Hun Chung has a paper showing Rawls's arguments against Utilitarianism were self defeating.
In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls wished to present a theory of distributive justice that was superior to utilitarianism. The resulting theory is what Rawls called “justice as fairness” which is composed of the following three principles stated in the order of strict priority,
Can a thing be said to be fair if it is arbitrary or unilaterally imposed? Yes. One can say 'the thing may be arbitrary, but the outcome seems fair'. However, in speaking of principles, not outcomes, a dogmatic ipse dixit assertion is not the outcome of fair proceeding.
Justice is fair only if justiciable matters are dealt with in an impartial, transparent and protocol bound manner. We may think a political arrangement is fair if everybody subjected to it has an equal say in how it comes about. But we may also think that political arrangement is utterly shit. This is because politics is separate from justice which in turn is separate from economics.
1. The Principle of Maximum Equal Basic Liberties: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.
A right is only as effective as the remedy provided for its violation. Some people may be able to enforce their right to liberty. Others may not. Where is the remedy to come from? To say there should be an all powerful state is to reduce everybody's liberties because such a state will require a lot of resources which can only come from the productive section of the population.
In practice, if the State is providing any significant proportion of the population with 'basic liberties', there is likely to be a high burden on tax payers. Some may exit the jurisdiction or there may be a disincentive effect on work and productive investment. This may end up causing the economy to tank. The State goes off a fiscal cliff. There is a collapse of entitlements. Everybody is worse off.
Even if everybody wants equality, if the pursuit of equality causes the collapse of the economy, everybody would still be worse off.
This principle does not identify a well defined set of 'liberties' because they are 'intensional' and 'impredicative'- in other words, providing remedies for some people reduces entitlements for other people. We don't know whether any particular set is 'incentive compatible' and have no way of identifying the 'supremum' amongst them. Thus this principle is vacuous. It is not informative. One could claim that any outcome whatsoever, or none whatsoever, fulfilled this principle.
2. The Principle of Fair Equal Opportunity: Social economic inequalities should be attached to positions and offices opened to all under conditions of fair equal opportunity.
This does not follow. Why should 'positions and offices' go with extra remuneration? Is it so as to create an incentive or so as to attract better quality applicants? If so, why should there be one rule for political offices and another for those of a commercial character? If the government bureaucrat or politician is permitted a higher standard of living, why reduce the income differential of those who generate the tax revenue of the government? Won't this cause people to flee productive work so as to gain wealth as administrators and politicians? But, this may cause acute fiscal problems leading to entitlement collapse. A wealthy 'nomenklatura' will preside over a zombie economy till they themselves begin to feel the pinch. This is despotism pure and simple.
Again there is an impredicative and 'intensional' element in the Principle which means that it can be given no unique, well defined, extension.
3.The Difference Principle: Social and economic inequalities should be arranged in a way that is the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society.
In which case they will cease to be the least-advantaged. Currently, people who prance around naked with a radish up their bum may be the least advantaged. They are unable to secure employment. They are incarcerated in prisons and lunatic asylums. Their families are ashamed of them and the friends of their childhood give them a wide berth. We might say that by forcing everybody to prance around naked with a radish up their bum, this section of society benefits greatly. However, those who do not relish this practice may feel they are now the least-advantaged. To benefit them we should insist that everybody prance around naked with a radish up their bum unless that is what they really want to do.
The thought was that these three principles would be chosen over utilitarianism by the representative parties of “the original position” behind “the veil of ignorance.”
Utilitarianism merely means that gross domestic product and thus tax revenue is as high as it could sustainably be. The State would have more capacity to tackle 'collective action problems' thus creating a virtuous circle of rising affluence and security. If we are to have a State, why not chose to have a State which can greatly benefit its people?
The original position is an initial situation where the representative parties of society decide the fundamental guiding principles regulating the basic structure of their society by their own voluntary agreement.
If they know Economics, they will refuse to do so because of 'Knightian Uncertainty'. It is foolish to commit to an arrangement of a rigid type when the future is unknown.
The veil of ignorance is a theoretical device that guarantees the fairness of the resulting agreement by depriving the original contracting parties of morally irrelevant information.
It is supposed to get rid of 'uncorrelated asymmetries' which dictate eusocial bourgeois strategies. But, it is foolish to do anything of the sort. One may say 'if you don't know you are good at baking cakes, you may agree that those who bake good cakes must share them with those who can't'. But the rejoinder is, 'nobody will bake cakes if they have to give away almost all the cake. Everybody will be worse off.'
Rawls’s argument for his three principles of justice—i.e. justice as fairness—and his argument against the principle of average utility—i.e. utilitarianism—are like two sides of the same coin. Rawls’s justification for justice as fairness derives from the purported fact that the parties in the original position will choose it over utilitarianism;
Only if they are stupid.
In a similar period, Harsanyi (1955, 1977) proved two mathematical results which he believed to formally justify utilitarianism.
Absent Knightian Uncertainty- sure.
There remain some controversies on whether Harsanyi’s formal results really support utilitarianism. Even so, Harsanyi’s contributions ignited one of the most hotly debated topics in contemporary political philosophy—namely, whether the parties in Rawls’s original position would choose justice as fairness or utilitarianism. Call this the “Rawls-vs-Harsanyi Debate.” The debate has now reached a complete deadlock—each side simply denying the crucial assumption made by the other.
That's what happens when stupid people debate stupid propositions.
For instance, supporters of utilitarianism claim that the “maximin rule” (from which Rawls seems to derive support for the original parties’ choice for the difference principle) is either straight out irrational (Harsanyi 1975) or depends on assuming that the original contracting parties are extremely risk-averse (Roemer 2002; Moreno-Ternero and Roemer 2008)
It assumes they are too stupid to know about how insurance markets work. The fact is, we pay for insurance. Actuaries work out how to reduce risk. Premiums are reduced for those with traits which make them less of a risk. Mimetics causes the spread of those traits- i.e. people smoke less, do more exercise etc. so as to pay a smaller premium or so as to keep up with what the smart people are doing. It would be crazy to agree that we should maximize the standard of living of the least well-off rather than insure ourselves against the risk of becoming destitute. This is because if everybody goes on the dole, there will be no fucking dole.
To this, Rawls argues that the selection for his justice as fairness, and, in particular, the difference principle does not depend on any assumption regarding the original contracting parties’ attitude toward risk
It depends on people being as stupid as shit. Why not suggest that people will agree to outlaw death so that everybody can live forever? Obviously, this may involve punishing those who appear to be defying the law by getting very sick and appearing to have one foot in the grave. Still, by introducing capital punishment for those who look like they might die sometime soon, we can get rid of the scourge of the Grim Reaper.
On the other hand, Rawlsians argue that in order for the parties of the original position to choose utilitarianism, they would have to be able to calculate expectations, but, the specific characteristics of the original position provide absolutely no basis for the parties to make any kind of probability judgments which renders the task of calculating expectations unfeasible.
We can choose a form of Government based on maximizing GDP and thus tax revenue and thus the provision of Public and Club goods and a 'social minimum' etc. The basic principle we can agree on regarding our Political arrangements is that they be sensible from the economic and national security point of view. Sadly, this may rule out forcing everybody to prance around naked with a radish up ther bum.
To this, utilitarians claim that, in such cases, we should rely on “the principle of insufficient reason” and assign equal probabilities for being born in each starting place in society, and once this is done, it would be rational for the original contracting parties to perform an expected utility calculation which would result in them adopting the principle of average utility.
This is unnecessary. We can use the Pareto distribution or 80/20 rule by which 80 percent of the wealth is in the hands of 20 percent of the population. In any case, is obvious that only one tenth of people will be in the 'bottom tenth'. So your chances of being one of the least well off is only ten percent.
After observing that the Rawls-vs-Harsanyi debate has reached a deadlock, Moehler (2018) concludes that there is no clear winner of the Rawls-Harsanyi dispute as each author attempts to model different moral ideals.
Both were silly but Rawls, not being an economist, was sillier.
Rawls’s refutation of utilitarianism was that it would not be chosen over justice as fairness from the original position.
Nothing would be chosen in the original position. A contract is unenforceable save if consideration passes. Why agree to anything if you aren't getting paid to do so? In any case, people know about Knightian Uncertainty and thus know that a Social Contract must be incomplete or else be unenforceable or catastrophic in its consequences.
Then, why wouldn’t the parties in the original position choose utilitarianism instead of justice as fairness? Rawls presents several reasons; he talks about strains of commitment, the distinction between persons, the publicity condition, and issues related to stability and self-respect.
In other words, Rawls says 'all rational people are like me and like what I like. That is why any social arrangement save the one I'm proposing would be bound to collapse.' One might as well say 'everybody secretly wants to prance around naked with a radish up their bum. That is why no Society will be happy and cohesive unless we immediately pass a law such that everybody is required to be naked and to have a radish up their bum. Obviously, proper training in prancing methodology should be provided by the State. The Institute of Socioproctology should be awarded a ten billion dollar contract in this connection.'
To understand the central idea that underlies these criticisms, it might be helpful to remind ourselves of a standard criticism against utilitarianism that is frequently made—namely, that utilitarianism may, in principle, justify the institution of slavery.
Not to mention the institution of my having to do the fucking washing up. The fact is, under some circumstances, I'd welcome the chance to be the slave of a powerful man rather than have to suffer the indignity of daily rape at the hands of the horny Lezzas who will undoubtedly take over the world after Rishi Sunak departs from Number 10.
Basically, we might interpret Rawls’s criticisms as inviting us to imagine a situation in which we chose utilitarianism behind the veil of ignorance, but, then, discovered ourselves to be slaves after the veil of ignorance has been lifted. Would we be able to honor our original agreement? No. (This is the argument from strains of commitment.)
Hilarious! Slaves can't remain slaves not because their captors will kill them if they try to run away but because they are incapable of committing to being slaves. Similarly, nobody dies save from a strain of commitment to being a fucking corpse.
If our society officially affirms that it will follow utilitarianism as its fundamental guiding principle (which is required by the publicity condition) and tries to publicly justify that the sacrifices of slaves are required to maximize social welfare, would it be possible for us, as slaves, to retain our self-respect? No. (This is the argument from the publicity condition and self-respect.)
Only in the sense that we we can't retain our self-respect unless we are prancing around naked with a radish up our bum. The Stoic slave had plenty of self-respect. Under certain conditions, it was safer to be a slave than a free-man. Moreover, the slave could do a lot of good while the freeman was spending all his time beating off rapists or guys who wanted to chop off his head and take a shit down his neck.
Wouldn’t this be a case of failing to take the distinctness and separateness of different persons seriously? (this is the argument from the distinctness of persons.)
Only in the sense that it was also a case of failing to take the distinctness of different seriously by insisting that they get nekkid and prance around with a radish up their bum.
And, if utilitarianism will be unable to generate wide universal support, would a political society regulated by utilitarianism be stable? No. (This is the argument from stability.)
It is a fact that there is no wide or universal support for the proposition that people should not be obliged to prance around naked with a radish up their bum. Indeed, most people are not even aware that any such proposition exists. This is the reason our Societies are so unstable that every four or five years a new administration is elected.
All of these are importantly distinct considerations that may explain why the original contracting parties in the original position would favor justice as fairness over utilitarianism. However, we can see that there is a central theme that penetrates all of these considerations; namely, there is a real danger that utilitarianism, once affirmed, might require one to sacrifice one’s most fundamental interests and basic rights/liberties for the sake of maximizing total or average social welfare.
This danger is only as real as that being human, once affirmed, might require one to prance around nekkid with a radish up your bum.
The reasons stemming from strains of commitment, stability, and self-respect are all mere implications of this possible consequence of utilitarianism.
or that of not prancing around naked with a radish up your bum.
And, the purported fact that justice as fairness, with its three principles, is able to securely protect these fundamental interests and basic rights/liberties (by its first principle) as well as their social worth (by its second and third principle; Rawls 1971/1999, 179) is the decisive reason why Rawls believes that the representative parties of the original position will choose his justice as fairness over any form of utilitarianism (see Rawls 2001, 102).
He thinks people were as stupid and ignorant of econ as he was himself. But the structure of his argument is the same as that of a person who believes that what everybody really wants is to prance around nekkid with a radish up their bum.
3 The Difference Principle and Primary Social Goods
Now, if it is true that each individual’s fundamental interests and basic rights/liberties are firmly secured by the very first principle (i.e. the principle of maximum equal basic liberties) of justice as fairness, then
why not expand that liberty to include the right not to fucking die?
what role do the other two principles (i.e. the principle of fair equal opportunity and the difference principle) really play in the representative parties’ decision to choose justice as fairness over utilitarianism?
The answer is that once we establish as our first principle that each individual's fundamental interests are firmly secured by something which has no such power- e.g. prancing around nekkid with a radish up your bum- then you need another couple of equally stupid principles to arrive at the conclusion that everybody must be forced to prance around nekkid with a radish up their bum. What I mean to say is, some poor fool may deny that she wants to partake in this delightful activity. She must be forced, in the name of equality and justice and fairness, to comply.
Why, for instance, should they not choose a conception of justice that
is concerned with justiciable matters- e.g. my law suit against the Mental Hospital which is preventing me from prancing around nekkid with a radish up my bum?
combines the principle of maximum equal basic liberties with, say, the principle of average utility instead of the difference principle?
This would allow some people, who do useful stuff, to escape having to prance around nekkid with a radish up their bum. That would be totes unfair.
One of Rawls’s reasons is that the difference principle (compared to the principle of average utility) better secures the worth of the basic liberties that the principle of equal basic liberties formally guarantees. According to Rawls,
Freedom as equal liberty is the same for all… But the worth of liberty is not the same for everyone. Some have greater authority and wealth, and therefore greater means to achieve their aims. … Taking [the principle of maximum equal basic liberties and the difference principle] together, the basic structure is to be arranged to maximize the worth to the least advantaged of the complete scheme of equal liberty shared by all. (Rawls 1971/1999, 179 emphasis added)
This is anything goes. One can say 'society will collapse if non-mentally ill peeps weren't given an exemption from prancing around naked with a radish up their bum. This would hurt the worst off in our society- viz. nutters who want to do nothing else.'
Again, the main point of the difference principle is that, by maximizing the expectation of the least advantaged group in society, it best guarantees that every member of society, especially the least advantaged group, enjoys the best worth of their basic right/liberties that the principle of equal basic liberties formally guarantees as much as possible.
Sadly, because of 'non convexities', this argument can be used to justify anything at all including the humane provision of gas chambers for those who will suffer needlessly because of their lack of aptitude for prancing around naked with a radish up their bum.
That is why we need the difference principle along with the principle of equal basic liberties.
Actually, it is only there as a sort of 'widows and orphans' justification for Capitalism. But it can also be used to justify the creation of a Society of naked prancers with radishes up their bums.
Now, Rawls claims that the difference principle is designed to apply to the distribution of what he calls “primary social goods.” According to Rawls,
… primary goods … are things which it is supposed a rational man wants whatever else he wants. … The primary social goods, to give them in broad categories, are rights, liberties, and opportunities, and income and wealth. (Rawls 1971/1999, 79)
Most people would think 'primary social goods' are to do with having a nice house for your family in a nice neighbourhood with good public schools and parks and sewers and so forth. One may commute from such places to 'dark Satanic Mills' so as to gain income and wealth.
The main reason for introducing the idea of the primary social goods is as follows.
It is to confuse 'goods' with 'services' provided under a vinculum juris. In this way, you can have a theory of Justice which has fuck all to do with the Judiciary. But this also means you can have a 'political conception of Justice' which involves everyone prancing around naked with a radish up their bum. The alternative would be to do boring statistical work so as to build a better Structural Causal Model of the polity and thus try to improve political outcomes.
In order for the difference principle to apply, one needs to identify which group is the least advantaged group in society. This requires interpersonal comparisons.
Not really. In the original position, it is perfectly possible to get an ordinal ranking such that there is a partial order. Everybody agrees that being a star athlete is better than being a rent-boy.
However, Rawls wanted to avoid making interpersonal comparisons in terms people’s welfare levels. A search for a more objective basis for interpersonal comparison is what led Rawls to rely on primary social goods.
I imagine that memories of rationing during the War might have influenced his generation. Post War reconstruction did feature some 'quantitative' planning of that type.
…the difference principle introduces a simplification for the basis of interpersonal comparisons. These comparisons are made in terms of expectations of primary social goods. In fact, I define these expectations simply as the index of these goods which a representative individual can look forward to. One man’s expectations are greater than another’s if this index for someone in his position is greater. (Rawls 1971/1999, 79 emphasis added)
The basic thought is that we can assign numbers to different bundles of primary social goods in a way that bundles that are assigned higher numbers are more valuable to everybody, regardless of his/her particular aims and goals, than bundles that are assigned lower numbers. From this, the problem of interpersonal comparison becomes greatly simplified; person A is better off than person B if and only if A possesses a bundle of primary social goods that is assigned a greater number than what is assigned to B’s bundle of primary social goods.
An immediate question is whether such indexing of primary social goods is actually possible. This is called the “indexing problem.”Footnote10 I will simply note that Rawls quite frequently sidestep this issue by using income and wealth as “first approximation(s)” for the purpose of applying the difference principleFootnote11 and later relies on such simplifying assumptions when he discusses several illustrative examples.Footnote12A similar move has been made by other scholars when they discuss about Rawls.Footnote13 Hence, from now on, I will follow Rawls, and simply assume that the indexing problem of primary social goods is adequately solved by regarding each individual’s wealth levels as proxies for the amount of primary social goods he/she enjoys.
In the remainder of the paper Hung shows that Rawls's reasoning is self defeating. However, a couple of other points can be made. Firstly, the 'difference principle' doesn't pick out a set with a well defined or unique extension. It is likely that everybody will try to show themselves to be the worst off- i.e. the system will be gamed. This also means the use of Szpilrajn extension or other means of getting to indexation will be ad hoc or gameable. Still, Hung's point is well made.
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