As America weakens while China continues to grow stronger, all countries are having to change their foreign policies.
My prediction is that Trump will do a trade deal with China and that they won't make their move on Taiwan till the end of the decade. Meanwhile, if Europe can rally around Ukraine and keep that war going then a European Army may become a reality. In any case, their arms export capacity is likely to rise and so, in a context where America may cease to be militarily self-sufficient by the beginning of the next decade, America may lose global market share and thus influence.
How does this affect India? Firstly, it means that talk of Quad is dead and buried. Biden's 'Indo-Pacific' strategy had always looked dodgy. Now even Article 5 of NATO doesn't mean very much. America is retreating but we can't say that there is a cohesive Eurasian power-block, under Chinese leadership, which can take its place. Still, Iran has seen that it needs some such thing so as to go nuclear. China's arsenal isn't yet anywhere near that of Russia. So, there will be increased cooperation between them. India may gain in that once Uncle Sam is out of the picture, it presents no real threat to China's soft under-belly. On the contrary, it represents a growing market and a possible partner in dealing with climate-change and the Myanmar mess which has spilled over across both nation's borders.
The second aspect is economic. Here, Modi's having to back down in the face of recent farm protests is the clinching factor. India can't do free trade in agriculture. The thing is political suicide. Sadly, it also appears unable to do Land and Labour and Judicial reform- at least at the Union level. Everything that matters is domestic. There are diminishing returns to foreign policy initiatives. But such has always been the case.
The cretin, Uttertosh Varshney, thinks otherwise. He writes in Print.in that
Indian foreign policy is in free fall.
Nope. It is what it was. Nothing has changed. If you can't open your economy, you can't open your economy even if you make agreements to open your economy. Also, if Uncle Sam says he will protect you, it doesn't mean he will protect you. He will run the fuck away. Ask the Afghans. They know.
Can we balance national pride with new power reality?
The power reality is that US power has declined. Uttertosh lives in America. His national pride may have declined but fuck does that matter to Indians living in India?
Unless dramatic reversals take place, the core of India’s foreign policy, which, at least since 2000, has focused on the US, Pakistan, China, and Russia, stands on the verge of collapse.
That core was shit. It didn't prevent the attack on the Indian Parliament or that on the Mumbai Taj hotel. The good news is that the US had given up on the MENA. True, it bombed Iran recently- but not a lot. It appears public support for Israel is waning. It may be that Israel can do better for itself trading freely on arms markets and hiring mercs to 'mow the lawn'. Two can play the 'pay for slay' game.
Unless US President Donald Trump’s tariff threats are primarily a negotiating ploy, India’s foreign policy has run into a virtual abyss.
If the damage to the Indian economy is just 0.2 percent then there is no fucking abyss.
It faces its greatest crisis since 1998, when India conducted nuclear tests and was subjected to international isolation.
There was no fucking crisis. The nuclear tests were popular. Vajpayee got to complete a term as PM. What was bad about the Nineties was political instability, insurgency, and extra-judicial killing. These were curbed. Sanctions had little effect. Indeed, in some respects they were a blessing in disguise.
The big difference is that the 1998 tests added to India’s overall power, which stands significantly diminished at the present moment.
No. What changed under Modi was that India retaliated for Pak sponsored terrorism. It is the weakening of Pak's economy which matters. China has a choice between making money in India or lending to Pakistan where its own people are the target for terrorist attacks.
One other point. It appears that Thorium fuel is becoming viable. India has plenty of Thorium and stands to benefit.
If the Indian economy had grown at an average of 8-9 per cent per annum over the last decade, instead of 6-6.5 per cent, and had India invested heavily in military modernisation,
and if Trump hadn't come to power
the country’s power in the international system would have been greater.
Because economic power translates into diplomatic and military power. China has risen because of its economy. But so has India. That's why it makes sense for the two countries to work together to make BRICS a success.
Now, a significant restructuring of policy priorities under pressure might have to be undertaken.
It was already underway. The fact is, Biden's abrupt and unilateral decision to run away from Afghanistan had concentrated minds. It is quite possible that India and China can have friendly relations with that country even if tensions with Pak heat up.
All major foreign policies can be conceptualised as having a core, a semi-periphery and a periphery.
India has maintained good ties with Moscow. That remains the case.
This tripartite division is not geographical, but one based on different layers of significance. The core of India’s foreign policy, at least since 2000, has focused on the US, Pakistan, China, and Russia.
The War on Terror meant that India had to shut the fuck up and watch NATO do stupid shit. But so did the rest of the world. But, by 2012, China could signal relative independence and, in 2014, Putin made his move into Crimea. The one big change we have seen this year is the decline of Iran's footprint in the MENA. That may be temporary.
The semi-periphery includes relations with the UK, France, and Germany in Europe; Israel, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Iran in the Middle East; India’s neighborhood beyond Pakistan and China; and Canada, Brazil, Australia, Japan, and Singapore. For reasons of space, the periphery need not detain us here.
Nothing Uttertosh writes need detain us. We understand what he is trying to say- viz. Modi is stupid and has made some very foolish error. But Modi isn't stupid. He didn't buckle when Trump put the squeeze on him. Nobody in India expected him to. They remember the farm protests. No Indian government can go against the largest voting block in the country- viz. farmers.
Unless dramatic reversals take place,
telling the farmers to fuck off? They will block every highway in the country.
the core of India’s foreign policy stands on the verge of collapse. To understand this, let us remind ourselves what the primary goals of Indian foreign policy have been, especially over the last two-and-a-half decades. Four such goals can be easily identified. India cultivated greater closeness with the US;
Manmohan got the Americans to deny a visa to Modi. Is that what this nutter is getting at?
it wanted to avoid a return of equivalence with Pakistan;
Pakistan was and is a 'major non-NATO ally'- i.e. it has superior closeness. It was never equivalent to India.
it sought parity with China;
it sought good relations with China. But that does mean keeping America at arm's length. Thankfully, no great effort has to be expended in doing so. The US wants out of the region. Indeed, it also wants to cut the umbilical cord to Europe. That is the new reality for Ashutosh's students. They need to understand that no Asian country can view the US in the way they did even a decade ago. But this is also true of Canada and France and so forth.
and it wished to maintain cordial relations with Russia.
India knows it may have to rely on the Russian Security Council veto.
Cordiality with Russia remains undiminished, though it is under significant threat.
Nope. Modi yields only to threats made by big Indian voting blocks- like farmers. He doesn't give a shit about POTUS.
A large part of Trump’s tariff penalty is aimed at undermining India’s reliance on oil imports from Russia. Even if the threats lead to a diversion to some other sources of oil, such as Saudi Arabia, India’s dependence on Russia for arms and weapons will not decline rapidly, keeping India-Russia warmth substantially intact. Invulnerable to rapid erosion, India’s defence relationship with Russia is long–lasting.
As is its relationship with Israel or France.
The other three core elements – concerning the US,
which nobody can rely on anymore.
Pakistan,
see above. There is no point having warm relations with Islamabad because then Rawalpindi will send terrorists across the border.
and China — are nearly in a free fall.
They are improving with China. Direct flights, border trade & business links have all opened up.
Shadows of an earlier era
Trump has dealt two crushing blows.
Which haven't crushed shit.
First, by threatening to impose a 50 per cent tariff on India’s exports to the US, leaving only electronics such as smartphones and pharmaceuticals out, he has essentially declared a trade embargo on Indian goods (though not on services). The US accounts for nearly a fifth of India’s total exports. It will take time for India to find alternative markets. Clothing from Tiruppur, polished diamonds from Surat, shrimp from Andhra Pradesh, machinery from Noida and Chennai, and auto parts from western and southern India run the risk of incurring losses adding up to tens of billions of dollars, at least in the short run.
Only in the short term. There will be 'trade diversion'. Trade deals are only exciting if there will be 'Trade Creation'. But, for India, that requires root and branch internal reform.
The second Trumpian blow is channeled through Pakistan. At least since 1999, if not earlier, the US has consistently downgraded its relationship with Pakistan, placing India on a higher pedestal.
So what? Pakistan declined because it did stupid shit.
This was a reversal of the Cold War pattern of Pakistan first and India later. Presidents Clinton, Bush, Obama, Biden, and even Trump in his first term sought friendship with India. A bipartisan consensus greeted India’s policy makers in Washington, as both Democrats and Republicans embraced India.
I suppose this nutter is thinking of the 123 nuclear agreement. My memory is that some US company was supposed to build a nuclear reactor in India. It went bust.
The recent India-Pakistan military conflict appears to have brought about a qualitative transformation, showing deepening shadows of an earlier era. Nothing symbolises the change more than Trump’s invitation to Pakistan Army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir for a luncheon meeting in the White House.
Why? The answer is that Trump needs a backchannel to Beijing. Munir will do for him what Yahya did for Kissinger & Nixon. You fondle the poodle of your enemy to signal your desire for an alliance.
Military chiefs of foreign countries are not invited to the White House unless they are also the head of state, as General Pervez Musharraf was. Agreements with Pakistan on cryptocurrency and exploration of potential oil reserves (which could well be a stand-in for mining rare earths in Balochistan) have also been struck. Of course, an old-style military alliance is missing,
Pakistan has been a major non-NATO ally since 2004. There is a Bill in the House of Representatives to revoke this but Trump has sent a very strong signal against its being passed. That's perfectly sensible. POTUS should have a free hand in diplomacy.
but one should note that the outgoing chief of the US Central Command, General Michael Kurilla, said that Pakistan was a US ally in the fight against terrorism, a surreal statement from Indian perspective and a dramatic change from the days that led to the 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden who was living less than a mile from the Pakistan Military Academy in Abbottabad.
Obama said the operation had been conducted without the knowledge of the Pakistanis (though they had initially claimed otherwise). This again was the decent thing to do. The families of Pak officers could have become targets.
A potential role for Pakistan in Iran may also be under consideration.
No Pakistani General is stupid enough to antagonize the Iranians.
In other words, this turn might have an autonomous strategic and economic logic. But it was almost certainly aggravated by India not recognising the US’ role in bringing about a ceasefire during the military conflict with Pakistan.
Because there was no such role. Still, it is good to see that Uttertosh is faithful to Trump and resents India's not telling lies so the fat fuck can get a Nobel prize same as Obama.
India’s diplomacy could not muster up an appropriate response to Trump’s well-known penchant for credit-seeking. What words to use to appease egos, when policy becomes highly personalised, is always a diplomatic challenge. India’s decision-makers could not craft a formulation that simultaneously satisfied India’s sense of self-respect and the dictates of realpolitik or realism.
Trump lost face. Guess which country thinks loss of face is a big deal? China. But what really matters in India, to Indian politicians, is Indian farmers. Modi gained face with them. That's why in his very long Independence Day speech he spoke for the first time about the RSS. Oddly, Nitish didn't raise a peep.
Let us now turn to China, the last core element of India’s foreign policy.
It is obvious that India has to choose between BRICS and Uncle Sam. Trump made it easy.
In 1990, India and China had roughly the same GDP. But today, thanks to a blistering economic growth rate averaging 9 per cent per annum,
based on 'smashing the iron rice bowl'- i.e. firing workers in lossmaking Public Sector units. India's paternalistic labour laws don't permit any such thing.
China’s economy is five times larger than India’s. China’s military power is also significantly greater. As Vipin Narang and Pranay Vaddi write in a recent essay, ‘How to Survive the New Nuclear Age’, China is determined to become a “nuclear powerhouse” under Xi Jinping. (Foreign Affairs, July-August 2025) And “Xi has chosen.. to build hundreds of new silos for land-based Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), which can be launched within minutes to devastate the U.S. homeland.” In short, China’s military prowess is inching closer and closer to that of the US.
Which is why it has less and less to fear from India. But this also means India has less to fear from it.
In contrast, India’s search for parity with China — both economic and military — has eluded its grasp. To reach the perimeters of parity, India’s economy needed to grow at 8-9 per cent per annum over the last 10-15 years, as it did in the first decade of this century, while heavy investments in military modernisation were also needed. Neither has happened to a desirable degree.
Because India isn't a one-party state which can 're-educate' or incarcerate anyone it likes.
Equally, the US had begun to see India as a counterweight to China,
The US thought it could itself be a 'counterweight' to China. It can't.
which after 2012-13 came to be viewed as America’s prime adversary. This logic drove the pro-India bipartisan consensus in Washington, though the rising capabilities of India’s American diaspora also played a role. India received valuable benefits from this turn. Defence cooperation rose
as it rose with other countries with advanced defence technology. India had become a big buyer in the global arms market.
and, quite markedly, the world’s third-most valuable company, Apple, also commenced its switch from China to India.
because India is itself a very big market. The difference is that Chinese phones and computers may become better than Apple's. There is no such danger in India or Vietnam. Let us see if Malaysia's new five year plan to become a leading AI player succeeds.
How will India approach China under the new circumstances? Earlier, the US sought India to counterbalance China. Will India seek China’s support for counterbalancing the US, if things worsen further? What will be the price of this greater closeness, given that Chinese support for Pakistan is longstanding and India also has an unresolved border dispute with China? India will have to approach China with a severe imbalance of power.
The border dispute is a case of 'two bald men quarrelling over a comb'. China's worry was that the US would get India to apply pressure on their soft under-belly when they were busy re-taking Taiwan.
India’s policy makers and strategic thinkers have to find a way out of this abyss.
It has already been done. Direct flights and border trade are re-starting. The BJP needs to launch a grass-roots campaign glorifying Modi for defending Indian farmers. Will they do it? Perhaps not. Their messaging has become lack-lustre.
The key is trying to strike a balance between the norms of self-respect, without which proud nations can’t live, and the realities of power, which can only be ignored at great peril.
Nonsense! Nobody gives a shit about foreign policy. Only cretins like Uttertosh teach it.
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