Could France have defeated Hitler in March 1936?

 

Many see March 1936 as the occasion on which Hitler could have been stopped in his tracks and the Second World War could have been avoided. The theory is that, France, which had seven motorized divisions while Germany had three, could have defeated Hitler in March 1936 when he sent troops into the Rhineland in defiance of the Treaty of Versailles. Their failure to do anything caused Belgium, in October of that year, to repudiate its previous agreement with France- which would in effect have meant the French fighting the Germans on Belgian soil- and thus weakened Frances's position. Indeed, the 'Breda variant' of the Dyle plan required strong cooperation from the Dutch and Belgians. They, naturally, would be unhappy if German troops reoccupied the Rhineland. One final point, without the Rhineland garrison- which was withdrawn in 1930, the French lost an element of mobility. In subsequent years, commencement of hostilities would require full mobilization of reserves- which itself created its own logistical strains. 

The plain fact is, by 1936,  France would have had to fully mobilize and then go into hostile territory. No doubt, they might make some gains while Hitler postured but sooner or later they would have had to fight and, if they did so, they would have lost. Why?

The Germans had at least 300,000 men by the end of 1934 and had introduced conscription in the following year. In 1936, the French had 320,000 men. However the core Army was about 110,000 while  about the same number had only six months of service.  France did raise the conscription period to two years in 1935 but questions remained about training and morale. For this reason, French military plans were over detailed and gave little scope for discretion to those lower down the chain of command. By contrast, the Germans had introduced radio communication and trained officers for Auftragstaktik (decentralized command)

The French rightly feared that Germany might be able to quickly scale up their Army to 700,000 men because of the greater prestige associated with Military service in that country as well as the population's evident devotion to their Fuhrer. By contrast, as in 1914, France remained deeply divided politically and socially. 

Thus, to conclude, France wasn't really in a position to reoccupy Rhineland- thus triggering war with a stronger country. Germany had a 65 percent bigger population a bigger air-force and better industry. It had been rearming with newer weapons while France continued to use Great War surplus stock. On the other hand, the French had invested a lot in the Maginot line which was considered unbreachable. But this also meant that France was temperamentally disinclined to go on the offensive.

Quite apart from the military situation,  the fact is, international opinion would increasingly back Germany because, after all, they were merely taking back their own territory. Moreover the French defence pact with the Soviets- despite being wholly meaningless because all the other Locarno powers would have to agree to the two parties assisting each other- was considered justification for Hitler rearming. What if there was some sort of conspiracy between Communists in France & their patrons in the Kremlin to forcibly convert Germany to that atheistic creed? We may laugh at such a suggestion but, back then, there were powerful right-wing forces in Europe and America who subscribed to a paranoid, anti-Semitic, world-view. 

I suppose, arguments about what could or could not have been done in 1936 are beside the point. France was a democracy. 1936 was a year of strikes and factory occupations. More than 2 million workers participated. In the circumstances, a politician who demanded military action would be accused of creating a bogeyman to distract the proletariat from its true class-interest. No doubt, the whole crisis had been cooked up by the Capitalists. The French Right retaliated by coining the slogan 'better Hitler than Blum (the Prime Minister. He happened to be Jewish.) General Gamelin- a staunch Republican- felt his country would need allies to the East, as in 1914, but this reinforced a defensive mind-set without materially helping Hitler's intended victims to his East. If Hitler hadn't been a cretin, Gamelin might be praised for having meticulously planned a veritable walkover for Hitler. The pay-off was that France escaped the 1.3 million fatalities in the Great War. Perhaps, if the UK had made a separate peace with Hitler and Stalin had gone off to sulk behind the Ural mountains, France would have prospered under Petain. After all, Hitler appreciated French culture. He wanted to be taken for a civilized man in the West, no matter what his people were doing in the East. 

Since we are speaking of counter-factuals, I may as well end with the question of the British 'limited liability doctrine' (i.e. first priority for the Air Force, second for the Navy and third for the Army) which sent the signal that the traditionally insular English might just want to cut themselves off from the Continent and go it alone. We know Gamelin wasn't happy with this doctrine but did it play a wider part in undermining French morale? 

Perhaps, some kind reader could supply me with the answer- or point me in the right direction to find it.