John Searle & Philosophy's obituary

Around the time I was born, the late John Searle wrote-

It often said that one cannot derive an "ought" from an "is."

One can't derive anything from anything. True, it may be useful to pretend otherwise for certain things in specific contexts, but only for a particular purpose.  

This thesis, which comes from a famous passage in Hume's Treatise, while not as clear as it might be, is at least clear in broad outline: there is a class of statements of fact which is logically distinct from a class of statements of value.

This is a proposition. In some limited context it may be 'true enough'- i.e. useful.  

No set of statements of fact by themselves entails any statement of value.

No set of any sort entails anything.  

Put in more contemporary terminology, no set of descriptive statements can entail an evaluative statement without the addition of at least one evaluative premise.

Not even then. Even an infinite regress of additional statements won't establish entailment.  

To believe otherwise is to commit what has been called the naturalistic fallacy.

To think about it at all is to have wasted your time.  

Consider the following series of statements: 

(i) Jones uttered the words "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars."

This entails nothing else save in some specific context and for a limited purpose.  

(2) Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars. 

Not if he was speaking rhetorically or in jest. On the other hand, suppose Jones had accepted five dollars worth of 'consideration' and made this promise in return, a judge may find that there is a verbal contract between Smith and Jones.  

(3) Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith five dollars. 

Not if Jones didn't have capacity to contract or Smith had frequently supplied Jones with goods and never sought to get Jones to make good on his supposed promise. A Judge looking at the pattern of interaction might take the view that the promise was 'empty' and created no obligation. There was no contract because Smith wasn't really supplying something for consideration.  

(4) Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.

This too does not follow. Undertaking an obligation does not, by itself, create an obligation.  

(5) Jones ought to pay Smith

This certainly does not follow. It is discovered that if Smith gets five dollars he will buy bullets for his gun and shoot himself because he is depressed. Jones ought not to give Smith money. Indeed, nobody should. 

I shall argue concerning this list that the relation between any statement and its successor, while not in every case one of "entailment," is nonetheless not just a contingent relation  and the additional statements necessary to make the relationship one of entailment do not need to involve any evaluative statements, moral principles, or anything of the sort.

There are no such 'additional statements'. One might appeal to the Law but then purely legal, not logical or philosophical, arguments apply. Even there, there may be a dichotomy such that, for example, Judges make determinations of law while a Jury makes determinations of fact.  

Let us begin. How is (1) related to (2)?

In any way you care to stipulate or, equally, in way at all.  

In certain circumstances, uttering the words in quotation marks in (i) is the act of making a promise.

Only if this is upheld by a court in the relevant jurisdiction. Even then, we can't be sure that decision won't be overturned.  

And it is a part of or a consequence of the meaning of the words in (i) that in those circumstances uttering them is promising.

We don't know what 'those circumstances' are. A Judge may instruct a jury as to how they should envision theme for the purpose of arriving at a verdict. But the Law is utilitarian. It is not philosophic. 

"I hereby promise" is a paradigm device in English for performing the act described in (2),

it may also be a paradigm of facetious language. 'I do hereby most solemnly swear, promise, and bind myself to pay you five dollars, in the currency of the realm, for the inestimable favour you have done me by allowing me to smell your disgusting farts.'  

promising. Let us state this fact about English usage in the form of an extra premise: (i a) Under certain conditions C anyone who utters the words (sentence) "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars" promises to pay Smith five dollars.

Sadly, C is not a well defined set because, by its nature, it is epistemic, features impredicativity, and has unknowable elements. 

What sorts of things are involved under the rubric "conditions C?"

All of Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Economics, Sociology etc.  

What is involved will be all those conditions, those states of affairs, which are necessary and sufficient conditions for the utterance of the words (sentence) to constitute the successful performance of the act of promising.

There are none such. A Judge may 'read in' a promise or else treat it as a nullity.  

The conditions will include such things as that the speaker is in the presence of the hearer Smith, they are both conscious, both speakers of English, speaking seriously.

Nonsense! A promise exists if it is habitually kept though no words are exchanged. There can be an implicit contract. What matters is expectations regarding incentive compatibility.  

The speaker knows what he is doing, is not under the influence of drugs, not hypnotized or acting in a play not telling a joke or reporting an event, and so forth. This list will no doubt be somewhat indefinite because the boundaries of the concept of a promise, like the boundaries of most concepts in a natural language, are a bit loose.4 But one thing is clear; however loose the boundaries may be, and however difficult it may be to decide marginal cases, the conditions under which a man who utters "I hereby promise" can correctly be said to have made a promise are straightforwardly empirical conditions.

No. They are never such. This is because there is no Momus window into the soul or other means of accurately recording thoughts and intentions and expectations. Still, for particular practical purposes, there may be good enough 'buck stopped' ways off adjudicating such matters. But, this is a matter of utility or convenience. 

The fact is, people engaged in a particular trade may be careful to keep promises made during the course of business because of the reputational advantage this gives.  

So let us add as an extra premise the empirical assumption that these conditions obtain.

but we also need to add the premise that the extra premise does not contradict the previous one (otherwise deduction from it is unsound). Than we have to add the premise that the last mentioned premise does not....etc, etc. There is an infinite regress. 

All we can say about 'propositions' is that they contain information of a functional type. Some propositions- however poorly formulated- are highly informative. Others may convey very little information. It is likely that, where there is selection pressure (in other words information has utility and opportunity cost) then something like a law of increasing functional information applies. This may involve more complex, or more efficient, signals or receptors and interpretative mechanisms. 

For certain purposes, in protocol bound contexts, uttering a particular sentence (e.g. 'I do' in a Marriage Ceremony) creates a vinculum juris or bond of law. However, it is defeasible. A court may or may not uphold it. Even then, there is a question of jurisdiction. 

Philosophy did attract some bright people after the war. Sadly, the more philosophy they did, the stupider they got. The obituary notices for Philosophy as an academic discipline are now at least five decades over-due.