In a paper with Laxmi Iyer, Abhijit Banerjee writes-
Iyer & Banerjee are assuming that 'differences in historical institutions' are random. This is not the case. Some areas permitted the flourishing of 'tax farming'- more particularly because big landlords could bring in labor from elsewhere thus breaking the bargaining power of locally dominant castes. This was not possible elsewhere for geographic and sociological regions. Even in ancient times, different types of land tenure existed side by side because geographical factors had created caste based resistance to the fungibility of agricultural labor and this in turn militated for 'ryotwari' 'peasant proprietor' regimes. The British knew this perfectly well. They contrasted the peasants of the flood plain who were weak and disease ridden, with the independent minded, martial, yeomanry of hilly or arid areas. In Bannerjee's ancestral Bengal, zamindars could bring in labor from what are now called S.C and S.T communities without a backlash from higher agricultural castes. This was impossible in ryotari areas.
Iyer & Banerjee are aware that Geography shaped History. Property rights were determined, not by the Brits but by Indian Physical and Social Geography.
They write-
Thus only Geography mattered. History did not. 'Policy choices' were not based on 'Historical Institutions' but ultimately constrained by Nature and differences in Social Formations which reflected Geographical, not Historical, differences.
On the other hand, it must be said, stupid Economists- who had a lot more power at one time because they brokered the 'resource curse' that was Development Aid- could, on the basis of their stupidity and ignorance, artificially produce a 'Historical' as opposed to 'Geographic' effect. But this was only true in the short run or so long as the cretinous Left could recruit credulous cunts.
Iyer & Banerjee admit as much-
In some parts of India there was a surplus which could be extracted. In others, there was a return on investment which could accrue- at least in the short to medium term. That investment might be wholly in a coercive machinery if the population was supine. Elsewhere it had to involve the provision of club goods. This depended on Geography which in turn determined Social formations and Fiscal Institutions.
Supine populations, often of mixed origin- because labor was brought in from outside- do badly in health and education though, no doubt, they may provide vote-banks for corrupt dynastic politicians. Where Geography has provided a sterner cradle, assertive dominant peasant castes rise up through education and enterprise. They may do so under Princes of their own or else as part of an 'intermediate' class representing a nexus between the lower order of the bureaucracy, the bazaar, and village councils.
Iyer & Bannerjee consider themselves to be showing how a 'historical accident' leads to economic divergence. They think it was pure happenstance that Brazil was hot and wet and had a lot of rain forest whereas New England had snow and the Mid West had vast prairies. Geography played no part in making Brazil a tropical country. Instead, there some accident occurred way back in history such that more Africans were sent to Brazil than to the US which attracted White people willing to pay their own passage.
They write- 'the fact that Brazil is where it is
Sadly, Brazil is where it is today because of Geography. It was considered better for sugar production because of Geography. Attempts to buck Geography- by growing Pineapples in Alaska or Christmas trees in the Sahara- soon come a cropper. On the other hand, stupid economists can always show, 'after controlling for a wide range of geographical differences', that Alaska is not a leading exporter of Pineapples only because of a historical accident. Similarly, it was only the prejudice of some European statesman or savant, prevented the Sahara from becoming one vast coniferous forest.
India was not a unitary state. Even under feudalism, the military government left the details of how taxes were raised to local intermediaries such that there was a mix of different property regimes. The British took over this fiscal machinery. From time to time they'd experiment with the system but, in general, reverted to the old system. Thus, in Oudh, they had sought to win the loyalty of the high caste peasant- whom they recruited to their Army- by reducing the power of Landlords. This backfired and thus, after the Mutiny, they went back to the old system- or, at least, the appearance of it.
Is the following ignorant simply or is it written in bad faith?
Every sentence in the above has a suggestio falsi. India was not 'one country' then. It was far from homogeneous in any particular. No doubt, Geographically similar regions were similar, but the country had a diverse Geography and ethnicity. The 'detailed history of institutional variation' testifies to endogeniety prevailing. Any exogenous change collapses quite quickly or else is merely cosmetic and counterproductive.
Where revenue collection was taken over by the British, it conformed to what was already robust, if not optimal. Policy initiatives could generate perturbations but had to be abandoned quickly enough. Hansard is full of mid nineteenth century debates where the old fogeys who had left India in the 1830's insisted that Indian agriculture was unchanging and the villages self-regulating, while those who had returned more recently said that the official picture bore no relation whatsoever to the facts on the ground. The British could pretend to rule only by turning a blind eye to what was actually happening. In essence, this was a mixed property regime which fluctuated for exogenous reasons Iyer & Banerjee omit from their analysis.
It is misleading to speak of British hegemony as 'conquest'. Speaking generally, annexation was subsequent to a quite long period of indirect control. Moreover, it ebbed and flowed in accordance with the resurgence or collapse of martial coalitions which had a caste basis. Thus British influence was not 'exogenous', nor does it have any cut and dried chronology. Had this not been the case, the Victorians would have figured out a way to impose a uniform system and maintain the share of land revenue in its total receipts. If the Brits couldn't do it, it was because it couldn't be done. Ultimately, smarter Brits decided they had to get out of India because they hadn't a clue as to how to mobilize it vast rural population such that the defense and prosperity of the British Commonwealth was advanced, not retarded.
Unlike Soviet Russia or Communist China or the crazy regime in Burma, the Indians, after Independence, realized they couldn't get the vast majority of peasants to pay anything towards the Government. Taxes may be the price of Civilization but our sturdy yeoman don't want Civilization- this was the secret of Gandhi's appeal. No doubt, some displaced tribals in the tea-estates and so forth could still be exploited, but a better course was to let the productivity of Indian peasants stagnate, or fall at the margin, so as to pass around the begging bowl. Indian mathematical economists gained an arbitrage opportunity in this way and some gained global prominence- as opposed to the obloquy they richly deserved. Sadly, beggary turns out to be a very expensive way to earn your living and so the Economists were disintermediated so as to permit the more assertive peasants to grow more food, feed the nation, and rise up economically, socially and politically. In several parts of India, they insisted their kids or grand-kids study STEM type subjects or set up businesses rather than just become pseudo Left wing Social Scientists or bureaucrats. Then they kicked the elites in the goolies and elected people like themselves- much to the chagrin of the Iyers & Bannerjee & Banajis & other such expat fuckwits.
It is ludicrous to suggest that Patels, or Jats, or Nadars or other such assertive peasant castes would let themselves be fucked over for all eternity in the manner of more supine populations, of mixed origin, located on cholera prone flood plains. Indeed, even they grow restive- though the solution to the problem of involuted agriculture is industrialization and urbanization which Left wing nutters refuse to deliver. However, it must be said, that assertive castes can still use 'feudal' arrangements to advance. This is not captured by 'official' figures, but British officials were aware it was happening and, together with the local notables who attended their kutcheris, found a modus vivendi. This was a wholly idiographic matter and no nomothetic research project can parsimoniously capture the underlying structural causal model. Instead, all it can do is support mischievous availability cascades- e.g. the Indian obsession with land reform as inevitably boosting productivity and ending the food shortage as opposed to perpetuating extreme poverty, reducing labor mobility, and increasing agricultural involution.
Banerjee & Iyer are contributing to an availability cascade which privileges History over Geography and permits the Ideologue with no direct knowledge of the country she is pontificating about to claim an interessement role. They admit that, in practice, there was a wide range of tenure systems. Moreover, information is severely lacking for many districts. Thus, they are having to make up the numbers in many cases, thus rendering the exercise wholly arbitrary and unscientific.
Though controversial- Iversen, Palmer-Jones & Sen have a paper challenging Iyer & Bannerjee's contention that the Central Provinces were 'zamindari' as opposed to 'malguzari' areas and thus their result does not follow- this paper is far better than average. But it is still junk social science. It is making a false claim- viz. stuff some Brits did a long time ago still has some impact. The truth is the Brits had to adjust to India's physical and social geography just as, after Independence, brown shitheads with PhDs in Mathematical Economics had to either emigrate and babble nonsense elsewhere or else shut the fuck up and let the politicians proceed in a pragmatic manner on the basis of existing reality not some stupid mathematical model.
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