"The newly popular singular view of identity is not only incendiary and dangerous. It is also astonishingly naïve," he said.

Come to think of it, in Hinduism a 'Yogijiva' is able to exist simultaneously in many bodies. But it is not 'naive' to believe that most people have only one body. Thus a long enough list of predicates will identify one body and one body only as embodying a particular person's identity. 

"In our normal lives, we consider ourselves as members of a great many groups. We belong to all of them."

That is 'oikeiosis' or 'belonging', it is not identity. I can quit a group without quitting life itself but when I quit my body I am dead.  

Multiple identities

Sen then cited a variety of ways one person can be identified: "The same person can be — without any contradiction — a U.S. citizen, of Asian background, of Indonesian ancestry,

Since 1965, this is true. Before that it would have been difficult for such a person to become a U.S citizen.   

a liberal, a woman, a vegetarian, a historian, a schoolteacher, a novelist, a feminist, a heterosexual, a believer in gay and lesbian rights, a movie fan, an environmental activist, a tennis player, a sprinter, and someone who believes that extraterrestrial beings should be taught how to write graceful sonnets, preferably in good English," he said, drawing laughter with the last identity.

This is foolish. It is obvious that there could be a contradiction in all this. An Indonesian Muslim may feel there was a contradiction in remaining a US citizen while it waged a war in which 1.3 million Muslims died. Some feminists believe that heterosexuality is an imposed identity for women. There can be a contradiction right there. Arguably movies promote the dominant narrative of hetero-normativity. Being a movie fan is not compatible with being a feminist just as being heterosexual is not compatible with that ideology. One can go on in this vein. The fact is that no two predicates applicable to us can't be found to contradict each other from some point of view.  

"Each of the collective identities to which this person belongs simultaneously without any contradiction gives her a particular identity,

This is not the case. She can be uniquely identified just by name, date of birth and Social Security number. It is not true that her identity changes because she stops being a movie buff and gets addicted to podcasts.  

which can be, depending on the context and circumstances, extremely important for her behavior and priority," he explained. "And these different identities can co-exist without any battle among them."

Or they can battle away with each other to their heart's content. The thing simply doesn't matter very much.  

The singular partitioning of the world population according to some overarching criteria of identity makes the work of terrorists and other instigators of violence who exploit the use of singularity much easier for them, he said.

No. The fact that people have bodies makes possible the task of violence. If we were non-corporeal entities we couldn't be stabbed or blown up. 

Crime can be suppressed only where we can uniquely identify criminals and pass sentence on them in a manner people consider just and fair. Otherwise there will be vendetta. 

"The ultimate issue is not only of personal choice and how we should approach our life and how we may think of our identity, but also of how we may see others," Sen said.

We should see others as having a single identity linked to their physical body.  

He illustrated his point with the example of "the demand for expelling all illegal immigrants from the USA."

Which is what the majority of American voters- especially the poorer ones- want.  

"Illegal immigrants of course do have the identity of being illegal, as well as illegal in status, and this is significant for public policy," he said. However, propaganda can make many already settled Americans, "particularly those nervous about their jobs," be persuaded "to see the identity of an illegal immigrant as being just that, as illegal, the total description.

This is foolish. Poorer Americans don't want either legal or illegal migration of a type which will undercut their wages. Also they don't want to be turned into a minority in their own land.  


"They have other identities, too, not just in terms of their shared humanity, their shared concern about their future, about their children, about families, about neighborhoods," Sen said, "but also in terms of the work they do, particularly for the economy, and the global perspective they can and often do bring directly and indirectly to American public reasoning."

But foreigners can do all this while remaining in their own countries! This is the age of the internet. We can get the perspective of a Nigerian or a Cambodian just from a Google search!

On the other hand, Americans accept that they might have to tolerate skilled immigrants with specialist knowledge or abilities.  

Inclusive vs. fragmentary views of world civilization

Sen described two ways of thinking about the pitfalls of civilization in the world. "One is to understand the story in an inclusive form and to encompass the manifestation of world civilization in different parts of the globe, taking on the divisions as well as the interdependences between human lives across the world," he said.

But that story is about how intense competition between enemies drove technological progress as well as social change of a desirable type. America ended Jim Crow because it needed African Americans to play a bigger and bigger part in the defence and prosperity of the country. Nobody can deny the tremendous contribution they have made in this respect. 

He contrasted the inclusive approach with the fragmentary approach, "which segregates the beliefs and practices of different regions into separated and self-contained boxes," he continued.

This 'fragmentary approach' is beneficial. America needed to get rid of Jim Crow. India needed to get rid of untouchability. Tagore, cretin that he was, got hold of the opposite end of the stick. He thought India had a Race problem! It didn't. It had a Religion problem. That's why his family lost their estates in East Bengal and also why Sen's family had to flee their ancestral homes. 


"Recently, the fragmentary approach has come much into prominence, especially in the threatening form of the so-called clash of civilization," Sen said.

What Sen means is that Huntingdon turned out to be right while he himself turned out to be utterly useless- at least to India.  

"The entire subject has been elevated to the position of being of central concern in many Western countries today."

And in India. Sen has spent twenty years railing against Modi to no avail whatsoever. The BJP has become largest opposition party in his own State. Only Mamta's goons keep her in power.  

He referred to the "dreadful events of 11 September 2001" having ushered in a period of awful conflicts and distrust in the world.

He won't say that it was the work of Muslims whose ideology was the same as that of those who drove his people out of their ancestral homes. The planner of 9/11 was Khalid Sheikh Muhammad whose father was a Deobandi preacher. 

"Indeed, many influential commentators have been tempted to see a firm linkage within the profusion of atrocities that you see around us today and the civilization of division primarily along religious lines," he said.

Salafi Islam turned out not just to be the enemy of Hindus and Buddhists and Sikhs. It also wanted to wipe out Christians and Jews and Socialists and Feminists and Movie buffs.  

To categorize people according to an identity such as a member of the Western world, the Islamic world, the Hindu world, or the Buddhist world, is to reduce people to this one dimension, as Sen sees it, and to presume this must be the predominant influence in his or her mode of thinking — thereby ignoring all other identities related to economic, social, political, professional, cultural or occupational affiliation.

Why did Sen's people have to flee their ancestral home? It was because their identity was 'kuffar'. Sen won't argue with the Muslims. He prefers to lecture us instead.  

In his 2006 book, "Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny," Sen noted that he discussed the harm that is done by the implicit belief in a single identity and "how this intellectual confusion can be used to foment violence, as terrorists do to recruit people to fierce deeds against ‘those others,’ and how that intellectual disarray can make it very hard to resist violence or to win the so-called war on terror."

Killing terrorists curbs that threat. This involves uniquely identifying them. It is morally unacceptable to just drone strike innocents.  The thing will create a backlash. 

Celebrating global interdependence

The West is suffering greatly right now from violence against it by those who want to exploit the divisions between civilizations and traditions, Sen said.

The West was suffering from the same thing that Sen's ancestors fled from. Why won't he admit it?  

The anti-Western jihadists, including Islamic terrorists, like to promote the idea of a fundamental dichotomy between the West and the non-Western world, he said.

They chased Sen's people out of East Bengal because they were 'kuffar' not because they were 'Western'.  

They see themselves as rigidly-separated Muslims, concerned only with their divergence from the West, and not with pursuits they can share with others in the world, including mathematics, science, literature or music.

These guys were playing a game for very high stakes. If they won, their families would be the aristocracy owning plenty of slaves.  

Sen called it "altogether astonishing and truly tragic" that Western parochialists do not dispute the fragmentation of civilization and history.

Instead of defending ourselves, we should talk Sen-tentious bollocks. That won't precipitate a tragedy at all. Why did Sen's daddy and mummy flee Dacca? Why did they not stay on to 'dispute the fragmentation of civilization and history'? How come Obama had Osama shot? Why did he not dispute with him instead? 

"Rather than resisting the alienation that feeds the anti-Western violence, this adds further force to the terrorists’ segregated vision," he explained.

Till they are killed.  

"In this sense, Western parochialism and the belligerence it generates have been in an unstated and implicit alliance with Islamic terrorism."

Very true. A woman who fights back against a rapist is in unstated and implicit alliance with him. Why does she not resist her own alienation from his desire to beat and sodomize her? Truly, this is a shameful and tragic error on her part.  


Sen concluded, "The need for recollecting and celebrating the richness of the vast interdependence within our global civilization has never been stronger.

He says this because it is the only thing he can do. But that thing is utterly useless.  

It’s a huge intellectual challenge that we face with increasing urgency, I believe."

Sen is mentally challenged. That's true enough. 

John Gray, the philosopher, had trenchantly criticized Sen's sen-tentious tosh in the Guardian back in 2006. He thinks Sen is making a

sustained attack on the "solitarist" theory which says that human identities are formed by membership of a single social group.

There is no such theory. Identity means inter-changeability. For a particular purpose, possession of a relevant property is the only thing that matters. Thus the authorities may give the order- 'all soldiers must return to their units' which applies to all soldiers but nobody else. 

Sen believes this solitarist fallacy shapes much communitarian and multicultural thinking, as well as Samuel Huntingdon's theory of "clashing civilisations".

This simply isn't true. We could speak of trait dominance without committing to determinism of a crude type. Perhaps Sen retained memories of vulgar Marxists who thought class origin conditioned consciousness. But that sort of thinking simply wasn't present in any academic text at any point in his career.  He and his friends at College seem to have read Marx as a wooly-minded Tagorean. A Bengali scholar write ' For Sen, Marx’s insistence upon seeing people from many different perspectives was a “vitally important message” for our world, where the penchant for labelling individuals and groups in one-dimensional terms not only robs them of the richness of their plural identities, it also lies at the root of pervasive inequality, exploitation, and conflict.' This is quite bizarre. Marxism stresses the importance of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' in paving the road to Communism. The economic substructure determines the superstructure. Some bourgeois types of idealism may give joy but they are a snare and a delusion which intellectuals should guard themselves from.

In each case it involves the fallacy of defining the multiple and shifting identities present in every human being in terms of a single, unchanging essence.

No such fallacy obtains in Huntingdon's oeuvre which Indians first received as a criticism of modernization theory. One may say that civilization is a function of governability and war or other violent conflict may arise out of a decline in governability which expresses itself as civilizational moral panic. One can't say that Huntingdon is an old fashioned racist who thinks A-rabs are bound to be all 'burqa burqa jihad' while the Chinese are bound to turn into Dr. Fu Manchu, while the Hindus will start yelling 'Kali Maa!' and trying to snatch Indiana Jones's heart out of his rib-cage.  

In Sen's view the idea that we can be divided up in this way leads to a "miniaturisation" of humanity, with everyone locked up in tight little boxes from which they emerge only to attack one another.

But Sen only emerges from his tight little box to attack everybody else.  Still, if that is what he gets paid to do- good luck to him. 

The solitarist view of human identity is plainly false, and it can also be dangerous.

No it can't because nobody holds it. One might as well say 'the view that everybody is actually my neighbor's cat is plainly false. Moreover, it can also be every dangerous because if you try to stroke pussy and it turns out to belong to a big butch lesbian who beats the shit out of you, you end up in hospital or you get arrested for indecent assault. Not that anything of the sort happened to me. It happened to this other bloke I know. We were in the SAS together, so I can't tell you his name.'  

Sen notes astutely how Huntingdon's crude theory has been used in the "war on terror" to entrench the perception that Muslims are defined only by their religious identity, itself supposedly defined in "anti-western" terms.

Fuck off! Bush was in the White House. He got on great with some members of Osama's family as well as with the Saudis and Gulf Sheikhs. Musharaff, in Pakistan, hastened to become America's ally though he says this was because America threatened to nuke his country back to the stone age. The fact is most Islamic countries were allies in the War against Terror. Indeed, the Egyptians had helped foil the first attempt to level the Twin Towers.  

Here, and at several points in Identity and Violence, Sen mounts a timely critique of the contemporary politics of identity.

No he doesn't. He won't go after the Islamists because that would get him in trouble back in West Bengal. Nor would he weigh in on any contentious issue like 'trans' rights vs. traditional Feminism. He just talks vacuous bollocks.  

Yet his critique is undermined by a pervasive lack of realism. He attacks the multicultural view of society, contrasting it with Gandhi's "far-sighted refusal to see a nation as a federation of communities and religions".

What on earth does that mean? Gandhi, like others in the INC, saw the Indian nation as a union of communities and religions. What else could it have been if not an invented appendage of the British Crown? 

In effect, Sen's alternative to multiculturalism is a species of liberal nationalism.

Except everybody can simultaneously belong to lots of other nations- which is cool if you are rich and can get to settle anywhere you like.  

Unfortunately he fails to ask how nationhood is achieved, and at what cost.

It was at the cost of his people having to run away from their ancestral homes. There was a 'Clash of Civilizations'. Pakistan was created for the Islamic Civilization. Kaffirs were not welcome.  

The emergence of modern nations has done much to emancipate individuals from the tyranny of local communities,

unless they were not able to migrate. But they may have had superior opportunities to do so under multi-national Empires.  

but this freedom has come at a heavy price. Nearly everywhere,

No. Only where there was a governance deficit. Norway and Sweden parted ways without a drop of blood being shed.  

large-scale violence has been an integral feature of the construction of nation-states. The communal slaughter that accompanied Indian independence is in no way exceptional.

Yes it is. Burma became independent without 'communal slaughter' and it was only in the Sixties that the Indians were chased away. Sri Lanka had no violence till the Government weakened the Army. Malaya did have anti-Communist violence but was subsequently peaceful. India was exceptional because there was a Muslim minority which was also the majority in one area. That's why Hindu Pandits were chased out of the Valley. Those foolish enough, or helpless enough, to have returned are now being killed one by one.

The US became a modern nation only after a devastating civil war,

I suppose that is one way of describing the Revolutionary War but it isn't the standard one.  

France only after Napoleon.

That wasn't a Civil War.  

In Africa and the Balkans the formation of nations has gone hand in hand with tribal conflict and ethnic cleansing, while the welding of China into a nation that is under way today involves the ruthless suppression of Tibetan and Muslim minorities.

The Chinese did have a Civil War.  

Even in its liberal, "civic" varieties, nationalism has spawned violence on a vast scale.

In some places- sure. But not in others.  

In comparison, multiculturalism - the chief target of Sen's critique - is a sideshow.

But the First World War was caused by the fragility of multi-ethnic Empires.  

There is a deeper unrealism in Sen's analysis, which emerges in his inability to account for the powerful appeal of the solitarist view.

There is no such view even among the Taliban or ISIS. 'Trait dominance' matters. You can join regardless of background provided you put one loyalty above all others. But this is equally true of the US Army. 

I suppose one could call the Khmer Rouge's ideology 'solitarist'. If you had soft hands or wore glasses you should be killed. Only horny handed peasants had the right ideology. On the other hand, Pol Pot's hands were plenty soft.  

He tells us "there is a big question about why the cultivation of singularity is so successful,

It is not successful at all. There is no country in the world where citizens are not encouraged to be good at maths and engineering and so forth along with being loyal to the State.  

given the extraordinary naivete of the thesis in a world of obviously plural affiliations".

But nobody actually holds this thesis anymore than they think that all beings are actually my neighbor's cat. 

Here we touch the heart of Sen's continuing bewilderment.

It pays him to be 'bewildered'. People think 'aw! he must be a really sweet guy to get so bewildered by the fact that some peeps like to murder and rob other people.'  

Along with many liberal philosophers, he seems to think human conflict is a result of intellectual error.

Because he gets paid to correct 'intellectual error'. Also he wants to be seen to be 'relevant'. Suppose he wrote a book proving that all human beings are not actually my neighbor's cat, people would think he had lost his marbles.  

But if the error of solitarism is so blatantly obvious, why do large numbers of people continue to believe in it and act on it?

Because they are all actually my neighbor's cat which, let me tell you, is not very smart or educated at all.  

Sen refers repeatedly to manipulation by malevolent propagandists. "Violence is fomented by the imposition of singular and belligerent identities on gullible people," he writes,

Very true. Back in 1977, a bunch of skinheads approached Sen with the intention of kicking in his Paki head. He explained to them that they were very gullible. A belligerent identity had been imposed on them. Actually, they were all a bunch of gay cats. This caused the skinheads to stop being violent. They started saying meow and gave each other rim jobs.  

"championed by proficient artisans of terror." But are people really so stupid? Or is the failure of understanding actually in the liberal philosopher?

Or is the liberal philosopher just making this shit up so as to virtue signal?


Writing of sectarian conflict in post-Saddam Iraq,

I was in Iraq between 1968 and 1970. Indian diplomats believed that Shia Sunni violence was imminent. The question was whether Kurdish Arab violence would occur first. The Assyrian Christians, however, had learnt their lesson and were keeping very quiet. But the remaining Jews were expelled in '68.  Some were hanged. This annoyed me because the kiddies cartoons were cancelled on TV so people could gaze their fill on Jewish corpses. 

Sen observes: "It should not be so surprising that the overlooking of all the identities of people other than those connected with religion can prove to be a problematic way of trying to reduce the hold of religious sectarianism."

This is foolish. The allies knew that there was a separate Kurdish and a separate Turkoman and a separate Marsh Arab and a separate Yezidi and separate tribal identities in addition to Shia/Sunni identity which, in the case of the Shias, was further complicated by allegiances to particular lineages of preceptors.  This did mean that Islamic State could be defeated by a complex coalition. 

The implication is that sectarianism in Iraq is a product of intellectual confusion - whether in Iraq or in its current western occupiers is unclear. But human divisions are not the result of any simple fallacy.

They arise because of political failure which in turn have to do with governability. However, in the case of Iraq one must mention the elephant in the room- viz. massive corruption.  

Their causes are many and tangled, including conflicts of interest, rival power structures and competition for resources.

Iraqis feel that corruption needed conflict so as to continue to flourish. In other words, reduced governability was a function of greed.  

Iraq is a post-colonial construction

Not really. It was supposed to join up with Syria and Egypt as a Socialist Arab State. Its institutions were 'Ba'athist' not British or Ottoman. It must be said, some Indians admired Iraq just as they admired Nasser's Egypt.  

whose populations are divided not only by ethnic and religious allegiances but also by rival claims on its oil reserves. Toppling Saddam's tyranny meant destroying the state and plunging the country into chaos.

Not really. Most people expected gradual 'de-Ba'athification' with technocrats being kept on so as to have rapid economic recovery. Iraqis believe the US did not take this path for a wholly corrupt reason.  

Shia, Sunni and Kurdish communities are not at one another's throats because they have a mistaken view of human identity.

That's true enough. Iraqis are religious and humanitarian. On the other hand clannishness and nepotism are leading to bad governance in the Kurdish region where two families have divided up all the spoils and many young and talented people are risking their lives (and paying a lot of money) to get to Europe.  

Trapped by the brutal logic of anarchy, they are locked in a battle for survival that could go on for generations. It has become fashionable to argue that the solution lies in partition, but if smaller and more viable states do eventually emerge in Iraq it will only be after a long period of mass slaughter as horrific as any that occurred when India was partitioned.

Hindus don't kill Hindus of any sect. They don't even kill Muslims or Christians save in retaliation. By contrast West Pakistan committed genocide on East Pakistan till it became independent with Indian help.  

For Sen, as a good liberal rationalist, it is an article of faith that the violence of identity is a result of erroneous beliefs.

Why not simply say that jihad as genocide of kaffirs is sinful? You won't get lots of virgins in Heaven if you blow up people of a different sect. 

The fact is Hindus would prefer to pay other people to kill. They believe killing is sinful. It is repugnant. It aint a great way to pass the time. But this means Hindus need to pay taxes for a proper Army and police force. Talking Sen-tentious shite won't help matters. 

He cannot accept that its causes are inherent in human beings themselves.

Only in human beings who think there is a Heavenly reward for killing 'infidels'.  

But as Berlin perceived, when freedom and order break down it is not because of mistakes in reasoning.

Yes it is. If leaders make stupid decisions, bad shit happens.  

The people who knifed the day-labourer in Bengal and who dragged off the man to his death in Petrograd made no error. They did what they did from fear, desperation or cruelty.

Or calculation. Violence serves a signaling function.  

Such atrocities express deep-seated human traits

No. You may say 'men are biologically programmed to rape' but it simply isn't true of most men. They are biologically programmed to whine. We don't like killing. The thing feels icky. Still, disciplined military training can make us better people even if War breaks out and we ourselves have to take human lives.  

that are not going to be removed by the kind of conceptual therapy offered by Sen.

Hinduism, remarkably, came to the conclusion that you have to learn statistical game theory to rule justly and minimize violence. This is the message of the Nalophkhyanam.  

If he cannot accept this fact it is because it suggests that ridding the world of identity-driven violence is going to be infinitely more difficult than he would like to believe.

Sen could have embraced the reverse game theory that is 'mechanism design'. He could have studied 'incomplete contract' theory. Instead he chose to talk vacuous bollocks.  

Turning to a more recent evaluation of Sen by Deen Chatterjee, a political philosopher, we get a clue as to why Sen was incapable of connected thought. The plain fact is he was incapable of understanding anything that he read. 

Citing the story of the Good Samaritan in the Gospel of Luke,

A story whose meaning for Christians is that Jesus was the Messiah of all people- not just a particular Jewish sect.  

where Jesus questions the idea of a fixed neighborhood,

He does not do so. Only those in the vicinity can help a wounded man. A Priest and a Levite refused to do so though they were in that vicinity or neighborhood. They did not love their neighbor but passed him by. The Samaritan showed love and care for the wounded man though he was of a different sect. He was a good and loving neighbor to him. We must be like that Samaritan if we are to inherit eternal life.  

Sen observes that “there are a few non-neighborhoods left in the world today.”

No. Only neighborhoods exist except perhaps at the Quantum level where there might be non-locality and 'entanglement'. It is not the case that putting out good energy or talking virtue signalling bollocks actually helps any injured or oppressed human being.  

 Going beyond the concept of reciprocity between equals

or non-equals. The Queen may smile at me and I am welcome to smile back. Reciprocity does not entail equality nor does equality entail reciprocity.  

that is embedded in the idea of social contract in the dominant Western ethics of justice,

there may be a notion of equality before the law or for a political purpose but this does not entail reciprocity. If the Judge pronounces sentence upon me, I am not at liberty to pronounce sentence upon him.  

Sen’s project of global justice takes a critical look at the realities of entrenched inequalities. Citing Buddha’s teaching, Sen argues that we have responsibility to the global poor precisely because of the asymmetry between us—our power and their vulnerability—and not necessarily because of any symmetry that is presumed in the social contract of reciprocity.

This is meaningless. Lord Buddha taught that Time and Causality are an illusion. There can be a pure intention towards loving kindness. But there is no responsibility because nothing complex exists or endures. 

There is an asymmetry between people who are poor because they are lazy and those who are rich because they are always working. Should the poor- who have more leisure- use it to judge the rich? Would that be cool? Suppose me and a bunch of my good for nothing friends start emailing smart and hard-working people with our judgments on their hair-style or diets? Would they comply with our judgments?

The fact is, the global poor should be wary of people who claim to feel a great responsibility towards them. Those virtue signaling crackpots may well fuck them over something chronic. When Gandhi first set up his Ashram in Wardha, the poor people there welcomed him. Then they discovered he was a crackpot. By the Eighties, the villagers would actively chase away Gandhian nutjobs who tried to enter their villages. They, quite reasonably, blamed the Gandhians- who said they had a responsibility to the poor- for the backwardness of the area. This was because Gandhians opposed Development schemes for one reason or another. 

Although Sen’s idea of justice is relational, it is not transactional

But Justice, like Education, is either a transaction- you pay your money and you get a service- or it is nothing. I want a burger to eat now because I'm hungry and I will pay for it. I don't want an inclusive promise to provide affordable and nutritious food for everybody. I won't give a penny for such nonsense. 

—it is inclusive. It is to Sen’s credit that he integrates the uplifting words of two great religious teachers

did he also integrate the uplifting words of Torquemada?  

into his secular political philosophy of justice, thereby providing a seamless blending of dimensions that is rich and unique.

Very true. When you blend Time and Space in a unique way you can get Buddha to do your chemistry homework while Christ tells you a nice bed-time story. 

Sen's work has helped some bureaucrats and bloviating academics but it had begun to lose both the war of ideas as well as the support of voters by about 1970. Thatcher and Reagan were on the horizon. Sen's students got rich in finance or enterprise. Some retained an irritating tendency to talk bollocks. But they quietly opened their wallets to Right Wing political parties. 


Likewise, while teaching at the University of California, Berkeley, on a visiting assignment in 1964–1965, Sen was impressed by how minority immigrants growing up under British colonial rule in diverse parts of the world were drawn to Berkeley and found a home,

That had happened much earlier. However, during the First World War, the Brits got the Americans to crack down on the 'Ghaddarites'.  

and friendship, in the intellectual and argumentative circles shaped by Berkeley’s free speech movement.

Which created a backlash such that Reagan got two terms as Governor of California.  

The New York Times reported: “For foreign students—many coming from countries with strong left-wing movements—the rise in activism made them feel at home, said the Indian economist Amartya Sen…who was teaching at Berkeley at the time.”

Vote for Reagan, otherwise California will be overrun by coolies.  

 Sen notes that America’s turn toward greater social equity and inclusive public policies over the decades has been in large part due to the free speech movement and activism in the 1960s: “Public debates and radical movements have made a significant contribution to this change” 

No. The Second World War and then the Cold War led to a great expansion of the State Sector which in turn helped organized Labor. Women and African Americans could rise because their skills and productivity was needed to finance the Military-Industrial complex. However, there was a backlash. The White working class turned against the Left because they believed 'Welfare Queens' were gaining disproportionately. African American economist too turned to the Right because the Welfare State was destroying Black Families.  


Sen enjoyed the thrill of teaching his “astonishingly talented” students at the Delhi School of Economics, after completing his tenure at Cambridge in 1963. He narrates a moving episode of the reaction of his students during one of his lectures when he read aloud a passage from Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments in which Smith strongly denounces the practice of slavery in America and Europe and resoundingly praises the people from the coast of Africa as superior to the slave owners.

This is incredibly stupid. Smith said that savages are different from us civilized folk. From a tender age they prepare themselves for a death involving hideous torture. In this sense they are superior to us. We don't scruple to scream and cry and get hysterical when pleading our case. The savage would never do so. 

Smith says that the French and Italians were the most polished nations of all. A Frenchman will weep in front of the King if refused a regiment. An Italian will howl more at being fined 20 shillings by the Magistrates than an Englishman facing the noose. 


Why did Sen's students not understand that this is racist shite? They knew that the Whites had regarded them as savages. Macaulay had written a lot about the cowardly Bengali who, however, would face the noose with equanimity because, after all, for all his cunning, he was merely a savage. 

What Smith is really saying is that 'Fortune' favors the civilized. They were destined to rule over savages. But there was no point beating and torturing dusky folk because they were mere savages. Just make sure they don't get enough to eat while working long hours at boring and menial jobs. 

Sen’s students, who in their own investigations found some of the practices of inequality in India close to the inhumanity of slavery, felt an “immediate sense of solidarity” with and a sense of pride in the people far away from them in Africa,

Smith says Asia too is populated by savages.  

as they felt with the people nearby. Sen recalls the shock and horror Tagore felt, much as Smith did, in response to the degrading treatment received by a segment of humanity on account of their race or status.

Yes, yes. These guys were always feeling lots of shock and horror. But they ran away from East Bengal swiftly enough.  

Sen concludes his memoir thus: “It was reassuring to find that the fundamental respect and understanding of people for which Smith and Tagore argued was so clearly recognized by the students. This must surely be a strong source of hope in the world” (p. 407).

Tagore was the head of an extremely casteist sect though he himself relaxed the rule that only Brahmins could preach from the pulpit. On the other hand, he ensured that all his children married Dalits. I'm kidding. The very idea! 


Meeting and interacting with people in different European countries who were open and inclusive during Sen’s youthful travel days gave Sen a sense of watching the “unfolding of European integration.”

Which everybody was cool with so long as White Europeans were getting the benefit.  

Indeed, as Sen looks back, he sees “some amazing achievements in Europe” over the intervening years in such important areas as human rights, rule of law, participatory democracy, the rise of the welfare state, and economic and political cooperation. Yet, with dismay, Sen notes the recent rise of a “backward-looking attitude” in several European countries,

Because non-White or Islamic people were seen as getting the benefit.  

including Britain, regarding European democratic tradition and European unity (p. 386). This trend reflects a recent surge of polarized politics centered on nativist populism and identity politics in democracies all over the world, posing a threat to the viability of participatory democracy.

No. It's just that Europe doesn't want non-Europeans turning up in great numbers to participate in that Democracy and demand the imposition of Sharia Law.  

As with many related areas, Sen’s justice project has an important bearing on this issue.

Thinks nobody at all.  

Indeed, his project has innovative prescriptions for a built-in safeguard against the corrosive effects of identity politics within a liberal democracy.

No it doesn't. If Dr. Taslima Nasreen has to run away from Bengal, and then India itself, Sen's 'innovative prescriptions' won't help her any. Who knows? She may have to run away from Scandinavia because of the increasing importance of the Muslim vote- not to mention the bloodthirsty nature of their gangsters.  


Sen’s work on global justice has been an exemplary road map for showing the futility of warfare for the cause of peace, security, and justice.

Actually, he has shown the futility of Welfare Econ and Political Philosophy. Warfare, meanwhile, is doing fine. Ukraine will become a great nation precisely because it has come together to fight Putin.  


The prime source of conflict between proponents of democratic solidarity and nativist populism on issues of identity is the cherished liberal idea that an impartial liberal theory of justice need not be incompatible with distinct principles of affirmative equality with regard to minority groups, within reason, of course.

Sharia Law for some. Nazism for others. Cool.  

This idea helps liberals justify minority accommodation in a pluralistic liberal democracy.

Till there is a backlash.  

But it leaves both sides—the minorities and the populists—unhappy, with the complaint of tokenism on one side and that of over-catering to minorities on the other, leading to simmering anger rooted in feelings of powerlessness.

These bleeding heart liberals were God's gift to the Right. Orban is in power thanks to Soros. The American Visa ban on Modi helped him become Prime Minister.  


This distrust is a barrier to dialogue and deliberation as a means of negotiating claims of culture and identity, both within and among groups. It makes pluralism—the hallmark of liberal democracy—an elusive goal.

Pluralism is not the hallmark of liberal democracy. It is liberalism. Pluralistic democracy is the sort of shite the Lebanese are stuck with. It doesn't work at all.  


In contrast to this divisive solidarity along national, cultural, and ideological lines, Sen’s ideas lay the foundation for an inclusive democratic solidarity.

How come nothing was built on it? The thing simply didn't exist.  

During his student days in Cambridge, Sen was instructed by his mentor Piero Sraffa to read Sraffa’s old friend John Maynard Keynes “on the formation—and importance—of public opinion and its role in social transformation…”

Keynes distrusted the public. They were stupid and had 'animal spirits'. Dewey believed in the public. Keynes didn't. The Government needed to instrumentalize the 'money illusion' of the great unwashed to achieve its objectives. 

Sen learned, among other things, that for Keynes public reasoning was critically important for a healthy democracy, and that “Keynes was eager to show how crucial it was for different sides to work together for the realization of their respective goals . . . even when their goals do not fully coincide . . . .” (p. 387).

What Sraffa may have meant was that Keynes had intended to write about Capitalism as suffering from a moral, not a technical, problem. However, the least marked reading of 'My early Beliefs' is the conventional one that Keynes had embraced Humeanism. The Bloomsbury group had been over-optimistic.  Keynes had lived long enough to concede that 'civilization was a thin and precarious crust erected by the personality and the will of a very few, and only maintained by rules and conventions skillfully put across and guilefully preserved’.

There is no point reasoning with thugs and brutes. But you can trick them into doing what is necessary. 

The importance of public reasoning in a pluralistic democracy

Kant and so forth thought public reasoning (confined to a higher class of public officials including University Professors who were classed as civil servants) was important in an enlightened despotism. You need a class of intellectuals who can suggest better mechanisms without fearing the Inquisition or the Secret Police. But this sort of freedom must be restricted to the genuinely smart. 

A pluralistic democracy would not feature public reasoning. Why? Public order would be disrupted because of claims of 'blasphemy' on the one hand and 'fanaticism' on the other.  

has been a key component in Sen’s great contribution in the culture and human rights debate,

but what is that contribution? Human rights are nice? That's a contribution? The question is whether incentive compatible remedies exist for rights' violations.  

as well as to the topic of justice. Sen has opened the way to bridging the divide between theoretical pronouncements and practical impediments by situating the arguments of justice in the real world of diversity, need, vulnerabilities, and interdependence.

Which is all very well but where is the money to come from? The Rich? But they have multiple identities as the survivors of horrendous sexual self-abuse. Also they have a clear 'capability' to get to Mars. Society must give them the means to do so. Many ninety year old Economists need more honorary Doctorates and Prizes. They must be kept alive- regardless of expense- so as to enjoy this valuable 'functioning'.  

Sen’s approach is practical and pluralistic, and based on the discipline of social choice, which pays attention to the lives of people as lived in the real world.

Hilarious! Social choice theory assumes that people have perfect information and costless computation. This means there is no need for language- let alone 'public reasoning'. Everybody already knows everything.  

For that, according to Sen, one need not be focused on ideal institutional arrangements, but should instead concentrate on promoting enabling institutions and viable social realizations to ensure the mitigation of injustice.

How? Either by giving them money or enabling them to make money. But Sen isn't saying where the money will come from. The fact is 'multiple identities' means that everybody has some glaring grievance or suffers what they believe is a remediable injustice. This creates a 'concurrency problem'. Where do you start? Who is first in the queue? We may agree that it should be a disabled LGTQ trans-person of color who is currently starving to death. But then it turns out that this is one of the multiple identities of my neighbor's cat. Yet it is me who is going to jail for Welfare fraud! That is terribly unjust! 

Accordingly, Sen proposes a comparative approach that is primarily about rectifying injustices rather than locating ideal justice.

But if you have no 'ideal' of Justice then who is to say that we must begin by remedying the injustice I suffer by not being selected Miss Teen Tamil Nadu and getting to marry Queenji in a Lesbian wedding presided over by Popeji? Also, why am I so fat? 

This bottom-up approach is in contrast to the dominant Western social-contract paradigm that seeks perfect justice in a liberal democracy.

Actually, people naturally prefer risk pooling through an insurance scheme which takes account of 'moral hazard'.  

Sen’s concern is more practical, guided by the realities of people’s lives and capabilities, with a focus on people’s plural identities.

But it has achieved nothing whatsoever. This is because 'plural identities' means that everybody can have an almost infinite claim against society. From one point of view Musk is rich and should pay more in taxes. From another he is a Martian and Society must spend ten trillion dollars to ensure that he can relocate to the Red Planet in a dignified and comfortable manner.  


Sen’s comparative approach is open enough to guide people in assessing and ranking available alternatives,

or just pulling them out of their arse

without the need to speculate on all possible outcomes for a perfect resolution.

But any decision can be blocked by a counterclaim.  

In fact, his approach is broad and inclusive in its enunciation of what counts as reasonable, and it even accepts the prospect of more than one reasonable option. Even if this procedure cannot always resolve all competing claims,

It can never do so. The capabilities practitioner has the capability of judging that I must get ten trillion dollars. True, objects may have to be inserted into the rectum of the practitioner for this capability to be realized but because they have multiple identities, the pain they experience in one persona is cancelled out by the pleasure gained by their masochistic identity.  

Sen points out that this “valuational plurality” makes public reasoning all the more necessary, to be celebrated rather than shunned in a democracy.

Very true! You should respect the valuational plurality displayed by those who beat you and insert things up your rectum even if they would by no means like the same thing to happen to themselves.  

 Public reasoning emboldens democracy by making it truly participatory.

Thus, everybody should be heard from before any decision is made.  

 It brings disparate groups together by showcasing their concerns in the shared arena, which generates cooperation and mutual understanding.

Then those disparate groups start beating each other and setting fire to everything. Sen, no doubt, feels that Capitol Hill should be invaded by lunatics every day.  

Sen’s justice project is tied to the plurality of impartial reasons

which can never be known to be impartial because we have no means of telling who is really impartial.  

embedded in today’s expanding circle of global human-rights approaches.

That circle is contracting. People discovered that it is difficult to detect bogus rights' claims with the result that the remedy was so rationed that obviously deserving candidates could get none.  

Because the notion of human rights is predicated on our shared humanity,

why not animal rights predicated on our similar biology?  

Sen’s idea of justice is open to the world.

So, anybody who wishes can come in and shit on it. Justice must be protocol bound and kept safe from nutters and hooligans. Sen teaches in places which go to great lengths to keep out stupid assholes like me.  

It goes beyond national borders and regards people, rather than states, as sovereign.

Why stop there? Why not see all living beings as omnipotent Gods? Indeed, this is one of my own multiple identities. How come Popeji isn't coming to do my washing up?  

 Sen is aware that “there are bound to be difficulties in advancing the assessment of global justice through public reasoning,” especially due to social media and the Internet.

Surely both are inexpensive technologies which facilitate communication and reasoning by savants in useful STEM subject fields?  

Yet he is cautiously optimistic. He notes: “What is needed is to make 

everybody and everything as nice as pie 

. . . public reasoning more extensive, more systematic, and much better informed, partly through expanding the vehicles of dissemination of information, strengthening the facilities for ‘fact-checking’ and for the scrutiny of ‘fake news,’ and doing what we can to remove the barriers to public discussion.”

This is happening anyway because there is a market for it. Sen's shite hasn't helped any. On the other hand my demand, first articulated in the Baghdad declaration of 1968, that 'everybody should be nice and not do naughty things' enabled the whole World to advance greatly.  

 Sen declares that in a world where our lives are globally interdependent as never before, “if the jointness of problems of justice is a global reality, interactive and informed reasoning is surely a global necessity.”

We have found that 'interactive and informed reasoning' does not help the people of Ukraine. There is no fucking 'jointness'. If guys start unjustly invading your territory, you have to fight and kill them. Sen isn't going to come to help you.  


Sen gives us a challenging but promising road map toward restoring liberal democracy in the face of populist illiberalism.

Really? Has the guy really figured out a way to get Trump out of American politics?  

However, regardless of how inspiring and practicable his path might be, it ultimately depends on the prevailing political will as to whether or not his vision is put into practice.

So the guy is a useless tosser. By contrast, only by implementing my Baghdad Declaration of 1968 can the World become a better place. Alas, this depends on the prevailing political will- something which I realized in 1977 when I issued my New Delhi Declaration demanding that political will become nice. It should stop being naughty. 

Sen notes: Keynes’s efforts to “sway contemporary government policy were not immediately successful,” but he “contributed a great deal to the ‘general opinion of the future’. . . .” (p. 388)

The Second World War opened people's eyes to what Government spending could achieve.  

Likewise, regardless of whether Sen’s ideas are getting immediate success in responding to the current political challenges, his monumental contribution to the imperatives of justice in our global world is a great gift to scholars and policy makers for generations to come.

Keynes had his 'multiplier effect'. What does Sen have? Nothing but empty words. Be nice. Don't be nasty.  


Home in the World

Noted ethicist Sissela Bok observes that when children are

given horrible names by stupid parents (hers were the Myrdals)  and then go quietly potty and end up as 'ethicists'.  

deprived of a culturally rooted education, “they risk developing a debilitating sense of being exiled everywhere.”

Though this can also happen if they have a culturally rooted education. Actually being exiled from everywhere can, however, lead to one culturally rooting all over the place.  

Tagore was well aware of this risk. He made efforts to see that students’ education was firmly rooted in Indian history and culture as well as in the Asian heritage, while simultaneously

talking incessant bollocks to them and encouraging them to do the same. 

pursuing relevant knowledge and wisdom gathered from all corners of the world.

Why are more kids not being taught Voodoo? Is it coz of Racism?  

Sen was a beneficiary of this well-rounded education early in his life.

But he kept well away from it later on.  

In Sen’s world, the local and the global complement each other.

They also compliment each other. The local says to the global 'you have got a smokin' bod!' and the global says 'you have nice eyes'. Then they get smoochy. The National then turns up and accuses the local of being a slut. The Global says 'dude, why you getting jelly? We was just makkin.' The National then says 'the local is underage!' at which point the Global goes running home to the International. 

Sen’s affirmation of his humanity and universalism is not rootless globalism or vacuous cosmopolitanism—it is

boring Bengali bullshit 

the confluence of the near and the far

and the Future and the Past, not to mention Magic and Science and Humanity and everybody having a multiple identity as my neighbor's cat 

in his wide range of experiences, encounters, and intellectual explorations all through his life.

Which was spent studying and teaching worthless shite.  

Sen takes pride in his Bengali identity, but it does not prevent him from affirming his other interlocking identities,

which arose because he ran away from India with his best friend's wife 

loyalties,

he wasn't loyal to his Bengali wife 

and obligations,

like not fucking his best-friend's wife 

including an affirmation of his shared humanity.

He certainly shared his jizz with his best-friend's wife.  

Instead of the exclusivity of a singular identity,

that of a Hindu husband who considers it wrong to run off with his best-friend's wife 

Sen’s vision makes room for a joyous interplay of

adultery 

multifaceted and overlapping identities whereby the imperatives of human yearnings are not compromised in the name of local practices or blindly followed while ignoring cultural roots and traditions.

Like the tradition of not fucking your best friend's wife.  

He goes beyond the narrow conundrum of conflicting loyalties,

You should be loyal and faithful to your own wife. You should not run off with your best friend's wife. 

where the forces of nationalism and ethnocentrism

or the sacrament of marriage 

can have an uneasy alliance with the broader vision of our common humanity, as we see in Tagore’s novel The Home and the World.

Which ends with Muslims slaughtering and robbing and raping Hindus.  

Sen’s mission is to bring the local and the global together in finding our home in the world.

His people fled their own locality fleetly enough. Then he fled India along with his best-friend's wife. But she was connected in different ways with both Sraffa and Gramsci so the dude was trading up.  


Sen himself has felt at home in the world

The world? Nope. Ivy League cloisters aint the world. We are speaking of an Ivory Tower.  

in terms of both his ideas and his global engagements.

His best friend's wife was Italian. That was a 'global engagement' right enough.  

He has been a leading catalyst for innovative vision in today’s troubled world.

No. His shite only helped UN bureaucrats and worthless academics.  

His ideas have been instrumental in exploring the prospects of collective action and value-based dialogue in a divided world where norms clash.

No. There is no substantive content to his shite. 

A leading critic of culture

He has made no cultural criticism. The fact is he didn't understand what he read in Tagore or Smith or Marx on anybody else.  

and also a passionate global citizen who embraces the best in all cultures,

He certainly embraced his best-friend's wife who he thought better than his own Bengali bride.  

Sen rejoices in the shared humanity of the global world.

But does not do so in his own ancestral Dacca. This was because his people decided they wouldn't 'share humanity' very long there because the place was majority Muslim.  


Being at home in a global world is the foremost challenge of our time.

Says another Bengali ex-pat teaching worthless shite  

By reframing the debate on culture and universal norms in accessible experiential terms,

is the guy for or against abortion or the burqa or animal rights? We don't know.  

away from its usually contested cultural and foundational juxtaposition, Amartya Sen has shown us the way toward responding to this global challenge.

He showed other Bengalis the way to emigrate on the basis of bogus erudition in bullshit subjects. But they would have found this path on their own. Still, it warms the cockles of our hearts to think that these boring buddhijivis imagine they have multiple identities as my neighbor's cat which spends a lot of time licking its own arse. Sen will only attain this felicity in his next life. Till then, other Bengali Professors must lick his arse for him. 


Friday, 13 May 2022

उठ जाग मुसाफिर

For this blasphemy against 'base case' Tamasic Yoga
Sleep, Dream, sushupti & Nirguna Bhoga
Kabir was condemned to Ezra's Pound
Above, but Rabies. Babies
The dog underground.

A mofussil Aristotle


'is to strain to be at the centre of the universe'
I totes grok
Tears are Pain's fossil in my own every verse.

Thursday, 12 May 2022

Buber as Baubo

Not that Paranoia was such Poverty as left me less character than cash
Nor a tongue but facile a yet fancier clit to mash
(Lest Love's true Prince turn out to be too moderately endowed)
But that, as Poet or Prophet, Thy conatus, I allowed.




Turing's lawless algorithms.


Thanks to Bearnays, Turing became aware that his work- relying on the principle of the excluded middle- could not necessarily describe any machine whose existence it proved. In other words, his result was non-informative. A converse statement- viz anything verifiable as corresponding to a description might not exist in Turing's oeuvre. In other words, to say 'there can be a thinking machine' would be like saying 'there can be a flying unicorn'. The thing is not informative. It is imaginative. Equally, to say 'thinking can be represented by something machine readable' would be non-informative. It is a pious hope or the motivation for a research program but is itself outside the scope of any logical discourse. 

Turing, on Bearnays suggestion, used Brouwer's notion of 'overlapping choice sequences' to get round this difficulty. The problem was that computable numbers no longer had a unique representation but this seemed worthwhile because the class of computable numbers became 'absolute' with respect to its representation in this or that formal system. The caveat is that 'formal system' must have a representation as a 'law-like' sequence. Yet we know formal systems can evolve. This means that the evolutionary state imposes uncorrelated asymmetries which is why uniqueness does not obtain. But it could do to the extent that the 'law-less' is constructible. Another way of saying this is that if there is a coevolved process which represents co-evolution non arbitrarily then proof of existence implies constructive description. This would make mathematics 'informative'. Perhaps it is so 'at the end of Time'. Otherwise evolution will be superseded. It is not that machines will be able to think, it is rather that humans will seek to become machines. Thought and Affect will be spandrels to be eliminated to improve efficiency. Ontological dysphoria will be banished. Humans would have become at home in the world at the cost of being turned into domestic appliances. 

My point is that when we consider how Turing came to his 'eidetic' or 'absolute' result, we come to see that when we use the term 'thinking machine', the mind represents 'thinking' in a non-unique manner. There is an element of choice or arbitrariness. In other words there is a lot of scope for philosophers to write nonsense.

Consider the following by Sebastian Sunday Greve writing in Aeon- 

‘It might be argued that there is a fundamental contradiction in the idea of a machine with intelligence,’ is how (Turing) began his final reflections in the lecture, which culminated in his ‘plea for “fair play for the machines”’. He illustrated what he had in mind with a little thought experiment, which may be regarded as an early precursor to the Turing test:
Let us suppose we have set up a machine with certain initial instruction tables [ie, programs], so constructed that these tables might on occasion, if good reason arose, modify those tables. One can imagine that after the machine had been operating for some time, the instructions would have altered out of all recognition, but nevertheless still be such that one would have to admit that the machine was still doing very worthwhile calculations. Possibly it might still be getting results of the type desired when the machine was first set up, but in a much more efficient manner.

The set of procedures would have been culled- sure- but the instructions would be the same. The knowledge we gain would be about what procedures are useful. However, there is a danger that some safeguard has been lost and thus 'robustness' has decreased. 


Commenting on this case, he then added:
In such a case one would have to admit that the progress of the machine had not been foreseen when its original instructions were put in. It would be like a pupil who had learnt much from his master, but had added much more by his own work. When this happens I feel that one is obliged to regard the machine as showing intelligence.

So a virus shows intelligence. But a virus may evolve into a Speigelman monster. It may lose robustness and go extinct because of a small change in the fitness landscape. Suppose the Ukraine war gets out of hand and we end up blowing up the planet. As a species we'd be considered bonkers, not brainy, by Galactic savants.

Turing knew that whatever he, or others, might feel about such a case was less important than whether machine intelligence is really possible. But he also knew – as well as anyone – that conceptual clarity at the fundamental level, such as might be achieved through philosophical reflection, was going to be crucial to any major scientific advancement in the right direction. Arguably, all of his philosophical work had only this instrumental aim of conceptual clarity. It was certainly always characteristic of his work that the two – philosophy and science (or, more generally, fundamental science and applied science) – went hand in hand in this way. In the lecture, this is shown by his immediate continuation from the passage above: ‘As soon as one can provide a reasonably large memory capacity it should be possible to begin to experiment on these lines.’

But that memory might be externally accessible or encoded in the fitness landscape by some coevolutionary process. Philosophy, on learning of Turning's use of Choice Sequences in 1937 would have had to say that there was no 'open' question here. The thing was already closed. The word thinking could not be used in the same way for viruses and human beings and machines. All this type of discourse could produce was non-informative figurative language of an imaginative, not philosophical, type. 

Turing’s strong interest in practical experimentation was one reason why he consistently advocated for the development of high-speed, large-memory machines with a minimally complex hardware architecture (child machines, as he would later call them), so as to give the greatest possible freedom to programming, including a machine’s reprogramming itself (ie, machine learning). Thus, he explained:
I have spent a considerable time in this lecture on this question of memory, because I believe that the provision of proper storage is the key to the problem of the digital computer, and certainly if they are to be persuaded to show any sort of genuine intelligence.

Or reduce the human labor involved as well as the scope for human error. Ultimately this was the economic reason which drove R&D. Philosophy can say little when the bead counters move in.  


In a letter from the same period, he wrote: ‘I am more interested in the possibility of producing models of the action of the brain than in the practical applications to computing.’ Due to his true scientific interests in the development of computing technology, Turing had quickly become frustrated by the ongoing engineering work at the National Physical Laboratory, which was not only slow due to poor organisation but also vastly less ambitious in terms of speed and storage capacity than he wanted it to be. In mid-1947, he requested a 12-month leave of absence. The laboratory’s director, Charles Darwin (grandson of the Charles Darwin), supported this, and the request was granted. In a letter from July that year, Darwin described Turing’s reasons as follows:
He wants to extend his work on the machine still further towards the biological side. I can best describe it by saying that hitherto the machine has been planned for work equivalent to that of the lower parts of the brain, and he wants to see how much a machine can do for the higher ones; for example, could a machine be made that could learn by experience?

Humans using a memoryless computer could learn by experience and that method of learning could be algorithmic to a certain extent.  

Turing participated in ...a discussion with Newman and Jefferson, chaired by the Cambridge philosopher R B Braithwaite, on the question ‘Can Automatic Calculating Machines Be Said to Think?’ At the outset, the participants agree that there would be no point in trying to give a general definition of thinking.

Why? One could say 'Thinking is categorical. The result of thinking is a functor- a mapping between categories.' That might be useful- more particularly to philosophers who would have been motivated to keep up with the math rather than go down cul de sacs of stupidity.   

Turing then introduces a variation on the ‘imitation game’, or the Turing test. In his 1950 paper, he says that he is introducing the imitation game in order to replace the question he is considering – ‘Can machines think?’ – with one ‘which is closely related to it and is expressed in relatively unambiguous words’. The paper’s version of the game, which is slightly more sophisticated, consists of a human judge trying to determine which of two contestants is a human and which a machine, on the sole basis of remote communication using typewritten text messages, with the other human trying to help the judge while the machine pretends to be a human. Turing says that:
[T]he question, ‘Can machines think?’ should be replaced by ‘Are there imaginable digital computers which would do well in the imitation game?’

This is foolish. A game is not a game if the player is dead or imaginary. A guy can fool another guy that a mannequin really lurves him. 'Weekend at Bernie' type stuff, involving the corpse of Harold Laski, happened all the time in the Indian Planning Commission- or so I fondly believe. There is only one test of what is or isn't 'thinking' or 'emoting'- viz whether it has survival value. But that's up to the fitness landscape which, no doubt, includes such snakes and ladders as are constituted by our own stupidity or serendipity as beings who like to bloviate. Turing was smart but a lot of smart guys talk ultracrepidarian crap. Socioproctology isn't smart. But it does point an accusing finger at assholes who aren't doing anything useful at all while cluttering up Academia.



Joshua Anderson wrong on Sen's Gita

 Justice is a Service industry. People pay to get a judgment and then pay to get that judgment enforced. Obligation holders may either pay money to dispute a judgment or they may ignore it or else spend a little money to frustrate its enforcement. 

There is a separate issue where an organization seeks a monopoly of legitimate coercion. It may justify this by saying that it will serve Justice or Religion or the Purity of the Race or Democracy or Communism or something else altogether.

An ideology associated with an organization claiming absolute power may have a theory of Justice or a theory of God or a theory of Racial Purity of a theory of Liberty or Happiness or Niceness or some other mishmash of its own. The theory of Justice or Liberty or Niceness associated with such ideologies are stupid and puerile. However, sycophants who wish to rise may pay a little for that type of indoctrination.

Amartya Sen made a living teaching nonsense of this sort to aspiring bureaucrats and other such sycophants and parasitic virtue signallers. Because he came from India and was of Hindu ancestry, he felt obliged to talk some tosh about the Bhagvad Gita. 

A young Professor of Philosophy in Viginia wrote a paper some years ago titled Sen and the Bhagavad Gita: Lessons for a Theory of Justice. It is obviously foolish. The Gita is set in the Iron Age. Some people- Sages, Princes, Guild heads etc- provided judicial services either for a fee or as part of some other function for which they were remunerated. The Gita is wholly unconcerned with this sort of 'Artha' or economic or administrative activity. Thus it has no 'lessons for a theory of Justice'. This is because Justice is not the same thing as 'Morality' or 'Righteousness' and thus neither 'Deontology', which is concerned with duty, nor 'Consequentialism', which is concerned with optimal decision making, appear in their pure form in discourse about Justice. Instead, there is always something like a 'reasonable man' test or else a customary norm. A person is welcome to say that they broke a law because they were more scrupulous than normal or had a better understanding of remote and currently invisible consequences, but a Judge or Jury would be entirely in the right to judge them as ordinary law-breakers who must pay a penalty.

Judgments and not decisions in the ordinary sense. The former conform to a protocol bound, 'buck stopped' (which also means no halting or concurrency problem), deliberative procedure of an essentially artificial, or invented, type. This does mean there are no 'topological holes' and discontinuous tipping points, and hysteresis effects and arbitrariness and inconsistency and so on. Precisely because juristic judgments are not decision theoretic, scandal is avoided because it is obviously utile to have a way of breaking tied decisions (or teiku in Hebrew), or concurrency live-lock or deadlock or Turing type 'halting' problems' etc. Moreover juristic judgments have signalling value even if they are not enforced. They may promote better correlated equilibria. On the other hand, having lots of unenforceable laws on the statute books may lead to the disintermediation of the Justice system. 

In the Hindu and Judaic tradition, those acting as judges or as jury members are asked to set aside their own interests and beliefs and act instead on the basis of what they believe to be 'common knowledge' of how 'reasonable' or 'pious' people behave in the ordinary way of things. At a high enough level of Judgment, new rules and exceptions, or meta-rules, may be created but these may be severely limited in their application. 

What happens if an economist- one, moreover, trained to look for utility maximising solutions because Knightian Uncertainty is assumed not to exist- or a Moral Philosopher of a Contractarian type- but one ignorant of Hohfeldian 'incidents' or the theory of incomplete contracts- tries to formulate an 'Idea of Justice'? The answer is that you get nonsense.

Joshua quotes Sen- '“... justice, by its very nature, has to have universal reach, rather than being applicable to the problems and predicaments of some people, but not others'

This is obviously false. Justice does not have and does not claim universal reach. It is circumscribed either de jure or de facto to a specific jurisdiction where, however, cost of enforcement may render it only of marginal significance. Justice is applicable only to the problems and predicaments of some people who have sufficient means, or effective claims against obligation-holders who have sufficient means, to make it worthwhile for them to approach the Courts. However, under incomplete contracts, it is mutually beneficial for parties to chose a binding arbitrator or legal jurisdiction such that both parties can proceed in good faith despite the existence of 'Knightian Uncertainty'. What this means is that when a novel state of the world arises, the contract can be amended in a relatively frictionless way such that the relationship can continue to burgeon. 

It is true that there were some virtue signallers who pretended- after the Soviet Union's fall and before China's rise had fully registered- that there might be 'universal human rights' which Uncle Sam would enforce under 'Right to Protect'. But it was obvious that most people- whatever their problems and predicaments- would not permit foreigners to turn up to enforce their own Judgments on territory which was not their own. In the short run, 'shock and awe' might subdue the natives. In the middle to long term, they would bleed the occupier dry. Justice can't have universal reach because of suicide bombs and nuclear weapons and brave Ukrainians who don't want Putin to 'de-Nazify' their Nation by killing their Jewish President and Prime Minister. 

The laws of nature, at least theoretically, must have universal reach because elementary particles are assumed to have no 'uncorrelated asymmetries'. A photon in Boston does not know it is different from a photon in Bangkok. People, however, possess 'uncorrelated asymmetries'. That is why 'bourgeois strategies' arise among living things but are markedly absent from inorganic matter. 

Judging legal cases can give rise to a specialist legal profession with a shared vocabulary and 'terms of art'. Judicial reasoning is 'objective' in that it adheres to the protocols maintained by this profession. But this is true of any protocol bound type of discourse. There may be disagreement on many substantive matters and different schools of thought may bitterly contend with each other but at least in respect to certain conventional procedures and 'terms of art' there is unanimity within a particular jurisdiction. But in a different jurisdiction- e.g Scotland rather than England & Wales- things may be quite different. A person who is a subject or a particular Jurisdiction may have a subjective view of the Laws binding upon him. If this subjective view is held to be 'reasonable' it may be upheld by a Court. But, 'objective' Law is the set of statutes and stare decisis judgments which exist. It isn't any subjective view of any sort however philosophical or informed by economic science.

Joshua writes-

 In other words, the dictates of justice are objective, at least to some degree,

those dictates are specified to a greater or lesser extent by the Jurisdiction but not in a manner which is complete or self-consistent. 

and for Sen impartiality is part of what it means to be “objective”.

This is not necessarily true of the Law. Some jurisdictions may require impartiality from Judges and Jury members. Others may not. It is sufficient for protocols to have been observed for a judgment to be objectively considered part of the Law.  

In particular, Sen believes that in order to arrive at good and just decisions one needs to consider the viewpoint of an impartial spectator.

This is a foolish belief. To arrive at a good decision one should certainly consider what a guy who is very good at making decisions of that sort would do. An 'impartial spectator' might say 'stop making decisions of this sort. How do you benefit by them? Get a fucking job you moron. Girls won't sleep with you just because you have a very good way of deciding how pretty they are. One or two might give you the time of day if you worked hard and became rich.'  

Sen observes, following Adam Smith, that “[i]n solitude, we are apt to feel too strongly whatever relates to ourselves… The conversation of a friend brings us to a better, that of a stranger to a still better temper.”

Smith wasn't a lawyer. He wasn't talking about Justice. He merely observed that guys who want to do well in life ought not brood over their bottle on the indignities and injustices they may have suffered. A cheerful conversation with a buddy over a cup of tea might improve your temper and thus the welcome you receive from others. Moreover, young Scottish men needed to talk to strangers from London and Paris and so forth so as to get a better view of the possibilities that global commerce was opening up.  

The idea for Sen is that often one’s decisions are biased by personal emotions or enculturation, for example.

That's a good thing. People trust you more. They understand that if you are their friend then you will stand by them in a fight. Scots were doughty fighters because they were 'enculturated' in a thymotic tradition which had embraced 'common sense' so as to rise up rather than be rendered an appendage of the English Crown.

 Sen's people came under that Crown but not as even potential equals. Why? They were terrible fighters perhaps because they weren't 'enculturated' at all.  They were merely gobshites. What Madhusudhan Dutt and Vivekananda and Tagore and so forth were constantly saying was 'what you call 'Sabhyata' (culture) is no such thing. It is merely hypocrisy and fine talk. First develop some manliness. Then pursue culture.' 

These Bengalis knew that Scottish Highlanders had put down the Mutiny. Scottish entrepreneurs built up the Jute business in Calcutta. It was obvious that these Scotsmen would have gained nothing by accepting the viewpoint of an impartial Bengali spectator. Why? Bengalis talked bollocks. 

The fact is, Sen's employers were not interested in Sen's 'impartial' views on the behaviour of the US or the UK. They employed this darky because they wanted his beggarly people to accept the 'impartial' judgments made by American or British spectators of the emerging economies.  

By testing one’s views and decisions by having them scrutinized by others better and more objective decisions will result.

Great inventors and entrepreneurs and scientists and artists don't 'test their views and decisions' by talking to 'impartial spectators'. They focus more narrowly on a field far beyond the ken of all save one or two of their bitter rivals. Competition between such people result in better and more objective decisions.  A scientist may not like a particular technique but may fear that his rival will use it to steal a march on him. Thus, he overcomes his subjective feelings in order to win the prize. 

Talking with everybody can cause you to double down on your own subjective intuition. So long as you can score off someone else or refuse to admit defeat when confronted by a superior argument, you can feel good about yourself. Since there is no objective test of who is superior, why not just talk for the sake of talking?

Further, the less stake the other(s) has in the decision, presumably the better the decision.

The opposite is the case. Those without 'skin in the game' should be excluded from the conversation. You must have 'locus standi' if you wish to be heard by the Court. I am not allowed to barge into a criminal trial and lecture the Judges about the evils of masturbation. 

To be clear, it does not have to be that the view of an impartial spectator is the correct one, it is just that decisions that have withstood the scrutiny of an impartial spectator tend to be better,

There is absolutely no evidence of this.  

because the impartial spectator helps to overcome biases.

But how do we know which spectator is truly unbiased?  

The other aspect of justice that will be significant for the purposes of this paper is sensitivity to consequences.

Justice should be robust- i.e. not be sensitive to consequences save by express provision of law. On the other hand, vinculum juri, bonds of law, must be incentive compatible. Where this condition is fulfilled there can be an upward evolution of norms and mores. Mechanisms whereby a murderer pays 'blood money' may be acceptable in a barbaric age. Indeed, the 'Stationary Bandit' - the State- may get its start by 'netting out' blood-money claims brought by different clans so as to make a profit. This is utilitarian enough, though the context is a thymotic society.  We, however, would find it unacceptable if Hannibal Lecteur is allowed to roam free because his skill saves more lives than his cannibalistic appetite consumes and, furthermore, he's one classy dude. 

Sen does not accept a crude consequentialism; rather he is interested in a thick conception of consequences, or what he calls comprehensive outcomes. Sen states that he wants to underscore “the importance of paying particular attention to ‘comprehensive outcomes’ that include actions undertaken, agencies involved, processes used, etc. along with the simple outcomes seen in a way that is detached from processes, agencies and relation—what [Sen calls] ‘culmination outcomes’.” (Sen 2009, 215)

Thus, Sen isn't talking about Justice at all. He is talking of Economic Policy. True, the Indian Planning Commission said it was pursuing 'Social Justice' but it wasn't actually a wing of the Justice Ministry. It decided Policy priorities. It served no juristic or judicial function. Sen confuses 'Niti' (Policy) with 'Nyaya' (Justice).  A Neta (leader) implements Niti. A Nyayadesh (Judge) delivers Justice. There is not even one literary source which supports Sen's contention that the word 'Niti' was ever used to mean 'Justice'. It seems his grandpappy didn't actually teach him Sanskrit of even the most rudimentary type. The consequence is that he wrote nonsense. 

Thus, for Sen, consequentialism is not only concerned with the best outcome of a particular decision, or action—a maximization of utility for example—but with how the action is brought about, taking account of the personhood of, or the relationship in which one stands to, those affected by a decision or course of action.

So, Sen is not concerned with 'Consequentialism' (or 'Utilitarianism') as a theory of Jurisprudence. He is concerned with a specific aspect of Economic Policy concerning Welfare treated wholly independently of other aspects e.g. Industrial Policy, Fiscal Policy, Monetary Policy, Trade Policy, etc. 

For example, on Sen’s version of consequentialism, one probably ought not sacrifice an innocent person for an overall increase in average utility—however, that is not to say one definitely ought not, but the increase in utility needs to be weighed against other factors, such as the person’s autonomy. To be clear, the weighing of processes, et cetera, and cumulative outcomes is what Sen means by sensitivity to consequences.

The problem here is two fold

1) the capacity to do a thing (e.g. sacrifice an innocent) is linked to what people believe about your character and conduct. An innocent person might kill you before you can kill him if he knows that have some propensity of the sort mentioned above. In other words, capacity is itself a function of expected outcome. If you decide to do something really stupid or out of character you may suddenly find that you are judged as lacking capacity and therefore can't complete your contemplated action. 

2) Consequences can never be fully known or indeed envisaged. There is always the possibility that some catastrophic outcome becomes possible through any given action. The 'maximum uncertainty principle' applies. This means that the expected value of the action is always zero (because you can imagine a maximally beneficial state of the world to offset the catastrophic outcome). However, if you are paid or otherwise legally obligated to do an action of a specific sort you must do it unless no reasonable person would have done it had they been in your shoes. This means, in any justiciable context, 'sensitivity to consequences' has a narrow range. Moreover, uncorrelated asymmetries arise. Your duty is different depending on whether you have a legal or other obligation of a commonly accepted or acceptable type. Here too there are gradations. Speaking generally, as economies advance, the Principal has a higher 'culpa levis in abstracto' duty of care. A menial Agent may have no actual liability. The onus was on the Principal to properly oversee his actions. 

In the Gita, Krishna is omniscient. He alone knows the 'consequence' set. But, he also has the capacity to reach any maximally beneficent outcome by a pure, creative, and gratuitous volitional act. God's affects are effects.

 However, in the Gita, he is acting as an 'agent' not a principal. That's what lends drama and suspense and poignancy to this Divine Song. 

It so happens that Arjuna had been given a boon such that he could visualize anything he wanted. However Arjuna refuses the boon. It thus become 'asvamika svatva' (masterless property). There is a legal subtlety here. If the Gandharva gave the boon gratuitously and for Arjuna's advancement then his failure to receive it does not mean it is not vested. On the other hand, since the Gandharva received consideration, there was a transaction for things of equal value but the boon was excluded from it. Thus the boon remains vested in the Gandharva. However, if the Gandharva wished for the boon to vest for the advancement of Arjuna (in Hindu Law, this distinction is made to clarify what is or isn't what British judges called a 'benami' trust) then the boon can vest under that conditionality- i.e. it actually does lead to Arjuna's advancement. These details might seem out of place in an Epic of the Greek sort, but the Mahabharata has an encyclopedic scope. What ever is found elsewhere is also found in it.

In the normal course of things, Arjuna is the master of himself. Then, suddenly, Arjuna experiences 'vishada' (depression)  and loses mastery of himself. Thus, no longer being his own master, he gains a vision of the terrible outcome of the war thanks to a property which did not vest in him till he was alienated from himself. (However it vested in the same way he would himself have wanted if he hadn't not wanted it to vest at all. Or perhaps the opposite happened. The relationship between property and 'predication' can be very interesting from the legal point of view.) 

 What follows is a piquant dialogue such that Arjuna gets the vision he wants as a gratuitous gift of the Lord. This is highly suggestive to Theists because you have a 'law-less' choice sequence such that 'freedom' attains God's gift of Grace without affecting any outcome. This is a Theodicy of an exquisitely crafted yet seemingly 'natural' type. It is consummate Art limning the credo of the simple Heart. 

 Joshua does not understand the Gita. He says it is actually a good example of the importance of introducing impartiality into one’s decision-making process. This is silly. Arjuna is partial and it is right for him to be partial because uncorrelated asymmetries give rise to bourgeois strategies which are eusocial. On the other hand, there was another great warrior who turned up at Kurukshetra who was truly impartial. He was also chivalrous and would fight for the weaker side. Krishna gets him to kill himself so the Divine Plan can unfold. 

According to Sen, Arjuna represents, and argues from, a consequentialist perspective. More precisely, Sen believes that the types of arguments which Arjuna gives, and the perspective that he takes, are of the thick Senian consequentialism variety that account for “comprehensive outcomes”.

Arjuna is a mere mortal. He has no information re. 'comprehensive outcomes'. His point is simple. Hindu 'Niyamas' (injunctions), in accordance with the Price Equation, say 'don't kill your relatives'. That is kin-selective altruism right there backed up by the deontological precedent that in his lineage the one with the superior right had given up the throne in favor of spiritual gain. Actually, this is the outcome of the Mahabharat. Karna has the superior right- if he wants it. 

Even absent the specific Niyamas mentioned,  we could say Arjuna's argument is based on an easy to apply rule of a socio-biological and mathematical kind. True, he had a grudge against the other guys and they had a grudge against his people. But the weaker side could walk away from that Holy fane and go conquer some other territory or take to spirituality. This is perfectly deontological and is robust to informational enrichment.  

Krishna, on the other hand, represents, and argues from, a deontological perspective.

No. Krishna is the self-conscious incarnation of an Occasionalist God. He is the only efficient cause in the whole of the Mahabharata. He doesn't bother with rules of any sort. However, his Grace is an entirely gratuitous gift which, he tells us, all can receive. 

Sen states that “Krishna’s deontology is of a particularly purist form, which goes beyond seeing the importance of duty-based reasoning, and denies the relevance of any concern, particularly any consequential concern, in determining whether some action should be undertaken or not.” (Sen 2009, 216)

This is nonsense. We could say Krishna had a Plan and wanted Arjuna to play his part in it. But that is consequentialism. We can't say he had any 'deontological' objection to Arjuna running away. After all, Ranchhod (one who flees battle) is an epithet of Krishna.  

Before the beginning of the battle between the just Pandavas

Actually, Karna is the true leader of the Pandavas (if he chooses to accept that position) and thus the War proceeds only because he wishes it.  

—of whom Arjuna is their most respected and gifted general—and their allies and the Kauravas—the unjust usurpers of the kingdom that rightfully belongs to the Pandavas—and their allies, Arjuna becomes overwhelmed and despondent due to the carnage that is about to ensue,

This is the interesting part. Why does Arjuna behave like this? The answer has to do with the boon he receives which was asvamika svatva- an unvested property. Theists consider devotional piety to itself be the gratuitous gift of God. Is it like the Gandharva's gift to Arjuna? Don't forget the Gandharvas rule over antarabhava (bardo in Tibetan) and thus the 'perfectly Just' mechanism of metempsychosis at the level of the womb. The Gita doesn't go into the details but that's okay because Krishna's references to Scripture over the course of the Gita grant us an intuition of a 'lawless' overlapping choice sequences where non-uniqueness establishes naturality. I may mention that the philosophy involved is directly linked to open questions in Math. But so is every type of decision theory or economic calculus. Thus ordinary blokes like me find the Gita illuminating. 

 Arjuna states that “we are not justified in killing,”

That is deontological. Indeed, we have a duty not to kill and to try to protect those in danger of being killed.  

and Sen believes Arjuna feels that he is not justified for the following reasons. (Sargeant 1994, 75) First, Arjuna ought not fight since it would entail Arjuna killing the teachers

There is a strict rule against killing the Guru.  This is deontology pure and simple.

and family members on the opposing army who had benefited him greatly throughout his life.

There is a rule against this as well.  

Second, since so many men would die as a result of the battle it would lead to the destruction of families, the caste system and all of society.

Again there is a rule against this. 

Thrid, the “evil would cling to us [the Pandavas]” for killing those who had benefited them and destroying society. (Sargeant 1994, 74)

In each case, the Hindu knows of a 'niyama' forbidding that action. The class of expounders of this text mention them in their discourses. Sen, perhaps because he studied at Tagore's Shantiniketan, does not know the Hindu tradition because Tagore was a Brahmo and thus prejudiced against Hinduism. Indeed, he fell out with Netaji Bose when the latter stood up for students expelled from a Brahmo hostel for doing Sarasvati Puja!  

In other words, the Pandavas, in general, and Arjuna, in particular, are personally responsible for all the deaths and the negative consequences that might result from those deaths.

No. They are breaking explicit 'niyams'- prohibitions- known to all Hindus. 

Finally, the benefit that could occur from the battle—viz. the Pandavas receiving the kingdom that is rightfully theirs—do not outweigh the negative consequences—i.e. is the first two points.

Because Niyamas have been broken. Only if God ordains the thing can it be done under such circumstances. That is what happens in the Gita. God takes the sin on himself.  

Based on the above interpretation of Arjuna’s thinking, Sen abstracts three, more general, principles. First, Arjuna’s reasoning is based on the “belief that what happens to the world must matter and be significant in our moral and political thinking,”

This is not the case. Arjuna is mentioning explicit Niyamas known to all Hindus. He is not presented as a scholar or a philosopher. He is a simple man repeating the explicit rules of his Religion in a manner understood by every Hindu.  

in particular, “the significance of human lives.” (Sen 2009, 212-3) That is to say, the massive loss of life that will result if the battle takes place cannot be ignored.

Only because explicit niyamas are broken. Arjuna is not saying wars of extermination are bad. He is saying that this specific war involves the breaking of explicit niyamas which are known to all Hindus. 

Second, Arjuna is concerned with personal responsibility. So, “Arjuna argues that the results of one’s choices and actions must matter in deciding what one should do,”

This is not the case. Arjuna is only mentioning the breaking of Niyamas. He is not mentioning the risk that he himself, or his brothers, might be killed. Yet those are exigencies directly connected to his decision.  

in other words, one is responsible, personally, for the results that occur due to one’s decisions and actions. (Sen 2009, 213)

Only if they break Niyamas or are otherwise inconsistent with one's Dharma or duty of eusebia. Arjuna nowhere embraces the doctrine of Ahimsa by which injury to all animate creatures- including microscopic animals- must be minimized.  

Third, Arjuna believes that there are relational obligations that must be considered. So, because many of the people that Arjuna would have to kill “are people for whom he has affection, including his own relatives,” Arjuna is particularly troubled. (Sen 2009, 213)

There are Religious duties to relatives and a general prohibition on killing them or causing them harm. Hindus are taught this from an early age.  

According to Sen “[r]elational obligation linked with family connections and personal affection as well as agency-related concerns … call for accommodation within the broader reach of moral and political philosophy, including that of the theory of justice.”

Niyamas are accommodated in the Hindu theory of Jurisprudence. Indeed Bengal was preeminent in  'Navya Nyaya' juristic reasoning of this sort. 

(Sen 2009, 213) On the other side of the debate stands Krishna, who Sen takes to represent the archetypal deontologist.

God has no duties or obligations. He can't be a deontologist. Prophets and Sages may prescribe duties and obligations to ordinary mortals. None have suggested that the Creator is bound by anything similar.  

According to Sen, “Krishna argues that Arjuna must do his duty, come what may, and in this case he has a duty to fight, no matter what results from it. It [the ensuing battle] is a just cause, and as a warrior and a general on whom his side must rely, he cannot waver from his obligations.” (Sen 2009, 209)

This is not the case. Krishna admits that a Kshatriya can decide to lay down his arms and dedicate himself to Spirituality. The Gita gives a reason not to do so- but only for Theists comfortable with the path of devotional piety.  

So, Sen understands Krishna to be arguing from a perspective that is only concerned with one’s duty, and is completely consequent-independent, which is in stark contrast to Arjuna’s consequence sensitivity.

Yet, it is obvious that the reverse is the case. Krishna has a Plan and needs Arjuna to play a part in it. Arjuna has a desire to receive God's grace as a gratuitous gift. Both get what they want.  

Arjuna’s moral and political reasoning is deeply concerned with outcomes in their comprehensive form.

Nonsense! He has no interest in Economics or Geopolitics or anything of that sort. He is a muscular warrior.  

The idea of social realizations

is the subject of the Artha Shastra. Arjuna has no interest in it whatsoever. Yuddhishtra on the other hand has to learn mathematical game theory to overcome his Vishada. He is less able as a warrior but is a better administrator than Karna or Arjuna.  

… demands that outcomes be seen in these broader terms, taking note of actions, relations and agencies.

This is 'mechanism design'- which Sen didn't bother with. Instead he pretended that some bureaucracy with infinite resources and infinite power could identify everybody's 'capabilities' and then devise a plan for the world- except they couldn't because first they'd need to consult impartial spectators in other Galaxies and after that everybody would have to spend an infinite amount of time discussing everything so nothing need ever be done. 

… Arjuna does make substantial room for his idea  of duty,

No. Arjuna mentions specific niyamas. Krishna then shows that these can be broken by the Theist under certain conditions such that a novel soteriology arises. The Gita is a Hindu Scripture. Sen was not taught this at Shantiniketan and thus ended up talking nonsense about it.  

taking into account his responsibility for his own agency,

what about his agency in having responsibility? Or his responsibility to have agency of that sort? Or his agency in acquiring that meta-responsibility? Why not take account of every item in this infinite regress?  How resolve the resulting halting problem? Sen's 'idea of Justice' has no fucking idea. 

and also acknowledging his special relationship with many of the potential victims of the war (in addition to his general grief at the prospect of massive human death and deliberate killing). (Sen 2009, 216-7)

What is not mentioned is why the assembled armies desecrated the Holy fane of Kurukshetra. The answer is that a collective delusion had seized them for a Cosmic purpose- viz. the inauguration of a new age of an inferior type.  

Thus, while, according to Sen, Krishna is advocating a view that one ought to “Fare forward. Not fare well/ But fare forward,”4 (Sen 2009, 210)

This is nonsense. God gives his devotees a reward more glorious than anything they can imagine.  

The fact is that an elderly shithead like me feels increasing joy from the 'externality' of love and service and sacrifice. But, I incur debt which my 'Hlaford' discharges. I get to die and never discharge any debt because, however poor, however abject, however utterly parasitical, cunts like me always have more cash than character, but all the good folk get an infinite reward which they will, again infinitely, more and more deserve. 

Fuck's wrong with thinking this way? Must I be miserable in my old age just because I've only ever been every type of loser and fuckwit? 

Tolstoy has an old peasant who tells Pierre, 'if you cavil at sickness, God won't grant you death.' It maybe Tolstoy's Christ wouldn't. My Krishna will. But then, unlike Tolstoy, I never had literary talent.

Arjuna wants to both fare forward and fare well. What is important for Sen’s purposes are the lessons that can be gleaned from the Arjuna-Krishna debate. What Sen wants to drive home is that using the type of reasoning that Arjuna does is essential for making good, moral and just decisions. By being sensitive to consequences an individual and a society can “fare well” and not just “fare forward”, and that is Sen’s point.

Is it worth making? Doesn't everybody want to do well going forward? Is there anybody who doesn't understand that making good decisions now will enable us to have a better future?  

For Sen, any adequate theory of justice must not only take account of comprehensive consequences, but do so with the idea that people and society can fare well and fare better.

But this is also true of any adequate theory of respiration or defecation! If you fail to breathe in you may suffocate. If you fail to take a dump, your health may suffer.  

However, contra a simplistic consequentialism, part of faring well involves accounting for agency, relationships and duties.

No it doesn't. Accounting is expensive. Just as there is no accounting for tastes, similarly there is no accounting for fancy shite like 'agency' (which is thymotic or chrematistic, not economic at all) and 'relationships' (which are dense, or otherwise robust, only at network nodes and hence ultimately positional, thymotic or chrematistic) and duties (which arise only from rents being otherwise defeasible by antidosis) save such rough and ready reckoning as is required or useful for economic or legal reasons. 

Sen's entire approach militates for nothing but endless talk of a vacuous kind. It faces race hazard and halting problems of a type well known for 50 years. The thing was always only a legitimating ideology for bureaucracies which everybody rebelled against over 40 years ago. Sen's obsolescent maths and imperviousness to any idea compatible with the notion that Hinduism does not exist merely to be shat upon, blinds him to his own ancestral Baidya 'yukti' or pragmatic attention to sequencing. This is a 'Brahmo' Brahminism of a sort more backward and useless than any credo Raja Ram Mohan Roy- who did write some dogmatic Benthamite shite- could be convicted of holding. Sen ended up being stupider and more vacuous than Tagore in his senile English spouting phase. 

It is easy to throw a spoke into the wheels of woke virtue signalers or Sen-tentious shitheads, by saying that their discourse is hopelessly exclusionary and epistemically Fascist in that it does not embrace the possibility that inanimate objects deserve to be treated as having a non-binary sexual agency quite separate from that of the people who want to thrust them up your arse.  

Joshua's appears to have read Aurobindo and Gandhi on the Gita. But, like Sen, these men were not Brahmins and did not have a traditional Hindu upbringing. Thus they failed to recognize the 'niyamas' Arjuna specifically invoked. Also, they were blathershites who wrote nonsense. 

While Arjuna repeatedly refers to his kinsmen, he is not concerned with the actual harm done to them. Rather, Arjuna is concerned with the “great sin” that would accrue to him for killing his kinsmen, and not the actual pain and suffering of the kinsmen themselves. (Auribindo 1995)

Because there is a specific injunction re. kinsmen which, however, was suspended during actual battle. That's how Niyamas work. 

Thus,  it is not that Arjuna is concerned with the agency or the relationships involved, but instead with the goods, or bads in this case, that would result for him personally.

No. The guy is a Hindu. He knows the relevant Niyamas and mentions them to Krishna who then provides the means to gain an immunity from them.  

Also it should be noted that “[i]n the past, he [Arjuna] never hesitated even when he had to fight against relations.” (Gandhi 2000, 34)

No Niyama was being broken in those cases.  

Therefore, he cannot really be offering it as a principled reason now,

Yes he can. This is a matter only Hindus can judge because they grew up hearing those Niyamas and are familiar with the means by which an immunity from them is gained. The Gita can be understood by ordinary people but it contains many references to Brahminical scripture. Non-Brahmins can learn that scripture under a Guru. However, a Brahmin conversant with his family texts should be able to work things out for himself without too much difficulty. At least, that is my own experience. 

but, rather, he is just using kinship as an excuse—i.e. using the issues of the agency and the relationships of those involved instrumentally—which, again, demonstrates that Arjuna was not really concerned with Senian “comprehensive outcomes”.

Why proffer any excuse? Krishna himself had run away from battle. His older brother had decided to take no part in it. Arjuna could exercise the same right. Krishna might upbraid him but he could be easily silenced because he himself had the epithet 'Ranchhod'.  

Arjuna- a stand in for the ordinary Hindu- mentions the specific Niyams he would be violating. Krishna prescribes a method of gaining immunity of general import for Theists. There was no Sen-tentious discussion of the type Joshua describes. 

The other major reason that Arjuna gives is that the battle would lead to the destruction of society as a whole.

No. 'Destruction of society' is 'arthavada'- mere hyperbole of an imperative type- which accompanies 'vidhi' or positive injunction. Hindus know this. It is not really the case that if you steal then society will collapse. Nor will you necessarily go blind if you have a wank. It's just that stealing is wrong and a guy who is constantly wanking may grow blind to the charms of his bride. 

However, were Arjuna to leave and not engage in the ensuing battle, the battle would still take place and families would still be destroyed and the caste system might still be ruined and society as a whole might collapse.

But he would not have contributed to this outcome and thus would pay no penalty for breaking a vidhi. This is pure heteronomous deontological thinking.  

Except, unlike with Arjuna’s reasoning—where his involvement could hypothetically lead to the destruction—if Arjuna did not participate it would be more likely happen, because “[i]f he left the battle, the Pandava army would be simply annihilated,” and the “evil” Kauravas would maintain rulership of the kingdom. (Gandhi 2000, 34)

This is not the orthodox Hindu view. God's power is infinite. The purpose of the Gita was to give theists a superior soteriological path. My people were udgatrs. We immediately understood that we needn't worry too much about some small ritual mistake. This actually improved performance and enabled Sama Veda to flourish more. Incidentally, Tagore had an Uncle who greatly advanced Musicology by taking the help of udgatrs. Sen may have studied at Shantiniketan, his Mum may have sung Rabindrasangeet, but he didn't get that the only way you can find out about Hindu Religion or Music or Philosophy is by actually consulting practicing Hindus. 

Without Arjuna at least as many people would have died except the unjust side would have won,

That is not the case. If Arjuna drops out, why would Karna want to fight? He just has to reveal he is the eldest of the Pandavas and there is no War. Justice requires the Pandavas to serve the Kauravas- who are pals of Karna- unless they decide to defy a particular Niyama and set up as autonomous principals.   

and on any version of consequentialism—comprehensive or otherwise—that would be a much worse consequence.

Sez who? The fact is, the Gita is occassionalist. God has a plan. Ultimately, Karna is the decisive actor. He wants all the thymotic warriors to gain Heaven by dying in battle and that is the actual outcome because God wants to reduce the numbers of this parasitic warrior class so that a more commercial type of regime can burgeon. 

The next issue to be discussed is that it does not seem that Arjuna was in fact arguing for any particular position, but rather, he was rationalizing his loss of nerve.

or desire to have a long Sen-tentious discussion. This was one view- e.g. that of Vivekananda- but it isn't the canonical view. 

In fact, as Gandhi points out, “[h]is reason [i.e. his ability to reason] is, for the time being, clouded.” (Gandhi 2000, 34) Before putting forth the “reasons” he has for not fighting  Arjuna was “[d]espondant ...

Vishada. The dual of this episode is the Vyadha Gita & Nalophkhyanam where Yuddhishtra's vishada is dispelled. But there is a further symmetry between the episode where Arjun vows to kill Yuddhisthra and the one where he kills his genuine eldest brother. The former shows that Krishna's 'visvarupa' theophany was actually a Christ-like self-slaying such that all devotee's sins are taken on by the Man-God.  

[and] said this: Having seen my own people, Krishna, [d]esiring to fight … [m]y limbs sink down, [m]y mouth dries up, my body trembles, … [m]y skin burns, I am unable to remain as I am, [a]nd my mind seems to ramble.” (Sargeant 2004, 66-8) Then, after giving his “reasons” the chapter of the Gita ends with “[t]hus having spoken on the battlefield, Arjuna sat down upon the seat of the chariot, [t]hrowing down both arrow and bow, [w]ith a heart overcome by sorrow.” (Sargeant 2004, 85) What is clear then, from the text, is that Arjuna was not speaking from a position of reason; he was overcome by sorrow and anxiety. 

So that the Gandharva's boon could vest in an equally asvamika Arjun. This explains why Krishna can't simply say 'Dude! Bhishma and Drona have the boon of dying only when they wish. You'll have your hands full keeping them from killing your brothers. How can you yourself kill them? Look, you just fight hard and hope for a stalemate followed by a negotiated settlement.'

Krishna knows Arjuna has the Gandharva's boon so what follows is a very 'balanced' symmetric game which builds suspense till Krishna avoids a potential oversight and remembers to give Arjuna 'divine eyeballs' to view his theophany. 

Therefore, it seems hard to believe “Arjuna’s moral and political reasoning is deeply concerned with outcomes in their comprehensive form.” (Sen 2009, 216) At least one could not draw such a conclusion based on the text of the Gita, because in the Gita Arjuna is not reasoning at all, or as Krishna indicates “Arjuna … is talking specious wisdom.” (Gandhi 2000, 38)

Krishna says dharma is difficult to understand. Just mentioning the relevant Niyamas does not mean you are wise. Still, the Gita shows one way forward such that deontology does not paralyze soteriological progress.  

The important thing to note is that Arjuna himself realized that he was not cognitively in a  position to make a proper judgment on the situation, and therefore asks Krishna for guidance regarding what the appropriate course of action is.

Krishna, as charioteer, was obligated to advise on how to kill a lot of the enemy. Arjuna, it turned out longed for enlightenment from the 'Lord of Yoga' which is exactly what he gets. His Vishada helped him get what he wanted which is why the episode is called 'Vishada Yoga'. 

The logical error Joshua is making is that he is assuming that people who are not suffering from Vishada don't ask the appropriate person for advise. This is foolish. A smart guy who has advisers working for him or who knows of smart people who are otherwise obligated to counsel him would certainly consult them before making up his mind. Indeed, Kings were supposed to consult their Raj-purohit and Mantris (Ministers). Chariot-warriors were supposed to talk to their 'Sutas'  

Ignorance of the Hindu context- viz. what Niyamas apply in stereotyped situations- has led young Joshua to talk nonsense. Sen, on the other hand, is an atheist who enjoys denigrating Hindu scripture. 

Arjuna’s mention of “duty” in the above quote provides a good segue into a discussion of Sen’s interpretation of Krishna as a pure deontologist—i.e. someone concerned only with duty regardless of the consequences. It seems clear from the above quote from Arjuna that the use of “duty” here is not to be taken in a technical or deontological sense, but rather as synonymous with what one “ought to do,” generally, and it is in that light that Krishna should be interpreted.

This is false. Arjuna explicitly mentions specific Niyams. He does not ask about purush-artha and whether the spiritual path is not better than that of the householder. However, Krishna addresses this question. The difference between the Vyadha Gita and the Bhagvad Gita is that the former is for Principals for whom there is an Upanishadic solution whereas the latter is for Agents who are given a Theistic solution. 

A problem, of course, does arise since, as has been mentioned, the Bhagavad Gita is a religious text. So, though it begins with concerns about the actual lived world and what is good and right and just, it then immediately turns to religious questions, and what Krishna has to say relates, more specifically, to that. It is therefore unfair to criticize Krishna’s “pure deontology” because he has taken the discussion from concerns about what is the right or just thing to do in the world to what is the right thing to do to attain liberation.

It is foolish but not unfair if you are an ignorant fool. You were bound to write nonsense no matter what you wrote about. 

Nevertheless, there are at least a few lessons about worldly justice that can be gleaned from Krishna’s discussion.

Justice should be done in a dispassionate and unmercenary manner- iff dispensing justice is your job. 

Arjuna’s expressed concerns—regardless of their motivation—are about the negative consequences that would result from the massive destruction of life,

how could he have any knowledge of this? It was by no means obvious that Drona and Bhishma could be made to give up their lives. That's why there had to be an episode where Arjuna gets a boon which, by his will,  remains unvested till he experiences Vishada. 

and particularly the lives of those with whom Arjuna is closely related. Arjuna was concerned about the sin that would accrue from such actions, but Krishna points out that “[b]y reason of delusion, man takes wrong to be right. By reason of delusion was Arjuna led to make a distinction between kinsmen and nonkinsmen.” (Gandhi 2000, 35)

But, Arjuna's thinking his side would win could have been dismissed as 'delusion' had the Gandharva not conferred a particular boon on him. 

The fact is, Arjuna unknowingly kills his own eldest brother. That is the piquant aspect of the story. Karna is the decisive character in the Mahabharata.  

Overcome as he was, Arjuna was not able to think clearly and thus assumed that there would be certain negative consequences. Not only was Arjuna making an invalid distinction between kinsmen and nonkinsmen

This distinction was perfectly valid. There was a Niyama in this regard. Moreover, uncorrelated asymmetries (e.g. kinsman vs stranger) dictate bourgeois strategies (as in hawk-dove) which are eusocial. Guys who distinguish between invaders and their own folk and thus who put up a good fight against the invaders are guys it is worth doing a deal with and then inter-marrying. On the other hand, one may as well exterminate a race of cowards unless the territory is so insalubrious it can only be rendered fruitful by the labor of enslaved cowards. 

—a tacit form of parochialism that Sen himself finds problematic—

Sen is a cretin. He doesn't get that his people- who fled East Bengal- were not commodiously accommodated precisely because they were seen as cowardly and lacking in fighting spirit. Thus West Bengal has fallen behind Bangladesh. The feeling is that there's no point helping the Hindu Bengali prosper because he won't do anything sensible to defend the gains his people make. Lack of parochialism doesn't make you cosmopolitan. It makes you a blathershite who will defend nothing and construct nothing.  

but that by not performing the duties proper to his caste and constitution he would be accruing the sin that he thought he would be for killing those to whom he had close personal relationships. Thus Krishna states that “if you [Arjuna] will not undertake [t]his righteous war, [t]hereupon, having avoided your own duty and glory, [y]ou shall incur evil.” (Sargeant 1994, 118)

How does Krishna know? The answer is that he is himself the Yogishvara of even Vishada Yoga. To prove his point Krishna has to reveal his cosmic form. But that's what Arjuna wanted all along- but only as a gratuitous gift.  

To return to the issue of Krishna’s pure deontology, it seems that Sen is comparing apples and oranges. Arjuna’s “arguments” are about this-worldly concerns,

No. Hindu Niyamas arise by reason of other-worldly concerns. Artha Niti- economic or other types of policy- have this-worldly concerns. There are discussions of such elsewhere in the Mahabharata. 

while Krishna’s are about other-worldly realization.

No. Krishna's plan concerns this world- so and so has to die and so and so has to live on. It is not the case Krishna is picking and choosing people for his Paradise.  

Thus, seen in the light of religion Krishna’s arguments make sense as a sort of pure duty.

No. There is a 'Legalist' argument of that sort but it is atheistic or, at best, ritualistic. That comes under the heading of Purva Mimamsa. Gita, however, is Vedantic.  

However, not everything Krishna does say concerns religious liberation. As has been noted, Krishna does discuss actual consequences. For example, as Gandhi draws out in his commentary, many of the negative consequences, that Arjuna feared, would more likely be realized were Arjuna not to fight, which is implicit in Krishna referring to the battle as a just or righteous cause.

But it was only so because Karna wished it. He is the true eldest brother of the Pandavas- if he wishes to be. If he forbids his younger brothers from opposing the Kauravas then the war is no longer a धर्म्यं संग्रामं except in the sense that any war between Kshatriyas where Hindu rites are observed is equally one. In any case, since we know that God wants the war to go ahead, God saying it is religious doesn't convey any information about whether it is or isn't righteous. The Old Testament tells of many things which God commands which become righteous only for that reason but which we would not consider to be so in the ordinary course of things. Halachah vein morin kein applies. Knowledge of a particular law can forbid acting upon it!

Finally, it is not that Krishna is ignoring consequences,

Krishna performs the action which secures the consequence he requires. This involves displaying his cosmic form. Moses saw the 'hindquarters of God'. Arjuna received a full frontal.  

it is just that many of the consequences which Arjuna expresses concerns about are ultimately outside his control. Thus, whether or not Arjuna participates in the battle many people are going to die. Therefore, holding the massive slaughter of those to whom Arjuna has personal relationships fixed, the issue of duty becomes more significant. The important thing to note, however, is not what position Krishna was arguing but the relationship in which Krishna stood to Arjuna.

He was both his Charioteer and his personal Lord God and Savior while also being the Creator, Preserver and Disposer of all things.

Regardless of whether or not  Krishna’s argument here is highly religious, and, thus, a full articulation of his argument is probably not relevant for the purposes of this paper.

This is not a complete sentence. 

What is important is simply to note that Krishna is pointing out Arjuna’s biases. 

Nothing of the sort occurs. Krishna isn't saying that Arjuna is partial to Yuddhishtra whereas he hates Karna and Duryodhana.  

Arjuna was actually presenting a version of comprehensive consequentialism to justify a particular course of action,

No. He was simply mentioning various well-known Niyamas which would be violated if his side won. Krishna provided a method by which an immunity was acquired. 

What should be noted is that from God's point of view nothing kills or is killed. But kirti (fame) and akirti (infamy) matter. Krishna later explains that to truthfully denigrate a person is to kill him but condign self-praise too is a type of expiatory self-slaughter! This opens a road from Occassionalism to onamatodoxy.  

Arjuna realized that he was not really in a position to properly judge the situation.

He knew less about Niyama, Vidhi, etc.  

In every way Krishna is Arjuna’s superior, and Arjuna knew that.
Further, Arjuna was aware that in the current context, despite any reasons he could give to justify his position, his perspective on the situation was skewed.

He was not an expert on Hindu dharma- i.e. Scripture and Commentary and so forth.  

He, therefore, looked to Krishna for guidance in a situation in which he knew his judgment was flawed,

His knowledge was less.  

and that is, at least one, important non-religious lesson that can be taken from the ArjunaKrishna debate.

In religion, the priest or preceptor or incarnate Godhead knows more than you just as, in Physics, the Professor or experimental researcher knows more than the layman.

There are actually a few related lessons that can be taken from the Arjuna-Krishna debate. First, in moral and political decision-making an individual—whether an individual person or an individual community—can, at times, be “too close” to the situation, and because of that fact be unable to make a good decision or even be able to properly evaluate the situation.

No. God is closer to reality than anybody. When a community asks an expert, it is because the expert is much closer to the situation of concern than any layman. Thus, if Americans like Joshua want to decide what the Gita means, they should ask the Hindu priests and preceptors who have devoted their lives to expounding the text. At the least, the opinion of a Brahmin should outweigh that of a blathershite Baidya or Bania.  

In such circumstances considering the viewpoint of an impartial spectator can be helpful, which is an issue important to Sen and the reason that he incorporates Adam Smith’s discussion of the impartial spectator within his understanding of justice.

The impartial spectator of a war may well say 'a plague on both your houses' or, more simply, 'sod this as a game for soldiers' and decide to go off with a pot of wine. 

The fact is the reason given for the battle at Kurukshetra and then the night-slaughter of the Pandava camp is that the Kshatriya class had grown too numerous. The herd had to be thinned out. War is a Malthusian check on population. A very big war can change the world for the better. Without the two World Wars, European Imperialism might still be with us.  

Second, it takes a certain amount of humility and self-critical understanding to acknowledge that one’s own viewpoint might, in fact, be flawed,

as might everybody else's. However a proud man might seek to correct any flaw in his view point for purely utilitarian reasons rather than as an exercise in humility whereas a hypocrite may continually denigrate his own judgment and gas on about his stupidity and ignorance and unworthiness.  

and it is this issue that I take to be what is actually illustrated by Arjuna in the Arjuna-Krishna debate.

But nothing of the sort occurs! Arjuna consults his charioteer who is acknowledged to be an expert in Religion. Suppose Krishna had said 'chant such and such mantra and no Niyama would be broken' then Arjuna's scruples would be overcome. What actually happens is a little more elaborate. Doing your duty dispassionately and without attachment to 'fruits' is highlighted. The problem is that Arjuna, because of Krishna, kills his elder brother while in a state of Manyu or dark anger.  

In his book, and elsewhere, Sen has argued that the importance of the Arjuna Krishna debate is that it demonstrates two issues. First, that in moral and political decision making processes one must be cognizant of a variety of consequences that might obtain due to a particular decision or course of action.

But we can't be cognizant of all the consequences or even of what varieties of consequence might be involved. Thus in moral and political decision making processes we are required to observe protocols, to act in good faith, and to avoid doing silly things- e.g. letting virtue-singalling blathershites dictate the agenda, or rather, create a Djikstra concurrency deadlock by their endless chatter.  

Second, and relatedly, deontology, in and of itself and precisely because it ignores consequences, is often an inappropriate approach to take regarding issues of justice.

Yet all over the world we see that the only appropriate approach to justice which is widely accepted is that of protocol bound, buck stopped, juristic decision making involving professional jurists using a specialized vocabulary and 'terms of art'. 

God is beyond the scope of Justice. 'An act of God' is outside morality or the law. Joshua says ' From the context of the Gita, since Krishna is an omniscient and omnipotent diety he is clearly in every way superior to the mortal Arjuna. Whether or not Krishna is a god is beside the point.' This is foolish. Throughout the Mahabharata, people with superior Religious knowledge are consulted. Krishna was one of this class of people. However, the fact that he is God is what clinches matters for Arjuna. 

While Sen might be correct about both of the conclusions that he draws, it has been shown that the Arjuna-Krishna debate does not actually justify such conclusions. A better understanding of the Arjuna-Krishna debate shows three things. First, Arjuna was actually less concerned with issues of comprehensive outcomes, agency and relationships than Sen maintains.

He had no such concerns. Nobody does. They are silly. If Sen cared about 'comprehensive outcomes' he wouldn't have wasted his time or that of his students. What fucking 'agency' or 'relationships' benefit from talking Sen-tentious shite?  

Second, Arjuna was actually not even making an argument for any particular position, but was instead rationalizing his lack of nerve and emotional weaknesses regarding the ensuing battle.

That was one view- e.g that of Vivekananda who was basically saying to his fellow Bengali blathershites 'Sack up! Psst- kill Whitey.' Anyway, that's what Sister Nivedita- who was White- told Subramaniyam Bharati. He wobbled his head in awe but did no such thing.  Lots of Bengalis look plenty White to us Madrasis. 

Third, while Krishna does, at times, advocate doing one’s duty, for duty’s sake, his purpose in doing so is religious and not really moral or political.

Religion is commonly considered to include morality. Furthermore, at a time of Hindu rule, it included the political realm.  

Further, Krishna is concerned with consequences it is just a question of which consequences are the important ones. So, if similar results are expected from two different courses of action, the one that aligns most closely with duties and obligations is, ceteris paribus, the better decision.

No. What matters is kirti or akirti- fame or infamy. This may align with duties but then again it may not.  

 Another way to think about the issue raised here is to note that Sen was arguing that the type of reasoning in which Arjuna engaged was critical for coming to a good and just decision.

For Hindus, it is obvious that you should think about Hindu Niyamas before coming to a decision.  

However, it was shown that Arjuna was not really reasoning at all,

Joshua believes this because he does not know that in Hinduism there are explicit prohibitions on killing Guru, grand-sire, kinfolk etc. True there are ways to get an immunity from the Niyama in every case or else to expiate the sin of violating dharma. Krishna, as an expert in Religion who is discharging the function of Suta (charioteer) is a fitting person to counsel in this matter.  

and therefore to model one’s decision making procedure on what Arjuna actually argued would most likely not lead to a good or just decision.

Why? It is perfectly proper for me to go to my lawyer and give legal reasons why I should not do something I find repugnant for a personal reason I don't want to disclose. The lawyer may accept and amplify one clinching argument while explaining why others are not germane. He is not obliged to say 'the reason you are doing this is because you are a greedy bastard'. 

A better understanding of the Gita, in general, and the Arjuna-Krishna debate, in particular, does illustrate the importance of incorporating the perspective of an impartial spectator into one’s decision making process.

The impartial spectator would say 'fuck you Kshatriyas! You are shit! It is better to have a large peasant army rather than an chariot warrior elite.' India should have used its manpower to become like China- a strong centralized country able to colonize more and more land and do demographic displacement. The last thing it needed was philosophically inclined Princelings- like the Buddha or Mahavira- who would encourage cowardice and defeatism. This, at any rate, is what 'impartial observers' have been saying about Hindus for the last couple of centuries. It is highly germane to Sen himself. His people wouldn't have had to flee Dacca if the Hindus had told Gita spouting Gandhians to go fuck themselves. 

Since the concept of an impartial spectator is an important aspect of Sen’s theory of justice it is interesting that he did not use the Gita, if he was going to use it at all, to illustrate that aspect of his theory. Further, one is left to wonder why Sen would use a text for secular purposes when it is difficult to make sense of the text divorced from its religious context.

Sen is an atheist who likes shitting on Hinduism. He won't shit on Islam because if he does he won't be safe in West Bengal. Like Dr. Taslima Nasreen, he will have to flee.  

While the Bhagavad Gita, itself, does not really discuss political issues or the organization of a just society, it seems clear that it takes for granted the Hindu theory of castes.

A Hindu theory of castes. The Hindutva theory is casteless. 

On such a theory, a just society is a well ordered society where people perform those functions which are appropriate to their caste, which in turn are based on people’s natural dispositions and inclinations. Thus, a just society is one that is similar, in many respects, to Plato’s republic.

Which was soon extinguished. Having a large, well provisioned, infantry matters though naval power can be more effective if it leads to greater wealth accumulation and technological advancement.  

The problem, of course, is that such a society might seem abhorrent to modern liberal sensibilities.

But liberal sensibilities pipe small unless they can prevail in battle thanks to superior tech.  

However, there is some intuitive plausibility to the idea that there is at least a prima facie obligation to exercise one’s abilities and talents in service of the greater society.

Why speak of obligation? It is obvious that enlightened self-interest promotes some Social 'goods'.  

Further, as has been mentioned, it is difficult to understand the Gita independent of its religious context and concepts. However, there are some ideas that seem relevant to an adequate theory of justice, and in this section of the paper I will discuss what some of those might be. First, the Arjuna-Krishna debate actually demonstrates the importance of incorporating an impartial spectator into one’s decision making procedure. I agree with Sen and Smith that considering the viewpoint of an impartial spectator is an important aspect of a theory of justice, and for just the same reasons—viz. universalizability and objectivity.

Smith said no such thing. Talking to smarter more successful people is about getting a better theory of society. This is John Muth's notion of rationality as expecting the prediction of the correct economic theory. Add in Hannan Consistency- i.e. regret minimization under Knightian Uncertainty- and you are good to go. But no 'universalizability' is involved. The theory only works where certain conditions are met and, even then, mechanisms are restricted to qualifying agents. However, we may speak of the  'naturality' or 'non-arbitrariness' of robust reflective equilibria of a certain type. However they are subject to Kuhn's no neutral algorithm stipulation. In other words, we have good reason to believe that there is no algorithmic manner of simultaneously satisfying a bunch of desirable properties. In other words, smart peeps knew Sen has been talking nonsense for forty years but said nothing because he was Brown. 

An impartial spectator understanding of objectivity introduces a notion of fallibility and correctability,

These exist if there is partiality. A guy having a wank knows that some methods of satisfying himself are fallible. Having a good internet connection turns out to be pretty important. 'Correctability' in this respect has been a driver of technological progress or so I firmly believe.  

and thus, at least potentially, can avoid some of the paternalistic concerns that one might have regarding a more traditional objective theory, like Plato’s.

Plato was a bum-boy. Paternalistic concerns are about kicking pedo scum in the bollocks. We want to bring up our kids under our own rooftree. We don't want them brought up by a bunch of fucking kiddy fiddlers. Corrupters of youth better keep clear of paternalistic boots. 

Second, by incorporating an impartial spectator one can evaluate one’s impartiality and not just particular decisions or courses of action.

No one can't. If Sen incorporates me and I tell him to stop being such a time-wasting blathershite, he will dismiss me as partial.  

In other words, there can be higher-order evaluations of impartiality.

How? We don't know who is impartial. How will we know who is an impartial judge of impartiality? There are TV series about guys who specialize in Juror selection. They can tell just by looking at what a person is wearing whether they are likely to be biased for or against a defendant. But they can't detect impartiality of a context independent type. Kuhn was right. There really is no neutral algorithm or decision process.  

The Arjuna-Krishna debate also demonstrates a problem that often arises in discussions of morality and politics, and that is emotions are often involved. While, emotions, in and of themselves, are neither good nor bad, they can lead to—as they did with Arjuna—poor decisions or less than rational reasoning.

Arjuna gets what he wants. His emotions and reasonings were just what the Doctor ordered.  

Questions of justice and of right and wrong are often emotionally charged issues, consider the debate currently occurring over healthcare, if one is not careful the emotions involved can cloud one’s  judgment.

A good thing. Emotions are Darwinian algorithms of the mind which break concurrency deadlock and express preference intensity. It is precisely because they are so useful that they can have damaging pathologies. 

Hopefully, COVID has made people more emotional about the need for universal health care. Not wanting to die of a horrible infection is too an emotion. 

It is at such times that Arjuna’s example can be instructive. Despite his rationalizations, Arjuna was aware that he was probably not in the best position to make such an important decision by himself, he therefore turned to one who was not only an impartial spectator, but an expert.

He turned to an expert who was highly partial to him. That was sensible. It would be foolish to listen to a guy who doesn't give a fart about you when there is somebody equally good who cares about you greatly.  

This, then, is another lesson that can be had regarding justice; that one has to be self-critical enough to know that one’s judgment might be being influenced by emotions or biases.

Justice is dispensed where there is a protocol bound, buck stopped, service industry of a certain type. Decisions made by individuals may be justiciable in such venues. But those decisions are not judgments in the same sense as the decisions reached by judicial bodies. 

Individuals have Hohfeldian immunities such that there is no reason to be 'self-critical' about being influenced by emotions or biases. Who you sleep with is up to you even if you are biased towards the opposite sex and are emotionally attached to your wife. Plato may not approve but then an impartial spectator may have kicked in his bollocks after witnessing him approach some kid in the playground. 

While one does not necessarily have to take the advice of an impartial spectator or an expert, one does have to be cognizant of one’s own biases and limitations.

Not unless it is leading to some loss or exposure to risk. 

A third lesson that can be had regarding justice and the Arjuna-Krishna debate is that there are situations in which there are no good solutions, just more or less bad ones.

The reverse is the case. The Gita shows there is a fucking fantastic solution for everybody. 

In other words, one lesson of the Gita is that one lives in a morally complex world in which there are competing demands, all of which cannot be satisfied.

Only if that is what one wants to do. You are free to quit any morally complex world and go be a beach-bum.  

In such circumstances there is not always an ideal solution, but one must act anyway, and that is the real import of Krishna’s claim to do one’s duty.

If one wishes to remain an Agent rather than a Principal- sure. But you could chose to be a Principal in which case the world is just as morally complex as you want it to be.  

Opting out, or in Arjuna’s case refusing to fight, is not a valid option,

Yes it is, provided Arjuna ceases to be an Agent and sets up as a Principal.  

especially in cases of manifest injustice—which the battle between the Pandavas and Kauravas was supposed to represent

but Hindus know it was no such thing. There was a tradition in that House of the stronger claimant giving up his claim and taking the path of spirituality.  

—there is an obligation to get involved. Further, by not getting involved or not acting one is tacitly condoning the injustice,which was Gandhi’s point in underscoring the fact that “Arjuna … had no choice but to fight.” (Gandhi 2000, 34)

Gandhi and Tilak and Vivekananda had a political interpretation of the Gita. However, the outcome of the Freedom struggle was that some who had cooperated with the British gained senior positions by reason of their administrative experience while others who had fought the British were left to their own devices because they had nothing valuable to offer independent India.  

“In the midst of his confusion, Arjuna himself understands the reality of what Krsna has indicated. He admits his weakness of heart. He knows that as long as a person thinks he knows, he cannot know the truth.”

Krishna begins by propounding the Vedantic doctrine which Arjuna has heard of and which he knows is a higher wisdom. The Gita is meant for ordinary people. It is a bridge between conventional morality and the higher spirituality. However, because God himself devises a particular soteriological mechanism for ordinary people during this episode, it isn't really an epoche or 'bracketing' for Theists. Atheists can make ridiculous claims about it but then us low IQ dudes probably sound ridiculous if we try to explain electricity or high finance.  

“ Similarly, it is not always the case that one’s family, community or country is on the “right” side of the battle.

Because there is an uncorrelated asymmetry. But, at the margin, some  'discovery' has to be done.  Not all public signals are alethic. 

Thus, while it is true that one does have obligations relative to one’s community, in matters of justice, the moral obligations of right and wrong trump clan and community affiliation.

Only for a Principal, not an Agent. A civilian is welcome to emigrate or, in totalitarian regimes, otherwise escape. A soldier can't sell his gun to the other side because of his moral obligation to pay a hooker. 

While the Bhagavad Gita is premised on an extreme version of such a situation, similar situations are not uncommon. What the Arjuna Krishna debate demonstrates is that one can have obligations that transcend one’s close relationships.

Unless one is an Agent. 

Thus, as in the previous issue, one must act, but for the right reasons.

A Principal may choose to be an Agent. But that choice does not depend on having right or wrong reasons.  

While few people will be put in Arjuna’s situation where they have to physically battle their kinsmen, the Gita does seem to be encouraging its readers to correct and improve one’s community, and that was, at least part of, the appeal of the Gita for Gandhi—it was not just the appeal of the pure theory of “doing one’s duty irrespective of the consequences” as Sen suggests. (Sen 2009, 210)

Gandhi was a Principal. He had some cock-eyed theory and was given money by some shrewd businessmen who did well out of his boycott of foreign cloth and other such shenanigans.  

The purpose of this section was to merely introduce some apparent lessons the Gita can provide when considering the question of justice. By putting the ArjunaKrishna debate in the proper context—in the previous section—lessons which Sen ignored can be brought to the fore. By noticing that Arjuna was not really defending a particular theory, concerns other than a sensitivity to consequences can be highlighted. Broadly speaking, the lessons articulated here are connected by two issues, namely impartiality and a self-criticalness.

Neither issue arises in the Gita. Krishna is Arjuna's maternal Uncle. Arjuna does not denigrate himself. He mentions Niyamas and Krishna provides a way to gain immunity from them. That's it. That's the whole story. If you want a theory of Justice out of the Mahabharata then all you have to do is analyze it in terms of Hohfeldian incidents. If you want Econ out of it then the Vyadha and Nalophkyanam provide the relevant normative and game theoretic foundations for the decision theory of Principals. The Gita is for Agents by Agents and isn't decision theoretic. It is therapeutic or gnostic. 

By incorporating an impartial perspective and acknowledging one’s own biases—whether personal or communal, and “[t]he Gita [all but] says, ‘…We should point out the lapses of our own people...’”—a particular view of justice seems to follow. (Gandhi 2000, 36-7)

No. A particular type of political rhetoric, not a view of justice, follows. Gandhi wasn't a judge. He tried but failed to set up an indigenous Justice system on the Sinn Fein pattern.  

The view of justice that seems to follow from the concerns discussed in this section is one of active involvement that is universal in scope.

If talking bollocks means 'active involvement'- sure.  

In other words, one’s moral obligations transcend the boundaries of any particular community and are exacting, a failure to act on one’s duty—broadly construed as moral obligations—is equivalent to supporting injustice.

Which is equivalent to fucking yourself in the ass which is equivalent to slut-shaming the Universe which is equivalent to not having a crafty wank while everybody else is busy with mental masturbation. 

My point is that anybody can talk bollocks. Non-informative propositions are all equivalent.  

Whether or not the conclusions made here, and derived from the lessons of the Bhagavad Gita, provide a correct, at least partial, theory of justice is an open question.

Let me close it politely but firmly. Joshua's conclusions are ignorant and foolish.  

As a matter of fact, not witless conjecture, India has a sizable corpus of both 'Judge made' and statutory laws which we know, by reading relevant auto-biographies etc, were influenced by Hindus cogitating on the Gita. The same is true of the Bible for judgments made by Christians or laws passed by them. Since we can always find that the same consideration- i.e. a Biblical maxim or one from the Gita- militated for opposite judgments or statutes we can safely say that no particular 'idea of Justice' is uniquely associated with either Gospel or Gita. However, Aumann has found game theory among the Sanhedrin and the Nalopkhyanam explicitly depicts the 'Just King' as having to learn statistical game theory to overcome Vishada. In contrast, both the Gospel and Gita are Theistic texts. They celebrate the Personal Lord God and Savior who redeems or ransoms even utter rogues like myself. The fact is, even I will die. That's all the Theodicy any reader of this blog needs. You may deplore my not having died already but be confident it will happen- probably in a more undignified and painful manner than you can whish or hope for.  When it does, the God of the Gita will have worked what for me would be his best and finest miracle. 


Tuesday, 10 May 2022

Accessibility is a Choice

Deign we drink our fill or, more daring, stop
 Dreams distill this globe drop by drop
Not the Dark, it is Dawn I dread
Of stars, thy robe, that it unthread

Envoi-
If Accessibility is a Choice with Sequence Lawless
Godel's proof of Thee, to me, is flawless