Joseph Mazor & why liberal egalitarianism is an oxymoron

Liberal egalitarianism is an oxymoron. To see why 

Joseph Mazor writes 

 when it comes to protecting the occupational freedom of the economically talented, liberal egalitarians face a dilemma: On the one hand, forcing the economically talented to abandon low-paying occupations for high-paying ones can, at least in theory, generate significant additional tax revenue – tax revenue that can improve the condition of the disadvantaged. On the other hand, doing so seems to violate occupational freedom, an important liberty.

This is quite mad. Talented people don't want to take low-paying occupations coz 

a) they get less money

b) people think they are losers and their special talent is to be a loser

There may be people who don't like money and who like being considered losers. The problem with giving them any type of high value adding job is that they will be more trouble than they are worth. The notion of an 'efficiency wage' hinges on paying guys more than they can get on the open market so they don't quit and tell you to go eat a bag of dicks if you try to tell them how to do their job 

Faced with this dilemma, liberal egalitarians have generally chosen to protect freedom of occupation, rejecting occupationally coercive taxes, despite their egalitarian benefits.

There are no egalitarian benefits. Even if there were what we are speaking of is forcing good looking people into prostitution. How dare young people not auction their virginity on Ebay? Why stop at liberal egalitarianism? Why not talk about liberal fraternity which involves a buddy system such that socially excluded cannibals get to be big brothers to the chubby little kid of their choice.  

They have given a wide variety of justifications for this position – more than can possibly be explored in a single article. My goal here is to examine the viability of three of the most prominent liberal egalitarian justifications for rejecting occupationally coercive taxation:

1. The argument that a commitment to economic equality, understood in terms of envy-freeness, rules out occupationally coercive taxation (Dworkin 2000, pp. 90-91)

Envy-freeness also rules out their being non-coercive resource allocation. Why? The 'core' of the game has a concurrency problem. Holding out is the best strategy till envy-freeness is scrapped. True, a repeated game could be 'envy free'. But it wouldn't be a comprehensive game- i.e. represent a general equilibrium- unless there are no hedging or income effects. But, in that case, 'egalitarianism' has no purchase.  

2. The argument that occupationally coercive taxation violates the priority of the Rawlsian basic liberties (Rawls 2001p., 158).

Rawlsian basic liberties rule everything out. Nobody in their right mind would vote for nutters fucking up the economy for philosophical reasons. They may vote for collective insurance. But, they may not. Knightian Uncertainty is a bitch. We don't know all future possible states of the world. Compulsory insurance may be a good thing. It may be a disaster. We don't know. The regret minimizing course is to have a lot of variety in this type of provision. Society should not choose one path.

3. The argument that implementing occupationally coercive taxation would require information-gathering by the state that is impractical, counterproductive, or entails unacceptable violations of privacy (Cohen 2008, pp. 218-219)

Or it could outsource this to tax-farmers- aka slave traders.  

I shall argue that none of these prominent strategies succeeds.

In criticizing these three strategies, I do not wish to suggest that liberal
egalitarians should abandon their commitment to the occupational freedom of the economically talented or that liberal egalitarianism is fundamentally incapable of safeguarding this important liberty. Instead, my aim is to motivate liberal egalitarians to devote greater scholarly attention to alternative justifications for rejecting occupationally
coercive taxation. Such alternatives include Kristi Olson’s (2010) appeal to an egalitarian notion of occupational options to which citizens have strong moral claims,

Cool! So conscription is off the table. But a strong moral claim to an occupational option would also militate against State regulation of that occupation. We may not be too fussed if I insist on my moral right to be a Rabbi, but what if I want to perform surgery? Clearly moral claims to occupations must be defeasible. But where to draw the line? The answer is- we don't know. It depends on how things turn out. 

Warren Quinn’s (1989) and Michael Otsuka’s (2008) appeal to the integrity of the individual, and Paula Casal’s (2009) appeal to the importance of the fair value of occupational liberty.

We are individuals. But we don't, mustn't know what our integrity involves and how others can help or harm it. We evolved on an uncertain fitness landscape. Getting the fuck away from places with a bad vibe is part of our DNA. So is not having a type of integrity which would make us predictable or manipulable by a predator or a parasite or stupid cunts who talk fancy.  

At the end of this article, I shall make a preliminary case for one of these
neglected alternatives: an idea put forward (but not developed) by G.A. Cohen (2008, p. 220) that certain types of occupational coercion impermissibly use the economically talented as a means.

Which is better than using them impermissibly as ends in themselves. I don't mind if a drunk uses me as a means to get home. I do mind if he tries to save my soul or tell me about some cunt named Kant. It may be that our identities are merely momentary coalitions of genes and memes whose ends are indifferent and inscrutable to us. To ascribe ends to us may be a type of immorality though enjoined by some particular moral code. But that has always been the problem with such codes. All we can hope for is to arrive at the mystery of economia in our own dealings. But akreibia as death will catch up with us soon enough.