Aikin & Scott & why I gave up streaking

 Over at 3Quarks, Aikin & Talisse are once again arguing that

there are two different phenomena called “polarization.”

Actually, there are infinitely many. Phenomena are like that.

The first, political polarization, refers to the ideological distance between opposing political parties.

This is something Mathematical Politics has tried to measure. If Knightian Uncertainty obtains it can't be done. One could still construct a metric relevant for some particular purpose and then look at changes in that metric. Thus one could say, there is more ideological distance now between the parties on abortion  but less on immigration.

When it’s rampant, political rivals share no common ground, and thus cannot find a basis for cooperation.

It is sufficient that there are gains from trade- i.e. different opportunity cost ratios- for there to be a basis for cooperation. Furthermore, if information asymmetry arises, a correlated equilibrium with public signals is likely provided all agents have reason to believe they will have to deal with each other for the foreseeable future.

Political polarization certainly poses a problem for democracy.

Nonsense! It helps Parliamentary Democracy by solving a 'discoordination' problem. We don't want to be seen as endorsing everything that is necessary or convenient. Having two or more parties enables us to go along with what is required under protest, so to speak.

What Aiken & Talisse are saying may have been relevant to the Polish Commonwealth with its 'Golden Liberties'. But that type of polity disappeared long ago.

Yet belief polarization is perhaps even more troubling. It is the phenomenon by which interactions among like-minded people result in each adopting more radical versions of their views.

 This may pose a nuisance, as does every type of wasteful competition, but measures can be taken to make that nuisance purely nominal.

On the other hand, the thing may be salutary. After all, the proper way to deal with a nutjob is to pretend to be holier than thou and talk even more fatuous balderdash.

Thus Chesterton baffles the Vegetarian by crying out against cruelty to tomatoes and our hideous insensitivity to the sufferings of salt.

In a slogan, interactions with likeminded others transform us into more extreme versions of ourselves.

Not if we have a sense of humor or an intuition regarding our own shortcomings. One only has to spend a little time with people of one's own age, class and gender to have a chastened conception of why your spouse, or your children, or younger colleagues might find you a bit of a trial.

In any case, there are many 'extreme versions' of ourselves most of which cancel themselves out. At the Christmas Party, I think I can dance Gangnam style. Next morning, I am as world weary as Koheleth.

Part of what makes belief polarization so disconcerting is its ubiquity.

Disconcerting to whom? Ordinary people think the thing is funny. Pedants may find it disconcerting but then they would scarcely be the figures of fun that they are if they any inkling of the contempt in which they are held.

It has been extensively studied for more than 50 years, and found to be operative within groups of all kinds, formal and informal.

Nothing at all can be found out about a thing as a result of extensive studies carried out by very stupid people.

Furthermore, belief polarization does not discriminate between different kinds of belief.

Thus ordinary people are thoroughly familiar with its absurd consequences. The thing becomes purely phatic.

Likeminded groups polarize regardless of whether they are discussing banal matters of fact, matters of personal taste, or questions about value.

That's why after a bit of 'storming' and 'norming' groups stop discussing things in detail and get on with something useful. From time to time, just for comic relief, some particular shithead might be invited to ride his hobby horse for a while so as to get a rise out of some other shithead. However, the more sober personalities step in before there are tears before bedtime.

What’s more, the phenomenon operates regardless of the explicit point of the group’s discussion.

Which is why the thing doesn't matter at all.

Likeminded groups polarize when they are trying to decide an action that the group will take; and they polarize also when there is no specific decision to be reached. Finally, the phenomenon is prevalent regardless of group members’ nationality, race, gender, religion, economic status, and level of education.

So, it is like breathing. We don't need to think about it because we are all adults and have grown up with this sort of thing.

Our widespread susceptibility to belief polarization raises the question of how it works.

The word 'susceptibility' suggests that something sinister is at work. Yet the thing always obtains. No question is raised by pretending something normal is actually sinister. Thus if I say, 'our susceptibility to taking air into our lungs and then expelling it raises the question of how breathing works', you would say 'no, it raises the question of why you haven't been sacked you fat sack of shit. If you can't say something sensible then shut the fuck up.'

Two views immediately suggest themselves, the informational account and the comparison account.

These facile suggestions are not actually distinct. Something is only informational in comparison with something which isn't.  Equally, a comparison has to be made to establish if new information has actually been received.

On the first, discussion with likeminded others exposes us to a high concentration of affirming reasons and ideas.

Likeminded others may have very smelly or otherwise objectionable bodies or personae. Cognitive dissonance may cause us to recoil from a view we had previously held when we notice that those who share it are smelly homeless people whose convictions for pedophilia were quashed on a technicality.

A coordination game may involve meeting up with likeminded people. However its focal point is likely to be the performance of some action which is mutually beneficial. I may wish to attend the Opera with fellow opera lovers. I certainly don't mind hearing how wonderful Opera is during intermission. But I don't want to hear any such thing while the fat lady sings.

Moreover, in such contexts, there is typically a scarcity of countervailing or disconfirming considerations.

Nevertheless, unless the thing has 'expected utility' people stop paying any attention to it. 

Consequently, group members absorb the new information, and revise their own view in light of it. As the new information confirms their antecedent view, they become more extreme advocates.

This is the problem of 'group-think' in organizations. They can begin to act like cults. Then they go bankrupt or lose funding or become a figure of public ridicule and contempt. 

Although the informational account surely captures part of what drives belief polarization, it cannot be the entire story. For one thing, belief polarization has been found to occur in groups even when new and novel information is not presented. In fact, it has been found to occur even in contexts where group interactions involve no exchange of information at all.

So what? It is utility which decides if the activity will burgeon or decline. Only the fitness landscape matters. 

This suggests an alternative, the comparison view, which holds that belief polarization results from in-group comparisons.

Comparisons are themselves informational. We compare ourselves with others to see if we have correctly assimilated useful information. Wittgenstien's Private Language argument explains why comparisons have to be made to ensure that

Group members care about how they are perceived by the other members.

Why? It is because they think something utile is up for grabs. If others hold them in high esteem they can have confidence that they are on the right path.

Once one sees that a particular group is not grasping after anything useful, you ditch the thing- or are forced to do so by economic pressures. 

In the course of discussion, they get a better feel for the general tendencies within the group, and, wanting to appear to others neither as a half-hearted outlier nor as an over-the-top fanatic, they update their opinions so that their view lies notably above what they perceive to be the mean, but beneath what they regard as unacceptably hardline.

Makes sense. There's always a trade-off between expected cost and expected benefit. When shopping for a hi-fi, you want the sweet spot between cheap tat and audiophile extravagance. You don't have to discuss this with anybody. You just pick the mid-range item after a chat with the salesman.

What Aiken & Talisse are describing is a purely economic phenomenon which arises in 'imperfect information' markets. 

Now, given that group members are engaging simultaneously in this kind of recalibration, the tendency to escalating extremity is to be expected.

But ex post Utility prunes back 'escalating extremity'. That's why we stop getting drunk at parties and refuse to dance Gangnam style when the office wag suggests we do so.

Although more promising than the strictly informational view, the comparisons account is still lacking.

These two views are one and the same. We compare ourselves to others to ensure we are absorbing information properly and making good choices. 

Just as belief polarization can occur in the absence of the exchange of information, it can be induced in the absence of in-group comparisons, too.

That's why it does not matter at all. The thing is just random noise and cancels out as such.

Indeed, the phenomenon can be activated even in the absence of anything that would count as interaction among the members of the likeminded group.

Yes. It is what happens on markets featuring imperfect information. Precisely for that reason, this approach adds nothing to our understanding of group interaction. It is has no Sociological or Psychological dimension. It is purely economic. 

It is not real time comparisons that drive the phenomenon so much as the subject’s own internal estimations of the dominant tendencies within his or her identity group.

But these estimations are 'crowd sourced' on a just in time basis. Thus, if one starts busting out Gangnam style moves and suddenly notices that everybody is looking at you in horror, you immediately stop and mumble something about how the deceased had always dreamed of moving to Seoul and making it big in K-Pop. Of course, that was before his Samsung phone blew his face off. Except it was a Shamsung phone bought off some cheap ass E-auction site. The guy always was a cheapo.

So neither information-exchange nor in-group comparison is strictly necessary for the effect; rather, the relevant shifts occur simply in light of group-affiliated corroboration of one’s views.

Or any other sort of corroboration. But, ultimately, ex post utility rules over all- at least statistically speaking. The die hards die out. 

That is, belief polarization can occur simply when an individual is caused to feel that a group with which she identifies widely shares a view that she espouses.

The same thing happens if a group she does not identify with, but which is more prestigious, endorses a particular view. I am not a Doctor and don't identify with smart people in lab coats, but I believe what they tell me and struggle to change my behavior accordingly.

A group I do identify with is stupid, fat, elderly losers. However, I reject any view which I discover to be widely shared by this group. So does every other member of this group. Thus, my wearing Hawaiian shirts causes others like me on my street to send their Hawaiian shirts to Oxfam- where I end up buying them because what with Global Warming, one can never have too many, right?

She need not hear any reasons in favor of the view, nor need she be in the presence of other members of the group with whom she can compare herself. Instead, the realization that one’s belief is popular among one’s identity group suffices for belief polarization.

Nonsense! If this were true, stupid and ignorant people like me would never go to the Doctor or hire a Lawyer when we get arrested. 

Thus a third account, the corroboration view, holds that shifts towards extremity can occur simply as a result of in-group corroboration.

This view is utterly shit. Most people know that they belong to an epistemically disadvantaged group with respect to almost all the important decisions we make. That is why we don't listen to others like ourselves and get expert advise before proceeding.

Failure to do so means we die off and are replaced by people with a less harmful trait. 

Corroboration from our peers makes us feel good about our shared beliefs, and this makes us feel affirmed in our social identity.

No. Corroboration by our epistemic superiors is required for a 'feel good' effect. The only reason we are reading this shite is coz Aiken & Talisse are far better educated than us and hold Professorships at a highly ranked University. 

In turn, when we feel affirmed in this way, we shift towards extremity.

But this shift is soon walked back by considerations of ex post Utility. I got into a bad crowd at High School. Reveling in the affirmation I received from the 'cool kids' I took things to extreme- showing up drunk for classes and even taking off my clothes and 'streaking'. But this type of behavior caused great distress to my beloved family. Anyway, that's why I quit teaching.