Pakistan is facing an economic crisis. Its military needs to demonstrate that it is vital to the country. Whatever cuts are made, they must be no question of reducing the military budget. On the contrary, more needs to be spent both on internal security and on meeting the threat from India and Afghanistan. It is in this context that the recent terror attack and the Indian response must be seen. The Pakistan Army is interested in getting more money and power. It is not interested in triggering a South Asian Armageddon such that all the Jihadis go straight to Heaven and all the kaffirs and munafiqs are sent to Hell.
The Bush administration gave Pakistan about 100 million dollars to implement Permissive Action Links on its nukes. The fear was that a crazy Jihadist general might launch nukes so as to trigger the Day of Judgment. What is not known is whether Pakistan has in fact centralized control of its nukes. Even if it has, control would be with the Army not the Civilians. Hopefully, the chain of command will remain strong in the Pakistan Army and thus the risk of a Dr. Strangelove type first strike is reduced. However, Pakistan's nuclear doctrine remains ambiguous. We don't know what the 'threshold' for a first strike actually is. Currently it appears that in a nuclear exchange, much of India would remain unscathed whereas Pakistan, being the smaller country, would be obliterated. Thus a Pakistani first strike would be highly irrational. We just have to hope and pray that the Pakistani army commander doesn't go crazy and launch a strike because some Djinn or Pari told him to.
Is there a game theoretic component to the recent Indo-Pak clashes? I think there is an element of 'discovery'- i.e. both sides are probing each other's weaknesses and assessing the quality of their respective hardware. It appears that India's anti-missile system has done well. This reduces Pak's nuclear threat point.
It may be that Pakistan's Chinese jets have shot down India's French Rafales. If so, China may be taking the lead in fifth and sixth generation fighters. This has implications for Taiwan. Trump appears to have backed down in his Trade war with the Chinese. Perhaps, the two things are related.
Marginal Revolution has the following post by Tyler Cowan.
The game theory of India and Pakistan
Now that the dust has settled at least temporarily, a few readers have asked me for comment on the recent clash. The events are difficult to understand, in part because of rampant misinformation and also because of genuine continuing uncertainty as to what happened. Nonetheless we do know two things:
1. The two sides whacked each other a fair amount, more than usual.
2. Neither sides resorted to nukes.
So in its simplest terms, we now know/suppose that the threshold for nuclear use is higher than we earlier might have estimated.
The suspension of the Indus water treaty may at one time have been considered a threshold. I suppose Chinese action on the Brahmaputra has changed the picture as far as water sharing goes. Still, there are questions as to whether India could do very much in this respect- other than desilting- to harm Pakistan in the near future.
Arguably, climate change has made the Treaty irrelevant. The most recent flooding in Pakistan was rainfall based not riverine.
Since very little was settled, the rational, game-theoretic presumption is that the two countries, in the future, will whack each other some more.
The Indians believe that the Army is seeking to strengthen its hand. It has brought the Bench to heel (previously a Chief Justice had defied the Military Dictator) and gained greater popularity at a time when it faces opposition from Imran Khan's supporters. The fear is that Trump may suddenly remember his old pal Imran and demand his release. The question which now remains is whether the Army can also deal with its problems in Balochistan and with the Taliban. The Chinese want to get a return on their investments in Gwadar etc. and Pakistan must show Beijing that its Army is prevailing over secessionist and ultra-Islamist elements.
Yet there is a second-order effect. The more they whack each other with non-nuclear means, the more the weaker party (usually Pakistan, in this context) will feel tempted to lower the nuclear threshold, if only stochastically (this can be done, among other ways, by exercising imperfect control over factions in the armed forces).
I think something like this is already happening. Some army units ignored the cease-fire. Was this on orders or was it done independently?
One way to put this point involves the Lucas critique
in other words, the future won't necessarily be like the past. The problem with the nuclear option for Pakistan is that it means annihilation. What if Heaven hasn't enough Virgins to go around just when 100 million Pakistani men turn up?
— one instance of whacking never really establishes what the future nuclear threshold will be.
Nobody has ever known what Pakistan's threshold was or is or will be. At one time, it was suggested that the Taliban was under Pakistan's nuclear umbrella.
So there is more future whacking, and continuing and perhaps even growing uncertainty about where the nuclear threshold lies.
The big question is the effectiveness of the Indian anti-missile defence system. No doubt, there are ways to get around it, but nuclear doctrine has to take into account how many nukes get through and what percentage of the enemy's territory they can target. I suppose the Indians will learn lessons from this war. They should have tried to keep up with China. Perhaps- if it is true that Chinese made jets shot down Rafales- India will have to change its defence procurement strategy. Can this tie-up with 'make in India'? It must do. War is a numbers game. Moreover, as the world becomes less predictable, countries will have to rely more on indigenous production.
The other big question is about drones. Clearly, they have been changing outcomes in battlefields across the world. Pakistan can probably rely on both Turkey and China to become a first rate indigenous producer. Can India keep up? Perhaps, with Israeli help, it can.
An institutionally more detailed take is possible, but perhaps this “crude” game-theoretic analysis captures some of the essentials. If you want to enrich the analysis, I would consider the variable “what we learned about the reaction functions of America and China,”
China has always said that nuclear weapons are overrated. True, they are currently nuking up but then they are also massively expanding their navy and air-force.
although the full stories here are not yet out. The same is true for “what we learned about the possibly non-unitary nature of Pakistani governance.”
It is said that both the 1965 and the 1971 wars were engineered by Bhutto and cronies of his in the military administration. Moreover, the Army has often pursued its own path regardless of what the Civilian administration wants- e.g. the Kargil war. Indeed, it is believed that terrorist attacks are orchestrated by the Army to prevent a Civilian PM in Islamabad getting chummy with his opposite number in New Delhi.
One question remains. What if Rahul, not Modi was PM? Would India have repeated its 2019 tactics or would it have reverted to Manmohan's policy after the Mumbai attacks? Currently, Rahul has expressed full support for 'Operation Sindoor'. One factor is that Muslim leaders, like Owaisi, have strongly denounced Pakistan and demanded stern action against the terrorist bases on that country's soil. The other factor is that the US is no longer involved in Afghanistan and thus has little reason to protect the country which was, in fact, harbouring Osama Bin Laden.
The game theory of 'discovery' has to do with regret minimization (including FOMO- fear of missing out) rather than expected utility maximization. The aim is to get a clearer idea of the pay-off matrix rather than establish a 'reaction function'. However, 'discovery' can be misleading. Currently, Pakistan is in poor shape- politically and economically speaking. India, thanks to Modi, is in good shape. But that may change.
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