Thursday, 11 December 2025

How shtupid was Judith Shklar?



The supervisor for Judith Shklar's PhD thesis was Carl Joachim Friedrich, a German-American scholar and former student of Max Weber's economist brother. Thus he absorbed the view that Max Weber & Hugo Preuss, writing the Weimar Constitution, had made a fatal error by creating the possibility of a 'plebiscitary' (or Caesarean) President. He played a role in the framing of the West German constitution. His oeuvre seems worth re-examining today in the light of recent developments in both the US & Germany. 

What isn't worth re-examining is Judith Shklar whose two big ideas were
1) the primacy of cruelty as the worst evil. 
The problem with this notion is that what is or isn't cruel depends on one's imagination. Only if evil is itself imaginary would cruelty be the summum malum more particularly if it has imaginary wings and flies around taking copious, albeit imaginary, dumps on your head. 
In any case, any political regime whatsoever can reduce cruel or inhumane practices. 
What of 'moral cruelty'?  Shklar describes it as 'not just a matter of hurting someone’s feelings. It is deliberate and persistent humiliation, so that the victim can eventually trust neither himself nor anyone else”. This is 'mental cruelty' which the law recognizes. Within a marriage, it is grounds for divorce. Within an enterprise, it may come under the heading of bullying and attract a payment of damages. Other instances may involve the criminal  offense of harassment or malicious communication as well as actions in tort. Shklar seems oblivious to the fact that the law has evolved a lot since the time of Montaigne. Moreover, existing remedies are constantly being repurposed by courts so as to tackle the underlying problem. Simply saying 'boo to moral cruelty' is otiose. 

2) "liberalism of fear," which emphasizes the avoidance of fear and oppression as the foundation of political life. 
Death is not imaginary nor is the fact that getting hit by a bus is very fucking painful. Political life should be founded on abolishing death and anything which causes pain. 
Shklar says 'while the sources of social oppression are indeed numerous, none has the deadly effect of those who, as the agents of the modern state, have unique resources of physical might and persuasion at their disposal”. She is wrong. The cartels will do things to you which no policeman or jailor would dream of. The reason States exist is because the alternative would be infinitely worse. 

Shklar made no contribution to the study of Politics. She merely expressed abhorrence of cruelty and things which cause pain or which people might find oppressive (e.g. having to listen politely to a crashing bore at a party). She appeared wholly unaware of the steps taken by Judges and Legislator and Social Planners to ameliorate the problems she pointed at. 

The fact is Liberalism, like Socialism or Communism, is a solution to a set of collective action problems. It is only concerned with cruelty or fear or oppression to the same extent as any other approach to such problems. Thus, the Commissar, just as much as the Capitalist, might object to a procedure which is unnecessarily cruel or oppressive or repugnant in some manner. If you have to execute a traitor, just do it already. Don't drag things out by chopping bits off him as he howls in agony. The thing isn't efficient. Fear is bad because it has a disincentive effect. People are less productive when they fear being robbed or raped on their way to or from work. Cruelty causes revulsion. People exposed to it may react by beating the shit out of you or else they may vote with their feet and run away to somewhere nice. 

Shklar was a well paid Professor on a posh campus. She knew nothing about 'lived realities of fear, cruelty, and injustice'. Her job was to teach ' grand theoretical systems' and then look at empirical evidence regarding their allocative and dynamic efficiency. 

Aeon magazine has an essay by Samantha Ashenden & Andreas Hess on Shklar from which I extract the following-
Shklar is most often cited as a critic of mainstream liberal thought.

e.g. that of Hayek & Friedman? She would have needed to be an economist to succeed in that project. Perhaps, Rawls or Dworkin are meant. But, again, they fall down because of mistakes in their economic thinking.  

During the Cold War in particular, liberalism served as an ideological weapon against the totalitarian threat of the former Soviet Union and its satellite states.

If so, it was wholly ineffective. The truth is, the US was perfectly happy to let Western Europe follow a 'mixed economy' model which, as Sir John Hicks pointed out, was more Socialist than Capitalist in that profit rates were implicitly set by the State. Moreover, Exchange Controls were ubiquitous even after the collapse of Bretton Woods, and financial markets played only a limited role in allocating investible funds. 

In the 'developing' world, the US dropped any pretense of promoting Liberal Democracy. They preferred Dictators supported by the Army.   

But Shklar was concerned about the stifling dimensions of this kind of Western intellectual defence mechanism:

One might say that Goldwater and Reagan (and Thatcher, a little later on) defended classical liberalism at a time when elites preferred 'Corporatism'. Indeed, the Tinbergen 'convergence hypothesis' (also endorsed by Galbraith) saw bureaucratic Communism becoming indistinguishable for bureaucratic Managerial 'Capitalism'.  

it served merely to protect the status quo,

Nothing is protected by hot air.  

and was very often a mere fig leaf for the accumulation of material wealth and for other, more problematic aspects of Western culture.

People are proud to get a shiny new car or TV set. Why buy a fig-leaf if you have a ginormous dong?   

It didn’t ignite any critical reflection or assist any self-awareness of how the liberties of Western democracy had arrived at such a perceived high standing.

That 'critical reflection' was plentifully supplied by the Mont Pelerin Society. Goldwater & Reagan gassed on about it endlessly.  

It was also silent about the fact that fascism had developed in countries that had been identified as pillars of Western civilisation.

No. It had developed amongst 'Huns' (Germans) and spics, dagos, wops, etc.   WASP societies were immune to such beastliness. 

In a talk to the American Political Science Association titled 'Redeeming American Science', Shklar said

What I plan to do in this talk is therefore quite ambitious, namely, redeem American political theory,

i.e. stuff stupid Professors gassed on about. Could the subject be 'redeemed'? Only if smart people entered the field and professional politicians were willing to pay them a lot of money for their advise.  

in order to bring out both its intrinsic intellectual importance

Alchemy appears intrinsically important because we have lots of lead and would like to turn it into shiny shiny gold. Sadly, only charlatans or lunatics go in for Alchemy. Thus it has no intellectual importance.  

and its significance for American political science.

There are plenty of smart people making lots of money as political consultants or analysts. What they do is increasingly scientific. Sadly, you need to be smart to go in for it.  

Far from being demeaning and scientifically superfluous, I would like to show that we have much to gain from seeing our present work as a continuation of the history of political thought in America.

Let's pretend we are as smart and as important as Ben Franklin or Thomas Jefferson.  

Such an outlook would serve to integrate political theory into political science, where it belongs;

Shklar was saying 'we have been teaching nonsense all these years. Our theory is completely disconnected with anything scientific. But political analysts were using path breaking statistical and game theoretic methods during the same period. The whole theory of 'rent seeking' evolved in the Sixties. Interestingly, these ideas were equally relevant for Socialist countries- if not more so. By the Eighties, the 'reverse game theory' of mechanism design had become an indispensable policy tool. Meanwhile, Shklar & Co had been getting more and more hysterical.  

and it would also offer mainstream political science the self-understanding that only a historically grounded analysis can give it'

This assumes that collective action problems are bedeviled by hysteresis. Yet the experience of the post-War years (during which there were very dramatic changes in the type of regime) showed that ergodicity prevails. The German 'Historical School' was shown to be useless. Harvard dropped the German language requirement for Econ PhDs and substituted a Math requirement by about 1960. 

(American Political Theory) has been charged with an obsessive and unconscious commitment to a liberal faith that prevents it from asking profound and critical questions.

America developed its own indigenous critiques of (Whig) Liberalism. Indeed, America inspired Europe's 'Listian' policies. With the election of Andrew Jackson, populist policies enter the policy space. Later, America produced Henry George and 'Trust busting'. It was in America, not Europe that an issue like bimetallism could dominate politics.  The provincial German pedant was wrong to be condescending towards the Americans. 

Incapable of envisaging alternatives, American political thought is said to be mired in the legacy of John Locke and a mindless optimism.

This may be said by ignorant immigrants teaching nonsense. It isn't true.  

The fact that there have always been many lively controversies, moreover, does nothing to dispel this bland uniformity,

if that is what you are determined to see, that is what you will see.  

because all parties are at some level said to be liberal.

What Americans object to is politicians being very liberal with their money.  

In any event our petty intellectual squabbles

e.g. the squabble which led to the Civil War?  

are mere shadowboxing compared to the real thing, the kind of ideological combat that feudalism and class war generated in Europe.

The last peasant uprising in Germany was crushed in 1525. By contrast, the Americans had a Revolution in 1776. They kicked out Mad King George's booted Hessians. Still, the fact is, they had originally petitioned the King to protect their rights as loyal subjects and English freemen. The King considered the petition to be disingenuous- which it probably was. Still, had he a better appreciation of the military situation, he might have taken a more conciliatory course. 

Be that as it may, the truth is, Europe was more conservative and traditional than America. Ideology mattered little. Being occupied by a vast Army altered the type of regime- but for most people it was just a case of repeating this slogan rather than that slogan or tugging your forelock to this Lord rather than that Lord. 

Shklar admits that American political thought isn't boring and repetitive. What she doesn't get is that America did the innovating. Europe played catch up. 

On close examination American political theory is not, in fact, just our own; for it has not been hermetically sealed off from European thought.

It was populated by migrants from Europe. But its political system is sui generis.  

Isolating it in order to illuminate its peculiarities is bound to reduce it to charmless uniformity. We do have special political traits; but from Locke to Social Darwinism, from the negative to the positive state, from Montesquieu to the Chicago School of political sociology, the controversies and the agreements have been shared, even if not shared identically by both sides of the big puddle.

It is fair to say that after the Second World War, Western Europe imitated America. Thus, when my father was born, he was a British subject. I am a British citizen. We now have a Supreme Court, just like the US, and have got rid of hereditary membership of the House of Lords. I suppose, if Trump wants to take over from King Charles, Sir Keir Starmer will have to accommodate him. 

One should not overlook the local circumstances that give a special color to American political ideas, but there is no reason at all to treat them either in quarantine or contemptuously.

You can take the girl out of Europe but you can't take European arrogance out of the girl. Who in their right mind would treat the most powerful country in the world with 'contempt'? 

At least four obvious political phenomena have contributed to distinguishing American political thought from its cultural neighbors:

Its closest cultural neighbors are Canada and the British West Indies.  

the early and painless acceptance of white adult male suffrage,

Some States- Vermont, Kentucky etc. did get it in the late eighteenth century but this became the rule only around 1856 which was the same time as South Australia got it. Canada was somewhat laggard in this respect. 

federalism,

Canada has it 

judicial review,

India has it.  

and most deeply, the prevalence of chattel slavery

in some states not others. Thus it can't be a distinguishing feature of American politics.  

long after it had disappeared in the rest of the European world.

Serfdom was abolished at about the same time as slavery was abolished in the US.  

Not racism-which is universal-but slavery in a modern constitutional state is truly unique.

The US has dual sovereignty. Is there a right to secession? The South thought so. It turned out they were wrong.  

Monarchical States may have a Constitution. Spain didn't have slavery in its own country but permitted it in Puerto Rico till about 1880. 

Until the Civil War amendments America was neither a liberal nor a democratic country, whatever its citizens might have believed.

No. It was both. It's just that African Americans and the First Nations were not accorded equal treatment under the law. But the fact that a thing is rationed, does not mean it doesn't exist. 

Yet it did have in place a set of institutions that were capable of becoming so and to an unequaled degree.

This could be said of any country. Any set of institutions can be improved.  

This country had embarked upon two experiments simultaneously:

just like the UK or France or Canada or India 

one in democracy, the other in tyranny.

Democracy was an experiment. Tyranny pre-existed the Revolution. Having studied and taught worthless shite, Shklar was unable to write a single sentence which wasn't false or foolish or both false and foolish.  

This list of the characteristics of our political development is hardly complete (I would add our unique university establishments),

Canada simply isn't that different from the US. What makes America special is its large population, strong economy and kick-ass Military.  

but it does point to features that have set American political institutions apart

There are no such features. Some countries have an 'Executive Presidency'. Others don't.  

and have had a decisive impact upon its most reflective citizens.

Its more reflective citizens consider 'Political Theory' to be a waste of time. Hire a smart analyst to help your candidate get elected. Don't listen to stupid Professors who had to run away from Hitler or Stalin or whoever.  

Of all aspects of this political culture none might seem more peculiarly local than political science,

in which case, the US would have hardly permitted German refugees to teach that shite.  

in all its many manifestations and eclecticism. To be sure, political science is only one of the modern social sciences; but it is the one that has flourished most in America,

Tullock & the theory of rent seeking is very American. Why? It is empirical. It is practical. It can go hand in hand with 'mechanism design' to radically improve outcomes and raise total factor productivity. 

where it has also lately become notably democratic.

No. It has become Statistical and Game theoretic. Those who understand how to use Big Data are changing the political climate as we speak.  

At the deepest level all the social sciences are part of a process of intellectual democratization.

No. They appeared at the same time as State bureaucracies expanded. Consider the LSE. Haldane helps set it up along with Imperial College because the Government needed better accountants and actuaries as well as chemical engineers.  

For only recently (in the last two centuries) has either the inclination or the political need to think seriously about the lives of ordinary people as intrinsically significant emerged at all.

Nonsense! The King had to think about 'ordinary people'. If they didn't have enough food to eat, they might slaughter his garrison and run riot. States came into existence to solve collective action problems. In poorer states, the ruling class has to closely monitor the conditions of the masses. Thus, as Marx noticed, the German Prince brought in a Yankee- like Count Rumsford- to find ways to feed his people more cheaply and make them more productive. The American Federal Government could rely on a 'spoils system' because 

1) there was 'subsidiarity'- i.e. local communities solved their own collective action problems

2) there was a large entrepreneurial class which any White Male could become part of. Specific projects requiring Federal funding could be pushed through by a more or less corrupt political machinery. 

The history, remote or contemporary, of great men and dramatic events has only very lately made a place for people who are absent from the annals of monumental history.

Nonsense! History is all about this King or that Emperor having his head chopped off because the poor weren't getting enough bread to eat.  

These lives can never be more than statistics; but they have come to matter, partly because social scientists became convinced that they were important in and of themselves

No. Social Scientists realized that their discipline was applied Statistics with a bit of Game theory thrown in. If you weren't mathsy, you were merely masturbating. Admittedly, there was also some mathsy masturbation- e.g. Social Choice theory.  

and partly because the many began to assert themselves as urban citizens, as voters, as strikers, and as members of increasingly diverse and lay-oriented religious denominations.

This happened everywhere. But any set of institutions- not necessarily democratic- can accommodate these changes or else do stupid shit with the result that the country becomes a 'failed state'. 

All the social sciences are submerged biographies of the silent majority of humanity:

Nixon spoke of the 'silent majority'.  

the peasant, the artisan, the immigrant, the slave, women,

most of whom had the capability innovate or become entrepreneurs. Good mechanism design promotes this possibility. It is the path to affluence. 

and (in our case) that basic irreducible unit of representative politics, the voter. All of them, even as mere numbers, have surfaced in the human sciences as part of a long and slow democratization of values

Nonsense! Great Empires in the Egypt and Iraq and China and India had a class of bureaucrats. The first census in the world was conducted in 3800 BC. It also counted livestock and other resources.  

in a period whose ideologies were often in every degree hostile to these aspirations.

Ideologies don't matter. What concentrates minds is the risk that starving mobs will kill and eat the rich.  

This is the historical context that makes the fact-mindedness of the social sciences different from that of those ancient bureaucratic regimes that also liked to keep minute records about their subjects.

No. This is what makes them similar. It is a different matter that some people got paid a little money to teach worthless shite at Uni. The moment you graduate and start working, your boss tells you to forget everything the Professor said. 

Some of the finest social scientists from Alexander Hamilton to Vilfredo Pareto have been utterly opposed to democracy.

They pointed out certain obvious dangers. The Classical Liberal solution was to have 'checks and balances'.  

Others have been ardently democratic.

Interestingly, almost all social scientists are opposed to death- at least when it comes to themselves. The failure of social scientists to abolish death is due to Neo-Liberal Patriarchy and the fact that dicks haven't been banned despite the fact that dicks are RAPING the Environment.  

The democratization of values that is implicit in the social sciences in general is

like the Collectivization of farts. Society as a whole must take responsibility for the 'silent but deadly' one I just released.  

entirely compatible with a great variety of political beliefs and theories, including some of the most destructive and cruel.

In other words, the thing is meaningless.  

Nevertheless, I do want to argue that within a welter of diverse ideas the social sciences are fundamentally inclusive in their orientation

i.e. a drooling imbecile can get a PhD in Social Science. That's Inclusivity right there.  

and that given the institutions of American government, a
democratic political science was eventually to be expected.

What was not expected, back in the Fifties, is that Sociology & Poli Sci would turn to shit. 

To be fair, Shklar gives an okay account of late eighteenth and nineteenth century American political thought and ends with Dewey & Merriam. But, that's just when the story gets interesting. The Great Depression caused the Cowles Commission to use advanced mathematical techniques to understand and solve the new collective action problems (and opportunities) facing the nation. That's when Social Science become Sciencey rather than idealistic or historicist.  

I hope that I have shown that its history has been a profound meditation upon our political experiences and our peculiar and often tragically flawed institutions.

That may have been true prior to the Great Depression. After the Wall Street crash, there was no time for 'profound meditation' or, if there was a bit of money for it, the task could be palmed off on refugee scholars.  

I expect-indeed hope-that others will give different accounts. However, if one were to cast aspersions on American political theory,

You'd have to understand that guys like Tullock & Buchanan were doing it. Shklar wasn't. She was merely virtue signaling in a hysterical manner. 

it should not be that it is Oedipally attached to liberalism

Oedipus killed his daddy and fucked his mummy. If that's attachment, we don't want it.  

but that like the rest of the political classes of Europe and America, it failed to understand itself and lacked the imagination to project a plausibly better future.

No. It did the reverse. Rights become meaningful when analyzed as Hohfeldian Incidents. Link them to incentive compatible remedies under a bond of law. Or, don't bother. There may be a cheaper Coasian solution. American and European 'political science' pictured a better world and helped create it by getting Public Finance and mechanism design right.  

If we can learn to do better,

we aren't teaching worthless shite

it will be because democracy is itself dynamic.

Chinese Communism is more so.  

The history of American political science is a part of its development,

No. It is a function of who would be willing to pay for it and whether they would notice if only cretins produced it.  

which was neither painless nor uniform; but it has been an intellectual adventure of the first order.

It really hasn't. Quantum Mechanics is an intellectual adventure of the first order. A guy with room-temperature IQ can do Poli Sci. Did you know Modi has a Masters degree in 'entire Political Science'? Mamta has a Doctorate from 'East Georgia University'. Nobody cares. What can't be denied is that they are superb politicians- i.e. masters of 'the art of the possible', not some arcane theory. 

As for 'American Political Theory'- what can we say about it in the age of Trump? Cruelty to migrants is celebrated. A climate of fear is celebrated. If oppression is what will make America great again, we can't have too much of it. 

Shklar appeared a true prophet in the era of Clinton, Obama & even Joe Biden. It wasn't that long ago when political correctness or 'wokeism' ruled the roost. 

The Aeon article I previously mentioned was written just 5 years ago. I suppose it was written before COVID took hold and suddenly the 'boomer' generation knew the meaning of real fear. Our liberties were taken away on a scale unprecedented in peace-time. Yet, most of us were touchingly grateful to the State for enforcing these restrictions. 

 In America... the fight between master and slave had not been just a Hegelian fantasy, it had been real.

No. It had been real in Haiti. In the US, the masters were simply too strong. Also, the White Southerner didn't really believe that the slave was hard working. He thought only fear of the whip kept him at his task.  

The fight against slavery was a fight for ‘freedom itself’, it was ‘a way of political life’ and was very differently conceived than the mainly European distinction between positive and negative liberty of which Berlin had been so fond.

There was a fight over the right of secession which had an economic aspect. The South might have preferred to have free trade with the UK. The North wanted protection for its industries. The West wasn't happy with the North's financial domination but it needed capital to expand and populate the frontier. 

Hannah Arendt was another of her targets.

To be fair, Shklar's parents had taken her to Canada which never had slavery. Arendt was very happy to get to Jim Crow America.  

Shklar admired Arendt, but felt that something was amiss in her work.

It was ignorant shite. It was Ayn Rand who made more money and who had a political impact.  

Shklar agreed with what Arendt had to say about the unprecedented social and political conditions under which the American republic was first conceived:

There were no unprecedented conditions. Different territories have different economic interests. Would the King do a deal acceptable to the colonists? No. He was as mad as a hatter.  

the notable success the Founding Fathers had in absorbing the revolutionary spirit and energy of the people,

meaningless shite. The people didn't want to pay taxes to King George. Also they wanted to expand to their West regardless of any treaties with the 'Injuns'. Because they were very good at fighting, they prevailed. 

establishing the country’s political institutions, and finally the relative success and achievements of the American revolution when compared with the problems associated with the French revolution.

The Americans expelled the Loyalists once and for all. After that, they had dual sovereignty and each State could pretty much do as it liked. The French were synoecist- i.e. centralizing. The result was that they exchanged a King for an Emperor.  

However, Shklar thought that Arendt’s account of America ‘exploded into wrongness’. Too much of the US and its history was missing from Arendt’s picture. For instance, the US had to fight a Civil War in order to secure the liberal promises of its revolution for African-American men, let alone women.

Hilarious! White dudes in 1776 were promising the world to darkies. Also, they demanded the banning of dicks- save such as are used for exclusively homosexual purposes.  

Arendt had no real appreciation of post-Civil War history,

she didn't know modern German history. She had studied utter shite at Uni.  

the complexities of Southern politics,

she knew well enough that darkies did the shitty jobs and couldn't vote in many of the States. She didn't care. She wanted to earn dollars and that is what she did.  

or of the many dimensions of American race relations, which could not be addressed through a simple distinction between public and private life.

Nor could they be addressed by some more complex distinction. What mattered was things like Voter Registration and entering segregated diners. That took courage.  

Shklar also differed from Arendt in her understanding of the environment in which Americans found themselves. Using an expression first coined by Ralph Waldo Emerson, she distinguished between the ‘party of hope’ and the ‘party of memory’. The former position was represented by Thomas Paine

Paine was a crank. He lost popularity by attacking organized religion and the contribution of George Washington.  

and Thomas Jefferson, and referred to the rejection of and radical rupture with almost everything that related to European history; Paine and Jefferson not only insisted firmly on living in the present,

then they died. They should have insisted on living in a more vehement manner 

but their attitudes also allowed them to nurture bright hopes for the future.

then they died. Sad.  

John Adams, and to some extent James Madison, represented what Shklar called the party of memory: both suggested looking to the past in order to find out what had gone wrong with classical European republicanism.

Why not simply admit that Adams and Madison had different economic interests from Jefferson?  

Adams and Madison shared a more pessimistic outlook than Jefferson and Paine, and Shklar thought this more robust. It allowed her to criticise both Arendt’s classicist republicanism and her uncritical defence of American exceptionalism, and also to give due credit to a skeptical tradition of American political thought.

A Canadian probably does know more about America than a German.  

Again, these were echoes of her take on the peculiarly American interpretation of the liberalism of fear. Shklar’s position amounts to one that sees American liberalism as a rather delicate achievement.

It was swamped by Jacksonian populism long ago. The question was who would control the gigantic state apparatus created over the course of the Thirties and Forties. The answer was technocrats like McNamara till they shat the bed and first tax-payers and then, later on, share holders, rebelled. 

Unlike Arendt’s treatment of the American political tradition, for which Mount Rushmore’s monumentalism is the obvious symbol,

Peter Norbeck was the Senator from South Dakota. He got federal funding to create a tourist attraction. It is said that President Coolidge enjoyed fishing there so much he signed off on the project. 

Shklar arrived at a more sophisticated and vital understanding of America and its history – and how its arguments are still played out and matter in our time.

No. American politics is but the shadow thrown by economic forces. Shklar didn't understand Econ.  

One might ask, where is the positive in all this? Shklar was no system builder, unlike her friend and colleague John Rawls.

He misunderstood Harsanyi's 'veil of ignorance' gedanken. Also, he had never heard of Insurance. If you could end up disabled and unable to work, you take out insurance or vote for a compulsory insurance scheme.  

She was highly critical of Rawls’s attempt to build a theory of justice with his 1971 book of that name.

But not for the right reason.  

In her own, much shorter book The Faces of Injustice (1990), she suggested a change of perspective: injustice is not just the negative counterpart to justice. Instead, injustice must be studied as a phenomenon in its own right.

But if stupid people do the studying, the result will be stupidity. In any case, the theory of justice is the theory of justiciability which distinguishes cases where injustice has a remedy. 

She maintained that to give injustice its due demands not only a different perspective but also a different type of narrative, one that helps to identify and recognise the many victims of injustice.

Shklar was teaching imbeciles. Her colleagues were cretins. She needed to identify and recognize the various types of horrendous epistemic self-abuse they had been subjected to. While at the LSE, I made it a point to approach Dr. Amartya Sen and condole with him for the repeated anal rape he must have suffered at the hands of various slum-dogs in Calcutta. Sadly, he did not appear grateful for my solicitude.  

Such a new critical approach, she argued, could tell us more about the many faces of injustice

e.g. the face Amartya Sen makes when he is being buggered by a Dalmatian.  

than following the false hope of striving for an ever-more perfect state of justice,

Shklar taught shit. She wasn't striving for anything.  

including the idea of a perpetual amelioration of the laws.

Which is what actually happens. That's why judges and lawyers get paid lots of money.  

Shklar’s political thought presents particular challenges to triumphalist and exceptionalist narratives.

Very true. Trump would shut the fuck up any time she was prowling around.  

She detected that the legacy of slavery made America’s commitment to democracy often sound hollow.

American democracy meant it could keep slavery for longer than the British West Indies.  

To her, discrimination remained a major scar that had not healed, despite all the rhetoric of equality and hard-fought-for improvements such as citizenship.

White lady liked virtue signaling. Black ladies weren't taken in. Every time she mentioned slavery or Jim Crow, they would ask how many of her Aunties were killed by Hitler.  

Her position with regard to relations between Israel and Palestine was even more revealing. She never defended the hawks and hardliners in the conflict

which made them cry and cry 

‒ and dared to say so in a letter that she circulated to colleagues and friends

i.e. useless cretins 

after a visit to the region in 1987.

Did she support recognition of the Palestinian state in 1988? The fact is, the US had been quietly pushing Israel to return to the pre-67 borders even in the time of Nixon and the Rodgers Plan. That's why Kissinger was hated by the Israelis.  

She reminded her American friends to remain realists, focusing on what could be achieved ‒ and defended. She did so by pointing out that ‘the Jews of Israel have achieved one of the aims of Zionism: they are no different, neither worse nor better, than the rest of mankind.

Sadly, they were better than their neighbors. Even economically, they began to rise in the Eighties thanks to Reagan's 'tough love'.  

They are neither smarter, nor more virtuous than all the other nations.’

No. On average, they are smarter, have lower alcoholism, spousal abuse, etc.  

Shklar’s intellectual formation is quintessentially that of

a person too stupid to do STEM subjects 

an exile. Born Judith Nisse in 1928 into a mainly German-speaking Jewish family,

Jews had only been allowed to settle in Riga in 1841. Thus, this was an immigrant family living amongst an alien people. 

her upbringing in Riga was not that of the typical Jewish shtetl of the region. Her father was a wealthy businessman, her mother a medic. Her education took place in a French lycée, an urban and secularised environment dominated by humanist subjects and language education.

In other words, her upbringing alienated her from the Latvian majority. But it also made it easier for her to assimilate to countries with a West European language and culture.  

In 1939, her parents decided to heed the advice of family friends to escape to Sweden. 

In one lucky move, the family managed to escape the totalitarian threat of both Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia. From Sweden, the Nisse family moved on, equipped with false papers, first through the Soviet Union to Vladivostok, then from Vladivostok to Japan, and finally from Japan via ship to Seattle. On arrival in the US, they were interned but, thanks to a rabbi who had spotted them among mainly Chinese and other internees of Asian origin, soon released.

In other words, her family was saved because of the color of their skin. 


This odyssey demonstrated to the adolescent Judith that conditions existed in which, independent of how wealthy one’s parents were or how educated one was, no guardian angel would come to the rescue to guarantee safe passage and asylum.

It showed the reverse. Money was the guardian angel.  

It pushed her into a kind of refuge in books and made her sharpen her intellectual interests, in the first instance in classic and modern literature and later in political ideas.

Because she was too stupid to do STEM subjects.  

It would be facile to draw a straight line between Shklar’s work at Harvard and her experience fleeing Riga followed by a harrowing journey into exile.

Latvia was a democracy in the inter-war period. The State monitored anti-Semitic activities and could provide a little protection to the Jewish community.  

But it would also be a mistake to maintain that there is no relationship between her early experience and a life spent thinking deeply about the political problems of loyalty, obligation and belonging.

There were no such problems. North America had been good to her family. They were loyal and soon felt they belonged.  


Toward the end of her life, Shklar undertook work on citizenship, exile and emigration to

play the Holocaust card and attract attention to herself 

throw new light on the history of political obligation and loyalty.

No such light was needed. The thing was as plain as day.  

She had always felt that the story of exile sat uncomfortably with the ideal of belonging.

She wasn't an exile. She was an immigrant. There may have been some Latvian Jews in America who booked their passage home after the place had been annexed by Stalin. They were exiles. Shklar wasn't. She didn't go to Latvia on a tourist visa.   

As she pointed out in her last two essays and in some of the lectures given just a few months before her death in September 1992 (recently published as On Political Obligation), exile was a fundamental human experience

as opposed to a canine experience? But it isn't fundamental at all. Few are exiles. Migration, for economic reasons, is much more common.  

that had captured the attention of historians, poets and novelists. Despite the depth and breadth of interest in exile, political theorists had had little to say on it – something that she attempted to remedy.

Exiles are often deeply involved in a type of politics which may bring about regime change in the home country. Some exiles gain command over immigrant communities with mischievous consequences. Mary Kaldor has studied this phenomenon.  

The exile’s perspective allowed her to address aspects of some core problems of political thought, including conditions for submission to rules and political obligation, but from an original angle.

She wasn't an exile. It is not the case that she had to flee Canada. She moved to the US to advance her career.  

Shklar was aware that today’s emigrants and exiles face conditions different from the ones that she and her family had faced fleeing from mid-20th century Europe.

No. Nothing much had changed.  

In many instances, there is no host country to offer asylum.

The US was turning away boatloads of Jews. The places which would let you in tended to be shitholes. That is still true today.  

There is often no country to escape to. Most of today’s refugees find themselves ‘in pure limbo’, a situation that evokes moral concern, even moral outrage.

It also evoked a shift to the Right in Europe & America. But Pakistan and Iran are now deporting Afghans in industrial quantities.  

In turn, those who are outraged and show solidarity find themselves in a solitary situation akin to that faced by Henry David Thoreau:

No they don't. Thoreau wrote well. They don't.  

they can neither join a liberating force nor is it always possible to identify fully with the many refugees due to the lack of detailed knowledge, physical distance, culture and lack of shared language.

Very true. If you claim to be a Somali woman, people expect you to speak Somali.  

As Shklar rightly observes, there is no ‘we’ here. What exactly do obligation and loyalty refer to?

Virtue signaling and hypocrisy.  

What are the responsibilities of humans to one another in such situations?

They must offer elderly Professors gratuitous rape counselling. Say 'I know you have been viciously raped by various dogs. Also, you were forced to eat cat poo by Chairman Miaow. I want you to know that we all empathize with you.' 

Since her death, Shklar’s questions on exile have grown weightier, and her insights sharper.

Because, as a ghost, she is slightly less stupid. 

For her, exclusionary practices

e.g. burying or cremating dead people instead of inviting them to dinner 

often give birth to loyalties of dubious quality.

Not if you exclude those whose loyalty is dubious. Killing them, too, sends a strong signal.  

One conclusion that offers itself from the modern experience is that cultural and national cohesion remain overrated ideas, prolonging and even causing the conditions in which injustices thrive.

Worse yet is the fact that dicks haven't been banned. Dicks cause RAPE! 

Shklar was aware that citizenship might not be the solution to all problems

even if Trump gives US citizenship to everybody in the world, dicks will continue to exist.  

but she was convinced that it remained an essential precondition not only for achieving a democratic and principally open country

Very true. Once 1.3 billion Muslims move into the US, they can vote for Sharia law. 

but first and foremost for making possible the experience of individual liberty.

e.g. by killing kaffirs.  

Wednesday, 10 December 2025

C.E Trevelyan on the Irish famine


In his book on the Irish Famine, C.E. Trevelyan quotes from a paper submitted to the Horticultural Society in 1822,

The effect of the unlimited extent to which (the potato's) cultivation may be carried, on the human race, must be a subject of deep interest to the political economist.

It seemed to lift the Malthusian curb on population. Trevelyan, previously a Civil Servant in India before being put in charge of the Irish & later the Scottish Famine, had been a pupil of Malthus at the East India Training College.  

The extension of population will be as unbounded as the production of food, which is capable of being produced in very small space, and with great facility; and the increased number of inhabitants of the earth will necessarily induce changes, not only in the political systems, but in all the artificial relations of civilised life.

In Ireland, you could get a labourer to work for you by giving him a tiny plot of land and a cabin. He could grow enough potatoes to feed himself and his family. Indeed, you could even start charging him rent- or, if you were too lazy, you could get a sub-tenant to do it for you.  What's more, you could start up a factory and get free labour because the cottier, renting his land from year to year, grew his own potatoes. Any eggs or bacon he was able to produce would have to be sold to cover his rent. Eating potatoes alone, he and his family would work long hours in your factory. 

Consider the Ralahine Commune in Ireland founded in 1831. A landlord, John Scott Vandeleur, fearful that agrarian secret societies might spread amongst his tenantry, brought in an English Socialist, Edward Thomas Craig, to create and run a flax factory. Vandeleur soon gambled away his estate and absconded. The experiment ended in 1833. Still, the marvellous potato, which appeared three times as calorific as wheat, must have put the idea of immense riches into the heads of landlords. Your workers feed themselves out of marginal land you own. Whatever wage you pay them, you get back as rent. This is a money making perpetual motion machine. This means the capitalized value of agricultural land is bound to rise and rise.

It must be said, this rosy view was not shared by the Irish poor- or even the class of intermediaries. There was bound to be a month or two of dearth because potatoes did not keep. There was also the folk memory of periodic blights. The problem was that those at the bottom of the heap didn't have the resources to diversify while those above them didn't have the incentive- more particularly after English style Poor Laws were introduced. Firstly, since the landlord became responsible for paying the poor rate for those leasing land for less than 4 pound per annum, the temptation was to evict the small fry. Secondly, those leasing more than a quarter acre were disqualified from receiving poor relief. In other words, there was no implicit risk-pooling or 'moral economy'. Similar problems existed with the incumbered Estate Act. 

The big landlords, absentees more of then than not, didn't care about raising productivity or just keeping their work-force together in bad times. Nor could the intermediary class do any substantial risk-pooling or diversification because any mechanism by which it could be done would be corruptly captured and rendered incentive incompatible. 

Still, there must have been some sort of 'moral economy' amongst the Gaelic peasantry otherwise the fatalities would have been 'front loaded'. In 1845, potato output fell by a third. But the next year it was down by three quarters. The big problem with the potato is that a much bigger amount of seed-potato is required per acre than is the case with wheat. Thus the agony of the Gael was prolonged. 

How far such changes may conduce to or increase the happiness of mankind, is very problematical, more especially when it is considered, that since the potato, when in cultivation, is very liable to injury from casualties of season, and that it is not at present known how to keep it in store for use beyond a few months, a general failure of the year’s crop, whenever it shall have become the chief or sole support of a country, must inevitably lead to all the misery of famine, more dreadful in proportion to the numbers exposed to its ravages.

It appears that almost the entirety of the population growth Ireland experienced in the first half of the nineteenth century was wiped out because of the potato blight. Those who had been dependent on it either died or emigrated. 

Writing of Ireland, Trevelyan could be speaking of the Permanent Settlement in India in the manner in which A.O Hume would soon come to speak of it. 

In Ireland, in 1870, 3 percent of agriculturists owned their own land. By 1929 the proportion, in Eire, was 97 percent. Ireland's refusal to pay the 'land annuity' (i.e. interest on British loans which had allowed tenants to purchase their land) led to an Economic war in the Thirties which, sadly, the valiant Da Valera was bound to lose. This meant continued emigration and population decline till the beginning of the Sixties. 

There are diminishing returns to research on the Irish or Bengali famines. True, official accounts of the period may have kept silent on some things- after all, bureaucrats have political masters- but other accounts are available which give a more rounded picture. This raises the question was the Potato famine 'genocide'? 

Several U.S. states, beginning with New Jersey and New York in 1996, have mandated history textbooks to include the Irish famine as akin to the trans-Atlantic slave trade or the Shoah.  The problem with this view is that it was up to the Irish rate-payer to provide appropriate relief under the Poor Law. Perhaps, if Daniel O'Connell had lived a little longer, a loan could have been taken to ease the burden on the rate-payer. After all, there can be no better investment than keeping hard working people alive and in good health.

It may be that if Ireland had had fiscal autonomy, it would have decided not to borrow so as to preserve its independence. If soo, the Irish famine would have been like the Finnish famine of the 1860s. 

What gives credibility to the charge of genocide is the suspicion  that if the people worst affected had been Protestant rather than Catholic, Westminster would have done much more for them. However, we must recognize that parts of Ireland, in the 1840s, had poor transport infrastructure. The 1879 famine led to far lower excess mortality because railways could transport food very quickly. Moreover, under the leadership of Parnell, the Irish had much better political representation. The diaspora, especially in America, raised vast sums and sent shiploads of food. More importantly, Westminster was finally coming round to the view that a prosperous, peaceful, Ireland required large scale land reform and what we would now call a pro-active 'industrial policy'. Sadly, many in England wanted to keep Ireland poor so as to gain cheap labour. Apparently, it was usual, on English farms to have a room above the stables where the 'hinds' (labourers) slept. A ladder led up to it and the farmer took away the ladder once the hinds had entered it for the night. This was so as to guard against the possibility that the hinds slaughter him in his sleep! 

 

Tuesday, 9 December 2025

知音


Since Unitarity is just one of those unctuous things
Pleasing to palates collegiums costively refine
That Yoga broke Bo Ya's lute strings
Smoke- Grothendieck's wine.

Note.
Wikipedia says ' Bo Ya's friendship with Zhong Ziqi generates the term Zhiyin (Chinese: 知音, original meaning: someone who knows music well), which means close friends that can completely understand each other.'

 When Zhong died, Bo Ya gave up music. No more would great mountains rise, or vast oceans flow, from what streamed from his lute. In other words, Mount Tai Shan & the River Huang He, too, lost the precondition for Yoga- viz. 'suhrit prapti'- a like hearted auditor or observer. Rta or Tao, repair this. So does Christ- if you will let him. 

Monday, 8 December 2025

Amartya Sen's two-faced poverty.


25 years ago the Inter-American Development Bank published the following article about Amartya Sen and the 'thousand faces of poverty'.  

What is poverty?

Low productivity. In particular, if a person makes less than is required to maintain life- he is poor.  

How is it measured?

By a deficit in income relative to the amount of money needed to stay alive.  

Who are the poor?

Those who fall below the poverty line.  

Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize winner for Economics, has devoted his life to such basic questions about development.

But they are easily answered. Devote your life to raising productivity or giving transfers to those unable to work. That is worthwhile.  But it isn't what Sen has done. He wrote pseudo-mathsy nonsense about imaginary problems- e.g. Arrow's theorem or Rawls's silly theory of justice. 

Defining and measuring poverty and calculating the percentage of poor people in a country or a region is not just a matter of numbers and averages.

Yes it is. Sadly, you may have to lower the poverty line if there isn't enough money to help those below it.  

In 1998, the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences awarded Amartya Sen the Nobel Prize for Economics “for having restored an ethical dimension to the discussion of vital economic problems.”

This is like giving the prize for best plumber to a guy who isn't a plumber but who argues that plumbers should be nice.  

Sen had delved beyond mathematical theory,

He isn't a mathematician. You can't delve into the theory of a thing of which you only have an undergraduate level knowledge.  

approaching economics with an innovative social vision that was more real and more human.

This is like a guy who can't fix your toilet but whose theory of plumbing says that plumbers should be nice. 

Years of hard work had helped him bring to light the many facets of poverty.

He hasn't done any actual work nor has he uncovered any 'facet' of poverty. He read somewhere that people have different metabolisms and nutritional needs. That's why special provision is made for them- e.g. expectant mothers were given a higher ration during the War. But this is an empirical, ideographic, matter. For a poor country, what matters is finding ways to boost productivity. Saying 'the government should give lots of money to poor people' is pointless. The Government doesn't have a lot of money. Why? Because productivity in the country is low.  

According to Sen, poverty is a complex, multifaceted world that requires a clear analysis in all of its many dimensions.

He is wrong. Poverty is about low productivity. There are many facets to this. Some policies (e.g. education) raise general purpose productivity. Others, like fixing a dysfunctional legal system, raise total factor productivity. By contrast, poverty has only one face or facet- viz. lack of income. 

“Human beings are thoroughly diverse,”

They really aren't. That's why a Doctor educated in India can practice just as well in America or Europe.  

the professor recently explained during a meeting of the Network of Policymakers for Poverty Reduction, an Inter-American Development Bank initiative.

i.e. a useless talking shop. 

“You cannot draw a poverty line and then apply it across the board to everyone the same way, without taking into account personal characteristics and circumstances.”

Nonsense! Governments do draw such a line and then make special provision for the disabled, expectant mothers, etc. etc.  

There are geographical, biological and social factors that amplify or reduce the impact of income on each individual.

But they are easily compensated for. That's why Doctors can treat patients from different countries and social backgrounds.  

The poor generally lack a number of elements, such as education,

some uneducated people are rich. They may have some special talent which makes them very productive.  

access to land,

plenty of rich people have zero access to land because they prefer to live in penthouse apartments 

health and longevity,

rich people can die young of incurable diseases 

justice,

a rich guy may be sent to jail for a crime he didn't commit 

family and community support,

Scrooge has neither yet is as rich as fuck.  

credit and other productive resources,

because they have low income- i.e. can't service debt. Also they can't buy a factory. Sad.  

a voice in institutions,

they may do. Sadly, those institutions may be powerless because of lack of resources arising from low productivity 

and access to opportunity.

Modi is poor. Rahul is rich. But it is Modi who seized the opportunity to become PM.  


According to Sen, being poor does not mean living below an imaginary poverty line, such as an income of two dollars a day or less.

Yet, such a person is in fact poor.  

It means having an income level that does not allow an individual to cover certain basic necessities, taking into account the circumstances and social requirements of the environment.

Which is what happens if you earn less than two dollars a day. A richer country can afford a higher poverty line.  

Furthermore, many of the factors are interconnected.

There is only one factor which matters- viz. productivity. Why won't Sen mention it? The answer is that it is useful to focus on ways to raise productivity. But, as a buddhijivi, Sen is averse to doing anything useful. His job is to scold all those nasty economists who raise productivity and help their countries become richer.  

Sen has found examples to illustrate his theory in the world of women, where he has done pioneering work,

No. He jumped on the 'missing millions' bandwagon which began in the mid Seventies when sex-selective abortion became popular. But, prior to that, there had been good old fashioned female infanticide.  

along with his studies on famines

which is caused by food availability deficit. The solution is to grow more food and invest in transport infrastructure so as to get the food to where it is needed. But British ICS officers knew all about this fifty years before Sen was born.  

and freedoms, and on the economics of poverty.

This simply isn't true. Sen doesn't even understand 'Giffen goods'- e.g. the fact that poor people may eat more potatoes when Income falls.  He believed that when incomes rose for those in Bengal who were working in war industries, they suddenly started eating three or four times as much rice as they previously had. The reverse was the case. If real income goes up, you eat less rice and more fish or vegetables. 

A woman with more education, he explains, tends to have a better paid job,

Unless she lives in a strict Islamic state. In some Indian States, higher female education correlates with lower participation in the work force. Why? Richer people can spend more on educating their daughters. But those daughters get married off into high status families which look askance upon women having a career. 

better control over her fertility,

unless contraception is banned 

and better health indicators for herself and her children.

only if household income is higher.  

For years, Sen has preached that the image of women as heroines relegated to self-sacrifice for home and family has not helped them at all.

Why not preach getting rural girls into giant factory dormitories? That's what leads to demographic transition. Higher productivity then directly raises real wages and permits collective insurance against sickness, unemployment, etc.  

“There are systematic disparities in the freedoms that men and women enjoy in different societies,” says Sen, “and these disparities are often not reducible to differences in income and resources.”

But, even more often, they are reducible to differences in income. If Sen were right, then Equal Pay Legislation would do little to tackle the underlying problem.  

There are many other areas with gender disparities, such as the division of labor in the household, 

only if there is a household 

the extent of education received, and the liberties that the different members of the same household are permitted to enjoy.

Governments and NGOs have specific programs to tackle these problems. Sen is ignorant of them. 

How people must look in order to be accepted in society–the clothes they wear and their physical traits–limits their economic options, a phenomenon Sen refers to as “social shame.”

Sen read this in Adam Smith. No doubt, in England in the Fifties, there was some truth to this notion. But, by the Seventies, the belted Earl and the Cockney prole were indistinguishable.  

Rather than measuring poverty by income level, Sen recommends calculating how much an individual can achieve with that income,

Nobody knows what they can achieve with their income. Had I bought 100 dollars worth of bitcoin ten years ago, I would now have 50,000 dollars.  

taking into account that such achievements will vary from one individual to another and from one place to another.

You can't take into account what is unknowable- e.g. the price of bitcoin ten years from now. 

Otherwise, how could we explain the existence of pockets of poverty in rich countries among middle-income people?

Drugs.  

In the inner cities of the United States,

where gangbangers indulge in drive-by shooting 

because of inadequate services the quality of life (measured in terms of life expectancy, infant mortality, health, education, and safety) of people who earn acceptable incomes and live in a rich society is comparable—and sometimes even inferior—to that of many poor countries in the rest of the world.

There was a period when young African American males had higher longevity and better educational and vocational outcomes if they were incarcerated under 'three strikes'. That is why that policy was popular with African American voters.  

Sen was born in India’s West Bengal state, and has used his country and China as a laboratory to study the economics of development.

No. He remained wholly ignorant of both. There is a story that he once went to Punjab to spend some time living with a family of farmers. He soon came running back to Delhi.  

He is currently a professor at Harvard University and Master at Trinity College at Cambridge University.

He spent about ten years in India but had to leave after eloping with his best friend's wife. Otherwise, his career has been entirely in the West- about which he knows nothing. He once said that Britain under Thatcher might face a Bangladesh style famine! 

Based on his extensive experience in development and poverty reduction, he had devised a large repertoire of theories and teachings that he believes also apply to Latin America and the Caribbean.

He has given bureaucrats an excuse to talk endless bollocks without actually doing anything.  

According to Sen, poverty analysis should focus on an individual’s potential to function rather than the results the individual obtains from functioning.

He is wrong. When analysing something undesirable there is only one way to proceed- viz. tackle the root problem which, for poverty, is low productivity. It is amazing that Sen, who comes from a country with very low productivity, has never once applied his mind to raising it. But that is easily done. Imitate what more successful countries have done. Don't try to reinvent the wheel.  

Another of Sen’s achievements has been to sweeten the development pill.

Nonsense! He ran away from India long ago. England and America were already developed. Manmohan sweetened the development pill by permitting some actual development with the result that the middle class expanded greatly and was able to buy nice cars and houses etc. Sen was against Manmohan.  

In the stroke of a pen, Sen did away with the blood, sweat and tears approach that had been pushed on underdeveloped countries as the only way for them to achieve progress.

Why not also get rid of death? Sadly, pen strokes have no magical powers. While Sen was talking nonsense, South Korea and Singapore and then China embraced export led growth. They raised productivity and thus became affluent. Sen objects to India taking the same road. That's why non-Bengali Indians despise him.  

The old theory of sacrifice has given way to that of individual success, which Sen subscribes to, provided that there is a framework of social support and genuine democracy.

Sadly the countries which have risen most in Asia have had neither for the greater part of their post-war history.  

This was the explanation Sen gave for the profound financial and social crisis that swept across Asia in 1998.

It was a market correction, nothing more.  

Efforts there had focused on production and individual success,

corporate success.  

but without a network of social support or the freedoms necessary for a democracy to thrive.

China is thriving. It has no fucking democracy. India had higher per capita income in 1980. Now China is about five times bigger. (Though under ppp, it might be only 2.5 times that of India).  

Sen believes that inequality, like poverty, is a multifaceted problem.

It isn't a problem. Development occurs because inequality increases. People have an incentive to imitate what the smarter people are doing.  

And in the course of a conversation laden with social commentary, the issue of globalization inevitably comes up.

Unknown to the participants, by 2015, with the rise of Trump & Sanders, the backlash against globalization would succeed. Hilary Clinton did a U turn on TPP. It was too little, too late.  

The protests against it, says Sen, have invigorated a very necessary debate on its impact.

The debate didn't matter. Trump & Sanders did. But immigration was as much an issue as the 'export of jobs'.  

In his view, globalization can be neither rejected outright nor accepted without serious criticism.

Criticism does not matter. Trump becoming POTUS does.  

First, we have to see what percentage of the world is benefiting from it. Because it’s one thing if education is 90 percent for the wealthy and 10 percent for the poor, and something very different if the proportion is 70/30 or 60/40.

Fuck that. The rich can afford to accumulate degrees on fancy campuses. The poor can't. What matters is the productivity gap. Bridge that and you cease to be poor. Take the lead, and it is your turn to be rich and to condescend to those you have overtaken. 

On the other hand, if you are stupid and useless, defeat your own poverty of ideas by virtue signalling like crazy. That's what Sen did. Being a darkie, he was awarded intellectual affirmative action. But Manmohan and Montek and Modi actually helped India to rise a little.  This made Sen very angry. He turns his scowl at Punjabis and Gujeratis who want the country to grow rich. His sweet and saintly smile, he turns towards Whitey. They reward him with Prizes and Honorary Doctorates. But it was Yunus, not Sen, who got to run his country. It is sad to think that Amartya was unable to make India a present to the Islamists as Yunus has done in Bangladesh. 

Sraffa's reswitching silliness


Sraffa's 'production of commodities by means of commodities' assumes that markets- and therefore 'market-makers' (arbitrageurs)- exist. However, people are not commodities. You can sell labour power. You can't sell yourself. The entrepreneur who combines factors of production is a free agent. He is not a slave.

Only things bought and sold on open markets are 'commodities'. If commodities are used in the production of other commodities, then they are classed as 'capital' or 'intermediate' goods. Their price is determined in the relevant market by the activities of arbitrageurs. They may be guided by Accountancy practices- e.g. 'historic cost less depreciation'- or the reverse might happen- i.e. Accountants 'mark to market'.

Wikipedia says-

'Sraffa reswitching is a concept in Sraffian economics where the most profitable production technique can change back to a more capital-intensive method

provided 'capital' intensity doesn't mean ratio of Capital to Labour.  Sraffa thinks a machine isn't capital. It is actually labour, albeit supplied at an earlier period. 

at higher interest rates,

 At higher interest rates, people have an incentive to sell their capital stock and buy debentures. Sraffa assumes they won't act upon this motive. Either that, or he is not talking about a market economy. But, in that case, neither the interest rate nor the profit rate nor the price is determined 'endogenously'. Everything is set by the State- including who can buy at the set price and who can borrow and who can save and who can run an enterprise. Incentives don't matter. Punishments do. 

after initially switching to a labor-intensive one at a moderate rate.'

Sraffa either assumes time travel or else there is no actual 'switching'. People merely say 'we should have switched. We couldn't because Time Travel hasn't been invented yet.' 

 Sraffa was working within a Marxist 'capital is dead labour' model. If he found inconsistencies or inefficiency in that model- that was of concern only to people living in command economies. It had no relevance for Societies where capital is allocated through financial markets.

 In market economies, Capital is what people expect to produce a given stream of income. Its value is decided by 'market makers' or entrepreneurs undertaking that function. Thus if an engineer sinks a lot of his own money into a novel product we say he is making the market for it. If he succeeds, the money he spent is 'investment' and the plant and machinery he has created are 'capital goods'. But, if he fails, that money wasn't 'investment'. It was, at best, a write off or else an expensive hobby which involved pissing money against a wall. The plant and machinery he has are junk or scrap metal. It isn't a capital good. 

On the other hand, if the State allocates funds to an investment project, then market forces don't operate. Prices and interest and profit rates are set by command. Subsequent appraisal may show that resources were misallocated. But that wasn't because of market forces. It was because the wrong commands were given. 

Sraffa stipulated that 'current costs of production are the sum of present values of dated labour inputs whereby capital inputs correspond to dated labour costs'. This simply isn't true in a market economy. Sooner or later, accountants have to mark to market. 

Current cost of production is just the actual money spent on combining factors of production. 'Historical costs' may be used to calculate profit but the Audit committee may object to this because it might lead to hostile takeover by an asset stripper or else unsustainable dividend cover (because depreciation allowances don't cover replacement cost) which itself may tank share price. 

This phenomenon contradicts the neoclassical assumption that there is a consistent relationship between the rate of profit and the capital-intensity of a chosen technique.

It contradicts the assumption (unstated, perhaps unknown, to the neo-classicals) that arbitrage will ensure this outcome. In any case, by using arbitrary Accountancy protocols, you can always order the domain such that you get the desired graph of the function. But ex poste won't be ex ante because unanticipated things happen. 

Sraffa argued that the possibility of reswitching complicates the idea of a simple, continuous measure of "capital intensity" as a determinant of production choice

It would if commodities weren't market phenomena in some sense. (You make a market for stuff you make even if you choose to give it away for free to someone you like. This is because there are people who want to buy it even if they can't do so.)  

Accountants spend a lot of time valuing capital stock. Around the time the 'reswitching debate' began to rage, Accountants had to deal with the problem or inflation and technological obsolescence and rising land prices. The stage was being set for the 'asset stripper'. It was more profitable to buy an enterprise to shut it down and sell its assets. This was because 'historic cost' accounting produced a balance sheet which did not reflect 'break up' value. 

Since Sraffa wasn't talking about a Capitalist economy, the debate wasn't really about capital. It was about stupid academics teaching nonsense. 

What Ajit Sinha calls 

Piero Sraffa’s profound contribution to economics.

had nothing to do with finding ways to economize on the use of scarce resources. It involved some stupid guys who got paid a little money to teach nonsense to careerist cretins.  

  Amartya Sen said

'It would be, I believe, a mistake to see (as has been sometimes suggested) in Sraffa’s analysis a causal system rival to the standard neoclassical model of the determination of prices, quantities, and the distribution of incomes.

In other words, it wasn't a contribution to economics.  

Sraffa was changing the nature of the inquiry

away from anything which might be useful  

—toward an important but neglected theme

neglected because it was useless 

—rather than providing a different answer to a given question already in vogue in contemporary economics. — 

Just as Sen doesn't help answer the question how India can be less poor. He changes the nature of the inquiry to focus on the capability to have the functioning to have the capability to have the capability to talk bollocks.  

Ajit Sinha says-

When Piero Sraffa’s book Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities was published in 1960, it was received with perplexity by the larger economics community.

Commodities are produced by people. People can't be bought and sold like commodities- at least not since slavery was abolished. Thus commodities aren't produced by commodities. 

It was not clear what the work was all about.
The consensus which gained ground was that 'Piero Sraffa's main aim in writing 'Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities' was to provide a prelude to a critique of orthodox, neoclassical economic theory. His objective was to establish an alternative framework for the determination of prices and income distribution that was independent of the neoclassical concepts of supply and demand, marginal utility, and the marginal productivity of capital.' 

Since there were command economies where the State fixed prices and, moreover, there was a lot of 'administered pricing' in the Corporate sector, such frameworks, of an ad hoc type, already existed. Indeed they had been a big feature of the economies of combatant countries during both World Wars. But they were unravelling. In the West, you had the 'asset stripper' and a rebellion by 'institutional investors' which led to the emergence of Merger & Acquisition mavens who became billionaires by increasing, or claiming to increase, 'shareholder value'. The Communist East was discovering that Kantorovich shadow prices were shit. Sell on open markets and your people don't have to queue up for hours to get their hands on a kilo of rotting turnips. 
Though leading economists of the day perceived that there was something profound in it, they were not able to put their finger on what that was. Sir Roy Harrod’s (1961) review of Sraffa’s book is the case in point. Though Harrod showed a profound lack of understanding of Sraffa’s treatise, he nevertheless acknowledged that “The publication of this book is a notable event. … A reviewer would be presumptuous if he supposed that he could give a final assessment of the value of its net product, or even single out what may prove to be its most lasting contributions. Before that result could be achieved, much prolonged consideration and reconsideration would be required” (p. 783).

Would the UK move towards or away from markets? Sir John Hicks believed that the rate of profit was already being set by the Government. Suppose Harold Wilson comes to power? Might the country embrace out-and-out Communism? There were people who believed Wilson was a KGB plant.  

The book came to prominence in mid-1960 when the now famous capital theory debates between the “two Cambridges” reached their climax. Apparently, Paul Samuelson at the MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts, had set his doctoral student David Levhari the task of disproving a proposition of Sraffa regarding “re-switching of techniques.” Levhari published his refutation of Sraffa’s proposition in the Quarterly Journal of Economics in 1965.

Geoffrey Harcourt once recounted to me that he was perhaps the first person in Cambridge, UK, to have come across this paper by Levhari at the Applied Economics Library. He went straight to Sraffa and told him that “there is a chap at MIT Cambridge who claims that your re-switching proposition is false.”

Sraffa responded: “No, he is wrong, and you show it to him!”

Harcourt responded: “Me? I can’t do matrix algebra.”

To which Sraffa responded: “Neither can I.”

So Luigi Pasinetti was asked to do the job, and the rest is history.

A good 1966 paper by Bruno, Burmeister and Sheshinski gives a clear account of how this unfolded.

Now suppose there are some goods that take more than one period to produce. One can either treat goods-in-process of different ages as different goods (with different activities)

which is what happens if you 'mark to market' for balance sheet purposes

or else calculate directly the implied price relationships.

In other words, rely on historic costs. This is fine if you have 'administered pricing' and all output can be sold at that price.  

The Pasinetti-Sraffa numerical example uses precisely the latter type of capital model.

In which case, there is no profit maximizing. We aren't talking about a Capitalist economy. Also, the interest rate is set arbitrarily. Who gets to borrow or who is forced to save is decided by the State. In other words, the price system is not allocating resources.  

There is one general common characteristic of all these models from which reswitching and other properties can be shown to follow.

It is that they can't exist in a market economy. If interest rates rise sufficiently, you don't get re-switching. You get a cessation of investment because everybody wants to be a lender, not a borrower.  Of course, if the rate of return (marginal efficiency of capital) is some multiple of the interest rate, there would still be investment. But then the thing would be so profitable that choice of technique would not matter. Just do what is easiest for you to do. Maybe you only get to double rather than triple your money. What do you care? You are laughing all the way to the bank. 

In 1966, Samuelson organized a symposium in the QJE, in which it was accepted by all parties, including Samuelson himself, that Levhari had made a mistake and that Sraffa’s proposition is, of course, robust.

Wikipedia summarizes the outcome very lucidly-  

 In a 1966 article, the neoclassical economist Paul A. Samuelson summarizes the reswitching debate:

"The phenomenon of switching back at a very low interest rate to a set of techniques that had seemed viable only at a very high interest rate involves

not being able to sell up and put the money into debentures. 


 more than esoteric difficulties. It shows that the simple tale told by JevonsBöhm-BawerkWicksell and other neoclassical writers — alleging that, as the interest rate falls in consequence of abstention from present consumption in favor of future, technology must become in some sense more 'roundabout,' more 'mechanized' and 'more productive' — cannot be universally valid." ("A Summing Up," Quarterly Journal of Economics vol. 80, 1966, p. 568.)

this was obvious. These guys were old enough to remember the Great Depression.  

Samuelson gives an example involving both the Sraffian concept of new products made with labor employing capital goods represented by dead or "dated labor" (rather than machines having an independent role) and Böhm-Bawerk's concept of "roundaboutness" — supposedly a physical measure of capital intensity.

There is no 'roundaboutness' if you have enough market makers with rational expectations. Why? Intermediate goods can be sold for something close to expected present value. This means, inter alia, that economies in its production can be gained and so others can enter the market for the finished good with much shorter elapsed time for break-even.  

Instead of simply taking a neoclassical production function for granted, Samuelson follows the Sraffian tradition of constructing a production function from positing alternative methods to produce a product.

If we produce a thing we know we can produce it in a particular way. We can't be sure we will know how to produce it in a different way.  

The posited methods exhibit different mixes of inputs. Samuelson shows how profit maximizing (cost minimizing) indicates the best way of producing the output, given an externally specified wage or profit rate.

He forgets that if the interest rate is higher than the profit rate, the project gets discontinued. Money is transferred to Debentures.  

Samuelson ends up rejecting his previously held view that heterogeneous capital could be treated as a single capital good, homogeneous with the consumption good, through a "surrogate production function".

Anything can be treated as anything else for some purpose. Your accountant may say 'sell your business. Put your money into debentures. You will be better off.' He is treating assets as homogenous with respect to money returns.  

Consider Samuelson's Böhm-Bawerkian approach. In his example, there are two techniques, A and B, that use labor at different times (–1–2, and –3, representing years in the past) to produce output of 1 unit at the later time 0 (the present).

Two production techniques
time periodinput or outputtechnique Atechnique B
–3labor input02
–270
–106
0output11


Then, using this example (and further discussion), Samuelson demonstrates that it is impossible to define the relative "roundaboutness" of the two techniques as in this example, contrary to Böhm-Bawerkian assertions.

B takes longer. Surely that makes it more 'roundabout'?

He shows that at a profit rate above 100 percent technique A will be used by a profit-maximizing business;

Not if B had already been chosen. You can't travel back in time. What will happen is the guy who would otherwise do A first tries to buy B. He would only go ahead with A if the profit rate was so high that he'd still be happy though reporting a higher rate of return.  

between 50 and 100 percent, technique B will be used;

It can't be chosen in time period -2. 

while at an interest rate below 50 percent, technique A will be used again.

Only A will be used unless it wasn't an option in time period-2 and can't buy out the guy doing B, you have no choice but to do A. So you have two different techniques without any switching between them. They have different rates of return. We might say, the 'marginal efficiency of Capital' is determined by the return on A which represents the addition, at the margin, to the Capital stock. 

The interest-rate numbers are extreme, but this phenomenon of reswitching can be shown to occur in other examples using more moderate interest rates.

There is no 'reswitching'. If you committed to B, you either sell out or carry on. If you come into the game at time-3 

The second table shows three possible interest rates and the resulting accumulated total labor costs for the two techniques. Since the benefits of each of the two processes is the same, we can simply compare costs. The costs in time 0 are calculated in the standard economic way, assuming that each unit of labor costs $w to hire:

where L–n is the amount of labor input in time n previous to time 0.

Reswitching
interest ratetechnique Atechnique B
150%$43.75$46.25
75%$21.44$21.22
0%$7.00$8.00

The results in bold-face indicate which technique is less expensive, showing reswitching.

If there is perfect arbitrage, B sells out or the guy doing A settles for a lower rate of return. Nobody can go back in time to switch technique.  

There is no simple (monotonic) relationship between the interest rate and the "capital intensity" or roundaboutness of production, either at the macro- or the microeconomic level of aggregation.

There are plenty but they are arbitrary.  

The proposition in question refutes the Clarkian-type neoclassical explanation of the rate of interest on capital on the basis of the “marginal productivity of capital,” which requires measurement of “intensity” of capital independently of the rate of interest.

Capital intensivity is determined by the money cost of physical capital relative to labour. This is independent of the rate of interest. It is computable based on the wage and the price of the capital goods in question. 

Sraffa’s “re-switching” proposition showed that, in general, there is no logical way by which the “intensity of capital” can be measured independently of the rate of interest —

Because he doesn't have a market for capital goods. He is not talking about a market economy. Otherwise, whatever is produced in time-3 in B has a price. That means B is actually more capital intensive than A in period -2. But if the rate of profit is higher than the interest rate, A may be chosen alongside B. 

and hence the widely held neoclassical explanation of distribution of income was logically untenable.

Anything at all can be made 'logically tenable'. The question is whether the thing is useful.  

This victory was hailed as the crowning glory of Sraffa’s book, but it came at a high price.

People decided Capital & Growth theory was useless. Finance was a separate field. Good mathematicians could make money and do something useful in that field. Also, if you like Marxism so much, why don't you fuck off to the Soviet Union? 

The orthodoxy interpreted Sraffa’s re-switching proposition as his main contribution to economic theory; they accepted its truthfulness and argued that the modern general-equilibrium orthodox economics need not aggregate capital independently of prices or the rate of interest, and hence the Sraffa critique of the orthodox theory was not fatal but rather minor.

So, either he made no contribution or made a minor contribution. That seems fair.  

Samuelson’s (1959) non-substitution theorem had already shown that a General Equilibrium model with the assumption of constant returns to scale and no possibility of technical substitution can generate classical-type price solutions independently of demand functions. In 1982, Frank Hahn published an influential paper in the Cambridge Journal of Economics in which he claimed that Sraffa can be incorporated as a special case of the inter-temporal General Equilibrium Model (see Sinha 2010, 2016 for a rebuttal). All this led to a general perception among the orthodox that the book on Sraffa can finally be closed. In a strange way it appeared that Sraffians lost the war after winning the great battle.

Everybody lost the war. Samuelson as much as Sraffa. There was a time when people thought that maybe 'shadow prices' and networked computers could allocate resources efficiently. Sadly, this was not the case. Knightian uncertainty obtained with a vengeance- i.e. unexpected events occurred more and more frequently.

One reason for this, was that perhaps the war was fought on side issues. My last several years of archival research (largely funded by INET and CIGI, see Sinha 2016) has led me to conclude that the battles, both in the areas of pure theory and history of thought, were fought on the wrong terrain—the question of re-switching of techniques was not the central aspect of Sraffa’s pure theory. It is a book that was designed to challenge the orthodox economic theory in a more fundamental way—there lies a methodological and philosophical sub-terrain underneath the apparent economic theory of the book.

Indeed. Sraffa was trying to give a labour theory of value based account of Capital. He failed.  

We should not forget that Ludwig Wittgenstein credited Sraffa for “the most consequential ideas” of the Philosophical Investigations (1953) and had put him high on his short list of geniuses.

Nor should we forget that Wittgenstein was wrong about everything.  

Wittgenstein had regular discussions with Sraffa for more than a decade during 1930s and ’40s in Cambridge,

Sraffa tried his best to avoid talking to Witless.  

England, and at many occasions he told his friends that those discussions “made him feel like a tree from which all branches had been cut” (Monk 1990, p. 261). Thus the philosophical sophistication and sharpness of Sraffa’s mind is beyond doubt. Unfortunately, Sraffa’s revolutionary contribution to economic theory was lost to the intellectual world because economists did not pay attention to the philosophical underpinnings of his economic theory.

He was trying to do stupid shit. If there was some merit to his approach, accountants and finance mavens would have already discovered and used it. Having a better theory of capital means you can become very rich. It must be said, Sraffa did make a bundle by buying Japanese scrip when it was undervalued. However, had the US not encouraged Japanese industry because of the Korean war, he would have lost money. In other words, something unanticipated made his investment profitable. 

Actually, the book was designed to challenge the usual mode of theorizing in terms of essential and mechanical causation — prices are shown to be neither ultimately caused by labor or utility/scarcity, nor are they determined by the forces of demand and supply. It, instead, argues for a descriptive or geometrical theory based on simultaneous relations. Sraffa demonstrates that on the basis of observed input-output data of an interconnected system of production, one can show, by simply rearranging them, that the rate of profits of the system can be determined without the knowledge of prices, if the wage rate is given from outside the system.

In other words, if people are slaves or robots, wages have no effect in determining the allocation of labour or the incentive to work hard.  

In this context, prices have only one role in the system and that is to consistently account for the given distribution of the net output in terms of wages and the rate of profits (introduction of rent of land does not make any difference to the result). Prices, in this context, do not carry any information that prompts “agents” to adjust their supplies and demands to bring about an equilibrium in the market. The questions of equilibrium as well as market structure are simply irrelevant to the problem.

Because Sraffa is assuming that workers are mindless drudges.  

A consequence of this approach was a complete removal of “agent’s subjectivity” or demand, and “marginal method” or counterfactual reasoning from economic analysis — the two fundamental pillars of orthodox economic theory.

Counterfactual reasoning means 'what would happen if we chose not to do this.' If there is no counterfactual reasoning, nobody is making any choices. They are mindless drudges.  

Sraffa wrote 'The marginal approach requires attention to be focused on change:- for without change either in the scale of an industry or in the 'proportions of the factors of production' there can be neither marginal product nor marginal cost.'

This is not the case. One can always ask what would happen if we cut output by one unit. How much would we save? That is the marginal cost.

In a system in. which, day after day, production continued unchanged in those respects, the marginal product of a factor ( or alternatively the marginal cost of a product) would not merely be hard to find-it just would not" be there to be found.

Your accountant can estimate if for you well enough. 

What Sraffa’s alternative economic theory establishes is that income distribution in terms of wage rate and the rate of profits are linearly related to each other

if that is what you assume- sure.  

and can be taken as given independently of prices. Now prices for any given input-output data must be such that those given distributional variables are consistently accounted for

Sraffa is assuming markets clear. But they may not do so. People form a queue. Those who arrived earlier can buy the good at the set price. The rest go home disappointed.  

— a conclusion that stands in stark opposition to the orthodox economic theory, which maintains that both the size and distribution of income are determined simultaneously with prices. Sraffa’s discovery of the “Standard commodity” plays the central role in establishing this thesis; and his reinterpretation of classical economics is also rooted in the above proposition.

The 'standard commodity' is based on the notion that there is some fixed basket of goods necessary for labour to maintain itself. But this is very different during peace-time than it is during a war.  Sraffa had lived through two big wars and one long 'cold' war. Man does not live by bread alone. He also needs submarines able to launch nuclear ICBMs.