Saturday, 25 January 2025

The Ideal observer intensional fallacy

Ideal or impartial observer theories commit the intensional fallacy. Even if the extension of the intension 'ideal observer' is non empty, it is unknowable. Either there is a way to tell what observation is ideal- in which case there is no need for an ideal observer because one can just keep generating observations till everyone says 'that observation is the one an ideal observer would have', or there is a way to know who is the ideal or impartial observer in which case there is a method to cultivate the traits that observer would have. Once again, the observer is not required. The problem is there is no observation everyone would agree at all times is 'ideal' nor is there any universally accepted method of cultivating the traits the ideal observer would have. 

 A Gandhian might say, abstaining from sex and spinning cotton will make you more and more ideal. But everybody else admits that Gandhians have shit for brains. 

Speaking of shitheads, Amartya Sen writes of Rawls's stupid original position. 

closed impartiality and parochialism That closed impartiality in the form of the original position can incarcerate the basic idea – and the principles – of justice within the narrow confines of local perspectives and prejudices of a group or a country was discussed earlier.

Nothing can 'incarcerate' an idea- basic or bullshit as it may be. To assert otherwise is merely an expression of prejudice or stupidity.  

As for 'parochialism', we can't escape it. Wherever we choose to live or choose to visit, there will be local laws and norms. They ought not to be 'universal'. You should be allowed to do certain things in the forest- e.g. pee on a tree or bush- which you should not be allowed to do in a City- unless, obviously, it is Calcutta. 

To that discussion I want to add three particular points here. First, we must give some recognition to the fact that procedural parochialism is not universally taken to be a problem at all.

Nonsense! It is obvious that, if 'jurisdiction shopping' occurs or 'extradition' or 'extra-territoriality' obtains, then 'procedural parochialism' or bias diminishes the value of having a juristic mechanism. The same is true, if your judges have a reputation for illiteracy and your lawyers spend most of their time giving blowjobs at truck stops. 

Sen is talking nonsense. Courts can't afford to be too shite coz otherwise they will be disintermediated.  Parishes have to compete with other parishes. This is what militates for convergence to isonomia- at least for contiguous parishes or parishes between which there is 'Tiebout sorting'- i.e. migration to enjoy better 'local public goods' including justice provision. 

In some approaches to social judgements there is no particular interest in avoiding group leanings – indeed, sometimes quite the contrary.

But this problem diminishes if there is competition between jurisdictions. We may say there is 'local arbitrage'.

To illustrate, some versions of communitarianism may even celebrate the ‘local’ nature of such priorities.

Only if there is no risk of disintermediation. 

The same may apply to other forms of local justice. To consider an extreme case, when the Taliban rulers of Afghanistan insisted, before the military intervention, that Osama bin Laden should be tried only by a group of Islamic clerics, all committed to the Shariah, the need for some kind of impartiality (against offering personal favours or partial treatment to bin Laden) was not denied, at least not in principle. Rather, what was being proposed was that the impartial judgements should come from a closed group of people who all accepted a particular religious and ethical code.

This is also what happens when a country seeks to extradite a criminal from some other country. Its judges have to approve the action even if there is an extradition treaty. However, if there is none, there still may be universal jurisdiction. In this case, under Shariah law, that obtained. The difficulty was that the US did not recognize the Taliban regime. Indeed, it still doesn't. However, Gen. Hamid Gul's prediction has come true. The Taliban wanted the US to invade so as to get its hands on seven billion dollars worth of military equipment. Currently, the Afghan GDP is only fourteen billion!

There is therefore no internal tension in such cases between closed impartiality and the underlying affiliative norms.

Yes there is. In this case 'affiliative norms' required treating a Muslim as superior in all respects to a Kaffir. 

The broader tensions, related to the acceptability of confining attention only to locally sequestered reasoning, do of course remain.

But, for any practical purpose, those 'tensions' can be resolved. The Taliban could have let the Saudis chose the Judges. Similarly, where there is an extradition case, the request originating country can stipulate milder punishment and fast track adjudication of a superior type.  

And those difficulties and limitations are the ones that came under Smith’s scrutiny.

No they don't. Sen is making this shit up. 

Indeed, when we leave the world of locally confined ethics, and try to combine a procedure of closed impartiality with otherwise universalist intentions, procedural parochialism must be seen as a serious difficulty.

Only in the sense that the fact that human beings are not gods or dogs or walruses is a serious difficulty. The fact is, any decision or deliberation which occurs in one place and amongst a particular set of people will be 'parochial' except in so far as it makes a lot of effort to be otherwise. 

Smith knew that Scots law was different from the law in England & Wales. He also knew that the East India Company was happy to apply 'Gentoo' or 'Islamic' law in territories it controlled. 

This is certainly the case with Rawlsian ‘justice as fairness’.

No it isn't. It is not the case that Rawls's gedanken fails because of cultural differences between people. It fails because it is stupid. Nobody prefers cutting the cake to favor the least well off as opposed to buying insurance just in case one's position worsens.  

Despite the thoroughly non-parochial intentions of the general Rawlsian approach, the use of closed impartiality involved in the ‘original position’ (with its programme of impartial assessment confined only to members of the focal group under a ‘veil of ignorance’ regarding individual interests and goals)

except nobody actually was enrolled in any such a group. Either everybody would accept Rawl's argument or, because it was foolish, everybody would reject it in favor of what actually obtains- viz. insurance including compulsory collective insurance of various types. The insurance industry then has an incentive to identify  and reduce risk. Thus, the providers of fire insurance lobbied for the creation of a fire brigade. 

does not, in fact, include any procedural guarantee against being swayed only by local group prejudices.

Yes it does because there aren't any actual people in the original position. Thus we don't have to worry whether they have B.O or chronic flatulence any more than whether they are 'swayed by group prejudices'.  

Second, we have to pay particular attention to the procedure of the original position,

It involves everybody getting a cognitive 'plug-in' of Econ 101, Sociology 101, Poli Sci 101 etc. The problem is that Econ 101 says 'uncorrelated asymmetries' dictate eusocial 'bourgeois strategies'- e.g. buying insurance rather than agreeing to cut the cake in a manner which ensures that no fucking cake will be baked.  

and not only to the intentions that may try to prevail over the recommended procedures.

There is no fucking procedure. Either you accept that Rawls is right or, like Harsanyi, you know he was wrong.

Essentially, Rawls's 'lexical preferencing' is, salva veritate, refusing to cross the road just in case you get run-over by a bus. The thing is stupid and can be rejected immediately.

Despite his general universalist inclinations, the formal procedure of the original position proposed by Rawls seems to be geared to allowing little exposure to fresh wind from outside.

It can allow anything it likes. One could say 'men in the original position would prefer than nobody has babies rather than risk that they might end up getting assigned wombs and vaginas'. But it would be easier to just say that the Econ 101 plug-in which everybody receives in the original position forbids maximin because there is a better strategy viz the one we actually choose- viz collective insurance with 'moral hazard' provision i.e. ensuring that unemployment or sickness benefit is significantly less than what can be earned in productive employment. However, for political reasons, this may not be possible in short to medium term. Long term there will be entitlement collapse.

Indeed, Rawls insists that the closed nature of the original position must be, at least in principle, strongly fortified (Political Liberalism, p. 12):

because Rawls came from a rich country. He wasn't suggesting that American prioritize the needs of Bangladeshis. 

I assume that the basic structure is that of a closed society: that is, we are to regard it as self-contained and as having no relations with other societies . . .

No. It can trade with them or bomb them from time to time. However, only its own citizens are given a say in how the country should be run. 

That a society is closed is a considerable abstraction,

This entire discussion is abstract not concrete.  

justified only because it enables us to focus on certain main questions free from distracting details.

The distracting detail in question being that these nutters are talking nonsense. 

The question that is begged here is whether considering ideas and experiences from elsewhere are matters of ‘distracting details’ that are somehow to be shunned for the purity of the exercise of fairness.

Rawls's cognitive 'plug-ins' can include ideas, supported by experience, from anywhere at all. Furthermore, there is no 'exercise of fairness' in the original position. Rather, it is asserted, on the basis of a fallacious argument, that 'Justice as Fairness' involves agreeing to stupid shit. 

Third, despite these strong grounds for open impartiality, it might be thought that a serious difficulty can arise from the limitation of the human mind and our ability to go beyond our local world.

Sen is able to go beyond his local world because he has multiple identities. Thus, when he is lecturing at Harvard he is also in Bihar presiding over the creation of a great University there. 

The plain fact is that local and national governments exist. There is no World State. Rawls thought that the US would be stupid enough to embrace his ideas. But they were stupid and kids who had to study his shite grew up to vote for Reagan and join the Federalist Society. One could say that Diversity Equity Inclusion (DIE) is Rawlsian. We must give first priority to the transgender drug addicted pedophile refugee who is as fat as fuck because they are the most disadvantaged in our society. The parents of kids raped by them need to pay much much more in taxes so that disadvantaged rapists are given a high material standard of living and a chance to further develop their capabilities- perhaps by committing genocide on the host population. 

Can comprehension and normative reflection cross geographical borders?

Yes.  

While some are evidently tempted by the belief that we cannot follow each other beyond the borders of a given community

only with respect to ideographic matters. Nobody thinks foreign Math or Physics can't be assimilated to the domestic variety 

or a particular country, or beyond the limits of a specific culture (a temptation that has been fuelled

by the fact that different countries have their own indigenous, buck stopped, judicial, political and administrative procedures. Sen must have noticed that he has an Indian passport not an American one. That's why he can vote in federal elections. Only Americans get to decide whom they will be ruled by just as only Indians decide who will run their country. 

particularly by the popularity of some versions of communitarian separatism),

Sen's people ran away from such 'communitarian separatism' in their ancestral East Bengal.  

there is no particular reason to presume that interactive communication and public engagement can be sought only within such boundaries (or within the confines of those who can be seen as ‘one people’).

Bangladesh has no difficulty importing ideas and techniques so as to rise up. 

Adam Smith argued strongly for the possibility that the impartial spectator could draw on the understanding of people who are far as well as those who are near.

No he didn't. What he said was ' “When I endeavour to examine my own conduct, 

which was known only to himself and of little interest to anybody else- more particularly those who were far away

when I endeavour to pass sentence upon it, either to approve or condemn it, it is evident that, in all such cases, I divide myself, as it were into two persons; and that I, the examiner and judge, represent a different character from that other I, the person whose conduct is examined into and judged of. 

This is not evident at all. I don't divide myself when I take a shit even though shitting is not my main activity. Similarly in reviewing my conduct I don't divide myself. I just exercise a different faculty. 

The first is the spectator, whose sentiments with regard to my own conduct I endeavour to enter into, by placing myself in his situation, and by considering how it would appear to me, when seen from that particular point of view.”

This sounds like the 'atma/jiva' distinction in Hinduism and is indeed theological. Essentially 'impartial spectator' is being put in the place of 'synderesis' or conscience or 'the still small voice of the soul'. 

Sadly, the thing is nonsense. When pronouncing judgment on your conduct, you do not appeal to what you observed at the time. You look instead at outcomes and, if they are evil, trace them to some flaw of character, deficiency of knowledge or skill, or momentary emotional or other impulse which brought about a bad result. 
This was indeed a significant theme in the intellectual concerns of Enlightenment writers.

Because they were trying to recast theological notions in 'naturalistic' terminology. But the Law had got to a better result by applying the 'reasonable man' test in the Menlove case.  

The possibility of communication and cognizance across the borders should be no more absurd today than it was in Smith’s eighteenth-century world.

What is absurd is suggesting that Rawls considered such communication impossible or undesirable. He was merely saying that the Social Contract, as he envisaged it, wasn't a 'contract of adhesion'. It was one whose terms the contracting parties would themselves arrive at. Sadly, this would only be the case if they were as stupid as shit. 

Even though we do not have a global state or a global democracy, Smith’s emphasis on the use of the impartial spectator has immediate implications for the role of global public discussion in the contemporary world.

It has none whatsoever. He merely asserted, falsely, that in exercising the faculty of judgment we 'split' ourselves. This is not the case, we judge our conduct in the same way we judge the conduct of others of our class. 

Global public discussion is just as stupid as any other sort. It isn't based on impartiality or observation. It is just talking is all.  

In today’s world, global dialogue, which is vitally important for global justice, comes not only through institutions like the United Nations or the WTO,

hilarious! Both are useless. Biden followed Trump in making WTO ineffective. The UN was always a joke.  

but much more broadly through the media, through political agitation, through the committed work of citizens’ organizations and many NGOs, and through social work that draws not only on national identities but also on other commonalities, like trade union movements, cooperative operations, human rights campaigns or feminist activities.

i.e. paranoid ranting. That wokeness just got cancelled big time.  

The cause of open impartiality is not entirely neglected in the contemporary world.

Some senile fools lecture about it. But we laugh at them because what Smith actually said was that darkies like Sen were stupid, ignorant and barbaric. Don't talk to them. They have shit for brains.  

Moreover, just at this time when the world

some fools, not the world 

is engaged in discussions of ways and means of stopping terrorism across borders (and in debates about the roots of global terrorism), and also about how the  global economic crises that are plaguing the lives of billions of people across the world can be overcome, it is hard to accept that we simply cannot understand each other across the borders of our polity.

Actually, the reverse is the case. The Taliban is back in power. America's path diverged from that of Europe after the crisis. It is likely to diverge yet further in Trump's second term. Global discussions turned out to be mischievous when they weren't stupid and useless. 

Rather, it is the firmly ‘open’ outlook, which Smith’s ‘impartial spectator’ invokes, that may be in some need of reassertion today.

The 'open' outlook is to judge actions by results. Talking bollocks about the need for public discussion and taking diverse points of view into account was counter-productive.  

It can make a substantial difference to our understanding of the demands of impartiality

there are none unless we are sitting on a jury or are otherwise paid to be impartial 

in moral and political philosophy

if these nutters were impartial they would admit 'moral and political philosophy' is useless nonsense 

in the interconnected world in which we live.

It is one in which 'moral and political philosophy' aren't connected to anything save senile stupidity.  

Wednesday, 22 January 2025

Hannah Kim & the Psilosophy of Fiction

We don't understand reality but we do understand fiction. Why? The latter is about wish fulfilment. The former is about how to survive and reproduce under conditions of scarcity and intense competition. Thus, European populations could displace indigenous people in America because they had a superior understanding of some material aspects of reality. But those who are currently Americans may be demographically replaced if some other power or set of people gains a superior understanding of certain natural or economic aspects of reality. 

Oblivious to this obvious truth, Hannah H Kim writes in Aeon- 

what distinguishes fiction from nonfiction?

The Law has a notion of 'legal fiction'- i.e. something deemed to be true even though everybody knows it was made up. Law courts can also adjudicate cases where the claim is made that a fictional work is actually non-fiction and defamatory in certain respects. Equally, a non-fiction work may be sought to be reclassified as fiction in order to suggest that it has little alethic content. Once again, this may be a justiciable matter. 

Speaking generally, to assert what you have written is fiction is to disavow factual inferences concerning things or persons who exist or have existed in the real world. However, a court may find that what you claim to be fiction is actually a claim of fact.

Equally an assertion of fact, whether or not it is true, may be categorized as fictional if it arises out of the working of the imagination rather than alethic research. What is fictional is 'made up'. What is non-fiction, whether it is true or false, is alethic in nature. 

These are justiciable matters. There is no scope for 'philosophy' here. 

What is fiction in the first place? Despite common usage, philosophers agree that we can’t equate ‘fiction’ with ‘false content’.

Fuck common usage. What is the usage of the Courts? That is what determines if something is fiction or, despite any assertion to the contrary by the author, non-fiction. Thus we may think a book by a person acquitted of a crime which says it is a fictional representation of how she actually committed the crime is 'non-fiction'. If a Judge agrees, this may become the basis of a civil action against the author. 

Non-fiction is bound to contain some 'false content'. Indeed, Court judgments, too, suffer this infirmity. What may reasonably be asserted is not the same thing as what is irrefragable truth.  

On the one hand, the inclusion of falsity isn’t enough to render a work fiction.

Non-fiction is bound to include some falsity. Human beings are fallible. In any case, as more information is acquired, authors of non-fiction are likely to revise or edit their work. On the other hand, a fictional work may correspond exactly to the facts of the case. The author may have, purely by the exercise of imagination and reason unaided by observation, have correctly reconstructed a particular chain of events or predicted exactly what would happen.  

Books with false statements – old science textbooks with disproven theories, history books with mistakes, memoirs with contradictory events – don’t change their status from nonfiction to fiction when false content is identified.

Nonsense! We may consider them to be great works of non-fiction which, however, have been superseded in certain respects. Thus Gibbon is great & even, the highly partisan, Macaulay, is great whereas some minor author's work on numismatics or some other such field, which has not been superseded, would not be considered either good or bad but merely workmanlike and accurate enough given its limited scope.  

Instead, we judge them to be bad nonfiction. On the other hand, not all fictions include false content since there are fictions that include only actual events, such as Helen Garner’s The Spare Room (2008), a factual account of the author’s experience of nursing a dying friend.

This book is a memoir in the shape of a novel. The 'novelization' of 'true life' accounts may have no fictional component. We say the thing is a novel if it looks like and reads like a novel though we understand it is no such thing. Similarly a scientist may chose to publish a synopsis of his work in the shape of a poem, or a Socratic dialogue, rather than follow the conventions of the 'popular science' genre. 

And the fact that historical fiction exists – that a fictional work can be consistent with all known facts, yet still be considered fiction – shows that fiction doesn’t need to include (known) falsity.

We would say 'this is a historical novel'. Novels use techniques developed by writers of fiction. A fiction writer could turn material gathered for a historical novel into a work of historical scholarship replete with quotations from other learned authorities, refutations of other scholars and an elaborate critical apparatus. 

What matters for nonfiction is that its content is believed to be true.

No. What matters is if it makes claims about actual people or events. We may not believe a word of it and are welcome to assemble evidence in support of our view. 

A creative writing friend of mine told me that writing what one sincerely believes to be true after due diligence in research and introspection is enough to render some content ‘nonfiction’.

Any one can write non-fiction. It just may not be accepted as such. My own highly circumstantial account of how my marriage to Mary Poppins, in the Sixties, broke down- because my work as a secret agent with a license to kill brought me into too close a proximity to Arsulla Undress- was destroyed by my wife who refused to concede that it was an important historical document. 

This means that, strictly speaking, nonfiction can be false but remain ‘nonfiction’ as long as we think it’s true.

No. Darwin's 'Origins' is non-fiction even to people who think God created the world on  October 23, 4004 BC

Furthermore, to say that ‘nonfiction’ tracks ‘truth’ is

to show you studied and teach worthless shite. Nozick's 'truth tracking' is about beliefs but whether a thing is x or non-x is not a function of belief though, no doubt, one could have beliefs about the matter. What this cretin means is 'beliefs regarding the fictional or non-fictional status of a text may be determined by what is known to be true. Discovering a character or event is wholly imaginary in what otherwise appears a non-fictional account, may cause us to believe it is fictional. However, there may be a stipulation that the character or event has been added for purposes of exposition or as a placeholder for some as yet unknown person or event whose existence we have good reason to suspect. Here, we may say that there is a 'working hypothesis' which relies more on our imaginative and ratiocinative power than incontrovertible evidence. 

misleading because we don’t have an unconditional and overarching interest in truth per se

we may do.  

that grounds our protectiveness over what gets called ‘nonfiction’.

There is no such 'protectiveness'. It is a different matter that greater latitude may be granted to works which claim to be wholly fictitious or, indeed, fantastic. Thus, Sir Salman Rushdie could claim that 'Satanic Verses' had nothing to do with the Prophet Muhammad. It was actually about some other dude entirely. Sadly, the Ayatollahs were not convinced. 

In ‘The Disinterested Search for Truth’ (1988), Jane Heal shows – convincingly, in my opinion – that one’s seeming pursuit of truth can always be better described

by smart peeps, not people who study or teach shit. Nobody 'pursues truth'. They may pursue, in some narrow domain, admissible facts about the case or structural causal models which fit available evidence or have predictive value. 

as a project that does not involve mention of truth. That is, ‘truth by itself has no motivating power at all.’

Nonsense! Truth is a word like Beauty or Justice. We have a higher opinion of those who pursue them than we do of people who bark loudly and run after cars or lorries in the hope of biting or eating them.  

We don’t say true things just because they’re true. There are always other considerations.

Not if we are required by law, or a code of professional conduct, to disclose everything relevant which is true.  

Kim began her essay by referring to a children's book by Linda Coombs about how White settlers disrupted the life of indigenous people. An attempt was made to shift it to the fiction section though it wasn't fiction. It may have been wholly wrong, but it wasn't a nice adventure story which kids might actually want to read. 

They targeted a book whose claim to truth practically interfered with their understandings of themselves and the country

They failed. They were welcome to challenge the book on factual grounds or simply suggest that the author was a transgender Lesbian who practiced Wicca, supported ISIS, and denied the Divinity of Christ, not to mention the Super Awesomeness of the Donald.  

When I was a newcomer to philosophy

but already too stupid to study anything worthwhile 

and enamoured with

getting a Credential in stupid shit.  

the kind of questions it asked, I thought I was after the Truth – with a capital ‘T’ – and went to grad school in philosophy because I wanted to know what’s True and what’s Really Real. But a single question from a friend dissolved that illusion: do you care about how many stars there are in the Universe right now?

Astro-physicists do care. Their estimate of the total mass of the stars (which involves estimating the number and type of stars) points to gaps in the Standard Model to do with things like Dark Matter & Negative Time or stuff weirder yet.  

I had to admit that I didn’t care, and that alone was enough to show me that perhaps I’m not committed to the True in itself.

Because you committed to studying useless nonsense.  Truth is an 'intension'. Its extension is different in different cases. This is the case for any epistemic intension. What this silly bint is indulging in is a cascade of intensional fallacies. 

If truth were valuable ‘in itself’,

The truth of any particular thing is the set of its interactions. If that set is empty, that is interesting in itself. If it isn't, then it is a data point of interest to relevant Structural Causal Models. For categorical theories, Yoneda lemma can be thought of as saying that knowing all the interactions of a things is to know everything about it. However, because of entanglement or epistemic impredicativity, this may mean knowing everything about everything. 

then any truth, merely by virtue of being true, would be worth knowing

If there was even one thing which was true 'in itself', and we knew what it was we would have a punctum Archemides.  We would probably also have a Godelian 'absolute proof'. Indeed, even finding a natural proof would be a great advance. 

– but this clearly isn’t the case: for instance, someone who keeps a meticulous daily record of the number of cars parked in the nearest lot with no use for the knowledge would strike us as odd.

You say odd, I say autistic but the truth is a hobby is just a hobby. Perhaps it arises from 'funktionzlust'- i.e. the pleasure in exercising a faculty one is endowed with though no present benefit flows from it. 

So, that something is true doesn’t justify our interest or commitment.

We don't know of anything which is necessarily true. If some such beastie were ever found, every branch of science would be affected. 

Instead, we care about truths that inform specific enquiries or projects.

No. We have a reason to care but may have a superior reason not to. 

What grounds the nonfiction/fiction distinction is

is the distinction between what is imagined and what is observed 

not that the former is based on truth or facticity per se,

the Imagination may be based on what is. 

but that the former contributes to how we see the world insofar as it organises the kinds of truths that we care enough about to read and write about.

World is very mean. It is incessantly organizing truths such that peeps think I'm stupid because I studied useless shite. 

The Montgomery County Commission

wants to please voters 

didn’t initiate a systematic audit of all nonfiction books that might include false or misleading information.

More worryingly, it didn't cut off its own dick even though dicks cause RAPE! 

Rather, they targeted a book whose claim to truth practically interfered with their understandings of themselves and the country.

Fuck that! They just didn't want their kids to be brainwashed into demanding the de-colonization of 'Turtle Island' and the expulsion of all those of European or African or Asian descent.  

Our thoughts about reality and our thoughts about fiction go hand in hand.

They could go hand in hand with anything they like. Mine prefer to dance cheek to cheek.  

Of course, sometimes we care about fiction because it lets us entertain a world that is different from ours.

We can entertain it with cocktails and dancing cheek to cheek.  

But even when it is fiction’s departure from the real world that makes it worthwhile, the departure is measured against the background of the real world.

Nope. Fiction is measured against other fiction. 

In fact, not only the content of fiction – what we’re able or willing to call ‘fiction’ – but also the nature of fiction – what fiction is – depends on how we think about the real world.

No. We may think the real world is the fart of an intergalactic giraffe but this doesn't change how the Library of Congress decides whether a book is fiction or non-fiction.  

A comparative study of the way ‘fiction’ as a concept develops across cultures shows that,

cultures differ. But they differ less than those who do 'comparative studies' would have us believe.  

whenever a group of people think of reality differently,

they don't really. 

the nature and function of fiction is understood differently as well. We can observe this by contrasting analytic philosophy of fiction

which is shit 

with classical Chinese conceptions of fiction.

which is the same as ours.  

In early 20th-century analytic philosophy, fiction crops up as a test case for general theories for meaning, reference and existence.

All of which were shit.  

Theories that explain how names refer, or whether ‘existence’ and ‘being’ are the same, had to contend with fictional characters that seemed, in the words of Amie Thomasson, like ‘odd, freakish entities, quite unlike common or garden objects’.

No such objects existed- at least none which could become the basis of an 'atomic proposition'.  

Note, for example, that Alexius Meinong’s separation in 1904 of ‘being’ and ‘existence’ explains how Pegasus is a nonexistent object,

though Parmenides said they weren't. Everything exists but only some things take the predicate 'imaginary' while many others can't take the predicate 'takes the predicate ' 

and that Gottlob Frege’s distinction in 1892 between ‘sense’ and ‘reference’

was a distinction with a difference. There is a sense in which a word refers to something and everything which makes sense refers to something cognizable. Sadly, that sense was 'naive' and based on unrestricted comprehension. In other words, the thing was childish.

explains why fictional names seem meaningful even though they’re empty of referent; the name ‘Odysseus’ lacks reference (there is no object in the world that the name refers to)

Nonsense! Boris Johnson has a son with that name. That's why there has to be 'disambiguation'. As for whether there was a historical Odysseus, that is a matter for scholars.  

but it has sense (a mode of presentation, a way of being understood).

What is the sense of  X Æ A-12? It gained one when Musk gave his son that name though, to comply with California law it had to be changed to X Æ A-Xii. 

The trend

of talking stupid bollocks 

has continued into the 21st century, and nearly all attempts to define ‘fiction’

are a waste of fucking time 

involve tools developed from metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind.

but those 'tools' are shit.  

For example, Richard Ohmann appeals to speech act theory to define fiction as discourse that pretends to assert;

Uncle Tom's Cabin is fiction and it asserts a great deal. There is no pretence about it.  

David Lewis applies the possible world framework to fiction;

Though fiction often deals with incompossible worlds.  

Kendall Walton utilises notions of imagination and make-believe to claim fictions are ‘props’ that prescribe certain imaginings;

to whom? Only those who already wanted them.  

Gregory Currie and Kathleen Stock appeal to intention and imagination, arguing that fiction is a product of a fiction-maker’s intention for the audience to imagine its content.

But fiction, like mine, is written even by those who know they won't have any fucking audience.  

(The exception is Stacie Friend who appeals to the concept of genre to explain what fiction is.

Why not appeal to the concept of a fart to explain what assholes are?  

It’s interesting to note that the only account that doesn’t draw from ‘core’ areas of philosophy is the one that also denies fiction having any essential or necessary characteristics.)

Nothing we know off has either. Thus it is not interesting at all to note this stupid shit.  

What the methodological trend shows is that the way analytic philosophers have been trying to understand fiction has closely relied on

stupid shit spouted by utterly useless shitheads 

the way we understand existence, language, modality and meaning.

These cunts don't understand shit. 

We extend theories developed in metaphysics, philosophy of language and philosophy of mind to try to understand fiction and fictional entities.

you can't use shit to understand shit- save in a shitty sense.  

Why are we tempted to investigate the ontological status of fictional characters?

Because that is a better temptation to yield to than eating your own shit. But only marginally.  

It’s because we’re convinced that, whatever they are, they are not like us; they don’t exist in the same way we do.

This is also true of an Eiffel Tower constructed entirely out of your own shit.  

We want to know whether their names function like our names

they do 

because fictional names seem to pick out something that’s not like objects, places and people in the real world.

Realistic fiction is realistic. Objects and places and people in realistic fiction may seem more real than in non-fiction. 

Analytic philosophy came to ask the questions it asks because it inherited the ancient Greek idea that some things are less ‘real’ than others.

Nonsense! It inherited the nominalism of Aristotle. Universals aren't real at all. 

In Anglo-European philosophy, ‘fiction’ is closely connected to what’s imagined – that is, what isn’t taken to be real –

an imagined thing may be real. Equally the account of a law suit featuring John Doe & Richard Roe requires us to take the parties to the suit to be real.

because the tradition inherited the appearance/reality distinction from Plato.

Who inherited it from the first humans who learnt to talk. 

Fiction occupies the ‘appearance’ side of things,

it may concern itself wholly with things which can't appear- e.g. a dialogue between the Spirit of Beauty and the Spirit of Justice.  

whereas nonfiction occupies the ‘reality’ side.

Books about UFOs or Ghosts or Poltergeists or shape shifting lizard creatures from Planet X are still non-fiction.

Platonic metaphysics is concerned with unchanging Being, and knowledge pertains only to what’s timelessly true and therefore knowable in a reliable fashion.

For Plato, the 'Forms' or Universals are really real. What exists is but as a pale shadow of the Forms which alone are truly real.  

In Book X of Plato’s Republic, artists and storytelling poets are criticised for creating misleading copies of the physical world, which is already an imperfect copy of the Forms.

Socrates did try his hand at poetry. His acolytes don't seem to have thought it worth preserving. Still, the point here is that Plato's books were more imperfect than Socrates's stupid shite from the point of view of 'mimesis'. But they may have been better from the point of view of 'methexis' or 'participation' in the ideal Form of that stupid shite. 

In Poetics, Aristotle argues that humans possess a natural inclination to imitate nature.

Aristotle often imitated potted plants. What he didn't understand is that people have a strong mimetic drive to imitate those smarter or more successful than themselves. If guys 'imitating nature' are making good money, that's what everybody tries to do till the fashion changes.  

Mimesis, or imitation, is at the heart of the Anglo-European understanding of the representational arts, including fiction

Nonsense! Verisimilitude is what we look for. It isn't the case that the best painting of a dog was made by a guy who spent a lot of time barking and biting and chasing his own tail.  

– and, as a result, concepts that help to adjudicate the relationship between the copy and the real

those concepts are known to guys who authenticate art works. They have nothing to do with 

(pretence, imagination and make-believe)

which aren't about copying but parodying or having fun with 

become the foundational concepts in analytic philosophy of fiction.

Because shit is a good foundation for shit.  

In cultures that don’t take on board a strong reality/appearance distinction,

all do. This is why there is no country in the world which accepts that I am Beyonce. My imitating her twerking, evidently, is not enough. I'd need to look beautiful like her and have great talent.   

however, ‘fiction’ isn’t understood alongside ‘pretence’ and ‘imagination’ in contrast to ‘the real’.

It is understood in terms of imagination. It may or may not feature pretence.  

Just like their ancient Greek counterparts, Chinese metaphysicians sought to understand what the world is like and what explains the way the world is.

Though that Grail is only attained when the Quest for it is abandoned.  

But while the ancient Greeks posited an unchanging ultimate reality that transcends mere phenomena,

not Heraclitus.  

the ancient Chinese believed that what is ultimate is immanent in the world, and that the Dao (道), the source of all things in the world, is itself constantly changing. This change-forward metaphysics led to a theory of fiction that didn’t contrast fiction against a stable, ‘real’ counterpart.

For Parmenides anything which can be thought or spoken of must be. One can find anything in Greek thought also in Chinese or Indian thought.  

Recall how Plato relies on the appearance vs reality distinction to argue that what’s ‘really real’ (the unchanging Forms) are beyond our sense perceptions.

Which is why, though we sense he is talking bollocks, what he is really saying is not accessible to us. But it does participate in the Form of Nonsense.  

Humans were meant to use the intellect, and not their senses, since sense data mislead us,

stuff like the Earth appearing flat or the Sun appearing to circle around it.  

while philosophising gives us a chance to grasp what’s beyond phenomena. In contrast, Chinese metaphysicians didn’t think ultimate reality is unchanging.

They didn't think anything was ultimate or penultimate 

Instead, the dominant view was that reality, including nature, follows consistent patterns (the Dao).

Which is like Indo-Iranian Rta or Greek Logos.  

What is ‘empty’ or ‘unreal’ was seen as the generator of all things,

In Hesiod's Theogony it is Chaos. Out of Nothingness or Formlessness or Chaos comes Substance and Form and Order.  

and all things were considered equal in significance since they are all manifestations of changing patterns.

 Nonsense! Some manifestations are significant- e.g. when a dude draws  a sword and tries to chop your head off- while others are not- e.g. when a dude passes you on the street whistling a merry tune. The Chinese weren't stupid. This is because they were denied education in anal-tickle philosophy probably on the grounds of race. 

The Chinese word for ‘fiction’ (xiaoshuo, 小說) literally means ‘small talk’ or ‘small sayings’.

Because kids are small and Mummy tells them bed-time stories. But, some such stories are illuminating and may profitably be included in a work dealing with serious matters.  

Chinese literary culture had a rigid hierarchy of discourses,

All literary culture had such a hierarchy with Revealed Scripture at the top. This may incorporate ancient poetry and the proclamations of Kings and Law-givers. The Confucian Analects were initially seen as a commentary on the Five Classics before themselves gaining canonical status. Something similar happened elsewhere.  

with Confucian classics and official histories at the top of the pyramid, while imaginative narrative texts like xiaoshuo were placed at the bottom.

More particularly if they were written in a demotic style and appealed to children or wore the guise of story-telling for the purpose of entertainment. But this is the case everywhere. 

However, it would be misleading to say that xiaoshuo was denigrated because it was imaginative, whereas philosophical texts and histories were elevated because they were ‘real’.

People think the Bible is higher than a Spiderman comic even if they don't believe Moses had super-powers. What differentiates them is that comic books seek to entertain, not instruct.  

Since Chinese metaphysics didn’t posit a fixed, transcendent reality, reality was understood to be an ever-changing process, and so the categories themselves couldn’t be based on inherent, necessary or fixed essences

which don't exist. Anal-tickle philosophy pretends otherwise even though, with the appearance of non-Euclidean geometries,  the scandal that no 'necessary' truths are identifiable was obvious by about 1870. 

but on functions and behavioural tendencies. The difference between discourses labelled ‘xiaoshuo’ and ‘great learning’ (Confucian classics and histories) wasn’t that one is unreal or imagined while the other is real.

This is also true of Plato's oeuvre compared to the Bible or the Quran- at least for some Christian and Muslim theologians.  

All discourse was understood as an account of the world, and the difference between ‘small talk’ and ‘great learning’ was the extent to which it was adopted to organise how people lived.

Which is why the US Constitution is considered to be more important than a Spiderman comic.  

Xiaoshuo wasn’t understood in contrast to reality,

Yes it was. People didn't really think that a beautiful woman was actually a fox spirit though foxy chicks we will always have with us. 

and it wasn’t metaphysically second class.

Because Physics is first class. Metaphysics is for second class, credential craving, pedants.  

It was at the bottom of the discourse hierarchy because its function wasn’t as grand as the classics’.

Entertainment mustn't put on airs for fear of losing custom. If you make a good living doing penis puppetry, don't pretend you are the successor of Martin Heidegger even though we all suspect that Heidi only turned to philosophy after failing at penis puppetry.  

Discourse that posed trouble for social and political interpretation was considered ‘xiao’ (small)

No. Such discourse was considered worth persecuting. Nobody bothered with the literary equivalent of penis puppetry.  

Because the Confucian classics were considered canon, there was little room for textual scholarship in philosophy (beyond commenting).

Nonsense! The Chinese imported Buddhism which was plenty philosophical. We have recovered the 'mondadology' of the Avatamsakasutra, or the  'field theory' of the Vimalakirti, from the Chinese. Indeed, the Chinese purged Buddhism of untouchability- which didn't happen in Korea and Japan- precisely because they were more philosophical. 

But history had to be continually produced, so history and historiography became the most revered genre, and eventually the paradigm of all culture discourse.

No. Moh Tzu, Shang Yang & Mencius put political philosophy at the top. Sima Quian had inherited the position of Court Historian but was castrated because he backed the wrong political horse. He was able to complete his father's mission to create a comprehensive history only because he wasn't important enough to kill.  

Again, a Western-minded explanation for the xiaoshuo/history distinction would appeal to the former being fake or imagined, and the latter being real.

No. The West, following Aristotle, would say Tragedy is more philosophic than History because the former deals with the possible whereas the latter is constrained to the actual. The Chinese, more particularly because of their poetic genius, when celebrating their great writers, generally preferred the legend to dry biographical details.  Thus Li Po drowned diving to rescue the Moon though scholars were aware that he probably died of thoracic suppuration or something equally tedious. 

But to do so would be to attribute inappropriate metaphysical commitments to the Chinese framework.

Metaphysical commitments don't fucking exist. Anal-tickle philosophy just made that shite up.  

Besides, the xiaoshuo/imaginary, history/actual, pairings aren’t exemplified in the categorised works themselves.

Sure they are. Along with alethic genealogical information, we are given charming, but obviously fantastic, anecdotes e.g. that the very tall and studious Lu Zhi fathered a son on a comely female ghost.  

Early forms of fiction included reports of what occurred, and official histories made room for invention and fabrication. Instead, I believe that xiaoshuo’s separation from history and historiography, and the resulting denigration, had to do with xiaoshuo material’s interpretive difficulties rather than the fact that fabrication was involved.

Nobody has metaphysical commitments or interpretive difficulties or suffers post traumatic stress disorder because of incessant epistemic self-abuse- which is all Anal-tickle philosophy actually is.  

Xiaoshuo’s weakness wasn’t tied to its being imagined or untrue, but to it being ‘unsuitable’ as a vehicle for meaning.

The weakness of what is entertaining is that if it finds no market it has no meaning. Credential craving or mindlessly bureaucratic turds have to pretend that they are doing something very serious and important.  

History was prioritised as a literary genre

because it fed patriotism and implanted a horror of the evil effects of foreign invasion, civil war, corruption at Court etc. What is unique about China is that the literary culture of an aristocratic governing caste gained currency among merchants who found it worthwhile in investing in Confucian scholarship so at least one son from the clan might get an official position by passing the Imperial exams. This meant that China was united not by Religion, as had happened in India, but by a political philosophy of a synoecist type.  

not because it talked about true things, but because it provided the stable basis for literary activity,

Religion does that for Hinduism or Buddhism or Islam or Christianity. China's uniqueness is that the spirit of Moh Tzu pervades its political philosophy even against the Confucian grain.  

a continual process of meaning-making through writing, reading and interpreting.

Which is also what auditors do for all Companies listed on the Stock Exchange.  

And history was interpretable, and therefore a suitable means for signification, because the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ posited that the unfolding of events reflected the ruler’s political legitimacy (or lack thereof).

Actually, that Mandate was linked to periodic droughts and floods which were predictable enough. The State had taken on food distribution and famine relief work across a vast area by the Second Century BC. But corruption and factionalism could cause state capacity to fall. Equally, at times, there were localized Malthusian food availability deficits on too large a scale to be remedied. The advantage of the 'Mandate of Heaven' theory was that if State failure and a circulation of elites was inevitable, then one might as well legitimize the Imperium  of whoever emerged from a period of crisis as the winner who takes all. This was more particularly the case when the ancient Aristocracy was able to reproduce itself within the Mandarin class. 

But xiaoshuo didn’t have such interpretive weight because much of its early examples were report-like narratives that involved the supernatural (ghosts, abnormalities, miracles, etc). It’s interesting to note that while categorised as xiaoshuo, these ‘records of the strange’ (zhiguai) were considered ‘leftover history’,

No. The term originates in the inner chapters of the Zhuangzi. Taoism was the indigenous, scholarly, syncretic, religion which was uniting local cults and thus serving at a 'grass-roots' level, a similar National purpose to Confucianism. Meanwhile, there was an official historiography as exemplified by Sima Qian. 

understood not as fabricated stories but as an offshoot of historical writing that was worth preserving due to their contribution to knowledge but not suitable for inclusion in official history given its weirdness.

No. There was an official historiography which, for prudential reasons, steered clear of religion. After all, Taoists and Buddhists and votaries of the Imperial cultus could clash. A rebellion might be Taoist. The Confucian bureaucracy may turn against the Buddhist monasteries. There were great political perils which the historian would be prudent to stay away from. Better be considered dull than end up being castrated or beheaded because you are seen as politically partisan.  

So, my suggestion is that discourse that posed trouble for meaningful social and political interpretation was considered insignificant, therefore ‘xiao’ (small).

This is silly. A fairy tale about a wicked King who raises taxes and thus is cursed by a wizard to turn into a frog has a very meaningful social and political interpretation. But such a tale would not be considered a great literary classic. It is the type of thing kids and the common folk might relish but, because they themselves were frightened of ghosts who spied on them (Moh Tzu said this is what kept the peasants honest) and because they thought that powerful wizards were likely to be employed by the Emperor, their impulse to rebel was effectively crushed. 

Scholars were unsure what, if anything, we can take as a larger message from these reports, therefore they were separated from history.

No. Chinese scholars weren't stupid. Moreover, they lived in China. They knew there were Shamans and Toaists and Buddhist and Nestorian monks wandering around who claimed all sorts of super-natural powers. Even if they themselves believed that shite, it was in their class interest to write in a manner which suggested otherwise.  

The important consideration wasn’t that they weren’t real; it was just that their points were unclear.

They were abundantly clear. If some people have super-natural powers, it is they you need to placate. Sucking up to the boss or praising the Emperor won't help you. The safer course was to say one thing and do another.  

The distinction between xiaoshuo and history wasn’t about inviting imagination but about whether the discourse belonged to a stable, communal interpretive framework.

Toaism and Buddhism and Nestorianism and other indigenous traditions were 'communal interpretive frameworks'. Genghis Khan and his people certainly had one. Under their High God, Tengri, they created a vast Eurasian Empire.  

Since there is no unchanging reality that fiction is contrasted to, xiaoshuo doesn’t invite mimesis as an operative concept.

Yet most of it is imitative. Fiction, always and everywhere, is about seeing what sells in the market and producing a similar product. Greater verisimilitude can give an author a competitive edge. Thus Cervantes's Don Quixote sold better than other novels of chivalry. Interestingly, it also propounds the laissez faire doctrine of the Salamanca School.  

And since fiction isn’t assumed to be a copy of reality, there is no theoretical apparatus aimed to clearly distinguish what’s real from what’s fictional.

Yes there is. The roman-à-clef or other allegorical work is deciphered by a 'theoretical apparatus' known as 'literary scholarship'. Consider Swift's 'Tale of a Tub'. Almost immediately 'keys' to it were supplied by Edmund Curll- a book-seller- but, the truth is, Swift's readership, then and now, didn't greatly care who or what was being satirised. 

To understand the importance of how a culture’s metaphysical commitments affect its view of fiction, imagine how two different communities might come to create a wooden duck.

Guys creating wooden ducks are called wood whittlers. They have no metaphysical commitments. They just like whittling wood. If they make some money by it, well and good.  

A community that hunts ducks

because they are metaphysically committed to killing the Donald- who has a duck incarnation. 

will use the wooden duck as a decoy that lures real ducks to a particular location.

Actually, an elaborate duck decoy can be constructed. Tame ducks are used to lure wild ones. A dog is used to ensure the wild ducks enter the trap set for them. This way, their flesh is free of shotgun pellets and thus commands a higher price. The metaphysical commitment underlying this is the desire to earn money by selling delicious duck meat for a higher price.  

For them, the wooden duck’s ‘point’ is determined in response to its similarities and differences to a real duck: it must be similar enough to trick other ducks into thinking it’s a real duck, but it must be different enough for humans to know not to shoot it.

This is the main reason wooden ducks are not endowed with life by their creators. Also there is the risk that the wooden duck might fuck real ducks with the result that future generations of duck will become unpalatable by reason of having turned to cardboard. I may mention, anal-tickle philosophers make a metaphysical commitment not to fuck ducks lest they get splinters in their dicks or vaginas or assholes. Never say getting a PhD in that shite is a waste of money.  

Its nature is understood in relation to a ‘real’ organic duck; a wooden duck is a mere decoy since it contrasts with the living version. The point of asking about the nature of the duck is to ask what one is meant to do with the object.

The point of saying shit like this is to prove you are a fucking shithead. Still, it is a good thing that Kim has been taught to ask about the nature of the Tesla Cybertruck. Once she learns it is a motor vehicle which you are meant to drive, she will cease thinking it a suppository which she must cram up her rectum.  This sort of metaphysical commitment on her part will be appreciated by owners of Cybertrucks around the world. 

Now, contrast the hunting community with another community that approaches the wooden duck as an aesthetic object.

It is possible to do both. We might say this wooden duck is so well made that it would be a shame to use it in the ordinary way. Let us rather make it an object of display.  Consider the master decoy carver, A.E Crowell. Two of his pieced have sold recently for over a million dollars. Interestingly, he himself favoured live decoys but some change in the law forced him into the decoy carving business. 

The wooden duck’s ‘point’ is determined in relation to the shape and colour that constitute the duck,

Actually, black is better. I suppose amateur duck hunters will pay for something pretty because their primary purpose is not to turn a profit on duck flesh or feathers.  

and different views might form depending on their reactions to the duck: it must be beautiful, or interesting, or compelling in some way to merit attention. Whatever we say about the object’s nature responds mostly to how people understand and react to the duck, and not some independent standard against which the duck might be compared.

Fuck off! Decoy ducks are about making money or getting nice duck flesh to feast on. This is economics not meta-fucking-physics.  

So here, too, asking about the wooden duck’s nature presupposes,

the asker is either mentally fucking retarded or studied anal-tickle philosophy at Grad Skool.  

or at least develops in tandem with, what we’re meant to do with the object.

Don't shove it up your bum. That's all we ask of you. Make a metaphysical commitment in this regard and we will concede that your expensive education wasn't wholly wasted.  

What the wooden ducks show is that the kinds of questions we ask of the same object (or concept) can differ depending on the background practices and commitments that we bring to it.

For example, asking how far up the rectum the thing should be shoved is predicated on background practices and commitments to Queer Theory. Much much more research needs to be done to illumine the manner in which shoving things up your Vagina, or 'prison purse', impacts metaphysical commitments of a Feminist kind.  

Each culture’s understanding of fiction arises from their pre-existing commitments about what the world is like.

None are. That's why fiction moves easily across borders whereas historiography or political theory does not. Everybody now knows the story of Mulan. Few have heard of Moh Tzu. The Indian Hitopadesha, or the Arabian 'Thousand and one Nights' had wide currency because everybody likes fables and adventure stories. They were relished by people of all nations who had no truck with Manu-smriti or the Sahih Bukhari. 

‘Fiction’ is difficult to define

Why define it? It is a 'Tarskian primitive'. For any practical purpose, there is a buck-stopped, juristic or administrative procedure to determine what is or isn't fiction.  

because fiction is not a standalone concept with its own intrinsic properties, but a concept that responds to a given metaphysical system.

Fuck off! Nobody has a 'metaphysical system' though some do have a lot of shit in their brain.  

Comparing Anglo-European and Chinese thoughts on fiction show how metaphysical assumptions affect the way we theorise fiction.

It shows the reverse. Once Chinese fiction became available to Europeans, they lapped the thing up. Goethe's remark on Universal Literature was motivated by his reading of a Chinese novel. He realized that the Chinese had plenty of such things. But the Chinese and Mongolians and so forth lapped up Western fiction. Apparently, by about 1896, Sherlock Holmes stories were translated into Chinese almost immediately after they appeared in the Strand magazine. Why? They sold well and soon had indigenous imitators. But then, Ernst Bramah's 'wallet of Kai-lung' came out in 1900. 

Metaphysics begins from our observations about the world

No. Metaphysics is what is beyond physics and therefore outside the scope of observation.  

and is sustained by the desire to make sense of the world.

Or the desire to talk nonsense.  

The metaphysical concepts we devise in turn affect the way we represent the world,

only if that is our intention- i.e. we want to write a metaphysical novel, like Sartre's Nausea.  

so it is no surprise that fiction develops in response to the metaphysical frameworks we begin with.

Some fiction may do so but it tends to be shit. Everybody likes Robinson Crusoe. Nobody, not even Sufis, likes Hayy ibn Yaqzan.

There isn’t a single definition of ‘fiction’ that can be applied transculturally

Yes there is. It is that relied upon by a court under the doctrine of the comity of nations. However, this is a justiciable matter. 

Fiction is part of a rich and varied cultural practice, so theorising fiction ought to be

done by people who aren't as stupid as shit 

sensitive not only to the metaphysical frameworks, but also to the sociohistorical frameworks in which fiction is conceived, produced and consumed.

Readers are already sensitive to such things- if they like the work in question.  

But perhaps more importantly, being clear-eyed about the dependent, contextual and even reactive development of fiction allows our philosophising about the nature of fiction to be conducted from a more informed place that is aware of why we ask the questions we ask.

Sadly, even if a shithead is transported to an 'informed place', they will still babble stupid shit.  

We can be clearer on what the stakes are in our fiction theorising, and this in part lets us see how fiction can – and has been – put to work in theory and practice.

Why work so hard to see what anybody wot didn't go to Collidge can see well enough?  

The Montgomery County Commission’s attention was on works whose content challenged their favourable picture of American history.

A 'citizens committee' ordered a book to be placed in the fiction section of the children's library. The County Commission reversed this because of a national outcry. I suppose, now the Donald is back in power, that reversal may itself be reversed.  

Attempting to recategorise a book from ‘nonfiction’ to ‘fiction’ on the basis of its unwelcome content shows that ‘fiction’ had been used as a practical tool for image management.

It shows that it is a completely useless and impractical tool. Kids would prefer to read fiction than non-fiction. Adults are content with internet porn.  

Noting the variety of ways in which works of fiction had been put to aesthetic, social, political and moral uses shows that the Texan committee’s use of fiction is more blatant than usual, but not extraordinary.

It shows the reverse. Texan library book banning, however, is effective and has already had a chilling effect on publishers. That is why my YA graphic novel describing the imaginative manner in which Anne Frank used Hitler as an anal dildo while vigorously fisting herself was rejected by the OUP. 

Current and historical practices, and the theories that propped them up,

did not and do not exist. There is merely what sells and what fails to sell.  

point towards the conclusion that there is no universal concept of fiction.

Also, there is no universal concept of a vagina. Who is to say that men don't have plenty of such orifices? It is unfair to exclude them from female athletic competitions. Also, I should be allowed to enter the Miss Teen Tamil Nadu Beauty pageant.  

It might be true that all human cultures tell inventive stories, but that isn’t enough to claim that there is a single definition of ‘fiction’ that can be applied transculturally.

Anyone at all can make any sort of claim. I might say Kim does not have sufficient reasons to make the claim given above but everybody would tell me to shut up. Why argue with a fucking cretin? Be glad she isn't trying to cram Cybertrucks up her fanny.  

‘Fiction’ is necessarily a thick term insofar as it presupposes some metaphysical framework that separates fiction from other genres of writing.

It doesn't. It is a Shelling focal solution to a coordination or discoordination game- i.e. the thing is utilitarian, not metaphysical. I suppose, nutters like Kim think that when I ask the bar tender the way to the Gents, I have committed to a metaphysical framework which has inflicted epistemic violence on Women, Transgender people and Socially Excluded and Tribal populations who reject the false binary of gender by sporting multiple penises and vaginas on their person. Hopefully, the Donald, in his second term, will kill off this stupid academic availability cascade. 

So, instead of asking how fiction might be defined (ahistorically, logically), we should ask what work we want fiction to do.

Also we should ask ourselves what work we want the door and the window to do. After that, we can discuss the floor and the ceiling.  

Our questions about fiction come from identifiable metaphysical starting points.

Which only partly explains why those questions were as stupid as shit. Still, telling the roof you want it to work harder at keeping rain out of the house does have a salutary effect.  

If we find ourselves continuing to crave a definition of fiction,

We might be better off becoming a bona fide drug addict. This is because there are highly effective Rehab techniques.  

we should also ask what need it will meet: what theory of fiction do we require to solve current problems?

Very true. What theory of fiction does Zelensky need to solve the big problem currently facing the Ukrainian people?  

In 21st-century Anglophone media, invoking fiction allows speakers to dismiss claims without incurring social cost.

Very true. Many serial killers have been acquitted by Courts simply because they said the prosecutor was actually a skilled writer of fiction. Indeed, no big company has had to pay punitive damages for pollution because, in order to be exonerated of all charges, they just had to say 'the case against us is fiction. It was penned in its entirety by Jane Austen. She did not have a dick. Ergo, she was as stupid as shit.' 

To get ahead of potential defamation lawsuits, movies and TV shows remind their viewers of the fictional status of the work

This is not a sufficient defence in law.  

but, outside of those contexts, fiction is often invoked to mean something like ‘hearsay’, ie, a claim that cannot be substantiated and therefore ought to be dismissed.

Fictio in Latin means 'invented statement'. But there are 'legal fictions'. The Court may deem an event to have occurred or they may 'read in' a clause into a contract such that, though the thing is invented, it is nevertheless deemed to be alethic.  

If we’re asking about the nature of fiction, then we should do so with an eye towards producing an understanding of fiction that wouldn’t allow bad actors to lie and successfully evade punishment by insisting they were ‘only making fiction’, or dismiss unfavourable claims as ‘fiction’ as if they can be the final arbiter, or as if fiction can be peddled as fact without ramifications.

Courts already do that. Anal-tickle philosophy comes late to the party. I have a theory that Shaw's 'unsocial Socialist'- a work of fiction- implanted in the shitty brain of Bertrand Russell's elder brother the notion that an American divorce held good in the UK. It didn't and so the Second Earl was sent to jail for three months.  

One of the most interesting – and promising – features of fiction is that it creates a space between the ‘true’ and the ‘false’, between ‘real’ and ‘imaginary’.

Not to mention a space between the fist up Anne Frank's fanny and Hitler, whom she is using as an anal dildo so as to challenge the metaphysical commitments of the Third Reich. Had Kamala won, I bet my children's book on the subject would have been compulsory reading in Public Schools by Executive order.  

Good fiction tends to destabilise such dichotomous ways of approaching the world through thoughtful content, innovative form, or self-referentiality.

Nope. What destabilises 'dichotomous' shite (e.g. banging on about fiction as opposed to non-fiction) is the fact that though initially only done by stupid and useless people, the field is soon invaded by crazy nutters who insist that no progress in overturning Patriarchy and Neo-liberalism can be made till private schools are banned and every five year old is required, by the Public School she attends, to give a detailed account of the various techniques used by Anne Frank in pleasuring herself with Hilter as an anal dildo,  

Is there some special work we can expect of fiction, such that we can rethink its nature and function towards that end?

Fiction should engage in a wide-ranging colloquy with Kim so as to undermine her metaphysical commitment to shoving Cybertrucks up her fanny. I fully expect my own fiction to have that effect on her. Sadly, there is no feasible method of getting her, or anybody else, to read my novels.  

The fiction/nonfiction distinction is one worth keeping,

up your fanny because that gives you an excuse not to stuff Cybertrucks up there 

and philosophers of fiction continue to have their work cut out for themselves.

This is not nice work even if you can get tenure for it. It is stupid and useless. Meanwhile, the Chinese ensure their kids study STEM subjects at Uni. That's why they will eat our lunch- unless the Donald can turn things around. 

Saturday, 18 January 2025

Callard's Open Socrates- cancel Tolstoy

 Why ask why? The answer is that the answer to some 'why' questions involves a 'Structural Causal Model'. If we possess such a thing, we can start tinkering with parameters to alter outcomes for the better. That is useful. But asking the 'why' question wasn't itself useful. What was useful was the the SCM and the desire to use it to make things better. 

This is not to say doing or talking useless shite can't be a nice enough way to pass the time. So long as such activities attract only useless shitheads, no great harm is done if they burgeon. What is wrong is to subsidize or otherwise celebrate this type of stupidity.

Consider Agnes Callard's new book 'Open Socrates'. If you spend your own time and money on purchasing and perusing it, it is only your own time and money you have wasted. On the other hand, if the teaching of that shite is subsidized by the tax-payer then there is a negative 'externality'- i.e. a cost received outside the market. That is why Socioproctology must point the finger at assholes who pretend Callard aint a shithead. 

Callard asks why we are afraid to ask stupid or useless questions. The answer is that we aren't afraid, we just have better things to do. Now it is certainly true that a crazy person may ask stupid or useless questions. Indeed, they may become obsessed with the question 'why am I a cat with the body of a hippopotamus?- and feel that life has become empty and meaningless because no one can supply a satisfactory answer to this pressing question. 

True, a literary genius, like Tolstoy, or a mathematical genius, like Godel, might suffer a mental illness and yet produce very crazy, yet thought provoking, work. But, academic philosophy no longer attracts smart people. Even if Callard is as crazy as a bedbug, she can't say anything interesting. She is too ignorant and too stupid. Moreover, readers nowadays can 'ask Alexa' or otherwise very quickly check factual claims. 

Consider the following

Google 'Tolstoy' and you find exactly what you expect. The guy suffered from depression. Thankfully, learning of the American Temperance Movement, he gave up alcohol which meant that, ceteris paribus, his condition was bound to improve. Giving up meat and whoring and doing a bit of manual labour meant he would live to a great age. Still, the fact is, as a Russian writer living at a time of great socio-political change, he either had to find new material- society novels were passe, Karenina was a damp squid compared to Doestoevsky's 'Demons'- or suffer a decline in esteem. Tolstoy chose so well that Lenin credited him with motivating the 1905 uprising. Thus Stalin pampered Tolstoy's pal, Vladimir Chertkov, while sentencing a lot of Old Bolsheviks to death. 

What Callard has written is foolish. Tolstoy was recognised as a great writer but he was being eclipsed and could easily be made as much a butt of ridicule as Doestoevsky had made of Turgenev a few years earlier. The most demonic character in 'Demons' is Kirillov the 'Man-God' who feels obliged to kill himself to free Man of his fear of Death and thus is content to provide a scape-goat for some squalid secret society of a murderous and nihilistic type. I suppose, while writing Karenina and realizing that the affairs and intrigues of the aristocracy were as boring as shit, Tolstoy invests in the even more deeply boring figure of Levin as his alter ego. But Levin was a cul de sac. He should either just get a Zossima type starets as a spiritual adviser or enlist in the Bulgarian Army and get shot. It is no wonder that Tolstoy- who drank a fair amount at that time- wanted to kill himself. He slowly worked his way back to productivity and, with the novella 'death of Ivan Ilyich,' showed he could deal with the trials and tribulations of a more middle class character. Still, it was Doestoevsky's death which gave him his second lease of literary life. Admittedly he had to overplay the peasant-sage shtick. But this is because he didn't have the sense of humour of those more humbly born. His view of society was bound to be stilted rather than genuinely satirical. 

 More generally, it is precisely the successful artist who feels the greatest anxiety. Those who praise him today may condemn his next book. Worse, they might lampoon him. The young would smirk knowingly at the mention of his name. The temptation is great to blow your brains out before your body runs to fat and your brain fills with shit. 

There was a continuity between the aristocrat Pushkin and the aristocrat Tolstoy. But the daemonic Gogol's successor, the even more daemonic, Doestoevsky, was smarter, funnier and more profound. Tolstoy needed to reinvent himself. The most boring character in Anna Karenina, nevertheless, could open a door out of the grand St. Petersburg salon and towards the humble peckha of the moujhik. 

The other point has to do with the manner in which, after Darwin's dangerous idea had gained currency, all writers, to a greater or lesser extent, posed or responded to existential questions. In Russia, there was a special urgency to the 'what is to be done?' question. Since there were no good answers, the 'why do anything? What is the fucking point?' question gained salience. Tolstoy knew that his literary reputation could disappear overnight. He knew that his peasants might slaughter him and his family. If God himself had been slain and Man was but a hairless monkey, what, indeed, was to be done? Sell up and become a citizen of Switzerland? Turgenev had many friends in France and Germany and England. He was at home in the West. Tolstoy would have always felt an exile. Still, the question remained, on what terms was he to stay on in Russia? Classical Liberalism was a fad whose day had passed. Narodnik nonsense was vulgar and might involve the country in costly and pointless wars in the Balkans. Socialism required a much larger industrial base. Given the options available, Tolstoy's choice of Pacificism wasn't silly. After all, the Russian army was in fact much weaker than appeared to be the case. 

Tolstoy's prescription for those who suffer suicidal ideation is sensible enough. Give up booze. Alcohol is a mental depressant. Keep yourself busy. Take things one day at a time. Callard writes- 

There is no 'Pandora's box' but there is such a thing as 'spiralling'. Tolstoy suffered a specific illness and said 'don't spiral'. Socrates did not suffer that illness. Had he met a depressed guy who kept trying to top himself, Socrates would have given him the same advise as Tolstoy. 

Both Socrates and Tolstoy took risks by appearing 'impious' (asebia). Socrates was put to death. Tolstoy might have been exiled. He was certainly under police surveillance at certain times. Both were patriots. But the risks they ran weren't out of proportion to the benefit they sought to secure for their countrymen. 

Still, the truth about Socrates was that he was 'ultracrepidarian'. He talked about things in which he had no expertise. He would have been acquitted by the Court if he had been able to say 'I am a Sophist. I charge high fees. I could rattle off the names of my students. The vast majority are successful and enjoy great public esteem. True, one or two, turned out to be bad apples. But why blame me rather than their wrestling coach or riding instructor? I do a job, just as they do a job. How are we supposed to predict what our student will do with the skills we are paid to impart to them?' Had Plato been indicted, he could have pointed at his Academy. Wealthy students from other cities came to study there. This was good for Athens. 

Tolstoy had a vocation- writing- for which he was paid quite well. Socrates may have had a vocation but he didn't get paid. He talked and he talked and eventually talked himself into a death sentence. He had charm. He had eloquence. He may have been regarded as a 'pharmakos' or scape-goat sacrificed so some spiritual benefit be gained by the Polis. But, there was no 'strategy' to this. We feel Socrates was possessed of a particular 'genius' or 'daemon'. He had no plan of his own. Still, the fellow was, if not a gentleman, then a diamond in the rough. This is not something one might appreciate in adolescence, but, at my age, Socrates is a welcome enough guest at my solitary symposia. 

Callard does not understand that Socrates never suffered from depression. He was never suicidal. He was part of a particular coterie in Periclean Athens which sought to use an amorous and charming type of discourse to create affectionate bonds to hold together a coalition. Thus an Athenian might say 'I disagree with Pericles on issues of fiscal policy and international diplomacy. But, I suppose you could say, we share a certain philosophy.'  If Socrates was the one who had persuaded him of this, his genius for conversation would be judged to have had political utility. Sadly, Athenian politics was a risky business. But then, life itself was risky. There might be a slave insurrection or a sudden invasion. Many a patrician might end his days as a galley slave. 

Socrates saw that many people in Athens- even Simon the shoe-maker- were talking about deep ontological and metaphysical questions. He talked to them as he talked to the professional Sophists who taught rhetoric and helped their clients win court cases. But he didn't 'dive headlong' into anything. He wrote nothing his acolytes thought worth preserving. When debating with a superior mind- Parmenides accompanied by Zeno- he gets trounced and takes his defeat in good part. It is his amateur status which secures him the station of a  a gentleman, though he was neither well-born, nor rich, nor had any great accomplishment to his credit. Yet, he inspired others- Aristophanes ridicules him, Plato and Xenophon praise him to the skies. Yet, in the end, he is a bit of a Schlemiel, and that endears him to us. 

Callard does not understand that anybody at all can be a mimetic target. There were plenty of Tolstoyans just as there were many imitators of Socrates and Diogenes and so forth. 

Callard draws attention to a stupid mistake Socrates made when presenting his defence. He tells the story of the Delphic oracle who answered no to the question 'is there any man wiser than Socrates'. It is fucking obvious that what Socrates should say next is 'no man is wiser than me. No man is wiser than any of you. But when you jointly make a decision, then there is a greater wisdom than that possessed by any mortal. But with great wisdom comes great mercy. I call myself a fool. Why else would I now stand before you accused of the dreadful crime of asebia? Instruct me and make such use of me as benefits our beloved Polis.' 

The problem with Periclean Democracy was that collective action problems were solved in an individualistic manner. There's a good reason, Rome, not Greece, provides the basis of Civil Law whereas Math and Physics and Philosophy remained a Greek monopoly. Could the Ecclesia have been repurposed- e.g. by delegating specialist matters to expert committees or by training up a class of 'logothete' civil servants- such that collective action problems could be better solved by reason of the application of more minds in line with the Condorcet Jury theorem? Perhaps. But the very individualism which made Athens so creative militated against it evolving superior organs of Government. 

Callard draws attention to Socrates's fundamental flaw- he wanted to talk only to people like himself as he makes clear to Gorgias. Since Gorgias is happy to meet Socrates on a field where he has professional  expertise, Gorgias agrees. 

The problem here is that plenty of propositions are neither true nor false. They are too vague to admit of verification or refutation. However, if you talk to people who are unlike you, it is likely that they have knowledge you don't have and thus there can be an epistemic Pareto improvement. Still, Socrates gives a good enough definition of philosophy as dealing only with 'open questions' such that as good an argument can be made for or against a proposition. The problem here is that empirical disciplines 'close' questions which philosophers, in their ignorance, continue to treat as open.

Socrates's point was that nobody could show he was wrong because he confined himself to topics where the thing was impossible. But this is also true of people who talk only about their cat or, in my case, my neighbour's cat. Sadly, it starved to death after its owner died. I told the police there was a cat in the flat and that it was probably hiding. I assumed they had removed it. They hadn't. Sad.  

We don't care if we are refuted if we talk nonsense. What is important is that we got somebody to listen to us. There's a reason we should display anger at being refuted. If we didn't, people might think we made a habit of talking just for the sake of talking. 

Of course, there is a certain pleasure in conviviality. If we know we are talking nonsense, we can talk and talk without risk of falling out with each other for any reason that isn't nonsense. Thus cat people may pretend to be interested in stories about each other's cats and religious people may pretend to be interested in stories about how Jesus Christ appeared to me in the shape of a tortilla and so forth.

I suppose the space around a soldier becomes peopled by soldiers or those who study military tactics. The space around a politician gets peopled by politicians or those interested in politics. But the space around Socrates wasn't peopled by Socrateses. Athenians were highly individualistic. That's why we know so many of their names.

On the other hand, there is a space near you which is dedicated to overcoming our fear of a particular question- viz. what happens to us after death. It is peopled by Christians. Billions of people seek to live as Jesus did, or the Buddha did, or Prophet Muhammad did. There are no Socratians. Guys who gas on about him are ill paid pedagogues. Socrates himself, in the Lysis, suggested that his method would be of use to pederasts. Talk that type of bollocks to beardless youths and they will clamour to be sodomized by you. Sadly, Socrates was mistaken. Pederasts had to continue to pretend to lurve or take a genuine interest in those they wished to bugger. Thankfully, beating and incarceration discourages paedophilia just as killing Socrates curbed a potential nuisance. On the other hand, crucifying Christ was a mistake. The son of a Carpenter took the place of Divine Emperors. 

Callard claims to understand decision theory but she does not know economics which descends directly from empirical 'Political Arithmetic' and the practical knowledge gleaned by merchants, farmers and industrialists. In its mathematical form, it concerns itself with constrained optimization. It has never had anything to do with 'ethics'. The name given to what is optimized is Utility or Ophelimity. Empirically, this means 'revealed preference'- i.e. whatever it is that people actually choose. However, this is epistemic- i.e. knowledge based- and hence its 'extension' changes as knowledge changes. In this sense, like 'Beauty' or 'the Good' it is unknowable and thus has no representation in set theory. 


Economists don't rate Bentham or Mill. Sidgwick kept abreast of Jevons and thus counts as a Marginalist ancestral to Marshall & Pigou. However, this is to ignore the obvious. Utility just means money. Maximize that. In particular, Governments should spend on stuff which will tend to increase the tax base. But this is an idea as old as taxes. Moreover, it is independent of historical circumstances. Thus, the School of Salamanca was more laissez faire than the Mercantilist England of the Tudors and Stuarts. 

Economics is about saving or making money. A few stupid academics may teach both Econ and Philosophy and Morris Dancing. But they don't get paid a lot compared to the economists whom Jeff Bezos hires. 

What is the origin of the economic doctrine of the 'invisible hand'? The answer, known to Christians, is that it is the 'mysterious economy' whereby the Katechon holds the Eschaton at bay. Religion is the common origin of Law, Economics, Politics and Philosophy. 

rejected Aristotelian economics. They were sound on portfolio choice theory. Still, it must be said, it is a particular sort of Religion which best promotes economic progress both for individuals and nations. Sadly, it is like the feather which helps Dumbo the elephant fly. It can't help anyone else to fly and, truth be told, didn't enable Dumbo to fly. Still, it served a purpose for a time. 

Callard asks why, in Ethics, there is a Neo-Aristotelian but no Neo-Socratic ethics? The answer is obvious. Aristotle was a pedagogue and gave a descriptive account of prevailing endoxa. Socrates was a chatterer, not a pedant. Still, he was a decent enough chap. He fought bravely for his country and did not sodomize children. 

In pedagogy, a 'Socratic' approach is one based on dialogue. But, it is quite usual to ask searching questions and seek for contradictions or inconsistencies when deciding upon an important matter. Thus this method can be 'layered' on to anything whatsoever. 
Callard takes a different view.

will never be called into question.

 Callard think this means that one type of free speech, calling into question a particular principle, is disallowed. This is not the case. A principle  applies in 'eligible' situations. If you determine eligibility, you can get any outcome from any principle. 

Chicago University was pushing back against 'cancel culture'. But an avowal of a creed is not Socratic. It is 'mere puffery'. Socrates didn't set up the Academy or the Lyceum. He never said 'my school will be super duper' because he wasn't in that line of business. The plain fact is American Universities were set up to make their students smarter and more productive so that the country as a whole became stronger and more prosperous. At one time, there was some play-acting about encouraging dissent and diversity and other such shite. But that story is over. Being anti-woke is popular. That's the performance smart peeps now want to give. 

Callard either writes carelessly or she is extremely stupid. An announcement is a command, if it is made by a person with authority. Alternatively, it may be a proposed command. It can never be a question. 


Every tool has that audacity. The screw-driver drives in screws. The hammer hammers stuff. The Socratic method may be used in education & training or for a judicial or other decision making process. Socrates wasn't a Christian, but the Church has used the method of elenchos (which means cross-examination or refutation), though, no doubt, it may have originated in the Law Courts or the deliberations of the Elders of the Clan. However, it is not at all essential that there be two or more parties to it. The mathematician takes up a proposition and then looks at the negation of that proposition. Suppose that negation leads to an absurdity, then the mathematician believes he has a 'proof by contradiction'. 

Callard is unaware of this. She writes
Socrates wasn't a stupid chatterbox. Graham Wallas & EM Forster popularized the saying '“How can I know what I think till I see what I say?” which they attributed to a little girl or an elderly lady- i.e. people who lacked dicks and thus who were assumed not to have brains. 

A lawyer or a guy hoping to get a loan may hold an imaginary conversation in his head so as to prepare for possible objections or to so present his arguments that those objections are forestalled. Thinking is not a 'social interaction'. Indeed, the latter requires you to disguise the former to a greater or lesser extent. Thinking can be open-minded even when done in perfect solitude provided no arbitrary restrictions are placed on what is thought. If a person benefits by gaining the truth, thinking is likely to be truth oriented. Inquisitive people are inquisitive. We may imitate them on a particular occasion if we believe we will profit by it. Thus a man who is not inquisitive at all may start asking the sort of questions an inquisitive person does if he wants to find out more about a woman whom he is attracted to. Socrates' motto was 'Know thyself'. He wasn't interested in persuasion nor was he a sceptic. He also wasn't a gnostic. Ignorance does not have evil results. It is not that which obstructs spiritual liberation. It is merely a predicate applicable to some people regarding some things at certain times. 


Socrates didn't say he knew he knew nothing. There were some things he knew (and one thing in particular- love) and other things he didn't know. But with respect to the 'Beautiful' and the 'Good', he was better off than those who thought they had knowledge when such was not the case.
... ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου γε σμικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἃ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδέναι.
... I seem, then, in just this little thing to be wiser than this man at any rate, that what I do not know I do not think I know either.

I suppose if you are at leisure to 'inquire into human affairs' by chatting with different people then Socrates provides you with a 'plan for life'. But it is the same plan as that of a Socioproctologist who spends his time pointing the finger at assholes like Callard who claim a knowledge they clearly don't possess. 

Socrates knew that there were good people who denied having any knowledge of how to be good or why they themselves were good. The same was true of the beautiful or those with great talent in particular fields. He himself knew about love and his 'plan of life' was to go around talking to people in a charming manner such that they felt goodwill towards each other. I suppose, there was a political angle to this. Socrates had been a friend of Pericles's mistress who, as a hostess, would seek to bind more closely together the coalition which supported her husband. 

Callard thinks Socrates was saying 'keep talking to other people so as to find out how to live your life better'. This was not the case. He wasn't advocating the setting up of an Agricultural Research Institute to conduct inquiries from which all farmers might benefit. He wasn't even prodding Plato to set up an Academy in which mathematics would be taught. What he knew about was 'love' in the sense of the affectionate ties which can hold a political coalition together while promoting Arts, Sciences & Commerce which benefit the Polis. 


There is no 'ideally knowledgeable life' though there may be immortal Gods who were omniscient. There is no 'substantive ethics of inquiry'. Some do the thing ethically and get nowhere because they are stupid. Others do it unethically and get somewhere because they are less stupid. Socrates understood this just as well as we do. He really wasn't a pompous pedant. Learning stuff may make you better at doing that stuff but it won't make you good. Nor do you need other people to show you where you are wrong- unless you are very stupid and in a class-room full of other very special little snow-flakes. True, some people find 'Group therapy' helpful but a lot of other people don't need anyone to point out to them that maybe they drink too much. It is enough to wake up and find you have shat yourself to realize that you need to cut down on the booze.

Callard does not seem to understand the difference between imperative statements- e.g. 'Do this!'- and principles. Utilitarianism has a principle for ranking different states of the world. It has no prescription regarding how that ranking is to be implemented. As for the categorical imperative, it is still inferior to being good. As Socrates says, categorical thinking is like using the oars of the boat when there is no wind to belly out the sails. 

In every political party or representative Institution there are people who go around chatting to people so as to create an atmosphere where dogmatic differences are put aside or rendered less obstructive of what Rawls called an 'overlapping consensus'. Even if some found Socrates irritating, he acted as a lightning rod. Two people on opposite sides of the fence might agree that the fellow deserved a good kicking. As a result they might look upon each other more kindly. The truth is, Socrates quaffed his cup of hemlock rather than seek to escape because, in this way, political passions might be assuaged. Though it was but a gadfly that the Ecclesia had swatted, perhaps that insignificant death would appease their blood lust. Socrates offered himself as the pharmakos- the Paschal lamb- in the hope that it might heal wounds and unite the Polis. That was admirable. But it can't be a 'plan for life' for any American now. This is because to get sentenced to death you have to do more than just talk. 

Callard puts some very strange views into Socrates's mouth

ignorance and only one solution, which is to learn.

Needless to say this is nonsense. The plague or the Persians killed both the learned and the unlettered. Socrates really wasn't saying 'go to Collidge. Make something of yourself.' This is because there were no fucking Colleges at that time. 
 
Socrates had been a soldier. He knew there were people who knew it was wrong to run away from the enemy but who couldn't stop themselves from doing so. What he questioned was those who claimed to teach an infallible method of cultivating courage. 

Socrates was Greek at a period when the Gods, for their own reasons, might still possess a man to bring about his downfall. As to why harm befalls some at the hands of others- this is the dark mystery of the Fates who may themselves be enchained by forces darker yet. 

Inquiry can be a harmful thing. If you keep inquiring into your lover's activities, she may tell you to fuck off. Your boss may sack you if you keep inquiring into the company's activities. A political party you belong to may be equally discommoded by your inquiries into its sources of funds or track-record of meeting manifesto pledges.

This is common sense- which Socrates did not lack. Callard believes otherwise. 


All of this is nonsense. Excessive inquiry can prevent business or other relationships being carried on as usual with the inquisitive person. Telling him to fuck the fuck off, improves matter for the rest. 

Socrates understood that parrhesia was perfectly compatible with condign punishment. Indeed, it was from the latter that it gained its imperative power. It is one thing to say 'Islam sucks' if you live in Texas. It is another thing entirely to do it in Teheran. 

As for egalitarianism- the plain fact is Socrates thought slavery could be a good thing. Anyway, this side of the grave none are not slaves of the gods. 

What was the secret of Socrates's charm? He wasn't particularly witty or gossipy or even persuasive. But he made his interlocutor feel young again or, if they were on the brink of manhood, it reminded them of an earlier innocence and spirit of play. 

Callard resents precisely this aspect of her hero.

Sadly, philosophy singularly fails in this respect. What it may give you is the ability to bullshit. But this means it is the employer's money which talks. Bullshit walks or takes the subway. 

Of course, it is quite possible to 'overdo Philosophy' and end up earning big bucks constructing LLMs or allocating funds between research programs. But this 'overdoing' took you out of Philosophy into a STEM subject field. At an earlier time, this was not uncommon. Then Philosophy became adversely selective of imbecility. If it is wholly shit, it is because it is taught by shitheads to drooling imbeciles. 

There was a time when only a small percentage of the workforce had a College education. This meant that even those who threw caution to the winds and dropped acid with Prof. Leary or turned to domestic terrorism under the influence of Prof. Marcuse, could rehabilitate themselves and end up as tenured Professors living bougie lives. Now there are too many graduates and PhD holders in shitty subjects. People have to be cautious. 


It is now very dangerous to do so. Pederasty is no longer winked at. You can go to jail for a very long time for indulging in 'Greek love'. Indeed, even having pictures of naked boys on your computer could get you into a lot of trouble. On the other hand, you are welcome to live your life in a Kantian manner producing the definitive account of Leonard Nelson's influence on Grete Hartmann or, if you are a sufficiently advanced Feminist scholar, the other way around. 

An 'untimely question' is one which crops up at the wrong time. Educators and lawyers and politicians, in preparing their arguments are careful to interject statements like 'at this juncture, you may well ask the following question. I won't answer it right away because I first have to give you relevant background information. But, be assured, I will give a very comprehensive answer at such and such time'. 

Callard takes a different view- 

Callard is saying that an 'untimely question' is the question which, with hindsight, we should have asked. But what was 'untimely' was our 'mental preparedness'. We were confused, we were flustered, we were not in tune with the spirit of the Age or the needs of the times. Had, by some magic, the right question popped into our heads, it would have been very timely indeed. 

Callard does not grasp that 'default answers' only appear to actual questions- not questions we didn't ask but which, with hindsight, we ought to have done. Moreover, non-default answers come from the same sources as default answers. It is just that more time is taken inspecting the menu of options. Answers of any type are not 'savage commands'. They are context dependent and only as prescriptive as we choose them to be. We act in a confused manner if we are confused or if it is in our interest to appear so. But a confused person can always act in a manner that is decisive and unambiguous while a person with great mental clarity may appear to act in a haphazard, scatter-brained manner. The TV show 'Elsbeth' features a dotty lawyer who appears to be a brainless chatterbox. Yet, her focus is laser like. 


This is sheer nonsense. Utilitarianism replaces theology and the divine right of Kings with Hutcheson's 'greatest good of the greatest number' which cashes out as maximizing 'transferable utility' i.e. aggregate money income (and hence the tax base). This has nothing to do with the 'savage commands' of the body which are dealt with by legal sanctions and punishments. Kant is not concerned with the group and his doctrine is compatible with autocratic rule. Aristotle is descriptive merely. All dealt with 'kairotic'- i.e. timely- questions though all misfired. 

Callard says the Socratic alternative is to go on inquiring and separating truth from falsehood. But that means more alethic research not armchair philosophy or chit-chat.  She mis-states three intensional paradoxes which arise because Knowledge is an 'intension' whose 'extension' changes as more of it is acquired. Meno's paradox is resolved by saying 'you start of searching for a thing which, over the course of your search, you find out is some other thing entirely'. Columbus did discover America though he may have thought it was India. Moore's paradox is that you can believe a thing while knowing it isn't true. This is because the intension 'belief' includes non-epistemic items in its extension. Thus I believe Mum's cooking is the best in the world though I know no expert on South Indian cuisine would agree. Callard's third paradox is about
Callard does not seem to know that in giving testimony, you act in bad faith if you don't tell the whole truth or if you include false statements. But saying I had this 'working hypothesis' is not to affirm something false. Nor does it impugn the conclusion you reach. To see why consider the following

Defence attorney- Detective Smith, you have said that you got a warrant to search my client's house because you had grounds to believe he kept illegal weapons on his property. Yet, you found no such weapons. What you found was a large quantity of cocaine. Since your premise about my client was false, it follows that your conclusion about him- viz. he is in the drug business- must surely itself be false. How can you justify this arrest?
Detective Smith- In procuring the warrant I presented evidence tying your client to illegal transactions involving the exchange of weapons for drugs. We have been able to establish that one day prior to our executing the warrant, your client exchanged a large quantity of guns for drugs. That is why he had drugs in his possession. He was planning to send the drugs to Canada in exchange for automatic weapons. We did not know that apart from gun running, your client is also a big intermediary in the supply chain for cocaine. Now, we not only know that but can provide admissible evidence which establishes this beyond doubt, peradventure or infirmity of suspicion.'

Clearly, in this case there is a close connection between what the police expected to find and what they actually did find. Suppose, the warrant had been gained for something else- e.g. possession of child pornography. Then there might be some suspicion that the warrant was improperly obtained and any evidence flowing from it was 'fruit of the poisoned tree'. But such is not the case here. 

Suppose the Judge in this case has read Agnes Callard's worthless book and has been persuaded by it. He intervenes as follows-
Judge- 'Detective Smith! I see you have been given the job of asserting truth. Please tell me the name of the other Detective on this case who has been given the job of avoiding falsehood. 
Detective Smith- There is no such detective. All police officers are enjoined to avoid falsehood while giving evidence under oath. Falsehood is avoided by saying what is true and carefully distinguishing suspicions or working hypotheses from facts established by evidence of an admissible kind. 
Judge- But that contradicts what Prof. Callard has written! Can she truly be a complete moron?
Detective Smith- Does she teach Law?
Judge- No. She teaches philosophy.
Detective Smith- I think that answers your question. 
Working together with another person is how we get babies. But, for everything else, one person may achieve a great deal more than they would if they were saddled with Callard as interlocutor. There can certainly be synergy between two smart people. There are gains from specialization and the division of labour. But, equally, there can be negative synergy. As for Philosophy, as Plato realized, it is mathematics, not idle chatter, which can free minds of 'blindness and bias and provinciality'. But, equally empirical research is required to rid Mathematics of particular shibboleths. 

Consider the impact of non-Euclidean geometry on the English mathematical establishment starting from around 1870 with Clifford's famous speech. If the actual geometry of the Universe was non-Euclidean then logic could point to no necessary truths. Bertrand Russell describes this scandal thus 'I discovered that, in addition to Euclidean geometry, there were various non-Euclidean varieties, and that no one knew which was right. If mathematics was doubtful, how much more doubtful ethics must be! If nothing was known, it could not be known how a virtuous life should be lived. Such thoughts troubled my adolescence, and drove me more and more towards philosophy.' In other words, discovering reality did not correspond with the nonsensical dogmas of philosophy,  drove this fellow further towards nonsense such that reality and utility and common sense disappeared from his mental horizon.

 What was the result of his teaming up with Whitehead? Both wasted their time. Russell wrote lucid nonsense. Whitehead wrote impenetrable garbage. Still, at least they didn't bum each other. We must be thankful for small mercies.

As for Tolstoy, whose wife thought Chertnov might be bumming him, there is a very simple way to read the following- 

Tolstoy's readers, in Russia or England or even India, would immediately identify the Biblical reference- viz. James 4.4.13 Come now, you who say, “Today or tomorrow we will go to this or that city, spend a year there, carry on business, and make a profit.” 14You do not even know what will happen tomorrow! What is your life? You are a mist that appears for a little while and then vanishes. 15Instead, you ought to say, “If the Lord is willing, we will live and do this or that.

Far from being an 'untimely question', it is right and proper for a bonus paterfamilias raising a son and husbanding a goodly estate, to turn his mind to the 'four last things'- Death, Judgment, Heaven & Hell. True, the answer had been supplied by the brother of Jesus almost two thousand years previously but, it is quite natural and proper for an aristocrat who has been a soldier and a man of the world to only 'get serious' after he has reached middle age and has settled down and is concerning himself with the proper education and instruction of his son and heir. 

From what little I know of Russian Orthodoxy, Tolstoy could easily have put himself under the spiritual direction of a starets and employed his marvellous literary gifts to reveal to the rest to the rest of the world certain evident points of superiority of the Greek Church to what we are familiar with in the West. In particular the Economia/ Akreibia distinction is very useful. Tolstoy, I think for 'kairotic' socio-political reasons, didn't take the easy path. He launched into an investigation of the most diverse soteriological traditions including those of India as propagated by Ramakrishna & Vivekananda. Would this lead him towards hesychasm and theosis? No. He went in what appeared a crazier direction- that of championing the Doukhobors. Apparently, the Canadians who had granted them asylum at Tolstoy's request looked askance at their habit of burning down school-houses and dancing naked around them. Later some returned to Mother Russia and, strangely enough, thrived on Stalin's collective farms!

 Callard with typical cack-handedness does not merely suppress the, quite conventional, Christian origin of the question troubling Tolstoy, she also pretends he didn't expend considerable effort researching other religions and sects.


This is nonsense. Both the question and the answer are supplied in the Bible which Christians hold to be uncreated Divine Revelation. Faith is founded upon a mystery, not on reason. Still, it is true that the fact Callard has shown great determination in not asking if she is actually a duck named Agnus Mallard, shows that her claim to to have decisively answered anything at all (since ducks are notoriously taciturn interlocutors) is gravely undermined. 

The plain fact is, Socrates has greater salience for the West than does Suqrat for the Islamic East because Socrates, like Christ, is a 'pharmakos' or 'korban'- i.e. a scapegoat sacrificed for the commonweal. Tolstoy's great importance is similarly linked to his eccentric but profound Christian faith. Callard, I believe, is Jewish. But that's not what motivates her suppressio veri or suggestio falsi. She is merely stupid and ignorant and has been rendered incapable of saying anything true or sensible by reason of her training in, and teaching of, arrant nonsense to imbeciles. 

Still, in one sense Callard is right. Studying philosophy at Uni is more likely to ensure you, like Socrates, earn nothing by it and end up punished by the law. This is why philosophy students must 'cancel' Tolstoy. He made a lot of money from his books and lived to a great age. Moreover he didn't have to sit down to pee. How is that fair?