Is India a State Nation or a Nation State?

 Rahul Gandhi has said that India is not a Nation even though the name of his party is 'Indian National Congress'. As with any other utterly stupid comment by that cretin (whose MPhil is from Cambridge) we find that some academic or other has already said something more stupid yet. 

A case in point is a book titled 

CRAFTING STATE-NATIONS. INDIA AND OTHER MULTINATIONAL DEMOCRACIES
, by Alfred Stepan, Juan J. Linz and Yogendra Yadav

which came out a decade ago. Back then it wasn't clear that the handsome Yogendra Yadav had shit for brains.  

Luis Moreno, a Spanish political scientist, ably summarizes its theoretical content in the italicized text given below. 

This book addresses core issues concerning nations, states, nation-states and state-nations.

 But those 'core issues' don't matter at all. Either a state can suppress any invader or indigenous insurrection or it ceases to exist. However, in the case of very serious socio-economic collapse it may itself appeal to some other power to take it over. 

The authors identify the latter as the main functional alternatives to ‘nations-states’, although both must share the necessary condition of being ‘states’ if they are to work.

This is foolish. A 'state nation' may take time to evolve a sense of nationality- e.g. Jordan- but it will do so sooner or later. Look at Hong Kong or Taiwan.  

Stepan, Linz and Yadav are themselves aware of the awkwardness of the term ‘state-nation’, which is meant to distinguish democratic states that do not --and cannot-- fit appropriately into the classic French- style Jacobin model of forged homogeneity.

But then neither can France. It includes Britanny. As late as the Second World War there was a Breton National Party ready to work with the Nazis to break away from France.  

India is a case in point

No it isn't. We have never had schools with signs saying the Hindi equivalent of 'Both speaking Breton and spitting on the floor are forbidden.'  India was already a Nation before Caesar observed that Gaul was split into 3 parts. 

which serves the purpose of illustrating a proposal of a set of seven policy domains that the authors regard as highly supportive for the crafting of state-nations.

Crafting by whom? Do these cretins really think that just as one can hire an architect so to can we hire a 'state-nation crafter' who will turn up and create a nice state-nation for you?  

Such policies are synthetically proposed in direct and parsimonious phrases composing a ‘nest policy grammar’ aimed at facilitating the emergence and persistence of state nations:

Is Zelenskyy calling up these cretins and asking for lessons in 'nest policy grammar'. The guy is a comedian by profession but these jokers have him beat.  

(1) An asymmetrical federal state is seen as better suited to state-nations than a symmetrical or unitary state. All state-nations ranked as being more trusted than nation-states are federal systems (India, Switzerland, Canada, Spain, and Belgium are included in this group).

This is mad! India is not federal in the slightest. It is wholly unitary. The Center can carve up States or down grade them to Union Territories without regard to the opinions of the local people. Canada, Belgium and Spain have seen some violent separatism on linguistic issues. India hasn't. True, the Tamils like to pretend that Delhi wants to impose Hindi on us but they genuinely don't. Maybe this is because we have the reputation for being very garrulous and boring. If we learn Hindi they will have to pretend not to speak that language.  

Other ranked federations, or federal-like countries, closest to fitting the nation-state model are Brazil, Austria, United States, Germany, Australia, and Argentina

But that model is shit. True Yogendra Yadav may whack off to bikini shots of that model but Yogendra is a very strange man.  

.(2) Individual rights and collective recognition should be accomplished together.

While whacking off to some model- sure.  

If the former are not constitutionally protected, the polity would not qualify as a democracy.

Yes it would. A democracy is a place where voters decide who gets to rule. They may choose to fuck over minorities. They may prefer lynch law. But they would still be democracies whereas a King who enforces a constitution with all sorts of fundamental rights would still be said to preside over a monarchy not a democracy.  

True, ten years ago some stupid Professors thought that their job was to give marks to different countries. If they said 'Democracy is declining in Ruritania' then the Ruritanians would start crying or shitting themselves uncontrollably. This would harm the economy and so Ruritanian businessmen would hire some 'state nation crafters' to ensure that the country got higher marks next time round. 

Likewise, territorially concentrated cultural groups or stateless nations need collective recognition of entitlements beyond the classical liberal rights, so that they can exercise precisely these liberal rights.

Nobody needs 'collective recognition' of shit. We may 'collectively recognize that Ukrainians should not be raped and murdered but that doesn't change the fact that it is happening. Is Zelenskyy saying 'please could you collectively recognize our entitlement to not being killed in a manner 'beyond classical liberal rights'? 

Of course he is. He isn't saying give us a fucking no-fly zone you cowardly bastards! 

(3) A parliamentary system is preferred instead of a presidential or semi-presidential one.

But India's experience shows there is no fucking difference here whatsoever. Only if both the President and the Premier are elected could there be any difference between the parliamentary and the presidential system. The US is sui generis. It would be silly to apply any 'model' to it. 

Based on the assumption that it more easily creates the possibility of a ’shareable good‘, a parliamentary system offers the possibility of various parties, composed of diverse nationalities, to form ruling coalitions.

But if there are 'nationalities' then there will still be separatism irrespective of what 'ruling coalitions' do. Still, extensive autonomy may be enough to buy off the separatists more particular if there is an external threat or internecine conflict is endemic. 

(4) There should be both polity-wide and ‘centric-regional’ parties and careers.

But if they are shit the country will still go down the fucking tubes.  

A coalitional pattern is most feasible if both polity-wide and regional parties are nested in a federal and parliamentary system.

No, because there will be separatism. Have these nutters never heard of a little thing called the American Civil War? 

Who would have thought that a day would come when sensible people would speak of 'Texit'?  To be fair this book was written before Brexit or Trump's triumph.

Regarding political careers, if citizens can pursue public and private polity-wide careers, the incentives to ‘exit’ from polity-wide networks will most likely be weaker.

Spain shows the opposite is the case. To be fair, it was published a year before the 2012 election which, for the first time, was won by a pro-independence party. 

(5) Populations ought to be politically integrated but not culturally assimilated. Internal ethno-cultural groups may resent, resist and eventually reject attempts to be fully assimilated to the dominant culture of the polity.

Do what the Indians do. Say everything is quintessentially Indian- including guys like me jabbering away in Tamil and other guys jabbering away in Bengalis. Gujjus, being smart, can jabber away so well in Hindi that they can get elected from the cow-belt. 

However, the absence of cultural assimilation does preclude the possibility of political integration, as ‘centric-regional’ parties may be ‘coalitionable’ with polity-wide parties.

But coalitions either breed stagnation and a growing economic malaise or else they prove unstable. A better way forward is a laissez faire policy to culture and language while ensuring that local majorities monopolize jobs and government contracts. Also having an external enemy helps.

(6) Cultural nationalists should prevail upon secessionist nationalists. When the former wins democratic political control of a component unit in an asymmetrical and parliamentary system, they may be challenged by the latter, who may use, or threaten to use, violence in order to secede or gain independence.

Some thing like this happened in Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra. The solution was to run the fuck away and let the locally dominant class do what it liked.  

In such a situation cultural nationalists may react putting their political and security resources against secessionist nationalists.

But 'cultural nationalists' turn out to be boring shitheads. Give the secessionists money and power and ensure that they have a crazier competitor close at hand. Suddenly they want to look like the grown ups in the room. 

(7) Multiple identities may be also complementary to both polity-wide and regional-national realms of political integration in multinational state-nations. Indeed, the pattern of complementary and multiple identities can also be an outcome earned through a deliberate crafting of the six referred-to policies in order to accommodate unity and diversity.

Spontaneous order is the better solution. Let things evolve on their own. If a particular group feels miffed make sure their elites get a lot of top jobs in the Civil Service and Army and so forth.  

In chapter 2 the authors argue that India’s diversity could not have been moulded into a nation-state peacefully and democratically.

Rulers of India found that it was convenient to erect a canopy over the political and administrative system which previously existed.  But the traditional aristocracy and scribal castes were mobile and had reached a modus vivendi. Thus India as a nation imposed its own stamp upon even a wholly alien rule. What became obvious during the Thirties and Forties was that Religion determined Nationality. Burma broke away because it was Buddhist. A Princely State which was ethnically closer to the Burmese opted for India because it was majority Hindu. Then the Muslim League advocated a two nation theory and created Pakistan for Muslim majority areas. Gandhi, in 1939 accepted that Congress was a high caste Hindu party. The story of independent India is the displacement of educationally forward castes by increasingly affluent and educated 'backward castes' and 'untouchables'. Everyone can see that is a good thing. 

In chapter 3, a hypothesis about the relative success of state-union policies in India is put forward by exploring four cases that could be considered ‘inconvenient facts’ for the normative proposals the authors deal with in the book: the insurgencies for independence in the Punjab, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Kashmir.

Which only exist because Hinduism is not the majority religion in any of those places.  

In chapters 4 and 5, Stepan, Linz and Yadav create a ‘matched pair’ between two different approaches to minority populations, those in post-Independence India and in Sri Lanka. They compare how India and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) treated their respective Tamil populations.

This is crazy shit. Indian Tamils belong to the majority religion. Sri Lankan Tamils don't. That's the whole story.  The fact is, 'Moors' (Muslims) are the largest minority on that island. But, I think, they won't back the crazy suicide bombers who bombed Christian churches a few years ago.

The authors argue that a major constitutive ingredient of peaceful integration in India has been the creative utilization of ‘nested’ policies, while aggressive nation-state policies in SriLanka were a constitutive part of the cruel Tamil-Sinhalese civil war.

A foolish argument. The facts are plain. Solomon Bandarnaike decided he was actually a Buddhist and got in bed with 'Buddy racketeer' who then had him killed. The supposedly Buddhist assassin demanded and was given Catholic last rites before his execution. 

In chapter 6, the questions explored regard how to utilize state-nation policies within a unitary state, and whether a ‘mixture’ of state-nation and nation-state policies can enhance inclusionary democracy and ethnic peace.

These are stupid questions. If the state-nation is rising rapidly or if there is an external threat then its own indigenous sense of nationalism will emerge as it has done in Jordan, Singapore, Taiwan- or even Hong Kong.  'Inclusionary democracy' does not matter. Jordanians united under the Hashemites to cut the Palestinians and their crazy leaders down to size. After Saddam's invasion, Kuwaitis developed a strong sense of nationalism. For obvious reasons, Hong Kong may not be able to retain its distinctness. But then again, in a quiet way, they may prevail. 

Chapter 7 analyses the federacy formulas that allow unitary nation-states to respond to the demands of potentially secessionist, territorially concentrated minorities by creating constitutionally embedded federal guarantees, as in the cases of Finland (Åland Islands) and Denmark (Greenland and Faroe Islands).

Which is totally irrelevant to places which aint fuckin' islands.  

In chapter 8,and after discussing the influential model of the United States world-wide, the authors conclude that if that model were to be attempted in robust multinational settings, it would produce close to the worst possible set of constraints for democratization.

Or not, if the resulting country can kick ass and make its people the richest and most envied in the world.  

Further applications and tests of the ‘nest policy grammar’ framework represent interesting exercises to be carried out in those countries which are not federal but share the historical trajectories and societal features of ‘union-states’ rather than nation-states. This is the case of the United Kingdom,

which has been highly unitary and which has kicked ass and gotten rich for the longest time 

which together with Spain

which turned into a shithole despite having really smart people. The same could be said for Portugal which did worse than Spain because it didn't get shot of its Empire. 

form a category of ‘old’ modern states, product of the union of pre-existing polities.

Spain was the product of religion. Them guys first kicked Muslim ass and then went on to conquer that half of half the world which the Pope hadn't given to the Portuguese.  

The book is very generous in dealing with a great numbers of theoretical terms in the search of clarification and conceptual boundary-building.

But it is still stupid shit. Why? It won't mention the elephant in the room- which for Hindus is the God Ganesh who both creates and removes obstacles. Indian nationalism is based on overcoming self-created obstacles to recognizing that the thing has always existed. 

I get that Yadav mightn't want to say 'India exists because 80 percent of the population are Hindu and another 18 percent are more Hindu than whatever it is they'd like to be. Take me. I'd like to come across like I'm the fucking Duke of Devonshire. But then I get mixed up and start chanting Hanuman chalisa like I'm actually Arvind Kejriwal. But Kejriwal kicked Yadav in the goolies and rose and rose politically. Maybe the fact that I iz just an ignirint Hindoooo slumdog is actually my saving grace.  

It is a useful contribution for anyone interested in the general theme of territorial politics and, in particular, to all those concerned with democratic accommodation in plural states

Yadav tried to get into 'territorial politics'. He failed and was laughed at. This was because though handsome and eloquent, his brains had turned to shit while studying and teaching 'Political Science'. Prashant Kishore studied engineering. Thus his brains didn't turn to shit. He is now the king-maker of Indian politics. Anyone interested in actual politics listens very carefully when Kishore speaks. When Yogendra speaks, we laugh at him. Sad.  

It occurs to me that I have been a little unfair by quoting an article by a Spanish professor. Can an Indian do better? The following is from the Bangalore Mirror and was published in 2015. It is by Chandan Gowda, Prof. of Sociology at Aziz Premji University.  

A recent book, Crafting State-Nations: India and Other Multinational Democracies (The Johns Hopkins University Press; CSN from now on), by the political scientists, Alfred Stepan, Juan Linz and Yogendra Yadav, argues that India has been a state-nation, not a nation-state. Their argument has major implications for our thinking on how countries have managed, and can manage, their cultural and political differences.

We will soon see that the only 'major implication' was that Yadav was a cretin. His political career would fail. 

But what is the nation-state model?

It is the subject matter of the Old Testament or the Mahabharata or the Confucian canon. These texts show how tribes are wielded together into Nations and how those Nations can become powerful Sates.  

Born in Western Europe in the 17th century,

Rubbish! This cretin is buying into an availability cascade re. the Treaty of Westphalia which did not actually feature any nation states whatsoever though such entities existed.  

this model suggests that it is natural for a group of people who share a common territory and culture (language, religion) to have their own state. This influential fairy tale has often meant a violent persecution of those not sharing the national culture of the majority community within a state. (The Jews and the gypsies in Europe are examples).

But that was for religious and racial reasons. It happened under Imperial despotisms- e.g. Tzarist Russia- as well under anarchic conditions or 'limited monarchies' etc.  

Or, they were forced to assimilate into the national culture. Everyone knows that most of France did not speak the French language at the time of the French Revolution in 1789. The state forced them to learn French afterwards.

But the majority spoke dialects with a common origin. So this was merely a business of standardization. However Bretons and Basques did speak separate languages.  

During colonial rule, the British accused India of not being a nation due to its cultural diversity.

No. They accused Indians of being stupid, lazy and incapable of defending themselves. Gandhi went one step further. He said they also couldn't feed themselves. 

White people didn't think darkies had any fucking culture. They were a little better than monkeys but not as sensible and loyal as dogs. 

In response, a few groups argued that the majority had Hindu religion in common and that India was indeed a nation like England and France. Mercifully, leaders like Gandhi and Tagore did not share this dangerous view.

Tagore pointed out that his own people would lose their property and their lives in the Muslim majority East. His grandfather had helped Raja Ram Mohan Roy to lobby Westminster to lift restrictions on European immigration and unjust enrichment in India. Why? Roy and Tagore explicitly said that the Brits were needed to prevent the Muslims taking back power. 

Gandhi explicitly said in 1939 that if the Brits left the Indian National Congress, a wholly High Caste Hindu affair (these are his actual words), would come under the dominion of the aggressive Muslims and also Punjabis (even Hindu Punjabis). 

The reason Gandhi and Tagore did not say 'Indian nationalism is Hindu nationalism' is because they were afraid of Muslims. Tagore, was right about East Bengal and so he was being sensible. Gandhi was wrong about Gujarat. Its Hindus could deal with their Muslim minority.  

Not only did they view India as a civilization with many faiths and languages,

and tremendous cowardliness and lack of martial ability amongst high caste Hindus 

they saw the one-nation, one-culture idea as narrow and non-desirable.

But British rule was fine. The trouble was that the Brits were leaving because they got tired of the cowardly Hindu politicians blaming them for everything while sitting comfortably in jail and rubbing their hands with glee the closer the Japanese got to the Indian border. 

India has a choice. It can be one nation. Or it can be ruled by foreigners who will impose their culture.  

As a result, India’s identity did not seek after cultural homogeneity and stayed compatible with cultural diversity.

But worshipping nutters like Gandhi was made compulsory.  

Stepan, Linz and Yadav argue that the ideals of inclusive India did not remain mere ideas but found expression in the design of its political institutions.

Very true. That is why cow protection is a Directive Principle in the Constitution. The Christians consider cow to be divine. They are revolted at the very mention of beef steak. Similarly, the Nationality law provides citizenship only to Muslims fleeing Pakistan. Non-Muslims were never granted citizenship.  

The Indian National Congress in the pre-independence era and the Indian Constitution sought a strong unitary state which made robust space for linguistic and religious diversity.

Not Gandhi. That nutter alienated the Madrasis with his Hindi campaign. 

CSN recognizes seven policy features of the State-Nation model.
First, the special needs of states like Kashmir, Nagaland, and Mizoram are respected through special legislations (“asymmetrical federalism”).

This was written in 2015. The very next year the Bench declared that Kashmir did not have even a 'shred of autonomy'. That's why Amit Shah could down grade it to a Union Territory and separate Ladakh out of it. As for Nagaland & Mizoram- who in their right mind would want to fuck with the natives? Lovely people but stay on their right side if you know what is good for you. 

Second, the rights of religious and linguistic groups and socially disadvantaged communities are protected along with individual rights.

Very true. Kashmiri Pandits could testify to this.  

Third, a parliamentary system better ensures the first two features than a presidential one.

No. A President or other Head of State may act independently to right wrongs. This is the theory behind 'President's Rule' in India. The truth is a Prime Minister with a big enough majority in both Houses as well as enough support from the States can strip an entire class of people of citizenship or, if they lack it in the first place, they can be detained or deported.  

Fourth, a mixture of regional and national parties, which can come together in coalitions, is seen. And, country-wide opportunities in the civil services, law, and business exist.

This may or may not be the case.  

Fifth, the political integration of the country through law and electoral opportunities exist without pressures of cultural assimilation.

But such integration may not be achieved. 

Sixth, due to the federal and parliamentary system, cultural nationalism in regional states do not lead to secessionism.

The thing existed in Canada and exists in Belgium. Clearly this simply isn't true.  

Last, “multiple and complementary identities,” where individuals identify with both their communities and the larger polity, are seen.

But this is also seen between the peoples of unrelated countries.  

The nation-state model presumed that only a culturally unified people could be loyal to the state.

No it didn't. France permitted migration. Napoleon was Corsican.  

Using survey data on the high levels of trust in the government seen among different religious communities in India, CSN argues against this presumption.

There was no such presumption. These guys just pulled it out of their collective arse. 

CSN does not offer deep historical analyses. The relatively lower violence in independent India is surely owed to older historical factors alongside a federal polity.

Also India does a lot of extra-judicial killing when separatists wag their tails.  

In recovering the state-nation model from the design of India’s political institutions, CSN does not suggest an Indian exceptionalism.

But it is exceptional. It is very populous and very very poor yet it is likely to remain a multi-party Democracy.  

Through a discussion of countries from across the world, it powerfully shows that the universality of the nation-state model is neither true nor desirable.

Neither Political Scientists nor Sociologists produce anything true or desirable. 

Indeed, the latter concern towards designing a polity that is maximally respectful of political and cultural differences animates this exciting book throughout.

Nobody is interested in living in a polity which is 'maximally respectful' of Nazi pedophiles  

It is necessary to recognize that the various states within India have imagined themselves as mini nation-states.

Very true. A Yadav from Bihar thinks of a Yadav from UP in the same way that a Britisher thinks of a Frenchman.  

Inter-state migration will therefore put India’s federal imagination under severe trial.

This does not seem to be happening. It is enough that there is a 'bhumiputra' strategy so locals get better paid jobs in the organized sector.  

The demographic composition of not just the large metros but of even the second-tier cities is changing rapidly. While our Constitution allows citizens to move anywhere in the country, it does not specify the ethics of migration within the Indian federation.

Gowda must be from Karnataka where, it now appears, there is increasing anti-Muslim Hindu consolidation so as to reverse the polarizing effect of the split between Lingayats and Veera Shavias. 

The presumption that the three-language formula, where children learn English, the official language of the state and a third language, would manage the linguistic challenges posed by inter-state migration has been undone recently by the Supreme Court ruling that parents can choose the languages of study for their children.

This is definitely a concern for Kannada speakers in Bangalore. However, Karnataka has great Saints and Theologians and so Hindus from other parts of India will slowly but surely learn the language so as to gain the spiritual benefit from living in such a spiritually advanced and theologically rich area. 

CSN does point out that the federal management of difference is “a continual effort,” and not a finished process. Can the present state-model successfully manage the new realities of migration, religious fundamentalism, and linguistic survival? The answer will have to wait.

Seven years later, the answer is becoming clear. Hinduism can manage its own problems of caste and region because there is no bar on adopting a local deity as 'ishtadeva' and of taking instruction from the local spiritual preceptors because they have comprehensive knowledge and will not lead you astray. Ecumenical Hindutva is prevailing because both rural and urban people want the same things for their kids- viz. STEM subject education and employment in high value adding Knowledge based industries. Much needs to be done in the way of economic reform but this has to be done at the State not the Central level- as the Farmer's agitation has shown. Neither 'Political Scientists' not 'Sociologists' can make any useful contribution in this matter. Why? They are forbidden from telling the truth- which is that Hinduism is the glue holding the Indian nation together. As Hinduism reforms itself, everybody- more especially minorities- becomes more affluent and more secure. Demonizing Hindutva, on the other hand, endangers minorities because their lunatic fringe gets empowered. Of course, the same point may be made about rich countries. Minorities must understand that the 'melting pot' must be revived. The 'salad bowl' approach, especially with the added sauce of 'Grievance Studies' will create a permanent underclass who will move back and forth between crime and terrorism. This will create a backlash- indeed, it already has. 

India was always a Nation but it was one under foreign Emperors till 1947. After the Muslims went their own way, there was no reason to pretend that India wasn't Hindu except that for the Communist reason that all religion is an evil opiate. But Communism, at least in China, has changed greatly. It is Chairman Deng's market-based Communism which Vijayan in Kerala wants to usher in. If he succeeds, then and only then might we speak of a 'Secular' alternative to Hindutva based Nationalism.  Otherwise we will end up babbling nonsense like the cretin Rahul Gandhi.