Thursday 5 July 2018

Adam Tooze on some shite Slobodian.

This is Adam Tooze reviewing  'Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism'. by Quinn Slobodian in Dissent magazine.

 For Slobodian, the earliest and most authentic brand of neoliberalism was from the outset defined by its preoccupation with the question of world economic integration and disintegration.
Imperialism was about world economic integration. But, it was discovered, it was unnecessary. Resources would flow to where they were needed without it. Countries would voluntarily club together- as Europe did after the second world war- and so there was no need for a Hitler or a Stalin.
In the 1970s, neoliberalism’s proponents would help unleash the wave of globalization that has swept the world.
Nonsense! 'Proponents of neoliberalism' means pointy headed academics or bottom feeding denizens of think tanks. What unleashed globalisation was the stupidity of the Trade Union movement and the cowardice and incompetence of the managerial class. Leaders all over the world decided to ignore those shitheads and let them price themselves out of the market. So what if unemployment went back up to Great Depression levels? There was no danger that either the Nazis or the Stalinists would take over because you only had to look at them to see they were as stupid as shite and as crazy as bedbugs.
But, as Slobodian shows, their advocacy for free trade and the liberalization of capital movement goes back to neoliberalism’s founding moments in the wake of the First World War.
All sorts of shite had its founding movements back then- including psychoanalysis and nudism and talking shite about Universal Peace and so forth.
The movement was born as a passionately conservative reaction to a post-imperial moment—not in the 1950s and ’60s but amidst the ruins of the Habsburg empire.
Passionately conservative? Nonsense! Hayek started off as an admirer of Weiser's democratic socialism before shifting to Menger's classical liberalism which however dispensed with a Whig landed aristocracy as the ultimate cordon sanitatire against mob rule. Thus it wasn't 'passionately conservative' at all. None of its members was a big fan of the Church or the landed magnate or the traditional Officer class.
Torn apart by self-determination, the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy in 1918 was not just the failure of a complex multinational polity. In the eyes of von Mises and his ideological allies, it threw into question the order of private property.
Urm... it was the Bolshevik revolutions and the insurrections of Bela Kun and so forth which did this.
It was the First World War and the Great Depression that birthed democratic nation-states, which no longer merely shielded private property but claimed control over a national economy conceived of as a resource to be supervised by the state.
The two events were widely separated in time. Neither was inevitable. Had Germany been occupied, disarmed, and made to pay reparations, it could not have tried a revanchist war which led all combatants to adopt command type economies.
Private property that had once been secured by a remote but even-handed imperial sovereign was now at the mercy of national democracy.
Bullshit! Remote 'imperial sovereigns' could order pogroms or Kulturfamfs. Private property wasn't secure at all. The Irish absentee landlord could be forced to break up his estate and sell to his tenants. Plenty of Austro-Hungarian magnates were under no illusions regarding what their future might be.
Faced with this shocking transformation, neoliberals set out not to demolish the state but to create an international order strong enough to contain the dangerous forces of democracy and encase the private economy in its own autonomous sphere.
They may have set out to do so just as the nudists may have set out to extirpate the aggressive instincts from our species by getting us all to play nude volleyball and go hiking while bollock naked, but they failed completely and entirely.
Before they gathered at Mont Pèlerin, von Mises hosted the original meetings of the neoliberals in the Vienna Chamber of Commerce, where he and his colleagues called for the rolling back of Austrian socialism.
That worked out a treat! Incidentally, the Soviet Union only permitted the re-unification of Austria because they were losing money on their occupation of a portion of it.
They did not think that fascism offered a long-term solution, but, given the threat of revolution, they welcomed Mussolini and the Blackshirts. As von Mises remarked in 1927, fascism “has, for the moment, saved European civilization.”
So, the guy was a shithead. That's why nobody listened to him.
Even in the late 1930s, Wilhelm Röpke, another leading neoliberal, would unabashedly declare that his desire for a strong state made him more “fascist” than many of his readers understood. We should not take this as a light-hearted quip.
We should not take it as anything at all. Germany's fate was decided by men with guns. History has forgotten him because 'ordoliberalism' has been revealed to be hot air.
The neoliberals were lobbyists for capital. But they were never only that. Working alongside von Mises, the young Friedrich Hayek and Gottfried Haberler were employed in empirical economic research. And it was the networks of interwar business-cycle research that drew key figures from Vienna to Geneva, then home to the League of Nations. The Swiss idyll is the site for much of the rest of Slobodian’s narrative, giving its name to the brand of globalist neoliberalism he labels the “Geneva school.”
Like the League, this 'Swiss idyll' had about as much impact as nudism or Rudolph Steiner's anthroposophy.
In the 1930s the League of Nations was a gathering place for economic expertise from across the world. But as Slobodian shows, what marked the Geneva school of neoliberalism was a collective intellectual crisis. In the face of the Great Depression, they not only came to doubt the predictive power of business-cycle research, they came to see the very act of enumerating and counting “the economy” as itself a threat to the order of private property. It was when you conceived of the economy as an object, whether for purposes of scientific investigation or policy intervention, that you opened the door to redistributive, democratic economic policy. Following their own edicts, after crushing the labor movement, the next line of defense of private property was therefore to declare the economy unknowable. For the Austrian neoliberals, this called for reinvention. They stopped doing economics and remade themselves as theorists of law and society.
So, they were crap economists and had to settle for being ex-pat lecturers in England or America or Istanbul. Had they not done so, they would have died unmourned and unlamented either at the hands of the Nazis or under bombardment by the Allies.
Evidently, this put them profoundly at odds with the technocratic spirit of the midcentury moment. The most famous expression of this alienation was Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom (1944), which takes up surprisingly little space in Slobodian’s account. In part, this is no doubt due to the focus of Hayek’s attack on European totalitarianism and the Beveridge plan for Britain’s postwar welfare state.
So, Hayek was wholly irrelevant to his own milieu. Later on, the British Trade Union shat the bed so thoroughly that working class people elected Thatcher to kick them in their collective goolies. Thatcher read Hayek because she was a bit dim- a Chemist, not a Physicist- and couldn't hack equations. Also, unlike Friedman- who was too Jewy and opinionated- Hayek was a gentlemanly Austrian who knew his place.
Slobodian’s Geneva School neoliberals, by contrast, focused their attention on global political economy. In the aftermath of the Second World War, they struggled to defend capital mobility against the restrictions of Bretton Woods. In the 1960s they inveighed against the postcolonial order, rallied to Apartheid, and did their best to undercut the visions of a fairer and more regulated New International Economic Order pushed by the global South. The idea of a government-regulated system of exchange dominated by commodity producers was anathema to neoliberalism.
And to the rest of us coz OPEC meant greasy Oil Sheikhs turning Knightsbridge into a drag strip for their sports cars or else, nutjobs like Gaddaffi or Chavez or Saddam running amok creating mayhem.
Slobodian gives us not only a new history of neoliberalism but a far more diverse image of global policy debates after 1945. Even in the heyday of Keynesianism and developmentalist policies, the neoliberals were never silenced. Neoliberalism was always part of the conversation, though it was not the secret blueprint of twentieth-century history. As Slobodian observes, from the 1930s, many neoliberal ideas were deliberately utopian. They weren’t aiming to change policy, at least not right away. Their interventions were polemics designed to break open the debate.
These poor bastards were running away from the continent to get ill paid teaching jobs. They wrote a couple of books to make a little money and thought Mcarthyism was their ticket to a better life.
It was in the 1980s that the neoliberals’ long march through the institutions of global economic governance finally carried the day.
Why? Coz the Liberals had shat the bed very thoroughly during the Seventies. Reagan was elected because of the incontinence associated with, what he called, the 'L-word'.  No doubt, because of the G.I bill, a lot of people thought quoting a Prof. was a cool thing to do. Still, these shitheads changed nothing. Precisely the same processes obtained even where their names were unknown. Gorbachev was convinced by his own mathematical economists to surrender Party control of the Economy. This immediately led to a scissors crisis and the collapse of the Soviet Union.
In this Slobodian agrees with the more familiar narrative. But rather than concentrating on national programs of monetarism, privatization, and union-busting, Slobodian focuses on the transnational dimension: the EU and the WTO. The protagonists of his story are people you have never heard of, second-generation students of the original Austro-German founders, trained as lawyers, not economists—men like Ernst-Joachim Mestmäker and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, who shaped the agenda in Brussels and helped to steer global trade policy.
'Helped to steer'? Bureaucrats don't help steer anything. They just are- like death and taxes.
It is a measure of the success of this fascinating, innovative history that it forces the question: after Slobodian’s reinterpretation, where does the critique of neoliberalism stand?
First and foremost, Slobodian has underlined the profound conservatism of the first generation of neoliberals and their fundamental hostility to democracy.
Though only democratically elected leaders- like Thatcher, Reagan, Mitterand and now Trump- can kick the intellectuals in the goolies and disintermediate them from political processes.
What he has exposed, furthermore, is their deep commitment to empire as a restraint on the nation state. Notably, in the case of Wilhelm Röpke, this was reinforced by deep-seated anti-black racism. Throughout the 1960s Röpke was active on behalf of South Africa and Rhodesia in defense of what he saw as the last bastions of white civilization in the developing world.
So what? BOSS paid a whole bunch of third rate people to write articles supporting the Apartheid regime. Even some Indians were offered a little money towards this end.
As late as the 1980s, members of the Mont Pèlerin Society argued that the white minority in South Africa could best be defended by weighting the voting system by the proportion of taxes paid. If this was liberalism it was not so much neo- as paleo-.
As late as the late eighties, South Africa was our ally. After the Wall fell, we pressurised Botha to do a deal with the ANC. Then Mandela became our hero.
If racial hierarchy was one of the foundations of neoliberalism’s imagined global order, the other key constraint on the nation-state was the free flow of the factors of production.
If nude hiking was one foundation of nudism's imagined global other, the other key constraint on the nation state was the free flow of air around everybody's genitals.
Neo-liberalism and nudism are only as important as each other. The fact that we all, in the year 2018, get nude before showering does not mean that nudism 'marched through the institutions' nor that it was not complicit in Adolf Hitler's own ablutions.
This is what made the restoration of capital mobility in the 1980s such a triumph. Following in the footsteps of the legal scholar and historian Samuel Moyn, one might remark that it was not by accident that the advent of radical capital mobility coincided with the advent of universal human rights.
Worthless shite. There was more 'radical capital mobility' in 1911 than 2018. I could have bought agricultural land in India or Egypt or Uganda in order to create a plantation. Now, such an action would be illegal or involve high compliance costs.
Both curtailed the sovereignty of nation states.
Nonsense! Greece just reimposed capital controls a couple of years back. Their sovereigny wasn't really impaired at all. They were just pretending it was because they thought Germany would write off their debts so as to avoid being accused of being neo-Nazi.

What about Universal Human Rights? Britain's sovereignty hasn't been curtailed because May now says she'll get rid of the thing.

Anyway, nobody believes that shite anymore- now Trump is in the Oval office and Merkel, not Orban, is on the run.
Slobodian traces that intellectual and political association back to the 1940s, when Geneva school economists formulated the argument that an essential pillar of liberal freedom was the right of the wealthy to move their money across borders unimpeded by national government regulation. What they demanded, Slobodian quips, was the human right to capital flight.
Which the tax-dodging 'Belgian dentist' achieved through the Eurodollar. Incidentally, it was the French who caused the Americans to rescind Roosevelt's executive order which prevented citizens from holding gold.
That irony curdles somewhat when we recall the historical context. After 1933, the human right to capital flight was no neoliberal joke. Money was the binding constraint both on the ability of German and Austrian Jews to leave the Third Reich and on their being accepted by potential countries of refuge. It may be typical of neoliberal hyperbole that defenders of capital mobility accused the U.S. government of resorting to “Gestapo” methods in tracking down the wealth of “enemy aliens.” But it was no coincidence that Reinhard Heydrich, future head of the Gestapo and the architect of the Holocaust, made his leap to prominence in the Nazi regime in 1936 as head of the foreign-exchange investigation division of Hermann Göring’s Four Year Plan. The neoliberals are onto something in insisting on the interconnections between the movements of money and people. Certainly restricting the former is a sure way to restrict the latter, especially in a world of national welfare where the right to entry depends on proving that you need neither social assistance nor a job.
Bilge. China keeps trying to crack down on capital flight- which is why it was manipulating its currency- but it keeps failing though it is ready and willing to put a bullet in the brain of anyone it catches.
Neoliberals have as much to do with this as German nudists of the Twenties have to do with the fact that I am currently nude and typing this in bed.
It was these entanglements of unfreedom that the Road to Serfdom dissected so effectively, which brings us to the ticklish question of its author. By the 1990s it can hardly be denied that neoliberalism was the dominant mode of policy in the EU, OECD, GATT, and WTO. But what kind of neoliberalism was it, and what has Hayek got to do with it?
It was the kind of neoliberalism which detected nothing but rent-seeking in complaints from Industries or Trade Unions of 'unfair competition' or 'the national interest'.

It had nothing to do with Hayek. Rather it was based on the memory of the stagflation of the Seventies when Governments had to subsidise Corporations and feather-bed Unions. Once you give into rent-seeking on one issue, they will demand more and more and more. In the early Eighties, there was a sketch on 'Not the Nine O'clock news' where the Trade Union leader, in addition to everything else, demands the right to sleep with the Manager's daughter. He offers his wife instead but the Unionists have seen her and won't be budged. Neoliberalism was about cutting down the Unions to size before they demanded droit de seigneur with respect to the daughters of management.
Slobodian works hard in his concluding chapter on the GATT and the WTO in the 1980s and 1990s to bring us back to the central Hayekian theme of the impossibility of representing the world economy as a whole.
Mathematics can represent the world economy as a whole. Hayek was a big silly.
In the case of key personnel at the WTO, he can show direct neoliberal lineage.
So what? Bureaucrats don't matter.
As a matter of intellectual biography this make sense. But as Slobodian knows only too well, there is an obvious counterargument to any claim that such organizations represent Hayekianism in action—Hayek’s profound skepticism toward anything that smacks of conventional economic policy, growthmanship, or, indeed, the very idea of the economy as such. This does not stop practical neoliberals from doing their stuff, any more than his disciples are bound to either the letter or the spirit of Keynes’s General Theory of Employment. Much of the political success of neoliberalism depends on the willingness of its practitioners to discard key ideas of its purist thinkers. What remains in real, “actually existing” neoliberalism is precisely its relentless emphasis on growth and competitiveness as the measure of all things.
Nonsense! Neoliberalism is about not letting Labour shit the bed and telling cartels quit bothering the bureaucrats and go bribe Congress in time honoured fashion.
The result as far as Hayek is concerned is profoundly ironic. After 1989 he was feted as the godfather of the global capitalist revival. No doubt, as a lifelong anti-Communist, he took satisfaction at the end of the Soviet regime. But for Hayek, the Cold War had never been more than a “silly competition” in which both sides took a crude quantitative measure of the economy as their benchmark of success and offered their citizens essentially the same promises. Turbo capitalism of the Friedmanite-Reagnite variety was, for Hayek, “every bit as dangerous” as anything Keynes ever proposed.
In a world framed by what, according to Slobodian, ought to be considered a contradiction in terms—neoliberal growthmanship—how should the left respond?
The overwhelming stress on the priority of “the economy” and its imperatives leads many on the left to adopt a position that mirrors Hayek’s. Following thinkers like Karl Polanyi, they criticize the way that “the economy” has assumed an almost godlike authority. Nor is it by accident that the libertarian left shares Hayek’s distaste for top-down economic policy, what the political scientist James Scott has dubbed “seeing like a state.” As the neoliberals realized in the 1930s, the nation-state and the national economy are twins. If this remains somewhat veiled in the histories of countries like France and the United Kingdom, the conjoined emergence of state power and the developmental imperative was stamped on the face of the postcolonial world.
Worthless gibberish. India found out that Economists have shit for brains. Wait till they go to sleep because 'India grows at night'.
Such critiques can be radically illuminating by exposing the foundations of key concepts of modernity. But where do they lead? For Hayek this was not a question. The entire point was to silence policy debate. By focusing on broad questions of the economic constitution, rather than the details of economic processes, neoliberals sought to outlaw prying questions about how things actually worked. It was when you started asking for statistics and assembling spreadsheets that you took the first dangerous step toward politicizing “the economy.” In its critique of neoliberalism, the left has challenged this depoliticization. But by failing to enquire into the actual workings of the system, the left has accepted Hayek’s injunction that economic policy debate confine itself to the most abstract and general level. Indeed, the intellectual preoccupation with the critique of neoliberalism is itself symptomatic. We concentrate on elucidating the intellectual logic and history of ideologies and modes of government, rather than investigating processes of accumulation, production, and distribution. We are thus playing the neoliberals at their own game.
Yup. You are talking worthless shite. So what? You are incapable of doing anything else. What is important is that you are not masturbating in public and jizzing in your student's faces. You are welcome to pretend your worthless Academic Department has some sort of Social utility. The truth is it is a collapsing Credentialist Ponzi scheme.
Given neoliberalism’s association with globalization, it might be tempting to see reclaiming the national economy as a way out of this trap. This is the impulse that lies behind “Lexit,” which, at its best, is a call for a return to the ambitious, left-wing social democracy of the 1970s. Given that this was the moment that provoked the neoliberals into their most vicious counterattack, one can see the attraction. The question is whether it is a real possibility. After all, the global South in the 1970s proposed not a series of go-it-alone national solutions, but a New International Economic Order. And in that moment, the global South could call on the energy of the first flush of postcolonial politics.
Hilarious! In the Seventies, post-colonial societies were ruled by corrupt gerontocrats. I recall the Brandt report. It was pure shit.
The passions that have been unleashed in the United Kingdom and the United States since 2016 are of a more rancid vintage.
As long as it remains at the level of abstract gestures toward “taking back control,” the impulse of resistance mirrors what it opposes. We are still not engaging with the actual mechanisms of power and production. To move beyond Hayek, what we need to revive is not simply the idea of economic sovereignty, whether on a national or transnational scale, but his true enemies: the impulse to know, the will to intervene, the freedom to choose not privately but as a political body.
That's Trumpism's Fart Act- selective tarriffs on everything to make America great again like it was when Fred Flinstone first moved to Bedrock.
An anti-Hayekian history of neoliberalism would be one that refuses neoliberalism’s deliberately elevated level of discourse and addresses itself instead to what neoliberalism’s airy talk of orders and constitutions seeks to obscure: namely, the engines both large and small through which social and economic reality is constantly made and remade, its tools of power and knowledge ranging from cost-of-living indicators to carbon budgets, diesel emission tests and school evaluations. It is here that we meet real, actually existing neoliberalism—and may perhaps hope to counter it.
By talking worthless shite.

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