Was the American loss of Myanmar inevitable?

 Eight years ago, Foreign Policy magazine carried an article titled 'Has China lost Myanmar?' Last year, the Diplomat magazine asked the opposite question. Today, we can all agree that China has won. America gave Xi a walk-over. It had imposed punitive sanctions, under the Magnitsky Act on the Army Chief and some other senior officers in 2019 with the result that the Burmese military had to made a choice. Either yield power to Aung San Suu Kyi's party- which won the elections by a landslide but which hoped to gain leverage against the Army by yielding economically to China- or else dispense with the pretense of Democracy while becoming China's partner in the region. It was inevitable that they would choose China and wave goodbye to America once the Chinese themselves chose to come down hard on pro-democracy movements.

Might things have been different if Hillary had taken the White House? After all, Myanmar was considered a triumph of Obama's 'pivot to Asia' strategy. The Burmese were angry at China's exploitation of its natural resources as well as wary of its historical support for separatist militias. Urban youth was attracted by American 'soft power' and the shiny new Center they had built near Suu Kyi's house. But, China remained Myanmar's biggest trading partner. American f.d.i did not materialize. The notion that Facebook and Google and Microsoft would open campuses in Myanmar appeared a pipe dream. Then the Rohingya problem hit international headlines and Suu Kyi herself became a hate figure in the West. Meanwhile the Chinese had formed a new equation with the military (which the US decided not to do joint exercises with) and showed it could help them deal with insurgent militias whom China had previously supported. This was a development of great significance. Many had expected the Chinese to punish Myanmar for getting cozy with Obama by supporting such insurgencies. Instead they played the long game offering somewhat better trade and other economic deals than had previously been the case. Furthermore, Wikileaks had shown that some 'Civil Society' opposition within Myanmar was actually paid for by America- e.g. the outcry against the Myistone dam. In other words, if China for some crazy ideological or geopolitical reason was prone to working in mischief in Myanmar, so was America. The difference was America was far away. China was and would remain the big dog in the neighborhood. It was better to show them, unambiguously, that you were their client rather than keep up the pretense of 'transitioning to democracy'. 

Myanmar's adhesion to China may appear the first unambiguous loss of the Biden administration though, of course, no blame attaches to him personally. Its significance lies in the fact that China now has two dependable overland routes- one through Pakistan and one through Myanmar to the Indian Ocean thus bypassing the Malacca straits. Since China can easily lift up Myanmar economically by supplying infrastructure and building giant factories, the ruling Junta may be able to deliver 'Tiger' style growth as compensation for an authoritarian style of functioning. 

Will Biden act quickly to counter China's recent push to woo Vietnam? More importantly will he make nice with Duterte to extend the Visiting Forces Agreement which is vital to America's force projection capability in the region? China is using 'vaccine diplomacy' and other inducements. More importantly, it is not interested in human rights. Will it backpedal on 'Wolf Warrior' diplomacy so as to secure its long term geopolitical interests? Perhaps. COVID has increased Chinese self-confidence while showing America in a poor light. This is Xi's moment. Biden may rise to the occasion but then again his own domestic problems may bog him down. If that happens, then America's soft power disappears. It can sanction anyone it likes and nobody will take a blind bit of notice. After all, if its own commentariat is to be believed, it is itself at great risk of turning in to a Fascist state.