Chris Brown, a scholar of International Relations, writes of Sen's 'idea of justice'
Consider first the issue of economic versus political rights. It is sometimes argued that poor countries cannot afford to be too concerned with political rights until the economic needs of their citizens are met:
A right is meaningless unless there is an effective, incentive compatible remedy.
As is often stated with rhetorical flourish, political rights mean nothing to someone who is starving. In a number of books and articles, most notably Poverty and Famines: An Essay in Entitlements and Deprivation and Development as Freedom, Sen argues persuasively that this argument is based on a false opposition
Yet, in East Bengal in 1943 and 1974, people who had the right to vote starved to death because not enough food was available. That is why Bangladeshis prefer a dictator to a corrupt or incompetent democrat. Sheikh Hasina's father was turning his country into a one party state when he was assassinated. The US seems to think she too is a dictator unworthy of an invite to Biden's Democracy summit. So what? Bangladeshis want to prosper under the rule of law. They don't want some crazy populist getting elected and ruining the country.
Deprivation largely takes the form of the absence of an entitlement to some good, rather than the absence of the good itself;
This is false. You may have a legal entitlement to a house currently occupied by squatters. You may never get it back because the cost of getting and enforcing an eviction order is too high. I may have no entitlement to live in your house and to eat the food in your fridge but you may be unable to deprive me of what I have taken by force.
thus, in most, if not all, famines the problem is not an absolute absence of food, but the fact that some people, as a result of poverty, or even perhaps of government policy, do not possess an entitlement to the food that is available.
In Bengal, they had such an entitlement but it could not be enforced because there wasn't enough food. Even if they got themselves arrested, they would be let out of jail because there was not enough food to give them the meals they were entitled to as prisoners.
Doing something about this situation is essentially a matter of politically empowering the deprived. In a striking observation, Sen states flatly that there has never been a famine in a country with a free press and a tradition of government by discussion;
except East Bengal
in other words, when potential victims of famine are able to publicize their plight, governments will be forced to respond.
Unless they government was Bengali. You can always blame 'neo-liberalism' or evil Hindus for everything.
Famines take place when authoritarian governments suppress information and allow them to develop – Sen’s initial reference point here being the Bengal famine of 1943, when India was ruled by the British
There had been Provincial Autonomy since 1937. On the other hand it is true that Premier Suhrawardy and Premier Nazimuddin were both blonde and blue eyed women from Yorkshire.
Entitlements are also at the heart of his work on gender.
Sen thought he was entitled to run off with his best friend's wife.
Sen’s most well‐known article on the subject first appeared in the New York Review of Books in 1990 with the striking title “More than 100 million women are missing.”
Female infanticide has been around for thousands of years. Sex selective abortion was something new. Sen couldn't condemn abortion because every woman is entitled to kill her foetus with the help of money from tax-payers.
He arrives at this figure by pointing out that in North America and Europe the ratio of women to men is typically around 1.05 or higher to 1, but in South Asia, West Asia, and China the ratio can be as low as 0.94 to 1. At birth, there are typically 1.05 boys for every girl, but nature seems to favor the latter, and overall the figures are reversed by the time an age cohort reaches adulthood, except in the areas specified above. Why is this? Intuitively, one might think that this shift in the ratio was an effect of poverty, but Sen’s figures suggest that this is not the case. For example, in Sub‐Saharan Africa, which is at least as poor as the regions 3 cited above, the ratio is 1.02 women for every man; within India rates vary from a low of 0.86 in Punjab to a high of 1.03 in the generally poorer state of Kerala. To simplify a complex story, the solution to this puzzle is the observation that where women are employed outside the home and have a degree of economic independence they are able to make effective their own entitlement to food and other goods, and that of their daughters; absent this independence they are at the mercy of men who will often neglect female children.
Women have been happily selling their daughters to pimps for thousands of years. This doesn't seem to have occurred to Sen.
One final example of the relevance of his work for international ethicists concerns the wider issue of cultural relativism, and the alleged Western origin of scientific rationality and notions, such as human rights. In a string of engagements over the years with “relativists” in the Development Studies community, culminating in his book The Argumentative Indian, Sen has argued that, contrary to the stereotype of Indian culture as spiritually‐oriented and mystical (and therefore unconcerned with issues of social justice), there are strong Indian philosophical traditions that stress the importance of rational argument and the value of tolerance.
That strong philosophical tradition didn't save India from being conquered by Turks or Europeans- did it?
Classic Sanskrit texts such as the Laws of Manu and the Bhagavad Gita are as illuminating on the subject of justice as most works within the Western canon, and rulers such as Ashoka and Akbar were considerably more tolerant and rational than their Western contemporaries.
No. They killed their opponents or even their own kith and kin, with vim and vigour.
Sen is a strong supporter of so‐called Enlightenment values, but he resists the idea that these values are necessarily tied to Western ways of thought.
Still, if you run off with your best friend's wife, it might be wise to move to somewhere with more enlightened views of adultery.
The Idea of Justice.. is a major contribution to, but also critique of, the enterprise of theorizing justice with which the name of John Rawls is now inevitably associated.
Rawls was a fool. He didn't get that people buy insurance. There is 'risk pooling'. It would be crazy to agree that the most unfortunate should have the first call on resources. There is an obvious 'adverse selection' or 'disincentive' effect.
It is generally agreed that Rawls was the most important political theorist within the Anglo‐American world since John Stuart Mill, and his masterwork, A Theory of Justice, is at the 4 center of modern thinking on its subject.
It was shit. Kids forced to sit through lectures on Rawls eagerly voted for Thatcher and Reagan.
Still, Rawls’s work has been much criticized (and Rawls himself has acknowledged that his original formulations were, in certain respects, inadequate). 7 Most of his critics within the tradition have, in effect, attempted to save Rawls from himself, suggesting ways in which his approach can be modified to cope with the problems it allegedly creates, or fails to deal with – most notable the issue of the international dimension of justice, which for Rawls cannot involve redistributive social justice, a conclusion his critics regard as perverse.
Because Americans don't want big shiny cars. They want to give all their money to terrorists in the Sahel.
...most philosophers asked how the word “justice” is generally used, Rawls is much more ambitious: he wants to be able to say that such‐and‐such a social arrangement is or is not “just.”
Why? There had been a brief period towards the end of the Sixties when some silly students pretended the Sun shone out of Chairman Mao's arse. But this was just a game.
His aim is to create “ideal theory,” a standard against which actual policy choices, when they arise, can be judged.
He gave a good enough rule for Cost Benefit Analysis. Obviously, you could always hire an economist to pretend that taking from the poor was the best thing that could happen to them.
He begins by defining justice as “fairness” and then, in A Theory of Justice, describes a procedure for cashing out this notion. Employing the well‐worn concept of a “social contract,” but with some twists of his own, he generates the principles for establishing just institutions in a society: equal liberty for all, fair equality of opportunity, and material differences to be justified only on the basis that they benefit the least advantaged.
No contract is valid save if consideration passes. Why sign a contract unless you get paid to do so? On the other hand, you are welcome to go join a commune with like-minded idiots.
These are quite radical principles (although socialists object that they still allow for substantial differentials) and they are taken to be of universal relevance. In his earlier work, Rawls holds that only liberal societies organized on these lines can be described as just, although later, in the Law of Peoples, he does acknowledge that some non‐liberal societies could be, if not actually just, at least “well ordered” and “decent.” Sen accepts the general proposition that justice should be understood as fairness, but finds many features of Rawls’ model troubling – and troubling for reasons that students of international ethics will have no difficulty in recognizing and sympathizing with. First, there is the contractarian nature of Rawls’s work, which requires us to see justice as the product of an agreement among members of a clearly defined society;
This may be the case by a 'legal fiction'. One may say it is a 'contract of adhesion' and, as Sir Edward Coke claimed, dates back to Greek speaking Druids.
Sen agrees with those critics of Rawls who find this problematic under modern conditions.
In which case he should be very upset with Arrow-Debreu formalism.
Rawls assumes for the purpose of his model that societies are discrete, self‐sufficient, self‐contained entities into which people are born and which they leave by death. This is clearly not the case in reality, and, even if it were, decisions made within one society can have serious consequences for others – one only has to consider the issue of environmental degradation to see that this is so. The point is that if justice is defined as the product of a contract, the interests of non‐contractors— foreigners, future generations, perhaps nature itself—may well be neglected. This is actually a common criticism of Rawls and Rawlsians, and Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge have suggested that perhaps the whole world should be regarded as a “society” for the purposes of this social contract. As Sen points out, however, this will not do – the idea of society presumes a degree of global unity that simply does not exist.
In law, there is such a thing as the 'comity of nations'. Rawls's utopia may be as crazy as Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium but you can always 'add on' features to address different issues.
It is the very idea of basing justice on a contract that is problematic, not the details of the contract.
Call it a Covenant and mention God and Abraham or Noah or some other such prophet.
Rawlsian critics of Rawls are generally much less concerned with the second feature of A Theory of Justice that exercises Sen, namely Rawls’s emphasis on the importance of “ideal theory” or what Sen calls a “transcendental” approach to justice, the desire to create an account of justice that is universal and necessary, that applies everywhere, and at all times.
Rawls does not give an 'account of Justice'. He says there is a universal principle applicable to it. Either you accept the principle or you don't. I don't because it is foolish and mischievous.
Sen doubts that a single account of this kind is either possible or necessary.
Yet, a universal principle is always universal in scope. It is a different matter that it is foolish.
There are many possible theories of justice.
Rawls's theory was that we would think it fair to make helping the worst off our first priority.
In the beginning of the book he tells the engaging story of three children, Ann, Bob and Carla, who are quarrelling over the fate of a flute . Ann claims the flute on the basis that she is the only one who can play it, Bob claims it because he has no other toys to play with whereas the others do, and Carla’s claim is based on the fact that she made the flute in the first place.
If Rawls is right the kids would agree that there is a universal principle at work here. Bob gets the flute unless Ann or Carla can give him something in return for it. However there is a problem of impredicativity. If Bob gets the flute Ann may become the poorest and thus he has to hand it to her but she then has to hand it back etc. There is an 'uncorrelated asymmetry' here- viz. who made the flute- which identifies one person uniquely as the owner. Give it to Carla. This is the bourgeois strategy of John Maynard Smith.
All of these statements are taken to be true, and Sen’s point is that one can produce intuitively plausible reasons for giving the flute to any one of the children. Utilitarians – and for different reasons, Aristotelians – would favour Ann, egalitarians Bob, libertarians Carla, but the real point here is that there is no reason to assume, as Rawls and most of his followers do, that we have to decide which of these answers is the right one.
In that case, we can't judge the issue at all. Let the kids beat each other till one emerges as the boss of the gang.
Sometimes there is simply a plurality of “right” answers. The idea that there is only one kind of just society – a liberal society defined by principles set out in Rawls’ model – and that all others represent a falling off from this ideal does not seem a plausible response to the pluralism that undoubtedly exists in the modern world.
It is not just plausible, it is action guiding. People do pay taxes and are willing to join the Army so as to continue to enjoy living in a Society of this sort. It is no good saying to them 'what about the penguins in Patagonia? They think shitting on each other's heads is the only just way of proceeding.'
Staying with the critique of “ideal theory,” Sen also contests the practical value of establishing an ideal in this way.
There was a practical value of standing up for 'Freedom' against the 'Evil Empire'. There is none in mentioning the Penguins of Patagonia and their proclivity for pooping on each other's heads.
In defence of ideal theory it is generally argued that an account of what a just world would look like gives us a yardstick against which to measure particular policies, but Sen observes that this is much less helpful than it might at first sight seem to be.
Because of impredicativity or the intensional fallacy.
In practice, we measure one possible policy against another possible policy, and not against an ideal;
but there is an ideal according to which they are ranked. Sen was being silly.
Sen uses another simple analogy to make the point: if asked to say whether a Van Gogh or a Picasso is the better painting it hardly helps to be told that Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa is the best painting of all time .
If an angel appeared and said this, it would be very helpful indeed. Scientists could analyse Da Vinci's painting and find some mathematical reason for its pre-eminence. This would enable them to establish a metric. Alternatively, somebody might note that Moaning Lisa would fetch the highest price at auction. In this case, the market is revealed to be the best at aesthetic judgment.
This is not a particularly good analogy, since what constitutes a “better” painting is unclear,
Sen is only mentioning famous painters whose work fetches hundreds of millions at auction
but the point Sen is trying to get across is clear enough, namely, that pursuing justice is actually about making comparisons;
If there is external verification- e.g. an angel which pronounces judgment- then you can easily have a metric. But this can also be done for any specific purpose- e.g. determining insurance value or seeing whether it would be worth hiring the picture for an exhibition. It may be that this would be profitable because thousands would pay good money to see the masterpiece for themselves.
we ask ourselves whether this policy will make the world a somewhat better place as opposed to that policy, and an ideal world contributes very little, if anything, to this process of comparison.
But the moment you make a comparison and say 'this is better', you are providing a data point for a metric by which what is best is indicated. Thus, when I go to the optician, different lenses are put before my eyes and I asked whether I see more clearly or less clearly through them. The optician finally settles on the prescription which is best for me.
The third point Sen raises against Rawls and the Rawlsians concerns the importance they place on establishing just institutions. The basic idea here is that if you can get the institutions right you do not need to worry about actual human behavior; essentially, the assumption is that, as Kant put it, even a “race of devils” could, if intelligent, produce just institutions and a just society.
In Econ, we call this mechanism design. Does Sen have a bone to pick with the folk theorem of repeated games? If so, why not challenge Ken Binmore to a debate?
This position is, of course, particularly problematic at the international level, where the institutional structure is weak by comparison with the sovereign state. This has led some Rawlsians to propose highly implausible, and probably undesirable, shifts toward global government (consider, for example, Thomas Pogge’s notion of a “democracy panel,” which would determine whether particular regimes were democratic and thus deserve to be treated as sovereign and entitled to dispose of their natural resources), while other political philosophers, most notably Thomas Nagel, have recently declared that global justice is simply impossible to achieve given the implausibility of such schemes.
Sadly, nobody told Biden that his Summit for Democracy would be an utter fiasco.
Here Sen is particularly innovative and illuminating. Drawing on the Sanskrit literature on ethics and jurisprudence, he outlines a distinction between niti and nyaya;
Niti means policy and is implemented by the Neta or political leader. Nyaya means justice and is administered by a Judge- like Sen's grandfather.
both of these terms can be translated as “justice”
No. Don't be silly. Policy is political. Justice is judicial.
but they summarise rather different notions. Niti refers to correct procedures, formal rules, and institutions;
No. We may say 'it is a good policy to follow proper procedures. It is a bad policy (kutniti) to behave in an arbitrary or Machiavellian manner'. But this does not change the fact that politicians pursue policies. Judges administer Justice.
nyaya is a broader, more inclusive concept that looks to the world that emerges from the institutions we create, rather than focusing directly on the institutions themselves.
The Indian Supreme Court has greatly reduced the scope of 'political question' and expanded justiciability. But it has shat the bed and will have to be curbed sooner or later.
Sen sees this distinction as visible in European thought. Theorists such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and, most recently, Rawls look to the establishment of correct institutions,
No they don't. They were not concerned with reforming the Judiciary or changing how Parliament or the Bureaucracy operates. One could say there was an ideological aspect to their theoretical work but they weren't judges or statesmen and thus could not say much about institutional reform.
while writers such as Adam Smith, Wollstonecraft, Bentham, Marx, and Mill take a more comparative approach, looking holistically at social realizations that are certainly the product of institutions, but also of other factors, including human behavior.
Bentham did talk vaguely of reforming the British justice system. But he was ignored. The others were good or bad enough polemicists who, however, were ignored by men with practical experience of running things.
Smith’s work in The Theory of Moral Sentiments is particularly important to Sen because, from within this second Enlightenment tradition that Sen values, it offers an approach to the notion of “fairness” that is highly attractive.
Smith was not concerned with fairness. He considered justice as the virtue which restrains us from inflicting positive harm on others thus enabling a Society to flourish peacefully.
Whereas Rawls employs an elaborate fiction in order to arrive at his notion of fairness (contractors are supposed to choose principles under a hypothetical “veil of ignorance” wherein they are ignorant of certain key facts about their own position)
Rawls took this notion from Vickrey and Harsanyi. However, once John Maynard Smith had explained the importance of uncorrelated asymmetries, there was little point going down this road. In any case, we are all always under a veil of ignorance. I don't know if I might be hit by a truck and paralyzed or if my Pension fund gets embezzled and I end up on the dole. But the right response is to buy insurance or support a compulsory insurance scheme.
Smith asks instead, what would an “impartial spectator,” someone (or several someones, because there could actually be numerous impartial spectators surveying the scene from different vantage points) observing from the outside make of a particular state of affairs.
Rubbish! Smith said there was a 'man within' us- the voice of our conscience- which judges our actions. 'The jurisdiction of the man within is founded altogether on the desire of praise-worthiness and in the aversion to blame-worthiness’ which underlies our ‘dread of possessing those qualities, and performing those actions, which we hate and despise in other people’. Smith did not think you should invite the views of naked Patagonians or brown Bengali Babus.
This is much less cumbersome and complicated a notion than that of the original position, and it has the added advantage of not pretending to be a precise exercise. It invites us to trust our capacity to identify injustice, if we can but project ourselves out of our natural partiality for our own interests.
The problem here is that the voice of conscience might say stupid shite. In Smith's own time, plenty of his fellows were scared shitless that they would burn in Hell Fire because they were predestined to damnation. Obviously, if your conscience keeps telling you you are a shitty little sinner, you may well take to the bottle.
Sen’s critique of conventional justice theory is developed in Parts I and II of The Idea of Justice alongside an elaboration of the notion of social choice, which is crucial to his understanding of how we actually compare the impact of different policies.
Social Choice theorists are useless. People avoid them at cocktail parties.
It is important here not to confuse the theory of social choice with what some economists call “rational choice theory.” The latter assumes that individuals are rigidly self‐interested, and indeed defines rationality as the pursuit of self‐interest;
but it identifies self-interest as whatever a particular self wants to do- even if this involves sucking off homeless dudes and giving them all your money because your voice of conscience tells you you are a sinful little cock-sucker who doesn't deserve to have any money.
whereas Sen insists that fairness involves a reasonable concern for the interests of others,
Sen was reasonably concerned that his best friend wasn't giving his wife enough dick.
and his account of social choice theory reflects this insistence—drawing heavily on his work on welfare economics, including such famous papers as the engagingly titled “Rational Fools” of 1977.
His paper was irrational and foolish. He thought a person sending a money-order to a relative would entrust some random dude with putting it in the letter-box.
15 In Part III, Sen examines “The Materials of Justice,” with a particular focus on the human capabilities approach, which he pioneered, along with Martha Nussbaum, in the 1980s.
It is useless shit. Nobody knows their own capabilities let alone those of anybody else.
16 Part IV, “Public Reasoning and Democracy,” contains a defence of his view that democracy is best defined as decision‐making by discussion rather than simply as a matter of procedures, such as regular elections.
This cretin didn't get that plenty of Absolute Monarchies and Dictatorships had lots and lots of discussion before decisions were made. A democracy where there is no discussion- because only cretins want to talk politics- is still a democracy provided elections are free and fair.
Social choice theory undermines the idea that there are viable democratic procedures for aggregating the preferences of voters,
Only if they are forbidden to delegate the job to their MP.
which makes a niti‐oriented approach to democracy problematic,
Fuck off! The reform of the Indian Election Commission made Indian elections much more free and fair.
but the value of government by discussion is readily understandable in terms of nyaya – the kind of society that it produces.
Indians prefer the kind of society Modi is producing. We don't care who he discusses stuff with.
The final section of the book defends the proposition that nowadays a concern for justice must have a global dimension.
It already does. There are plenty of international treaties covering all sorts of legal matters.
Before attempting an overall assessment of The Idea of Justice, it may be helpful to say one or two things about the book as a text. I have tried to provide a concise summary of the book’s contents, but in so doing I have been obliged to take on the near‐impossible task of providing a summary of his work of the last quarter century, because this volume effectively pulls together arguments he has made previously into one set of covers.
He repeats himself ad nauseam.
This does mean that those already familiar with Sen’s work will find little that is new here (for such readers the recent collection Against Injustice: The New Economics of Amartya Sen will be much more useful)
it is useless nonsense
but, by the same token, the book provides an excellent introduction to Sen’s work for those who are not already aficionados. Still, both the cognoscenti and the neophytes should be warned that, because the book draws extensively on earlier writings, it contains quite a lot of repetition. Moreover, we must keep in mind that Sen knows, or knew, most of the people with whom he debates the nature of justice.
It was a dialogue of the deaf.
This, combined with the fact that Sen is a very generous writer, even toward authors whose positions he opposes, makes one feel occasionally that the argument is a little too cosy, and that a somewhat more acerbic approach would make for a better read. Finally, although Sen enlivens the text with anecdotes and engaging stories (such as that of Ann, Bob, Carla and the flute), there are some sections of the book that are addressed to his fellow professional welfare economists and political philosophers, and – although these sections do not contain the kind of forbidding mathematical apparatus used by many modern economists – they are still hard‐ going for the general reader.
They are nonsense. Sen just keeps committing the intensional fallacy. This aint math, it is madness.
So much for the down‐side, which is far outweighed by the advantages that follow from engaging with Sen’s arguments. For the general reader, Part IV, on democracy and human rights, will perhaps be of the greatest interest because it deals directly with practical issues; this is where one might hope for concrete advice based on his theory. In fact, some critics have actually identified a certain lack of substance to the argument, suggesting that Sen offers rather less in the way of policy advice than we might have hoped for ‐ but this is to miss the point.
Sen's job is to talk nonsense and thus delay decision making.
Sen does not pretend to offer an ideal in the manner of Rawls, but rather to inculcate certain habits of mind.
The habits of a virtue signalling cretin
He invites us to reason impartially and non‐parochially:
while running the fuck away from Muslim dominated areas
we should not assume that our particular way of doing things is the only way; we need to examine our predilections and practices with the eye of Smith’s impartial spectator.
Who is the voice of conscience which, sadly, is shit. It isn't true that you will go to Hell if you have a wank now and again.
His discussion of capital punishment (p. 403ff) exemplifies this kind of reasoning; it is actually clear that he opposes the death penalty, but the main thrust of the argument is to suggest that those countries that employ it – in particular China and the United States – should re‐examine the practice in the light of experience elsewhere.
This is because China is not inhabited by Chinese people. It is inhabited by Norwegians who, however, have modelled themselves on Nigerians.
For example, by refusing to take into account anti‐capital punishment arguments made in European or Latin American courts, the US Supreme Court is denying itself access to relevant information;
The US has 'dual sovereignty'. The Bench needs to be very careful when it comes to violating 'States' Rights'. Europe or Latin America are irrelevant.
indeed, reflection on cases of past injustice in the US itself might cause proponents of capital punishment some unease.
It may also cause them to stroke themselves off.
In short, Sen argues that proponents of the death penalty should try to become impartial spectators with respect to their own position, and, indeed so should opponents of capital punishment.
Sen's impartial spectator counselled him to run off with his best friend's wife.
If we apply this kind of reasoning more generally, he suggests, we will realize that there are many aspects of today’s world that cannot be justified even though, in a superficial way, they seem to work to the advantage of those of us who live in the advanced industrial world.
Anything at all can be justified. Even Sen's shite is justified by other virtue signalling cretins.
The inhabitants of rich and powerful countries have a special obligation to adopt the viewpoint of an impartial spectator, assuming the perspectives of those whose life‐chances are severely restricted compared to their own—specifically, those who suffer from malnutrition, poverty, and oppression.
You can get rich running a bogus charity- that is true enough.
But something more than this is required, for the rich and powerful need also to recognise and respect the interests of the poor and powerless.
Why not recognize and respect the interests of those who want to sodomize your children?
The peoples of the advanced industrial world need to realize that what they do will have a profound effect on everyone else, whether it is intended or not.
But the peoples of the retarded turd world need to realize that what they themselves do will have a much more profound effect on themselves.
Interdependence at all levels is such that the decisions taken by the United States in particular have implications everywhere, whether in respect to addressing issues of terrorism or the global financial crisis.
Similarly, decisions made by terrorists sitting in some cave in Afghanistan can have very big implications for the US
Throughout The Idea of Justice, Sen invites us to engage in public reasoning in pursuit of justice,
Fifteen years later we can see that 'public reasoning' was utterly useless.
not by reference to some kind of ideal, but in very practical terms, comparing the impact of particular policies, and reflecting on the way things are done in the name of impartiality and fairness.
Sen wasn't impartial or fair at all. He kept condemning Modi till all non-Bengali Indians turned against him.
He invites us to consider social arrangements as wholes, to assess their impact in broad comprehensive terms without becoming obsessed with procedures or formal rules—in short, to embrace nyaya rather than niti,
This was the approach of the Indian Planning Commission. Don't worry about money, just make the Plan and money will come by itself. Sadly, without money no Plan can be implemented. Discussing Nyaya won't cause efficient Police Men and smart Judges to appear by magic.
This kind of public reasoning can no longer be confined to particular societies but must now be global in scope and range.
Osama should discuss Rawls with Obama. They should agree to suck each other off on Live TV so as to raise money for charity.
Fortunately, the very interdependence that demands that we take into account the interests of others also helps us to see things from their perspective.
Very true. Blind people who take account of the interests of sighted people soon gain 20/20 vision.
Sen recognizes that this will not be easy.
Which is why some people are still blind. If they participate in public discussion ten hours a day, seven days a week, they will eventually be able to see perfectly well.
There is no ideal to guide our discussions, and the comparisons he invites us to make will cause us to question our own interests, which is never comfortable.
It was in Sen's interest to virtue signal by writing stupid shite. He is perfectly comfortable doing so.
Still, in his own work, and indeed in his own life, he offers us a paradigm of what it means to be a global impartial spectator.
Saying 'Modi is Hitler' is not the action of a global or impartial spectator. It is what a guy who owns property in Mamta's Bengal needs to say so as not to get the shit kicked out of him. He now says Mamta should be PM! But then, he had previously claimed that Rahul was intelligent!
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