Sunday, 14 September 2014

Kordig proves God exists, but it turns out he's a smelly old child molester.

Deontic logic concerns itself with duties not facts. It is my duty, even if it is not a fact, to attribute to Carl Kordig the following proof that God exists and is a smelly old child molester- and like, dude, each time you watch one of them slimy sacks of shit do the perp walk in front of the TV cameras you gotta ask how come they weren't spotted for the creeps they were from the get go?

My Kordig type argument goes as follows-
1) If we ought to believe that deontics isn't empty, or wholly ontologically dysphoric, it must be the case that we ought to believe that a deontically perfect being ought to exist. Why? Well, suppose the reverse. Then, either deontics is well founded (i.e. there is always a minimal duty and thus deontics is non empty) but not upwardly so or it can't be well ordered and ought to be junked straight away. What if it is not upwardly well founded? Then it cashes out as a Dialethia or Polyalethia or anything goes or faces a halting problem- again, a good reason we ought to junk deontics coz it can never give us a substantive answer to even the simplest question unless, obviously, it happens to be Kleene-Brouwer well ordered, in which case it could be (but, by Kordig, therefore, ought to be-)  utterly apophatic and intuitionistic and suddenly everybody's either got a long beard, like Brouwer, or crazy eyes, like Wittgenstein, and is starting to get smelly and it suddenly becomes (coz now Maths, i.e. Logic, i.e. Reason, is wholly outside Language) 'common knowledge' impossible to discriminate the brain dead child molester from the tortured genius who just likes beating kids coz that's proper Aryan Paideia or some other such shite.
Thus, if we really ought to believe deontics isn't wholly useless- i.e. empty- and provided we aren't, most of us, living in the wrong Universe- then we ought to believe
2) If a deontically perfect being ought to exist, then such a being can exist. Moore's paradox gives us two choices- either we can say 'we ought to believe that a deontically perfect being can exist while simultaneously knowing that nothing of the sort is the case' or else we can say 'we ought to believe that a deontically perfect being can exist and also know that this is the case'. Suppose, we choose Moore and affirm the latter.
3) Then something we know can exist is a deontically perfect being.  What? Well, a deontically perfect being cannot be a contingent being. Therefore, a deontically perfect being must necessarily exist.
4) We know smelly old child molesters exist. We ought to beat them to death so they cease to exist. If they continue to exist, then their existence is deontically necessary not contingent. Since a lot of smelly old child molesters claim either to be God or his Holy Vessel or Vassal or Vaseline or whatever, pragmatics tells us 'smelly old child molester' is a rigid designator for God since words like smelly and old and child molester are merely contingent and not descriptive at all.

Thursday, 11 September 2014

Old Ez & Free Radio Speech

That Pragmatics is the Poet's singular Secular Ordination & Shame
As but zero knowledge proofs of Semantics' dis-coordination game
 Your shithouse flies 'neath Da Xue's radar.
& Jesuits forge each Voltaire's Veda.

Saturday, 6 September 2014

Rawls's Reasonableness vs Robot Rationality

Suppose there are N identical robots which can connect to M heterogenous Wireless Networks. Each robot would prefer the Network that assigns highest priority to its requests. Suppose further that the co-ordination problem for all robots is best solved if all are connected to the same Network and that the gains of co-ordination far outweigh any other consideration. Now assume 'common knowledge'.
What happens?
Presumably, ceteris paribus, in an infinite repeated game, sooner or later all robots will connect to one Network which is robustly (i.e. non-gameably) neutral re. the identity of the robot making the request.
How does the Network solve its concurrency problem in order to make this happen?- i.e. when it receives 2 or more simultaneous requests, of the same semantic class (which cashes out as cash offers), how does it decide which request to deal with first such that no bias towards a particular robot obtains?
Suppose there is an effable, white box as opposed to black box, method to do this for at least one Network. Then either there is a zero-knowledge proof of robust (i.e. non gameable) neutrality which that Network can give the robot or such isn't the case. The ability to discriminate such zero knowledge proofs would be a desirable feature for our robots. Assume they have this ability.
Now, what we have is a Network which can give a zero-knowledge proof that it solves concurrency problems in an unbiased, non-gameable and thus robustly neutral manner. But (Razborov Ruditch)  this means a proof of P=NP exists or, equivalently, pseudorandom strings can always be efficiently discriminated from truly random strings. Why? Because the string of robot requests arising from the same response to a global event will be received as truly random yet the Network can discriminate this from a pseudorandom string generated by an attempt to game it and thus violate its neutrality. Another way of saying the same thing is that it is impossible to tell if an allocation has the core property because its universal set is unknowable.

Rawls, in 'Justice as Fairness' draws a distinction between being 'reasonable' and being  'rational'. The robots aren't reasonable, they fail a Turing test but, provided there is a proof that P=NP, adhere to a Coordination Solution which is identical to the Co-operative solution for Rawls's 'reasonable' human beings.
 'Throughout I shall make a distinction between the reasonable and the rational, as I shall refer to them. These are basic and complementary ideas entering into the fundamental idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation. As applied to the simplest case, namely to persons engaged in co-
operation and situated as equals in relevant respects (or symmetrically, for short), reasonable persons are ready to propose, or to acknowledge when proposed by others, the principles needed to specify what can be seen by all as fair terms of cooperation. Reasonable persons also understand that they are to honor these principles, even at the expense of their own interests as circumstances may require, provided others likewise may be expected to honor them. It is unreasonable not to be ready to propose such principles, or not to honor fair terms of cooperation that others may reasonably be expected to accept; it is worse than unreasonable if one merely seems, or pretends, to propose or honor them but is ready to violate them to one's advantage as the occasion permits. 

'Yet while it is unreasonable, it is not, in general, not rational. For it may be that some have a superior political power or are placed in more fortunate circumstances; and though these conditions are irrelevant, let us assume, in distinguishing between the persons in question as equals, it may be rational for those so placed to take advantage of their situation. In everyday life we imply this distinction, as when we say of certain people that, given their superior bargaining position, their proposal is perfectly rational, but unreasonable all the same. Common sense views the reasonable but not, in general, the rational as a moral idea involving moral sensibility. '

Rawls says that an agent may be rational but unreasonable. Can there be a reasonable agent who is also irrational? For example, given that no rational argument obtains for assuming P=NP or that an efficient way exists to discriminate pseudorandom from random sequences or that a robustly neutral solution to Race hazard or Concurrency bias exists- could Rawls be considered reasonable for making an argument which depends crucially on assumptions such as these?
Certainly. Why not?  It may be that 'common sense' views Reason as irrational in so far as it involves a moral idea or moral 'sensibility'. If human beings are socially canalised to ontological dysphoria- i.e. to not feel at home in the world- then, it may be, Reason counsels irrationality (itself a moving target) or elite susbscription to a 'noble lie'.
But, surely, this is not Rawl's implication- he seems to be saying that Reason is a sub-set of the Rational with 'Moral Sensibility' providing the Partition. If this is not in fact, by the Maxim of Relevance, his Gricean implicature, then how is his political theory of Justice-as-Fairness different from an arbitrary theory based on some supposed 'Revealed Truth' or Supernatural Oracle or bogus Ideology like 'Post Colonial Reason'? Why would any rational person want to be Rawls reasonable?

Indeed, common sense tells us that, contra Rawls, no 'reasonable person would be ready to propose, or to acknowledge when proposed by others, the principles needed to specify what can be seen by all as fair terms of cooperation.' Why? Suppose I say to you- 'go get the pizza and I'll pick up the beer.'- and you reply- 'Cool'- is it really the case that either of us needs to specify what principle is involved so that everybody in our society can see that what we are doing is an example of fair co-operation?
Suppose a stranger who overhears our conversation says- 'Stop! It's unfair that Vivek gets to go for the beer just because he's got a bigger dick than you. Why shouldn't he go for the pizza for a change? Could you please justify the principle underlying this proposed co-operative act of yours in a manner which sets to rest my doubts as to its fairness by reason of gender bias and like Vivek just having such a huge swinging dick which is like itself unfair.'
I suppose, if we were both as reasonable as Rawls, we could spend a few months or years or decades attempting firstly to grasp what the underlying deciding principle was (hint- it's the theory of Comparative Advantage) and then to prove it was Baumol super-fair, or zero regret or whatever. We would fail because  'Fairness' is like a Wealth effect in Sonnenschein, Mantel, Debreu, i.e. not independent of the comparative statics or concurrency of the system.

Any 'political' regime (and Rawls redux is offering us only a purely Political conception of Justice) is going to display the same level of unfairness as arises out of an Economic regime purely because of concurrency problems in co-ordination games even if there is no other source of scarcity or even conflict of interest. Indeed, monarchy, oligarchy, the market, GOSPLAN etc. all reappear as concurrency solutions which fail the neutrality test. This means the Benthamite planner has a choice between devoting resources to reducing Race hazard rather than expanding the Network which is similar to the dilemma of the 'Super Intelligent Self improving Machine' approaching FOOM

Sunday, 31 August 2014

Gaucho Marx- Borges as gagster.

If the pages of Roberto Bolano's posthumously unwritten 'Gaucho Marx' are haunted by a specter, it is the imminence of an immanance that never comes to pass, or rather the Permanence of a World Wide Insurrection against the soul-deadening szygy of Trade- which is synoecist precisely because it is expansionary- and Settlement- which is perennially schizophrenic by reason of being so impredicatively imprecise as to constitute the hieratic locution of its own locust like horde.

Borges, in his burlesque incarnation as the libidinous, too-necessary-to-exist, Liebnizian  gagster, Gaucho Marx, unites 'Jerusalem to Benares': id est, on the one hand, the Ivrim & the Arya- Sinai's Jerusalem and what it will always already have become for vast Northern steppe lands- and, on the other, the infloldingly infinite labyrinth of jaguar haunted jungles which lure both Semite & Steppe nomad, than desultory Death, yet farther South.

Not that Bolano's 'Gaucho Marx' actually bothers with any such notions, concentrating instead on taking cheap shots at best selling Indian authors- like Rabindranath Tagore ('I never forget a beard, but since you are Victoria Ocampo's beard, I'll make an exception'- what? it's funny in Spanish especially if you jiggle your eyebrows and gesture suggestively with a cigar) and Jawaharlal Nehru ('Like the covers of his books, Nehru Jackets enclose shite.'- which is funny in any language provided you've met an Indian diplomat or a relict of Swinging Sixties Carnaby Street- or Natkat Singh who is both) and Sri Aurobindo ('fuck off you great big bearded Bengali retard. Seriously. Just fuck the fuck off you utterly worthless cunt.' Not particularly funny, but an immortal truth that transcends language and thus an esprit de escalier worthy of the Superman toiling up Urania's spiral Staircase towards the Omega point of Tielhard's salon.)

Okay, you can give over with the retching, granted this is my worst post ever, still, I think I've given you an idea of why people like Borges's Gaucho Marx are just too metaphysically necessary, therefore real, to ever actually exist. Why? Because conatus now entails being comic in a manner more meaningless than Existence itself. So, and ever sadder than we can know,  all that can be or be thought about-  Parmenides's pining as the Quantum Zeno of every Divorced Dad's, Singles' Complex, House of Night- is re-runs of a Seventies sitcom by, not Ruth Barcan, which would be bad enough, but Barcan-Kripke, which is like totally fucked.
For which, needless to say, I personally blame David Cameron.
That boy aint right.
Mind it kindly.

Tuesday, 26 August 2014

Borges's Lottery in Babylon vs Rawls's Veil of ignorance

"Imagine that you have set for yourself the task of developing a totally new social contract for today's society. How could you do so fairly? Although you could never actually eliminate all of your personal biases and prejudices, you would need to take steps at least to minimize them. Rawls suggests that you imagine yourself in an original position behind a veil of ignorance . Behind this veil, you know nothing of yourself and your natural abilities, or your position in society. You know nothing of your sex, race, nationality, or individual tastes. Behind such a veil of ignorance all individuals are simply specified as rational, free, and morally equal beings. You do know that in the "real world", however, there will be a wide variety in the natural distribution of natural assets and abilities, and that there will be differences of sex, race, and culture that will distinguish groups of people from each other."[6]

Since we  only prefer clear cut Contracts to 'fuzzy' Relationships or opportunistic Transactions where there is a need to hedge against some specific type of Uncertainty- the 'Social Contract' has to be about the specific sorts of Uncertainty arising out of strategic behavior in the Socio-Political realm.
A quite separate issue has to do with the provision of Public Goods, policing of Repugnancy markets, enforcing of Contracts and so on.
These clearly don't require a Social Contract because Absolute Monarchies, Dictatorships and so on can provide them just as well. Indeed, iff the folk theorem of repeated games is Muth Rational and Evolution has provided our Species with a mimetics that is thus epigenetically canalised, then we can show that a unilateral & universal Social Contract isn't in the Core assuming non-zero information and/ or compliance costs.
Nevertheless, just as Monarchies and Dictatorships still have a 'Niti' type Ethical Discourse such that subject-hood exceeds compliance, so too do Liberal Democracies acknowledge that free-riders remain part of the Social Contract. More generally, it isn't the case that acceptance of a given Nation's Social Contract means you agree to every specific article regarding who or what is protected, or how that protection is provided, by National Defence or Health or Economic Policy.

Indeed, a Social Contract is only needed because every type of Public Justification or Substantive Due Process or Just Entitlement thesis can and will be gamed with the result that we all have an incentive to hedge against the uncertainties arising out of the manner of that gaming. Thus, the Social Contract- unless itself the constitution of a Regime specifically stated to have unlimited powers- to count as falling within Liberal discourse, must conform to a limiting ejusdem generis type canon of construction & therefore have no specific & indefeasible Economic or even Legal content, but concern itself wholly with hedging against Mechanism Design or  Race Hazard or Concurrency deadlock or Moral or Agent Principal type hazards.

By contrast, Rawls believed, epigenetically canalised risk aversion would militate for everybody agreeing that the minimum provision of 'basic goods'- which includes Aristotelian 'Goods' like Self-Esteem and Liberty- be maximised subject to Natural as well as Economic/ Social Science type constraints. Rawls, believed that the Social and Biological Sciences were univocal, so to speak- i.e. no 'reswitching' or multiple equilibria obtain- and thus there would always be an 'overlapping consensus' re. the Social Choice Menu and this by itself would militate for metaphysical differences having nil impact on the 'reflective equilibrium' because the latter only concerned itself with unambiguous, unanimously received, 'material' outcomes.

Borges, however, writing a few years earlier than Harsanyi (whose work Rawls drew on) had looked at the opposite situation- viz. what happens in an established, indeed ancient, Society- the paradigmatic Babylon- when a Lottery (i.e. a new source of Social mobility) is introduced. He shows that, under psychologically plausible assumptions re. 'Preference Profiles' in the General Population- people would wish for more and more random, more and more bizarre outcomes (e.g. Gender reassignment and Social invisibility) to occur with dizzying frequency.
Indeed, if your metaphysics commits you to metempsychosis- then the 'tuirgen' knights-tour of all possible lives is by itself soteriologically liberative and so everybody should choose Borges's nightmare Lottery in Babylon over Rawls's Bleeding Heart Nanny State. This does not mean there can't be an 'overlapping consensus' to stick with widespread compulsory Social Insurance- it's just that some sensible people vote for it because they believe the Bureaucratic nightmare that results will simulate Borges's Babylon, not Rawls's Brahminical Boston.

Meredith Townsend, whose spank mag (the Spectator) permanently perverted the young Jawaharlal, argued that Orientals aint motivated by rational self-interest but Arabian Nights 'interestingness'- like the increasingly bizarre outcomes of Borges's lottery- but, of course, it is only Rawlsian rubbish and Sen-tentious shite which can construct the Kafkaesque Bureaucratic Punishment Machine which instantly breaks down to but butcher its one fervent proponent whose crime is to 'Be Just'!

Abu Nawas, I think it was, who first remarked that, at our Symposium, the Saqi's muslin veil protects her from the wine fumes & Plato from mirth.
Alas! Modi's culling of the Planning Commission is to all us old L.S.E-wallahs, Folly's famine & dearth.
For which I personally blame David Cameron.
That boy aint right.
Mind it kindly

Monday, 25 August 2014

Fuck off- I'm talking about my Mom

Emotionally orphaned, did Mom ever have?
Acceleration equal to Kronos' grav?
 Or-kay!- Krishna Whole levels Libra
 El's worship else but a Kremlin Qibla.

Thursday, 21 August 2014

Tho' Sons of God taste just fine

Since to dream of Discourse as Public Justification
Is, at its own Symposium, a Rite of Incubation
Tho' Sons of God taste just fine.
Pour, Saqi, a more bitter wine