Pedants who lived centuries ago didn't have access to Wikipedia. We are more fortunate. There is no reason why we should not draw on advances in Mathematics, Logic, the Natural and Social Sciences as well as the Science of Law, to see how and why those pedants went wrong. In doing so, we stand on surer ground in deriding and reviling those pedants and public intellectuals who, relying on obsolete arguments and imbecilic availability cascades, continue to make a nuisance of themselves.
As a case in point, consider Kant's claim that the only innate right is freedom- 'Freedom (independence from the constraint of another’s will), insofar as it is compatible with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law, is the one sole and original right that belongs to every human being by virtue of his humanity.' Sadly, Kant meant that this 'right' only existed if his categorical imperative was true. It wasn't. It was stupid shit. What more could you expect from Kant who- as he said- was a member of a 'lower faculty' (Philosophy) looked down on by those in higher faculties (Medicine, Law, Divinity).
Since Socioproctology is so high a faculty that, as yet, no University has attained an altitude where even its highest faculty could afford it hospitality, it follows that my categorical imperative is greatly superior to that of Kant. Briefly, it states that everybody should do what is best for me. This is because I am super special. If everybody believed me- or if this wasn't an obviously stupid claim- I'd be better off or at least not considered a moron.
Kant's categorical imperative runs thus-
“Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.”
Thus if you are raping and decapitating a person, be sure that you enjoy raping and killing that particular person rather than regard killing and raping simply as a means to pass the time.
Kant believed that
“[I]t is manifest that a violator of the rights of man intends to use the person of others merely as means without taking into consideration that, as rational beings, they ought always at the same time to be rated as ends….”
This is not manifest at all. People violate rights accidentally, negligently, or with the best of intentions. Moreover, it is a violation of rights to rape and kill a person even if the end you aim at is that the person gains a senior position on the staff of his Satanic Majesty and thus would be very grateful to you.
Kant writes-
Any opposition that counteracts the hindrance of an effect promotes that effect and is consistent with it.
Sadly that same opposition may counteract both the hindrance and the effect itself. Only time will reveal what forces are 'consistent' with each other.
Now, everything that is unjust is a hindrance to freedom according to universal laws.
Everything that is just may be. We don't know. Only time will tell. It would be nice if things we like are all mutually compatible and consistent. The reason I hesitate to invite Beyonce and Rihanna for a sleepover is because though I am sure both will want to be my best friends forever and ever, they may not get on with each other. Beyonce will want to braid my hair- which is fine with me- but what if Rihanna isn't content to do my nails? There could be tears before bedtime.
Coercion, however, is a hindrance or opposition to freedom.
It may be. It may not.
Consequently, if a certain use of freedom is itself a hindrance to freedom according to universal laws (that is, is unjust),
then you can be sure those laws aren't universal.
then the use of coercion to counteract it, inasmuch as it is the preservation of a hindrance to freedom, is consistent with freedom according to universal laws; in other words, this use of coercion is just.
In other words, the Prussian King should suppress the fuck out of any Revolution on the French, or even the American, model.
It follows by the law of contradiction
which does not apply to epistemic objects because the 'intension' has no well-defined extension. Thus, Borges isn't Borges precisely because he is Borges. Indeed, nothing is what it is from some point of view.
that justice [a right]
is epistemic and changes as the knowledge base changes such that it forbids the very act that it previously enjoined or, like 'halachah vein morin kein' forbids the action iff it is known that the action is required.
is united with the authorization to use coercion against anyone who violates justice [or a right]
Authorization flows from Authority. It may be delegated to Judges or Executives or Legislators. The latter may affirm but do not establish Authority. In the US, the People are the source of authority. In the UK it is the Crown in Parliament. There is no 'authorization' to use coercion even in self-defence. There is a defeasible 'immunity' which a Court of Law may accept on the basis of delegated authority.
Kant
distinguishes a duty of virtue from a juridical duty (by) the fact that external compulsion to a juridical duty is morally possible, whereas a duty of virtue is based on free self-constraint.
Any system of morality can permit 'external compulsion' in any situation simply by stipulating for different facts in the case. Even if a moral theory is categorical, i.e. has a unique model quid juris, still the person holding the theory is free to decide, quid facti, that coercion even of an extreme type is justified. In other words there has to be categoricity both re. principles and re. facts. This does obtain in plenty of things. We agree that is an elephant and this is a mouse. But nothing becomes justiciable unless there is a dispute either about facts or about what law or principle applies. More generally, Kant's theory is useless when it isn't mischievous because it is 'anything goes'.
Consider freedom of thought or expression. Should the State be allowed to use coercive methods to curb this? In 'the conflict of the faculties', Kant admits that in the higher University faculties (Law, Medicine and Divinity) are vital to the State and thus must be strictly supervised but, he says, the lower faculties (e.g. Philosophy & Natural Science) aren't important and thus can be given more freedom to speculate. But this also explains why the 'natural law' of the philosopher is lower to 'positive' law (i.e. law as command). The latter matters. It is vital to the state and the safety of the population. Natural law & natural religion don't matter. They are just things pedagogues in lower faculties talk about to adolescents who, if they are smart, will go on to a higher faculty. If they are stupid, however, they may be school teachers or tutors to rich kids.
To be fair, Kant had to write the way he did because he was a subject of the Russian King and a 'beamte' civil servant by virtue of his employment as a Professor. He hints at his own views when he quotes the story of a French politician Minister who asks a group of leading merchants to suggest ways of stimulating trade. The younger merchants make various suggestions. Then the old merchant speaks up. He says build good roads, mint sound money, have good laws and, for the rest, leave us alone!
This isn't exactly 'laissez faire' and there were already Listian arguments for 'infant industry' protection. Still, this was the 'common sense' the Scots were propounding. But the Scots were safe from invasion or oppression by a tyrant. Prussians were not. Beamteliberalismus- the liberalism of the civil servants- couldn't be too full throated. As with Justice, Liberty too must cut its coat according to its cloth.
Kant applies a common judicial tool in considering the most salient motive for an action as the motive that must be considered. If you do a thing mainly because it is profitable, though you also know it is morally the right thing to do, then your motive is profit not morality. Where Kant goes wrong is that he thinks what is moral is always what is dictated by a principle- that too one that is 'universalizable' or symmetric in every way. This is not the case. It may be that we may get to general principles by induction but those principles will evolve as our knowledge and experience increases. True, we can deduce things from axioms which may, at one time, seem intuitively true. Sadly, those intuitions are misleading. There are no such things as apodictic synthetic a priori judgments. One reason is the 'intensional fallacy'. Saying 'x is x' is false if x is 'epistemic'. It does not coincide with itself because it changes as the knowledge base changes.
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