Tuesday, 9 December 2025

知音


Since Unitarity is just one of those unctuous things
Pleasing to palates cosy collegiums refine
That Yoga broke Bo Ya's lute strings
Smoke- Grothendieck's wine.

Note.
Wikipedia says ' Bo Ya's friendship with Zhong Ziqi generates the term Zhiyin (Chinese: 知音, original meaning: someone who knows music well), which means close friends that can completely understand each other.'

 When Zhong died, Bo Ya gave up music. No more would great mountains rise, or vast oceans flow, from what streamed from his lute. In other words, Tai Shan & Huang He too lost the precondition for Yoga- viz. 'suhrit prapti'- a like hearted auditor or observer. 

Monday, 8 December 2025

Amartya Sen's two-faced poverty.


25 years ago the Inter-American Development Bank published the following article about Amartya Sen and the 'thousand faces of poverty'.  

What is poverty?

Low productivity. In particular, if a person makes less than is required to maintain life- he is poor.  

How is it measured?

By a deficit in income relative to the amount of money needed to stay alive.  

Who are the poor?

Those who fall below the poverty line.  

Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize winner for Economics, has devoted his life to such basic questions about development.

But they are easily answered. Devote your life to raising productivity or giving transfers to those unable to work. That is worthwhile.  But it isn't what Sen has done. He wrote pseudo-mathsy nonsense about imaginary problems- e.g. Arrow's theorem or Rawls's silly theory of justice. 

Defining and measuring poverty and calculating the percentage of poor people in a country or a region is not just a matter of numbers and averages.

Yes it is. Sadly, you may have to lower the poverty line if there isn't enough money to help those below it.  

In 1998, the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences awarded Amartya Sen the Nobel Prize for Economics “for having restored an ethical dimension to the discussion of vital economic problems.”

This is like giving the prize for best plumber to a guy who isn't a plumber but who argues that plumbers should be nice.  

Sen had delved beyond mathematical theory,

He isn't a mathematician. You can't delve into the theory of a thing of which you only have an undergraduate level knowledge.  

approaching economics with an innovative social vision that was more real and more human.

This is like a guy who can't fix your toilet but whose theory of plumbing says that plumbers should be nice. 

Years of hard work had helped him bring to light the many facets of poverty.

He hasn't done any actual work nor has he uncovered any 'facet' of poverty. He read somewhere that people have different metabolisms and nutritional needs. That's why special provision is made for them- e.g. expectant mothers were given a higher ration during the War. But this is an empirical, ideographic, matter. For a poor country, what matters is finding ways to boost productivity. Saying 'the government should give lots of money to poor people' is pointless. The Government doesn't have a lot of money. Why? Because productivity in the country is low.  

According to Sen, poverty is a complex, multifaceted world that requires a clear analysis in all of its many dimensions.

He is wrong. Poverty is about low productivity. There are many facets to this. Some policies (e.g. education) raise general purpose productivity. Others, like fixing a dysfunctional legal system, raise total factor productivity. By contrast, poverty has only one face or facet- viz. lack of income. 

“Human beings are thoroughly diverse,”

They really aren't. That's why a Doctor educated in India can practice just as well in America or Europe.  

the professor recently explained during a meeting of the Network of Policymakers for Poverty Reduction, an Inter-American Development Bank initiative.

i.e. a useless talking shop. 

“You cannot draw a poverty line and then apply it across the board to everyone the same way, without taking into account personal characteristics and circumstances.”

Nonsense! Governments do draw such a line and then make special provision for the disabled, expectant mothers, etc. etc.  

There are geographical, biological and social factors that amplify or reduce the impact of income on each individual.

But they are easily compensated for. That's why Doctors can treat patients from different countries and social backgrounds.  

The poor generally lack a number of elements, such as education,

some uneducated people are rich. They may have some special talent which makes them very productive.  

access to land,

plenty of rich people have zero access to land because they prefer to live in penthouse apartments 

health and longevity,

rich people can die young of incurable diseases 

justice,

a rich guy may be sent to jail for a crime he didn't commit 

family and community support,

Scrooge has neither yet is as rich as fuck.  

credit and other productive resources,

because they have low income- i.e. can't service debt. Also they can't buy a factory. Sad.  

a voice in institutions,

they may do. Sadly, those institutions may be powerless because of lack of resources arising from low productivity 

and access to opportunity.

Modi is poor. Rahul is rich. But it is Modi who seized the opportunity to become PM.  


According to Sen, being poor does not mean living below an imaginary poverty line, such as an income of two dollars a day or less.

Yet, such a person is in fact poor.  

It means having an income level that does not allow an individual to cover certain basic necessities, taking into account the circumstances and social requirements of the environment.

Which is what happens if you earn less than two dollars a day. A richer country can afford a higher poverty line.  

Furthermore, many of the factors are interconnected.

There is only one factor which matters- viz. productivity. Why won't Sen mention it? The answer is that it is useful to focus on ways to raise productivity. But, as a buddhijivi, Sen is averse to doing anything useful. His job is to scold all those nasty economists who raise productivity and help their countries become richer.  

Sen has found examples to illustrate his theory in the world of women, where he has done pioneering work,

No. He jumped on the 'missing millions' bandwagon which began in the mid Seventies when sex-selective abortion became popular. But, prior to that, there had been good old fashioned female infanticide.  

along with his studies on famines

which is caused by food availability deficit. The solution is to grow more food and invest in transport infrastructure so as to get the food to where it is needed. But British ICS officers knew all about this fifty years before Sen was born.  

and freedoms, and on the economics of poverty.

This simply isn't true. Sen doesn't even understand 'Giffen goods'- e.g. the fact that poor people may eat more potatoes when Income falls.  He believed that when incomes rose for those in Bengal who were working in war industries, they suddenly started eating three or four times as much rice as they previously had. The reverse was the case. If real income goes up, you eat less rice and more fish or vegetables. 

A woman with more education, he explains, tends to have a better paid job,

Unless she lives in a strict Islamic state. In some Indian States, higher female education correlates with lower participation in the work force. Why? Richer people can spend more on educating their daughters. But those daughters get married off into high status families which look askance upon women having a career. 

better control over her fertility,

unless contraception is banned 

and better health indicators for herself and her children.

only if household income is higher.  

For years, Sen has preached that the image of women as heroines relegated to self-sacrifice for home and family has not helped them at all.

Why not preach getting rural girls into giant factory dormitories? That's what leads to demographic transition. Higher productivity then directly raises real wages and permits collective insurance against sickness, unemployment, etc.  

“There are systematic disparities in the freedoms that men and women enjoy in different societies,” says Sen, “and these disparities are often not reducible to differences in income and resources.”

But, even more often, they are reducible to differences in income. If Sen were right, then Equal Pay Legislation would do little to tackle the underlying problem.  

There are many other areas with gender disparities, such as the division of labor in the household, 

only if there is a household 

the extent of education received, and the liberties that the different members of the same household are permitted to enjoy.

Governments and NGOs have specific programs to tackle these problems. Sen is ignorant of them. 

How people must look in order to be accepted in society–the clothes they wear and their physical traits–limits their economic options, a phenomenon Sen refers to as “social shame.”

Sen read this in Adam Smith. No doubt, in England in the Fifties, there was some truth to this notion. But, by the Seventies, the belted Earl and the Cockney prole were indistinguishable.  

Rather than measuring poverty by income level, Sen recommends calculating how much an individual can achieve with that income,

Nobody knows what they can achieve with their income. Had I bought 100 dollars worth of bitcoin ten years ago, I would now have 50,000 dollars.  

taking into account that such achievements will vary from one individual to another and from one place to another.

You can't take into account what is unknowable- e.g. the price of bitcoin ten years from now. 

Otherwise, how could we explain the existence of pockets of poverty in rich countries among middle-income people?

Drugs.  

In the inner cities of the United States,

where gangbangers indulge in drive-by shooting 

because of inadequate services the quality of life (measured in terms of life expectancy, infant mortality, health, education, and safety) of people who earn acceptable incomes and live in a rich society is comparable—and sometimes even inferior—to that of many poor countries in the rest of the world.

There was a period when young African American males had higher longevity and better educational and vocational outcomes if they were incarcerated under 'three strikes'. That is why that policy was popular with African American voters.  

Sen was born in India’s West Bengal state, and has used his country and China as a laboratory to study the economics of development.

No. He remained wholly ignorant of both. There is a story that he once went to Punjab to spend some time living with a family of farmers. He soon came running back to Delhi.  

He is currently a professor at Harvard University and Master at Trinity College at Cambridge University.

He spent about ten years in India but had to leave after eloping with his best friend's wife. Otherwise, his career has been entirely in the West- about which he knows nothing. He once said that Britain under Thatcher might face a Bangladesh style famine! 

Based on his extensive experience in development and poverty reduction, he had devised a large repertoire of theories and teachings that he believes also apply to Latin America and the Caribbean.

He has given bureaucrats an excuse to talk endless bollocks without actually doing anything.  

According to Sen, poverty analysis should focus on an individual’s potential to function rather than the results the individual obtains from functioning.

He is wrong. When analysing something undesirable there is only one way to proceed- viz. tackle the root problem which, for poverty, is low productivity. It is amazing that Sen, who comes from a country with very low productivity, has never once applied his mind to raising it. But that is easily done. Imitate what more successful countries have done. Don't try to reinvent the wheel.  

Another of Sen’s achievements has been to sweeten the development pill.

Nonsense! He ran away from India long ago. England and America were already developed. Manmohan sweetened the development pill by permitting some actual development with the result that the middle class expanded greatly and was able to buy nice cars and houses etc. Sen was against Manmohan.  

In the stroke of a pen, Sen did away with the blood, sweat and tears approach that had been pushed on underdeveloped countries as the only way for them to achieve progress.

Why not also get rid of death? Sadly, pen strokes have no magical powers. While Sen was talking nonsense, South Korea and Singapore and then China embraced export led growth. They raised productivity and thus became affluent. Sen objects to India taking the same road. That's why non-Bengali Indians despise him.  

The old theory of sacrifice has given way to that of individual success, which Sen subscribes to, provided that there is a framework of social support and genuine democracy.

Sadly the countries which have risen most in Asia have had neither for the greater part of their post-war history.  

This was the explanation Sen gave for the profound financial and social crisis that swept across Asia in 1998.

It was a market correction, nothing more.  

Efforts there had focused on production and individual success,

corporate success.  

but without a network of social support or the freedoms necessary for a democracy to thrive.

China is thriving. It has no fucking democracy. India had higher per capita income in 1980. Now China is about five times bigger. (Though under ppp, it might be only 2.5 times that of India).  

Sen believes that inequality, like poverty, is a multifaceted problem.

It isn't a problem. Development occurs because inequality increases. People have an incentive to imitate what the smarter people are doing.  

And in the course of a conversation laden with social commentary, the issue of globalization inevitably comes up.

Unknown to the participants, by 2015, with the rise of Trump & Sanders, the backlash against globalization would succeed. Hilary Clinton did a U turn on TPP. It was too little, too late.  

The protests against it, says Sen, have invigorated a very necessary debate on its impact.

The debate didn't matter. Trump & Sanders did. But immigration was as much an issue as the 'export of jobs'.  

In his view, globalization can be neither rejected outright nor accepted without serious criticism.

Criticism does not matter. Trump becoming POTUS does.  

First, we have to see what percentage of the world is benefiting from it. Because it’s one thing if education is 90 percent for the wealthy and 10 percent for the poor, and something very different if the proportion is 70/30 or 60/40.

Fuck that. The rich can afford to accumulate degrees on fancy campuses. The poor can't. What matters is the productivity gap. Bridge that and you cease to be poor. Take the lead, and it is your turn to be rich and to condescend to those you have overtaken. 

On the other hand, if you are stupid and useless, defeat your own poverty of ideas by virtue signalling like crazy. That's what Sen did. Being a darkie, he was awarded intellectual affirmative action. But Manmohan and Montek and Modi actually helped India to rise a little.  This made Sen very angry. He turns his scowl at Punjabis and Gujeratis who want the country to grow rich. His sweet and saintly smile, he turns towards Whitey. They reward him with Prizes and Honorary Doctorates. But it was Yunus, not Sen, who got to run his country. It is sad to think that Amartya was unable to make India a present to the Islamists as Yunus has done in Bangladesh. 

Sraffa's reswitching silliness


Sraffa's 'production of commodities by means of commodities' assumes that markets- and therefore 'market-makers' (arbitrageurs)- exist. However, people are not commodities. You can sell labour power. You can't sell yourself. The entrepreneur who combines factors of production is a free agent. He is not a slave.

Only things bought and sold on open markets are 'commodities'. If commodities are used in the production of other commodities, then they are classed as 'capital' or 'intermediate' goods. Their price is determined in the relevant market by the activities of arbitrageurs. They may be guided by Accountancy practices- e.g. 'historic cost less depreciation'- or the reverse might happen- i.e. Accountants 'mark to market'.

Wikipedia says-

'Sraffa reswitching is a concept in Sraffian economics where the most profitable production technique can change back to a more capital-intensive method

provided 'capital' intensity doesn't mean ratio of Capital to Labour.  Sraffa thinks a machine isn't capital. It is actually labour, albeit supplied at an earlier period. 

at higher interest rates,

 At higher interest rates, people have an incentive to sell their capital stock and buy debentures. Sraffa assumes they won't act upon this motive. Either that, or he is not talking about a market economy. But, in that case, neither the interest rate nor the profit rate nor the price is determined 'endogenously'. Everything is set by the State- including who can buy at the set price and who can borrow and who can save and who can run an enterprise. Incentives don't matter. Punishments do. 

after initially switching to a labor-intensive one at a moderate rate.'

Sraffa either assumes time travel or else there is no actual 'switching'. People merely say 'we should have switched. We couldn't because Time Travel hasn't been invented yet.' 

 Sraffa was working within a Marxist 'capital is dead labour' model. If he found inconsistencies or inefficiency in that model- that was of concern only to people living in command economies. It had no relevance for Societies where capital is allocated through financial markets.

 In market economies, Capital is what people expect to produce a given stream of income. Its value is decided by 'market makers' or entrepreneurs undertaking that function. Thus if an engineer sinks a lot of his own money into a novel product we say he is making the market for it. If he succeeds, the money he spent is 'investment' and the plant and machinery he has created are 'capital goods'. But, if he fails, that money wasn't 'investment'. It was, at best, a write off or else an expensive hobby which involved pissing money against a wall. The plant and machinery he has are junk or scrap metal. It isn't a capital good. 

On the other hand, if the State allocates funds to an investment project, then market forces don't operate. Prices and interest and profit rates are set by command. Subsequent appraisal may show that resources were misallocated. But that wasn't because of market forces. It was because the wrong commands were given. 

Sraffa stipulated that 'current costs of production are the sum of present values of dated labour inputs whereby capital inputs correspond to dated labour costs'. This simply isn't true in a market economy. Sooner or later, accountants have to mark to market. 

Current cost of production is just the actual money spent on combining factors of production. 'Historical costs' may be used to calculate profit but the Audit committee may object to this because it might lead to hostile takeover by an asset stripper or else unsustainable dividend cover (because depreciation allowances don't cover replacement cost) which itself may tank share price. 

This phenomenon contradicts the neoclassical assumption that there is a consistent relationship between the rate of profit and the capital-intensity of a chosen technique.

It contradicts the assumption (unstated, perhaps unknown, to the neo-classicals) that arbitrage will ensure this outcome. In any case, by using arbitrary Accountancy protocols, you can always order the domain such that you get the desired graph of the function. But ex poste won't be ex ante because unanticipated things happen. 

Sraffa argued that the possibility of reswitching complicates the idea of a simple, continuous measure of "capital intensity" as a determinant of production choice

It would if commodities weren't market phenomena in some sense. (You make a market for stuff you make even if you choose to give it away for free to someone you like. This is because there are people who want to buy it even if they can't do so.)  

Accountants spend a lot of time valuing capital stock. Around the time the 'reswitching debate' began to rage, Accountants had to deal with the problem or inflation and technological obsolescence and rising land prices. The stage was being set for the 'asset stripper'. It was more profitable to buy an enterprise to shut it down and sell its assets. This was because 'historic cost' accounting produced a balance sheet which did not reflect 'break up' value. 

Since Sraffa wasn't talking about a Capitalist economy, the debate wasn't really about capital. It was about stupid academics teaching nonsense. 

What Ajit Sinha calls 

Piero Sraffa’s profound contribution to economics.

had nothing to do with finding ways to economize on the use of scarce resources. It involved some stupid guys who got paid a little money to teach nonsense to careerist cretins.  

  Amartya Sen said

'It would be, I believe, a mistake to see (as has been sometimes suggested) in Sraffa’s analysis a causal system rival to the standard neoclassical model of the determination of prices, quantities, and the distribution of incomes.

In other words, it wasn't a contribution to economics.  

Sraffa was changing the nature of the inquiry

away from anything which might be useful  

—toward an important but neglected theme

neglected because it was useless 

—rather than providing a different answer to a given question already in vogue in contemporary economics. — 

Just as Sen doesn't help answer the question how India can be less poor. He changes the nature of the inquiry to focus on the capability to have the functioning to have the capability to have the capability to talk bollocks.  

Ajit Sinha says-

When Piero Sraffa’s book Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities was published in 1960, it was received with perplexity by the larger economics community.

Commodities are produced by people. People can't be bought and sold like commodities- at least not since slavery was abolished. Thus commodities aren't produced by commodities. 

It was not clear what the work was all about.
The consensus which gained ground was that 'Piero Sraffa's main aim in writing 'Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities' was to provide a prelude to a critique of orthodox, neoclassical economic theory. His objective was to establish an alternative framework for the determination of prices and income distribution that was independent of the neoclassical concepts of supply and demand, marginal utility, and the marginal productivity of capital.' 

Since there were command economies where the State fixed prices and, moreover, there was a lot of 'administered pricing' in the Corporate sector, such frameworks, of an ad hoc type, already existed. Indeed they had been a big feature of the economies of combatant countries during both World Wars. But they were unravelling. In the West, you had the 'asset stripper' and a rebellion by 'institutional investors' which led to the emergence of Merger & Acquisition mavens who became billionaires by increasing, or claiming to increase, 'shareholder value'. The Communist East was discovering that Kantorovich shadow prices were shit. Sell on open markets and your people don't have to queue up for hours to get their hands on a kilo of rotting turnips. 
Though leading economists of the day perceived that there was something profound in it, they were not able to put their finger on what that was. Sir Roy Harrod’s (1961) review of Sraffa’s book is the case in point. Though Harrod showed a profound lack of understanding of Sraffa’s treatise, he nevertheless acknowledged that “The publication of this book is a notable event. … A reviewer would be presumptuous if he supposed that he could give a final assessment of the value of its net product, or even single out what may prove to be its most lasting contributions. Before that result could be achieved, much prolonged consideration and reconsideration would be required” (p. 783).

Would the UK move towards or away from markets? Sir John Hicks believed that the rate of profit was already being set by the Government. Suppose Harold Wilson comes to power? Might the country embrace out-and-out Communism? There were people who believed Wilson was a KGB plant.  

The book came to prominence in mid-1960 when the now famous capital theory debates between the “two Cambridges” reached their climax. Apparently, Paul Samuelson at the MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts, had set his doctoral student David Levhari the task of disproving a proposition of Sraffa regarding “re-switching of techniques.” Levhari published his refutation of Sraffa’s proposition in the Quarterly Journal of Economics in 1965.

Geoffrey Harcourt once recounted to me that he was perhaps the first person in Cambridge, UK, to have come across this paper by Levhari at the Applied Economics Library. He went straight to Sraffa and told him that “there is a chap at MIT Cambridge who claims that your re-switching proposition is false.”

Sraffa responded: “No, he is wrong, and you show it to him!”

Harcourt responded: “Me? I can’t do matrix algebra.”

To which Sraffa responded: “Neither can I.”

So Luigi Pasinetti was asked to do the job, and the rest is history.

A good 1966 paper by Bruno, Burmeister and Sheshinski gives a clear account of how this unfolded.

Now suppose there are some goods that take more than one period to produce. One can either treat goods-in-process of different ages as different goods (with different activities)

which is what happens if you 'mark to market' for balance sheet purposes

or else calculate directly the implied price relationships.

In other words, rely on historic costs. This is fine if you have 'administered pricing' and all output can be sold at that price.  

The Pasinetti-Sraffa numerical example uses precisely the latter type of capital model.

In which case, there is no profit maximizing. We aren't talking about a Capitalist economy. Also, the interest rate is set arbitrarily. Who gets to borrow or who is forced to save is decided by the State. In other words, the price system is not allocating resources.  

There is one general common characteristic of all these models from which reswitching and other properties can be shown to follow.

It is that they can't exist in a market economy. If interest rates rise sufficiently, you don't get re-switching. You get a cessation of investment because everybody wants to be a lender, not a borrower.  Of course, if the rate of return (marginal efficiency of capital) is some multiple of the interest rate, there would still be investment. But then the thing would be so profitable that choice of technique would not matter. Just do what is easiest for you to do. Maybe you only get to double rather than triple your money. What do you care? You are laughing all the way to the bank. 

In 1966, Samuelson organized a symposium in the QJE, in which it was accepted by all parties, including Samuelson himself, that Levhari had made a mistake and that Sraffa’s proposition is, of course, robust.

Wikipedia summarizes the outcome very lucidly-  

 In a 1966 article, the neoclassical economist Paul A. Samuelson summarizes the reswitching debate:

"The phenomenon of switching back at a very low interest rate to a set of techniques that had seemed viable only at a very high interest rate involves

not being able to sell up and put the money into debentures. 


 more than esoteric difficulties. It shows that the simple tale told by JevonsBöhm-BawerkWicksell and other neoclassical writers — alleging that, as the interest rate falls in consequence of abstention from present consumption in favor of future, technology must become in some sense more 'roundabout,' more 'mechanized' and 'more productive' — cannot be universally valid." ("A Summing Up," Quarterly Journal of Economics vol. 80, 1966, p. 568.)

this was obvious. These guys were old enough to remember the Great Depression.  

Samuelson gives an example involving both the Sraffian concept of new products made with labor employing capital goods represented by dead or "dated labor" (rather than machines having an independent role) and Böhm-Bawerk's concept of "roundaboutness" — supposedly a physical measure of capital intensity.

There is no 'roundaboutness' if you have enough market makers with rational expectations. Why? Intermediate goods can be sold for something close to expected present value. This means, inter alia, that economies in its production can be gained and so others can enter the market for the finished good with much shorter elapsed time for break-even.  

Instead of simply taking a neoclassical production function for granted, Samuelson follows the Sraffian tradition of constructing a production function from positing alternative methods to produce a product.

If we produce a thing we know we can produce it in a particular way. We can't be sure we will know how to produce it in a different way.  

The posited methods exhibit different mixes of inputs. Samuelson shows how profit maximizing (cost minimizing) indicates the best way of producing the output, given an externally specified wage or profit rate.

He forgets that if the interest rate is higher than the profit rate, the project gets discontinued. Money is transferred to Debentures.  

Samuelson ends up rejecting his previously held view that heterogeneous capital could be treated as a single capital good, homogeneous with the consumption good, through a "surrogate production function".

Anything can be treated as anything else for some purpose. Your accountant may say 'sell your business. Put your money into debentures. You will be better off.' He is treating assets as homogenous with respect to money returns.  

Consider Samuelson's Böhm-Bawerkian approach. In his example, there are two techniques, A and B, that use labor at different times (–1–2, and –3, representing years in the past) to produce output of 1 unit at the later time 0 (the present).

Two production techniques
time periodinput or outputtechnique Atechnique B
–3labor input02
–270
–106
0output11


Then, using this example (and further discussion), Samuelson demonstrates that it is impossible to define the relative "roundaboutness" of the two techniques as in this example, contrary to Böhm-Bawerkian assertions.

B takes longer. Surely that makes it more 'roundabout'?

He shows that at a profit rate above 100 percent technique A will be used by a profit-maximizing business;

Not if B had already been chosen. You can't travel back in time. What will happen is the guy who would otherwise do A first tries to buy B. He would only go ahead with A if the profit rate was so high that he'd still be happy though reporting a higher rate of return.  

between 50 and 100 percent, technique B will be used;

It can't be chosen in time period -2. 

while at an interest rate below 50 percent, technique A will be used again.

Only A will be used unless it wasn't an option in time period-2 and can't buy out the guy doing B, you have no choice but to do A. So you have two different techniques without any switching between them. They have different rates of return. We might say, the 'marginal efficiency of Capital' is determined by the return on A which represents the addition, at the margin, to the Capital stock. 

The interest-rate numbers are extreme, but this phenomenon of reswitching can be shown to occur in other examples using more moderate interest rates.

There is no 'reswitching'. If you committed to B, you either sell out or carry on. If you come into the game at time-3 

The second table shows three possible interest rates and the resulting accumulated total labor costs for the two techniques. Since the benefits of each of the two processes is the same, we can simply compare costs. The costs in time 0 are calculated in the standard economic way, assuming that each unit of labor costs $w to hire:

where L–n is the amount of labor input in time n previous to time 0.

Reswitching
interest ratetechnique Atechnique B
150%$43.75$46.25
75%$21.44$21.22
0%$7.00$8.00

The results in bold-face indicate which technique is less expensive, showing reswitching.

If there is perfect arbitrage, B sells out or the guy doing A settles for a lower rate of return. Nobody can go back in time to switch technique.  

There is no simple (monotonic) relationship between the interest rate and the "capital intensity" or roundaboutness of production, either at the macro- or the microeconomic level of aggregation.

There are plenty but they are arbitrary.  

The proposition in question refutes the Clarkian-type neoclassical explanation of the rate of interest on capital on the basis of the “marginal productivity of capital,” which requires measurement of “intensity” of capital independently of the rate of interest.

Capital intensivity is determined by the money cost of physical capital relative to labour. This is independent of the rate of interest. It is computable based on the wage and the price of the capital goods in question. 

Sraffa’s “re-switching” proposition showed that, in general, there is no logical way by which the “intensity of capital” can be measured independently of the rate of interest —

Because he doesn't have a market for capital goods. He is not talking about a market economy. Otherwise, whatever is produced in time-3 in B has a price. That means B is actually more capital intensive than A in period -2. But if the rate of profit is higher than the interest rate, A may be chosen alongside B. 

and hence the widely held neoclassical explanation of distribution of income was logically untenable.

Anything at all can be made 'logically tenable'. The question is whether the thing is useful.  

This victory was hailed as the crowning glory of Sraffa’s book, but it came at a high price.

People decided Capital & Growth theory was useless. Finance was a separate field. Good mathematicians could make money and do something useful in that field. Also, if you like Marxism so much, why don't you fuck off to the Soviet Union? 

The orthodoxy interpreted Sraffa’s re-switching proposition as his main contribution to economic theory; they accepted its truthfulness and argued that the modern general-equilibrium orthodox economics need not aggregate capital independently of prices or the rate of interest, and hence the Sraffa critique of the orthodox theory was not fatal but rather minor.

So, either he made no contribution or made a minor contribution. That seems fair.  

Samuelson’s (1959) non-substitution theorem had already shown that a General Equilibrium model with the assumption of constant returns to scale and no possibility of technical substitution can generate classical-type price solutions independently of demand functions. In 1982, Frank Hahn published an influential paper in the Cambridge Journal of Economics in which he claimed that Sraffa can be incorporated as a special case of the inter-temporal General Equilibrium Model (see Sinha 2010, 2016 for a rebuttal). All this led to a general perception among the orthodox that the book on Sraffa can finally be closed. In a strange way it appeared that Sraffians lost the war after winning the great battle.

Everybody lost the war. Samuelson as much as Sraffa. There was a time when people thought that maybe 'shadow prices' and networked computers could allocate resources efficiently. Sadly, this was not the case. Knightian uncertainty obtained with a vengeance- i.e. unexpected events occurred more and more frequently.

One reason for this, was that perhaps the war was fought on side issues. My last several years of archival research (largely funded by INET and CIGI, see Sinha 2016) has led me to conclude that the battles, both in the areas of pure theory and history of thought, were fought on the wrong terrain—the question of re-switching of techniques was not the central aspect of Sraffa’s pure theory. It is a book that was designed to challenge the orthodox economic theory in a more fundamental way—there lies a methodological and philosophical sub-terrain underneath the apparent economic theory of the book.

Indeed. Sraffa was trying to give a labour theory of value based account of Capital. He failed.  

We should not forget that Ludwig Wittgenstein credited Sraffa for “the most consequential ideas” of the Philosophical Investigations (1953) and had put him high on his short list of geniuses.

Nor should we forget that Wittgenstein was wrong about everything.  

Wittgenstein had regular discussions with Sraffa for more than a decade during 1930s and ’40s in Cambridge,

Sraffa tried his best to avoid talking to Witless.  

England, and at many occasions he told his friends that those discussions “made him feel like a tree from which all branches had been cut” (Monk 1990, p. 261). Thus the philosophical sophistication and sharpness of Sraffa’s mind is beyond doubt. Unfortunately, Sraffa’s revolutionary contribution to economic theory was lost to the intellectual world because economists did not pay attention to the philosophical underpinnings of his economic theory.

He was trying to do stupid shit. If there was some merit to his approach, accountants and finance mavens would have already discovered and used it. Having a better theory of capital means you can become very rich. It must be said, Sraffa did make a bundle by buying Japanese scrip when it was undervalued. However, had the US not encouraged Japanese industry because of the Korean war, he would have lost money. In other words, something unanticipated made his investment profitable. 

Actually, the book was designed to challenge the usual mode of theorizing in terms of essential and mechanical causation — prices are shown to be neither ultimately caused by labor or utility/scarcity, nor are they determined by the forces of demand and supply. It, instead, argues for a descriptive or geometrical theory based on simultaneous relations. Sraffa demonstrates that on the basis of observed input-output data of an interconnected system of production, one can show, by simply rearranging them, that the rate of profits of the system can be determined without the knowledge of prices, if the wage rate is given from outside the system.

In other words, if people are slaves or robots, wages have no effect in determining the allocation of labour or the incentive to work hard.  

In this context, prices have only one role in the system and that is to consistently account for the given distribution of the net output in terms of wages and the rate of profits (introduction of rent of land does not make any difference to the result). Prices, in this context, do not carry any information that prompts “agents” to adjust their supplies and demands to bring about an equilibrium in the market. The questions of equilibrium as well as market structure are simply irrelevant to the problem.

Because Sraffa is assuming that workers are mindless drudges.  

A consequence of this approach was a complete removal of “agent’s subjectivity” or demand, and “marginal method” or counterfactual reasoning from economic analysis — the two fundamental pillars of orthodox economic theory.

Counterfactual reasoning means 'what would happen if we chose not to do this.' If there is no counterfactual reasoning, nobody is making any choices. They are mindless drudges.  

Sraffa wrote 'The marginal approach requires attention to be focused on change:- for without change either in the scale of an industry or in the 'proportions of the factors of production' there can be neither marginal product nor marginal cost.'

This is not the case. One can always ask what would happen if we cut output by one unit. How much would we save? That is the marginal cost.

In a system in. which, day after day, production continued unchanged in those respects, the marginal product of a factor ( or alternatively the marginal cost of a product) would not merely be hard to find-it just would not" be there to be found.

Your accountant can estimate if for you well enough. 

What Sraffa’s alternative economic theory establishes is that income distribution in terms of wage rate and the rate of profits are linearly related to each other

if that is what you assume- sure.  

and can be taken as given independently of prices. Now prices for any given input-output data must be such that those given distributional variables are consistently accounted for

Sraffa is assuming markets clear. But they may not do so. People form a queue. Those who arrived earlier can buy the good at the set price. The rest go home disappointed.  

— a conclusion that stands in stark opposition to the orthodox economic theory, which maintains that both the size and distribution of income are determined simultaneously with prices. Sraffa’s discovery of the “Standard commodity” plays the central role in establishing this thesis; and his reinterpretation of classical economics is also rooted in the above proposition.

The 'standard commodity' is based on the notion that there is some fixed basket of goods necessary for labour to maintain itself. But this is very different during peace-time than it is during a war.  Sraffa had lived through two big wars and one long 'cold' war. Man does not live by bread alone. He also needs submarines able to launch nuclear ICBMs. 


 
 

Thursday, 4 December 2025

Daryl Janzen on Black holes

 Daryl Janzen, a Professor of Astrophysics & Philosophy, has an intriguing essay which asks-

'What if black holes never actually form?
'How confusing inevitability with reality built decades of paradox'

I was under the impression that there is a lot of evidence that black holes exist. I am not aware of any theory which explains what is observed better than the black hole hypothesis. 

If a thing is inevitable, then sooner or later it will really appear. I am alive. My death is inevitable. This means that in the not too distant future I will be a corpse.

Janzen writes
Black holes are among the most captivating and scientifically intriguing phenomena in modern physics, inspiring both scientists and the public alike.

It is because there is so much evidence that they exist that they captivate us.  

But do they really exist?

Yes. At least, that's the best explanation we currently have for what Astronomer's observe. 

What if they are only ever forming, never formed?

If, there is a boundary beyond which we can't detect further 'forming', then all we can say, empirically speaking, is that the thing has formed. 

Currently, Doctors use various protocols to determine when a person has died. It may be, in the future, these protocols will be changed because 'signs of life' or viability for resurrection currently undetectable become observable.   

Just imagine — what if the whole edifice of black hole physics is built on an invalid logical inference that’s gone unnoticed (or unacknowledged?) for the better part of a century?

This wouldn't matter if the existence of the thing is empirically observed. Suppose Sherlock Holmes finds a clue that suggest Moriarty will be at the Charing Cross Hotel to kill the Archduke at 9 pm. This turns out to actually be the case. Mycroft Holmes points out that Holmes's logic was faulty. All that could be validly deduced was that there was a strong likelihood that a member of Moriarty's organization would seek to carry out the assassination at a particular time. Sherlock might reply 'look, my logic was good enough to serve my purpose. My job was to save the Archduke. The fact that I was also able to capture Moriarty was a bonus. I guess, he underestimated me. He should have sent some minion to do the dirty deed.'

Inevitability is not actuality — that’s obvious enough.

But it will be. Moreover, if it applies to a class of objects, then it is likely that some actual cases can be found. There is no proof that everybody currently alive will die but there is a lot of evidence that everybody who lived more than two centuries ago did actually die.  

Yet for sixty years physicists have ignored relativity’s most basic rule,

which is that there are no privileged frames of reference. I suppose one could say 'for human beings who can only move forward in time, that which is inevitable will have actual examples. Maybe there are other sorts of beings for whom this would not appear to be the case.' But this doesn't greatly matter because, while alive, we have no means to stop being human and become some other type of being.  

and we’ve taken for granted that the latter is implied by the former. Like fools walking around imagining we’re all dead because someday we’ll die, they look at the evidence that nothing can stop black holes from collapsing toward their horizons and imagine that a process which remains forever incomplete has already come to its end.

Death may be a longer process than we realize. A thousand years from now, they may have the technology to revive a corpse which has been dead for twenty years. What is certain is that, as far as we are concerned, death is both actual and inevitable. We think the same is true of existing black holes and things which will become black holes.  

Consider the following. We build a spaceship with three items onboard: a hot cup of coffee, a thermometer to measure the coffee’s temperature,

at some point the thermometer won't be able to find any difference between the coffee's temperature and that of the ambient atmosphere. Better and better thermometers may extend that limit from, let us say, 90 minutes to 90 minutes and three seconds or 90 minutes and 3.000001 seconds, etc. etc.  

and a clock that measures the arctangent of elapsed time since launch.

The clock will soon show Pi/2 radians. Better and better clocks will only be able to distinguish tiny increments on elapsed time. But they are a convergent series. Thus we can say with certainty that there is an upper bound. 

The ship, which has perfect insulating walls, is launched — and through some future technological innovation it is capable of constant proper acceleration away from Earth for all time.

A continuous signal is transmitted back to Earth, sending two pieces of information: the coffee’s temperature and the arctangent time.

Quite soon, they both have an upper bound- i.e. improving the clock or the thermometer only makes an infinitesimal increment. Still, this may be important for testing the predictions of some other theory. 

According to Newton’s Law of Cooling, the coffee’s temperature will approach the ambient cabin temperature exponentially and asymptotically — meaning it will very quickly approach the cabin temperature, but it actually takes infinite time to reach equilibrium.

For any given clock and thermometer, 90 minutes is that limit.  

Therefore, the temperature value sent back to Earth will exponentially approach a finite value, but it will only reach that value exactly in the infinite future.

But that won't be observable. Our equations are artefacts of our mathematic model but that model is not reality.  

Since the elapsed time is sent back as its arctangent, that value will also asymptotically approach a finite value of π/2 in the infinite future.

But the elapsed time, for any given receptor, will have quite a small upper bound.  

And since the ship will be forever accelerating, the signal that transmits this information will quickly become practically invisible due to redshift. However, in principle the signal will forever be received back on Earth, as the coffee gradually cools and elapsed time increases — all while the ship’s velocity asymptotically approaches the speed of light.

In other words, there is no need to mention a spaceship. My cup of coffee too will only reach ambient temperature after infinite time, though no clock and thermometer, however advanced, will be able to show elapsed time as more than about 90 minutes. 

People die. Coffee cools down. Black holes have formed and will form. That is what empirical observation teaches us.

, when the radius of a star collapses to the finite value of its event horizon, only a finite amount of proper time will have passed on a clock carried by a particle at its surface. These two values — the star’s radius and the elapsed time since it started collapsing — are approached in essentially the same manner as the coffee’s temperature approaches its asymptotic limit while the arctangent time approaches π/2.

In other words, black holes form as inevitably and ubiquitously as cups of coffee cool down. True, we may have a theory that says it takes infinite time for the boundary to be reached but that just means that any cut off we observe could be infinitesimally bettered if we had better tech. Thus, instead of saying the patient died at 3.02 AM, we may be able to say time of death was 3.0199999997 A.M.  

And from the standpoint of external observation, the light emitted outwards from a collapsing star exponentially fades and quickly becomes invisible

in other words, the thing ceases to be observable- unless you are moving away from it at the speed of light.  

— though in principle, no matter how long an external observer waits, they will forever “observe” that when the light they are now receiving was emitted,

there is no such light save in the case mentioned above.  

the star still had not collapsed below its event horizon — just as the future civilization above will forever see that the coffee hadn’t yet reached equilibrium when the signal now being observed was sent.

No. Future beings won't be able to detect any difference in the coffee's temperature just like us. They won't see the black hole after we stop seeing it. Obviously, if an astronomer says 'there used to be light coming from this patch of the sky. Today, that light disappeared.' then his peers will understand that if the object is 3000 light years away, a particular object became a black hole 3000 years ago. 

But regardless of which past events are observed now, we’d also like to know whether collapsing stars should be thought to have already crossed this observational threshold,

the moment you cease to observe them, you know that they became black holes x number of years ago where x is the number of light-years separating us from the collapsing star.  

or if they are more accurately thought of as still approaching their event horizons.

If at 10 AM some light was received but none was at 10.01 AM then we know the thing became a black hole x number of years ago.  


In essence, while the image of the star freezes and fades, we’d like to know: Do gravitationally collapsing stars really pass through their event horizons and form massive singularities in our universe?

Currently, that is the best hypothesis.  In 2015, a massive star, designated N6946-BH1, that was expected to explode as a supernova was observed to disappear entirely, a phenomenon called a "failed supernova". The star's quiet demise suggests it collapsed directly into a black hole, and instruments like the Hubble and Spitzer space telescopes helped confirm its disappearance, say NASA scientists. It may

Or, do they instead remain forever collapsing towards their event horizons, approaching asymptotic limits in both radius and proper time just as, in reality, the coffee’s temperature approaches equilibrium with the ship’s cabin while the arctangent time approaches π/2?

The 'failed supernova' mentioned above is still detectable on the infrared frequency.  Currently we think it is generated from stuff falling into the black hole.

General relativity is agnostic about which distant events are coincident with one another.

Not for inhabitants of this tiny planet. We have a common frame of reference. It's just that we finding 'simultaneous' some species on a planet far far away might not.  

This is by design: whether or not any two particular events occur “simultaneously” is not supposed to have any objective meaning in standard general relativistic descriptions.

No. The thing is well defined for a local frame of reference- e.g. the one all mankind currently shares. 

In principle, we can hear Lord Jesus deliver the sermon on the Mount. However, it is likely that there is a limit beyond which coherence of sound waves is irretrievably lost. 

What happens to an astronaut as he falls into a black hole? To an observer, the astronaut would appear to slow down and freeze at the event horizon, eventually fading from view completely. However the last photon to reach us will be so 'redshifted' as to only reach us much later. But this doesn't mean that we can't say 'in (2015 minus x, where x is distance in light years) such and such failed supernova became a black hole'. 

The only thing external reality can ever know for sure is that when the information now being received left the star, it had not yet reached its event horizon.

Sadly we can't know anything for sure. The Universe may be a hologram.  

Since no external event is ever causally connected to the horizon formation event,

so far as we know.  

this is the only empirically valid claim that can ever be made.

For the moment.  

Naming the fallacy

Empirical claims may be false. Logical claims may be fallacious. The question, for the former, is whether the best available information confirms them or, at the very least, does not contradict them. There may be a 'structural causal model' associated with the empirical claim or prediction. It may feature logical fallacies which it may or may not be worthwhile to correct.  

The primary problem with the canonical picture of black holes emerging through gravitational collapse is one of metaphysical overreach:

if a problem is metaphysical, physicists need not bother with it. I suppose, since Janzen wears two hats- that of a philosopher as well as that of a physicist- he has a certain scruple which others need not share. I suppose a Theologian who is also a Physicist may have a different scruple. Why is God not being mentioned by the theory?  

we infer one of two essentially different potentialities to be true while ignoring the other, even though both must remain forever unobservable.

One might say 'we can't point to the exact moment when Achilles overtook the tortoise, we can only say 'with current 'photo-finish' technology, this is our best guess of when that happened.' But this doesn't mean there is any fallacy in deducing that Achilles swiftly overtook the tortoise.  

The inference is therefore scientifically illegitimate, unjustified metaphysics.

It is scientifically legitimate if the physics community overwhelmingly considers it to be so even if they also believe that the inference will be 'sublated' at a later date. Still, it may be some valuable Research Program is motivated by the scruple raised by Janzen.  

This does not bear on the Penrose-Hawking singularity theorems themselves. Rather, the issue is with ontological overreach in drawing specific physical implications on the basis of these mathematical theorems.

Life involves 'ontological overreach'. How can we be sure we aren't already dead? Anyway, that's the reason I put off doing the washing up. 

The theorems tell us that if certain energy and causality conditions hold, and if space-time is extended in a particular way, then geodesic incompleteness is inevitable. The upshot in the case of black hole singularities is that these must be a global feature of the space-time manifold.

In 1783, John Michell hypothesized 'dark stars' on the basis of Newton's theory.  In 1916, Karl Schwarzschild found the first solution to Einstein's equations that described a black hole. But it was only in 1971 that the first strong evidence for a black hole was found in the X-ray source Cygnus X-1-  which is now widely regarded as the first black hole identified. 

But inevitability and actuality are not the same, and conflating them is a modal fallacy.

No fallacy arises where empirical evidence supports the existence of an object predicted by a theory. However, that empirical evidence might turn out to be wrong.  

We might name this the tense-import fallacy

which isn't really a fallacy. It is merely a linguistic misunderstanding. But nothing of the sort arises here.  

— or, more specifically, the present-tense import fallacy — the slide from atemporal mathematical features (event horizons, singularities) to present-tense claims about what has “already” occurred in our universe.

There is no such slide. What happened was that mathematical physics theorized a type of object which, many years later, empirical observation confirmed as actually existing. Mathematics is a separate language from that of Astronomy- which is concerned with objects existing in the cosmos. It turns out that black holes exist in the same way that galaxies exist.  

The canonical interpretation of black holes as real, already actualised objects within our universe is tied to a deeply problematic view by which space-time manifolds, along with the individual events such as those in the regions “inside” event horizons — including singularities at r = 0 — physically exist.

One would only say so if one also felt that believing you are alive, and thus can do the washing up, is deeply problematic.  

But the points in space-time should not be confused with physical reality.

Nor should an infinite series be confused with the passage of time as we humans experience it. Achilles really does overtake the tortoise because the distance between them is a 'converging sequence' till he overtakes it. 

Rather, space-time should be understood as

a model or map. It isn't the actual terrain.  

a set of events that happen in our existing reality.

No. Stuff that happens may, for some particular purpose, be given a mathematical mapping.  

From this perspective, the manifold is a descriptive tool, not the fabric of reality itself.

No one has suggested otherwise. It is not the case that by manipulating a manifold we can turn into rabbits living on a planet in the Andromeda galaxy.  

It does not have to be maximally extended in any ontological sense; it only has to describe the physical events that occur in our existing universe in its domain of applicability.

Such descriptions are either useful or useless. It is fair to say, the philosopher's 'domain of applicability' is different from that of the physicist. It may be that the scruple expressed by Janzen is motivating some potentially very useful Scientific Research Programs.  

Janzen concludes thus

In a universe that continues to expand and undergo hierarchical structure formation, ultra-compact Kerr-like bodies will continue to merge and grow.

but we don't have to assume they contain actual singularities. Even if this is not the case, it is useful to have people working on theories which account for existing observations without the relevant assumption.  

But from any external vantage point, each collision will always be observed in its pre-horizon phase. The observational future of the universe is

dependent on the compossibility of observation. It may be that everything really interesting about the Universe is essentially unobservable. But it may still be very useful. Observation is like verification. A lot can be done- and the most interesting things may be of this sort- without either observation or verification save in the sense that a superior outcome becomes available.  

thus not one of mergers between completed black holes, but of ever-larger, ever-more-compact collapsing objects whose horizons are approached only asymptotically from the outside universe’s perspective.

Emerson, grieving for his dead son, wrote in his essay 'Experience'- ' Was it Boscovich who found out that bodies never come in contact? Well, souls never touch their objects. An innavigable sea washes with silent waves between us and the things we aim at and converse with.' Emerson was aware of the new 'field' theories (which the Jesuit Boscovich may have learnt about from a translation of the Vimalakirti sutra). It turned out that the 'sea' which washes between us is composed of forces- e.g. electro-magnetism- which we can very profitably harness to our own ends. But, for now, death remains death and black holes remain black holes. 


Tuesday, 2 December 2025

Ha Joon-Chang's undigested Economics


Tyler Cowen keeps banging on about different types of food. Now Ha Joon-Chang is muscling in on that action. He is shilling a new book, 'Edible Economics', in Aeon. 

He begins with a long complaint against British cuisine in the mid-Eighties. He doesn't understand that this was a product of the long shadow thrown by War and Post-War rationing where work canteens got hold of good ingredients and provided good food for employees. Even in the early Eighties, it was usual for white collar workers- including the Management cadre- to have a one hour, three course, lunch in the Company dining room. This was the main meal of the day. At night, you had supper- a sandwich or something light. 

In the Fifties and Sixties, most  Girls were taught 'Home Economics' and were good enough cooks.  The Sunday roast was something to look forward to but as more and more women went to work, weekday meals were filling rather than tasty.

Rising wages in manufacturing meant that restaurants dropped their culinary standards because of staffing problems. Technological limitations obtaining at that time affected the quality of processed food. During Rationing, fish and chips had become the National cuisine. This could be of good enough quality. Fish was cheap and latch key kids were happy to consume vinegar soaked chips when not chowing down on Mars bars. The Chinese and the Indians and the Portuguese and Italians provided more flavourful food for those able to tolerate such foreign filth, On the other hand, there was a big pent up demand for American fast food franchises. The 'Wimpy' chain survived in England after folding in the US. The British sausage roll or Cornish pasty remained dire but so long as you could 'breakfast three times a day', you could eat well enough. Bacon and Eggs are difficult to muck up. 

What about Economics? It was known to be shit. South Korea, by listening to Irma Adelman and concentrating on Tardean mimetics, had shown that 'Development Economics' and the mathematical theory of Economic growth was utterly stupid and mischievous. Marxist Econ was dead in the water. Keynesianism had shat the bed fifteen years ago. Thatcher's doctrinaire Monetarism failed spectacularly. With the end of exchange controls and 'Big Bang' , Markets gained the whip hand over Government Economic Policy. Lamont's defeat at the hands of the likes of George Soros in 1992 put an end to any pretensions to policy relevance that Oxbridge Econ might have had. In the mid Seventies Brian Walden and Peter Jay and Samuel Brittan had an impact on politics. By the Nineties, Jay- Callaghan's son-in-law, had become a flunkey of Robert Maxwell. Academic Economists sought grants from foreign MNCs or ended up in bed with International bureaucracies of an obviously useless type. Having made a commodity of themselves, Rothbard's law- eminent Economists specialize in what they are worst at- operated with a vengeance.

This was not how the young Korean saw things. There had once been a golden age of British economics. Nutters like Maurice Dobb or utterly useless tossers like Sraffa were taken seriously in distant parts of the world. Then, the Godfather movies came out. Third World elites understood that Mafia dons, not ones from Cambridge, alone understood Political Econ. 

Up to the 1970s, economics was populated by a diverse range of ‘schools’ containing different visions and research methods – classical, Marxist, neoclassical, Keynesian, developmentalist, Austrian, Schumpeterian, institutionalist, and behaviouralist, to name only the most significant.

They were all utterly shit.  

These schools of economics – or different approaches to economics – had (and still have) distinct visions in the sense that they had conflicting moral values and political positions, while understanding the way the economy works in divergent ways. I explain the competing methods of economists in my book Economics: The User’s Guide (2014), in a chapter called ‘Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom – How to “Do” Economics’.

Why not say that there were once many ways to do Alchemy? Lead can be turned into Gold either by the use of sex magic or else by catching and holding a leprechaun, or else by messing about with alembics and tinctures of mercury. 


Not only did the different methods coexist but they interacted with each other. Sometimes, the competing schools of economics clashed in a ‘death match’ – the Austrians vs the Marxists in the 1920s and ’30s,

Both were shit.  

or the Keynesians vs the neoclassicals in the 1960s and ’70s.

There are no closed economies. Everything is microeconomics. The problem is Knightian Uncertainty. General Equilibriums are 'anything goes'.  

At other times, the interactions were more benign. Through debates and policy experiments tried by different governments around the world, each school was forced to hone its arguments.

Fuck off! Everybody doubled down on repeating hysterical lies.  

Different schools borrowed ideas from each other (often without proper acknowledgement). Some economists even tried the fusion of different theories – for example, some economists fused the Keynesian and the Marxist theories and created ‘post-Keynesian’ economics.

Which was useless. Voters lost interest when they realized that they themselves would be funding that shit-show through their taxes.  

Economics until the 1970s was, then, rather like the British food scene today: many different cuisines, each with different strengths and weaknesses, competing for attention; all of them proud of their traditions but obliged to learn from each other; with lots of deliberate and unintentional fusion happening.

Fuck off! The British food scene is market driven. Econ was, albeit indirectly, State funded. Essentially, undergrads were exposed to nutters in the hope that they would recoil in disgust and quietly become Chartered Accountants.  

This intellectual ‘monocropping’ of economics has narrowed the intellectual gene pool of the subject

Monocropping doesn't narrow the gene pool. It is likely that where it occurs, the Seed Companies will maintain widening inventories some of which are G.M. 

Since the 1980s, however, economics has become the British food scene before the 1990s.

It has lost salience. Governments ignore economists. If voters are foolish enough to listen to a Varoufakis, they quickly repent their folly.  

One tradition – neoclassical economics – is the only item on the menu.

Sadly, you just have to pretend to learn or teach it. You don't have to absorb its main lesson- which is that there is a market for economic theories where 'information asymmetry' has changed such that it is 'common knowledge' that Academic economists are stupider and more ignorant than almost everybody else.  

Like all other schools, it has its strengths; it also has serious limitations. This ascent of the neoclassical school is a complex story, which can’t be adequately considered here.

It's a mathematical formalism, that is all.  

If told, the story would have many ingredients. Academic factors – like the merits and demerits of different schools, and the increasing dominance of mathematics as a research tool (which advanced knowledge of particular kind while suppressing others) – have mattered, of course.

There is a conspiracy to suppress the knowledge that this guy is actually a genius. 

However, the ascent has also been critically shaped by power politics – both within the economics profession and in the outside world. In terms of professional power politics, the promotion of neoclassical economics by the so-called Nobel Prize in economic sciences (it is not a real Nobel prize but only a prize ‘in memory of Alfred Nobel’, given by Sveriges Riksbank, the Swedish central bank) has played a big role.

But there are actual Nobel Peace and Literature Prizes which are generally awarded to evil or illiterate people.  

In terms of power politics beyond the profession, the neoclassical school’s inherent reticence to question the distribution of income, wealth and power underlying any existing socioeconomic order has made it more palatable to the ruling elite.

Ruling elite is refusing to admit that I and I alone deserve the title of Miss Teen Tamil Nadu.  

The globalisation of education during the post-Second World War era, in which the disproportionate ‘soft’ cultural power of the United States has been the biggest influence, has played a crucial role in spreading neoclassical economics, which had become dominant in the US first (in the 1960s).

Neoclassical econ arose from the marginalist revolution in Europe. America was originally more 'Institutionalist'. To get a PhD in Econ at Harvard you had to know German not Math till about 1960.  The Cowles Commission and, later on, the Rand Corp. did play a role in promoting mathematical econ and there was also a big influx of sub-standard Math mavens into Econ Departments. OR was actually quite useful as was dynamic programming, stochastic integrals and so forth. Econophysics together with Big Data can generate bubbles and thus enough volatility to maintain robustness all by itself. This means Pundits of all types can be wholly disintermediated. 

But, whatever the causes, neoclassical economics is today so dominant in most countries (Japan and Brazil, and, to a lesser extent, Italy and Turkey are exceptions) that the term ‘economics’ has – for many – become synonymous with ‘neoclassical economics’. This intellectual ‘monocropping’ has narrowed the intellectual gene pool of the subject. Few neoclassical economists (that is, the vast majority of economists today) even acknowledge the existence, never mind the intellectual merits, of other schools.

They are all shit. Even if one turd gazes admiringly at another turd- both are flushed down the toilet.  

Those who do, assert the other varieties to be inferior. Some ideas, like those of the Marxist school, they will argue, are ‘not even economics’. It’s claimed that the few useful insights these other schools once possessed – say, for instance, the Schumpeterian school’s idea of innovation,

A genius who noticed that cars had replaced horse drawn carriages. This conclusively proved that guys who earn a little money teaching Economics aren't completely blind.  

or the idea of limited human rationality from the behaviouralist school – have already been incorporated into the ‘mainstream’ of economics, that is, neoclassical economics.

In other words, some poor schmuck gets paid a little money to teach that shite.  

They fail to see that these incorporations are mere ‘bolt-ons’, like the baked potato beside a Pizzaland pizza, rather than genuine fusions – like Peruvian cuisine, with Inca, Spanish, Chinese and Japanese influences, or the dishes by the Korean American chef David Chang (no relation), with American, Korean, Japanese, Chinese and Mexican influences.

Similarly, mathematical physics is nothing but 'bolt-ons'. This is because physicists from other types of universes aren't able to immigrate or invade Physics departments on Earth. Indeed, I have heard that even octopuses face discrimination in gaining tenure.  

I am not saying that neoclassical economics is particularly bad. Like all other schools of economics, it was built to explain particular things on the basis of certain ethical and political premises. So it is very good at some things but very bad at other things. The problem, rather, is the almost total dominance of one school, which has limited the scope of economics and created theoretical biases and blindspots.

Since only stupid people teach Econ, this doesn't matter in the slightest.  

In the same way in which the country’s refusal to accept diverse culinary traditions made Britain before the 1990s a place with a boring and unhealthy diet,

It was healthier than what we have. Why? 'Home Economics' was discontinued. Girls could no longer whip up even simple dishes like leeks in white sauce. We started watching cooking shows while chowing down on takeaway.  

the dominance of economics by one school has made economics limited in its coverage and narrow in its ethical foundation.

Also, it has made economists stupid and smelly.  

Some readers may legitimately ask: why should I care if a bunch of academics become narrow-minded and engage in intellectual monocropping? However, you should all care, because, like it or not, economics has become the language of power.

Money is the language of power unless it's the other way around. Economists aren't good at making money or, if they are, we don't call them economists. We call them billionaires. 

You cannot change the world without understanding it.

Sure you can.  Cyanobacteria made the planet habitable by producing oxygen through photosynthesis. 

In fact, I think that, in a capitalist economy, democracy cannot function effectively without all citizens understanding at least some economics.

For a Government to function effectively, the guys who pay the taxes need to get something in return. Otherwise, they figure out a way not to pay.  

These days, with the dominance of market-oriented economics, even decisions about non-economic issues (such as health, education, literature or the arts) are dominated by economic logic.

Also sex. Billionaires have no trouble getting laid.  

I have even met some British people who are trying to justify the monarchy in terms of the tourist revenue it allegedly generates. I am not a monarchist, but how insulting is it for the institution to be defended in that kind of way?

Not insulting at all. Saying 'the bloke pulling down the big bucks is adding a lot of value' isn't an insult. It is a compliment.  

When so many collective decisions are formulated and justified with the help of the dominant economic theory, you don’t really know what you are voting for or against, if you don’t understand at least some economics.

In 2005 Bernie Sanders proposed a bill revoking China's most favoured nation status. Ten years later he could launch a challenge to Hilary. But Trump won. Why? He promised to protect Americans not just from low-wage competition abroad but also from migrants at home.  Do Americans understand that the long term supply is elastic and thus there will be no windfall from tariffs? Probably. But, in the long term, we are all dead. 

Economics is not like studying, say, the Norse language or trying to identify Earth-like planets hundreds of light-years away. Economics has a direct and massive impact on our lives.

It has none. Government policies impact our lives. But those policies are politically determined.  

We all know that economic theories affect government policies

We all know that vested interest groups pay a little money to economic theorists of various sorts to make the case for policies that will benefit them. They don't care about the ideology of the economist in question. They just want them to demand what is in their own pecuniary interest. But they pay a lot more money to 'influencers' and Madison Avenue types. 

regarding taxes, welfare spending, interest rates and labour market regulations, which in turn affect our daily material lives by influencing our jobs, working conditions, wages and the repayment burdens on our mortgages or student loans. Economic theories also shape the long-term collective prospects of an economy by influencing policies that determine its abilities to engage in high-productivity industries, to innovate, and to develop in an environmentally sustainable way.

I suppose you could say expectations are based on theories. Moreover, if there is a 'correct' economic theory, then there will be 'Rational Expectations'- i.e. the expected outcome will be the actual outcome. This gets rid of 'cobwebs' and stabilizes the market. However, this assumes there are enough arbitrageurs or market makers.  

But beyond even that: economics doesn’t just influence economic variables, whether personal or collective. It changes who we are.

Money does that. Fame does that. Power does that. Theories don't. A loser is still a loser even if he has a very sophisticated theory of loser-dom.  

Economics shapes us in two ways. First, it creates ideas:

No. We create ideas. If they are based on experience, they may be useful.  

different economic theories assume different qualities to be at the essence of human nature,

No. They assume that different people have different preferences or that the same person has different preferences at different times. What matters is aggregate behaviour. 

so the prevailing economic theory forms cultural norms about what people see as ‘natural’ and ‘human nature’.

It has no such power. The fact is people with different economic theories have the same view of human nature. It isn't the case that Keynesians consider it right and proper to decapitate Monetarists while Monetarists think it only natural to shove hamsters up the butt-holes of Actuarial Scientists.  

The dominance in the last few decades of neoclassical economics,

Financial markets are dominant but Technical analysis dominates in short term trading. For the long term, fundamental analysis is better. But, it is ideographic. 

which assumes that human beings are selfish, has normalised self-seeking behaviour.

Very true. Prior to Alfred Marshall, the Brits had zero interest in money. They engaged in the slave trade and the opium trade and the Empire racket purely out of a spirit of Christian charity.  

People who act in an altruistic way are derided as ‘suckers’ or are suspected of having some (selfish) ulterior motives.

e.g. Mother Theresa wanting to get into Heaven. Had this not been the case, she would have set up a hedge fund.  

Were behaviouralist or institutionalist economic theories dominant, we would believe that human beings have complex motivations, of which self-seeking is only one of many; in these views, different designs of society can bring out varying motivations and even shape people’s motivations in diverse ways.

We understand that suicide bombers might be in a hurry to get to a Paradise where they will sleep with 72 virgins.  

In other words, economics affects what people see as normal, how people view each other, and what behaviour people exhibit to fit in.

Yet people who have no idea what the word 'economics' means may have even more cynical views.  

Economics also influences who we are by affecting the way the economy develops and thus the way we live and work, which in turn shapes us.

Which is why we should scold Economics and send it to bed without any supper. Otherwise, Economics may turn us into neo-liberals. This is one of the leading causes of sodomy in South Korea.  

For example, different economic theories offer contrasting views on whether developing countries should promote industrialisation through public policy intervention.

Why not retard it instead?  

Different degrees of industrialisation, in turn, produce a variety of types of individuals. For example, compared with those who live in agrarian societies, people who live in more industrialised countries tend to be better at time-keeping, as their work – and consequently the rest of their lives – is organised according to the clock.

People with watches are better at time-keeping.  

Industrialisation also promotes trade union movements

unless they are suppressed as they were in England by the Combination Acts. South Korea only recognized the KCTU in 1999. Only in 2025 did South Korean Trade Unions get the type of (limited) immunity from damages which UK workers have enjoyed since 1906.  

by amassing large numbers of workers in factories where they also need to cooperate much more closely with each other than in farms.

In the Soviet Union, there were no big factories. That is why there were no Trade Unions- right? China has only one Trade Union with 300 million members. It is wholly subordinated to the Ruling Party.  

These movements in turn create centre-Left political parties

only in multi-party polities.  

that push for more egalitarian policies, which may be weakened but do not disappear even when factories disappear, as has happened in most rich countries in the past few decades.

Anyone can push for 'egalitarian policies'. There may be money in it for you, if for nobody else. The need to fight 'total wars' militated for more egalitarian policies. It is no accident that countries which applied them, including South Korea, had conscription and faced an existential military threat.  

We can go further and assert that economics influences the kind of society we have.

Why not go further still and say society influences people? 

First, by shaping individuals differently, varying economic theories make societies of contrasting types.

No. Culture & Religion & Education & Tardean mimetic effects do that. What works even better is 're-education' in Gulags. What is interesting is that societies can transition from totalitarian to liberal democratic very quickly. 

Thus, an economic theory that encourages industrialisation

which is what the Brits had in the nineteenth century 

will lead to a society with more forces pushing for more egalitarian policies, as explained above.

 Unless those forces are beaten to death. The plain fact is inequality increased when industrialisation took place. But the same could be said of the agricultural revolution. 

For another example, an economic theory that believes humans to be (almost) exclusively driven by self-interest will create a society where cooperation is more difficult.

No. The reverse happens. Why? Cooperation is positive sum. That's why businessmen prefer to form a cartel rather than indulge in wasteful competition. Where people are driven by higher motives than filthy lucre, cooperation may become impossible. Gandhi was famous for non-cooperation, not for making life easier for the Viceroy.  

Second, different economic theories have different views on where the boundary of the ‘economic sphere’ should lie.

No. The economic sphere encompasses both public and private realms. Where there are externalities or repugnancy markets, there may have to be a public intervention.  

So, if an economic theory recommends privatisation of what many consider to be essential services – healthcare, education, water, public transport, electricity and housing, for example – it is recommending that the market logic of ‘one-dollar-one-vote’ should be expanded against the democratic logic of ‘one-person-one-vote’.

An accountant may recommend privatization based on the fact that the Government has no money and is shit at running things. But truly essential services- Army, Police etc.- aren't privatized. 

People won't vote for non-existent public health care etc. What would be the point?  

Finally, economic theories represent contrasting impacts on economic variables, such as inequality (of income or wealth) or economic rights (labour vs capital, consumer vs producer). Differences in these variables, in turn, influence how much conflict exists in society:

No. Religious or ethnic differences create conflict. If Labour wants to fight Capital by not working, Labour doesn't eat. Capital fucks off and lives large elsewhere.  

greater income inequality or fewer labour rights generate not just more clashes between the powerful and those under them but also more conflicts among the less privileged, as they fight over the dwindling piece of pie available to them.

No. One side hires guys with guns and shoots the other side if it tries any rough stuff. There may be misery. There is little conflict.  

Understood like this,

by a fucking cretin 

economics affects us in many more fundamental ways than when it is narrowly defined – income, jobs and pensions.

Not if the Army and the Police can fuck over anyone who tries any rough stuff.  

That is why it is vital that every citizen needs to learn at least some economics.

But not from this cretin.  

If we are to reform the economy for the benefit of the majority,

we have to get elected or else be smart enough to be worth consulting. Teaching and writing retarded shite won't help.  

make our democracy more effective, and make the world a better place to live for us and for the coming generations, we must ensure some basic economic literacy.

Only general purpose productivity matters. Raise that by all means. I suppose, Korea used heavy handed methods to achieve this- e.g. the New Village Movement- but the determination of the Koreans to emulate and outdo Japan, their former oppressor, was matched with extraordinary skill, stamina, and need to achieve. Development is based on Tardean mimetics but lazy people should choose lazy mimetic targets while those with high 'need for achievement' should emulate the richest and most successful countries. 

South Korea was a plausible candidate to become a sort of junior Japan and that is what it did. North Korea could be like Communist China except with more Soviet Aid. That worked quite well so long as the Soviets were prepared to subsidize the regime. 

Independent India could be like Colonial India- i.e. be a night-watchman state save when, for some reason, the balance of payments constraint lifted in which case it could do a bit of infrastructure investment and village development. The big question was whether there could be a floating exchange rate and free convertibility. If this happened, you were likely to get foreign direct investment on the one hand and, on the other, local entrepreneurs importing cheap 'capital-goods' which raised factor productivity and generated a profit. This wasn't possible under Bretton Woods and remained rather theoretical because capital markets were pretty shitty. It takes time for Markets to learn to regulate themselves. Short to Medium term, you have speculators and fraudsters who, inevitably, establish corrupt connections with politicians and bureaucrats. 

The alternative was a 'zaibatsu' approach- i.e. work with a select group of industrialists who start of as sub-contractors but then benefit from the privatization of a new industry set up by the Government. The problem here is that, in a Democracy, there is nothing to stop the zaibatsus from switching support to the opposition party. It takes decades for politicians to get the whip hand such that big industrialists impartially support whichever party wins the election. Often, this is because the industrialist is using 'pyramiding' to achieve control rights with little 'skin in the game'. Indeed the nationalized banks and insurance companies may be providing most of the finance.

 Back in the early Nineties, it was hoped that the World Bank could supply cheap money for infrastructure and local contractors would quickly 'learn by doing' in partnership with the best global enterprises in the relevant field. Sadly, 'activists' can scare off the World Bank. Hence the reliance, in India, on 'Ambanis & Adanis' as well as the older industrial business houses. 

Frontline has an interview with Chang where they ask him- 

Earlier this year, responding to Trump’s Liberation Day tariffs, you told Jacobin magazine that “there should be no return to free trade”.

There was no free trade. If the West didn't like your politics, they could sanction the fuck out of you or use opaque Human Rights or Environmental clauses in Trade treaties. Now, China has an equally effective threat-point. But, Growth is the key. If you aren't growing faster than your rival, your threat point diminishes. 

For economists, policymakers, and a generation that came of age over the last three decades in India and Asia, free trade and globalisation drove economic growth.

It removed the binding balance of payments constraints. If you don't have enough hard currency, you have to tighten your belt one way or another. Subsidizing food means less infrastructure investment which means lower productivity which means having to finance a bigger food subsidy.  

Why shouldn’t the world return to it?

If you have foreign currency reserves, you have some freedom of action. If you don't, you have to try to play off super-power overlords or pick a side and stick to it. The problem is that- as newly independent states in the Sixties found out- the 'overlord' might suddenly turn stingy. Maybe investing in terrorism could give you a bargaining chip. Alternatively, like North Korea, you could run your finances in the manner of a Mafia boss. 

In all of this, there are terminological confusions, if I may put it like that. Engaging in international trade, being able to export to global markets, is essential for economic development.

Sadly, it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition. Getting conquered by guys who can raise productivity is what works best- more particularly if they ethnically cleanse hunter-gatherers and subsistence farmers.  

Because as a developing country, you need to import advanced technologies whether it is in the form of machines, or intermediate inputs, or technology licensing, and you have to pay for them with foreign exchanges.

No. You can permit foreigners with skill and capital to settle in your country. Development, traditionally, was about migration. Human beings are more mobile than other factors of production. Pretending decolonization changed this fundamental fact about our species was foolish. 

You need to earn hard currency. Without international trade, there will be no economic development. But that is not the same as free trade. Even if there is some degree of trade barrier, you can still export. For example, international trade as a proportion of GDP grew much faster in the 1970s than in the 1980s

because of better tech (e.g. transistors) & lower transaction costs on the one hand (stuff like containerization) on the one hand and OPEC on the other. I believe 'Baumol cost-disease' fell in many places- because of a previous expansion in education & training. But this also meant that 'differentials' for educated professionals got eroded. We had the first signs of a credentialist crisis.  

—[a time] when there was a lot of trade liberalisation

because there had been devaluations & relaxations of exchange control regimes. Things like remittances altered the picture.  In the1970s and 1980s, over a million South Koreans worked in the Gulf. Soon there was no need for this as South Korean industry attained excellence in more and more fields. One might say that the economic system was cruel or extractive with respect to the working class, but, eventually, they did reap the benefits. Was it all worth it? Only Koreans can answer that question. 

—because trade barriers are only one of many things that determine the level of trade.

Income determines it. As incomes rise, countries don't mind importing cheap tat even if this means shitty sweat-shops in their own country shut down. Those who worked in such places could live better on the dole.  

But more importantly, developing countries cannot develop with free trade.

Sure they can- through f.d.i. The trick is to get the investors to settle in your country.  

I mean, this is something that I have said in many different ways—with historical record, from a theoretical perspective. South Korea was a very poor country until the early 60s. In 1961,

when South Korea was still a democracy 

India’s per capita income was $88 and South Korea’s was $94. Essentially, the same level of development. But then, South Korea wanted to be a serious player in all sorts of high-tech industries—automobile, shipping, electronics.

It wanted to imitate Japan. India wanted to go in a Socialist direction. The problem was that land couldn't be collectivized and there couldn't be coercive 'Village Development'. Why? Dominant agricultural castes were too powerful. They would shoulder aside the educationally 'Forward Castes' and take control creating corrupt dynasties with strong links to organized crime.  

I believe the South Korean Dictator gave the corrupt a choice. Invest your ill gotten gains in South Korean Companies or face expropriation. But there was a political angle to this. 

Of course, when they started these industries, they had to protect them very, very heavily.

Only if they wanted to retain ownership.  

Otherwise, they would have been wiped out.

Better to be wiped out than to survive as a subsidized, retarded, dwarf.  

For example, when South Korea started producing its self-designed cars, the biggest company that was producing them was Hyundai, which [today] also has quite a big presence in India. In 1976, Hyundai produced 10,000 cars.

Because it only started the previous year. Hyundai had prospered because it was protected from Trade Union militancy. British Leyland was not. That's why though engineers from BL helped create the first South Korean car, the British company disappeared from the scene long ago.  

That year, Ford produced 1.9 million cars. General Motors was approaching 4.8 million cars. Now if South Korea had free trade in cars back then, Hyundai would have disappeared overnight.

No. So long as the Dictator could be relied on to kill or incarcerate Commies & Labour Activists, there would have been a South Korean car industry. The big guys understood that Dictators have to appear Nationalistic so as to fight off the Lefties. One way or another a deal could have been done. The founders of some Korean companies- e.g. Hyundai- have family backgrounds similar to the Ambanis. Others, like Samsung's Lee family, are of higher social class and education. The commonality is that they did well as contractors in the Fifties. The Dictator took control of the finance side of things- e.g. Samsung's banks- but gave the chaebol protection from Labour and foreign competition. 

I suppose the peculiar political situation of South Korea militated for some degree of crazy shit going down. Still, the Dictator did devalue on Irma Adelman's advise. India left it a bit late. 

So until 1988, the South Korean government not only put up high tariffs, they banned the import of all foreign cars. And until 1998, they had banned the import of Japanese cars.

For obvious historic reasons.  

And then they gave a huge amount of direct and indirect subsidies. This is what is called infant industry protection.

It is also called corruption or crony capitalism.  

They developed automobile, electronics, shipbuilding,

that was important. New purpose built shipyards could get economies of scope and scale not available to old established shipyards. Otherwise, what Korea offered was 'greenfield' sites- i.e. no Unions- and thus low labour costs. Could the Koreans excel as engineers, designers, inventors etc? Yes. But it took a bit of time. 

all these industries through similar measures.

What was that measure? It consisted of the Dictator making an industrialist an offer he couldn't refuse. Since the Dictator sent a lot of high quality troops to Vietnam, the US- though sometimes recoiling from the thug- remained on side. Still, most economists shared Joan Robinson's rosy view of North Korea. They thought the average South Korean was poorer and more brutally treated. An Indian journalist who visited both the North and the South in the late Sixties and Seventies noticed that people worked harder in the South. He thought this had to do with the determination to equal or surpass Japan. His readers thought this was because Capitalism is very evil and seeks to turn people into robots.  I even heard that that in the North the indigenous spiritual tradition was cherished whereas the Dictator sought to uproot traditional religion in the villages and thus create a Christian majority. This was not the case. The Americans had grown wary of Christian Generals who turned out to be useless and who alienated the Buddhist majority. 

Before economic liberalisation in 1991, India, too, exercised strong protectionist measures.

It protected workers in the organized sector. Japan, Korea, etc. got rural girls into factory dormitories and exploited the fuck out of them.  

What went wrong with that approach?

It wasn't based on economics. It was based on ethics though, no doubt, the thing ended up as a rent-seeking shitshow. 

In India, until the 1980s, protection was used to preserve existing producers

they had a licence to produce only up to a particular quantity of the product 

rather than giving them the space to accumulate production capabilities and go out in the bigger world to fight.

In other words, India ignored 

1) theory of comparative advantage

2) theory of economies of scope and scale

3) gravity model of trade

Also, fuck buying low and selling high. Why not buy high and sell low? Profits are vulgar. Losses are cool. Every industry should become 'sick' and end up being subsidized by the tax payer.  

Look at the Indian car industry. Earlier, the Indian government believed that trying to produce things like nice cars was giving into Western consumerism. They kept producing the same Austin ambassador car. In the 1950s, this was okay because everyone had cars like that. But by the 1980s, it became a joke.

Sanjay Gandhi's Maruti was more than a joke. It was the reason he gave for wanting to take over the country.  

And then they had to bring in Suzuki and all these Japanese producers to give the country better cars. That kind of protectionism doesn’t work.

It works well enough. We have nothing against Japanese tycoons. It is only Ambani & Adani whom Rahul attacks. My point is some Indians hate some other Indians more than they hate any foreigner.  

Protection only works when you use it to develop your own infant industries, so that they can export to the global market.

No. You promise protection to a guy who sets up his factory in your country. He is assured of the domestic market and thus thinks it worthwhile to invest. But, if productivity rises thanks to the investment, he may also get export markets on the basis of scope and scale economies. Chang is thinking from the highly nationalistic Korean perspective.  

When I say “Developing countries need infant industrial protection”, people say, “But how about India in the 1960s and 1970s.” That is not what infant industry protection is, because India’s earlier economic strategy froze the infant industry in the infant stage.

It had a license system for 'luxuries'. But even the Brits had helped the indigenous Iron & Steel industry (as Nehru pointed out in his Autobiography).  

There was no ambition to make that infant grow up,

the ambition was to raise the wages of the workers. Why? They have more votes than industrialists. All the political parties have Trade Unions of their own.  

go out in the bigger world, and fight the big boys,

Indians prefer to fight each other. If you want to do business, fuck off to Africa or America or wherever.  

which is what South Korea has done with companies like Hyundai.

No. It is what the brothers running Hyundai wanted. The equivalent would be Modi backing Ambanis & Adanis.  

The whole point is that you need a mixture of protectionism and active international trade in order to propel your economy forward.

No. You need to raise general purpose productivity. If this is happening, there is a Coasian solution- i.e. money for the subsidy is available regardless of trade policy. 

After the infant industry protection phase, a particular industry or economy goes through a virtuous cycle of manufacturing.

Unless wages or bribes or both rise so that there is no surplus for investment.  

That did not happen in India.

But there was 'featherbedding' of organized labour and a culture of corruption.  

Exactly. A lot of developing countries have experienced what is called premature deindustrialisation. But I would say that India hasn’t even experienced industrialisation in the first place.

Parts of it did. You could see plenty of abandoned factories or 'sick units' in virtually every city

In the early 1960s, the manufacturing sector’s share of gross domestic product (GDP) in India was 14 per cent, and then it went up to 18 per cent [in the 2000s], and today it is 12 to 13 per cent.

Because Services aren't heavily Unionized or equally at the mercy of bribe-seeking Factory Inspectors.  

Consider Brazil. It had, by the mid 1980s, a manufacturing sector that accounted for about 35 per cent of GDP.

Because the Military suppressed the Unions while borrowing heavily abroad to finance import-substitution. But this was done through public sector enterprises. Had protected industries been left in private hand, domestic savings could have been more effectively mobilized. The other thing is that volatility in commodity prices militated for a prudently managed Sovereign Wealth Fund. Still, some amount of 'Dutch Disease' was inevitable. The problem with public sector units is that there is a tendency to throw good money after bad rather than just take a write off on an uncompetitive unit.  

Now, it is about 10 per cent. That is what premature deindustrialisation looks like.

No. That's what State-led development with giant PSUs looks like after a fiscal crunch.  

But India, very worryingly, has not been able to maintain even the relatively low level industrial development that it had achieved by the 2000s.

It has quadrupled in absolute terms. It just hasn't increased its share of GNP very much. But, at the lower end, the value added is pretty small in labour intensive industries.  

India still has ambitions of becoming a global manufacturing hub.

It has a huge internal market. The thing is inevitable.  

Governments have tried to push it for two decades—Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched “Make in India” in 2014. Yet India has failed. It missed both waves of manufacturing diversification out of China; those investments went to South East Asia instead. Why does India repeatedly fail to industrialise?

Because it didn't have cruel Dictators. Still, labour law reform has been pushed through at the Centre. But implementation depends on the States. 

I think, ultimately, that has to do with the political economy. Your business elites do not want serious industrialisation.

Sure they do. They'd also love to acquire farmland even if farmers change their minds, and to deal with only one Company Union, and not to get harassed by the 'Inspector Raj' and so forth. But the elites don't command a lot of votes.  

The business elites are either in the financial sector or, even if they are in the industrial sector, they still have very strong links with financial capital which doesn’t like industrialisation because, for them, the most important thing is the rate of return.

This can't rise if there is incessant rent-seeking including nuisance law-suits. There is no business house in India which doesn't have a raft of plans for big industrial projects. Some have been inherited from fathers or grandfathers. Others represent a revival of what was achieved by the great-grand father.  

In the short run, if you want to develop a serious industrial base, you need to go through a period when finance is repressed.

No. You need to go through a period when general purpose productivity rises across the board. Curb corruption by all means. Have strong regulation of Capital markets. Send Mundhra type scamsters to jail. That's how Finance gets to flourish. Don't forget arbitrage smooths things out. You get your capital cheap even though break-even is years away. Equity remains fungible because the market maker buys when it is cheap- e.g. a Hindenburg type bear raid- and sells as prices return to the equilibrium level.  

Because if shareholders keep asking for money [in the form of return on investment], companies would not have the money to invest.

Shareholders want Capital Gains.  


Arguably one of the most famous Indian companies—though I do not know whether it is still legally Indian—is steel manufacturer ArcelorMittal. But Lakshmi Mittal built the company through clever mergers and acquisitions rather than by coming up with innovative technologies.

He recruited good engineers and managers trapped in PSUs and sent them around the world. His Pakistani equivalent did well in Ukraine.  

Your elites do not want to wait for 10 or 15 years and sacrifice short-term financial returns to build productive capabilities.

No. They want Capital Gains the same way people investing in AI do. If Finance is not 'repressed', equity is fungible. You take your profit when there is a tax advantage in doing so. Family offices are pretty sophisticated in such matters.  

You need to invest in worker skills, infrastructure, and research and development (R&D).

But you only actually do so if it raises your valuation. There are systemic, institutional, things a country can do to raise total factor productivity. I suppose this would make R&D more remunerative. 

I looked up the latest data on R&D in India, and as a proportion of GDP, it is barely 0.6 per cent,

because its people are poor. Also, smart Indians prefer to do R&D in rich countries where the pay and facilities are better.  

compared to the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) average of 3 per cent, and South Korea’s 5.2 per cent.

 It must be said, back in the Fifties, there seemed some possibility that Indians would do fundamental R&D in fields like Atomic Energy, Electronic Computing, Space Rockets & Satellites, etc. There were some notable successes but, for a poor country, the priority always had to be food security. Sadly, the Nehruvian elite thought the agricultural sector infra dig. 

I am afraid that there is no serious attempt to develop manufacturing in India.

What he means is that India wasn't colonized by Japan and feels no need to match or outdo Japanese industrialization.  

Yes, earlier India built manufacturing industries, but there was no ambition to join the global economy. And later, [the government and companies] did say that they want to develop manufacturing, but they did not do anything serious because they did not want to forego their short-term interests in order to have a more dynamic, industrially driven economy.

No. Indian industrialists understood that if the peasants don't want to sell you their land, you won't get that land. That's what happened in Singur. Modi, around the same time, cancelled a land transfer when the farmer's changed their minds. Some Bombay based industrialists were angered by this. Then they realized that Modi was simply being realistic. 

India, unlike Korea, is very big. Development must be done on the basis of subsidiarity with the Centre simply providing monetary stability and enforcing fiscal discipline. It should also improve Corporate governance and the working of Capital markets. What it should not and could not do was to put the whole country on a particular growth path.