Do Indians have different 'epistemic intuitions'?

This is from a paper by Weinberg, Nichols & Stich-  

One day Charles is suddenly knocked out by a falling rock, and his brain becomes re-wired so that he is always absolutely right whenever he estimates the temperature where he is. Charles is completely unaware that his brain has been altered in this way. A few weeks later, this brain re-wiring leads him to believe that it is 71 degrees in his room. Apa!1 from his estimation, he has no other reasons to think that it is 71 degrees. In fact, it is at that time 71 degrees in his room. Does Charles really know that it was 71 degrees in the room, or does he only believe it?

Apparently, East Asians say 'Charles really knows' much more often than Americans. 

However, this difference declines in the following case-

One day John is suddenly knocked out by a team of well-meaning scientists sent by the elders of his community, and his brain is re-wired so that he is always absolutely right whenever he estimates the temperature where he is. John is completely unaware that his brain has been altered in this way. A few weeks later, this brain re-wiring leads him to believe that it is 71 degrees in his room. Apart from his estimation, he has no other reasons to think that it is 71 degrees. In fact, it is at that time 71 degrees in his room. Does John really know that it was 71 degrees in the room, or does he only believe it?

Why do 20 percent of East Asians say 'only believes' in this case whereas a mere 10 percent said this in the previous case? The answer is that the information set has changed. The elders could have told John what had happened. The rock could not. We feel sorry for John. Clearly he is not somebody the elders think highly off. What goes on in his head is merely belief, whereas we- whom the elders have taken into confidence- have accurate knowledge. 

Why are more Americans inclined to say 'only believes'? The answer is that in their Society, people look at thermometers or other such devices as part of their job or training. In other words, protocols differ. There is nothing 'philosophical' here.

The authors take a different view. They think the big change between the two cases arises out of the latter involving a 'socially sanctioned' act. This is crazy shit. East Asian Elders aren't allowed to monkey with a guy's brains. The weasel word was 'scientist'. East Asians are in awe of them coz East Asians be smart and have gotten a lot richer in recent decades by doing sciencey stuff. 

The Faluki are a large but tight knit community living on a remote island. One day, a radioactive meteor strikes the island and has one significant effect on the Faluki- it changes the chemical make-up of their brains so that they are always absolutely right whenever they estimate the temperature. The Faluki are completely unaware that their brains have been altered in this way. Kal is a member of the Faluki community. A few weeks after the meteor strike. while Kal is walking along the beach, the changes in his brain lead him to believe that it is 71 degrees where he is. Apart from his estimation, he has no other reasons to think that it is 71 degrees. In fact, it is at that time exactly 71 degrees where Kal is. Does Kal really know that it is 71 degrees, or does he only believe it?

This time, East Asians were more likely than Westerners to say 'only believes'. Why? Coz the 'Faluki' sound kinda ooga-booga, grass-skirt wearing, spear-chucking cannibal type retards who will chase Jackie Chan as he retrieves the jade sword of the Yellow Emperor. Them jokers know shit. 

The authors however think that the change occurred because knowledge was now collective- not individualistic.

In other words, these Westerners think 'East Asians' are

1) obedient to 'Elders' who decide what is 'socially sanctioned'

2) Collectivist by nature whereas Americans are rugged individualists. 

Consider the following 'Gettier case'-

Bob has a friend, Jill, who has driven a Buick for many years. Bob therefore thinks that Jill drives an American car. He is not aware, however, that her Buick has recently been stolen, and he is also not aware that Jill has replaced it with a Pontiac, which is a different kind of American car. Does Bob really know that Jill drives an American car, or does he only believe it?

If Jill is a friend of Bob, it may be that he knows her preference re. cars. She may, at a pinch, drive a non-American car. But she isn't happy doing so. If Bob knows this, then he really knows Jill drives an American car, though- at the moment- she may be giving a b.j in the back of a Japanese vehicle. 

I vote with the East Asians who say 'really knows' not 'only believes'. Why? The word 'friend' suggests a degree of psychological intimacy- a knowledge of the heart. 

The authors then sampled some Sub-Continental people in New Jersey who were even more inclined than the East Asians to plump for 'really knows'. Again, the explanation lies in the very high knowledge of the heart attributed to the friend. Indeed, God is the Friend. Mithra meant God and survives in Hindi as Friend. The Prophets are 'Khalilullah'- Friends of God. 

The authors think 'epistemic intuitions' differ & what counts as knowledge on the banks of the Ganges does not count as knowledge on the banks of the Mississippi.

This is nonsense. The American reads 'friend' as 'acquaintance' because America is based on Dale Carengie type 'winning friends and influencing people' not by showing them your heart but telling them what they want to hear. They may use some other word- bud, bro, homey, goombah- to indicate a deep emotional bond.

Consider the following-

It's clear that smoking cigarettes increases the likelihood of getting cancer. However, there is now a great deal of evidence that just using nicotine by itself without smoking (for instance, by taking a nicotine pill) does not increase the likelihood of getting cancer. Jim knows about this evidence and as a result, he believes that using nicotine does not increase the likelihood of getting cancer. It is possible that the tobacco companies dishonestly made up and publicized this evidence that using nicotine does not increase the likelihood of cancer, and that the evidence is really false and misleading. Now, the tobacco companies did not actually make up this evidence, but Jim is not aware of this fact. Does Jim really know that using nicotine doesn't increase the likelihood of getting cancer, or does he only believe it?

If Jim really knows about this evidence he must have considerable technical and statistical knowledge. Thus he really knows. Since sub-continentals in New Jersey are more likely to be employed in some Sciencey profession- though some may work in retail or run motels etc- they were more for 'really knows' whereas the reverse was the case for 'Westerners'. Why? 'Knows about the evidence' means something different for people in Sciencey fields. You have to have expertise to evaluate evidence. Having read about it in the newspaper or heard of it on the radio does not constitute knowledge for an immigrant group whose green-cards were predicated on higher degrees in Sciencey stuff. This is not the case with subcontinental Britishers. Most of us iz stoopid and don't reed reel gud. If I say 'mujhe ye pata hai'- I know this- to the guy at the Tandoori, he laughs and says 'arre hum jaise logon ko kya pata hota hai? bus roti ke liye pasina bahana or mawt ke liye aansu'- people like us know only how to sweat for our bread and shed tears for our dead. 

Mike is a young man visiting the zoo with his son, and when they come to the zebra cage, Mike points to the animal and says, '"that's a zebra." Mike is right-it is a zebra. However, as the older people in his community know, there are lots of ways that people can be tricked into believing things that aren't true. Indeed, the older people in the community know that it's possible that zoo authorities could cleverly disguise mules to look just like zebras, and people viewing the animals would not be able to tell the difference. If the animal that Mike called a zebra had really been such a cleverly painted mule, Mike still would have thought that it was a zebra. Does Mike really know that the animal is a zebra, or does he only believe that it is?

We say a father who correctly identifies an animal to his son really knows what he is talking about. Fuck the 'older people in the community'. They think 9/11 was a hoax- like the moon-landing. 

The Indians are 50-50 on this while the Westerners are 70-30 for 'only believes' probably because they smoked more dope and watched a lot of movies where everything, not just the moon-landing, was faked by Government scientists. 

What's going on in these last two cases? Why do SCs and Ws have different epistemic intuitions about them? The answer, to be quite frank, is that we are not sure how to explain these results. But, of course, for our polemical purposes, an explanatory hypothesis is not really essential. The mere fact that Ws, EAs, and SCs have different epistemic intuitions...

No they don't. They just accord different values to words like 'knows', 'friend' and consider a Dad pointing out zebras to his son to be a good guy worthy of respect. This has nothing to do with 'epistemic intuitions'. It's just a matter of language use in cultural contexts. The politer form 'knows' is preferred where the actor is worthy of respect or is assumed to have expert knowledge. 

The following surprised me

Pat is at the zoo with his son, and when they come to the zebra cage, Pat points to the animal and says, "that's a zebra." Pat is right-it is a zebra. However, given the distance the spectators are from the cage, Pat would not be able to tell the difference between a real zebra and a mule that is cleverly disguised to look like a zebra. And if the animal had really been a cleverly disguised mule, Pat still would have thought that it was a zebra. Does Pat really know that the animal is a zebra, or does he only believe that it is? 

If Pat is rational, he would say 'I believe that's a zebra but can't be sure. I'm too far away.' He doesn't really know anything. Indeed, he might say 'this is a guess of mine- not actually a belief at all.' 

I was surprised that better educated people were 90 percent for 'really believes'. But, a moment's thought enabled me to dismiss this result. These guys didn't really believe shit. They just ticked a box so as to get the thing over and done with.

The problem with this sort of experiment is that where there are cultural or educational differences, then the thing must be rewritten for each sub-group so that the emotional valency of the words used is the same.  If this isn't done, you are aren't separating a signal re 'epistemic intuition' from socio-linguistic 'noise'. 

The authors deny that 'intuitions which come with a clear sense of necessity and modal import -strong intuitions, as we propose to call them- are anything close to universal.' The problem here is that we all know that intuitions can be systematically misleading. Expertise is about developing a sixth sense for where this might happen. Thus, by its nature, intuition is divorced from 'necessity' and 'modal import'- both of which are highly technical and counter-intuitive. Precisely for this reason, intuition may turn out to have 'univocal foundations' of a deep sort. There may be some method of harmonious construction such that our intuition was correct to mislead us or, rather, we were correct to misread it. Necessity may turn out actually to be Freedom. Truth may arise out of its own judicial murder. All sorts of weird Hegelian shit may go down after the owl of Minerva has taken wing and we return to Parminides' House of Night. 

This is the problem with the author's conclusion-   we think that the best reaction to the Western philosophy professor who tries to draw normative conclusions from the facts about "our" intuitions is to ask: What do you mean "we"?

The fact is, if humanity will cease to exist at some point in time, then, by backward induction, there must always be some 'we' we'd all assent to be part off if provided with infinite time and computation power and so forth so as to arrive at an 'overlapping consensus'. After all, the word 'we' is the solution to a coordination problem. It is useful. There is some pragmatics for it such that we would all benefit by accepting it covers us as well. If doesn't matter if this is not ascertainable or, indeed, if it involves the ineffable. So long as it seems likely that humanity will perish, strong intuitions re. normativity remain a spectre at our feast.