Wittgenstein's error

We read in Wittgenstein's Tractatus that “what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence”.

This is obviously false. What can be said can also be said very obliquely or in a confused or garbled manner. Drink enough Whiskey and you will see this for yourself. Is the reverse equally true? I think so. It is merely a matter of skill. At any rate, we can't prove otherwise. The fact is, we frequently find a phrase or idiom- sometimes in another language, sometimes amongst the less educated class of our own people- which perfectly expresses something inchoate which we had previously struggled to express. 

As for what cannot be talked about- e.g. being homosexual at a time when male homosexuals were pitilessly prosecuted- the truth is an artful, elegant, superbly witty, discourse develops around it such that everything can be expressed without anything be said. Indeed, some older British homosexuals felt that de-criminalisation of sodomy killed off an exquisite idiolect- 'Polari'- which had added colour and spice to the drab world of post-war reconstruction. 

Can anything said in 'natural language' be recast in terms of propositional calculus? For any particular purpose, yes- it can be done well enough. It is merely a question of 'restricted comprehension' or giving well-defined extensions to intensions. 

In 1939, the University of Cambridge offered two courses on the “Foundations of Mathematics” — one taught by Alan Turing, the other by Ludwig Wittgenstein. Both were wrongheaded. Math has no foundations. It is useful and burgeons where people are motivated by utility rather than the desire to shit higher than their arseholes. Still, computer checking of proofs- or indeed computer generated proofs- are useful for Math and so Turing & Gentzen were on the right track. Brouwer too was useful. With Voevodsky you had 'univalent foundations'. With Wiltless you had vacuity.