Authoritarian elements in democracy
I remember Kanshi Ram, the founder of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), speaking to fellow Dalits at election rallies. As a graduate student then writing a dissertation on the BSP, I heard him speak at many such rallies. Kanshi Ram was nothing if not a democrat.
He was essentially a Trade Union leader who came into politics not so much with the intention to win elections but to create a Dalit 'class consciousness' which would lead to cohesive action. However, by the time Ram entered politics, the power of Religion was increasing in his native Punjab. Zail Singh and Buta Singh wielded great power though Punjab as a whole remained Jat dominated.
Kanshi Ram's big break came after the destruction of the Babri Masjid when Mulayam Singh Yadav promoted him as a Dalit face for his Yadav/Muslim alliance.
He led a revolution for the empowerment of Dalits
No. He led those who had already received affirmative action. Could he do anything for other Dalits? No. Neither Yadavs nor Muslims were interested in lifting up the Dalits. Mayawati became CM with BJP support and showed she could deliver things which mattered to Dalits like 'pattas'- i.e. title to land.
and other excluded subaltern groups within India’s democratic framework.
Not really. Kanshi Ram wasn't a skillful politician. Still, Mayawati needed his imprimatur though she was by far the more capable leader.
But his egalitarian, democratic ends were achieved through a hierarchical style of representation.
No. He was primarily a Trade Union leader and had the mannerisms of that stripe of person. The workers need to know their representative will drive a hard bargain with the bosses.
At rally after rally, he stood on the dais, with a pen tucked in the pocket of his shirt and a faintly irritable expression on his face, and lectured the throngs of young men before him on what they needed to do to obtain power. It was not an empathetic address but a paternal or a school-masterly one. It helped that he was older than most of his flock. He was, not incidentally, called Sahib (Sir).
Chandra is describing the typical Trade Union organizer. The question was whether he could do electoral politics without becoming the pawn of a shrewder operator. The answer was no. It was Mayawati who had that skill.
A hierarchical style of representation is common among politicians in India.
No. Plenty of politicians dress like they are penniless peasants. Socialists and Trade Union organizers might wear a bush shirt and trousers. But, if you are appealing to dominant caste voters, you dress as they would on ceremonial occasions- i.e. flamboyant turbans, shawls, etc. Some politicians have their own sartorial style.
The difference is often in the style of hierarchy, not the fact. One is spoilt for choice between the imperial style of Indira Gandhi,
Indira could be imperious but did not have an imperial style. She dressed tastefully, not gaudily, and had the common touch.
the different but no less imperial style of Narendra Modi,
Modi is image conscious, not imperial. This is part of his aura of professionalism and managerial efficiency.
the didactic style of Charan Singh,
Charan Singh was rightly proud to have a book on the Harvard Econ reading list. His son, Ajith- a computer scientist in America in the Sixties- was even more intellectual accomplished. With hindsight, Charan Singh could have cultivated a more technocratic image and projected his son as an all-India leader who would ensure industry and agriculture would grow rapidly together.
the dictatorial style of Bal Thackeray, the regal style of Vasundhara Raje,
an actual Princess
the patronal style of Karunanidhi,
He had a combative style but, no doubt, mellowed somewhat in later years. But to Tamils, the fire of his oratory could never fade from the mind.
and the ‘elder-sisterliness’ of Mamata Banerjee.
she is the ultimate pugilist of combative politics. We may call her 'Didi' but we never forget her valour.
As Kanshi Ram’s example highlights, it is found in even the unlikeliest places, as much among the leaders of subaltern groups as among those backed by dominant groups.
What this lady is saying is there is no 'hierarchical style' in India. Different leaders dress and talk differently. That is a matter of their own personal preference.
Hierarchy is more commonly associated with authoritarian than democratic government.
No. England was democratic though absurdly hierarchical. America might have appeared more egalitarian but it had its Senators and Judges and Honorary Colonels.
It does not, of course, amount to authoritarianism. But it is one element in a package of elements associated with authoritarianism.
Hierarchy is associated with a more ancient, 'deferential', society based on immemorial traditions. An authoritarian society- like that of Tzarist Russia- might have a strict table of ranks such that every official knows their place within the bureaucracy- but it might not actually be particularly hierarchical. Thus a Russian Prince might be quite a poor man whereas in Western Europe such a thing was unthinkable.
Others include personality cults, a circumvention of institutions, a separation between rulers and ruled, a principle of selection based on appointment or heredity or wealth or something other than popular choice, centralization of power, an arbitrary use of that power, suppression of dissent, rulers who are unconstrained or unaccountable, a suspension of rights and so on.
All these things could exist without authoritarianism. Misgovernment- whether due to incompetence, exigent circumstances, or malfeasance of various types- can exist in an egalitarian democracy.
Democracy, by contrast, is a system associated with elements such as political equality,
No. A portion of the population- even the majority- may not be eligible to vote because they are 'guest workers' or treated as such.
a principle of selection based on free and fair elections,
that is 'representative democracy'. Other types exist.
rule of law,
The Legislature can usurp the Judicial function in a Democracy.
a pluralistic distribution of power, freedom to dissent, rulers who are both constrained and accountable, a guarantee of fundamental rights and so on.
All these things may disappear due to exigent circumstances without any change in who is making the laws or enforcing them.
India has many democratic elements: unusually competitive elections; plural centres of power, given both the large number of parties in India’s party system and the multiple levels of government, spanning national, regional and local politics; a vocal and critical media; a remarkably open political system in which the fluidity of electoral coalitions acts as a catalyst for bringing new groups into politics; frequent turnover not only between the parties but also the groups who are in power; and, since the introduction of panchayati raj, a tenacious form of grassroots democracy. What is more, a strong and vibrant democratic culture that has sprung up around these structures and practices.
So. India is a Democracy. Moreover the Judiciary is independent and activist. The Electoral Commission is neutral. India is better off than the US in that respect.
But India’s democracy also has several authoritarian elements.
Which polity does not? So long as, at least at the last resort, the police or Army enforce decisions then there is a relevant authority and chain of command. However, if orders are issued by elected politicians and there is judicial overview then there is an exercise of legal authority but no political authoritarianism. No doubt, opposition leaders may decry the use of the police as 'Fascist'- e.g. Mrs Thatcher use of the police during the Miner's strike- but voters are at liberty to reject the imputation and to punish those who make it at the polls.
This does not mean that India is an authoritarian regime. But it does mean that any reckoning of democracy in India has to take the admixture of authoritarian elements into account. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the word ‘admixture’ as ‘something mixed in with something else; a minor ingredient.’ And the often minor authoritarian ingredients mixed into Indian democracy can become major in particular spaces or time periods.
It would be truer to say that stupid savants can magnify something minor and then start raving hysterically about Fascism and Adolf Hitler.
Consider the example of personality cults. The latest example of a cult of personality is the one that has sprung up around Prime Minister Modi.
Modi has a personality. Manmohan didn't.
But there are many more. Mayawati, the former Chief Minister of the state of Uttar Pradesh, erected statues to herself while in government.
But those statues had no magic power to keep her in office. Sad.
The city of Kolkata is strewn with larger than life posters and cut-outs of Mamata Banerjee. Perhaps the biggest personality cult of them all was the one that enveloped Jayalalithaa, who was worshipped by her supporters as Adhiparasakthi or the ‘omnipotent female power’.
Karunanidhi scripted the film 'Parashakti'. Jayalalitha had to go one up on her rival.
The term 'personality cult' only has meaning within a Communist framework. The pretense is that the leader should know 'Scientific Socialism'. His personality doesn't matter. A cult of personality is something wicked Jews like Trotsky go in for.
In Democratic polities, candidates want to look and sound their best. They seek to display a winning personality. But this is also true of actors in TV commercials trying to get us to buy a particular brand of soap powder.
In fact, even those leaders who self-consciously avoid hierarchy consciously cultivate a cult of personality.
No. They project a larger than life persona. A personality cult would involve claims like 'Beloved leader doesn't need to poo or piss. He needs no sleep. Moreover though everybody thinks he is a fat tub of lard, he is actually very slender and well muscled.'
Take Laloo Prasad Yadav, for example, who purposefully challenges hierarchy as a mode of relating to his constituent public. His style is jocular and affectionate, emphasizing his shared background with subaltern groups, not his superior knowledge and qualifications. But it was under his reign that the government owned Bihar Textbook Corporation published a Class VII textbook with a lesson that described Laloo ‘as the priceless jewel of the soil of Bihar... whose birth can be compared with that of the Enlightenment of Lord Buddha under the Bodhi Tree.’
You've got to hand it to Laloo. He knew how to make people laugh.
Similarly, Arvind Kejriwal’s face and name has become practically synonymous with the Aam Aadmi Party.
Kejriwal's persona as the guy sitting next to you on the Secretariat bus has certainly helped his party.
Then there is the politics of heredity and family. This is widespread too.
Why? Is this a feature of 'segmentary societies'? Or do dynasties maintain a 'favor bank' that is more robust than that of any Political party?
22% of the MPs, 33% of India’s current chief ministers, and the leaders of 36% of parties in Parliament have a dynastic background.
In India people join politics to spend more time with their families. However, India has a caste system. Particular families may be identified as representing particular caste based coalitions or voting blocks.
And many of those representatives who avoid hierarchy and personality cults, such as Akhilesh Yadav or Omar Abdullah, usually because they are too young to draw on them successfully, relied instead on heredity for their entry into politics.
I'm not sure what this means. Akhilesh and Omar were said to appeal more to youth. But both would be seen as entitled Princelings.
Now consider the limits on dissent. India has a remarkably broad colonial era sedition law
which had zero effect on Gandhi, Nehru etc.
which makes practically any action (speech, writing, signs, or any other visible representation) that is critical of the government (more specifically, ‘which brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards the government’) punishable by a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.6 The Supreme Court later limited the application of the law only to cases where an incitement to violence had occurred. But both the central and the regional governments, led by parties across the political spectrum, have invoked this law freely and arbitrarily. The most recent, almost farcical example, is the opposition’s demand that BJP MP Tarun Vijay be charged with sedition for his prejudiced remarks on race and colour.
The sedition law is now in abeyance. Criminal defamation is likely to go the same way. If politicians gain by going to jail, or being threatened with jail, then, clearly, sedition laws don't really limit dissent.
In recent years, this law has also begun to be used to stifle large-scale protests. In 2012 and 2013, the police under Tamil Nadu’s AIADMK-led government charged 9000 people in Tamil Nadu with sedition for protesting a nuclear power plant. In 2016, the BJP-led national government charged JNU student Kanhaiya Kumar with sedition for supposedly shouting anti-India slogans. Hardik Patel, the then 22 year old who led an agitation of the Patel caste in Prime Minister Modi’s home state of Gujarat in 2015, was also charged with, and jailed for, sedition. Sedition charges of this sort rarely result in a conviction – but they are now being used as a routine tool to suppress protest through incarceration and harassment.
Both Kumar and Patel gained by such prosecution. The State has other ways to tackle protests.
Finally, consider the ‘emergency powers’ given to the central government by the Indian Constitution. A national level emergency has not been declared since 1975, and constitutional amendments now make the declaration of such an emergency more difficult. The declaration of President’s Rule in individual states has also become significantly less frequent in the past two decades than in the 1970s and 1980s. However, to the extent that these laws remain on the books, and can easily be invoked by elected governments, the shadow of a constitutionally sanctioned authoritarianism continues to be closely linked to the practice of democracy in India.
The UK last declared a state of Emergency in 1974. Canada had one in 2022. This means Canadian democracy is more authoritarian than that of India or Britain- right?
Further, another form of ‘routine emergency’ in the form of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (the AFSPA) is in effect in Jammu and Kashmir, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram. The act empowers the government of these states or the central government to declare all or part of the territory of these states a ‘disturbed area’. In areas declared ‘disturbed’, security forces are empowered to shoot to kill, arrest without warrant, search without warrant, and enter or destroy property. All areas in all these states are not declared disturbed all the time. But as long as the AFSPA remains in effect in these states, fundamental rights can be suspended in any part of these states with relative ease.
Equally, insurgents can be killed and separatist forces extinguished. Punjab was under AFSPA between 1983 and 1997.
This list of authoritarian elements which coexist with democratic ones suggests a change in the way in which we think about democracy and authoritarianism in India.
Only in so far as there being a state of Emergency in Northern Ireland changed the way people thought about democracy and authoritarianism in Britain. In other words, the thing doesn't matter in the slightest.
So far the standard interpretation of India is as a mostly democratic country with occasional authoritarian episodes.
There was an authoritarian episode in 1975-77. The Congress Party certainly has the potential to be a full blown Fascist party but assassination tempers autocracy. Mrs. Gandhi was terrified somebody might poison her food (after her cook died in a traffic accident) and so Sonia cooked for the family.
The Emergency was one such episode, with the blame laid primarily at the door of Indira Gandhi. Present day India, some have suggested, is approaching a second such episode, with the blame laid primarily at the door of Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
Modi showed courage battling against Indira's Emergency. He knows that strong arm tactics will alienate the voter. He has no son or daughter to promote.
But authoritarianism in India is not an episode that can be located in one person, either Gandhi or Modi, or in one demarcated period, either past or present. It is a continuous strain, mixed in with democratic elements, and found continuously in varying strength across time periods, regions and leaders in India.
In other words, it is a mirage. One may as well say, 'Libertarianism in North Korea is not an episode that can be located in one person. It is a continuous strain mixed with authoritarian strains.'
The balance between authoritarian and democratic features may shift from time to time. Certainly, it shifted decisively towards authoritarianism during the Emergency. There are obvious excesses that happened during the Emergency that have not happened since, including large-scale detentions and arrests, and severe censorship imposed on the media. But there are lower key authoritarian elements that have remained persistently in the background both before and after, sometimes coming to the foreground as well.
Very true. North Korea has lower key libertarian elements that have remained persistently in the background. Indeed, Saudi Arabia has lower key Zionist elements and France has lower key Anglophile elements whereas Germany is totes Nazi- right?
Importantly, and paradoxically, these elements coexist with what is also a real and undeniable proliferation of democratic elements. It should not be surprising, then, that this oxy-moronic coexistence also shows up in the data we have on what citizens think. According to a 2013 survey on India done by CSDS-Lokniti, 44% of those who prefer democracy to other forms of government also prefer a strong leader who dispenses with elections and Parliament.
Indian statistical surveys tend to be shit.
Further, authoritarian and democratic elements do not just coexist in India’s democracy. They shape each other.
Just as libertarian elements are shaping authoritarian elements in North Korea.
In the example that I started with, Kanshi Ram used hierarchy in the service of democracy.
No. He was a Trade Union organizer who entered politics. But so did Datta Samant. Class mobilization was the basis for political mobilization. This had nothing to do with hierarchy. Samant got elected to the Lok Sabha in '84 despite the Rajiv wave. Kanshi Ram seems to have been a useful idiot for Mulayam Singh.
The essays in the issue are replete with many more such examples. The essays by Michelutti and Vaishnav suggest that criminal ‘bosses’ in local politics provide service and are accountable in many ways to their constituent publics.
Hilarious! Murderous thugs are not 'accountable'. What Yogi has proved is that killing a Brahmin Don doesn't lose you Brahmin votes.
In the essay by Ikegame, the guru and other traditional leaders use hierarchy to achieve democratic ends in elections.
But, in India, Gurus- as opposed to Acharyas- are anti-hierarchical.
The essay by Harriss on Jayalalithaa notes that the personality cult around her has gone hand in hand with a strong welfarist agenda.
Buying votes is the monopoly of no one party. Sadly, Jayalalithaa's charisma was not transferable to Sasikala.
In other work, I have suggested that dynasties can bring about social inclusion in some respects.
The Windsors achieved a lot in that direction when they ruled India.
Democratic features in turn shape authoritarian ones. The criminal bosses, patrons, top down reformers, gurus and dynasties discussed here all have constraints on their power based on elections – and also have to operate in a plural marketplace. Their constituencies are not captive. They have the option to go elsewhere. This also shapes and constrains their own behaviour. I will return in the concluding section of this essay to the implication of this coexistence and interaction between democratic and authoritarian elements for how we think about democracy, in India and globally.
The lady hasn't mentioned any 'authoritarian elements'. In Pakistan, there is Army involvement in politics. That is authoritarian. In some States- e.g. Bengal- one may speak of party cadres beating opponents into submission. But, at the central level, there is no whiff of authoritarianism though there may be misbehavior in Parliament with the result that the Government just passes the bills it needs to pass and the Speaker adjourns the House.
India is by no means unique. All democracies have a cache of authoritarian elements, although the content and size of this cache, and the balance between democratic and authoritarian elements varies across space and time.
In the Seventies, Westminster style democracies including UK and Canada imposed States of Emergency. But, as in India, no permanent harm was done to the democratic ethos.
In other democracies too, in a fact that is often ignored, authoritarian features not only coexist with but also shape the democratic elements.
No. In India and the UK, emergency powers have been pruned back. COVID was not considered serious enough to trigger the Civil Contingencies Act of 2004. Alternatively, maybe nobody actually understood what Gordon Brown had constructed. The man was too clever by half.
To illustrate, I will focus on the two democracies invoked most often in discussions of the classic model of liberal democracy: the United Kingdom and the United States.
The United Kingdom currently has many of the classic elements associated with democracy: constitutionally protected rights, a constrained and accountable government, a free press, rule of law, competitive elections and so on. But, as a monarchy with dedicated space for the aristocracy in the upper house of parliament,
There are a few hereditary peers elected by their fellows. This was part of a compromise made by Tony Blair.
it also legitimizes the principle of heredity, and negates the idea of political equality.
Not really. It is merely a nod to Britain's love of 'pomp and circumstance'.
One could argue that the monarchy and aristocracy are constrained by, and now support, a democratic system. But that only proves the point that authoritarian and democratic elements often interact and shape each other in the countries that we think of as classic cases of democracy.
Kingji is very authoritarian. He is chopping off head of naughty children. As for the Duchess of Dunroamin, she will beat you with her chappal if you don't sit up straight.
Further, democracy inside Britain developed in a way that was closely linked to authoritarianism outside, in the form of colonialism.
Nonsense! There was no link between the two whatsoever. In the late eighteenth century there were a couple of 'Nabobs' and West Indian plantation owners- people like 'the Great Commoner' Pitt and Alderman Beckford- who were considered 'Radical', but they weren't really. The reforms of 1832 were driven by the manufacturing class while 1867 was about appealing to the rising skilled workman.
The two were linked in at least three ways. First, the idea of democracy as the rule of ‘we the people’ rests on the idea of exclusion, for there can be no ‘we’ without a ‘they’.
Yes there can. We in this pub, at this moment in time, would like to get drunk. There is no 'they' we care about.
Colonialism, by identifying outsiders, helped solidify the sense of Britishness.
Nonsense! Ireland was colonized but its Parliament was taken away and after Catholic Emancipation, more and more Irish Catholic MPs sat in Westminster. The Irish question had a big impact on British politics. The creation of the Liberal Unionist party was a direct result of Gladstone playing footsie with Parnell & Co. Nignogs and wogs didn't matter though one or two people of Asiatic ancestry did get elected to Westminster.
Second, and relatedly, the idea of democracy as it developed in Britain rested on the notion that some people were fit for it while others were not.
No. The original idea of democracy- based on the Athenian model- would have confined the suffrage to property owning males with extra representation for the Universities and so forth. Universal suffrage was a Radical 'Chartist' demand which was considered a harbinger of mob rule- not democracy. After 1867, it became apparent that a large section of the working class was Tory (i.e. hated the Irish) and, at a later date, it dawned on politicians that women were even more conservative than the men.
There is still an archway in India’s Rashtrapati Bhavan – the former Viceroy’s Palace – with the inscription, ‘Liberty will not descend to a people. A people must raise themselves to liberty. It is a blessing that must be earned before it can be enjoyed.’
This is from Charles Caleb Colton. His point was that reform was pernicious if it only brought a bunch of rogues to power. The odd thing is that there's a Persian translation of this on South Block.
This legitimized empire – and in turn strengthened the sense of collective distinctiveness that legitimized democracy in Britain.
Nonsense! What legitimized empire was profit and increased national security. When these two conditions failed, Britain got shot of its colonial possessions with alacrity.
Third, colonialism helped to produce the wealth which is associated with the flourishing of democracy in Britain and elsewhere.
No. The Brits decided to keep the profits from mercantile trade and colonial expansion in private hands. Thus the King had to depend on Parliament for money to spend on whores and horses. That's how Parliamentary democracy got its start. It wasn't the case that the Brits decided they were White and should have democracy so as to make all the wooly headed nignogs jelly.
Now, consider the example of the United States. Many commentators have suggested that Donald Trump’s election as President has brought authoritarianism to America.
Trump delivered lower taxes and a more conservative Supreme Court while presiding over an economic boom. Then COVID struck and suddenly people turned against a guy who thought that injecting yourself with bleach might be a good idea.
Trump was transactional. He was a deal maker. He wasn't authoritarian.
And indeed, his style of leadership does carry several hallmarks of authoritarianism: it is whimsical and arbitrary, concentrates authority in his person and family while running down institutions, represents an oligarchy, and relies for legitimacy on an ideology of racial exclusion.
This describes a guy who is a bit shit at governance. It has nothing to do with authoritarianism. Trump wasn't sending in Federal Troops to get Blue States to abandon abortion or anything of that sort.
But while Trump has begun to shift the balance between democratic and authoritarian features in the US, it would be hard to argue that he created authoritarianism in America. Many of the authoritarian elements he is accused of existed in some form prior to his coming to power.
and exist in Biden's America which is why we might accuse him of seeking to reintroduce slavery and to carry out genocide against the First Nations. On the other hand, he may well scalp King Charles III if he attends his coronation. My point is that authoritarianism, like the custom of scalping people, has interacted with and shaped American democracy.
The tendency towards family-based politics in the US, for example, predates Trump. His main opponent in the presidential election, Hillary Clinton, is the wife of a former president. One of his opponents in the Republican primary, Jeb Bush, is the son and brother of other former presidents. Dynasticism also persists in the US Congress and in executive positions.15 Trump’s version of family-based politics is different in the sense that his family members have been appointed to non-transparent and non-accountable advisory positions rather than running for elected office. But this is not the first time an American president has appointed family members to such positions. Bobby Kennedy was his brother John F. Kennedy’s closest adviser before he ran for elected office. In fact, the ‘Federal Anti-Nepotism Statute’ which prohibits a public official from appointing relatives to positions in his agency –which Trump had to circumvented by arguing that his ‘personal staff’ was not covered by the law – has been nicknamed the ‘Bobby Kennedy law’.
Trump ran a family business as viewers of 'the Apprentice' well knew. Thus there was nothing surprising about his continuing to rely on family members- or his son-in-law- once in power.
Oligarchy also predates Trump: a 2014 study of public opinion surveys by political scientists at Princeton and Northwestern found that ‘majorities of the American public have little influence over the policies of the government while the rich exercise an effective veto on many issues.’
When was this not the case? Washington and Jefferson and so on weren't exactly beggars.
The racial exclusion that characterizes Trump’s appeal has also been a recurrent strain in American democracy – and in democracies more broadly. As David Scott Fitzgerald and David Cook-Martin write, in a study of democracy and racism in twenty-two countries including the US, ‘Racism has been the cultural frame that allowed inferences about people’s morality and capacity for democratic participation from their appearance or cultural practices.’ In the US, it justified racist immigration policies in the 19th century, and the disenfranchisement of African Americans until well into the 20th century.
Fuck that. America went in for genocide on an industrial scale against the First Nations.
This exclusivist strain coexists with other inclusive ones and the balance between them shifts from time to time. But it is an old strain that Trump has taken to a new, dangerous level by threatening to build a wall keeping immigrants out, not something that he has introduced to American politics for the first time.
Eisenhower and Kennedy presided over 'Operation Wetback' which illegally deported many Spanish speaking citizens.
None of this is to say that the UK or the US are authoritarian regimes, any more than India is. Quite the opposite. They have many democratic elements and the balance of democratic elements is still greater than the authoritarian ones. But these elements coexist and influence each other.
No. The US did genocide and slavery and so forth without any fucking authoritarianism. It is not the case that only guys in uniforms do evil shit. People don't need no stinkin' orders in order to get busy lynching or gunning down minorities.
In the circumstances it should not be surprising that public opinion polls find that 50% of Britons have ‘authoritarian’ views, correlated with the vote on Brexit,19 and that 44% of white Americans have ‘authoritarian’ worldviews, correlated with the vote on Trump.
This is Junk Social Science. Did Brexiteers want BoJo to dress up in a uniform and declare himself Field Marshall for life? No. Don't be silly.
As in India, these views coexist with support for democratic government. And this combination of democratic and authoritarian public attitudes is found elsewhere as well. Hale points in his essay in this issue, for example, to survey evidence in Russia that shows over 31 per cent of the population thought that both democracy and a strongman leader were ‘good fits’ for Russia.
Putin's approval rating is now 82%. I suppose Russians really do feel very possessive about eastern Ukraine. But the Serbs felt similarly about Kosovo. Tough titty, Tovarich.
The standard way of thinking about democracy and authoritarianism in political science and outside, is in typologies.
And the standard way of thinking about political science is thinking it is shit.
The most common typology is a dichotomous one, which distinguishes between democracies and authoritarian regimes.
This is like distinguishing between food and shit. It is a useful distinction to make. If you are dealing with a democracy, you know the leader wants to get reelected and that one type of deal is on the table. If you are dealing with an autocrat it may be that the guy wants an excuse to make his people really suffer so that he can scapegoat an intermediary group of people so that his own power increases.
Other typologies include trichotomous ones which distinguish between ‘liberal democracies’,
nice food
‘illiberal democracies’
food that smells like shit
and ‘authoritarian regimes’,
shit
or between ‘democracies’, ‘hybrid regimes’ and ‘authoritarian regimes’. Levitsky and Way take this proliferation of categories further, unpacking the different types of ‘hybrid’ regimes, and focusing on one kind in particular – competitive authoritarian regimes.
turds which compete with other turds for the title of most stinky piece of shit.
There have also been attempts to introduce continuous measures for democracy, including a 10-point scale constructed by the Polity Project or Freedom House’s 100 point score.22 But these continuous measures are inevitably collapsed for heuristic purposes into discrete categories.
These are fundamentally foolish projects. We pity the fools paid a little money to make these moronic calculations.
These typologies are not simply of academic interest. They come with value judgments attached, according to which liberal democracies are best, illiberal democracies second best and authoritarianism the worst. They confer legitimacy on regimes classified as democratic – even better, liberal democratic – and on the actions taken by their leaders in the name of democracy. They affect policy: for example American foreign policy treats democratic countries differently from non-democratic countries. And they affect self-perception. The fact that India is usually classified as a democratic country, in contrast to its historically authoritarian neighbours, is a major source of national pride.
Maybe under UPA. Modi and Co. didn't give a shit about the thing. America fucks over its friends and deserts its allies. It can help its enemies- albeit inadvertently. India's relationship with America is transactional. America is on its way out of the region.
The problem with these typologies, however, is that they come with blind spots. In typological thinking, countries belong to one and only one category. This prevents us from acknowledging the coexistence of democratic and authoritarian elements and their interaction in many countries.
Not really. What matters is if a particular country is on our side or on the wrong side. Its internal politics don't greatly matter. America, as leader of the Free World, would deem a country free if it was an ally. Truman hated Franco but his officials wore him down and so Spain was rehabilitated by 1955. Nixon, as President, went the extra mile, describing the Caudillo, after his death, as a great friend and ally.
Consider the case of dynastic politics. This is a pervasive feature in modern democracies. But because dynastic politics is seen as the antithesis of democracy – associated with authoritarian or pre-democratic forms of rule – and because typological thinking forces us to categorize countries as democratic or authoritarian but not both, this prevented us from acknowledging for a long time the coexistence, and interaction, between dynastic and democratic politics.
No. The relevant distinction is between the two party system of the UK and US where no one individual dominates an entire party and there is some ideological or sociological difference between the parties, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, what are essentially plebiscitary dictatorships of a hereditary or military type. If strong arm tactics are used to turn out the vote, we speak of authoritarianism. Otherwise we make jokes about banana republics with dynastic rulers of increasing ineptitude.
We either underplay the role of heredity in shaping democracy – treating the British monarchy or House of Lords, for instance, as somehow intrinsically democratic
which is what it was. After the Glorious Revolution, you can't say any British nobleman was plotting to get the throne or to grab the domains of other noblemen. In France, on the other hand, you had the Orleanists.
The plain fact is, Parliaments in Anglo Saxon countries were not primarily focused on 'Game of Thrones' type dynastic intrigue.
– or study heredity as a separate subject – as in the case of dynastic politics in the US Congress, which stimulated several standalone research papers – without integrating it into a theory of democracy.
Some children like following in their parent's footsteps. The child of a Doctor may be more likely to become a Doctor and the same is true in politics. What is undemocratic is if a particular family comes to own a political party and to demand slavish obedience from its members. That is what has happened with the Indian National Congress. Rahul is utterly useless yet 45 million Congress members must compete with each other in praising him.
Similarly, we study British colonialism as a phenomenon that is separate – geographically and analytically – from British democracy without acknowledging the role that one played in shaping, and shoring up, the other.
The Brits did export their institutions to some of their colonies but there was no reciprocal influence whatsoever.
Empirical studies of the effect of British colonialism on democracy typically investigate the effect that British colonialism had on sustaining democracy in the colonies, not on the mutually reinforcing relationship between colonialism and democracy in Britain itself.
There was no such relationship. Getting rid of the Raj had zero political fall-out in Britain whereas France and Portugal suffered great internal convulsions when they had to give up territory in Africa. Indeed, the Portuguese had two revolutions- one in 1910 and then the more successful 1974 carnation revolution both of which were directly connected to Portugal's overseas empire.
In the US, we study oligarchy in America as something separate from democracy or as the anti-thesis of democracy: the standard head-line is that America is an oligarchy, not a democracy. But in fact, America combines both oligarchic and democratic elements in the same regime.
Which is cool unless you are a 'People's Democratic Republic'- i.e. not democratic at all.
Changing the classifications of individual countries does not fix the problem. Consider again the case of the US, usually classified as a liberal democracy. Now, with Trump in charge, many commentators have changed the classification of the US from a ‘liberal’ to an ‘illiberal’ democracy.
Why not just say 'US is totes shit coz a guy I don't like is in charge?'
But downgrading the contemporary US into the category of ‘illiberal democracy’ downgrades the US present while upholding, even glorifying, the category of liberal democracy – and simultaneously glorifying the US past. American democracy, this implies, may be illiberal now, but it was unsullied by authoritarian features earlier – and in that earlier golden period, it fit the category of a liberal democracy. But my point here is that there is no democracy that is unsullied by authoritarian elements: the category itself, and the typology that contains it, both bear questioning, not simply the placement of countries within that category and typology.
Why stop there? Why not say that no democracy is unsullied by ritual cannibalism and the sacrifice of virgins to the Great God Chthulhu?
It’s the same with India. The classification of present-day India as democratic rather than authoritarian has produced a literature that celebrates its successes in electoral politics – broad based turnout, competitive politics, anti-incumbency – to the point of fetishization, without integrating into this literature other equally valid insights about authoritarian elements, such as heredity, coerciveness, the personalization of power, limits on dissent, and militarization which also characterize Indian democracy.
The people who did all this were stupid and useless. Prashant Kishor used his degree in Statistics to fundamentally change Indian politics in one short decade. Nobody cares how you classify stuff. What matters is bringing about worthwhile change.
Further, the sharp separation between the Emergency as an ‘authoritarian’ period and the rest of India’s post-independence history as ‘democratic’ blinds us to the way in which authoritarian features have continuously characterized and shaped India’s democracy.
Was the Emergency seen as a continuation or revival of things which had existed in the Nehru era? No. It was sui generis. No doubt, there were some officials who remembered the British crackdown during the Quit India movement. But there was an orderly aspect to that. India, it is true, had seen some extra-judicial killing and would do so again but the Emergency was a horse of a different color. Essentially, Indira was saying 'This is what Dictatorship looks like. You want 'Total Revolution'? Well, I can deliver it better than JP or Kripalani or other such eunuchs.' The other point is that Indian officials wanted to show that the country was not what the Myrdal's called 'a soft state'. It was well hard. Heath's Emergency failed. Indira's kicked ass. Why? Indira remembered what JP & Co. had forgotten. The British policy of jailing seditionists had succeeded. Everybody became quiet and sweet after a few years of porridge. The Congress led Freedom struggle had failed. Lining up to get hit on the head or get sent to jail doesn't magically produce the outcome you want. The thing is childish.
Classifying India as an illiberal democracy does not solve the problem either.
Just point out that it is populated by brown peeps who worship monkeys and elephants.
It reifies the category of a ‘pure’ liberal democracy while at the same time placing India outside that category. But it is not the case that a class of relatively ‘pure’ democracies exists, and India has failed to pass muster. In fact, any work that creates a special category in which to place India – including my own previous work which classifies India as an example of a special class of democracies termed ‘patronage democracies’ or Partha Chatterjee’s work which classifies democracy as it is practiced in India as an example of ‘political society’– is problematic to the extent that by introducing a separate category in which to place India, they uphold at the same time categories such as ‘liberal democracy’ or ‘civil society’ which India is believed to deviate from.
For Marxists, there was some point debating the type and extent of 'class formation' or shite like that. But Marxism turned out to be nonsense. But so did Political Science after a brief period in the Fifties and Sixties when the CIA might fund the thing. The plain truth was that guys who understood Statistics and psephology could make some money for themselves and gain political influence. The Professors were useless. India's 'Political Economy' changed rapidly in the Nineties and nobody in Academia really got a handle on it. They just regurgitated their own earlier work but in a shriller, more hysterical, tone. They were supposed to be experts on India, but India was no longer a country they understood.
Part of what I have tried to suggest in this essay is that the category of liberal democracy itself is problematic,
Nope. The thing can be well enough defined in terms of 'Law & Economics' even if the Political Economy is unknown.
to the extent that it blinds us to the routine presence of authoritarian elements even in those countries which are routinely classified as ‘liberal democracies’.
But this routine presence is delusionary. One may as well say all polities have elements of ritual cannibalism and the sacrifice of virgins to the Great God Chthulhu.
When it comes to democracy and authoritarianism, then, it is better to think in admixtures rather than typologies.
No. It is better to look facts in the face. Are the guys running things wearing uniforms and bundling dissidents into Black Marias? No? Then there is no authoritarianism. However, State Banquets may be a cover for ritual cannibalism- more especially if Macron is the invited guest. Also Biden probably does sacrifice virgins to the Great God Chtulhu. It is the persistence of these atavistic elements in liberal democracies which Netflix should focus on.
‘Admixing’, as I noted above, refers to ‘the action of adding an ingredient to something else.’
This begs the question who is 'adding' an authoritarian ingredient? In the old days, you could say 'I hear the East Germans are training the Intelligence Bureau' or 'the President is close to General X who is close to the CIA Head of Station. I hear that there is a special military unit which is being trained by the Israelis for rapid deployment against members of such and such party.'
But those days are long gone- at least as far as South Asia is concerned.
The ingredients I refer to here are the authoritarian elements which are mixed into a democratic regime.
Where do they come from? In Pakistan, you could say 'the ISI is behind this'. But not in India.
The admixture of these authoritarian elements does not make democratic regimes authoritarian. Nor does it imply that all democratic regimes are the same. Democratic regimes can and do vary in which and how many authoritarian elements they contain, and in the balance of authoritarian to democratic elements. This balance often does not tip over into authoritarianism.
The plain fact is nobody currently is 'admixing' any 'authoritarianism' to the Indian kedgeree. Modi wants the RSS to flourish. But it is a voluntary organization not a paramilitary outfit.
No doubt, there may be some extra-judicial killing in some States to curb the menace of the gangster politician. But that is only popular if you declare victory and say 'now everybody is safe, the 'encounter specialists' have been retired or sent off somewhere else.'
But thinking in admixtures allows us to acknowledge and measure this variance – and place democratic regimes on a continuum according to the ratio of authoritarian to democratic elements.
Only if there is actually some exogenous source of the 'authoritarianism' which is being added to the kedgeree. This was fine for Banana Republics where the CIA or the Cubans were training an elite counter-insurgency force. You could say 'If the President-for-life fucks up, his life will be terminated by General X who will take over using his CIA or Cuban trained special forces.
This way of thinking is easily measurable, perhaps more precisely measurable than dichotomous or trichotomous typologies.
We have measured the 'way of thinking' of this lady. The number we get is zero.
At the same time, the advantage it has over typologies is that it allows us to acknowledge the presence of authoritarian elements,
why not elements of ritual cannibalism and the sacrifice of virgins to the Great God Chuthulhu?
and also theorize about their interaction with democratic elements, which a typological form of thinking does not permit.
The intuition behind this suggestion is not entirely new. One related statement comes from Ayesha Jalal who wrote in 1995: ‘Far from representing a new and sharp dichotomy, democracy and authoritarianism are reflective of ongoing struggles
in Pakistan- sure. They do have plenty of ambitious Generals and crazy ISI officers not to mention corrupt politicians who think they can become the 'Ameer-ul-Momineen' of the Islamic masses.
between dominance and resistance. Without blurring the distinction between them it is important to acknowledge that they may frequently overlap irrespective of the formal designation of polities and states as democratic or authoritarian. It seems more apt to view democracy and authoritarianism as both antithetical and interdependent historical processes, coexisting in tension while at the same time each informing and transforming the other.’
Fuck off! India is nothing like Pakistan. Generals have never taken over the country and hanged politicians.
But the concept remained under-developed in Jalal. It was too quickly overwhelmed by historical detail. Further, and more problematically, Jalal also dismissed the many aspects of participatory democracy in India, suggesting in the process that India was not that different from Pakistan or Bangladesh.
Her husband is Sugata Bose who was a TMC member of parliament till recently.
I have tried to develop the concept of admixture in a fuller and more precise way. Further, the idea as I develop it here acknowledges India’s democratic elements as fundamental.
Admixture requires an exogenous agent acting deliberately. One could say authoritarianism is a back-up feature of enforcement mechanisms and that democratic polities may have to resort to the back-up because of resource, or preference diversity, problems. But that is mere common sense. You must cut your coat according to your cloth.
Recognizing the existence of authoritarian elements does not negate the presence or import of democratic ones.
The same is true of recognizing that great banquets of State indicate the persistence of ritual cannibalism within democratic polities. Indeed, democracy is shaped by and itself gives shape to ritual cannibalism.
Quite the opposite: they coexist and can, paradoxically, even strengthen each other. Recognizing this does not collapse the distinctions between democratic and authoritarian regimes in South Asia or outside, but renders them more precisely.
There is little point in being precise about worthless shite. Admix that, Chandra!
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