Sunday, 31 October 2021
Bertrand Russell's stupid Pacifism
Saturday, 30 October 2021
Padraic Scanlan on anti-masturbation & Empire
Why? Because Protestant Evangelicals and Quakers, etc, loathed that Satanic institution. However, they were equally ardent in their opposition to masturbation- at least they pretended to be.
By contrast, plenty of 'Liberals' had no problem with slavery- provided it was dusky folk, or those descended from them under the 'one drop rule' who were the slaves. After all, sex with slaves doesn't count as masturbation.
Although individual enslaved people were often brought to Britain by the people who claimed to own them,
This contented patriotism
Slaves cannot breathe in England; if their lungs
Receive our air, that moment they are free
They touch our country and their shackles fall.
That is noble, and bespeaks a nation proud
And jealous of the blessing. Spread it then,
And let it circulate through every vein
Of all your empire; that where Britain’s power
Is felt, mankind may feel her mercy too.
William Wilberforce, the leader in Parliament of the campaign to abolish the British slave trade, admired Cowper’s eye for evidence of Providence. He was his favourite poet. For both men, antislavery confirmed Britain’s special place in human and divine affairs.
For Cowper and Wilberforce, Britain was exceptional
In the United States, a similar caricature of British antislavery as especially precocious and virtuous has become a useful foil for reimagining American history, in The New York Times’s 1619 Project and elsewhere. If slavery is the American ‘original sin’, and the preservation of slavery was a cause of the American Revolution, British antislavery becomes an avenging force driven out of the new United States. And yet, when white Virginia colonists first purchased enslaved African workers to cultivate tobacco in 1619, the colonists thought of themselves as English. They looked south to Spain and Portugal’s colonies, where plantation slavery was well-established, and hoped to make a fortune. To the colonists, hierarchy was natural and defined by God. Coerced, enserfed or enslaved labour was unremarkable – and, from the colonists’ perspective, necessary – gentlemen, by definition, did not work in the fields. The sins weren’t original, and they weren’t ‘American’.
The Caribbean, not the colonies that became the American South, was the focus of debate for supporters and opponents of slavery in the British Empire. During the nearly three centuries of the transatlantic slave trade, more than 2.3 million enslaved people disembarked in Britain’s Caribbean colonies, compared with roughly 390,000 in the Thirteen Colonies and the US. In 1783, Britain lost the Thirteen Colonies, but retained more than a dozen sugar-producing colonies in the Caribbean. After the disruption of the Revolutionary War, colonists in the Caribbean resumed importing nearly everything, from barrel staves to livestock, from the US and Britain. Sugar was so profitable that one British slaveholder claimed that an acre planted with sugarcane would yield enough sugar to buy and import five acres’ worth of grain.
Despite geographic affinities and deep commercial relationships with the North American colonies in rebellion, the Caribbean colonies remained a part of the British Empire. The white planters who dominated the British Caribbean had strong incentives for loyalty.
The antislavery movement, like the West India interest, was not unified.
There is a common thread connecting these disparate political, cultural and intellectual movements that coalesced into popular antislavery in Britain: all flowed from the growth of the 18th-century empire.
When the 1807 Slave Trade Act passed, Britain was at war with Napoleonic France.
Thornton was a Merchant Banker. Having high principles has a reputational benefit in that line of work. He was a member of the Clapham Sect and responsible for the dissemination of their Tracts. He was also instrumental in founding and maintaining Sierra Leone as a refuge- or dumping ground- for freed slaves or Black people in London and other British cities. Emancipation with compensation was helpful to bankers because it increased money circulation. Wealth was no longer tied up in human bodies.
After 1807, antislavery leaders assumed that ‘natural’ economic laws would erode Caribbean slavery. Without a supply of enslaved labour, slaveholders would need gradually to improve living and working conditions on plantations until slavery gradually disappeared. ‘I am not afraid,’ Wilberforce had told the House of Commons in 1792, ‘of being told I design to emancipate the slaves.’ However, he continued, ‘True Liberty is the child of Reason and of Order; it is indeed a plant of celestial growth, but the soil must be prepared for its reception.’ After the end of the slave trade, enslaved people would learn to be wage workers; slaveholders would learn to be employers. In antislavery rhetoric, absentee slaveholders, because they lived in genteel houses in Britain and patronised the same charities and institutions as leading abolitionists, could be partners in this project of ‘ameliorating’ the conditions of enslaved labour. If absentees returned to the Caribbean as patrician landlords, they would be unable to resist the decline of slavery, and might also help to rehabilitate a British agricultural aristocracy that seemed in decline. ‘Now the legitimate and rightful lord,’ Cowper had mourned, in a passage about the sale of old aristocratic acres in Britain, ‘is but a transient guest, newly arrived.’
Some wealthy slaveholders shared this vision of themselves as patricians. Bryan Edwards, slaveholder, MP and historian of the Caribbean, believed that slavery was necessary to empire, but that it should be reformed. He thought of himself as a father to the people he claimed to own and, as an MP, led a movement to repeal colonial laws that allowed enslaved people to be sold to pay off debts, a common reason for family separations.
But ‘amelioration’ did not end slavery. Colonial legislatures resisted amelioration. Enslaved people – like the rebels who fought against colonial militias and British troops in Barbados in 1816, in Demerara (later part of British Guiana) in 1823 and in Jamaica in 1831 and 1832 – forced emancipation on to the Parliamentary agenda, but the emancipation that Parliament granted in 1833 was not what enslaved rebels fought for. Unlike emancipation in Haiti or the US, won through armed struggle and secured with radical constitutional settlements, the end of slavery in the British Empire happened by Act of Parliament, to public acclaim. On 1 August 1834, the hundreds of thousands of enslaved people in the British colonial empire were free, but most passed from slavery into ‘apprenticeship’ for four more years of forced labour.
Scanlan rightly observes-
Antislavery aligned capitalism with morality.
As sugar plantations declined in the Caribbean colonies after emancipation, freedpeople were blamed for failing the ‘mighty experiment’. For a decade after 1834, reams of data were published in Britain, comparing the quantity of sugar produced by apprentices (after 1838, fully free workers) to yields from the era of slavery, and from other European colonies that still used enslaved labour. In 1846, the Sugar Duties Act introduced a schedule for the end of imperial protection for sugar.
Cuba had adopted sensible economic policies. By 1818, it had Free Trade. Slavery was one factor but from 1840 onward Cuba also introduced new technology and thus raised productivity. A fall in coffee prices meant that Cuba concentrated on sugar, thus gaining economies of scope and scale. Its sugar production grew rapidly till American protectionism during the Great Depression put a ceiling on further growth. This also sparked a Revolution in 1933.
As the British sugar industry collapsed, many antislavery activists turned to West Africa.
Fowell Buxton
In 1851, to secure an antislavery treaty, British warships shelled Lagos, forcing the abdication of the Oba (or ruler), Kosoko.
The campaigns against the slave trade and slavery aligned well with the interests of an industrial and capitalist British Empire.
Friday, 29 October 2021
Saumitra Jha on tolerance
On December 6, 1992, many towns across India erupted into flames as activists destroyed a 16th-century mosque.
Riots sparked among Hindu and Muslim communities that had lived side by side for centuries.
At that time, I was in high school in the Himalayas. The morning after the mosque was destroyed, we were scheduled to take an eight-hour bus ride south to Delhi. The old heartland of the Mughal empire, the region we were to travel through had some of the most religiously mixed cities in the country.
Religious hatred and violence seemed so medieval.
I found a path to begin understanding why, during my junior year of college, when I first encountered the work of economist Douglass North.
Prior to North—and the “New Institutional Economics” that he helped establish—many benchmark economic models simplified the world by assuming that individuals were perfectly rational: capable of flawlessly solving even the most complex of math problems.
New Institutional Economics (NIE) adopted a more rounded, if disturbing view. People are only rational at times, argued the NIE: they use rules of thumb, often conceal information, cheat, and even employ violence. Societies develop institutions—informal and formal rules—that shape how individuals navigate the complexity of the world. However, looking at history, North noted that if such institutions are ever optimal, it is “usually by accident.”
This view gave me a lens to understand the puzzle that troubled me since I was as a boy.
To be honest, I found this view both accurate and pretty depressing. As a PhD student, I set out to try to understand what, if anything, we could do about it. Again, I was inspired by India’s example.
India does have a history of tragic waves of religious violence.
I wanted to understand when and why some Indian communities developed “good” rules—institutions that support long histories of tolerance—and why others remained powder kegs for violence.
To do this, I began by looking into the very first encounters of Hindus and Muslims in Gujarat and the rest of India, going back to the seventh century, studying contemporary travelers’ narratives and accounts. I traveled to Gujarat in 2006, visiting and talking to members of communities around the state that had been affected by the riots and those that had remained peaceful. And I gathered a lot of data.
So, where do institutions of tolerance emerge?
One important set of examples of these were ports—like Mahatma Gandhi’s own hometown, Porbandar—that had traded to the distant Middle East during the medieval period.
Further this complementarity in overseas trade came from a trading network that was intangible, and so impossible to seize,
Ports emerged at natural harbors along India’s medieval coasts to accommodate these trading relationships.
An example of these tolerant, local, institutional beliefs can be found in Gandhi’s own life. Growing up in the erstwhile medieval port of Porbandar in the late 19th century, he would later reminisce about the syncretic nature of his mother’s temple, with a Koran kept inside the temple itself, and the active discussions that took place emphasizing the commonalities of both religions. This he credited as an important influence on his own beliefs and approach to nonviolence.
Norms also emerged that reinforced inter-religious trade.
Organizations also emerged to support tolerance.
Yet, while Porbandar had a strong tradition of religious tolerance between Hindus and Muslims,
These patterns were reflected in the data. Despite being, on average, somewhat poorer and more religiously mixed, I found that erstwhile medieval ports had five times fewer religious riots than otherwise similar towns through the colonial era, and were “oases of peace,” even during the widespread rioting in Gujarat in 2002.
Further, even into the 21st century, the Hindu-Muslim wealth gap was smaller in these port towns than elsewhere.
In contrast, in other medieval towns, like Ahmadabad, where Hindus and Muslims competed, or on inland trade routes where it was easy to replicate the other’s trade network, there were much weaker incentives to build institutions to support peace.
Working to understand institutional change in the spirit of North and Greif, I began to realize that a lot of the problems we face today of hatred, polarization, and conflict are also very old problems.
I now convene the Stanford Conflict and Polarization Lab, where we are conducting modern randomized control trials, inspired by some of these successful historical natural experiments. We are finding that, in contemporary field experiments, too, these ideas can build support for peace.
This research has also left me with some hope that we are not condemned to repeat the past, or be stuck in a morass of poor rules. Instead, such historical institutions can provide valuable clues for informing contemporary policies. Poor rules can be—and, perhaps, are made to be—broken
We present a theoretical framework that highlights two key twin challenges faced by non-violent movements in ethnically diverse countries.
Sri Lanka is ethnically diverse. Yet it got universal suffrage in 1931. India had to wait till Independence to get rid of the restricted franchise.
The first is the challenge of mass mobilization across ethnic lines.
Which Sri Lanka found unnecessary.
The second challenge lies in overcoming the enhanced temptations faced by members of large mobilized groups to turn violent, whether to secure short-term gains from mob action or in response to manipulation by agents who stand to gain from political violence. We show how these challenges appear to match general patterns from cross-campaign data.
Brigadier Dyer and Police Commissioner Tegart, between them, showed that there is no enhanced temptation for turning violent if you know you will be killed or sent off to rot in the Andamans.
Motivated by these patterns, we discuss how these challenges were overcome during the Indian Independence Struggle. We argue that the first challenge that of forging a mass movement was accomplished through the brokering of a deal that took advantage of external shocks - in this case, the Great Depression - to align the incentives of disparate ethnic and social groups towards mass mobilization in favor of democracy and land reform.
But there had been mass mobilization during the Congress-Khilafat campaign. The Hindus wanted independence and 'swadesi' (i.e. Indian textiles to replace British textiles) while the Muslims were worried about the Ottoman Caliphate. Then Gandhi called off the movement and everybody realized that the departure of the British Umpire would inevitably involve a show down between the Hindus and Muslims. Anyway, British rule was better than Indian rule because, most Indians believed, Indians were shit at running things.
The second key challenge - that of keeping the mass movement peaceful was accomplished
by the British Imperial police who had informers and agent provocateurs all over the place. Also they found that a bit of mayhem caused the Indians to come whimpering to them demanding 'the smack of firm governance'. In other words, riots were good for the Brits because it reminded people of how bad things were before they came.
through organizational innovations introduced by Mohandas Gandhi in his reforms of the constitution of the Congress movement in 1919-20.
He got people to spin cotton and pay their membership fees with yarn. That was quickly abandoned because the organization needed cash not unusable yarn.
These organizational innovations took the Congress movement from one dominated by a rich elite to one organized on the principle of
getting wealthy Hindu businessmen to pay for crack-pot schemes not
self-sacrifice, selecting future leaders who could then be trusted to maintain non-violent discipline in pursuit of the extension of broad rights and public policy objectives.
Which did not materialize.
We conclude by arguing that a key, but hitherto mostly neglected, aspect of 'Gandhi's Gift' - the example of non-violence applied to India's independence struggle - lies in understanding these organizational innovations.
But they failed. The Brits only left because the Americans wouldn't lend them money unless they threw in the towel. Thus, Indian independence was the gift of Hitler and Tojo.
In the body of their paper, these two cretins say
Yet, modern techniques of civil disobedience incorporated new organizational ideas that have been credited with a number of remarkable successes. These include the ceding of democratic rights to 30 million South Asians by the British Empire in the 1930s and the Civil Rights movement in the United States in the late 1950s and the 1960s
Ceylon got universal suffrage in 1931 because the elite was sensible and Anglophile and there was strong minority protection built into the Constitution. India got little because the minorities united against Gandhi at the Second Round Table Conference.
Civil Rights succeeded in America because the State Dept. and the Army wanted it. American power would be enhanced by it. Presidents were prepared to send Federal States to recalcitrant States.
If these two cretins are ignorant of history what of the times they themselves live in? Consider the following-
However, non-violent civil resistance has also often failed. Modern scholars of civil resistance point to the issue of maintaining ‘nonviolent discipline’ in the face of provocation as an important missing piece in our understanding of how to make civil resistance work. And on the ground, as historic episodes such as the violence of the 1942 ‘Quit India’ movement, the race riots that followed in the wake of the US Civil Rights movement, as well as the Arab Spring and the battles in Tahrir Square demonstrate, movements that begin peacefully are often prone to rapid breakdowns into violence that further facilitates repression.
Spontaneous demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt did lead to regime change. Gaddafi put up military resistance as did Assad. The former is dead, the latter seems to have prevailed. But no organized non-violent movement was involved. Spontaneity can prevail- e.g against Ceaucescu- precisely because the Intelligence service is caught off guard. But organized, disciplined, non-violence fails miserably because it can be gamed by the other side.
The first is the challenge of mass mobilization: non-violent movements, more so than violent movements, are only effective when they are large in scale
No. A hunger strike by a venerated figure can be more effective than millions marching through the streets. There were mass mobilizations against nuclear weapons and various wars and the fact that Trump had a penis and the fact that Trump did not win the elections and so on and so forth. Stupid mobilizations fail unless stupid leaders decide to do stupid shit. That's what matters. Is the guy in charge a fool? De Gaulle ran away from the Paris students in 1968. That was cool, coz he was a French soldier and thus prone to running away. This alarmed the French because they preferred their own cowardly generals to crazy students. Anyway, the students' leaders were stupid and so De Gaulle came back.
In India, a little later, there was a mass mobilization against Indira Gandhi. She crushed it with insulting ease. Edward Heath, who had earlier declared a State of Emergency in the UK, failed miserably in his confrontation with the Unions. On the other hand a mass mobilization against Thatcher's poll tax did succeed- probably because it spontaneously turned violent. Something similar may be said about the Yellow Vests in France.
What do our authors mean by 'non-violent mobilization?
Let us define a ‘non-violent’ movement, in contrast, as only different from other movements in that the strategy either requires the leader to expel members who engage in looting or violence or imposes sufficient penalties on members that violence is not a preferred choice.
The Indian National Congress never had either of these two qualities. Gandhi didn't expel those who engaged in violence of any sort. Ethnic cleansing of Muslims in Bihar was done by Congress-wallahs as he said at the time.
Violence against the British or those who worked with the British was ruthlessly punished. However, the reason the British ruled India was that they were non-violent. The District Commissioner did not engage in looting or violence against the Chief Medical Officer. Indeed, British politics- unlike Indian politics- was wholly non-violent. Gandhi was pretending that Congress would be as non-violent as the Tory Party or the Liberal Party or the Labor Party. But he knew this was just pretense- a necessary one so that Indians could themselves become peaceful- not rely solely on Pax Britannica. . Sadly, the Brits were on their way out because non-violent politics is money politics and America pulled the financial plug on the Raj. Gandhi, Nehru, Jinnah and so forth then had to preside over a vast blood letting. Thankfully, the 'steel frame' created by the British proved its worth. Institutions like the Police and the Army could do their job provided politicians weren't as stupid as Saumitra Jha.