Saturday, 30 August 2025

Tyler Cowen vs Rebecca Lowe on positive freedom

 Free means the opposite of Slave just as tall means the opposite of short. In a recent podcast, Tyler Cowan comments on the 'bimodal nature of the distribution of how people talk about freedom'. Equally there is a bimodal distribution of how people talk about height and weight and other observables which carry a normative charge. Nobody likes being called a short, fat, slave. Nevertheless, there is an underlying continuum. 

The philosopher, Rebecca Lowe, asks if countries are the kind of things which can be free. The answer is yes. If the leaders can be easily removed and their powers are strictly limited and subject to judicial scrutiny, the country is free. True, there may be exigent circumstances limiting current freedom but the expectation is that this is a temporary state of affairs. 

Cowen replies that 'no one really has a very clear definition of freedom.

They can have clear definitions of types of freedom- e.g. freedom of expression or economic freedom. These are Hohfeldian immunities which, however, are defeasible. One may certainly look at the trade off between restrictions on such immunities and their cost and benefit.  

 But if so many good things are bunched together so tightly that the distribution of countries as free or not free is so bimodal, it may mean we don't need a fully tight definition.

That 'bunching' may be due to Tardean mimetic effects or else arise by 'convergent evolution'. If so, definitions may be useful for improving mechanism design. 

We can simply look around and try to build up the elements of the bundle, which will have these other good effects like prosperity, right? Maybe greater opportunity, better aesthetics in some cases, other philosophic values, and that takes a bit of the pressure off freedom to carry the whole water.

Contracts are about giving up Hohfeldian entitlements or immunities for consideration. The 'Social Contract' as a contract of adhesion can certainly be evaluated in terms of Costs and Benefits. However, it is an incomplete contract. We are having to guess at future states of the world. Provided there is free entry and exit, there will be something like 'Tiebout sorting'- i.e. people move to jurisdictions with the fiscal mix that most appeals to them. 

The most important element of freedom to me is what George Stigler called positive freedom,

i.e. an expanded choice menu. It is 'positive' in that people would pay money to have access to that menu- e.g. paying a fee to Costco so as to be able to shop at Costco prices.  

which he associated a little too quickly with wealth, but I think it's closely connected to wealth. And it's simply what opportunities do you have with your life and also in terms of purchasing power?

If, ceteris paribus, people are willing to pay to relocate to a jurisdiction where they have a bigger choice menu, then a capital value can be placed on the increment in freedom available there.  


Now, negative freedom also matters.

absence of coercive constraint 

But I think in a pinch, people prefer positive freedom. And most definitions of negative freedom, in fact, turn out to be parasitic on other understandings of positive freedom and what really matters in terms of consequences.

Rebecca mentions Gerald MacCullum's  'triadic relation', in which "x is (is not) free from y to do (not do, become, not become) z'. Thus I am free from you when it comes to my murdering the Post Man. This is because you live far away. Sadly, I am not free from the Police and thus have decided not to murder anyone today. Speaking generally, there is no 'triadic relation' involving some named third party. One's immunities and entitlements arise under a vinculum juris binding on everyone. 

Tyler responds thus- But I bet if you sat down, you could come up with 57 different kinds of freedom that are relevant. Look at Amartya Sen’s Paretian liberal paradox. Well, what would you choose if the choice affected only you? For him, that's a significant part of liberty. I think it's an insignificant part, but if he insists on putting it on his list, okay, it can go on the list.

A Paretian liberal would recommend a Coasian solution. Prude can pay Lewd not to read Lady Chatterly or vice versa. Like 'triadic relation', Sen's contribution is worthless. You can get rid of all 57 philosophical kinds of freedom and just stick with the choice menu. One may say that for prudential reasons, some sacrifices (i.e. choices with an opportunity cost) have to be made to ensure that the existing menu remains available. Consider the UK and France in the inter-war period. Had they known Hitler could endanger their freedom, they'd have happily spent much more on Defence. 

REBECCA

So I think, to my mind, one of the things that the Sen paradox shows is that you can't just reduce freedom down to preference satisfaction.

Because of Knightian Uncertainty, expected utility maximization is wrong. You should go for 'regret minimization'. This is the prudential aspect I mentioned previously. 'Guns vs Butter' was a crude utilitarian but wholly misleading and mischievous trade-off. It turned out that the guys with the guns could come and take all your butter. You need guns to keep your butter.  

And I think even framing it in terms of ‘it's bad if you don't want to listen to the Benjamin Britten song that I propose that you listen to because I think you’d get value from it’.

That's informative. Regret minimization may cause you to listen to the song just in case you are missing out. If it is horrible, you gain new information- viz. the guy who made the recommendation was either pranking you or is a some sort of snobbish shithead. You give him a wide berth in future.  

I feel like this again is just reducing freedom to something too thin. Is that fair?

Either 'freedom' has a well defined extension- e.g. a choice menu- or it is subjective and perhaps ineffable. One may say 'the day I truly felt free was when I was riding a camel in the Gobi desert'. If asked to explain why this was, the reply may be 'I can't put it into words. All I can say was that the feeling of freedom was sublime.' 

Rebecca thinks Sen is

getting at something like what's important is you deliberate on your choice.

Deliberating on anything Sen says will soon convince you he is a waste of time.  

What's important isn't just that you're allowed to go along with what your base preference is in some first-order sense. It's that you have to have the freedom, the right even, which is the other kind of horn of the paradox, in order to be able to determine how you live your life, even if it doesn't match what your preferences are.

Why stop there? Why not say it is important to have the freedom to have the freedom to have the freedom to have the freedom, the right even, to go on deliberating without making any choice whatsoever because you have lost your job and have no fucking money?

Tyler- But that will typically collapse into positive freedom. So the sheer or mere right of deliberation, even very bad systems, would give you a lot of that. The Soviet Union, you could deliberate all you want. People there, I think, deliberated more often than Americans do. But at the end of the day, you couldn't choose the thing.

Sen and his best pal from Shantiniketan wrote a paper in the early Seventies where they explained that guys doing 'Project appraisal' had no fucking importance whatsoever. He who paid the piper called the tune. He might also pay a bit of money for an appraisal saying the tune was enchanting. If you said something different, you might not be offered another such gig.  

So I don't view the Paretian liberal paradox as being about deliberation at all.

It was silly. Still, in life, we find that storing up grievances or bizarre preferences of our own are a good way to checkmate boring cunts who want to gas on about Gaza or whatever. My technique is to start talking about racism in Ireland. Iyers have been expelled from the Emerald Isle by homosexual Maratha leprechauns like Leo Varadkar. The UN is refusing to take up the matter. It's coz I iz bleck- right?  

That might make it more interesting, but it's just about can we find a reason why we might object to what are in fact practical gains from trade?

Sen's generation of Bengali economists were against Trade. Sen ran away from India after trading in his wife for that of his best friend. Manmohan, who had studied Trade, remained faithful to his wife and to his country and eventually triumphed. Punjabis are like that only. 

And Sen being more or less anti-market is wanting to do that.

REBECCA So when you talk about positive freedom, I think maybe what you're talking about is something like an agent-focused framing of freedom.

Only time-wasters talk like that. Either agents are free, in which case anybody who tries to do 'framing' is just spinning his wheels, or they aren't free in which case they should focus on emigrating or bringing down the regime.  

So I think one of the problems with the kind of negative framings generally, so if we think about the classic, particularly on the kind of liberal/libertarian side, people might want to say something like freedom is non-interference, freedom is non-coercion. The republicans might say it's non-domination.

What value are they adding? None at all. Still, if you decide to study stupid shit, you will have to listen to stupid shit.  

One risk with these things is I think it avoids centring the person who it is who's doing the free thing, the person who has freedom, the agent. Is that fair?

It is deeply unfair that poor bleck peeps don't know how deeply unfair we think it is that we are so much their superior and they don't even know it because they think we are useless tossers.  

TYLER Yes. One way to think about it is let's say you can either be killed by a lightning bolt from the sky, which is not libertarian aggression against you, or you can be killed by a robber.

In both cases there are prudential 'regret minimizing' actions you can take. But there is also a collective action problem. There may be economies of scope and scale in solving it in that manner.  

Now, you might prefer to be killed by the lightning bolt because you couldn't say your rights were infringed. And if your rights were infringed, there's something extra bad about that. But at the end of the day, you're dead either way. And if you're too focused on that as truly the big deal, the constituent important part of freedom, I think you're just missing the boat about what people actually care about.


REBECCA I think this is right. I think libertarians who say, look, your freedom is only being infringed if your rights are being violated are missing the point.

Libertarians don't say that. They think the State has limited rights. Individuals don't. 

TYLER Right.

REBECCA But I also think there's a sense in which you think about, if you think about something as freedom as non-interference,

why do so? Either there is a Hohfeldian immunity or there isn't. This is a justiciable matter.  

then you could say, well, I don't know, the field isn't being interfered with. Or you could say the moon interferes with the tides of the sea.

People don't say that. The moon is inanimate. Gravity probably arises out of the 'positive geometry' of Space Time.  

This seems to me to be crazy in an ordinary sense: we don't talk about the sea being free or not free. It seems like you need some kind of agent, some kind of, I don’t want to go as far as to say person, but some kind of living thing that has this capacity. I think this is the advantage of an agent-focused conception of freedom.

It is not much of an advantage to have a conception which applies only to living things when, in fact, no one has ever denied this to be the case.  

TYLER I don't know. This talk is making me nervous. So maybe I think more in relational terms. So I don't agree with George Stigler and the purely consequentialist view that all that matters is wealth or opportunity.

But all that matters can be given a cash-value or depicted as a possible trajectory or 'world-line'.  

I think if, say, someone comes along and murders an innocent baby, to choose the simplest possible example, there's something wrong with that above and beyond the GDP impact or the suffering of the baby.

We may say the thing is repugnant. Economists know about repugnancy markets.  

There's something relational about treating the baby that way, that above and beyond the lost happiness is deeply wrong and bad.

What about a foetus? Is Tyler pro-life?  

REBECCA That's right. But we also, I mean, I don't think it makes sense to say freedom is the only element of the good anyway.

But nobody, except some useless philosophers, says anything of that sort. We get that some jurisdictions, at some times, can only be ruled if freedom is severely curtailed. The opportunity cost is what matters. The alternative to this curtailment is even less freedom- e.g. England's Defence of the Realm Act which curtailed freedom but which prevented Hilter conquering and enslaving the country.  

So just when we're thinking about is this a good or a bad thing, the idea that we're going to be able to determine that just in terms of whether freedom has been lost seems to me overly thin anyway.

It isn't 'thin'. It is a matter of detailed calculation. Was France right to surrender to Hitler? Yes. It took far less casualties than in the First War and bounced back quicker.  The Brit policy of relying on the Air Force wasn't too shabby. Again, the UK took far fewer casualties- though more than the cheese eating surrender monkeys.

TYLER Yeah, I agree.

REBECCA So I guess there's two criticisms here. One is, is freedom just about rights?

Rights without remedies are meaningless. Freedom is about choices directly linked to outcomes.  

And the other is, is the good just about freedom, even if the conception of freedom goes beyond rights.

It can be. But many feel 'the good' has something to do with God.  

TYLER But practically speaking, I think Stigler's approach, looking at positive liberty and wealth, it gives you the right answer in virtually all cases. Done as a rule at the societal level.

REBECCA That's right. So I think in a descriptive sense, you might want to say something like, if we're considering whether country X is freer than country Y, you want to think about things like opportunity. This seems to me to make sense.

if Norwegians spend good money to emigrate to Switzerland, we can put a cash value on the greater economic freedom they get there. In some other respect- e.g. sexual freedom if they move to Dubai- they may lose out. Again, a cash value can be given to this. 

The question for me, the deeper question is, why do we care about opportunity?

Because it is linked to productivity which is linked to prosperity and national security.  

We don't just care about it in terms of, hey, counting up GDP.

Forecasts of GDP trends can look at how the configuration space changes as opportunities of various kinds increase or decrease.  

We care about it because the kinds of creatures who are in that society are the kinds of creatures that have the capacity to be free.

Hens are the kinds of creatures which have the capacity to be free. We prefer it if they are kept in coops and lay eggs for us to eat.  

Is that fair?

It is silly.  

Like, why does it matter? Who does freedom matter to? Freedom doesn't matter to the sea. Does freedom matter to your dog?

It matters to a wolf. As for your dog, it doesn't want to be kept chained up all day. It wants to be taken walkies. So do I. Sadly, nobody is willing to pick up my poop.  Is it coz I iz bleck?

Does freedom matter to you? There's clearly a sense in which it makes sense to talk about you as free. I think there's a sense in which to talk about your dog as free, at least if you compare your dog with a little electronic dog. But talking about the sea as free doesn't make sense.

It is poetic. My beloved is in America. The sea is free to go and meet her. I am not because nobody takes me walkies and scoops up my poop.  

Talking about Belgium as free only really matters if

we are thinking of relocating there. It is classed as 'moderately free' in Economic terms. But financial and monetary freedom is higher than average.  

we're talking about what are the conditions that conduce within Belgium for the kinds of things for which freedom matters.

This is well studied by people who advise companies on where to relocate.  

TYLER  Sure, the Belgians will be happier with a fair degree of freedom.

Maybe not for Islamists.  

REBECCA But again, happier. Is it just about happiness? No, I think we've already addressed that.

It's about entry and exit. If smart people are running away that's bad. If rapists and terrorists are running away people feel very happy.  

TYLER No, but that's the single biggest and most important component is human well-being, that people flourish…

It really isn't.  Survival is what matters. After that the question is whether your progeny will multiply faster than the other guys progeny. 

REBECCA But the risk then is that...


TYLER… and then sustainability. So free societies appear to be pretty good at defending themselves against their enemies.

If they have nukes. Ukraine gave them up. Look at it now.  

And that's critical. So you need enough wealth and GDP to buy defence and have alliances. And that's going to trump most other considerations, because if you're enslaved by someone else, it's just the end of the line and the debate, so to speak, is over.

REBECCA So one of the objections, the republicans, these people who want to see freedom broadly as non-domination…

Nothing wrong with a bit of S&M between consenting adults and one really promiscuous chicken.  

TYLER
You mean the philosophical republicans...
REBECCA Yeah, I mean, that's right, the people like Tim Sellers, and Philip Pettit, Quentin Skinner. These people want to see that the notion of freedom that's operative or should be operative within the society is the idea of non-domination. So this is going further than non-interference. It's saying something like a lack of arbitrary interference.

It can be taken further to mean that Neo-Liberalism and the Cash Nexus and Gender dimorphism and the invidious distinction Society makes between human babies and my cat baby should all be overthrown. Otherwise, nobody is really free. Also, why is the Government not putting LSD in tap water? 

And one objection they would have to the non-interference idea is something like, you've got the slave and the slave master, and the slave master seems terribly benevolent. Maybe the slave has all of the opportunities they want. Maybe they live a happy life in the sense of gaining access to the goods and services that they want. Maybe they can get married, all of these things.

Sadly, even the most Islamic states have now abolished slavery- at least on paper. 

But the republican objection is: any day now, the slave master could just on a whim, because they're having a bad day, impose some arbitrary restriction on the slave. One thing you could take from this objection is the suggestion that it's not just about how good your life looks. It's also about the power you have to determine stuff for yourself.

It is prudent not to become a slave just in case you get 'sold down the river'. 

TYLER It's too loose a concept.

It is the first step to psychosis.  

I also would point out it cannot handle what you might call children's rights at all, and especially in earlier societies where life expectancy is not long, being a child is a significant chunk of your life. Arguably, it's the most important part of your life. There's no way to avoid the sense that in some significant regards, children are dominated. You don't have to believe in hitting them or even spanking them.

Students are dominated as are folk who listen to their confessor or Rabbi. Soldiers are dominated. So are employees in most firms. So what? 

But at the end of the day, their parents tell them what to do and discipline them and bring them up and sort of induce or force certain views on them.

Kids can sue for emancipation. In some countries, they have all sorts of channels of legal redress.  

And that's inevitable. You could even say it's desirable. Maybe today we don't even do enough of it. And if you start with non-domination as fundamental, I just think you hit a huge mess. And a very important question.

REBECCA I generally think that the children objections aren't as strong as people think they are. Largely because you can just deal with it by saying, look, a child isn't yet a fully reasoning creature.

Nor are people who teach Philosophy. So what? Most of us are as stupid as shit. We outsource important decisions.  

A child isn't yet the kind of creature that's capable of all of the things that we think, therefore, they should be treated as a free individual in themselves.

No one is as yet.  That's a good reason to 'let go & let God'. 

TYLER I think they're incredibly smart. And none of us or few of us are willing to take the reductio that therefore say people with Down syndrome are not fully reasoning or have fewer rights. So we're pulling things out of a hat that we don't really need.

Nothing wrong with protecting people with diminished capacity. That may be our own fate soon enough.  

REBECCA I totally agree. But I think you can deal with those problems by saying the person with Down syndrome, you can even go as far as to say the person in the coma, has rights qua being the kind of thing that has these capacities, whether they're just kind of potentially held.

Humans have certain Hohfeldian immunities and entitlements. The question is whether an effective remedy will be provided under a vinculum juris. This raises the question of incentive compatibility if the obligation holder is a private entity and of fiscal headroom if the obligation holder is the State. It is likely that, at the margin, the benefit will be rationed.  

If you separate out the capacity from the exercise of the thing,

you can also separate out the capacity to have the capacity and so on. Sen's approach sucks ass big time.  

which is one way I think you can get into thinking about what freedom means in terms of having freedom, as opposed to doing things freely or being free.

We have already done so by saying positive freedom is a menu of choice.

So if you separate out the noun from the adjective or the adverb. Then you can deal with these objections by saying, look, the person in the coma is still a person.

as is the person who isn't in a coma.  

A person, with these capacities.

People who are not in a coma have the capacity to not give a fart for those who are in a coma.  

And that's why you need to respect their rights.

I don't need to respect shit.  

The risk...

is that if we stop respecting the rights of people in a coma, we may absentmindedly eat them. What if Bleck peeps are disproportionately at risk of being eaten because there is a higher probability of their being eaten. Then, we'd not just be cannibals- we would be racist cannibals!  It is to avoid this terrible fate that it is worth doing a PhD in stupid shite. 

TYLER The word qua makes me nervous there. [Laughter.] I think I prefer the Straussian view that we're not sure what are the rights of people in comas, especially if they're probably never going to come out. But for slippery slope reasons, and because we want these strict lines around human life as a value, we're going to treat it that way. Though deep down, we're really pretty uncertain about the finally correct philosophic answer. That's how I would handle people in comas.

People who get paid to handle such people, handle such people. We don't.  Canada leads the world in euthanasia. Maybe they are onto something. 

The word qua, you're getting into metaphysics.

or jurisprudence. Qua links to an identity class.  

You're not going to win that battle. And then there's plenty of other intermediate cases. Like try considering abortion. It's a very tough issue. You inject the word qua into an abortion debate, you're not going to get anywhere.

REBECCA Every time I say qua, Tyler, from now on in the rest of our lives, and as you know I think we're going to live forever, please just assume I'm meaning as, or in the state of, or something like that.

TYLER But there's a reason why you pick the word qua. And this Aristotelian sense of these hidden potentialities that maybe, in no feasible universe can be realised, but you still want to invoke them. I'm probably opposed to that, but at the very least, it makes me too nervous to want to embrace it.

Yet Courts and Policy makers have to deal with identity classes which in turn determine entitlements or immunities.  

REBECCA Okay, so if you just take a really simple approach in which you compare the person in the coma with the rock, there's a sense in which the person in the coma is much closer to the person outside of the coma than the rock.

The coma patient may have family or friends or may belong to a particular community. I hear that life support has been turned off for a fat Tamil man. I don't like it because I am a fat Tamil man. Is Society discriminating against the likes of me? Fuck you Society! Fuck you very much! Then I learn that the fat Tamil man is that cousin of mine who refused to invite to his birthday party. I think 'good riddance to bad rubbish. Still, I should call. His widow might be hot?'  

What are the qualities that these two things share? One way of approaching it is that they are the kind of thing that has these capacities, whether or not they exercise them.

This particular rock has the capacity to cause a horrible Dictator to trip and fall and break his neck. We must protect and cherish this rock. That cousin of mine in a coma should be sent straight to the crematorium.  

So a human being is the kind of distinct thing, like ontologically, that has these capacities.

Nobody knows their own capabilities let alone those of other people or rocks or trees or whatever.  

TYLER That’s so Aristotelian, come on. [Laughter.]

Aristotle was incredibly stupid. Still, he was Alexander the Great's tutor.  

REBECCA What's wrong with that? Isn't Aristotle the greatest thinker of all time?

No. He was a pedant who taught useless shit.  

TYLER I'm more or less a nominalist. So the rock is an extreme example. But if you compare the human in a coma to a non-human animal, probably the non-human animal does better.

If its your granny in the coma you don't want life-support to be turned off ever. It is so comforting to visit her. The whole family has come together as never before.  

But we do not completely protect their rights, or try to police nature, or promise never to take away their homes by building our homes and so on.

We don't completely protect any rights whatsoever. This is because obligations are defeasible. If the State has no money it reneges on its obligations. Since it has sovereign immunity, nothing can be done about it.  

So I think you'll find other examples that will defeat that attempt at a counter.


REBECCA That's right, but if we're really strict in separating out the kind of definitional work,

lawyers have done this well enough. Currently, US courts recognize that a hippopotamus can be an 'interested person'. Sadly, they still haven't achieved legal 'personhood'. 

working out what kind of thing the human is, what kind of thing the dog is, what kind of thing the rock is, that seems to me a good starting point to thinking…

in a utterly useless fashion. It is a different matter that studying dogs may enable better techniques of dog rearing such that both the dog and the family get more out of the relationship.  

TYLER There's just more Aristotelianism. I think one has to accept the fact, especially as biosciences advance and there's more genetic manipulation, more human evolution, different branches of people may change in different ways, there’s people with disabilities, we just need to accept some of these fine lines aren't there.

Structural Causal Models of rocks or dogs may be very useful. Philosophers can add no value.  

Then we need to decide where do we need to draw them. I would be pretty strict with that, because I worry about the actual logic and dynamic of coercive power as I observe it in the real world. But I don't want to rely on Aristotle there. I want to cite public choice theory for these strict lines.

Sadly, it is 'anything goes'.  

REBECCA OK, so let's take a step back. What kinds of things does freedom matter for then? You don't want to divide things up neatly into humans and dogs and rocks. Can we say something, though, like there are certain kinds of things in the world that it doesn't mean anything to say that freedom matters for those things?

No. Anything at all can be meaningful to some person. I see a rock. I feel it should be free to fly through the air and hit you on the head. Thus, it will have fulfilled God's plan and get a better reincarnation.  

TYLER Freedom for rocks does not matter. Agree.

I throw a rock at Tyler. He catches it. It turns out to be a pure gold nugget. I want it back. He says the rock exercised its freedom to fly through the air and land in his hand. It should be free to depart with its destined owner. That's a case where the freedom of a rock would matter greatly to Tyler. 

REBECCA Why is that?

TYLER What's a rock? It's a rock, right?

If it is a rock which is 90 percent gold and is worth 10,000 dollars it is more than a rock.  

Until we learn more about rocks, there are a few panpsychics running around out there, but they haven't persuaded me. And in the meantime, you can just kick a rock.

REBECCA Why can you kick a rock? It seems to me like...
TYLER Isn't that how they refuted Bishop Berkeley? [Laughter.] I refute him thus and he kicked the stone. It's fine to kick the stone.

REBECCA Why is it fine to kick the stone, and not to kick the person in the coma or not to kick the baby or not to kick the dog?

It is fine to do so if you are a solipsist. The trouble is you may get beaten or bitten.  

I think pretty quickly we're going to get onto something like it's living,

No. If kicking living humans is wrong, kick-boxing would be banned.  

and then we're going to want to make some kinds of distinctions like having intentions or being conscious.

No. Intentions or consciousness may mitigate the wrong. But what is wrong remains wrong. Why? The law says so or Society has a norm in this respect.  

Even you accept we're conscious, right?

TYLER Right. Sure. Even I, except we're barely conscious, but we are a little bit. There might be some arguments in the biodiversity direction, but with the environment, where kicking the stone can be this big mistake. I'm still not persuaded of them, but I wouldn't rule them out entirely. I could imagine, you know, three years from now, maybe I'm persuaded by them. But that would still be viewing the rock in terms of some larger ecosystem. And the rock per se is not carrying the value.

It is if it contains gold or diamonds.  


REBECCA Just one more attempt, though, at thinking about the kinds of things that can have freedom. Can a non-conscious thing be free?

Yes. Researchers can take a bacteriophage out of the wild and reduce its functionality till it becomes a Speigelman's monster which would die if were free.  

Does it mean something? If you compare your dog with the electronic dog, the little battery-operated dog running about, you might want to say something like, if nobody's constraining it, if nobody's interfering with the direction it runs in, you might want to say it's free. This seems to me crazy.

It isn't. Depending on the sort of computer chip it has, its 'free' behaviour conveys information.  

REBECCA I still think there's a sense in which if we aren't the agents of change, if we aren't capable

then maybe we are women and have to sit down to pee. Also, we are probably being dominated and are being brainwashed into thinking cat babies aren't just as good as human babies.  

… I mean, you started by talking about positive freedom. So one reason people might care about positive freedom is they say, look, it's just not enough for there not to be barriers in the sense of interference or coercion or domination. You have to be able to control what you're doing for yourself.

Also, you should have a penis and not have to sit down to pee 

Whether that's in terms of project formation, whether that's in terms of having your own preferences that can be satisfied.

I didn't ask to be a woman. The world is totes unfair! 

This to me speaks of being an agent in the sense of having some kind of capacity,

like peeing standing up 

some kind of control, at the extreme some kind of power to determine things.

Call no man free till he is POTUS. Call no POTUS free till every country does what he wants. Also, POTUS should be allowed to tell Death to fuck off. 

How do you have… Why does this positive sense of freedom matter if you think that the kind of thing that has it isn't something that can cause stuff?

Both free and unfree, animate and inanimate, things can cause stuff. The question is what is the 'efficient cause' of the thing? I didn't make my computer. But I was part of the demand curve for it and in that sense am the efficient cause. But what a paltry sense that is! The chain of causation in human affairs may be well enough uncovered for a judicial or commercial purpose but it eludes itself in the process. 

REBECCA But what does it mean to choose if choice doesn't mean, if you don't have open choice in the sense that you could have gone for the other option, what does it mean to…

It means ontological dysphoria- you are not at home in the world as it presents itself to you. Do the 'Eat, Pray, Love' thing. There may be somewhere else, this side of the grave, where you do feel at home.  

TYLER You're part of the causal chain.

oikeiosis is related to feeling at home in the world. Where it breaks down, there is ontological dysphoria.  

But say if you live in the United States, there's 30 brands of ketchup on the shelf. And if you were back in old school communist China, there wasn't ketchup at all. And that's a big difference. And it really matters to people.

REBECCA But does it matter at the level of you choosing?

Nothing wrong with doing 'discovery'. Try something new. You might like it.  

That's the question. It's not, are you going to have the better life? It's not, are you passively going to be the recipient of the better life…

being passive is bad. Girls should be on top.  


REBECCA You could imagine a kind of zombie society,

apparently there is a type of psychosis where the patient believes everybody else has become a robot 

though, where people go around having what seem like more options, having what seems like better access to the bundle of goods, but without having any kind of these other concepts you're talking about, like choosing. Is that fair?

It is very unfair. I used to try to explain to Amartya Sen that it was very  unfair that he was forced to devour nothing but dog turds as had been proved by Arrow's theorem. Sen denied he was a Bengali economist. He pretended to be a Punjabi lady. That was very unfair of him. I think it's coz iz bleck. 



Did Savarkar originate Hindutva?

 Back in 2017, Ariel Sophia Bardi, a journalist once based in New Delhi, wrote the following for Aeon magazine- 

'How ‘Hindutva’ recast multi-faith India as the Hindu homeland'
India was always the home of Hindus. Other religions came to it. In some parts of it, Hindus were persecuted or ethnically cleansed. After the Great War, it was obvious that the age of multi-ethnic Empires was over. Would India survive as a Federation- which is what the British wanted- or would it be divided on the basis of religion? The answer was that first Buddhist Burma would go its own way in 1937 and then, after the 1946 election where Muslims voted overwhelmingly for the Muslim League, Pakistan was created. Interestingly, Jinnah and Nehru- who presided over Partition- were considered secular politicians with little knowledge or interest in religion. Yet there was a lot of ethnic cleansing on both sides of the border. 

In 1892, the great scholar Chandranath Basu, published a book titled ' Hindutva--Hindur Prakrita Itihas' which propounded an ecumenical Hinduism which defended various types of orthopraxy under the overarching rubric of Advaita. It was immensely popular- more particularly with orthodox Hindus. 
'Hindutva,’ explained Vinayak Damodar Savarkar

who had previously been a revolutionary of an agnostic type  

in 1923, is ‘not a word, but a history.’ It was introduced in a lengthy pamphlet, Essentials of Hindutva, which Savarkar wrote on the walls of his prison cell, and re-published in 1928 under the new title Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?

Savarkar and the Maharashtrian revolutionaries were influenced by Herbert Spencer and other Left leaning Sociologists and Economists. He was seeking to make a comeback into politics. Congress shunned him because of his previous involvement with revolutionary violence. But he was a great hero to the young and the Hindu Mahasabha was happy to be associated with him so as to gain favour with the younger generation. Thus he became its President in 1937 till he retired in 1943. 

‘A Hindu,’ Savarkar declared, ‘means a person who regards this land of Bharat Varsha’– a name for ancient India used in the Puranas, a set of foundational Hindu texts – ‘as his Fatherland as well as his Holy-Land, that is the cradle land of his religion.’

The term ‘Hindutva’, which Savarkar coined

He didn't coin it. Ariel is simply ignorant.  

by adding the Sanskrit suffix ‘-tva’ (equivalent to the English ‘-ness’) to the adjective ‘Hindu’, rebranded Hinduism – ‘Hindu-ness’ – as a nationalist ideology, a political groundswell formulated along ethnic lines.

This had happened before Savarkar was born with the publication of 'Anand Math' by Bankim. Incidentally, it was Bankim who got Chandranath to switch to writing in Bengali.  

Savarkar wrote: ‘The Hindus are not merely the citizens of the Indian state because they are united not only by the bonds of the love they bear to a common motherland but also by the bonds of a common blood. They are not only a Nation but also a race (jati).’ ‘Hindutva’ recast multi-faith India as the Hindu homeland, giving Hindus a unique claim to the country.

There's a good reason why Bengal took the lead in the creation of a Hindutva ideology. The Hindus there wanted to dominate the entire province though they were a minority in the East. Vivekananda and Aurobindo had one foot in the revolutionary camp and the other foot in monastic religion. Interestingly, there was also a Christian revolutionary- Brahmobandhav Upadhyay- who wrote in 1898, "Are we Hindus?", "By birth, we are Hindu and shall remain Hindu till death. .. We are Hindus so far as our physical and mental constitution is concerned, but in regard to our immortal souls we are Catholic. We are Hindu Catholic.' However, he reconverted to Hinduism a short time before his death in 1907. Something similar was the case with his hero Keshab Chandra Sen. A Hindu might say 'Christ is my Ishtadeva'- my personal God and Saviour- but I also perform rites associated with my 'kuladevam'- of family deity. This would be frowned on by the Church. 

As a 20-something law student living in England, Savarkar was charged with plotting against the British monarchy after aiding in the assassination of a British civil servant. Extradited back to India in 1911, Savarkar received two life terms. Through a series of confinements – beginning in the Andaman Islands, home to a brutal penal colony, then in a port city prison near the Arabian Sea in Maharashtra – Savarkar plotted his political manifesto.

He was reacting to the Khilafat movement. The fact is, Congress Hindus were hypocritical in their support of it.  They did not really believe that the Caliph should rule the world. The question was whether the Hindu Mahasabha could become a rival to Congress. The answer was no. Congress was the muscular arm of the Hindus. They could enforce 'hartals' on Muslim shopkeepers even if this led to riots in which the minority suffered disproportionately. Also, Gandhi was genuinely religious. Savarkar wasn't. He wouldn't even perform traditional Hindu funeral rites- unlike the Nehru dynasty. 

It is difficult to imagine that the pain of colonial incarceration did not shape the fervour of his tract, which laid out a long, historically fanciful rationale for Hindu supremacy.

By then, it was obvious that Hindus would be supreme where they were the majority. The question was whether Congress would monopolize the Hindu vote. The answer was- yes. Congress kicked ass. Nehru was ruthless. In 1937 he appointed only Hindu Chief Ministers and refused to ally with Fazl ul Haq in Bengal. In other words, others talked but only Nehru delivered. In 1947, as Prime Minister, he presided over the ethnic cleansing of Delhi. The Muslim share of the population fell from one third to five percent. He passed a law preventing those who had fled in panic from returning to reclaim their property.  

Hindutva represented a hardline form of Hindu nationalism, in which Muslims appeared as bellicose invaders.

That was how the Muslims saw themselves- unless, like the Ismailis, they had themselves been persecuted by Sunni Sultans and had to flee to Gujarat. But the Aga Khan, their Spiritual leader, was a strong supporter of the Muslim League and the Pakistan project.  

‘Nations and civilisations fell in heaps before the sword of Islam of Peace!!’ writes Savarkar. ‘But here India alone had to face Arabs, Persians, Pathans, Baluchis, Tartars, Turks, Moguls – a veritable human Sahara whirling and columning up bodily in a furious world storm!’

Prior to the Treaty of Lausanne, most people though Nationalism would be linguistic rather than religious. But once Greek speaking Muslims were sent to Turkey and Turkish speaking Christians moved to Greece, it became obvious that religion was more important. Lebanon was created for the Christians. Would an Israel be created for the Jews? That was in fact the outcome.  

As anti-colonial movements gained ground during the last decades of British rule in India, Hindu nationalism became the default expression of reclaimed political power.

There was no need to call itself that. After independence, Shyam Prasad Mukherji quit the Hindu Mahasabha because it wouldn't change its name. He founded the Jan Sangh with the help of the RSS. The Sangh turned into the BJP which is currently in power at the centre.  

Indian Muslims, who made up a third of the country before the creation of Pakistan in 1947, saw themselves as sidelined

by Nehru in 1937 who refused to share power in the Provinces. Congress was a Hindu party devoted to things which only Hindus cared about. Also, the Mahatma was an utter crackpot. You can't blame Muslims from wanting to get away from his idiocy.  

from independence movements, leading to the 1906 creation of the Muslim League, a separate political party that would later advocate for an independent Muslim state.

In 1916 it made Jinnah, a Congressman, its President. He did a deal with Congress. The problem was that everybody understood that any concessions it offered in the short-run would be snatched away the moment it got control of the Army and thus became omnipotent.  

Unlike future leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi, who made a point of Muslim inclusion,

it was purely cosmetic. Still, he did get his wife to cook mutton chops for his pal, Azad. Nehru, being a Hindu, didn't get any. He also wasn't allowed to smoke in the Mahatma's presence. But Gandhi was leading Azad up the garden path.  

proponents of Hindutva disapproved of non-Hindu outreach, a process known in India as ‘appeasement’.

Nehru got rid of any and every concession previously made to the Muslims.  

(Such was Savarkar’s aversion to Gandhi’s approach that he was implicated in his assassination in 1948.)

As was some Hindu Maharaja. Congress had to proceed cautiously. It was possible that the Princes and big landlords could come together and pose a problem for them.  

Britain no longer dominates India, but for supporters of Hindutva, the country’s prime antagonists are still non-Hindu Indians, chiefly Muslims.

More particularly if Muslims ethnically cleanse Hindus where they are in the majority- e.g. the Vale of Kashmir.  

And the coinage has stuck. Almost a century later, Savarkar’s writings remain a fount of inspiration for those who still seek to unify India under a putatively pan-Hindu banner.

Not really. The guy simply wasn't a Hindu. Chandranath Basu was orthodox. Vivekananda and Ramakrishna had religious charisma. But it is the Nehru dynasty which takes care to observe Hindu rituals. Sonia Gandhi may be a Christian but her daughter marred her Christian husband in a Hindu ceremony. Then, it turned out a Sankaracharya had performed her 'grha pravesh' ceremony! Rahul is actually a 'janeodhari' Brahmin! There are rumours that both Vajpayee and Advani were irreligious. Modi has taken care to appear orthodox. This is part of his appeal. 

In India, the ideology of Hindutva

changed with the times. Back in the Sixties and early Seventies, when Socialism was popular, it became Socialistic. Now, its main claim to fame is its commitment to getting rid of casteism. After all, the essence of Hinduism is what is true of that religion in all possible worlds- including worlds where there was never any inherited inequality or discrimination on the basis of occupation.  

is experiencing a second act, proving itself inextinguishable.

It would be extinguished if it were associated only with corrupt or cretinous clowns. Congress has declined because Rahul is useless. 

‘The book is today a Bible for Hindu nationalists,’ wrote the journalist Uday Mahurkar of Savarkar’s tract in 2015.

He was lying. Hindus, nationalistic or otherwise, read the Bhagvad Gita. They don't read Savarkar's tosh.  

The politics of India’s current administration are still greatly informed by the young law student’s vision of a Hindu nation.

No. They are informed by the RSS which had beef with the Hindu Mahasabha to which Savarkar belonged. That's why they helped Mukherji when he split from the Mahasabha. The fact is, Savarkar's personal atheism makes him distasteful to Hindus. Still, he and his brother had shown great valour and suffered greatly for it.  

‘Savarkar has become more relevant today,’ said Amit Shah, president of India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (the Right-wing BJP) earlier this year.

Indira Gandhi too said nice things about him in 1980. After all, Chitpavans have votes and they may like to hear praise of a hero from their community.  

‘We have to apprise the youths and generation next of his freedom fight and literary work.’ Just two years after the release of Essentials of Hindutva, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) was founded as a volunteer paramilitary organisation dedicated to advancing Savarkar’s platform of Hindu unity and promoting Hindu causes.

Nonsense! Dr. Hegdewar was emulating his friend Dr. Hardikar who had previously created the Congress Seva Dal in imitation of the 'Anushilan Samitis' of pre-War Bengal. Both had been medical students in Calcutta at that time. When the Brits cracked down on the Seva Dal, the 'non-political' RSS could function. Its philosophy was different from Savarkar. On the one hand, it did not criticize any Hindu ritual. On the other hand, it supported 'inter-dining' and abolition of untouchability. Savarkar, opportunistically, said his party would not vote for enforcement of Temple Entry. But the core belief of Hindutva is that caste is not part of the essence of Hinduism. It is merely a convention or 'samskar'. We must get rid of it to make progress.  

It is often called the BJP’s ‘ideological parent’.

By ignorant people. The Jan Sangh was set up by the son of Sir Ashutosh Mukherji with help from the RSS precisely because the Mahasabha was stupid and shitty. Savarkar simply didn't have what it takes to succeed politically. He was a gifted writer but his tone is unappealing to Hindus.  

In 2014, the self-styled populist Narendra Modi, an RSS member,

like Prime Minister Atal Behari, who had been Mukherji's right hand man,  

won India’s general elections.

Because Rahul refused to run or to nominate some other PM candidate 

Modi ran on a platform of neoliberal development schemes wedded to a Right-wing Hindu nationalist agenda.

No. He ran on 'last mile delivery' and 'good governance'. He said here is mobile phone number. If you don't get your entitlement, do 'missed call'. Within a week my people will get back to you and make sure you receive your due.  

His ascent to prime minister marked a shocking victory, which foreshadowed Donald Trump’s rise to power.

Trump has changed party several times. He is the only POTUS who never received a Government salary check in his life. By contrast, Modi was a party hack who had been a very successful Chief Minister of Gujarat. Yet, if Rahul had become PM and led his party in 2014, the BJP would have put up Advani, who was twice Rahul's age. Rahul would have won. The lion of Gir would have roared once or twice but have remained in Gujarat.  

In 2008,

when Modi was worried that his former ally Parvin Togadia of the VHP would ally with Keshubhai Patel  

while still chief minister of Gujarat – a tenure darkened by his suspected complicity in the brutal anti-Muslim pogroms of 2002

it brightened his political future just as Nehru's presiding over anti-Muslim pogroms brightened his political future. But it was Rajiv who got the biggest majority for presiding over anti-Sikh pogroms.  

– Modi launched a website dedicated to archiving ‘Savarkar’s thoughts [which] touch upon every aspect of nation-building and are relevant even today’.

Only someone who hasn't read Savarkar would bother doing so.  

In 2016, on the 133rd anniversary of Savarkar’s birth, Modi Tweeted out a salute to the ‘true son of Mother India’ using his popular honorific Veer, meaning ‘brave’.

Maybe, this helped his party in Maharashtra. It annoyed the fuck out of Rahul who doesn't seem to understand that his great-grandfather was a loyalist while Savarkar was in jail during the Great War. 

Like Savarkar, the BJP presupposes an elemental Hindu-ness, survivor of myriad foreign onslaughts. ‘It weathered the storms of invaders, from the Greeks to the Huns … to the Islamic armies of Turks and Afghans,’ states the BJP website.

Nehru said similar things.  

‘It fought and resisted external oppression,

How shameful! It should have offered its anus for sodomy to external oppressors.  

and its essential civilisation and culture survived great challenges and attempts at effacement.’

That's true enough- in Hindu majority areas.  

Singled out for special opprobrium is the ‘Holocaust’ that ‘Muslims reaped’ on Hindus during centuries of Mughal rule (1526-1857).

Why aren't Hindus celebrating being enslaved? What is wrong with them?  

For decades, the BJP has been committed to giving Hindus a unified country,

Nehru gets the credit for ridding India of the Muslim headache. He also took back Goa from the Portuguese.  

which they have already partially achieved through the consolidation of Hindu voting blocs. BJP now wields control over 18 out of 29 states.

It is now down to 14 and has lost its majority in Parliament. What will happen after seats are redistributed and the women's quota kicks in? In theory the BJP should benefit- but there is many a slip between cup and lip. 

The Hindu nationalist vision of India hinges on

Hinduism of the 'Puranic' type.  

an imagined, culturally pure Vedic golden age,

Actually, it is the Ramayana and Mahabharata which capture the Hindu imagination. The Vedas, Richard Crasto said, are Indian scriptures created by Indians for Indians but understood only by German Professors.  

a Hindu rashtra, or nation. It’s usually represented by the ancient kingdom of Ram, the godly hero of India’s national epic, the Ramayana. The BJP gained popular support in the 1980s by launching a campaign against the Babri Masjid, a 16th-century Mughal-built mosque in the northern city of Ayodhya, claiming that it had been built over a shrine marking Ram’s birthplace.

Rajiv threw it open to Hindu worship. Sadly, he was killed before he could construct the Temple himself. It is interesting that when Rahul returned to India, one of the first things Sonia did was announce that her Sankaracharya would preside over the building of the Temple once the Court case was decided. 

In 1992, Hindu rioters, incited by politicians, stormed the mosque.

It wasn't a mosque. Islamic law says that a place which is not used for Islamic worship is not a mosque. Hindu worship their had been ongoing since 1949.  

The resurgence of Hindutva was spurred,

by the Mandal Commission- i.e. more affirmative action for other backward castes. The alternative to endless caste conflict was to appeal to the common religion.  

in part, by India’s transformation from a socialist to a market economy. The demolition of the Babri Masjid directly followed the 1991 economic liberalisation of India, which quadrupled the country’s GDP by opening up to foreign investment and adopting a policy of trickle-down economics.

That may have been the intention but politics made buying votes with 'freebies' more attractive.  

With widening income gaps and a barrage of foreign goods, Savarkar’s writings, which denounced caste divisions and emphasised cultural nationalism over economic equality, held a new appeal.

The silly man had started babbling about Socialism when that seemed cool.  

The lure of a harmonious, Hindu-helmed past served as a galvanising fiction,

from the 1880s onward. In the 1890's it was 'cow protection' which gave Congress 'mass contact'. Incidentally, the founder of the INC- Alan Octavian Hume was a vegetarian Advaitin who believed in cow protection for agronomic reasons. Cow protection is a Directive Principle in the Constitution.  

propelling the ideology of Hindutva to mainstream acceptability.

Everybody already had that ideology. True, they may have pretended to be secular, but they weren't really. In 1919, Nehru's younger sister married a Muslim. Gandhi broke up the couple and arranged a 'suitable' Brahmin boy for her to wed. The family had no problem marrying Jains, Jews, Zoroastrians or Christians. But they drew the line at Muslims.  

BJP leaders are still focused on having Ram’s temple reinstated.

That has been done. Modi certainly milked the occasion for all it was worth.  

This motive of ‘return’ to a purer, idealised nation informs the Hindutva claim to the Indian nation as a unique Hindu homeland.

Which is what it became thanks to Nehru pulling the trigger on Partition. Interestingly, Rajaji arranged for priests from Tamil Nadu to hold a Hindu consecration ceremony for Nehru a few hours before the official transfer of power. 


In the opening pages of Essentials of Hindutva, Savarkar alludes to the ‘fair Maid of Verona’. He quibbles with Juliet over the importance of names: ‘Forgive us for this our idolatrous attachment to it when we make bold to assert that: “Hindus we are and love to remain so!”’

There's a good reason nobody reads Savarkar.  

To Savarkar, Hindutva is at once precise and collective, both expansive and exclusionary. The word gave a title to political Hinduism, recasting Hinduism as a distinct national form for India.

The Hindu Mahasabha was created in 1915 by Madan Mohan Malviya. Gandhi & Motilal Nehru attended. At that time, Savarkar was still a Revolutionary of a left-wing type. But he was being tortured in jail.  

Hindutva still offers Hindu-ness as a deep, shared identity, borne out of an unbroken lineage. In the Hindutva ideal, Hinduism represents a vast, encompassing reality, a subcontinental cultural ethos that is not reliant on faith (Savarkar himself was an atheist).

In other words, he was an opportunist seeking to make a political comeback. His legendary heroism did give him some glamour but he wrote too much. Unlike Hardayal or Aurobindo, there was no genuine spirituality to his work. Still, Indians agree that all freedom-fighters who suffered jail or who risked hanging were heroes regardless of ideology.  

Hindutva secularises Hinduism, relying on a heavily mythologised golden age and, as is common to nationalist stories, a fictitiously unified past.

No. It offers an alternative to caste-based Dynastic parties. However 'Hindu consolidation' is easier said than done.  

Hindutva introduced a nationalist history of Indian greatness and unity, in which all acknowledged the authority of the nation.

Alan Octavian Hume was Scottish. He created the INC which needed Hinduism to achieve 'mass contact'. The Muslim reacted by forming the Muslim League and the Hindus reacted by creating the Mahasabha. Savarkar came late to the party. By then Congress was the muscular arm of Hinduism. The question was whether Gandhi could lead the Muslims down the garden path. The answer was no. In Jinnah, he met his match.  

Since the publication of his pamphlet, Savarkar, like the myths to which his vision of India defaulted, has also been memorialised, aggrandised and revered. In the Andaman Islands, where Savarkar carried out the harshest years of his sentence, the Veer Savarkar International Airport now greets arrivals. The BJP will soon adorn his small cell with a plaque in praise of the freedom fighter who challenged British rule in India and whose ideology of Hindutva now, a century later, has both united the country and set it bitterly at odds.

Nobody gives a shit about ideology- except Rahul who talks of 'vichardhara'. Apparently, his cousin doesn't have good 'vichardhara' which is why he won't let him back into the Congress party. Meanwhile, the BJP has pumped and dumped both him and his mother. That brought a smile to Sonia's face.  

Another Aeon article on Savarkar by Mihir Dalal suggests that Hindus didn't know they were Hindus which is why they could put up no resistance to Islamic or Christian invaders. He forgets that the Marathas, the Sikhs, the Gurkhas and so forth were proud of their religion and happy to turn the tables on the Muslims. 

Over a 70-year period starting in the 1750s, the British East India Company defeated both European and local rivals and turned the Mughal dynasty that had ruled India for more than 200 years into its puppet.

Previously, they were the puppets of the Marathas.  

Britain’s barbaric traders carried out their conquest through loot and rapacity,

No. They were businessmen who punctually paid pensions to those who surrendered a fort to them or who otherwise helped them expand their rule. The reason they prevailed is because their finances were sound thanks to their great oceanic trade.  

while its scribes, missionaries and historians provided the moral justifications by portraying India as a degenerate civilisation that British rule might redeem.

Money was the only justification. Morality didn't matter in the slightest.  

Some European thinkers, Orientalists and Romantics valorised ancient Hindu India as the cradle of civilisation, but they too lamented its decay.

Nobody cared about 'lamentations'. Could money be made in India? That's what mattered.  

Under British colonialism, elite Hindus often accepted the British narratives for colonial rule.

No. Everybody tried to get some sort of official employment so as to get rich. Narratives didn't matter. Money did.  

They were especially tortured by the question: how could a vast nation like India be conquered by a distant island a fraction of its size and population?

The answer was obvious. Princes fought each other when they weren't being killed by their own sons or nephews. Moreover, the fiscal foundations of Kingdoms were shaky. Sooner or later there would be a revenue shortfall. Unpaid soldiers desert or turn to dacoity. The tiller of the land hopes that invaders will lower the tax burden.  

Such musings about Indian or Hindu history furthered the development of Indian nationalism. By assuming that a ‘national’ Hindu-Indian identity had existed since time immemorial (it hadn’t),

It certainly had for caste Hindus- especially Brahmins. We know from which Vedic Rishi we are descended.  

elite Hindus felt driven to recover their Hindu-Indian identity in the present.

They already had it. Just ask your purohit (family priest).  

In fact, until British rule, people in the subcontinent hadn’t seen themselves as Hindu (or Muslim) in the modern sense.

Yes they had. That is why the British found that there was a different personal law for Muslims of different 'mazhabs' and Hindus belonging to various sects. 

They balanced various identities, including those of place, caste and family lineage;

this was preserved by their family priests in the case of Hindus and Jains.  

religion merely provided one among several, as the political theorist Sudipta Kaviraj and others have written.

They are ignorant shitheads.  

However, in the 19th century, some upper-caste Hindus, awed by the power of Britain’s military and industrial superiority, launched vigorous movements to ‘purify’ their religion and make it more like Christianity.

Some guys who had got rich working for the Brits did create a 'Brahmo Samaj' which at one time seemed likely to merge with the Unitarian Church. It must be said, there were some very high quality converts to Christianity.  

They moved to cast off what they saw as the appendages dragging down Hinduism – the inegalitarian caste system, the large diversity of gods, sects and practices – believing this reformation would make India great again.

Does Mihir mean the Prarthana Samaj and the Arya Samaj? They came later and in the latter case were concerned with 'shuddhi'- reconversion.  

British historical narratives portrayed Hindu-Muslim enmity as a fundamental, self-evident feature of Indian history.

No. They portrayed India as a place which could be ruled in a secular manner because there was a tradition of people of different faiths working together in the administration. Indeed, such was the case in their own offices.  

In reality, religious pluralism and toleration – not fanatical religious hatred – had been the norm among people of various religions in South Asia.

Unless it wasn't. The problem with hatred is two can play at that game. You may start the persecution but end up being slaughtered. What mattered was money. People need it to buy bread.  

In The Loss of Hindustan (2020), the historian Manan Asif Ahmed writes that, before British rule, many elite Hindus and Muslims had thought of Hindustan as a homeland not only of the Hindus, but of the ‘diverse communities of believers’ including Muslims and Christians.

But it was better administered by sojourners from a distant isle. They only stayed long enough to qualify for a pension. But this meant that they were less corrupt and nepotistic than the locals and thus more widely trusted. Still, what mattered was money. If the Brits couldn't make a profit running the place they would run the fuck away.  

British colonialism constructed a different narrative, one in which Hindus had been subjugated in their home for 1,000 years by Muslim invaders.

Why the fuck would they construct such a narrative? If Hindus started killing Muslims, it would be their own turn next.  

This distorted the South Asian experience of Hindustan into claims of immutable enmity between Hindus and Muslims.

Muslims don't regard Hindus as kaffirs. British historians invented this myth.  

The British census aggregated Hindus and Muslims across India into homogeneous groups and facilitated the creation of solidarity – and belligerence – among them.

Prior to the British census, Indians did not know whether they were male or female. Evil Britishers forced them to choose between having a penis or a vagina. This is called 'bio-politics'.  

Towards the end of the 19th century, colonial influences combined with what the historian Christopher Bayly in 1998 called ‘old patriotisms’ to contribute to the invention of a pan-Indian Hindu nationality, and a more inchoate Muslim nationality.

Why? The answer is the reforms of the 1880s which were meant to increase Indian representation in the administration. The hope was that India could become more and more self-administering and self-garrisoning. Also, it was vital that agricultural productivity rose so that the Government gained more fiscal headroom. Otherwise, with the decline of the price of silver, retired officers would find their pensions insufficient.  


Working in this legacy, Savarkar made his first lasting contribution to Indian politics in 1909, with the publication of a historical work, The Indian War of Independence of 1857. In 1857, large numbers of Indian soldiers and gentry in northern and western India had risen under the banner of the fading Mughal dynasty in the largest armed uprising against the British Empire by a ruled people.

But Indians sided with the British in even larger numbers. That is why they prevailed.  

British historians had played down this war as a ‘sepoy mutiny’, restricted to disgruntled soldiers rather than a polity – a view Savarkar set out to correct. In Hindutva and Violence (2021), an authoritative work on Savarkar, the historian Vinayak Chaturvedi shows that Savarkar was a master at reclaiming Indian history from the British by reading colonial records and works of scholarship ‘against the grain’.

An interesting story could be told about why Maharashtra was relatively untroubled. The fact is, if British officers acted sensibly, disturbances could be localized and easily crushed. A.O Hume, in Etawah, was very successful in this probably because his reforms were appreciated by the local people.  

Drawing inspiration from the French and American revolutions as well as the ultranationalism of Mazzini, Savarkar reconstructed 1857 as the ‘first war’ for Indian independence. To this day, 1857 is understood as such in India.

Not really. The thing is a pretence. The word 'ghaddar' has a negative meaning.  

His passionate, romantic account glorified Indian war heroes with the intent of inspiring a revolution against the British.

Because he and his brother were revolutionaries inspired by Vasudev Phadke and the Chapekar brothers.  

In the book, Savarkar introduced the central motif in his historical works: violence as mystical unifier. He held that Hindus and Muslims had become united for the first time ever during the war through the means of violence.

They were even more united in the Three Company Armies which stayed loyal.  

The literal ‘shedding of [British] blood’ together had forged the Hindu-Muslim bond, as the political theorist Shruti Kapila characterises Savarkar’s idea in Violent Fraternity (2021).

To be fair, at that time it was possible to posit an alliance between all colonized people against European powers. Amba Prasad Sufi & Ajith Singh tried to make this a reality during the Great War. But once it ended, it was obvious the age of multi-ethnic Empires was over.  

Savarkar’s conception of Hindu-Muslim history had been partly shaped by the long tradition of religiopolitical enmity against the Mughals in his homeland of Maharashtra, as the historian Prachi Deshpande shows in Creative Pasts (2007). But Savarkar, always the innovative thinker, borrowed only what suited his purposes. He wrote that, since Hindu kings had avenged centuries of Muslim oppression by defeating the Mughals in the 18th century, the ‘blot of slavery’ had been ‘wiped off’. Having re-established their ‘sovereignty’ at home, they could now fraternise with Muslims.

Not in Hyderabad. Anyway, Savarkar was already out of date. The Morley-Minto reforms would make reservations on the basis of religion the crucial question. The only way to solve it was Partition. 

And finally, such was the power of the violence in 1857 that India now became ‘the united nation of the adherents of Islam as well as Hinduism’. Indian War and its author were admired across the political spectrum.

Gandhi condemned him and his 'kato maro panth'- i.e. 'stab & kill party'.  


The book was the high point of Savarkar’s youth. Soon he lost his infant son to smallpox, and his elder brother was arrested for treason. In 1910, Savarkar himself was sentenced to life imprisonment at the Andamans, a brutal penal colony in the Bay of Bengal. He had become notorious on account of the violent activities of his secret society. But more than this, it was his ‘seditious’ writings with their potential to sow widespread disaffection that had threatened the British, the historian Janaki Bakhle wrote in 2010.

The brothers were indeed heroes. However, by the end of 1917, the Brits understood that power would have to be ceded to representative institutions in India.  

Prison broke Savarkar. In his autobiography, Savarkar writes about frequently suffering from dysentery, lung disease and malaria. He was put in solitary confinement for months, and for eight years was denied permission to see his wife. The Irish jailor was sadistic, and Muslim warders were cruel to Hindus. Nearly driven to suicide, he filed mercy petitions, abjured revolution, and promised to serve the empire (the issue most debated about Savarkar today). The petitions were rejected but in the early 1920s Savarkar was moved to a less harsh prison in western India.

He was irrelevant. Egypt, Ireland & Afghanistan had gained Independence in 1922. But, in India, Gandhi had unilaterally surrendered. It was obvious that Hindu-Muslim unity was based on hypocrisy. Hindu were pretending they would die to establish an Islamic Caliphate.  


By then, Gandhi’s leadership of the Indian National Congress had revolutionised Indian politics. His religiosity and asceticism attracted the masses to the independence movement, which had been limited to a tiny section of educated Indians.

No. Some Provinces had seen mass-movements- e.g. Bengal after Curzon partitioned it. The Hindus of Punjab, under the banner of the Arya Samaj, were politically very conscious. Madras had a lot of political activity though there was friendly feeling towards the British.  

But, unusually, Gandhi emphasised nonviolence, ethical conduct, social reform and Hindu-Muslim unity as much as political independence.

Did he really want it? He said that he would deliver it if a large enough sum of money was collected. It was but he didn't. The truth is, he valued 'Pax Britannica'. Without the Brits there would be war. Banias (businessmen) like himself would be displaced by 'Rajput' warriors.  

He also often upset fellow nationalists. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, some Indian Muslims launched a movement to compel the British to preserve the institution of the Islamic Caliphate, a symbol of international Muslim solidarity. Gandhi encouraged Hindus to join in, even though they had no stake in the cause.

He was leading Muslims up the garden path. After he surrendered and went meekly to jail, the Muslims discovered that it was the Viceroy, not Gandhi, who put most pressure on the Cabinet on this issue.  

Savarkar had met Gandhi, and had disdain for the man and his politics, which seemed to him anachronistic and effeminate.

Gandhi condemned him. The truth is, the older generation were shocked by Dhingra's assassination of Wylie- who was a friend of his father. Dhingra's family repudiated him.  

The Caliphate movement also triggered Savarkar’s fears about India being invaded again by Muslims.

What alarmed him was a Muslim Congressman saying Muslims would have to support an Afghan invasion on religious grounds.  

This wasn’t simply Islamophobia. Many elite Muslims resisted the slow democratisation unfolding through the colonial period, for fear of losing out to Hindus. They saw themselves as India’s historical rulers whose say in its affairs ‘could not be merely proportionate to their numbers’, as the political scientist Christophe Jaffrelot writes in The Pakistan Paradox (2015), a history of Pakistan. Some Muslim leaders used the rhetoric of pan-Islamism and threats of violence to push their claims with the British. After the Caliphate movement, Savarkar felt that Indian War’s paean to a composite nationalism had been rejected by Indian Muslims because of their ‘divided love’ (the other interest being Muslims outside India); he reacted like a ‘spurned lover’, writes Bakhle in 2010.

His problem was how to re-enter politics. Gandhi & Congress wouldn't touch him with a barge-pole. As non-cooperation ended and was replaced by Hindu-Muslim riots, there was an opening on the Right. The problem was that Savarkar wasn't religious.  

In Hindutva, Savarkar applied the European framework of nationalism – that a nation needed a homogeneous community, a common culture, a long history – to the subcontinent.

He was reviving Hindu Bengali ideas from the 1890s. But he had come late to the party. Lala Hardayal and Aurobindo had moved in a philosophical or spiritual direction. But Savarkar was not a philosopher or inclined to mysticism.  

In western European nations and the United States, Christianity, race and language had offered the basis for a common history and identity (or so their nationalists claimed). But what could work for India? Hinduism, the religion of the majority, seemed unfit since it lacked a unifying mechanism of one book or church.

Just say 'Ram! Ram!' and the thing is done.  

India’s resident Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Jains, Buddhists and others also bitterly resented attempts to hitch an Indian nationality to Hinduism.

They were even more upset that Hindus were the majority. Why can't they just kill themselves already? Would that be too much to ask? 

Hinduism thus posed ‘the main obstacle’ in Savarkar’s quest for a big-tent Indian identity, as Kapila notes.

Yet, Gandhi, saying 'Ram! Ram!' had worked the trick. But then he was genuinely Hindu.  

To resolve this conundrum, unlike religious nationalists, Savarkar strove to secularise Hindus – instead of Hindu scriptures, he chose as the foundation of his ideology the discipline of history, the paradigmatic secular form of the enlightened political thinker.

No. Unlike Chandranath Basu, he wasn't a historian. However, many Marathas find his love of a pure form of their language (which he linked to Shivaji) very inspiring. He truly was a son of the soil influenced by heroic Maharashtrian patriots through the ages. He wrote English well but his heart belonged to his mother tongue. 

By turning to history, Savarkar wanted to show that followers of all religions born in India – Hinduism, Sikhism, Buddhism, Jainism – owed allegiance to a common genealogy: Hindutva, or Hindu-ness. ‘Hindutva is not a word but a history,’ Savarkar wrote in his pamphlet. He also seized the chance to redefine who is a Hindu. Essentially anyone whose ‘fatherland’ and ‘holy land’ resided within the subcontinent qualified as Hindu, he concluded. Not only followers of Hinduism, but Sikhs, Jains and Buddhists counted as Hindus – a novel interpretation.

No. That was the law at the time. Moreover ancient Hindu temples which refuse admittance to Christians or Muslims have always welcomed Jains, Buddhists, Sikhs etc.  

Muslims and Christians, however, were outsiders as their holy lands lay beyond India,

Sadly, Hindus consider Muslims like Shirdee Sai Baba and Christians like Mother Theresa as worthy of worship.  

he emphasised. The influence of social evolutionism was clear. Hindus must remember that ‘great combinations are the order of the day,’ Savarkar wrote. ‘The League of Nations, the alliances of powers Pan-Islamism, Pan-Slavism, Pan-Ethiopism, all little beings are seeking to get themselves incorporated into greater wholes, so as to be better-fitted for the struggle for existence and power.’

But Nehru was better at that type of struggle. His vision of India prevailed. Hindus wanted a strong centre lest they once again fall prey to Muslim or Communist salami tactics.  

He theorised that Hindu identity had been formed chiefly through violence,

In which case, Kshatriyas, not Brahmins like himself, should rule.  

Chaturvedi notes, whether it was in the Islamic period that lasted more than a millennium starting in the 8th century or even earlier. In the long war with the Muslims, ‘our people became intensely conscious of ourselves as Hindus and were welded into a nation to an extent unknown in our history,’ Savarkar wrote in Hindutva.

Sadly, Princes preferred to fight each other before getting stabbed by a son or a nephew.  

He ridiculed nonviolence – to negate Gandhi’s ideas – which, along with Muslim hatred, became his lifelong obsession.

Plenty of Hindus hated Muslims with better reason. But Maharashtra is strongly Hindu majority. You have to tackle socio-economic issues- e.g. job reservations for 'sons of the soil'- to get elected.  

Eloquently written with a clear sense of urgency, Hindutva became The Communist Manifesto of the Hindu Right.

No. It wasn't Hindu enough.  

Soon after its publication, K B Hedgewar, a former Congress member from Savarkar’s homeland, founded the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) in 1925.

He continued to be a Congress member. His pal, Hardikar set up the Congress Seva Dal. The RSS was an imitation of it which was supposedly 'non-political' and thus might not be banned when the Seva Dal was banned.  

He conceived it as a sociocultural organisation that would transform the character of Hindus through indoctrination and paramilitary training, and make them masculine in order to defeat ‘outsiders’.

Like the Seva Dal which Nehru enthusiastically joined.  

Hedgewar thought RSS would stay away from direct politics. It would operate in the shadows to avoid backlash from the British, and build Hindu unity from the ground up to realise a Hindu nation in the future.

The RSS did impressive work in breaking down caste barriers. Their Hindutva is Hinduism without caste.  

Mihir may be too young to remember Advani's rath yatra movement. Thus he foolishly writes

The Rama temple evangelism was manufactured by an insurgent BJP primed to knock over the decrepit ancien régime of the Congress.

The BJP's target was Mulayam Singh Yadav, not Congress which might decide to build the Temple for the greater glory of the Dynasty. 'Hindu consolidation' was a weapon against caste-based parties which opportunistically allied with Muslims.  

It is the same former insurgent – now a dominant but deeply insecure incumbent, haunted by its discreditable past

Its past is highly creditable. Unlike Congress or the Caste-based parties, it is not dynastic or kleptocratic.  

– that orchestrates the Savarkar propaganda.

Savarkar is a hero of the freedom struggle and an important Marathi writer. He is celebrated by the BJP for the same reason they celebrate Netaji Bose.  

Both campaigns share a common feature: the Right’s felt need to locate its legitimacy in history.

The Dynasty had rewritten all the history books to legitimate themselves. The BJP is playing catch up.  

The BJP has carried on Savarkar’s legacy of

losing elections and being side-lined? Fuck off! The BJP knows it can only get re-elected if it does 'last mile delivery' and improves governance.  

turning to history instead of Hindu religious texts for validation. It’s not the Vedas or the Bhagavad Gita, the greatest Hindu scriptures, that ordained the BJP’s rule, but the

voter. Also, Rahul's refusal to step up to the plate made it a case of 'Modi or Nobody'.  

civilisational history of the Hindus that did. Positing an unbroken chain stretching back thousands of years, the BJP-RSS present themselves as the guardians of the great Hindu civilisation, successors to iconic kings like Chandragupta Maurya (reign c322-298 BCE), Prithviraj Chauhan (c1178-92) and Shivaji (1674-80).

Whereas Indira Gandhi was Goddess Durga and Rajiv was Lord Ram.  

The significance of their success in appropriating Indian history cannot be overstated.

Nobody gives a shit about history. It is the future which concerns us.  

The appropriation allows for the exclusionary politics of the BJP-RSS to subsume, even replace, religious belief.

Nonsense! The BJP supports the Hindu religion.  

For example, the inauguration of the Rama temple by Modi this January, one of the biggest events in modern Indian history, incited a national frenzy among Hindus. But the spectacle wasn’t mainly a celebration of Rama bhakti (religious devotion). It was about a politically united Hindu community declaring its pre-eminence in its homeland.

Rubbish! It was a highly auspicious occasion. Modi was one of the yajmans and took the sankalp for the pran prathistha. For Hindus that is very meaningful.  


If the BJP-RSS have worked very hard to make history – admittedly, partly a colonial one – their strength, it is also their weakness.

Nope. Nobody gives a shit about history. The fact is, Indians suspect that the country would have been better off if the Brits had stayed around till the 1970s.  

The RSS is hypersensitive to its shaming non-participation in India’s freedom movement.

It did participate. But by the time it was founded, the door to freedom was wide open. The problem was that everybody wanted to be the first to pass through it so as to lock it behind them. Anyway, guys who meekly go off to prison every few years aren't fighting or struggling. They are merely sulking. 

(This is what Congress party members meant when they called Right-wing leaders ‘anti-national’, which, now, unsurprisingly, is one of the Right’s favourite labels for its critics.) There is no escaping the fact that Indian independence came

because of Hitler & Tojo & the Americans refusing to finance the Empire.  

under Gandhi using Gandhian methods,

or under Jinnah using Jinnahian methods or under Aung San using Aung Sanian methods or under Senanayake using Senanayakian methods.  

and the Hindutva antipathy for Gandhi and his methods is hard to hide, indeed central to their formation and history.

Everybody hates Gandhians. They are useless tossers. Gandhi may have been lovable. His acolytes weren't. Nobody shed a tear for the Gandhi Peace Foundation when Indira returned to power and Buta Singh put the boot into it.  

The Right cannot fundamentally alter public perception of these facts all at once.

Nothing can alter the fact that if Rahul is unelectable then there is no point pretending Gandhi & Nehru weren't shit. Suppose Congress had a good PM candidate. Then we could say this marvellous candidate has all the good qualities of Gandhi & Nehru & the goat which supplied Gandhi with milk.  

Savarkar is the one figure who cannot be claimed by the Congress and who has genuine links with the anti-British struggle.

There were plenty such- e.g. Bagha Jatin, Lala Hardayal, Amba Prasad Sufi, Aurobindo & so on.  

His revolutionary past and later marginalisation yield a counterfactual interpretation that can cover somewhat for the Right’s embarrassing absence. In the Right’s telling, Savarkar was sidelined by Gandhi and Nehru while the Hindu polity foolishly rejected Hindutva – Partition was the calamitous outcome of these two decisions. If Hindus had chosen Savarkar’s (and the RSS’s) macho Hindutva over Gandhi’s ‘Muslim appeasement’, they would have reigned supreme in undivided India, it is implied.

If Rahul is crap, we have no incentive to say his ancestors weren't crap. As for praising Savarkar, if it annoys Rahul, then we have a good reason to do it.  


The icon of Savarkar thus reminds Hindus: without Hindutva, India’s national security is perennially under threat. Only by heeding ‘the man who could have prevented Partition’ can you secure Hindu India, especially when Islamic terrorism is perceived as a threat, and Muslims constitute 14 per cent of India’s population. Muslims oppressed Hindus for centuries and won a nation for themselves by expropriating Hindu territory – why shouldn’t Hindus become masters in whatever was left of their own ancient homeland? Gandhi had dedicated his life to fighting such realpolitik, a struggle carried on by Nehru after independence.

He presided over the biggest slaughter of Muslims in the history of the sub-continent.  


Hindutva now, however, enjoys wide legitimacy among Hindus of all castes. The BJP won about 37 per cent of the votes cast in the last national election of 2019, but that number greatly understates the public’s approval of Hindutva. Rival parties can criticise the BJP, but they dare not oppose Hindutva.

Nonsense! Mamta has done so as has Vijayan and Stalin and so forth. The problem is that Rahul is a moon calf.  

The self-professed secular Congress party, for instance, tends to respond to the BJP’s Savarkar propaganda by questioning his lack of machismo for filing mercy petitions with the British, instead of contesting his Hindu supremacism lest it be seen as anti-Hindu.

It is anti-Hindu as is the author. Nothing wrong with that. If it can provide better governance, Hindus will vote for it.  


As BJP and RSS leaders have brought Savarkar to prominence in Indian politics and thought, a cult of Gandhi’s assassin Godse has flourished among party loyalists. In recent years, statues and even temples dedicated to Godse have cropped up, while Gandhi memorials are defaced.

Because Gandhi made Nehru his heir. This would be fine if Rahul were not a moon-calf.  


As resurrected Hindutva icons, they stand in death as they did in life: Savarkar, the guru, behind the pulpit; Godse, the disciple, on the streets. Savarkar would have thought that India’s Hindus today are finally being cured of what he hated as their perverted virtues of nonviolence, tolerance and respect for adversaries.

They never had any such thing. Nobody did. Also, nobody gives a shit about history. What matters is the future. Vote for the guys who will ensure we have more money. That's it. Nothing more can be said about the subject.  

Adam Szeidl & Ferenc Szucs conspiratorial model of Populism.

My friendly A.I assistant tells me that 

Populism is a political approach that positions "the people" against a corrupt or self-serving "elite," claiming to represent the authentic voice and will of the common person, often in opposition to established institutions.

Andrew Jackson is considered the first populist President. One may deplore his attitude to the First Nations or to African Americans but we have to admit that a more upper class President would have presided over the same thing. One may say that the 'spoils system' encouraged what Pareto called the 'circulation of elites'. Rotating offices may have increased corruption or incompetence but it gave more and more people experience of administrative or judicial procedure.

Can Trump be compared to Jackson? No. Jackson, like Eisenhower or Grant, was a General. Moreover, the franchise had already been expanded and would have been expanded further in any case. The country was growing so rapidly, that the influence of the more aristocratic element was bound to diminish. Trump is sui generis because he never received a Government salary of any sort before getting the top job. He wins because markets think he is good for the economy. If markets turn against him there is a risk that the country will sink into stagflation and his party will lose control of Congress. He may have to resign to avail of a Presidential pardon. The hope is, he will do a U-turn on any policy which spooks the markets while continuing to deliver tax cuts, less regulation, etc. 

A recent AER paper offers

A Model of Populism as a Conspiracy Theory

When was the US worst afflicted by 'conspiracy theories'? The answer is during the McCarthy period. Interestingly, both Nixon and Kennedy got their start under the Senator. But Eisenhower was a good guy who had no truck with that brand of craziness.  

By Adam Szeidl

a Professor at Soros's University in Vienna. Orban chased it out of Hungary. We can be fairly sure the man isn't crazy about Trump or 'populists'. 

and Ferenc Szucs

at Stockholm University. The European Research Council gave him some money to investigate 'alternative reality'. It wasn't money well spent.  

The fact is, institutionalised elites (a nomenklatura) may subscribe to conspiracy theories. They can have an esoteric doctrine for the initiated and an exoteric 'noble lie' to be broadcast to the hoi polloi. The Straussian neo-cons are an example. By contrast, Populists have to promise things which are popular though this may only be because of the prejudices of poorer people whose lives are full of frustrations of various sorts. The difference between Obama and Trump is captured by the former saying 'we can' and the latter saying 'I will'. Nobody is interested in Trump's thinking. Will he deliver? That's all that matters. 

We model populism as the dissemination of a false “alternative reality”, according to which the intellectual elite conspires against the populist for purely ideological reasons.

Elites are likely to want to maintain their own power. It is in their interest to 'conspire' to silence dissenting voices raised even within their own charmed circle, let alone the cries of rage or despair emanating from the 'great unwashed'.

If enough voters are receptive to it, this alternative reality—by discrediting the elite’s truthful message—reduces political accountability.

Where there is an elite, accountability is reduced. This may be a good thing. The experts may indeed know best and their time is wasted if they have to justify every single thing they do. But experts may be wrong. Moreover, they may have vested interest in preventing the truth from becoming known.  

When it comes to messages, we need to differentiate between 'cheap talk' and 'costly signals'. If elites 'put their money where their mouth is'- e.g. emigrate from a country when a bad politician gains power- that is a 'costly signal'. If they merely say what everybody else is saying because it costs them nothing to do so they may be virtue signalling.

Elite criticism, because it is more consistent with the alternative reality, strengthens receptive voters’ support for the populist.

I think they mean 'Criticism of elites is consistent with an alternative reality'- e.g. one where shape-shifting lizards from Planet X have replaced all the top officials.  

Alternative realities are endogenously conspiratorial to resist evidence better.

Organised Religion may have that property. But so does a theory which suggests that criticism of those who currently have power is part and parcel of a paranoid delusion system.  

Populists, to leverage or strengthen beliefs in the alternative reality, enact harmful policies that may disproportionately harm the non-elite.

In which case, they cease to be popular and lose elections. The damage they can do is limited in a Democracy under the rule of Law.  

These results explain previously unexplained facts about populism.

Let us see if this is in fact the case. 

Populist leaders paint a grim picture of the world.

No. They paint a rosy picture of what the world will become when they take power. Religion may paint a grim picture of the world so that people spend more time praying and thinking about the after-life. Politicians need to promise things which the public actually wants. Some may say 'What Americans really want is for 'Turtle Island' to be restored to the First Nations. Those of European of African or Asian descent should deport themselves.' But this is not a view which is popular with American voters. They may want immigrants to be deported because 'they take our jobs', but they don't want to deport themselves.  

The populist ideology is often centered around a false narrative, an alternative reality, in which a conspiracy of the elite shapes major events to the detriment of the people.

Like Orban saying Soros wants to bring in lots of Muslims into Hungary? The problem here is lots of other countries seem to be worried about immigration from places like Afghanistan. Currently Iran and Pakistan are deporting the most Afghan Muslims. No doubt, this is the fault of populist Islamophobia in those two countries.

In this narrative, the elite is not only “corrupt”, as described in leading accounts of populism (Guriev and Papaioannou, 2022); it is conspiratorial and all-powerful.

An anti-populist ideology offers a false narrative according to which an elderly business man is actually Adolph Hitler in disguise.  

For example, a central part of Donald Trump’s political narrative is that the 2020 US election was stolen by a conspiracy of the deep state.

Human beings understand that 'narratives' offered by a candidate are strategic. But so are beliefs. Newcombe problems or Kafka's toxins show why having an irrational belief can be beneficial.

Trump had to make some such claim if he was to retain control of the Republican party.  At the time, this seemed a forlorn hope. The real puzzle is how Trump has managed to make himself the King of his party. The answer, I think, is migration and fears of 'demographic replacement'. Perhaps there has also been a backlash against 'Wokeism'. Vivek Ramaswamy has done very well for himself by publishing a book attacking that ideology.  

The populist narrative matters because it shapes supporters’ beliefs: the majority of Republicans believe that Trump did not lose the 2020 election legitimately.

If he didn't lose, then he should remain the King of his party. But if Trump doesn't lead it, who will? Foreigners may think the Republicans had more attractive candidates, but Americans don't appear to do so. Why? I suppose the answer is that Trump, like Perot, wants to set the clock back to a sort of 'closed economy Keynesianism' featuring 'optimal tariffs' and a robust industrial policy.  The plain fact is markets rose when Trump was re-elected. They fell in April over tariff concerns but have risen again. If they keep rising then it doesn't matter what 'intellectual elites' say. Investors are the only 'experts' who count. 

These sorts of misbeliefs are potentially highly consequential.

As is the 'misbelief' that Trump is part of some vast conspiracy. Why not simply say he is a shape-shifting lizard from Planet X?  

Populism is also associated with a profound decline in political accountability.

We think guys we didn't want to see elected are very horrible. True political accountability would involve their confessing to rape, murder, arson, and saying rude things about fat people. After that, they should hand themselves over to the FBI and go quietly to prison.  

Funke, Schularick and Trebesch (2023)

who consider Boris Johnson a populist. Why not Rishi Sunak? Their policies were the same. Why is Modi a populist but not Imran Khan? The fact is, a politician like Modi or Johnson who rose up within a cadre base political party, is not a populist even if he is very popular. In British politics one might say Baldwin and Thatcher paid attention to PR and left their stamp on the politics of their age. If Farage comes to power, we might say that populism has triumphed in England. Otherwise, it is the rank and file of the Parliamentary party with a majority in the House of Commons which decided who will lead the country.

show that populist leaders, despite substantially reducing GDP per capita, stay in power for twice as long as non-populists.

Popular leaders may do so if there is no attractive alternative. Modi came to power in 2014 because Rahul refused to step up to the plate. He has lost his majority but there is still no other credible Prime Ministerial candidate. Things may have been different if Gehlot had agreed to run for the post.  

Moreover, populists seem to achieve electoral success despite widely-publicized acts that would normally be extremely damaging: for example, Donald Trump, a convicted felon, won the 2024 election.

The prosecution asked for an 'unconditional discharge' which is what he got. It appears that his felony attracted neither fine nor a prison sentence.  

In our theory, the goal of populism is to provide a false alternative reality that discredits the intellectual elite’s message about the politician.

There is no homogenous 'intellectual elite'. Every party has some smart people with high educational credentials. There were plenty of Professors who supported Hitler and Mussolini and Stalin and Mao and so forth.  

Specifically, we assume that populist propaganda can (partially) persuade voters that the elite conspires to criticize the politician’s competence purely because they disagree with his ideology.

People aren't stupid. They get that an egghead who stands to gain if his Party is elected has a strong motive to pretend that the other candidate is a moron with loose morals.  

This alternative reality discredits elite criticism that would normally reveal the politician’s type.

Sadly, only his performance reveals his type. I recall the surge of anti-Reagan propaganda back in the early Eighties. Gore Vidal spread the canard that the senile cowboy would start World War III because he believed in 'the Rapture'- i.e. all the good Christians getting beamed up to Heaven while the Earth was blown apart by nuclear missiles.  

There were good economists who criticized both Reagan and Thatcher's monetary policies- which they quickly abandoned. What was surprising was that the working class did not support the air traffic controllers or the Coal miners. Mass unemployment was believed to be political poison. Yet, the working class tolerated it because they cared more about inflation. 

“Bad” politicians, expecting elite criticism, propagate the alternative reality to remain in power.

Sadly, propaganda isn't enough to stay in power. You have to be better than the alternative candidate. Very often, if a leader remains in power it isn't because he was doing a good job. It's just that the opposition could not unite around someone electable.  

Thus, our theory predicts both the use of conspiratorial propaganda and its association with reduced accountability.

Sadly, voters care about outcomes not accountability. Saying 'I've tanked the economy but my account-books are very well maintained' isn't going to win you the election.  

We formalize these ideas in a model which explicitly incorporates the false
alternative reality. Beyond explaining our motivating facts, this model makes
several new predictions. It predicts that truthful elite criticism can backfire and
strengthen some voters’ support for the politician;

if they think that the other party would have done a worse job- sure. Otherwise, such criticism seems pointless.  

that alternative realities are endogenously conspiratorial to better resist evidence;

sadly having a conspiracy theory doesn't improve your life. What matters is having a better choice menu. There were people who thought Reagan was stupid. But they voted for him because the alternative was worse. What puzzled foreigners was Hilary's defeat. We put it down to Comey's intervention. Why did Obama appoint a Republican in Sept. 2013? One can be a little too high-minded.  

and that populists, despite their “pro-people” rhetoric, may set policies that disproportionately harm the non-elite.

They may do stupid shit. That's why it is important to have a good candidate whom people feel won't do stupid shit. Sadly, Biden didn't fit the bill though he started well. But Trump too may come a cropper by the end of the year.  

These results offer a new understanding of populism.
In our model, presented in Section 2, an incumbent politician is characterized
by a type dimension, e.g., competence, along which he can be good or bad.

Sadly, we only know a politician's 'type' after the event. Reagan turned out to be very good. Thatcher turned out to lack political horse-sense.  Her own party dumped her in an ignominious manner. But they also got rid of Johnson whom voters liked. 

Voters do not directly observe the politician’s type but form beliefs over it, and political
accountability is measured with the accuracy of their beliefs.

That is not the usual meaning of the term. In a Democracy, politicians are accountable to the Cabinet, the Legislature and the Judiciary. Election outcomes determine whether voters think they are better or worse than a rival candidate. This is based on 'Expectations' not 'Accountability'.  Consider the case of Joe Biden. At one time, we thought he had beaten Trump once and could do so again. Then expectations changed. The man might be senile. He had to go. With hindsight, Kamala was a bad choice. Both her parents were immigrants and the country was turning against 'affirmative action' and being welcoming to even highly qualified immigrants. 

The politician and the intellectual elite send messages which affect these beliefs.

Messaging is important. But if you look decrepit on TV, people draw their own conclusions.  

First, the politician chooses whether to send conspiratorial propaganda.

Most avoid it because it makes them look like losers. Trump retains some appeal as a 'deal maker'. But if the Chinese don't give him a favourable deal, the Stock Market may fall. 'Exorbitant privilege' may be lost as 'de-dollarization' proceeds apace. The cost of living starts to rise at just the time when a 'negative wealth effect' kicks in. Stagflation returns to the economy. There's a good reason the sort of 'closed economy Keynesianism' taught to the Wharton Class of '68 had to be abandoned. 

Then the elite (including the news media), having received an informative signal about the politician’s type, sends a message that reports on that signal. We assume that the elite consists of a continuum of small members, who individually cannot influence voters and
thus report about the signal truthfully.

What a bizarre assumption! The elite needs well-paid jobs otherwise it isn't elite at all. It is a bunch of smelly people who buy their clothes at the thrift store. Guess who offers well-paid jobs? It is Media magnates and billionaires who fund Think-Tanks. Each party has its own eco-system to pay highly credentialised eggheads. But money talks. Bullshit walks.  

A share α of voters are receptive to propaganda,

In which case, PACs will find ways to identify and target them. The rest of the population doesn't matter.  

so that propaganda exogenously and counterfactually increases their prior belief in the alternative reality (AR).

Why stop there? If these guys are susceptible to propaganda then they are stupid enough to fall for all types of scams. Information about them would be available- for a price. They soon won't have a pot to piss in. Also, the comelier amongst them would be incessantly sucking off anyone who told them that their jizz was the elixir of immortality.  

The AR is a state of the world with zero objective probability, which differs from the objective reality in precisely one way:

Why just one? If you can brain-wash a percentage of the population, why not also enslave them and get them to donate their kidneys to any pal of yours who needs one? 

An economic theory which posits the irrationality of a portion of the population isn't 'ergodic'. It isn't scientific. It is a 'just so' story of a paranoid type.  

In the AR the continuum of small elite members can coordinate—effectively conspire—and thus can collectively choose their message to influence voters.

In actual reality, people in high positions do coordinate their actions.  That's how political parties and PACs and Think-Tanks work. Everybody knows this. We get that a registered Democrat is going to say 'Trump is shit' while a Republican will focus on how shit the Dems are. 

It follows that if elite members sufficiently dislike the politician, perhaps because they disagree with his ideology, then in the AR they will always report that politician bad. Intuitively, in the AR the “fake news media” criticize Trump’s competence not because he is incompetent, but because he is “anti-woke.”

Sadly, it appears the vast majority of people are 'anti-woke'. They don't think bearded rapists should be sent to women's prisons just because they have decided to change their name from John to Joanna.  

We analyze the model in Section 3. We show that an equilibrium of the fol-
lowing form emerges. (i) In the objective reality only the bad politician sends
propaganda, and the elite always reports truthfully.

This is not the actual reality. It is a conspiracy theory about evil people who are destroying Democracy. Why not simply say they are shape-shifting lizards from another planet?

(ii) In the alternative reality both the good and the bad politician sends propaganda, and the elite always criticizes the politician.

If that politician, or one of his backers, is paying their salary their criticism is likely to be muted or confined to esoteric policy discussions.  

Intuitively, in reality the good politician has no reason to send propaganda as he expects praise from the elite.

But praise from people who have specialized in types of praise which influence voters is more desirable. Forget praise. Just hire people who are great at P.R and Marketing and 'Image Consultancy' and so forth.  

The bad politician, who expects criticism, has an incentive to send propaganda if doing so discredits elite criticism.

Just say they are a bunch of Jewish homosexuals with fancy-shmancy Collidge degrees and be done with it. 

Discrediting only works if the narrative of the alternative reality is
plausible:

Sadly, this isn't true. The point about a scape-goat is that everybody knows the creature is innocent. They just want somebody else, not themselves, to be sacrificed. When things are shitty for almost everybody it is a comfort to know there is some group which is receiving even shittier treatment. I may not be able to pay my utility bill but I am in clover compared to some dude who has just been deported to Uganda.  

if it is incentive compatible for the conspiring elite to criticize even a
good politician.

This is the crux of the matter. People like Soros provided incentives to such critics. But, since Soros wasn't weeding out those who were ineffective, they had no incentive to do a good job. Indeed, their activities were highly counter-productive.  

This holds provided that elite members sufficiently dislike the
politician (sufficiently disagree with his ideology).

The puzzle is why Republicans are getting behind a guy whose economic ideology is so out of date. Perhaps, they fear that if their party doesn't tank the economy, Leftists like Sanders will do so. 

Under this assumption, the equilibrium admits the above form; otherwise it does not feature propaganda.

If you assume a portion of the population is susceptible to propaganda, then there will be propaganda. Moreover, every type of politician will indulge in it lest their rival corners that particular market. Equally, if there is a 'single-issue' voting block, every party will try to cater to it.  

These results immediately predict the equilibrium use of conspiratorial propa-
ganda, and its association with reduced accountability. Thus, our model helps
explain our motivating facts.

This is an exercise in circular reasoning. If you assume some voters can be brain-washed and that good politicians abhor brain-washing, then it follows that a bad politician will have an unfair advantage. The problem is that if some voters can be brainwashed to vote for bad politicians who tank the economy, then, surely, they can also be brainwashed into giving me their kidneys or letting me sleep with their wives. 

The model also yields new theoretical implications. First, it predicts that pro-
paganda inverts the effect of the elite’s message on receptive voters, so that elite
criticism increases their beliefs that the politician is good.

It also predicts that brainwashed people who are currently having red-hot pokers thrust up their bums by evil sadists will get very angry with anybody who points out to them that they are being tortured. What is happening to them is illegal. Yet, because they are brainwashed, they will kill any police-man who tries to intervene and demand yet more red-hot pokers be thrust up their bums. If this isn't happening in your neighbourhood, chances are the model advanced by these two nutters is utterly foolish.  


(Our) result explains a key fact in contemporary US politics: that the four criminal in-
dictments against Trump in 2023 were accompanied by an increase in his support
among Republican voters (Swan et al., 2023).

Because they thought it was 'lawfare'- i.e. the instrumentalization of the Justice system from a partisan motive. But, if the Dems were so scared of Trump it must be because he was the Republican candidate they most feared.  

This reaction by supporters of the presumptive party of law and order is puzzling,

unless you understand that Republicans want a Republican POTUS. Trump had won before. Could he win again? Yes. Biden was decrepit. Kamala was the child of immigrants. Ultimately, it was the perception that the Dems had increased inflation which was fatal. Trump was saying 'there were no wars when I was POTUS. There was strong growth in real wages. Vote for me and I will deliver Peace & Prosperity.' Suppose he had ended the Ukraine war and got the Nobel Peace Prize. The Chinese would have offered him a good trade deal. He could take things easy as his party made gains in Congress. A happy Trump would be a lazy Trump. The world would be a safer place. 

especially when compared to the case of Nixon, who lost Republican support after Watergate.

His economic policies, which represented peak-Keynesianism, failed.  

Our inversion result explains the increased support for Trump by predicting that it was the causal effect of the indictments.

This is correlation not causation save in so far as voters felt this was a partisan type of 'Lawfare'. South Park is currently satirizing Trump for using the same tactics on his opponents.  

This prediction is in line with survey evidence that Republicans claimed to increase support for Trump due to the indictments.

If the Dems want him out of the race, it must be because they are scared of him.  

It is also in line with new evidence we present that scandals of Republican politicians caused an increase in the donations they received from Trump supporters.

They will need to spend more to get re-elected. But they only get the money if a superior candidate can't be found.  

Finally, our model explains the contrast between Trump and Nixon through the logic that only Trump had a sufficiently large ideological cleavage with the elite to make the alternative reality plausible.

Nixon thought that the East Coast elite had it in for him. The authors say ' Although both Nixon and Adams attempted to use conspiracy theories to deflect criticism (Shabecoff, 1974; Mays, 2024), they were unsuccessful.' Nixon could not have stood for election again. He couldn't and didn't try to overturn the 22nd Amendment. He was literally a 'lame duck'. He needed a Presidential pardon. Proving a conspiracy in a court of law is difficult. Adams is standing for Mayor as an independent candidate. If he wins- which seems unlikely- then he has a bright political future. 

Nixon, representing the more educated party (Republicans around 1970), could not credibly argue that the intellectual elite conspired to remove him.

He could and did in the run up to the '68 election. He painted the Vietnam War as an elite conspiracy to enrich what Eisenhower had called the 'Military Industrial complex'. He appealed to ' the great Silent majority of my fellow Americans, I ask for your support. I pledged in my campaign for the presidency to end the war in a way that we could win the peace.' In '72, he and Agnew won by a landslide. Then came the first oil price shock and subsequent stock market crash which thoroughly disillusioned Americans. Maybe, if Spiro Agnew hadn't been forced to resign- with the result that Ford became Veep- the Republicans could have put up a better fight. Still, with hindsight, it was Reagan they should have chosen. 

we investigate the effect of conspiratorial populism on government policy.

Putting labels on things you don't like isn't 'investigation'. It is merely name-calling.  

This is an important topic since populism is associated with large economic and non-economic costs (Guriev and Papaioannou, 2022).

The opportunity cost is what is relevant. What would the other party have done? Very often, it is a case of 'better the devil you know'.  

We find that populists introduce harmful policies for two distinct reasons.

There is only one reason. It is popular and the leader is stupid enough to believe it to be a smart thing to do.  

First, there is a direct effect of reduced accountability: populism enables “bad” politicians to maintain power, who then enact “bad” policies.

Nonsense! Politicians are elected for a term of years. They may face impeachment or legal proceedings. That's as far as 'accountability' goes. The rules are the same for a bad guy or a good guy. Biden faced an impeachment inquiry. Few believe he had done anything wrong.  

Second, our model predicts that populists will choose harmful policies purely to trigger the elite.

They may do so if the elite is unpopular. But a non-populist may do so for the same reason. Macron is of the elite. Yet he closed the ENA to gain popularity.  

The intuition follows from the inversion result: since elite criticism increases the support of receptive voters, the politician chooses harmful policies to invite elite criticism.

If a particular bunch of guys are unpopular, it pays for politicians to attack them. However, they may secretly assure them that the thing is merely cosmetic.  

Harmful policies also emerge in the Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2013) model, where populists signal their independence from the elite using policies that disproportionately harm the elite. The key difference is that our model can also account for harmful policies that do not disproportionately harm the elite.

It also explains why a section of the population can be brainwashed into giving away all their money and donating their kidneys to their brain-washers.  

As a result, our model helps explain the previously unexplained fact that populists, despite their pro-people rhetoric, are not actually siding with the “people”: their policies seem to hurt the non-elite as much as they hurt the elite.

This happens, regardless of the type of regime, when stupid shit is done.  

Indeed, Funke, Schularick and Trebesch (2023) show that populists reduce GDP per capita without meaningfully reducing inequality,

Maduro and one or two other such nutjobs may have done so. Modi hasn't. Nor has Erdogan.  

i.e., that they seem to cause equal economic harm to the elite and the non-elite. Populists also favor specific policies that especially harm the “people.” They tend to be massively corrupt (Zhang, 2024), thereby reducing the quality of government services; they implement tariffs that harm their core supporters (Fajgelbaum et al., 2019); and they oppose environmental policies that would help the non-elite (Friedman, Plumer and Stevens, 2025).

Why stop there? Why not prove, using a mathematical model, that populist leaders are entering our homes at dead of night and draining us off our precious bodily essence through aggravated acts of cunnilingus and fellatio? 

We conclude that the current wave of populism will likely create substantial harm to both the elite and the non-elite.

Populism is very bad. Leaders should be unpopular. Then they won't enter our homes at dead of night to drain us off our precious bodily essence. 

One thing puzzles me. The economics profession has an elite. But no two members of that elite agree on everything. There is inter-elite competition which militates for ideological differentiation (as in monopolistic competition). Moreover, there is 'elite circulation' which reinforces this differentiation. Indeed, you are likely to get 'distinctions without a difference'- i.e. observationally equivalent theories are attached to different dogmas. 

 We assume that the elite’s message sj and propaganda p are subject to vanishing noise.

Why? Noise is useful particularly where the number of predictors is small. Forecasting is improved by adding noise.  

This ensures that beliefs are well-defined off the equilibrium path.

But beliefs aren't well-defined at all! They are vague and inchoate. Sometimes there are Schelling focal solutions for coordination games. But hedging and income effects can arise through hedging on discoordination games. A Faith may be well-defined- i.e. be reducible to a dogma. But there is a mystery at the heart of Faith. Beliefs however may be highly idiosyncratic.  

With probability εe, perfectly correlated across elite members, every elite member’s realized message ˆsj is the opposite of the message sj sent; and with independent probability εp, realized propaganda ˆp is the opposite of the propaganda p sent.

Why? Surely, both will be adjusted if this is the case. I may be in the habit of saying 'no' when I mean 'yes', but I have to discard this habit to have a better life.  

We let εe and εp go to zero and characterize the equilibrium in the limit.

In other words, we have fixed the game so that we get the outcome we want.  

Alternative reality. To model the alternative reality, we assume that there is a state of the world θr ∈ Θr = {R, AR}, where R represents the objective reality and AR the alternative reality.

The extension of R is unknowable. It isn't a well-defined set. This is an example of the intensional fallacy. Nothing mathematical or logical can be proved about a thing which isn't a set.  

We assume that the true prior probability of θr = AR is zero.

The problem is that 'R' is epistemic. Expectations about R can create elements of R. That's one reason the extension is not well-defined. We may give the thing an ad hoc extension for some rough and ready purpose. But there is no point doing so if what you have to say is silly.  

The difference between the two realities is that in R the elite cannot, but in AR the elite can coordinate.

An elite which can't coordinate is not an elite. It is a bunch of rando nutters.  

Thus, if θr = R, then each elite member j chooses her message sj individually to maximize her own utility, but if θr = AR, then the elite collectively chooses an identical message sj = s for all of its members to maximize the sum of their utilities.

One can say one thing and do another. A lot of inter-elite competition has to do with 'distinctions without a difference'. You admit you will do the same thing as your rival but explain your philosophy is good and wholesome. His philosophy is totes slutty. 

The authors are using 'perfect Bayesian equilibrium'. The problem is that politics features not just incomplete information, but also Knightian Uncertainty. Thus the right way to proceed is to uses some some sort of regret-minimizing multiplicative weighting update algorithm. This cashes out as things like 'better the Devil you know' which is the reason shitty politicians get re-elected because, the fear is, their rivals are shittier yet.

One final point. A leader whose party is cohesive and obedient is more appealing then one who presides over a 'circular firing squad'. People think the former will be more effective whereas the latter has to devote all his energy to managing his people and preventing one of them from stabbing him in the back.

One may speak of 'strong man' leaders as likely to be populist because they focus their messaging on the people rather than various factions within their own party.  

The authors conclude thus- 

The same framework may be used to study other ideologies as well. One possible example is nationalism.

e.g. the American Nationalism of George Washington.  

Aiming to deflect criticism or initiate collective action, political leaders may demonize the citizens of the other country, 

they said Mad King George was trying to tax Americans. No taxation without Representation!  

an alternative reality that captures some elements of nationalism. Modeling this alternative reality may lead to

demanding that the US of A should humbly beg King Charles III to rule over their rich land 

predictions about the emergence and persistence of conflict, based on the idea that nationalistic ideology leads to a misinterpretation of other countries’ actions.

Nationalism is very evil. George Washington was a populist. King Charles III should re-conquer America and throw Donald Trump in prison.  

More generally, formalizing other ideologies as strategic alternative realities is a potentially important avenue for future research.

Democracy is very evil because Voters may vote for a Nationalist or a Populist or a Populist Nationalist. We hope King Charles III will ban elections after he reconquers the US.