Colin Alexander & 'Public Diplomacy'

In a book titled 'the frontiers of public diplomacy', Colin Alexander- known to Indian readers from his study of the last British Governor of Assam- writes-  

The public diplomacy

i.e. the sort of stuff that the British Council & perhaps the BBC does for Britain.  This is nothing but 'branding' or the projection of a particular image. It is P.R or propaganda- nothing more. 

It has been suggested that there are global collective action problems- e.g. climate change- where non-state actors can negotiate with each other thus laying the foundation for international treaties. Could this be classed as 'public diplomacy'? Certain countries may indeed treat it as such. But, to the extent they do, the thing loses legitimacy either in some very obvious way or, more opaquely, it adds dimensions to the policy space thus paving the way for a struggle for 'agenda control (under the McKelvey Chaos theorem). The reverse could also be the case- non-state actors might seek to instrumentalize nation-states rather than the other way around. No doubt, certain big corporations retain very well paid consultants in this regard. But this too leaves a bad taste in our mouth. The thing seems dishonest. It can backfire. 

of an international actor at a given time can be analysed through the triangulation of three interrelated factors: (1) the predominant structures of hegemony and counter-hegemony;

sadly nobody knows what they are or, indeed, whether they really exist.  When a regime collapses or suffers a humiliating setback, it is discovered that all the money it spent on acquiring 'hegemony' was money pissed against a wall. 

(2) the prevailing notions of virtuosity and ‘goodness’ within the international system

see above. 

and (3) the power status and ambition of the actor.

In other words, there is no such thing as hegemony. There is merely the perception that the actor has power and wishes to increase it in particular ways. But, perceptions give rise to expectations. If those expectations are disappointed- e.g. the actor suffers a military or economic calamity- then all the money it sank into 'public diplomacy' turns out to have been wasted. 

Taken together, these factors provide a theoretical framework upon which all public diplomacy activity can be understood.

No. There is only one factor a 'theoretical framework' should focus on- viz. whether outcomes match the expectations created by the thing. The Bayesian likelihood of this happening is the only parameter which matters. Either your theory gives you a better Bayesian estimator in this regard, or your theory is a pile of shit. 

 The eighteenth-century French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau wrote

stupid shite. He was mad, you know. 

that

Since no man has a natural authority over his fellow,

For certain specific purposes there is a non-arbitrary (hence 'natural') way of identifying who has authority over whom for what purpose. The guy who is very good at curing people of diseases is the natural medical authority for the sick- even if the sick dude is much richer or more powerful.  

and force creates no right,

A right is something attached to a remedy by a bond of law. If force is used is to compel the obligation holder to provide that remedy, then it is force which makes effective the right in question.  

we must conclude that conventions form the basis of all legitimate authority among men. 

Conventions are Schelling focal solutions to coordination games. They may display 'naturality'- i.e. everybody sees immediately who the medical authority is- viz. the dude who is best at curing people.  

The ‘conventions’ that Rousseau alludes to, which other translations of his work into English have termed ‘covenants’ or ‘agreements’,

The point about 'focal solutions' is that they have salience independent of any agreement. People naturally gravitate to it.  

often take the form of normative behaviours that are communicated as part of efforts to validate the power ambitions of some and to disqualify those of others.

The problem here is 'preference falsification'. We may all agree that when we go home tonight, we will watch the Satyajit Ray movie on Channel 4. But what we actually do is watch Die Hard. 

Why does public diplomacy exist? The answer has to do with information asymmetry and Knightian uncertainty. The former gives rise to competitive signalling and screening so as to affect Perceptions and therefore Expectations. The latter militates for a 'regret minimizing' FOMO. If others are doing it, though it is wasteful, maybe we should do it to just to show we too can burn money. The thing is a Zahavi handicap. Muth Rationality doesn't get rid of it because all possible future states of the world are not known. (In other words, Muth rationality can't get rid of wasteful 'cobwebs' or 'arms races'. )

Econ theory may not be really high IQ- it's just common sense insights tarted up with a bit of math- but, it isn't vacuous, paranoid, bullshit of the Gramscian, Foucauldian type. 

Colin has a chapter on North East India during the Second World War. Government officials were having to rely on propaganda because the military situation was utterly dire. Colin takes this as an example of 'public diplomacy'. It wasn't. The representative of the King Emperor was saying to subjects in imminent danger of being conquered by the enemy that there was no point in screaming loudly and shitting yourself. Keep a stiff upper lip. Soldier on. Who knows? Everything might turn out all right in the end. 

During the spring of 1942 it became clear that the British were about to be driven almost entirely out of Burma by the advancing Japanese Imperial Army. Anthony Gilchrist McCall, the Indian Civil Service Superintendent for the Lushai Hills,

he had served there for ten years and was well liked. I suppose as a professional soldier during the Great War, he would have heard of the valour of troops recruited from that region. His military background created a bond with those who, like him, had served in France. Also, as a soldier he had been thinking of the defensibility of the district since 1935. The war-like locals could respect his strategic insights. 

was just over the border in northeastern India. On 3rd April McCall brought the 300 community leaders of that tribal region together and asked them to join in a voluntary bond with the British Crown.

What do you have to lose? Even if you get conquered, you could pretend to be really really important to your new overlords. They might believe you and give you a better deal than the rest of your people.  

... The triangulated texts confirm that the Chiefs and Upas (village elders) of this remote backwater of empire pledged their loyalty to the British despite their colonial overlords being in a weakened position and there being clear opportunity for resignation from the imperial project.

What would be the point? If the Brits thought enough of you to value your pledge of loyalty, this increased the price at which you could sell yourself to your new masters. If you fought the Brits now, what guarantee was there you might not fight the Japs tomorrow?  

It is the circumstances leading up to this pledge and their importance to a nascent understanding of public diplomacy that will be discussed in this chapter. The following is an extract from the minutes of the meeting held on 3rd April 1942 in the Lushai Hills: McCall: If you decide not to fight would it be unfair for the Government to withdraw from the Lushai hills? […] We have no wish or desire to abandon a fine people, but if we are to follow Lal Upa’s advice to us then it would amount to the Lushais abandoning the government.

If you can make your useful to us, your new masters will assume you will be useful to them. If you are useless, you will be treated like wild horses which must be broken to the saddle.  

Lal Upa: In the old days pasalthas used to be given zu, women and praise. Now that our society has changed will it not be essential for our men to be paid by the Sircar?

Servants get paid. Moreover, when entering the service of the new master, it would be nice to show that pay was quite high. He mightn't give you as much but he will have a higher opinion of you.  

Chief Pu Thanghlianga Sailo: We are in the position of a man who owns a house – the thief is passing near our door – we must stand up close to the door to see that the thief does not come in. Even if our Sircar is weak and in difficulties it is not for us to consider leaving the Sircar – rather should we put ourselves out to give our Sircar every help which is within our power.

I am the guy who owns this house. Pay me a lot. Tell Lal Upa to fuck off.  

The problem with handing out cash in a highly factionalized society is that it will cause envy and enmity and thus end up defeating its own purpose. Since that was obvious, the only thing which mattered was whether there was a workable military strategy such that the community could come together and kill lots of invaders without taking too many casualties themselves. Since McCall was a soldier (he had been admitted to the ICS at a time when it was difficult to get enough Europeans in) he could actually provide that plan. It was 'Schelling focal'- i.e. the best available. That was good enough to be getting along with. Later formal training was provided for a proper brigade. 

Upon agreeing to side with the British against the Japanese the document then states Every single Chief and Upa (300) – with two Civil Assistants – the Chief Ministerial Officer – Mrs. McCall and the Superintendent all join hands in one great circle – around the Union Jack – and standing all sing ‘God Save the King’ in Lushai – as token of unity and of our allegiance to His Majesty.

A token that we can be docile- for a price.  

Let us not downplay the remarkability of this event both for its historical importance vis-à-vis wider hostility to British imperialism in India at the time and for its importance to the Allied victory over Japan in the Burma frontier of war.

There was no shortage of Indians who wanted to get paid by joining the Army or Government service. What was even better was a fat contract for supplying shoddy stuff.  

It is now known that the Total Defence Scheme (TDS) designed by McCall and enacted by the tribes of the Lushai Hills held for long enough during the war

because of Air support. The locals liked fighting, knew the terrain, and received some training and arms. Having aeroplanes on your side was the cherry on top. 

despite McCall’s forced transfer out of the region in May 1943 (more about this later). It was partly the failure to gain a foothold in the Lushai Hills that fractured the Japanese Imperial Army’s rather haphazard logistics systems and scuppered their progress towards a land invasion of India proper (Raghavaih, 1971: 106).

They were overstretched. Once General Slim could depend on air-dropped food his men could go around the Japs and leave them to starve.  

... It is the circumstances that led to McCall’s manufacture of the allegiance of the leaders of the Lushai Hills in the years before the start of World War II that is of greatest interest here.

He was there for 10 years. He and his wife had even put their own money into a cotton weaving scheme. His genius was to bring rival clans together. The TDS he created functioned even in his absence as a source of social cohesion. In other words, its very existence was a blessing for the community.  

Improved understanding of these events enhances the main themes of this edited volume: first, through an important contribution to the arguments surrounding public diplomacy

McCall was a good administrator who helped bring the rivalrous clans together. What he was doing was 'Community Development'. Christianity was another such force. McCall took a harsh line with some local 'prophets' who were predicting the end of the world.

If the TDS worked well it was because the people wanted to keep out the enemy and preserve an identity separate from the Burmese (who had split off from India in 1937). More importantly, they wanted to come together as a people rather than let enmity fester between clan and clan. 

and its support for a hegemonic coalition and second, adding to the portfolio of case studies of public diplomacy frontiers. In the case of the latter, a historical study of public diplomacy on the margins of Empire and a mass communications campaign directed towards a human society on the fringes of the forces of globalisation.

Something of this sort could be said of T.E Lawrence. But McCall was an administrator who did his job very well. True, he broke protocol and was transferred as a punishment but his scheme worked. Why? It was actually in the interests of the people of the area. What McCall had done was provide 'leadership', not 'diplomacy' or 'propaganda'.  

McCall’s mass communication activities bear more than a little resemblance to what many modern public diplomacy practitioners would consider as best practice.

Nonsense! This was conquered territory under a colonial administrator. Neither 'mass communications' nor 'diplomacy' of any kind feature in this episode. 

What defeated the Japanese was airpower. But then, the main reason they wanted to get into Assam was to shut down the airfields supplying the Chinese 'over the hump'. So this is really a story about American planes not plucky hill tribes or a sympathetic colonial officer and his devoted wife.