Bertrand Russell's nonsense

Why was the Tractatus bound to be nonsense?  The answer, obviously, was that Wittgenstein was as stupid as shit. Consider the following

5.5422 The correct explanation of the form of the proposition, 'A makes the judgement p', must show that it is impossible for a judgement to be a piece of nonsense. (Russell's theory does not satisfy this requirement.)

This is a stipulation that no one can make a nonsensical judgment. Yet anyone can give an example of a judgment that is nonsense. But that is itself a judgment.  However, it may be a wrong judgment. It may be found that the nonsense judgment makes sense in some other context- for e.g. as an example of nonsense. 

Witless had said, a few years earlier-

Every right theory of judgment must make it impossible for me to judge that this table penholders the book. Russell’s theory does not satisfy this requirement.

If 'this table penholders the book' really is nonsense then the judgment that it is so is right. How can it make itself impossible? I suppose Witless meant that if you make a judgment then the proposition expressed in the judgment must follow immediately without any further premise. But, in that case, no judgment is empirical or capable of verification. But, in that case, it must have an infinite number of premises ruling out all false or nonsensical propositions. Alternatively, it must have access to a possibly finite set of all true and meaningful propositions. But if there is such a set, depending on the syntax, it might be a member of itself.

There is also the problem that there may be a novelty book which is also a pen and a novelty table which is also a penholder. Depending upon the syntax of the language in question, it may be perfectly sensible to say that currently that table is penholdering that book. 

Russell's multiple-relation theory of judgment, which is fine for pragmaticism or intuitionism, is problematic for logicism but only because logicism is nonsense.

In 'On Truth & Falsehood' Russell had written-

...we have to seek a theory of truth which (1) allows truth to have an opposite, namely falsehood,

only because you reject Pragmatism which only looks at whether a proposition is useful 

(2) makes truth a property of beliefs,

in which case the intensional fallacy arises. You can't do logic with stuff which isn't identical with itself because it is epistemic and changes when the knowledge base changes 

but (3) makes it a property wholly dependent upon the relation of the beliefs to outside things.

which can be done well enough for any particular purpose by a protocol bound juristic system. But, in this case, there would be a distinction between matters of law and matters of fact. In the case of the latter, there would be verification protocols wholly independent of juristic protocols. Indeed, determinations of fact might be made by an different body- e.g. a Jury or a panel of experts.  

The necessity of allowing for falsehood makes it impossible to regard belief as a relation of the mind to a single object,

there would still be the problem of strategic beliefs- e.g in Newcombe problems.  

which could be said to be what is believed. If belief were so regarded, we should find that, like acquaintance, it would not admit of the opposition of truth and falsehood, but would have to be always true.

it would admit this opposition for a particular person or point of view.  

This may be made clear by examples. Othello believes falsely that Desdemona loves Cassio.

No. He genuinely has this belief. It turns out that his belief was wrong as Othello himself admits.  

We cannot say that this belief consists in a relation to a single object, “Desdemona’s love for Cassio,”

yes we can. The object either existed or could have existed but didn't.  

for if there were such an object, the belief would be true.

No. It would be false. There was no such thing in actual existence.  

There is in fact no such object, and therefore Othello cannot have any relation to such an object.

Yes he can. He can believe it exists.  

Hence his belief cannot possibly consist in a relation to this object.

It does relate to a 'Meinongian object' one which does not exist but which can be specified- like the 'present King of France'.  Russell hadn't wanted any such beasties 'To suppose that in the actual world of nature there is a whole set of false propositions going about is to my mind monstrous.'

Yet, to other minds, there might be all sorts of monsters prowling around in the natural world. I suppose, Russell means that the assumption is 'too big' to serve the purpose. But purposes are heterogeneous. Something one believes for one purpose may be incompossible with something else one believes for some other purpose. 

'I cannot bring myself to suppose it. I cannot believe that they are there in the sense in which facts are there.'

Sadly, facts aren't 'there'. You have to spend money to find out about them and get them certified till somebody smarter comes along and decertifies them. 

Russell, however, wants one logic- an atomic one, at that- to rule all other logics. But that logic can only exist in a universe where everything has been turned into a logical monster, albeit of an elementary sort. 

It might be said that his belief is a relation to a different object, namely “that Desdemona loves Cassio”;

Othello acts on the belief that Desdemona is fucking Cassio. That is his motive and one may say it is something he objectively believes about the world. Suppose Othello has a different motivation- viz. to have peace of mind that he is not being cuckolded- then there is no tragedy. Even if it was impossible for Desdemona to love any but Othello, still he had put the issue beyond doubt, peradventure or infirmity of suspicion. If he was beforehand in murdering possible rivals, he would become a King respected for his sagacity, rather than a mere vassal of the Doge.  

but it is almost as difficult to suppose that there is such an object as this, when Desdemona does not love Cassio, as it was to suppose that there is “Desdemona’s love for Cassio.”

It isn't difficult at all. True, Russell wanted to reduce math to logic and though for any given mathematics, there may be 'univalent foundations', speaking generally, we can't be sure this is the case.  

Hence it will be better to seek for a theory of belief which does not make it consist in a relation of the mind to a single object.

That theory was not far to seek. It is possible that X loves Y and there is some probability associated with it. This probability changes if we find what we believe is evidence they are fucking incessantly.  

It is common to think of relations as though they always held between two terms, but in fact this is not always the case. Some relations demand three terms, some four, and so on.

Sure. Relations can be based on multiple contingencies- Desdemona loves Cassio if she has grown bored with Othello and her best friend is a slut who encourages her to have an affair and Cassio is not to particular about where he takes his pleasure.  

Take, for instance, the relation “between.” So long as only two terms come in, the relation “between” is impossible: three terms are the smallest number that render it possible. York is between London and Edinburgh; but if London and Edinburgh were the only places in the world, there could be nothing which was between one place and another.

and yet some place, or phenomena, may be deemed to be 'between' them for some particular purpose. The semantics of a 'relation' is its pragmatics. 

Similarly jealousy requires three people:

Nope. There are plenty of stories of a guy getting suspicious that is wife is seeing some other bloke when it actually turns out that she has been making herself pretty for him or earning money to buy him a nice anniversary gift 

  there can be no such relation that does not involve three at least.

Who can all be imaginary. Jessica Rabbit isn't a real person.  

Such a proposition as “A wishes B to promote C’s marriage with D” involves a relation of four terms;

No. There are only two terms. The guy and the thing he wishes would happen. It may be that he wants B to piss off C and doesn't give a shit about D. But that is irrelevant.  Equally we could say there are an infinite number of terms. A has a wish regarding what he wishes he wishes etc. 

that is to say, A and B and C and D all come in, and the relation involved cannot be expressed otherwise than in a form involving all four. Instances might be multiplied indefinitely, but enough has been said to show that there are relations which require more than two terms before they can occur.

If what occurs has a cause we may speak of there being a causal relationship. But  we don't know if we can carve up the world along its joints when it comes to what truly causes what. It may there is just one big cause of everything. It may also be that there are non-denumerably infinite causes for everything including themselves. 

The relation involved in judging or believing must, if falsehood is to be duly allowed for, be taken to be a relation between several terms, not between two.

only in the sense that it could be taken to be a relation between no terms or an infinity of terms or both or neither or both neither or neither both and neither.  

When Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio, he must not have before his mind a single object, “Desdemona’s love for Cassio,” or “that Desdemona loves Cassio,” for that would require that there should be objective falsehoods, which subsist independently of any minds;

We know that Othello has a vivid image of his wife having sex with Cassio in his mind. This is what he believes is actually happening. He is wrong. 

As for 'objective falsehoods'- they exist independently of any minds if objective truths do. I suppose one could say 'our judgement that x is true is only truly a judgment if x is true' but this is not itself a  judgment. It is merely a pious wish or else a sly way of evading the issue. Thus if I am called on to condemn Hamas atrocities but don't want to have my throat slit, I might say 'if there was any credible proof that Hamas did not treat everybody at all times in the kindest, most courteous, way then and only then would I judge their actions to have been wrong always provided it was in fact wrong.' 

and this, though not logically refutable, is a theory to be avoided if possible. Thus it is easier to account for falsehood if we take judgment to be a relation in which the mind and the various objects concerned all occur severally;

judgment is something which occurs. It isn't a relation though a particular judgment may relate to a particular justiciable matter.

that is to say, Desdemona and loving and Cassio must all be terms in the relation which subsists when Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio. This relation, therefore, is a relation of four terms, since Othello also is one of the terms of the relation. When we say that it is a relation of four terms, we do not mean that Othello has a certain relation to Desdemona, and has the same relation to loving and also to Cassio. This may be true of some other relation than believing; but believing, plainly, is not a relation which Othello has to each of the three terms concerned, but to all of them together: there is only one example of the relation of believing involved, but this one example knits together four terms.

That is an arbitrary assertion. Othello also has various misogynistic beliefs about how wimmin are totes randy and enjoy cuckolding their boring husbands. Also, I suppose the fact that he is a Moor means he might have some prejudices against Europeans whom he might think are oversexed and promiscuous and disloyal and so forth. But, there is a more basic problem. In anything 'epistemic'- like belief- there is a vast amount of 'background information' which it would be difficult to specify which are part and parcel of one's beliefs about possible states of the world. The intensional fallacy arises with a vengeance in Belief, or Preference, or other such 'Relations'. 

Thus the actual occurrence, at the moment when Othello is entertaining his belief, is that the relation called “believing” is knitting together into one complex whole the four terms Othello, Desdemona, loving, and Cassio.

not to mention many other terms to do with biological gender and prevalent social mores etc., etc.  

What is called belief or judgment is nothing but this relation of believing or judging, which relates a mind to several things other than itself.

This is not true. Belief and judgment are words in common usage. They may relate 'a mind' to itself. We can have beliefs about our own beliefs and then judge those beliefs to be wrong.

An act of belief or of judgment is the occurrence between certain terms at some particular time, of the relation of believing or judging.

When did we come to believe there was an external world? By what act did we judge Mummy and Daddy to be separate from ourselves? These are the sorts of questions logicism could not answer. It could merely get hoist by its own ipse dixit petard. Perhaps, if Russell had never met Wiltesstein or if Frank Ramsey had lived longer, Anal-tickle philosophy wouldn't have been such a fucking waste of time. Or perhaps philosophy is merely a displacement activity indulged in by smart people tackling open questions in STEM subjects. Now we have Expert Systems and AI, I suppose we will have much greater heterogeneity in the field. Instead of meticulous nonsense, we may have a useful messiness.