The essential asymmetry between the Muslims and Hindus of India arose from the fact that the vast majority of Hindus lived in a compact, contiguous, area where they were the majority. By contrast, the majority of Muslims lived in non-Muslim majority areas. The correct solution to the underlying bargaining problem was for the Muslim League to stipulate for a strong center, an independent judiciary and police force, and the right to mother tongue education in State funded sectarian schools. The Hindus would have agreed to this with some regional variation such that cow slaughter could be banned in some districts with something similar being conceded for the Muslim majority areas.
Sadly, Jinnah and Liaquat were as stupid as Gandhi.
In May 1947, Jinnah issued the following statement
It is utterly mad.
Now the question of partitioning Bengal and the Punjab is raised, not with a ‘bona fide’ object,
It is obvious that if the Hindu minorities in Pakistan wish to emigrate and go to their homelands
A.G Noorani, the distinguished lawyer and constitutional expert, published the following in the Criterion Quarterly in 2019. He was soon to turn ninety years old but wrote as lucidly as ever. His was a voice in the wilderness for many decades. Yet he has lived long enough for his view to become almost mainstream.
Jinnah began as an ardent federalist. The Congress’ lust for absolute power drove him to demand partition. The Cabinet Mission’s Plan of 16 May 1946 for a loose federation provided a sound compromise. He accepted it. The Congress, rather its supreme leader M.K. Gandhi, did not. It preferred partition of India when offered a choice between the partition and the Mission’s plan. In 1946 as in 1937 the Congress was hell bent on monopoly of power in a highly centralized federation.
To be fair, India needed a strong center because the states had to be reorganized on a linguistic basis.
The Cripps Proposals of 30 March 1942 provided for an All-India federation with a right to the Provinces to secede from the Union. It was rejected by both the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim league. But the British had sounded a timely alarm bell. Sir Stafford Cripps was a Constitutional Adviser. Professor Reginald Coupland was a gifted scholar; objective, original and very erudite. His Report on The Constitutional Problem in India was a classic. In 1944 he produced an essay on The Future of India in which he proposed “An Agency Centre” with the Centre endowed with three powers “(1) foreign affairs and defence; (2) external trade or tariff policy; and (3) currency.”
We know that India and Pakistan followed very different diplomatic and military policies. It may be that the Army needed to play a political role in West Pakistan because its civil society was less developed. The big question was whether India could become economically integrated- e.g. free movement of food and no internal 'octroi' or other trade barriers.
He added “REGIONALISM meets half the Moslem claim. It concedes the first demand of the ‘Pakistan Resolution’. It combines those ‘geographically contiguous’ areas in North-West and North-East India in which the Moslems are in a majority and consolidates them as single political units. It provides the Moslems with national homes which they can call their own. They would be autonomous States, not secondary or subordinate units of administration. The government of the Regions and of the Provinces of which they would be composed would cover almost the whole field of public affair, including those which most closely and directly affect the daily life of the people.…
This was the problem. Why should these autonomous states not go in for ethnic cleansing or forcible conversion? Indeed, why should they not go to war with each other?
But it would be a Centre of a new kind, different in the scope of its authority and different in the basis on which that authority would rest, from the Federal Centre as previously contemplated in Indian constitutional discussion. The inter-Regional Centre would possess only those minimum powers which it must possess if the unity of India is to be preserved at all,
But that unity would be meaningless.
and it would exercise those powers not on the direct authority of an all-India electorate but as the joint instrument or agent of the Regions. It would provide the mechanism by which, within that minimal field, the peoples of the Regions could share the governance of their common motherland” – a phrase Jinnah had used in his article in the Time and Tide of London in January 1940 (R. Coupland; The Constitutional Problem in India; Parts 1, 2 and 3; Oxford University Press; 1944; Part III; p. 126).
This would be like the pre-British state of India. Rulers may pretend to be 'Nizams' or 'Nawabs' appointed by a Mughal Emperor who had no power. The East India Company itself was supposedly the agent of that Emperor.
Therefore when on 23 March 1946 a Mission of three members of the British Cabinet arrived in Karachi there existed on the table a sound basis for compromise.
Viz pretending there was a Federal Government in Delhi just as there was supposed to have been a Mughal Emperor there.
The Ministers were Lord Pethrick-Lawrence, Secretary of State for India, Sir Stafford Cripps, President of the Board of Trade, and A.V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty.
The January 1946 elections showed that the Muslim League commanded the votes of the vast majority of Muslims while Congress monopolized Hindu votes. Previously, Congress could believe that the League was just a cat's paw of the British without any real popular support. These dreams were dashed to the ground. The Naval Ratings Mutiny too had shaken up both the Brits and Congress. Power might slip away from them to the Communists.
The Mission held extensive talks with leaders of the Congress, Muslim League and all significant parties. On 27 April 1946 the Mission invited the Presidents of the League and the Congress to send four representatives each and outlined as a “basis of negotiation” on the following principles: “The future constitutional structure of British India to be as follows: A Union Government dealing with the following subjects:- Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications. There will be two groups of Provinces, the one of the predominantly Hindu Provinces and the other of the predominantly Muslim provinces, dealing with all other subjects which the provinces in the respective groups desire to be dealt with in common. The Provincial Governments will deal with all other subjects and will have all the residuary Sovereign rights.”
The Congress President Maulana Azad’s reply was swift (28 April) and revealing. “As you are aware, we have envisaged a Federal Union of autonomous units. Such a Federal Union must of necessity deal with certain essential subjects of which defence and its allied subjects are the most important. It must be organic and must have both an executive and legislative machinery as well as the finance relating to these subjects and the power to raise revenues for these purposes in its own rights. Without these functions and powers it would be weak and disjointed and defence and progress in general would suffer. Thus among the common subjects in addition to Foreign Affairs, Defence Communications, there should be Currency, Customs, Tariffs and such other subjects as may be found on closer scrutiny to be intimately allied to them.”
In other words, the Center needed control of fiscal policy and the Administrative cadre. However, Muslim civil servants and military officers tended to see a brighter future for themselves in Pakistan. When Liaqat was put in charge of Finance he was able to use Muslim civil servants to paralyze Patel who had the Home ministry. This made Partition inevitable. It was clear that the Center would be ineffective unless the League was pushed out of India.
Jinnah’s reply of 29 April cited the Lahore Resolution of 1940 and forwarded a copy of the Resolution by the Muslim League Legislators’ Convention on 9 April 1946. On 29 April the Mission forwarded the agenda for the proposed Conference in Simla on 2 May.
Azad’s letter of 6 May opposed the very principle of grouping. “In our discussions yesterday repeated references were made to “groups” of provinces functioning together, and it was even suggested that such a group would have an executive and legislative machinery. This method of grouping has not so far been discussed by us but still our talks seemed to presume all this. I should like to make it very clear that we are entirely opposed to any executive or legislative machinery for a group of provinces or units of the Federation. That will mean a sub- federation, if not something more, and we have already told you that we do not accept this. It would result in creating three layers of executive and legislative bodies, an arrangement which will be cumbrous, static and disjointed, leading to continuous friction. We are not aware of any such arrangement in any country.”
This was perfectly sensible. The country would have been divided with large non-Muslim populations having been ceded to Pakistan. It was better to give Jinnah less now, rather than more a little down the road simply so as to preserve the fiction of a united India.
Faced with the division of opinions the Mission sent on 8 May:
“SUGGESTED POINTS FOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVES OF CONGRESS AND THE MUSLIM LEAGUE. 1. There shall be an All-India Union Government and legislature dealing with Foreign Affairs, Defence, Communications, fundamental rights and having the necessary powers to obtain for itself the finances it requires for these subjects. 2. All the remaining powers shall vest in the Provinces. 3. Groups of provinces may be formed and such groups may determine the Provincial subjects which they desire to take in common. 4. The groups may set-up their own Executive and Legislatures. 5. The Legislature of the Union shall be composed of equal propositions from the Muslim-majority Provinces and from the Hindu- majority provinces whether or not these or any of them have formed themselves into groups; together with representatives of the States.”
Again, this was unacceptable. The Hindus wanted to dominate the areas where they were the majority. Let the Muslims do the same. Congress had had enough of the Muslims because, it turned out, they were as smart and as demagogic as Congress. Nehru's 'mass contact' program for Muslims had failed. Jinnah had beaten Congress at their own game- at least as far as Muslims were concerned.
The Conference invited both sides to state their offers, which they did on 12 May. The Congress offer read: “1. The Constituent Assembly to be formed as follows:- (i) Representatives shall be elected by each provincial Assembly by proportional representation (single transferable vote). The number so elected should be one-fifth of the number of members of the Assembly and they may be members of the Assembly or others. (ii) Representatives from the States on the basis of their population in proportion to the representation from British India. How these representatives are to be chosen is to be considered later.
Congress knew there were far more Princely states in Hindu majority areas than in Pakistan. They foresaw a permanent stalemate with Princes allying with the League so as to frustrate the majority. This would mean that power would leak away to the Communists.
2. The Constituent Assembly shall draw up a constitution for the Federal Union.
This constitution would have all sorts of reservations for various groups so as to turn the majority into a minority. Congress had played this game before and lost.
In all subsequent discourse to this day little notice has been taken of the Muslim Leagues offer by Jinnah. It was not for partition but for a confederation of India. If approached sincerely he would have agreed to a federation, as he eventually did. It read:
“1- The six Muslim Provinces (Punjab, N.W.F.P., Baluchistan, Sind, Bengal and Assam) shall be grouped together as one group and will deal with all other subjects and matters except Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications necessary for Defence, which may be dealt with by the Constitution-making bodies of the two groups of Provinces – Muslim Provinces (hereinafter named Pakistan Group) and Hindu Provinces – sitting together.
This meant handing over East Punjab and West Bengal to the tender mercies of the League. Assam wanted nothing to do with the scheme because it did not want to be dominated by Bengalis of any type.
2- There shall be a separate Constitution-making body for the six Muslim Provinces named above, which will frame Constitutions for the Group and the Provinces in the Group and will determine the list of subjects that shall be Provincial and Central (of the Pakistan Federation) with residuary sovereign powers vesting in the Provinces.
The Sikhs weren't going to sit quietly while their throats were slit. Congress understood that if it sold out Hindus and Sikhs in Punjab and Bengal just for the mirage of a united India then they would be punished at the polls by both the Hindu Mahasabha as well as the Leftists.
3- The method of election of the representatives to the Constitution- making body will be such as would secure proper representation to the various communities in proportion to their population in each Province of the Pakistan Group.
So the Muslim majority would prevail even over districts where they were the minority. Jinnah overreached himself. The consequence was that the Muslims in Hindu majority areas turned into second class citizens overnight. Worse happened to Sikhs and Hindus in Pakistan but there was always a sword of Damocles hanging over the Indian Muslim in the North.
4- After the Constitutions of the Pakistan Federal Government and the Provinces are finally framed by the Constitution-making body it will be open to any Province of the Group to decide to opt out of its Group, provided the wishes of the people of that Province are ascertained by a referendum to opt out or not.
This is very funny. West Pakistan didn't have proper elections till 1970.
5- It must be open to discussion in the joint Constitution-making body as to whether the Union will have a Legislature or not.
Why not simply give it a nice kennel and some straw to sleep on?
The method of providing the Union with finance should also be left for decision of the joint meeting of the two Constitution- making bodies, but in no event shall it be by means of taxation.
No representation and no taxation! Why not say that in no event should the Union open its mouth or do anything whatsoever?
6- There should be parity of representation between the two Groups of Provinces in the Union Executive and the Legislature, if any.
So that the Muslim minority would be equal to the non-Muslim majority. Sadly, non-Muslims don't think they will do well under such an arrangement.
7- No major point in the Union Constitution which affects the communal issue shall be deemed to be passed in the joint Constitution-making body, unless the majority of the members of the Constitution-making body, of the Hindu provinces and the majority of the members of the Constitution-making body of the Pakistan Group, present and voting, are separately in its favour.
So ethnic cleansing can go ahead and the Union can do nothing about it.
8- No decision, legislative, executive or administrative, shall be taken by the Union in regard to any matter of controversial nature, except by a majority of the three-fourths.
Did Jinnah really think he would get any of this?
9- In Group and Provincial Constitution fundamental rights and safeguards concerning religion, culture and other matters affecting the different communities will be provided for.
10- The Constitution of the Union shall contain a provision whether any Province can, by a majority vote of its Legislative Assembly, call for reconsideration of the terms of the Constitution, and will have the liberty to secede from the Union at any time after an initial period of ten years.
These are the principles of our offer for a peaceful and amicable settlement and this offer stands in its entirety and all matters mentioned herein are inter-dependent.”
Clearly there was considerable play at the joints, as the phrase goes. The document was a first offer by Jinnah, a tough negotiator. Small wonder that he accepted the Mission’s Plan published on 16 May 1946.
Small wonder that the thing was an exercise in futility. Jinnah betrayed the Muslims in Hindu majority areas so as to get a 'moth eaten' Pakistan. The truth is Muslim majority areas were already safe for Muslims. Jinnah's genius was to make his own people unsafe in their ancestral land.
Jinnah issued a long statement on 22 May analyzing the Plan in detail, and left it, without any commitment on his part to the League’s Working Committee and Council to take a final decision.
The Congress Working Committee rejected any compromise on 24 May, criticized the idea of grouping and significantly linked the Plan to any proposals for power sharing in the interim. It said: “There is a marked discrepancy in these two separate provisions, and it would appear that a measure of compulsion is introduced which clearly infringes the basic principle of provincial autonomy. In order to retain the recommendatory character of the Statement, and in order to make the clauses consistent with each other, the Committee read paragraph 15 to mean that, in the first instance, the respective provinces will make their choice whether or not to belong to the section in which they are placed. Thus the Constituent Assembly must be considered as a sovereign body with final authority for the purpose of drawing up a constitution and giving effect to it. …
The Indians had realized that they had to get rid of the Muslim League if they wanted a strong country of their own. The Muslim Bengalis would soon regret having sided with Jinnah. Pakistan itself has now fallen behind Bangladesh economically. Shias feel unsafe there. Ahmadiyas, who were in the forefront of the Pakistan movement, have fared even worse.
Noorani must be aware of all this. Yet for him Jinnah was a genius and Congress was a bunch of fools who were 'lusting power'. What was Jinnah lusting? Powerlessness for people like himself- viz Muslims from Hindu majority provinces.
Partition of Punjab and Bengal was always on the cards if India was to be partitioned. Jinnah was prepared to avoid it.
No he wasn't. His people would have had to work constructively with Congress to solve the problems of the country. They would not do so. Thus partition became inevitable. Congress's Hindu leaders were almost all from Hindu majority areas. It was no skin off their nose if the Hindus in Pakistan got short shrift. They could amply revenge themselves on local Muslims. By contrast, Jinnah and Liaquat stood to lose property in India. Yet they went ahead and slit the throats of the Muslims in Hindu majority areas.
On 16 April 1946 the Cabinet Mission offered Jinnah two alternatives. One was Pakistan “consisting of, say, Sind, North-West Frontier province, Baluchistan, the Muslim majority districts of the Punjab, except perhaps Gurdaspur, Eastern Bengal and the Sylhet District of Assam.” The other was the federation that was proposed finally in the Missions’ Plan.
Jinnah voiced a fear that came true – “If he made a concession, he would have lost it before the negotiations began. It was the Congress who should make a proposal” (Vide A.G. Noorani; Jinnah and Tilak; Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2010; p. 179).
Jinnah had already lost the cause of Muslims like himself- i.e. those from Hindu majority areas. A few could emigrate and do well in the new country. But most faced a miserable future.
The Mission could not persuade Jinnah to make a commitment. On 25 April Jinnah rejected the partition proposal. He was prepared “to consider” the federation proposal “if the Congress were prepared to accept it and if he could be assured of that, he would put it to the Muslim League Working Committee”. Nehru rejected it. What has been overlooked by Indians as well as Pakistanis is the fact that the Muslim League’s offer of 12 May 1946, in a Memorandum embodying Principles to be agreed to as our offer”, did not propose the partition of India but a confederation based, not on a treaty but a binding Constitution.
Which would give Muslims everything and the Hindus nothing.
On 6 June 1946 the Muslim League Council accepted the Mission’s Plan.
This was the magnitude of the concession Jinnah had made.
There was no concession. The truth is that if the League had worked constructively with Congress in the interim Government then and only then could Partition have been avoided. But the League was incapable of doing anything constructive as was proved by the subsequent history of Pakistan.
In a letter to K.M. Munshi on 17 May 1946 Vallabhbhai Patel wrote: “Thank God, we have successfully avoided a catastrophe which threatened our country. Since many years for the first time an authoritative pronouncement in clear terms and conditions has been made against the possibility of Pakistan in any shape or form. The continuous threat of obstruction to progress and the power of veto from obstructionist elements have been once for all removed. The withdrawal of the British Power of Attorney in India is no more in doubt and we are now free to shape our own destiny without hindrance of interference from outside. We are now on the eve of accomplishing our life’s work, and, if we can finish it quickly, nothing would stop us from achieving our final objective.”
Munshi remarked; “It was evident that Sardar was prepared to pay a price for averting the partition of the country, and was willing to share power with the Muslim League” (K. M. Munshi, Pilgrimage to Freedom, Bharatiya Vidya Bhawan; 1967; Vol.1, p. 103).
Why not? Muslims are just as smart as anybody else. If the League and Congress had worked together to address the problems of the country then India could have come up rapidly. Right wing Hindus understood that Islam places a high value on 'tijarat' (free enterprise). The Muslim peasant or artisan is just as hardworking and skillful as the Hindu or the Sikh. What the country needed to do was concentrate on feeding and clothing itself and then rising up as an economic power.
But by then another force was already at work, the Congress’ supreme leader, Gandhi. It was not Nehru’s “outburst” in July that torpedoed the Mission’s Plan. It was Gandhi’s instant rejection. The Volumes of the Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi tell the whole story. They contain the full texts of his articles in his paper Harijan on 20 and 26 May 1946. In his view “there was nothing in it binding in law”. In his view “it is an appeal and an advice”. This, of course, was untrue.
Actually, nothing is binding on any sovereign body. In any case, a law which can't be enforced is no law.
The Missions’ Plan was an offer of compromise which all the sides had to accept. This, the Congress refused to do. Patel’s views changed to be in line with Gandhi’s. His plan was two-fold – Enter the Constituent Assembly and discard the Plan. Enter the Interim Government and demand transfer of power from the British. As early as on 17 May 1946 Gandhi said “The Provinces were free to reject the very idea of grouping”. (CWMG; Vol. 86; p.162).
I suppose Noorani means there was bad faith on both sides. But the difference was that Jinnah's bad faith would endanger his own people whereas the Congress leaders, by and large, were from Hindu majority areas. They had nothing to lose. As a matter of fact, Partition destroyed the power and influence of Muslim in North India. In Kerala, it is true, a Muslim League survived but it had never been separatist.
On 23 May, a week after the Cabinet Mission published its Plan, the Congress held a meeting with the Viceroy. The minutes read: “The meeting considered the draft instructions to be issued by the Viceroy and the Delegation for the election of representatives to the Constituent Assembly.” (Nicholas Mansergh; The Transfer of Power 1942-7, The Cabinet Mission, Volume VII; 1977; page 672). The editors set out para 2 which read: “Any person is eligible for election provided (a)…..(b) that a nomination is accompanied by a declaration (i) that the candidate is willing to serve as a representative of the province for the purposes of paragraph 19 of the Statement and (ii) …” This was sent to the Governors on May 24 (ibid; page 1027).
This bound the candidate to abide by the Mission’s proposals once he became a member of the Constituent Assembly elected under those proposals and for their implementation. Two days later, on 25 May, the Mission issued a statement rejecting the Congress’ interpretation on grouping.
Gandhi was angry when his attention was drawn to the instructions. He was prepared to enter the Assembly; if need be, “it could be turned into a rebel body”. But he now felt, “Even the Constituent Assembly plan now stinks. I am afraid, we cannot touch it.” (Pyarelal: Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase; Navajivan Publishing House; Vol. I; page 234).
Gandhi, like the other Hindu leaders, was slowly giving up the idea of a united India. Previously, Congress could flatter itself that the people did not back the wealthy 'barristocrats' and land-owners of the League. But they had got a nasty surprise when Jinnah and Liaquat turned out to be very effective at mass mobilization. India had changed while the Congress leaders had been locked up. Non-violence and satyagraha were meaningless in a world where vast Armies and powerful new weapons of mass destruction were reshaping the balance of power.
In a “clandestine way, a meeting was engineered on the morning of 23 June with Pethick-Lawrence” at which Patel claimed that the Congress had accepted the Mission’s proposal.
This was the first time that the Cabinet Mission met Vallabhbhai alone – and without Viceroy Wavell. The formula for a compromise that was worked out was as follows: Cripps quickly drafted a sentence on a piece of paper and showed it to Patel. It read ‘for the purposes of the declaration of May 16’ in place of “for the purpose of para 19 of the declaration of May 16’.
According to the official record, the concession was made the next day, on 24 June, when the Mission and the Viceroy met Gandhi and Patel at 8 p.m. Gandhi felt that “by signing the declaration … a member of the Constituent Assembly might be bound morally to accept the Delegation’s interpretation”. Cripps agreed to the deletion (Mansergh; The Transfer of Power, Vol. VII; page 1027). Wavell furiously protested the next day. He wrote: “I consider that there has either been a reversal of policy which has not been agreed, or that the assurance given to Mr. Gandhi is not entirely an honest one” (ibid.; page 1032). Prof. R.J. Moore holds that Wavell “justly described” it as “a dishonest assurance” (Escape from Empire, page 138).
Yes. The whole thing was dishonest. Yet, had Congress and the League worked constructively together then a more honest type cooperation would have been possible. Sadly, 'non-cooperation' had become ingrained in Indian politics. Congress must take some of the blame for that.
The government announced “the elucidation” in a reply to a question by a representative of the Associated Press of India to the effect that the declaration would not include any reference to para 19 (Mahatma Gandhi: Correspondence with the Government 1944-47; Navajivan; page 212).
In his diary Wavell noted that when he said that “the grouping was an essential part of the scheme”, Pethick-Lawrence “asked me not to press the point” (Moon; Wavell’s Journal; page 303). He told Wavell the next day (25 June) that “it would have been a great mistake to have exacerbated Mr. Gandhi on this subject. … if we had pressed the matter it might have kept the Congress from agreeing to the long-term plan…”
The Congress entered the Interim government in August 1946 on the strength of its “acceptance” of the Mission’s Plan, which the British knew was “a fudge”. Not to be left behind, so did the League, in October. But when, at the Congress’ insistence, Wavell asked Jinnah to rescind the League’s resolution of 29 July 1946, withdrawing its acceptance of the Plan, he demanded that the Congress be first asked and first to accept it.
The British government sought to resolve the deadlock by inviting Nehru, Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan and Baldev Singh to London. It issued a statement on 6 December 1946. It provided ample warning of partition unless the Congress accepted the Plan. It said, “The Cabinet Mission have throughout maintained the view that divisions of the sections should, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, be taken by a simple majority vote of the representatives in the sections. This view has been accepted by the Muslim League, but the Congress have put forward a different view…
The truth is that the Congress leaders had emerged from prison into a very different world. Nobody was interested in Hindu-Muslim unity. Moreover, a partitioned Bengal and Punjab would reduce the ability of those two States to dominate Northern India. U.P and Bihar would emerge as the 'King-making' Provinces. But, there is a deep seated animosity against Islam in both places. The urban Punjabi or Bengali is repulsed by this. They consider Hindi written in devanagari to be an uncouth and rustic language. Even the Gujarati has a higher regard for a Persianized vocabulary. But India's future would now be shaped by the 'cow-belt'.
“His Majesty’s Government have had legal advice, which confirms that the statement of 16 May means what the Cabinet Mission have always stated their intention. This part of the statement, as so interpreted must, therefore, be considered an essential part of the Scheme of 16 May for enabling the Indian people to formulate a Constitution which His Majesty’s Government would be prepared to submit to Parliament. It should, therefore, be accepted by all parties in the Constituent Assembly…
“There has never been any prospect of success for the Constituent Assembly except upon the basis of the agreed procedure. Should the constitution come to be framed by a Constituent Assembly in which a large section of the Indian population had not been represented. His Majesty’s Government could not, of course, contemplate – as the Congress have stated they would not contemplate – forcing such a Constitution upon any unwilling parts of the country.”
The “high legal opinion” was an allusion to an extremely well considered written opinion given by none other than the head of the British judiciary, the Lord Chancellor Lord Jowett, dated 2 December 1946. It exposed the utter untenability of the Congress’ “interpretation” (The Transfer of Power, Vol. XI, page 238). The further mention of “unwilling parts of the country” was ominous. It meant partition of India.
The opinion of British judges was scarcely relevant. Where was the machinery for enforcing the law? Wavell himself had said that it had broken down over large parts of the country. When the ethnic cleansing began, how many people were arrested? Was anybody charged and sentenced for the massacres that took place?
On 12 April 1947, the new Viceroy Lord Mountbatten asked Patel if the Congress could accept the Plan “without any reservation.” Patel replied on 26 April by claiming it had. The claim was examined by George Abell, who was familiar with the record, and found to be false. On 1 May 1947, Mountbatten informed London: “Jinnah has some justification to fear that the Congress do not mean to stick to their acceptance.”
As late as On 19 March 1947 – less than three months before the Partition Plan – the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, wrote to the Secretary of State for India, Pethick-Lawrence, that having met Jinnah recently, Colin Reid, correspondent of The Daily Telegraph “got the impression that he might accept the Cabinet Mission’s plan if the Congress accepted it in unequivocal terms”. Mountbatten tried to secure that and failed. The Congress preferred India’s partition to sharing power with the League in a United India.
But the League was crap at ruling Pakistan. Ayub Khan put it out of its misery in 1958. Jinnah left his own people in India in the lurch. But the Pakistan he created could not go down a democratic path. Nobody can share power with stupid and incompetent people.
The pass had been sold by the authors of the Plan in June 1946. In December 1946 they tried to make Nehru see reason but the latter was certain that the League “would come in anyhow”. He was told belatedly that “the League’s interpretation was in fact that intended by the Cabinet Delegation”.
A united India spelt sharing of power with the League. On 10 June 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru told the Cabinet Mission categorically that “The Congress were going to work for a strong Centre and to break the Group System and they would succeed. They did not think that Mr. Jinnah had any real place in the country.” The only way he could be expelled was – by partitioning India. While Jinnah was prepared to accept a united India, the Congress rejected it, led by Gandhi who led from the front at the outset.
Yes. Jinnah's victory was the defeat of his people. The vast majority of Indians decided that Muslims should either keep silent and make themselves useful or they should leave. But Pakistan treated non-Muslims worse. However, there was a religious angle to this. Indians didn't have any religious objection to Muslims they just thought their political contribution was mischievous and unwelcome.
This may change. Why should there not be a technocratic Muslim party in North India competing with caste based 'Samajwadi' parties?
H.M. Seervai’s censure is fair. “It is sad to think that Gandhi’s rejection of the Cabinet Mission’s proposal for an Interim Government, and of the Cabinet Mission Plan, should have had the unfortunate consequence of destroying the unity of a free India for which he had fought so valiantly and so long.” (H.M. Seervai; Partition of India: Legend and Reality; Oxford University Press; Karachi, 2005; p. 182).
There was an interim Government in India from September 1946 till August 1947. Liaquat paralyzed it. This made partition inevitable. Incidentally, J.N Mandal, the League's Law Minister had to flee to India later on. Nothing similar happened to Congress Muslims though some did emigrate for other reasons.
It is hard to disagree with Jinnah’s censure at the conclusion of the Muslim League Council Session at Bombay on 29 July 1946 which withdrew its acceptance of the Missions’ Plan. “The Congress had accepted their proposals conditionally, and the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy had committed a flagrant breach of faith. Any honest or self- respecting man could see clearly that the only party which came out honourably from the negotiations was the Muslim League. When the League accepted their proposals they did it deliberately and with full responsibility, and they accepted the statement of 16 May, the statement of 25 May and the original formula for the Interim Government.
“I think that if there is any man who has got any self-respect or honesty or any sense of fairness and justice to himself, he would say that the Muslim League was moved by higher and greater considerations than any other party in India.
By the time Jinnah died, nobody shared this view. Pakistan was a shit-show.
“The League, throughout the negotiations, was moved by a sense of fairplay and sacrificed the full sovereign state of Pakistan at the altar of the Congress for securing the independence of the whole of India. They voluntarily delegated three subjects to the Union, and by doing so did not commit a mistake. It was the highest order of statesmanship that the League displayed by making concession.” (Jamiluddin Ahmad, Speeches and writings of Mr. Jinnah Sh. Muhammad Ashraf; 1947, Vol. 2; p. 315)
Statesmanship involves making the State better at serving the people. The interim Government did not do this. Nor did the Muslim League when it ran Pakistan. Nobody now thinks that Jinnah and Liaquat were 'statesmen'. They left their own people in the lurch and then made a hash of governing Pakistan.
In 1947 the Congress was blinded by the same ambition that drove it to spurn Jinnah’s offer of cooperation in 1937. It refused to share power with the Muslim League in 1946 even if it spelt the break-up of India’s unity.
This is the crux of the matter. Non-Muslims in North India don't feel that Muslim political organizations have anything to offer them. This does not mean Muslim politicians can't succeed on the basis of offering better governance. But it does mean that Muslim political parties are seen as merely a way to split the Muslim vote in a tactical manner in selected constituencies. I think right-wing Congress politicians hoped to gain support from influential 'Ashraf' Muslims for free-market policies. However, the economic backwardness of most Muslims meant they tended to become the silent partner in cynical caste based coalitions of a populist type.
It could well have realized its plan for a centralized federation in Group A of the Missions Plan which comprised the India of today. Eventually it did just that; but after wrecking India’s unity. As Sir Chimanlal Setalwad wrote: “It is futile to attempt to hide the naked truth by saying that force of circumstances has compelled the Congress to accept the partition of India and they had to submit to the inevitable. The circumstances were of their own creation, and what had once been warded off was made inevitable by their own deeds. The cherished boon of a united India had fallen into the lap, but they by their own want of political wisdom threw it out and made it beyond their reach.'
This is sheer nonsense. Liaquat was so clever that he posed as a Leftist prepared to tax the Hindu bania out of existence. This was an existential threat to Congress. Naturally, they showed 'political wisdom' by chasing these silly people out of the country. Muslims, as an organized political community, would never again play a role in North Indian politics. That may not have been an entirely good thing for Hindus. Muslims may have voted for free market policies.
In Kerala and Tamil Nadu, Muslims played a constructive role. Hindus vote for the Kerala Muslim League if they put up a better candidate. But orthodox people will even vote Communist if they perform better. That is as it should be. Politics is not about the letter of the Law. It is about doing sensible things and working together harmoniously. No doubt, one can say 'Gandhi was a cretin. Motilal was a fool. Rajaji babbled nonsense' and so forth. But one can't say that these leaders betrayed their own people so as to gain high office. After Independence, Congress leaders showed enough esprit de corps to provide stable, relatively clean, democratically elected administrations to India. There was no military coup or Communist uprising. The Hindus benefited because Parliament was able to reform Hindu law and suppress feudal habits of mind. The Muslims in the North, it must be confessed, lost power and influence and may have now fallen behind Dalits in some places. This isn't their fault. It was the fault of the clever barristocrats- Jinnah, Liaquat etc- whom they unwisely supported.
Still, it is nice to see Noorani doing a hatchet job on Nehru and Gandhi and so forth. The BJP may not have anyone of equal caliber for similar work. However, it must be admitted that Congress was the Hindu party par excellence and, when it finally lost patience with Jinnah, it delivered what the Hindus wanted. That's about as much as you can ask for in a democracy.
No comments:
Post a Comment