Justice is a Service industry. People pay to get a judgment and then pay to get that judgment enforced. Obligation holders may either pay money to dispute a judgment or they may ignore it or else spend a little money to frustrate its enforcement.
There is a separate issue where an organization seeks a monopoly of legitimate coercion. It may justify this by saying that it will serve Justice or Religion or the Purity of the Race or Democracy or Communism or something else altogether.
An ideology associated with an organization claiming absolute power may have a theory of Justice or a theory of God or a theory of Racial Purity of a theory of Liberty or Happiness or Niceness or some other mishmash of its own. The theory of Justice or Liberty or Niceness associated with such ideologies are stupid and puerile. However, sycophants who wish to rise may pay a little for that type of indoctrination.
Amartya Sen made a living teaching nonsense of this sort to aspiring bureaucrats and other such sycophants and parasitic virtue signallers. Because he came from India and was of Hindu ancestry, he felt obliged to talk some tosh about the Bhagvad Gita.
A young Professor of Philosophy in Viginia wrote a paper some years ago titled Sen and the Bhagavad Gita: Lessons for a Theory of Justice. It is obviously foolish. The Gita is set in the Iron Age. Some people- Sages, Princes, Guild heads etc- provided judicial services either for a fee or as part of some other function for which they were remunerated. The Gita is wholly unconcerned with this sort of 'Artha' or economic or administrative activity. Thus it has no 'lessons for a theory of Justice'. This is because Justice is not the same thing as 'Morality' or 'Righteousness' and thus neither 'Deontology', which is concerned with duty, nor 'Consequentialism', which is concerned with optimal decision making, appear in their pure form in discourse about Justice. Instead, there is always something like a 'reasonable man' test or else a customary norm. A person is welcome to say that they broke a law because they were more scrupulous than normal or had a better understanding of remote and currently invisible consequences, but a Judge or Jury would be entirely in the right to judge them as ordinary law-breakers who must pay a penalty.
Judgments and not decisions in the ordinary sense. The former conform to a protocol bound, 'buck stopped' (which also means no halting or concurrency problem), deliberative procedure of an essentially artificial, or invented, type. This does mean there are no 'topological holes' and discontinuous tipping points, and hysteresis effects and arbitrariness and inconsistency and so on. Precisely because juristic judgments are not decision theoretic, scandal is avoided because it is obviously utile to have a way of breaking tied decisions (or teiku in Hebrew), or concurrency live-lock or deadlock or Turing type 'halting' problems' etc. Moreover juristic judgments have signalling value even if they are not enforced. They may promote better correlated equilibria. On the other hand, having lots of unenforceable laws on the statute books may lead to the disintermediation of the Justice system.
In the Hindu and Judaic tradition, those acting as judges or as jury members are asked to set aside their own interests and beliefs and act instead on the basis of what they believe to be 'common knowledge' of how 'reasonable' or 'pious' people behave in the ordinary way of things. At a high enough level of Judgment, new rules and exceptions, or meta-rules, may be created but these may be severely limited in their application.
What happens if an economist- one, moreover, trained to look for utility maximising solutions because Knightian Uncertainty is assumed not to exist- or a Moral Philosopher of a Contractarian type- but one ignorant of Hohfeldian 'incidents' or the theory of incomplete contracts- tries to formulate an 'Idea of Justice'? The answer is that you get nonsense.
Joshua quotes Sen- '“... justice, by its very nature, has to have universal reach, rather than being applicable to the problems and predicaments of some people, but not others'
This is obviously false. Justice does not have and does not claim universal reach. It is circumscribed either de jure or de facto to a specific jurisdiction where, however, cost of enforcement may render it only of marginal significance. Justice is applicable only to the problems and predicaments of some people who have sufficient means, or effective claims against obligation-holders who have sufficient means, to make it worthwhile for them to approach the Courts. However, under incomplete contracts, it is mutually beneficial for parties to chose a binding arbitrator or legal jurisdiction such that both parties can proceed in good faith despite the existence of 'Knightian Uncertainty'. What this means is that when a novel state of the world arises, the contract can be amended in a relatively frictionless way such that the relationship can continue to burgeon.
It is true that there were some virtue signallers who pretended- after the Soviet Union's fall and before China's rise had fully registered- that there might be 'universal human rights' which Uncle Sam would enforce under 'Right to Protect'. But it was obvious that most people- whatever their problems and predicaments- would not permit foreigners to turn up to enforce their own Judgments on territory which was not their own. In the short run, 'shock and awe' might subdue the natives. In the middle to long term, they would bleed the occupier dry. Justice can't have universal reach because of suicide bombs and nuclear weapons and brave Ukrainians who don't want Putin to 'de-Nazify' their Nation by killing their Jewish President and Prime Minister.
The laws of nature, at least theoretically, must have universal reach because elementary particles are assumed to have no 'uncorrelated asymmetries'. A photon in Boston does not know it is different from a photon in Bangkok. People, however, possess 'uncorrelated asymmetries'. That is why 'bourgeois strategies' arise among living things but are markedly absent from inorganic matter.
Judging legal cases can give rise to a specialist legal profession with a shared vocabulary and 'terms of art'. Judicial reasoning is 'objective' in that it adheres to the protocols maintained by this profession. But this is true of any protocol bound type of discourse. There may be disagreement on many substantive matters and different schools of thought may bitterly contend with each other but at least in respect to certain conventional procedures and 'terms of art' there is unanimity within a particular jurisdiction. But in a different jurisdiction- e.g Scotland rather than England & Wales- things may be quite different. A person who is a subject or a particular Jurisdiction may have a subjective view of the Laws binding upon him. If this subjective view is held to be 'reasonable' it may be upheld by a Court. But, 'objective' Law is the set of statutes and stare decisis judgments which exist. It isn't any subjective view of any sort however philosophical or informed by economic science.
Joshua writes-
In other words, the dictates of justice are objective, at least to some degree,
those dictates are specified to a greater or lesser extent by the Jurisdiction but not in a manner which is complete or self-consistent.
and for Sen impartiality is part of what it means to be “objective”.
This is not necessarily true of the Law. Some jurisdictions may require impartiality from Judges and Jury members. Others may not. It is sufficient for protocols to have been observed for a judgment to be objectively considered part of the Law.
In particular, Sen believes that in order to arrive at good and just decisions one needs to consider the viewpoint of an impartial spectator.
This is a foolish belief. To arrive at a good decision one should certainly consider what a guy who is very good at making decisions of that sort would do. An 'impartial spectator' might say 'stop making decisions of this sort. How do you benefit by them? Get a fucking job you moron. Girls won't sleep with you just because you have a very good way of deciding how pretty they are. One or two might give you the time of day if you worked hard and became rich.'
Sen observes, following Adam Smith, that “[i]n solitude, we are apt to feel too strongly whatever relates to ourselves… The conversation of a friend brings us to a better, that of a stranger to a still better temper.”
Smith wasn't a lawyer. He wasn't talking about Justice. He merely observed that guys who want to do well in life ought not brood over their bottle on the indignities and injustices they may have suffered. A cheerful conversation with a buddy over a cup of tea might improve your temper and thus the welcome you receive from others. Moreover, young Scottish men needed to talk to strangers from London and Paris and so forth so as to get a better view of the possibilities that global commerce was opening up.
The idea for Sen is that often one’s decisions are biased by personal emotions or enculturation, for example.
That's a good thing. People trust you more. They understand that if you are their friend then you will stand by them in a fight. Scots were doughty fighters because they were 'enculturated' in a thymotic tradition which had embraced 'common sense' so as to rise up rather than be rendered an appendage of the English Crown.
Sen's people came under that Crown but not as even potential equals. Why? They were terrible fighters perhaps because they weren't 'enculturated' at all. They were merely gobshites. What Madhusudhan Dutt and Vivekananda and Tagore and so forth were constantly saying was 'what you call 'Sabhyata' (culture) is no such thing. It is merely hypocrisy and fine talk. First develop some manliness. Then pursue culture.'
These Bengalis knew that Scottish Highlanders had put down the Mutiny. Scottish entrepreneurs built up the Jute business in Calcutta. It was obvious that these Scotsmen would have gained nothing by accepting the viewpoint of an impartial Bengali spectator. Why? Bengalis talked bollocks.
The fact is, Sen's employers were not interested in Sen's 'impartial' views on the behaviour of the US or the UK. They employed this darky because they wanted his beggarly people to accept the 'impartial' judgments made by American or British spectators of the emerging economies.
By testing one’s views and decisions by having them scrutinized by others better and more objective decisions will result.
Great inventors and entrepreneurs and scientists and artists don't 'test their views and decisions' by talking to 'impartial spectators'. They focus more narrowly on a field far beyond the ken of all save one or two of their bitter rivals. Competition between such people result in better and more objective decisions. A scientist may not like a particular technique but may fear that his rival will use it to steal a march on him. Thus, he overcomes his subjective feelings in order to win the prize.
Talking with everybody can cause you to double down on your own subjective intuition. So long as you can score off someone else or refuse to admit defeat when confronted by a superior argument, you can feel good about yourself. Since there is no objective test of who is superior, why not just talk for the sake of talking?
Further, the less stake the other(s) has in the decision, presumably the better the decision.
The opposite is the case. Those without 'skin in the game' should be excluded from the conversation. You must have 'locus standi' if you wish to be heard by the Court. I am not allowed to barge into a criminal trial and lecture the Judges about the evils of masturbation.
To be clear, it does not have to be that the view of an impartial spectator is the correct one, it is just that decisions that have withstood the scrutiny of an impartial spectator tend to be better,
There is absolutely no evidence of this.
because the impartial spectator helps to overcome biases.
But how do we know which spectator is truly unbiased?
The other aspect of justice that will be significant for the purposes of this paper is sensitivity to consequences.
Justice should be robust- i.e. not be sensitive to consequences save by express provision of law. On the other hand, vinculum juri, bonds of law, must be incentive compatible. Where this condition is fulfilled there can be an upward evolution of norms and mores. Mechanisms whereby a murderer pays 'blood money' may be acceptable in a barbaric age. Indeed, the 'Stationary Bandit' - the State- may get its start by 'netting out' blood-money claims brought by different clans so as to make a profit. This is utilitarian enough, though the context is a thymotic society. We, however, would find it unacceptable if Hannibal Lecteur is allowed to roam free because his skill saves more lives than his cannibalistic appetite consumes and, furthermore, he's one classy dude.
Sen does not accept a crude consequentialism; rather he is interested in a thick conception of consequences, or what he calls comprehensive outcomes. Sen states that he wants to underscore “the importance of paying particular attention to ‘comprehensive outcomes’ that include actions undertaken, agencies involved, processes used, etc. along with the simple outcomes seen in a way that is detached from processes, agencies and relation—what [Sen calls] ‘culmination outcomes’.” (Sen 2009, 215)
Thus, Sen isn't talking about Justice at all. He is talking of Economic Policy. True, the Indian Planning Commission said it was pursuing 'Social Justice' but it wasn't actually a wing of the Justice Ministry. It decided Policy priorities. It served no juristic or judicial function. Sen confuses 'Niti' (Policy) with 'Nyaya' (Justice). A Neta (leader) implements Niti. A Nyayadesh (Judge) delivers Justice. There is not even one literary source which supports Sen's contention that the word 'Niti' was ever used to mean 'Justice'. It seems his grandpappy didn't actually teach him Sanskrit of even the most rudimentary type. The consequence is that he wrote nonsense.
Thus, for Sen, consequentialism is not only concerned with the best outcome of a particular decision, or action—a maximization of utility for example—but with how the action is brought about, taking account of the personhood of, or the relationship in which one stands to, those affected by a decision or course of action.
So, Sen is not concerned with 'Consequentialism' (or 'Utilitarianism') as a theory of Jurisprudence. He is concerned with a specific aspect of Economic Policy concerning Welfare treated wholly independently of other aspects e.g. Industrial Policy, Fiscal Policy, Monetary Policy, Trade Policy, etc.
For example, on Sen’s version of consequentialism, one probably ought not sacrifice an innocent person for an overall increase in average utility—however, that is not to say one definitely ought not, but the increase in utility needs to be weighed against other factors, such as the person’s autonomy. To be clear, the weighing of processes, et cetera, and cumulative outcomes is what Sen means by sensitivity to consequences.
The problem here is two fold
1) the capacity to do a thing (e.g. sacrifice an innocent) is linked to what people believe about your character and conduct. An innocent person might kill you before you can kill him if he knows that have some propensity of the sort mentioned above. In other words, capacity is itself a function of expected outcome. If you decide to do something really stupid or out of character you may suddenly find that you are judged as lacking capacity and therefore can't complete your contemplated action.
2) Consequences can never be fully known or indeed envisaged. There is always the possibility that some catastrophic outcome becomes possible through any given action. The 'maximum uncertainty principle' applies. This means that the expected value of the action is always zero (because you can imagine a maximally beneficial state of the world to offset the catastrophic outcome). However, if you are paid or otherwise legally obligated to do an action of a specific sort you must do it unless no reasonable person would have done it had they been in your shoes. This means, in any justiciable context, 'sensitivity to consequences' has a narrow range. Moreover, uncorrelated asymmetries arise. Your duty is different depending on whether you have a legal or other obligation of a commonly accepted or acceptable type. Here too there are gradations. Speaking generally, as economies advance, the Principal has a higher 'culpa levis in abstracto' duty of care. A menial Agent may have no actual liability. The onus was on the Principal to properly oversee his actions.
In the Gita, Krishna is omniscient. He alone knows the 'consequence' set. But, he also has the capacity to reach any maximally beneficent outcome by a pure, creative, and gratuitous volitional act. God's affects are effects.
However, in the Gita, he is acting as an 'agent' not a principal. That's what lends drama and suspense and poignancy to this Divine Song.
It so happens that Arjuna had been given a boon such that he could visualize anything he wanted. However Arjuna refuses the boon. It thus become 'asvamika svatva' (masterless property). There is a legal subtlety here. If the Gandharva gave the boon gratuitously and for Arjuna's advancement then his failure to receive it does not mean it is not vested. On the other hand, since the Gandharva received consideration, there was a transaction for things of equal value but the boon was excluded from it. Thus the boon remains vested in the Gandharva. However, if the Gandharva wished for the boon to vest for the advancement of Arjuna (in Hindu Law, this distinction is made to clarify what is or isn't what British judges called a 'benami' trust) then the boon can vest under that conditionality- i.e. it actually does lead to Arjuna's advancement. These details might seem out of place in an Epic of the Greek sort, but the Mahabharata has an encyclopedic scope. What ever is found elsewhere is also found in it.
In the normal course of things, Arjuna is the master of himself. Then, suddenly, Arjuna experiences 'vishada' (depression) and loses mastery of himself. Thus, no longer being his own master, he gains a vision of the terrible outcome of the war thanks to a property which did not vest in him till he was alienated from himself. (However it vested in the same way he would himself have wanted if he hadn't not wanted it to vest at all. Or perhaps the opposite happened. The relationship between property and 'predication' can be very interesting from the legal point of view.)
What follows is a piquant dialogue such that Arjuna gets the vision he wants as a gratuitous gift of the Lord. This is highly suggestive to Theists because you have a 'law-less' choice sequence such that 'freedom' attains God's gift of Grace without affecting any outcome. This is a Theodicy of an exquisitely crafted yet seemingly 'natural' type. It is consummate Art limning the credo of the simple Heart.
Joshua does not understand the Gita. He says it is actually a good example of the importance of introducing impartiality into one’s decision-making process. This is silly. Arjuna is partial and it is right for him to be partial because uncorrelated asymmetries give rise to bourgeois strategies which are eusocial. On the other hand, there was another great warrior who turned up at Kurukshetra who was truly impartial. He was also chivalrous and would fight for the weaker side. Krishna gets him to kill himself so the Divine Plan can unfold.
According to Sen, Arjuna represents, and argues from, a consequentialist perspective. More precisely, Sen believes that the types of arguments which Arjuna gives, and the perspective that he takes, are of the thick Senian consequentialism variety that account for “comprehensive outcomes”.
Arjuna is a mere mortal. He has no information re. 'comprehensive outcomes'. His point is simple. Hindu 'Niyamas' (injunctions), in accordance with the Price Equation, say 'don't kill your relatives'. That is kin-selective altruism right there backed up by the deontological precedent that in his lineage the one with the superior right had given up the throne in favor of spiritual gain. Actually, this is the outcome of the Mahabharat. Karna has the superior right- if he wants it.
Even absent the specific Niyamas mentioned, we could say Arjuna's argument is based on an easy to apply rule of a socio-biological and mathematical kind. True, he had a grudge against the other guys and they had a grudge against his people. But the weaker side could walk away from that Holy fane and go conquer some other territory or take to spirituality. This is perfectly deontological and is robust to informational enrichment.
Krishna, on the other hand, represents, and argues from, a deontological perspective.
No. Krishna is the self-conscious incarnation of an Occasionalist God. He is the only efficient cause in the whole of the Mahabharata. He doesn't bother with rules of any sort. However, his Grace is an entirely gratuitous gift which, he tells us, all can receive.
Sen states that “Krishna’s deontology is of a particularly purist form, which goes beyond seeing the importance of duty-based reasoning, and denies the relevance of any concern, particularly any consequential concern, in determining whether some action should be undertaken or not.” (Sen 2009, 216)
This is nonsense. We could say Krishna had a Plan and wanted Arjuna to play his part in it. But that is consequentialism. We can't say he had any 'deontological' objection to Arjuna running away. After all, Ranchhod (one who flees battle) is an epithet of Krishna.
Before the beginning of the battle between the just Pandavas
Actually, Karna is the true leader of the Pandavas (if he chooses to accept that position) and thus the War proceeds only because he wishes it.
—of whom Arjuna is their most respected and gifted general—and their allies and the Kauravas—the unjust usurpers of the kingdom that rightfully belongs to the Pandavas—and their allies, Arjuna becomes overwhelmed and despondent due to the carnage that is about to ensue,
This is the interesting part. Why does Arjuna behave like this? The answer has to do with the boon he receives which was asvamika svatva- an unvested property. Theists consider devotional piety to itself be the gratuitous gift of God. Is it like the Gandharva's gift to Arjuna? Don't forget the Gandharvas rule over antarabhava (bardo in Tibetan) and thus the 'perfectly Just' mechanism of metempsychosis at the level of the womb. The Gita doesn't go into the details but that's okay because Krishna's references to Scripture over the course of the Gita grant us an intuition of a 'lawless' overlapping choice sequences where non-uniqueness establishes naturality. I may mention that the philosophy involved is directly linked to open questions in Math. But so is every type of decision theory or economic calculus. Thus ordinary blokes like me find the Gita illuminating.
Arjuna states that “we are not justified in killing,”
That is deontological. Indeed, we have a duty not to kill and to try to protect those in danger of being killed.
and Sen believes Arjuna feels that he is not justified for the following reasons. (Sargeant 1994, 75) First, Arjuna ought not fight since it would entail Arjuna killing the teachers
There is a strict rule against killing the Guru. This is deontology pure and simple.
and family members on the opposing army who had benefited him greatly throughout his life.
There is a rule against this as well.
Second, since so many men would die as a result of the battle it would lead to the destruction of families, the caste system and all of society.
Again there is a rule against this.
Thrid, the “evil would cling to us [the Pandavas]” for killing those who had benefited them and destroying society. (Sargeant 1994, 74)
In each case, the Hindu knows of a 'niyama' forbidding that action. The class of expounders of this text mention them in their discourses. Sen, perhaps because he studied at Tagore's Shantiniketan, does not know the Hindu tradition because Tagore was a Brahmo and thus prejudiced against Hinduism. Indeed, he fell out with Netaji Bose when the latter stood up for students expelled from a Brahmo hostel for doing Sarasvati Puja!
In other words, the Pandavas, in general, and Arjuna, in particular, are personally responsible for all the deaths and the negative consequences that might result from those deaths.
No. They are breaking explicit 'niyams'- prohibitions- known to all Hindus.
Finally, the benefit that could occur from the battle—viz. the Pandavas receiving the kingdom that is rightfully theirs—do not outweigh the negative consequences—i.e. is the first two points.
Because Niyamas have been broken. Only if God ordains the thing can it be done under such circumstances. That is what happens in the Gita. God takes the sin on himself.
Based on the above interpretation of Arjuna’s thinking, Sen abstracts three, more general, principles. First, Arjuna’s reasoning is based on the “belief that what happens to the world must matter and be significant in our moral and political thinking,”
This is not the case. Arjuna is mentioning explicit Niyamas known to all Hindus. He is not presented as a scholar or a philosopher. He is a simple man repeating the explicit rules of his Religion in a manner understood by every Hindu.
in particular, “the significance of human lives.” (Sen 2009, 212-3) That is to say, the massive loss of life that will result if the battle takes place cannot be ignored.
Only because explicit niyamas are broken. Arjuna is not saying wars of extermination are bad. He is saying that this specific war involves the breaking of explicit niyamas which are known to all Hindus.
Second, Arjuna is concerned with personal responsibility. So, “Arjuna argues that the results of one’s choices and actions must matter in deciding what one should do,”
This is not the case. Arjuna is only mentioning the breaking of Niyamas. He is not mentioning the risk that he himself, or his brothers, might be killed. Yet those are exigencies directly connected to his decision.
in other words, one is responsible, personally, for the results that occur due to one’s decisions and actions. (Sen 2009, 213)
Only if they break Niyamas or are otherwise inconsistent with one's Dharma or duty of eusebia. Arjuna nowhere embraces the doctrine of Ahimsa by which injury to all animate creatures- including microscopic animals- must be minimized.
Third, Arjuna believes that there are relational obligations that must be considered. So, because many of the people that Arjuna would have to kill “are people for whom he has affection, including his own relatives,” Arjuna is particularly troubled. (Sen 2009, 213)
There are Religious duties to relatives and a general prohibition on killing them or causing them harm. Hindus are taught this from an early age.
According to Sen “[r]elational obligation linked with family connections and personal affection as well as agency-related concerns … call for accommodation within the broader reach of moral and political philosophy, including that of the theory of justice.”
Niyamas are accommodated in the Hindu theory of Jurisprudence. Indeed Bengal was preeminent in 'Navya Nyaya' juristic reasoning of this sort.
(Sen 2009, 213) On the other side of the debate stands Krishna, who Sen takes to represent the archetypal deontologist.
God has no duties or obligations. He can't be a deontologist. Prophets and Sages may prescribe duties and obligations to ordinary mortals. None have suggested that the Creator is bound by anything similar.
According to Sen, “Krishna argues that Arjuna must do his duty, come what may, and in this case he has a duty to fight, no matter what results from it. It [the ensuing battle] is a just cause, and as a warrior and a general on whom his side must rely, he cannot waver from his obligations.” (Sen 2009, 209)
This is not the case. Krishna admits that a Kshatriya can decide to lay down his arms and dedicate himself to Spirituality. The Gita gives a reason not to do so- but only for Theists comfortable with the path of devotional piety.
So, Sen understands Krishna to be arguing from a perspective that is only concerned with one’s duty, and is completely consequent-independent, which is in stark contrast to Arjuna’s consequence sensitivity.
Yet, it is obvious that the reverse is the case. Krishna has a Plan and needs Arjuna to play a part in it. Arjuna has a desire to receive God's grace as a gratuitous gift. Both get what they want.
Arjuna’s moral and political reasoning is deeply concerned with outcomes in their comprehensive form.
Nonsense! He has no interest in Economics or Geopolitics or anything of that sort. He is a muscular warrior.
The idea of social realizations
is the subject of the Artha Shastra. Arjuna has no interest in it whatsoever. Yuddhishtra on the other hand has to learn mathematical game theory to overcome his Vishada. He is less able as a warrior but is a better administrator than Karna or Arjuna.
… demands that outcomes be seen in these broader terms, taking note of actions, relations and agencies.
This is 'mechanism design'- which Sen didn't bother with. Instead he pretended that some bureaucracy with infinite resources and infinite power could identify everybody's 'capabilities' and then devise a plan for the world- except they couldn't because first they'd need to consult impartial spectators in other Galaxies and after that everybody would have to spend an infinite amount of time discussing everything so nothing need ever be done.
… Arjuna does make substantial room for his idea of duty,
No. Arjuna mentions specific niyamas. Krishna then shows that these can be broken by the Theist under certain conditions such that a novel soteriology arises. The Gita is a Hindu Scripture. Sen was not taught this at Shantiniketan and thus ended up talking nonsense about it.
taking into account his responsibility for his own agency,
what about his agency in having responsibility? Or his responsibility to have agency of that sort? Or his agency in acquiring that meta-responsibility? Why not take account of every item in this infinite regress? How resolve the resulting halting problem? Sen's 'idea of Justice' has no fucking idea.
and also acknowledging his special relationship with many of the potential victims of the war (in addition to his general grief at the prospect of massive human death and deliberate killing). (Sen 2009, 216-7)
What is not mentioned is why the assembled armies desecrated the Holy fane of Kurukshetra. The answer is that a collective delusion had seized them for a Cosmic purpose- viz. the inauguration of a new age of an inferior type.
Thus, while, according to Sen, Krishna is advocating a view that one ought to “Fare forward. Not fare well/ But fare forward,”4 (Sen 2009, 210)
This is nonsense. God gives his devotees a reward more glorious than anything they can imagine.
The fact is that an elderly shithead like me feels increasing joy from the 'externality' of love and service and sacrifice. But, I incur debt which my 'Hlaford' discharges. I get to die and never discharge any debt because, however poor, however abject, however utterly parasitical, cunts like me always have more cash than character, but all the good folk get an infinite reward which they will, again infinitely, more and more deserve.
Fuck's wrong with thinking this way? Must I be miserable in my old age just because I've only ever been every type of loser and fuckwit?
Tolstoy has an old peasant who tells Pierre, 'if you cavil at sickness, God won't grant you death.' It maybe Tolstoy's Christ wouldn't. My Krishna will. But then, unlike Tolstoy, I never had literary talent.
Arjuna wants to both fare forward and fare well. What is important for Sen’s purposes are the lessons that can be gleaned from the Arjuna-Krishna debate. What Sen wants to drive home is that using the type of reasoning that Arjuna does is essential for making good, moral and just decisions. By being sensitive to consequences an individual and a society can “fare well” and not just “fare forward”, and that is Sen’s point.
Is it worth making? Doesn't everybody want to do well going forward? Is there anybody who doesn't understand that making good decisions now will enable us to have a better future?
For Sen, any adequate theory of justice must not only take account of comprehensive consequences, but do so with the idea that people and society can fare well and fare better.
But this is also true of any adequate theory of respiration or defecation! If you fail to breathe in you may suffocate. If you fail to take a dump, your health may suffer.
However, contra a simplistic consequentialism, part of faring well involves accounting for agency, relationships and duties.
No it doesn't. Accounting is expensive. Just as there is no accounting for tastes, similarly there is no accounting for fancy shite like 'agency' (which is thymotic or chrematistic, not economic at all) and 'relationships' (which are dense, or otherwise robust, only at network nodes and hence ultimately positional, thymotic or chrematistic) and duties (which arise only from rents being otherwise defeasible by antidosis) save such rough and ready reckoning as is required or useful for economic or legal reasons.
Sen's entire approach militates for nothing but endless talk of a vacuous kind. It faces race hazard and halting problems of a type well known for 50 years. The thing was always only a legitimating ideology for bureaucracies which everybody rebelled against over 40 years ago. Sen's obsolescent maths and imperviousness to any idea compatible with the notion that Hinduism does not exist merely to be shat upon, blinds him to his own ancestral Baidya 'yukti' or pragmatic attention to sequencing. This is a 'Brahmo' Brahminism of a sort more backward and useless than any credo Raja Ram Mohan Roy- who did write some dogmatic Benthamite shite- could be convicted of holding. Sen ended up being stupider and more vacuous than Tagore in his senile English spouting phase.
It is easy to throw a spoke into the wheels of woke virtue signalers or Sen-tentious shitheads, by saying that their discourse is hopelessly exclusionary and epistemically Fascist in that it does not embrace the possibility that inanimate objects deserve to be treated as having a non-binary sexual agency quite separate from that of the people who want to thrust them up your arse.
Joshua's appears to have read Aurobindo and Gandhi on the Gita. But, like Sen, these men were not Brahmins and did not have a traditional Hindu upbringing. Thus they failed to recognize the 'niyamas' Arjuna specifically invoked. Also, they were blathershites who wrote nonsense.
While Arjuna repeatedly refers to his kinsmen, he is not concerned with the actual harm done to them. Rather, Arjuna is concerned with the “great sin” that would accrue to him for killing his kinsmen, and not the actual pain and suffering of the kinsmen themselves. (Auribindo 1995)
Because there is a specific injunction re. kinsmen which, however, was suspended during actual battle. That's how Niyamas work.
Thus, it is not that Arjuna is concerned with the agency or the relationships involved, but instead with the goods, or bads in this case, that would result for him personally.
No. The guy is a Hindu. He knows the relevant Niyamas and mentions them to Krishna who then provides the means to gain an immunity from them.
Also it should be noted that “[i]n the past, he [Arjuna] never hesitated even when he had to fight against relations.” (Gandhi 2000, 34)
No Niyama was being broken in those cases.
Therefore, he cannot really be offering it as a principled reason now,
Yes he can. This is a matter only Hindus can judge because they grew up hearing those Niyamas and are familiar with the means by which an immunity from them is gained. The Gita can be understood by ordinary people but it contains many references to Brahminical scripture. Non-Brahmins can learn that scripture under a Guru. However, a Brahmin conversant with his family texts should be able to work things out for himself without too much difficulty. At least, that is my own experience.
but, rather, he is just using kinship as an excuse—i.e. using the issues of the agency and the relationships of those involved instrumentally—which, again, demonstrates that Arjuna was not really concerned with Senian “comprehensive outcomes”.
Why proffer any excuse? Krishna himself had run away from battle. His older brother had decided to take no part in it. Arjuna could exercise the same right. Krishna might upbraid him but he could be easily silenced because he himself had the epithet 'Ranchhod'.
Arjuna- a stand in for the ordinary Hindu- mentions the specific Niyams he would be violating. Krishna prescribes a method of gaining immunity of general import for Theists. There was no Sen-tentious discussion of the type Joshua describes.
The other major reason that Arjuna gives is that the battle would lead to the destruction of society as a whole.
No. 'Destruction of society' is 'arthavada'- mere hyperbole of an imperative type- which accompanies 'vidhi' or positive injunction. Hindus know this. It is not really the case that if you steal then society will collapse. Nor will you necessarily go blind if you have a wank. It's just that stealing is wrong and a guy who is constantly wanking may grow blind to the charms of his bride.
However, were Arjuna to leave and not engage in the ensuing battle, the battle would still take place and families would still be destroyed and the caste system might still be ruined and society as a whole might collapse.
But he would not have contributed to this outcome and thus would pay no penalty for breaking a vidhi. This is pure heteronomous deontological thinking.
Except, unlike with Arjuna’s reasoning—where his involvement could hypothetically lead to the destruction—if Arjuna did not participate it would be more likely happen, because “[i]f he left the battle, the Pandava army would be simply annihilated,” and the “evil” Kauravas would maintain rulership of the kingdom. (Gandhi 2000, 34)
This is not the orthodox Hindu view. God's power is infinite. The purpose of the Gita was to give theists a superior soteriological path. My people were udgatrs. We immediately understood that we needn't worry too much about some small ritual mistake. This actually improved performance and enabled Sama Veda to flourish more. Incidentally, Tagore had an Uncle who greatly advanced Musicology by taking the help of udgatrs. Sen may have studied at Shantiniketan, his Mum may have sung Rabindrasangeet, but he didn't get that the only way you can find out about Hindu Religion or Music or Philosophy is by actually consulting practicing Hindus.
Without Arjuna at least as many people would have died except the unjust side would have won,
That is not the case. If Arjuna drops out, why would Karna want to fight? He just has to reveal he is the eldest of the Pandavas and there is no War. Justice requires the Pandavas to serve the Kauravas- who are pals of Karna- unless they decide to defy a particular Niyama and set up as autonomous principals.
and on any version of consequentialism—comprehensive or otherwise—that would be a much worse consequence.
Sez who? The fact is, the Gita is occassionalist. God has a plan. Ultimately, Karna is the decisive actor. He wants all the thymotic warriors to gain Heaven by dying in battle and that is the actual outcome because God wants to reduce the numbers of this parasitic warrior class so that a more commercial type of regime can burgeon.
The next issue to be discussed is that it does not seem that Arjuna was in fact arguing for any particular position, but rather, he was rationalizing his loss of nerve.
or desire to have a long Sen-tentious discussion. This was one view- e.g. that of Vivekananda- but it isn't the canonical view.
In fact, as Gandhi points out, “[h]is reason [i.e. his ability to reason] is, for the time being, clouded.” (Gandhi 2000, 34) Before putting forth the “reasons” he has for not fighting Arjuna was “[d]espondant ...
Vishada. The dual of this episode is the Vyadha Gita & Nalophkhyanam where Yuddhishtra's vishada is dispelled. But there is a further symmetry between the episode where Arjun vows to kill Yuddhisthra and the one where he kills his genuine eldest brother. The former shows that Krishna's 'visvarupa' theophany was actually a Christ-like self-slaying such that all devotee's sins are taken on by the Man-God.
[and] said this: Having seen my own people, Krishna, [d]esiring to fight … [m]y limbs sink down, [m]y mouth dries up, my body trembles, … [m]y skin burns, I am unable to remain as I am, [a]nd my mind seems to ramble.” (Sargeant 2004, 66-8) Then, after giving his “reasons” the chapter of the Gita ends with “[t]hus having spoken on the battlefield, Arjuna sat down upon the seat of the chariot, [t]hrowing down both arrow and bow, [w]ith a heart overcome by sorrow.” (Sargeant 2004, 85) What is clear then, from the text, is that Arjuna was not speaking from a position of reason; he was overcome by sorrow and anxiety.
So that the Gandharva's boon could vest in an equally asvamika Arjun. This explains why Krishna can't simply say 'Dude! Bhishma and Drona have the boon of dying only when they wish. You'll have your hands full keeping them from killing your brothers. How can you yourself kill them? Look, you just fight hard and hope for a stalemate followed by a negotiated settlement.'
Krishna knows Arjuna has the Gandharva's boon so what follows is a very 'balanced' symmetric game which builds suspense till Krishna avoids a potential oversight and remembers to give Arjuna 'divine eyeballs' to view his theophany.
Therefore, it seems hard to believe “Arjuna’s moral and political reasoning is deeply concerned with outcomes in their comprehensive form.” (Sen 2009, 216) At least one could not draw such a conclusion based on the text of the Gita, because in the Gita Arjuna is not reasoning at all, or as Krishna indicates “Arjuna … is talking specious wisdom.” (Gandhi 2000, 38)
Krishna says dharma is difficult to understand. Just mentioning the relevant Niyamas does not mean you are wise. Still, the Gita shows one way forward such that deontology does not paralyze soteriological progress.
The important thing to note is that Arjuna himself realized that he was not cognitively in a position to make a proper judgment on the situation, and therefore asks Krishna for guidance regarding what the appropriate course of action is.
Krishna, as charioteer, was obligated to advise on how to kill a lot of the enemy. Arjuna, it turned out longed for enlightenment from the 'Lord of Yoga' which is exactly what he gets. His Vishada helped him get what he wanted which is why the episode is called 'Vishada Yoga'.
The logical error Joshua is making is that he is assuming that people who are not suffering from Vishada don't ask the appropriate person for advise. This is foolish. A smart guy who has advisers working for him or who knows of smart people who are otherwise obligated to counsel him would certainly consult them before making up his mind. Indeed, Kings were supposed to consult their Raj-purohit and Mantris (Ministers). Chariot-warriors were supposed to talk to their 'Sutas'
Ignorance of the Hindu context- viz. what Niyamas apply in stereotyped situations- has led young Joshua to talk nonsense. Sen, on the other hand, is an atheist who enjoys denigrating Hindu scripture.
Arjuna’s mention of “duty” in the above quote provides a good segue into a discussion of Sen’s interpretation of Krishna as a pure deontologist—i.e. someone concerned only with duty regardless of the consequences. It seems clear from the above quote from Arjuna that the use of “duty” here is not to be taken in a technical or deontological sense, but rather as synonymous with what one “ought to do,” generally, and it is in that light that Krishna should be interpreted.
This is false. Arjuna explicitly mentions specific Niyams. He does not ask about purush-artha and whether the spiritual path is not better than that of the householder. However, Krishna addresses this question. The difference between the Vyadha Gita and the Bhagvad Gita is that the former is for Principals for whom there is an Upanishadic solution whereas the latter is for Agents who are given a Theistic solution.
A problem, of course, does arise since, as has been mentioned, the Bhagavad Gita is a religious text. So, though it begins with concerns about the actual lived world and what is good and right and just, it then immediately turns to religious questions, and what Krishna has to say relates, more specifically, to that. It is therefore unfair to criticize Krishna’s “pure deontology” because he has taken the discussion from concerns about what is the right or just thing to do in the world to what is the right thing to do to attain liberation.
It is foolish but not unfair if you are an ignorant fool. You were bound to write nonsense no matter what you wrote about.
Nevertheless, there are at least a few lessons about worldly justice that can be gleaned from Krishna’s discussion.
Justice should be done in a dispassionate and unmercenary manner- iff dispensing justice is your job.
Arjuna’s expressed concerns—regardless of their motivation—are about the negative consequences that would result from the massive destruction of life,
how could he have any knowledge of this? It was by no means obvious that Drona and Bhishma could be made to give up their lives. That's why there had to be an episode where Arjuna gets a boon which, by his will, remains unvested till he experiences Vishada.
and particularly the lives of those with whom Arjuna is closely related. Arjuna was concerned about the sin that would accrue from such actions, but Krishna points out that “[b]y reason of delusion, man takes wrong to be right. By reason of delusion was Arjuna led to make a distinction between kinsmen and nonkinsmen.” (Gandhi 2000, 35)
But, Arjuna's thinking his side would win could have been dismissed as 'delusion' had the Gandharva not conferred a particular boon on him.
The fact is, Arjuna unknowingly kills his own eldest brother. That is the piquant aspect of the story. Karna is the decisive character in the Mahabharata.
Overcome as he was, Arjuna was not able to think clearly and thus assumed that there would be certain negative consequences. Not only was Arjuna making an invalid distinction between kinsmen and nonkinsmen
This distinction was perfectly valid. There was a Niyama in this regard. Moreover, uncorrelated asymmetries (e.g. kinsman vs stranger) dictate bourgeois strategies (as in hawk-dove) which are eusocial. Guys who distinguish between invaders and their own folk and thus who put up a good fight against the invaders are guys it is worth doing a deal with and then inter-marrying. On the other hand, one may as well exterminate a race of cowards unless the territory is so insalubrious it can only be rendered fruitful by the labor of enslaved cowards.
—a tacit form of parochialism that Sen himself finds problematic—
Sen is a cretin. He doesn't get that his people- who fled East Bengal- were not commodiously accommodated precisely because they were seen as cowardly and lacking in fighting spirit. Thus West Bengal has fallen behind Bangladesh. The feeling is that there's no point helping the Hindu Bengali prosper because he won't do anything sensible to defend the gains his people make. Lack of parochialism doesn't make you cosmopolitan. It makes you a blathershite who will defend nothing and construct nothing.
but that by not performing the duties proper to his caste and constitution he would be accruing the sin that he thought he would be for killing those to whom he had close personal relationships. Thus Krishna states that “if you [Arjuna] will not undertake [t]his righteous war, [t]hereupon, having avoided your own duty and glory, [y]ou shall incur evil.” (Sargeant 1994, 118)
How does Krishna know? The answer is that he is himself the Yogishvara of even Vishada Yoga. To prove his point Krishna has to reveal his cosmic form. But that's what Arjuna wanted all along- but only as a gratuitous gift.
To return to the issue of Krishna’s pure deontology, it seems that Sen is comparing apples and oranges. Arjuna’s “arguments” are about this-worldly concerns,
No. Hindu Niyamas arise by reason of other-worldly concerns. Artha Niti- economic or other types of policy- have this-worldly concerns. There are discussions of such elsewhere in the Mahabharata.
while Krishna’s are about other-worldly realization.
No. Krishna's plan concerns this world- so and so has to die and so and so has to live on. It is not the case Krishna is picking and choosing people for his Paradise.
Thus, seen in the light of religion Krishna’s arguments make sense as a sort of pure duty.
No. There is a 'Legalist' argument of that sort but it is atheistic or, at best, ritualistic. That comes under the heading of Purva Mimamsa. Gita, however, is Vedantic.
However, not everything Krishna does say concerns religious liberation. As has been noted, Krishna does discuss actual consequences. For example, as Gandhi draws out in his commentary, many of the negative consequences, that Arjuna feared, would more likely be realized were Arjuna not to fight, which is implicit in Krishna referring to the battle as a just or righteous cause.
But it was only so because Karna wished it. He is the true eldest brother of the Pandavas- if he wishes to be. If he forbids his younger brothers from opposing the Kauravas then the war is no longer a धर्म्यं संग्रामं except in the sense that any war between Kshatriyas where Hindu rites are observed is equally one. In any case, since we know that God wants the war to go ahead, God saying it is religious doesn't convey any information about whether it is or isn't righteous. The Old Testament tells of many things which God commands which become righteous only for that reason but which we would not consider to be so in the ordinary course of things. Halachah vein morin kein applies. Knowledge of a particular law can forbid acting upon it!
Finally, it is not that Krishna is ignoring consequences,
Krishna performs the action which secures the consequence he requires. This involves displaying his cosmic form. Moses saw the 'hindquarters of God'. Arjuna received a full frontal.
it is just that many of the consequences which Arjuna expresses concerns about are ultimately outside his control. Thus, whether or not Arjuna participates in the battle many people are going to die. Therefore, holding the massive slaughter of those to whom Arjuna has personal relationships fixed, the issue of duty becomes more significant. The important thing to note, however, is not what position Krishna was arguing but the relationship in which Krishna stood to Arjuna.
He was both his Charioteer and his personal Lord God and Savior while also being the Creator, Preserver and Disposer of all things.
Regardless of whether or not Krishna’s argument here is highly religious, and, thus, a full articulation of his argument is probably not relevant for the purposes of this paper.
This is not a complete sentence.
What is important is simply to note that Krishna is pointing out Arjuna’s biases.
Nothing of the sort occurs. Krishna isn't saying that Arjuna is partial to Yuddhishtra whereas he hates Karna and Duryodhana.
Arjuna was actually presenting a version of comprehensive consequentialism to justify a particular course of action,
No. He was simply mentioning various well-known Niyamas which would be violated if his side won. Krishna provided a method by which an immunity was acquired.
What should be noted is that from God's point of view nothing kills or is killed. But kirti (fame) and akirti (infamy) matter. Krishna later explains that to truthfully denigrate a person is to kill him but condign self-praise too is a type of expiatory self-slaughter! This opens a road from Occassionalism to onamatodoxy.
Arjuna realized that he was not really in a position to properly judge the situation.
He knew less about Niyama, Vidhi, etc.
In every way Krishna is Arjuna’s superior, and Arjuna knew that.
Further, Arjuna was aware that in the current context, despite any reasons he could give to justify his position, his perspective on the situation was skewed.
He was not an expert on Hindu dharma- i.e. Scripture and Commentary and so forth.
He, therefore, looked to Krishna for guidance in a situation in which he knew his judgment was flawed,
His knowledge was less.
and that is, at least one, important non-religious lesson that can be taken from the ArjunaKrishna debate.
In religion, the priest or preceptor or incarnate Godhead knows more than you just as, in Physics, the Professor or experimental researcher knows more than the layman.
There are actually a few related lessons that can be taken from the Arjuna-Krishna debate. First, in moral and political decision-making an individual—whether an individual person or an individual community—can, at times, be “too close” to the situation, and because of that fact be unable to make a good decision or even be able to properly evaluate the situation.
No. God is closer to reality than anybody. When a community asks an expert, it is because the expert is much closer to the situation of concern than any layman. Thus, if Americans like Joshua want to decide what the Gita means, they should ask the Hindu priests and preceptors who have devoted their lives to expounding the text. At the least, the opinion of a Brahmin should outweigh that of a blathershite Baidya or Bania.
In such circumstances considering the viewpoint of an impartial spectator can be helpful, which is an issue important to Sen and the reason that he incorporates Adam Smith’s discussion of the impartial spectator within his understanding of justice.
The impartial spectator of a war may well say 'a plague on both your houses' or, more simply, 'sod this as a game for soldiers' and decide to go off with a pot of wine.
The fact is the reason given for the battle at Kurukshetra and then the night-slaughter of the Pandava camp is that the Kshatriya class had grown too numerous. The herd had to be thinned out. War is a Malthusian check on population. A very big war can change the world for the better. Without the two World Wars, European Imperialism might still be with us.
Second, it takes a certain amount of humility and self-critical understanding to acknowledge that one’s own viewpoint might, in fact, be flawed,
as might everybody else's. However a proud man might seek to correct any flaw in his view point for purely utilitarian reasons rather than as an exercise in humility whereas a hypocrite may continually denigrate his own judgment and gas on about his stupidity and ignorance and unworthiness.
and it is this issue that I take to be what is actually illustrated by Arjuna in the Arjuna-Krishna debate.
But nothing of the sort occurs! Arjuna consults his charioteer who is acknowledged to be an expert in Religion. Suppose Krishna had said 'chant such and such mantra and no Niyama would be broken' then Arjuna's scruples would be overcome. What actually happens is a little more elaborate. Doing your duty dispassionately and without attachment to 'fruits' is highlighted. The problem is that Arjuna, because of Krishna, kills his elder brother while in a state of Manyu or dark anger.
In his book, and elsewhere, Sen has argued that the importance of the Arjuna Krishna debate is that it demonstrates two issues. First, that in moral and political decision making processes one must be cognizant of a variety of consequences that might obtain due to a particular decision or course of action.
But we can't be cognizant of all the consequences or even of what varieties of consequence might be involved. Thus in moral and political decision making processes we are required to observe protocols, to act in good faith, and to avoid doing silly things- e.g. letting virtue-singalling blathershites dictate the agenda, or rather, create a Djikstra concurrency deadlock by their endless chatter.
Second, and relatedly, deontology, in and of itself and precisely because it ignores consequences, is often an inappropriate approach to take regarding issues of justice.
Yet all over the world we see that the only appropriate approach to justice which is widely accepted is that of protocol bound, buck stopped, juristic decision making involving professional jurists using a specialized vocabulary and 'terms of art'.
God is beyond the scope of Justice. 'An act of God' is outside morality or the law. Joshua says ' From the context of the Gita, since Krishna is an omniscient and omnipotent diety he is clearly in every way superior to the mortal Arjuna. Whether or not Krishna is a god is beside the point.' This is foolish. Throughout the Mahabharata, people with superior Religious knowledge are consulted. Krishna was one of this class of people. However, the fact that he is God is what clinches matters for Arjuna.
While Sen might be correct about both of the conclusions that he draws, it has been shown that the Arjuna-Krishna debate does not actually justify such conclusions. A better understanding of the Arjuna-Krishna debate shows three things. First, Arjuna was actually less concerned with issues of comprehensive outcomes, agency and relationships than Sen maintains.
He had no such concerns. Nobody does. They are silly. If Sen cared about 'comprehensive outcomes' he wouldn't have wasted his time or that of his students. What fucking 'agency' or 'relationships' benefit from talking Sen-tentious shite?
Second, Arjuna was actually not even making an argument for any particular position, but was instead rationalizing his lack of nerve and emotional weaknesses regarding the ensuing battle.
That was one view- e.g that of Vivekananda who was basically saying to his fellow Bengali blathershites 'Sack up! Psst- kill Whitey.' Anyway, that's what Sister Nivedita- who was White- told Subramaniyam Bharati. He wobbled his head in awe but did no such thing. Lots of Bengalis look plenty White to us Madrasis.
Third, while Krishna does, at times, advocate doing one’s duty, for duty’s sake, his purpose in doing so is religious and not really moral or political.
Religion is commonly considered to include morality. Furthermore, at a time of Hindu rule, it included the political realm.
Further, Krishna is concerned with consequences it is just a question of which consequences are the important ones. So, if similar results are expected from two different courses of action, the one that aligns most closely with duties and obligations is, ceteris paribus, the better decision.
No. What matters is kirti or akirti- fame or infamy. This may align with duties but then again it may not.
Another way to think about the issue raised here is to note that Sen was arguing that the type of reasoning in which Arjuna engaged was critical for coming to a good and just decision.
For Hindus, it is obvious that you should think about Hindu Niyamas before coming to a decision.
However, it was shown that Arjuna was not really reasoning at all,
Joshua believes this because he does not know that in Hinduism there are explicit prohibitions on killing Guru, grand-sire, kinfolk etc. True there are ways to get an immunity from the Niyama in every case or else to expiate the sin of violating dharma. Krishna, as an expert in Religion who is discharging the function of Suta (charioteer) is a fitting person to counsel in this matter.
and therefore to model one’s decision making procedure on what Arjuna actually argued would most likely not lead to a good or just decision.
Why? It is perfectly proper for me to go to my lawyer and give legal reasons why I should not do something I find repugnant for a personal reason I don't want to disclose. The lawyer may accept and amplify one clinching argument while explaining why others are not germane. He is not obliged to say 'the reason you are doing this is because you are a greedy bastard'.
A better understanding of the Gita, in general, and the Arjuna-Krishna debate, in particular, does illustrate the importance of incorporating the perspective of an impartial spectator into one’s decision making process.
The impartial spectator would say 'fuck you Kshatriyas! You are shit! It is better to have a large peasant army rather than an chariot warrior elite.' India should have used its manpower to become like China- a strong centralized country able to colonize more and more land and do demographic displacement. The last thing it needed was philosophically inclined Princelings- like the Buddha or Mahavira- who would encourage cowardice and defeatism. This, at any rate, is what 'impartial observers' have been saying about Hindus for the last couple of centuries. It is highly germane to Sen himself. His people wouldn't have had to flee Dacca if the Hindus had told Gita spouting Gandhians to go fuck themselves.
Since the concept of an impartial spectator is an important aspect of Sen’s theory of justice it is interesting that he did not use the Gita, if he was going to use it at all, to illustrate that aspect of his theory. Further, one is left to wonder why Sen would use a text for secular purposes when it is difficult to make sense of the text divorced from its religious context.
Sen is an atheist who likes shitting on Hinduism. He won't shit on Islam because if he does he won't be safe in West Bengal. Like Dr. Taslima Nasreen, he will have to flee.
While the Bhagavad Gita, itself, does not really discuss political issues or the organization of a just society, it seems clear that it takes for granted the Hindu theory of castes.
A Hindu theory of castes. The Hindutva theory is casteless.
On such a theory, a just society is a well ordered society where people perform those functions which are appropriate to their caste, which in turn are based on people’s natural dispositions and inclinations. Thus, a just society is one that is similar, in many respects, to Plato’s republic.
Which was soon extinguished. Having a large, well provisioned, infantry matters though naval power can be more effective if it leads to greater wealth accumulation and technological advancement.
The problem, of course, is that such a society might seem abhorrent to modern liberal sensibilities.
But liberal sensibilities pipe small unless they can prevail in battle thanks to superior tech.
However, there is some intuitive plausibility to the idea that there is at least a prima facie obligation to exercise one’s abilities and talents in service of the greater society.
Why speak of obligation? It is obvious that enlightened self-interest promotes some Social 'goods'.
Further, as has been mentioned, it is difficult to understand the Gita independent of its religious context and concepts. However, there are some ideas that seem relevant to an adequate theory of justice, and in this section of the paper I will discuss what some of those might be. First, the Arjuna-Krishna debate actually demonstrates the importance of incorporating an impartial spectator into one’s decision making procedure. I agree with Sen and Smith that considering the viewpoint of an impartial spectator is an important aspect of a theory of justice, and for just the same reasons—viz. universalizability and objectivity.
Smith said no such thing. Talking to smarter more successful people is about getting a better theory of society. This is John Muth's notion of rationality as expecting the prediction of the correct economic theory. Add in Hannan Consistency- i.e. regret minimization under Knightian Uncertainty- and you are good to go. But no 'universalizability' is involved. The theory only works where certain conditions are met and, even then, mechanisms are restricted to qualifying agents. However, we may speak of the 'naturality' or 'non-arbitrariness' of robust reflective equilibria of a certain type. However they are subject to Kuhn's no neutral algorithm stipulation. In other words, we have good reason to believe that there is no algorithmic manner of simultaneously satisfying a bunch of desirable properties. In other words, smart peeps knew Sen has been talking nonsense for forty years but said nothing because he was Brown.
An impartial spectator understanding of objectivity introduces a notion of fallibility and correctability,
These exist if there is partiality. A guy having a wank knows that some methods of satisfying himself are fallible. Having a good internet connection turns out to be pretty important. 'Correctability' in this respect has been a driver of technological progress or so I firmly believe.
and thus, at least potentially, can avoid some of the paternalistic concerns that one might have regarding a more traditional objective theory, like Plato’s.
Plato was a bum-boy. Paternalistic concerns are about kicking pedo scum in the bollocks. We want to bring up our kids under our own rooftree. We don't want them brought up by a bunch of fucking kiddy fiddlers. Corrupters of youth better keep clear of paternalistic boots.
Second, by incorporating an impartial spectator one can evaluate one’s impartiality and not just particular decisions or courses of action.
No one can't. If Sen incorporates me and I tell him to stop being such a time-wasting blathershite, he will dismiss me as partial.
In other words, there can be higher-order evaluations of impartiality.
How? We don't know who is impartial. How will we know who is an impartial judge of impartiality? There are TV series about guys who specialize in Juror selection. They can tell just by looking at what a person is wearing whether they are likely to be biased for or against a defendant. But they can't detect impartiality of a context independent type. Kuhn was right. There really is no neutral algorithm or decision process.
The Arjuna-Krishna debate also demonstrates a problem that often arises in discussions of morality and politics, and that is emotions are often involved. While, emotions, in and of themselves, are neither good nor bad, they can lead to—as they did with Arjuna—poor decisions or less than rational reasoning.
Arjuna gets what he wants. His emotions and reasonings were just what the Doctor ordered.
Questions of justice and of right and wrong are often emotionally charged issues, consider the debate currently occurring over healthcare, if one is not careful the emotions involved can cloud one’s judgment.
A good thing. Emotions are Darwinian algorithms of the mind which break concurrency deadlock and express preference intensity. It is precisely because they are so useful that they can have damaging pathologies.
Hopefully, COVID has made people more emotional about the need for universal health care. Not wanting to die of a horrible infection is too an emotion.
It is at such times that Arjuna’s example can be instructive. Despite his rationalizations, Arjuna was aware that he was probably not in the best position to make such an important decision by himself, he therefore turned to one who was not only an impartial spectator, but an expert.
He turned to an expert who was highly partial to him. That was sensible. It would be foolish to listen to a guy who doesn't give a fart about you when there is somebody equally good who cares about you greatly.
This, then, is another lesson that can be had regarding justice; that one has to be self-critical enough to know that one’s judgment might be being influenced by emotions or biases.
Justice is dispensed where there is a protocol bound, buck stopped, service industry of a certain type. Decisions made by individuals may be justiciable in such venues. But those decisions are not judgments in the same sense as the decisions reached by judicial bodies.
Individuals have Hohfeldian immunities such that there is no reason to be 'self-critical' about being influenced by emotions or biases. Who you sleep with is up to you even if you are biased towards the opposite sex and are emotionally attached to your wife. Plato may not approve but then an impartial spectator may have kicked in his bollocks after witnessing him approach some kid in the playground.
While one does not necessarily have to take the advice of an impartial spectator or an expert, one does have to be cognizant of one’s own biases and limitations.
Not unless it is leading to some loss or exposure to risk.
A third lesson that can be had regarding justice and the Arjuna-Krishna debate is that there are situations in which there are no good solutions, just more or less bad ones.
The reverse is the case. The Gita shows there is a fucking fantastic solution for everybody.
In other words, one lesson of the Gita is that one lives in a morally complex world in which there are competing demands, all of which cannot be satisfied.
Only if that is what one wants to do. You are free to quit any morally complex world and go be a beach-bum.
In such circumstances there is not always an ideal solution, but one must act anyway, and that is the real import of Krishna’s claim to do one’s duty.
If one wishes to remain an Agent rather than a Principal- sure. But you could chose to be a Principal in which case the world is just as morally complex as you want it to be.
Opting out, or in Arjuna’s case refusing to fight, is not a valid option,
Yes it is, provided Arjuna ceases to be an Agent and sets up as a Principal.
especially in cases of manifest injustice—which the battle between the Pandavas and Kauravas was supposed to represent
but Hindus know it was no such thing. There was a tradition in that House of the stronger claimant giving up his claim and taking the path of spirituality.
—there is an obligation to get involved. Further, by not getting involved or not acting one is tacitly condoning the injustice,which was Gandhi’s point in underscoring the fact that “Arjuna … had no choice but to fight.” (Gandhi 2000, 34)
Gandhi and Tilak and Vivekananda had a political interpretation of the Gita. However, the outcome of the Freedom struggle was that some who had cooperated with the British gained senior positions by reason of their administrative experience while others who had fought the British were left to their own devices because they had nothing valuable to offer independent India.
“In the midst of his confusion, Arjuna himself understands the reality of what Krsna has indicated. He admits his weakness of heart. He knows that as long as a person thinks he knows, he cannot know the truth.”
Krishna begins by propounding the Vedantic doctrine which Arjuna has heard of and which he knows is a higher wisdom. The Gita is meant for ordinary people. It is a bridge between conventional morality and the higher spirituality. However, because God himself devises a particular soteriological mechanism for ordinary people during this episode, it isn't really an epoche or 'bracketing' for Theists. Atheists can make ridiculous claims about it but then us low IQ dudes probably sound ridiculous if we try to explain electricity or high finance.
“ Similarly, it is not always the case that one’s family, community or country is on the “right” side of the battle.
Because there is an uncorrelated asymmetry. But, at the margin, some 'discovery' has to be done. Not all public signals are alethic.
Thus, while it is true that one does have obligations relative to one’s community, in matters of justice, the moral obligations of right and wrong trump clan and community affiliation.
Only for a Principal, not an Agent. A civilian is welcome to emigrate or, in totalitarian regimes, otherwise escape. A soldier can't sell his gun to the other side because of his moral obligation to pay a hooker.
While the Bhagavad Gita is premised on an extreme version of such a situation, similar situations are not uncommon. What the Arjuna Krishna debate demonstrates is that one can have obligations that transcend one’s close relationships.
Unless one is an Agent.
Thus, as in the previous issue, one must act, but for the right reasons.
A Principal may choose to be an Agent. But that choice does not depend on having right or wrong reasons.
While few people will be put in Arjuna’s situation where they have to physically battle their kinsmen, the Gita does seem to be encouraging its readers to correct and improve one’s community, and that was, at least part of, the appeal of the Gita for Gandhi—it was not just the appeal of the pure theory of “doing one’s duty irrespective of the consequences” as Sen suggests. (Sen 2009, 210)
Gandhi was a Principal. He had some cock-eyed theory and was given money by some shrewd businessmen who did well out of his boycott of foreign cloth and other such shenanigans.
The purpose of this section was to merely introduce some apparent lessons the Gita can provide when considering the question of justice. By putting the ArjunaKrishna debate in the proper context—in the previous section—lessons which Sen ignored can be brought to the fore. By noticing that Arjuna was not really defending a particular theory, concerns other than a sensitivity to consequences can be highlighted. Broadly speaking, the lessons articulated here are connected by two issues, namely impartiality and a self-criticalness.
Neither issue arises in the Gita. Krishna is Arjuna's maternal Uncle. Arjuna does not denigrate himself. He mentions Niyamas and Krishna provides a way to gain immunity from them. That's it. That's the whole story. If you want a theory of Justice out of the Mahabharata then all you have to do is analyze it in terms of Hohfeldian incidents. If you want Econ out of it then the Vyadha and Nalophkyanam provide the relevant normative and game theoretic foundations for the decision theory of Principals. The Gita is for Agents by Agents and isn't decision theoretic. It is therapeutic or gnostic.
By incorporating an impartial perspective and acknowledging one’s own biases—whether personal or communal, and “[t]he Gita [all but] says, ‘…We should point out the lapses of our own people...’”—a particular view of justice seems to follow. (Gandhi 2000, 36-7)
No. A particular type of political rhetoric, not a view of justice, follows. Gandhi wasn't a judge. He tried but failed to set up an indigenous Justice system on the Sinn Fein pattern.
The view of justice that seems to follow from the concerns discussed in this section is one of active involvement that is universal in scope.
If talking bollocks means 'active involvement'- sure.
In other words, one’s moral obligations transcend the boundaries of any particular community and are exacting, a failure to act on one’s duty—broadly construed as moral obligations—is equivalent to supporting injustice.
Which is equivalent to fucking yourself in the ass which is equivalent to slut-shaming the Universe which is equivalent to not having a crafty wank while everybody else is busy with mental masturbation.
My point is that anybody can talk bollocks. Non-informative propositions are all equivalent.
Whether or not the conclusions made here, and derived from the lessons of the Bhagavad Gita, provide a correct, at least partial, theory of justice is an open question.
Let me close it politely but firmly. Joshua's conclusions are ignorant and foolish.
As a matter of fact, not witless conjecture, India has a sizable corpus of both 'Judge made' and statutory laws which we know, by reading relevant auto-biographies etc, were influenced by Hindus cogitating on the Gita. The same is true of the Bible for judgments made by Christians or laws passed by them. Since we can always find that the same consideration- i.e. a Biblical maxim or one from the Gita- militated for opposite judgments or statutes we can safely say that no particular 'idea of Justice' is uniquely associated with either Gospel or Gita. However, Aumann has found game theory among the Sanhedrin and the Nalopkhyanam explicitly depicts the 'Just King' as having to learn statistical game theory to overcome Vishada. In contrast, both the Gospel and Gita are Theistic texts. They celebrate the Personal Lord God and Savior who redeems or ransoms even utter rogues like myself. The fact is, even I will die. That's all the Theodicy any reader of this blog needs. You may deplore my not having died already but be confident it will happen- probably in a more undignified and painful manner than you can whish or hope for. When it does, the God of the Gita will have worked what for me would be his best and finest miracle.
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