Indian history textbooks explain that Congress felt it represented all India and that it should be treated differently. This is understandable. But, if this was the case, why did they let Gandhi go alone to the Second Conference? Either they should have turned out in force or they should have boycotted the thing. The advantage of sending a big delegation is that Congressmen could influence those closest to their own thinking who had been chosen to represent some particular group. The British would have seen that Congress was a big tent affair which could always conciliate particular interest groups- e.g. the intellectual heavyweights of the Justice Party or the 'Depressed Classes'.
I suppose the answer to this question is that had Congressmen attended the Conference in force, they would have had to come out of their fantasy world. They would have had to admit that there were real problems facing the country which could only be tackled on the basis of pragmatic 'give and take' not the bogus 'Socialism' of the Karachi Resolution.
Consider the crisis that arose in Kashmir, during the Conference, when religious riots in Kashmir caused tribal irregulars from the North West to invade the State. The Maharaja had to appeal to British troops to save himself. There was a lesson here which Congress, as the future ruler of a large portion of the country, needed to learn.
As a matter of fact, Gandhi did suddenly suggest that Dr. Ansari be brought in but the Muslim delegates weren't having any of it. This shows that Gandhi himself must have regretted making himself the sole representative of Congress.
From the Indian point of view, the Tory victory in the General Elections as well as Muslim intransigence rendered the Second Conference futile. Yet, had Congress endorsed the plans it made for representative Federal Institutions, then the role of the Governors and the Viceroy would have been undercut. From Westminster's point of view, India would look like a Dominion rather than a bunch of States with local autonomy but no sovereignty with respect to Defense or Foreign Affairs.
Gandhi failed in two separate spheres- one was to conciliate the Minorities. The Dalits, the Sikhs, the Indian Christians, the anti-Brahmin Justice Party in the South and the Muslims were at one in repudiating him. The second was to show Congress could be a responsible partner in a Federal structure. In particular, his demand that the Army be placed under an elected Ministry was regarded with suspicion. Muslims and Sikhs genuinely believed that they were making a disproportionate contribution to Defence. They considered this a cowardly Bania trick to gain military power. Thus one result of the Conference was that Defence was retained wholly under the Viceroy. This was then quoted as the reason for leaving External Relations under him because of some supposed indissoluble connection between Diplomacy and Defence. Yet, the fact is, Defence costs money and the whole point of having Representative Institutions is that this means people are willing to pay more in tax. Had Congress had a number of delegates, rather than just the one, each could have explained to some opposite number of his how Federal Taxes (which were not envisaged) could 'sweeten the pot' for everybody. Indeed, this is the reason it is rational to pool sovereignty.
It is noteworthy that under cover of the Conference Indian plutocrats struck a deal with their British counterparts in a cordial atmosphere. But if this type of business could be done, why not deals of a political type more beneficial to the commonweal?
The Second Round table conference is considered a failure for Gandhi. Two years previously, his arrest had created a revolutionary situation in many parts of India. But, after the Conference, he was jailed without much reaction.
I believe the Conference had two important effects
1) the Pakistan demand was conceded before it was formally articulated. Sindh became a province and the NWFP was upgraded to similar status.
A contemporary observer, writing for the Pacific Review, wrote
'The Moslems carried their determined opposition to the
Obviously, the Muslim majority States would only want to stay in the Union if they were getting something in return at the Center. It was in Congress's interest to ensure there was a Center where this sort of horse-trading could be done. Potentially, they were the biggest beneficiary going forward.
2) The Tories, whose grip on power was strengthening, would dictate the pace and nature of Indian political developments. Congress had been a 'big camp' National movement'. Now it was a party of Northern, High Caste, Hindus. Gandhi returned to India, and Jail, empty handed. The Tories imposed a diktat which left very substantial residuary powers in the hands of the Viceroy. Irwin was the last such to try to do a deal with Gandhi. His successors jailed Gandhi and outlawed Congress in a contemptuous manner.
In my view, a large Congress delegation may have been as unsuccessful as Gandhi was on his own. But, a party with half a million members benefits when its representatives get a chance to travel and meet political rivals. The Justice Party and the 'Depressed Classes' certainly benefited from their moment in the Sun, though it must be said they sent first rate men. But Congress did not lack in talent either. The big lesson the Conference taught even first rate barristers was the necessity for mental flexibility and the 'increasing returns' to striking deals and fostering 'overlapping consensus'. Congress did not learn this lesson. It assumed that concentrating power in the hands of one man- even if he was a crackpot- was a superior alternative. A few years later Govind Vallabh Pant would cry out in ringing tones 'Italy has its Il Duce. Germany has its Fuhrer. India has its Mahatma'. But, history would soon show that Duces and Fuhrers, like Mahatmas, are bad for the countries they impose their stupidity upon.
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