Suppose a bunch of us start talking about niceness. We agree that it is nice to be nice. I mention that cats are nice. You say dogs are nice. Should we then speak of niceness as the dog which is a nice cat? Perhaps. By doing so we are signaling that the discussion is puerile or has attracted very emotionally damaged and mentally retarded people. By babbling nonsense we are proving we are very nice.
Something similar happened to Social Choice theory because, unlike Welfare Econ (which is just a branch of Public Finance) it was stupid and useless. Thus it morphed into saying 'Welfare is nice but Democracy is nice so Welfare is Democracy as Freedom as the cat which is a nice dog within a context of diversity, inclusivity and everybody having gender reassignment surgery every Tuesday such that public discourse becomes foundational to a nicer type of Justice.
This ignores the fact that there are different types of Justice each of which has a different way of deciding what is the objective truth. Thus, for Criminal Justice, DNA evidence may prove that the man who raped and killed the child was Smith. However, Racial Justice or Social Justice might require us to acquit Smith because objectively speaking he is of the right race or class. One might say, 'subjectively Smith is a rapist but, objectively, because of his class or racial origin, he is incapable of rape or murder. The truth is, the three year old child he raped and killed was a bourgeois saboteur.'
In “POSITIONAL VIEWS” AS THE CORNERSTONE OF SEN’S IDEA OF JUSTICE Antoinette Baujard & Muriel Gilardone write-
define a positional view as an individual judgment towards any social state, considering objectively the context from which she or he is able to assess this social state.
Since the only 'context' from which a 'social state' is assessed is that of the subject's mind, it follows that a positional view is merely a subjective view. The rapist and murderer may feel that Criminal Justice is the wrong type of justice to apply to a person in his position. Social Justice, which emphasizes his poverty and lack of life-chances, requires that he be exonerated and put in charge of an orphanage where he can rape and murder plenty more children.
Our line of argument is therefore: consider positional view as the cornerstone of Sen’s idea of justice
i.e. Sen's idea of justice is subjective.
as if it were a material , and show how Sen’s idea is built from there:
his idea is based on his bigotry
this reading is likely to highlight how and why this is not a material in the sense that formal welfarism would require.
Objective welfarism would seek to identify an objective function to be maximized or (in the case of global opportunity cost) minimized. This could be done in a rough and ready fashion and may be quite useful in solving collective action problems.
Obviously, we could ignore the opinions or interests of those we don't like by saying 'they are in no position to know what's good for them or the rest of Society.'
This choice is corroborated by the consideration of Sen’s earlier philosophical work. The positional interpretation of viewer relativity goes back to the beginning of the eighties. Sen (1982, 1983, and more extensively 1993) claims that the identification of the viewer’s position does matter for the evaluation of social states rather than her mere utilities or preferences.
His position in Society is already reflected in 'utilities' or 'preferences'. Nothing further is needed save if we want to punish him because we don't like him or reward him because he shares some particular trait with us.
In the welfarist framework, social states are assessed on the basis of given individual preferences only, with the assumptions that they are reliable and fixed.
No. The assumption is that behavior reveals preferences.
Sen questions these strong assumptions, because individual preferences, and more broadly individual views, depend on the viewer’s position for several reasons.
No. Some views or preferences may be contingent in the manner suggested. Others aren't.
First, the difference of view between two persons may be explained by their difference of position in the social state considered.
It may be explained by saying one has shit for brains while the other is a freakin' genius. But this is irrelevant.
Sen illustrates this fact by the following image: if one person looks at the moon from Earth and the other from space, they may assess the size of the moon differently or similarly, relative to the size of the sun, and their observation shall consequently be considered as position-dependent (Sen 1993: 128).
But we don't actually do any such thing. Currently, there are some people in space and a lot more here on Earth. But anyone 'assessing' the size of the moon either in space or down here is getting pretty much the same answer. BTW a kid or a cretin gawking at the moon aint assessing shit.
Second, the viewer’s position may evolve which might change her view on the social state. For instance, if the second person travels from space to Earth, her evaluation of the relative size of the moon and the sun will automatically change.
Fuck off! Neil Armstrong didn't say 'guys! I just discovered that the size of the moon changes depending upon where I'm positioned in the solar system.' He'd have been laughed at if he did so.
Third, Sen underlines the fact that “[t]he person is not free to choose the position from which he should evaluate the states” (1983: 123, underlined by us).
Yes he is, unless some guy is torturing him and forcing him to evaluate states from a very undignified and painful position.
Hence, her view is dependent upon such position, and there is nothing we can do about this.
there is nothing useful these two ladies can do.
Consequently, for a given individual view regarding a specific social state, the position from which it is expressed cannot be neutral, insofar as the view depends upon that particular position.
Sez who? I may say, 'You can't tell me Sen doesn't eat dog turds because you have never spent even a single hour being me.' I may go further. I may accuse you of being biased because you personally profit by selling dog turds to Sen. This does not alter the fact that the 'neutral' view is that Sen doesn't eat dog turds. Somebody would have noticed if he did.
Sen insists that his positional interpretation of a person’s views is not fundamentally due to a lack of “ability to imagine what it would be like to evaluate the state from a different position” (1982: 37).
because it is fundamentally due to his being as stupid as shit.
Indeed, the concept of positional views is precisely thought to facilitate such ability,
but only in so far as that ability is the ability to thrive on a diet of dog turds
against the standard idea in the economic literature that since “individuals are really individuals, each an autonomous end in himself […] they must be somewhat mysterious and inaccessible to each other” (Arrow 1973: 263)17.
Because in an Arrow-Debreu world there would be no language.
But the fundamental idea is to understand what makes a social state more or less desirable from a person’s point of view because “one of the positions in that state is peculiarly [her] own” (1982: 37).
Fuck off! We can easily imagine a highly desirable social state in which we ourselves would not exist. You might say 'but you'd like it better if you could exist in that world' But the answer is 'maybe, maybe not. It depends.'
Hence the viewer should be personally involved in the characterization of his own position.
Why do we refer to a guy whose head has been chopped off as the victim of a crime? How do we know the fellow isn't delighted with the outcome? Not till dead people can personally testify that their welfare has decreased because they were killed should murder be considered a crime.
In other words, he should participate to the identification of the positional parameters
e.g. being in a coffin six feet underground
that influence his view in a way that remove the idea of a pure subjective and person-dependent view. Positional parameters are, for Sen, a question of “any general, particularly non-mental, condition that may both influence observation, and that can systematically apply to different observers and observations” (Sen 2009: 158).
see above
In order to characterize a position, it is thus required to highlight the conditions “that (1) may influence observation, and (2) can apply to different persons” (Sen 1993: 127). For instance, “being myopic or color-blind or having normal eyesight; knowing or not knowing a specific language; having or not having knowledge of particular concepts; being able or not able to count” may be such conditions or positional parameters.
but so could being or not being dead or being or not being me. If you were me you would understand that not only does Sen eat only dog-turds but also the Universe should be shifted a few feet to the left to improve its feng shui.
Sen's idea of justice is that Rawls's theory was naughty and should be sent to bed without its supper. This was because Sen was in the position of having no idea of justice but a great love for talking meaningless shite.
Our paper offers a novel reading of Sen’s idea of justice, beyond the standard prisms imposed by theories of justice – resting on external normative criteria
like guilt or innocence
– and formal welfarism –
which is interested in raising welfare rather than talking endless bollocks
involving the definition of individual welfare and its aggregation.
putting money values to things can be helpful. Courts have to do so to award damages.
Instead we take seriously Sen’s emphasis on personal agency
which is irrelevant for both Justice and Welfare.
and focus on his original contribution to the issue of objectivity.
He says subjectivity is actually objectivity
Firstly, we demonstrate that Sen’s idea of justice, with at its core “positional views”, is more respectful of persons’ agency than would be a theory based on individual preference or capability.
But we don't require such respect of our agency when it comes to Justice or our Welfare. You may say, the police should give you a chance to beat up your rapist rather than take it upon themselves to kick his fucking head in. Equally, you may think it rude of a surgeon not to offer you a turn with the scalpel when operating on you. But, in both these cases, you would be considered a fucking lunatic.
Secondly, we argue that Sen’s conception of objectivity considers that both information and sentiments are relative to a position.
Because Sen confuses subjectivity, which may be position dependent, with objectivity.
Such an alternative approach to subjectivity allows the formation of more impartial views through collective deliberation and a better consideration of justice by agents themselves.
No. It merely allows the talking of endless bollocks and the pretense that we must consult impartial spectators from Patagonia or Pluto.
We now want to show that another mistake would be to miss Sen’s departure from the standard preferentialist framework and continue to understand people’s voices as individual preferences.
A voice is something people prefer to lend to some things not others.
The focus on preferences raises many problems for welfare studies,
No. There are only pseudo problems arising out of stupidity.
and even more for democratic issues, as included in the general criticism of welfarism introduced by Sen.
A criticism which fails because it is stupid.
The legitimacy of Sen’s positional approach is based on
stupidity
the defense of persons’ agency and relative values (Sen 1982)
both are fully reflected in preferences
against a certain tendency of consequentialism,
which does not exist
often associated to welfarism in normative economics.
by shitheads.
This may appear paradoxical since welfarism is generally defended on the grounds that favoring individual utility exclusively and above all else amounts to respecting individuals’ sovereignty.
Nonsense! Welfare is independent of 'sovereignty'. We can be concerned with the welfare of a lunatic in a padded cell. On the other hand if you say welfare means sovereignty which means training senior citizens in sodomy then you can write a paper about how welfarism falls short of a conception of sovereignty based on elderly dudes ass fucking.
In Arrow’s welfarist framework (1963), such an approach is translated by the condition that each individual is free to have a definite ordering of all conceivable states, in terms of their desirability to him according to a wide range of values.
No. In Arrow's framework, nobody is free not to have any such thing nor to tell the fucking Social Choice rule to go fuck itself.
Nevertheless, Arrow concludes that “the doctrine of the voters’ sovereignty
a voter is not a sovereign
is incompatible with that of collective rationality” (1963:60),
not to mention the fact that a voter is not a fucking sovereign
i.e. with a social decision that would respect each individual ordering.
unless they decide to respect them by not respecting them at all.
In this sense, he shows one possible way to be respectful of individuals’ sovereignty
by tenderly supporting them in imparting skills in sodomy to senior citizens.
is to return to standard individualistic assumptions, according to which individuals’ orderings do not reflect individuals’ values regarding social states but his utilities in each social state – i.e. “his own consumption-leisure-saving situations” (Arrow 1963: 61).
which are epistemic. Thus an intensional fallacy arises- i.e. nothing is well ordered. Social Choice is an impossible project save for
Sen applies the opposite reasoning, arguing that within welfarist consequentialism, the person is likely to lose her sovereignty,
the person has none under welfarism. That is why lunatics can be incarcerated for their own good.
insofar as an external evaluator restricts any individual view to “a special case of consequence-based evaluation in which the outcome morality is evaluator-neutral”
in other words, we don't evaluate the outcome with reference to the degree to which it promotes or retards training in sodomy for senior citizens which is the only true measure of popular sovereignty within a framework of diversity, inclusivity and elderly peeps fucking each other in the ass.
As a result, there is no room for deontology that Sen defines as wanting “not to maltreat others, in dealing with them (e.g. by violating their rights,
failing to facilitate their life-chances with respect to imparting training in sodomy for senior citizens while remaining mindful of the Palestinians occupying Gazza's football strip
breaking his promises, etc.)” (1982: 23). Nor there is room for autonomy, including “the desires, projects, commitments
sodomy workshops for senior citizens
and personal ties of the individual agent” (Sen 1982: 23), except if it directly affects his personal well-being.
Sen came from a shitty part of the world which was pursuing shitty economic policies. He thought Social Choice theory should tell stupid lies about how maybe Cuba was actually much richer than America and Bangladesh, in 1974, was fucking paradise.
In contrast, Sen states that “[a]gency encompasses all the goals a person has reasons to adopt,
No. Agency is about a sense of one's own power to act and the feeling of being in control. It has nothing to do with a theological goal like gaining God's grace and thus getting to the Good Place. Equally one may want all welfare economists to devote themselves to tenderly imparting training in sodomy to senior citizens without oneself having to do anything to bring this about.
which can inter alia include goals other than the advancement of his or her own well-being” (Sen 2009: 287).
No. Any action can be seen as aiming to advance the agent's well being.
Sen (2009: 281, italics are ours) considers that: […] the informational inputs in a social choice exercise in the form of individual rankings can also be interpreted in ways other than as utility rankings or happiness orderings. […]
No. Because of the intensional fallacy they can't be seen as any type of ranking or ordering at all.
the nature of the debate on the consistency of social choice systems can be – and has been – moved to a broader arena through reinterpreting the variables incorporated in the mathematical model underlying social choice systems […]
Sadly, there is no fucking math underlying it. Preferences are epistemic. They change as the knowledge base changes. This means the 'intension' that is Preference has no well defined extension. This is the intensional fallacy.
and indeed voice is a very different – and in many ways a more versatile – idea than the concept of happiness.
People want to be happy. They don't want to hear voices.
Sen challenges the standard and narrow approach to “individual voices” in social choice theory, drawing important lessons from famous results (Arrow 1963, Sen 1970). He particularly questions Arrow’s assumption that social choice theory relies on orderings of individuals considered separately, without any interpersonal comparisons or social interactions.
There are no orderings. To assume otherwise is to commit the intensional fallacy.
For instance, as soon as equity is a concern,
or the fact that some peeps belong to the right Race or Religion while others are scum
the problem is not anymore the consistency of the voting rule, but the fact that “we are in the wrong territory by concentrating only [on] individual preference orderings” (Sen 2014: 39) 13.
More particularly because there are no fucking preference orderings.
If we add the concern for minority rights
or killing kaffirs
and liberty,
or instructing senior citizens in sodomy so as to achieve popular sovereignty for penguins
Sen interprets the result of “the impossibility of the Paretian liberal” (Sen 1970) as highlighting the crucial dependence of democratic social choices on the formation of tolerant values (Sen 2009: 337).
Sen came from East Bengal. Democratic social choice there involved killing or chasing away kaffirs. No democracy has come into existence without some degree of religious or other type of intolerance. A 'Paretian Liberal' is a Liberal- i.e. one who thinks very few decisions should be made collectively. Pareto optimality just means that there are no more bilateral trades to be made. It does not mean stupid shit Arrow pulled out of his arse.
This necessarily involves social interactions with a more comprehensive approach of person’s voices and situations.
No. It involves talking stupid shite. It's not as though these nutters spend their time talking to Trump supporters.
Sen’s criticism of the standard welfarist interpretation of the informational inputs of social choice exercises may also be related to his view on behavioral approaches.
Sen's own behavior was bad. He didn't help the poor. He ran off with his best friend's wife. Naturally, he didn't want to b judged on his behaviour.
Sen (1973) argues that behavior is an extremely limited source of information,
it is the only source of information on actual behavior- i.e. what people actually do as opposed to stuff they talk about doing.
so that the revealed preference theory is not easy to justify in terms of the methodological requirements of our discipline.
It was useful enough. People do need to estimate demand curves and work out elasticities and so forth.
To him, the thrust in this theory has undermined “thinking as a method of self-knowledge and talking as a method of knowing about others” (1973: 258).
How? Economists get paid to estimate elasticities and so forth. They, like everybody else, is welcome to think and talk and wank.
In contrast, the concept of “positional view” opens a path to both introspective and public reasoning.
by telling stupid lies or just wasting everybody's time with woke, virtue-signaling, bollocks.
Like Peter (2012) has underlined, appeals to external authority has become problematic in economics and, more generally in political theory.
In which case people should stop pretending Arrow's theorem or 'Paretian Liberal' means shit.
One important issue with formal welfarism is indeed linked to the empowerment of an external authority.
Professors like Sen or Rawls or Arrow are external authorities
An external person, should she be a philosopher, an expert or a policy maker (let us call them expert for the sake of simplicity), decides upon the proper material and the proper aggregation properties; equivalently, experts may decide upon the axioms, i.e. the desired properties, characterizing the representative aggregation, and the theory of justice associated with the chosen material. These decisions mechanically translate into policy proposals, without being debated by the persons concerned by the implementation of the policy.
Why not? They could be debated. The external authority is welcome to look at those debates. In practice, the Bench may look at parliamentary debates to determine the intention of a piece of legislation. The Judge is an external authority.
That the experts intend to favor these individuals’ welfare by doing so is not questionable. What Sen forcefully denounces is that this top-down process may conflict with the persons’ agency .
In which case that person may have an action in law against such usurpation. Thus if you officiously come and wipe my bum for me, I can charge you with indecent assault. Your argument that you were concerned with my welfare fails because I am perfectly able to wipe my own bum.
Thus, a necessary condition to reestablish persons’ agency is primarily to preclude welfarism, and to let agents choose the kind of evaluation they want to bring into the collective process of decision.
No. Re-establishing agency requires removing impediments on their freedom of action- e.g. being in jail. Precluding 'welfarism' doesn't do shit.
Sen however offers a way around this moral problem
which does not exist
without giving up normative reasoning, which explains he stays close to social choice theory. In our view, what Sen keeps exploring from Arrow’s (1963) seminal program are two general ideas: 1) that the diverse individual values or views are the essential basis for a democratic theory
though this simply isn't true. Chichilniksky showed that Preference and Endowment diversity must meet a Goldilocks condition for Markets or Democracy to work. But this is fucking obvious.
Empires- like the British Raj- can be very diverse. The transition to Democracy, however, is likely to involve ethnic cleansing. That's what happened in India during Sen's boyhood.
and 2) that the comparison of social states is the means to express such views.
the comparison of imaginary states- maybe. Social states are difficult to fully specify or acquire information about.
But, in Sen’s idea of justice, these two general ideas are translated in a way that is far less mechanist and easy to grasp than in social choice theory.
Sen gives an argument for labelling as 'Just' any fucking arbitrary action by policy makers while labelling as 'unjust' any proper, diligent, juristic procedure.
According to our reading, Sen distinguishes three kinds of inappropriate positional views on justice.
Sen doesn't get that there are different kinds of Justice- e.g. Criminal Justice, Distributive Justice, Nazi Justice, scolding Judges for not tenderly imparting skill in sodomy to senior citizens while pretending to be a penguin, farting vigorously and running away, etc.
A first kind is what Sen calls “objective illusions” (Sen 1993: 132) or “positional illusions” (Sen 2009: 166) that Sen attributes to the narrow informational bases available in the considered position.
These don't exist because no subject in any fucking position can't also have a big enough information base.
Another kind is “adaptive preferences” that Sen has sometimes used in the context of gender inequality and poverty evaluations, to highlight the social conditioning of individual views (see Gilardone 2009).
Again, these don't exist. If everybody can have Muth rational expectations fuck would they bother with adaptive preferences for?
This second kind is due to the narrowness of perspectives and expectations, given social circumstances, from the considered position.
Sen was repeating in his own addled fashion the old chestnut about how darkies are actually happier plucking cotton and eating water-melon on Massa's plantation.
The resultant adjustment of claims and desires represents an obstacle for dealing with persistent inequalities or poverty.
No. The obstacle is not having enough money.
A third kind of inappropriate view is parochialism. Parochialism amounts to under-scrutinized local values, fixed beliefs and specific practices. Parochial views are strictly dependent upon the traditions and culture of the small community one belongs to.
These worthless cunts belong to a very small, very ignorant, very parochial community. Let them continue to eat each other's shit.
As a result, if public reasoning is confined to the perspectives and understandings of the local community only, it might not help to overcome shared prejudices or cultural biases.
That is the only way it would do so. If 'public reasoning' relies on foreign or otherwise exogenous arguments, all that has happened is that there is a prejudice against what is indigenous or endogenous. You get Sen-tentious self-hating Hindus.
All these views are inappropriate to ground a collective view on justice, but also to represent well one’s values and interests.
A typically bombastic ipse dixit pronouncement which is meaningless when it is not mischievous.
A crucial stake of public reasoning is thus the possibility for individuals to reflect or reason on their own positional views.
It is always possible for sentient beings to reflect or reason on their views. But this has nothing to do with 'position'. Cats perceive mirror images of themselves differently from apes like us. But, cats growing up around mirrors soon learn to ignore the fictitious 'invasive' cats they keep glimpsing. In other words, if it is useful to overcome 'positional' illusions', that is what tends to happen if this adds survival value.
We already justified the focus on “positional views” with the importance of reflexivity on one’s own position and some understanding that it could be different.
But this happens without 'public discussion'- e.g. among cats.
Communicating one’s view is the means to check whether the proposed claims and the arguments supporting them are publicly defensible and resistant to a trans-positional examination.
No. There is no necessary relationship of this sort. There can be complementary perceptual or 'marking services' - e.g. a hunter can see somethings better than his dog but the dogs sense of smell means that the dog can sense some other things better than the hunter. This is a case of symbiosis. Speaking generally, there are mimetic effects such that an 'objective' view is adopted thanks to signals from other sentient beings absent any type of discussion or verbal activity.
In other words, the submission of positional views to public reasoning allows both reflexivity and mutual understanding, providing the informational basis available in each position is revealed.
No. Even in the case of highly mathematical information, 'reflexivity and mutual understanding' may be wholly absent even though there is observational or behavioral equivalence. This is like the 'matam'/vigyaan or doctrine/science distinction in Hindusm.
The confrontation with others’ positional views is a means both to move toward more transpositional views and to improve their agency.
Or it is a dialogue of the deaf. Still if one bunch of guys have better outcomes, there may be a Tardean mimetic effect such that behavior is the same though doctrines or dogmas remain very different and there is no mutual communication or dialogue.
This last point is rather implicit in Sen’s idea of justice.
He has no idea of justice. He just gasses on about how we should never adopt any operationalizable principle but just go on deafly discussing stuff while waiting to hear from impartial spectators in Patagonia or on Pluto.
But since such confrontation may help to remove positional illusion, it can be said that the search for greater transpositionality and the pursuit of greater individual agency are intimately connected.
Only in the sense that the search for greater farts and the pursuit of greater individual agency to achieve rocket propulsion by lighting those farts are intimately connected.
In this sense, a sphere of deliberation is needed for competing lines of reasoning, diverse experiences, information and knowledge to be exposed and discussed.
It is a useless sphere featuring useless shitheads like Sen.
According to our reading, Sen’s idea of public reasoning aims at broadening information available from every position, and not from the position of a so-called social evaluator.
In which case, why pay the 'social evaluator'? Also why not invite the cat to express its views?
The access of information to each individual as well as interpersonal comprehension are therefore central issues to be addressed by a theory of justice.
No. They are addressed by common sense regarding how actual people change their behavior to improve outcomes for themselves. This has to do with mimetics reinforced by improved outcomes not endless discussion.
Both shall reveal crucial for the identification of inappropriate views, and as a result for favoring their evolution. While the three kinds of inappropriate views that we had identified – objective illusions, adaptive preferences and parochialism – rely on distinct positional bias, it can be argued that they are sometimes closely related. For instance, “the apparent cogency of parochial values often turns on the lack of knowledge of what has proved feasible in the experiences of other people”
No. Cogency is a function of 'harmonious construction'. Some can do it. Some can't. But what makes parochial values prevail or fail is the success or failure of 'bourgeois strategies' arising out of the uncorrelated asymmetries underlying 'oikeiosis'. One may reject parochial values and mimic the values of the metropolitan culture so as to enjoy better outcomes. This happens whether or not there is 'public discussion'.
In other words, parochialism may support positional illusions or adaptive preferences.
Sen occupies a particular- useless but well remunerated- position. His preferences are 'adaptive' in the sense that he changes what he says minimally so as to continue to be well rewarded. But he is a useless shithead.
Public discussion would therefore benefit from including the views of people from other communities in order to identify the positional bias as extensively as possible.
No. Public discussion benefits from being brief and from screening out nutters or fools or virtue signaling cunts from distant countries.
Sen (2009: 123-152) introduces the concept of “open impartiality” to insist on the fact that the discussion should not be confined to persons who are entitled to make collective choices or engaged in social evaluation because they belong to the polity for two main reasons.
America could quickly destroy itself by letting China make its decisions for it. The main reason Sen advocates this sort of stupidity is because he has shit for brains. He doesn't just hate his native Hinduism. He also hates the America where he has done well for himself.
The perspective for those “inside” may firstly be enlightened by distant views on local understandings. Secondly, outsiders might “bear some of the consequences of decisions taken in that particular polity” (Sen 2009: 134) and this information may change insiders’ views on their own decisions.
If that information was relevant, the 'insiders' would have paid to gain it anyway or else would have suffered a loss of some kind such that their menu of choice got restricted.
In other words, open public reasoning opens up two important ways for changing positional views in transpositional ones providing mutual comprehension is made possible: 1) enlightenment, and 2) a greater sense of neighborhood.
Or being invaded and enslaved. Your new neighbors may have good reasons to value raping you regularly in between robbing you.
To reach the condition of mutual comprehension and reduce the felt distance between individuals who may have the most difficulties to understand each other, one key may be to inform as much as possible on the differential of positional parameters between persons.
The raped should learn to empathize with their rapists. Also, they should chop off their own arms and shove those arms up their assholes. Then we could all have a nice public discussion about the various ideas of poetic Justice applicable to Sen-tentious cretins.
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