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Saturday, 22 August 2020

Prashant Iyengar on Bhushan's Contempt


I have frequently vented my hatred of Iyengars in this blog. Those bastards look nice, tend to be slim, and are smart. Thus they are preventing elderly Tambram Iyers like me from getting not just Educationally Backward but Mentally Fucking Retarded, Missing Link in the Evolutionary chain, status. Indeed, we should be classified as 'Special Needs' right away.  

However some Iyengars are not smart at all. Prashant Iyengar, an Indian lawyer, who is doing a PhD at Columbia, is a case in point. He writes in the Wire re. the Bhushan contempt case

in this article, I approach the decision from the lens of political theory and suggest, firstly, that we need to read this decision as an instance of judicial ‘violence’ by the Supreme Court;

Why stop there? Why not say it is an instance of judicial rape and genocide and 'soul murder' of a Satanic type? Is it not a fact that Bhushan was held down and sodomized by the Bench? Venugopalan pleaded with the Judges, with tears streaming from his eyes, to at least give Prashant a reach around. But the Bench ignored the Attorney General who has a right of audience and thus gets to hear the shrieks of Bhushans as they are anally raped again and again and again by heartless judges who, let me tell you, make highly insensitive remarks about the condition of Bhushan's poor battered rectum.  

and secondly, that, more than just legal reform, the path towards rehabilitation of the court may entail a broader recognition of the inherently ‘political’ nature of justice.

May? Nay. Must. In a Constitutional Democracy, 'rehabilitating' a branch of Government is a political process. Furthermore, Justice serves a political purpose as well as an economic and moral one. There is no theory of jurisprudence which neglects the political dimension of the Judiciary. Consider the establishment of the UK Supreme Court. It was done for a political reason so as to bring the UK into conformity with European practice. 

Iyengar is clearly a cretin. He thinks there is no broad recognition of the political dimension of justice. Why? How shite is Columbia University?  

For roughly half the judgment’s length, the court wonders whether any statutory procedures could fetter its power to punish for contempt.

The answer is no. If the offense exists then so does the right of suo moto cognizance. Indeed, the relevant statute explicitly gives the Court greater powers of detention in suo moto rather than Attorney General certified cases. 

Can, for instance, a law like the Contempt of Court Act 1971 regulate the manner in which contempt cases are brought before the SC? Would the SC be bound by the statutorily prescribed maximum punishment for contempt (currently six months imprisonment)? This was an important question to resolve since, in taking up Bhushan’s case, statutory procedure had not been strictly followed.

That is not the law of the land. Whatever procedure the Court thinks is fair is the correct procedure.  If the Legislature does not like it, they can amend the Constitution. But this might violate its 'Basic Structure'. We have entered the realm of Res Integra. What we know for certain is the Bench's ruling is the law. This may be challenged but then again it may not.

Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court fails to discover any legitimate constraints over its contempt power. The court describes its power to punish for contempt as ‘inherent’, but the word it really wants to use is ‘absolute’. 

 Nonsense! The Bench does not pretend to have any 'absolute' power. It says its own power must be exercised in a particular way. That right is inherent. It can't be absolute because if it were then it could be exercised in a manner the Bench itself thinks unfair and prejudicial to the common good. 

Can the Supreme Court punish someone for contempt by hanging them, or ordering a public stoning?

No. Why? The punishment is disproportionate and violates the Bench's own notions of fairness.  

Although the court does not consider these questions pointedly, the logic of the Supreme Court’s decision, issued on independence-eve, suggests that not even the fundamental rights of citizens would so constrain the Supreme Court. They simply do not register as relevant considerations.

Says a stupid Iyengar whose brains have rotted away because he is doing a PhD in a shite subject at Columbia. 

I may with equal justice write ' Although Iyengar does not consider these questions pointedly, the logic of his article, issued in American citizen Varadarajan's shitzine, suggests that not even the fundamental rights of Iyengars would so constrain Vardarajan as to leave this poor boy's anal cherry intact. The disgusting condition Iyengar rectums does not even register as a relevant consideration.'

What follows in the second half of the decision, is a tedious precis of every major decision by the Supreme Court on its contempt ‘power’. We learn that the Supreme Court has an unfaltering record of justifying the exercise of its contempt jurisdiction. On every occasion it has punished someone for contempt, it has self-certified its actions as impartial, and calculated to restore ‘public confidence’ in the judiciary. Carefully conforming to this tradition, the court pronounced Bhushan guilty in this case.

Clearly, reading this between the lines in the light of the critical political theory, Iyengar has written this only because he is being incessantly sodomized by Varadarajan. What follows in the second half of his article is a tedious precis of every anal violation committed by that fat Iyer fuck on this poor trembling Iyengar. Obviously, you have to read all this between the lines only because this Iyengar is a cretin who has had all the brains buggered out of him at Columbia. Thus he writes in the only manner he has been accustomed to write though feeling great shame and pain at the contemptuous and criminal manner in which his anal cherry has been lost to the swinish Varadarajan who, like the Bench in the case of the other Prashant, refused even to give the fellow a reach around.  

Leaving aside the many defects in the court’s legal reasoning, I would like to focus analysis on two rhetorical features of the court’s decision.

There are no defects in the reasoning though the writing is vile. The fact is this was egregious contempt. Bhushan will get a suspended sentence- because he may profit politically from a spell of porridge- and may be barred from appearing before the Supreme Court for a year- as happened to another advocate in a similar case.  

Firstly, the decision is constructed as a search and discovery of the court’s ‘power’ to punish for its contempt.

No. The decision is constructed in the usual way- i.e. expounds the relevant law so as to arrive at the ratio. 

'Discovery' is a term of art. None was required in this case. Furthermore the Kurle case was fresh in everyone's memory- though Bhushan, cretin that he is, thought it favored him which is why Kurle asked leave to intervene lest Bhushan's incorrect reliance on an in curiam judgment prejudicially affect Kurle. 

Iyengar, though an Indian lawyer, appears as innocent as a babe about all this legal palaver. Poor fellow, we  must read between the lines. His ass is very sore. Perhaps publishing this in the Wire is Varadarajan's way of offering a symbolic reach-around. At least, this is what a sufficiently advanced Political Theory would suggest.  

I would like to suggest, however, that the word ‘power’ does not accurately describe what the court discovered.

Yes, yes. We know. Bench was buggering Bhushan. Then a wormhole in Bhushan's anus caused Bench to be transported to Imaginationland where Iyengar was being raped by Varadarajan. Then Karl Marx came down from Heaven. He gave Iyengar a lollipop. The word 'power' does not accurately describe what Iyengar discovered when he put the lollipop in his mouth. It was a penis. Sad.  

When courts sentence convicts to imprisonment or even death, we do not customarily describe this, in criminal terms, as a ‘kidnapping’ or a ‘murder’.

But only because Karl Marx's lollipop turned out to be a penis. Otherwise, for sure, Iyengar would describe being sent to jail as 'kidnapping' and 'rape' as 'unsolicited sperm donation' and a PhD from Columbia in a shite subject as being some sort of accolade rather than a certificate of cretinism.  

What distinguishes the court’s action in these cases is a fiction that it is not acting individually, but representatively on behalf of the community.

Nonsense! What distinguishes the Court's actions is their legal nature and their punitive effects of a real, not fictitious, kind.  

In Bhushan’s case, however, I think grounds exist to withdraw this fiction.

What Iyengar thinks is grounds to consider him a cretin. 

In the name of exercising judicial ‘power’, it would appear that the Supreme Court has armed itself with the license to judicial violence. 

The Bench hangs people. D'uh! 

In her celebrated monograph On Violence, the philosopher Hannah Arendt usefully distinguishes ‘violence’ from ‘power’.

Arendt knew shit about the Law. Everybody usefully distinguishes violence from power. If you use violence against somebody with more power, you get fucked over. Arendt wasn't stupid. She ran away from Nazi violence coz she had no power. She settled in the USA which had a lot of power and which fucked over the Nazis who had less. To make a little money, she wrote stupid shite- e.g. “Power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy . . . Violence can destroy power; it is utterly incapable of creating it”

Did the US listen to this stupid woman? No. It hired smart mathematicians to develop Game Theory. Violence does not matter. Threat points do. Sadly those who lack 'Rational Expectations' are going to fuck up. But a nice stretch of porridge calms them down a treat. 

There are three features of her account of violence that, I find, easily attach to what the Supreme Court calls its contempt ‘power’. 

But they also attach to Iyengars being sodomized by Varadarajan and then a wormhole in his rectum opens up and he is sucked into Imaginationland where Karl Marx offers him a lollipop- but it isn't a lollipop at all! Sad.  

Firstly, for Arendt, while power seeks ‘legitimation’ from the founding decisions of a community, violence seeks ‘justification’ from an end that lies in the future.

This was clearly untrue. People or countries which were attacked retaliated with greater violence, if they had greater power. The 'justification' was in the past. Hitler killed Jews because he said they had 'stabbed Germany in the back' in the past. Arendt was wrong about Stalin and Mao and so forth. They all said they were avenging the past crimes of Class Enemies and Saboteurs and Left Adventurists or Right Deviationists etc. etc. Why is violence justified in terms of the past, not the future? The answer is that this is the 'bourgeois strategy' in Hawk Dove. It is robust unlike any other solution concept under Knightian Uncertainty. The Aumann correlated equilibrium could be eusocial and Muth Rational. Hannah's Aunt may have fucked Heidegger but she had shit for brains. Still, fucking Heidi was a big deal back then- for people with shitty Doctorates in shite subjects. 

Actually, one could use the concept of 'oikeiosis' to describe this game theoretic finding in the language of the Liberal Arts. But why bother? Them guys be cretins.

Tellingly, she notes, “Violence can be justifiable, but it never will be legitimate”.

Nonsense! The State may be defined as that which has the monopoly of legitimate coercion or violence. Oikeiosis is about giving life, and life as belonging to something or being able to appropriate something, but it is also about ending life. The philosopher who has paid his debts may be allowed to kill himself in a manner Society considers legitimate. But then again, he may not. It depends of which theory of oikeiosis is considered to be compatible with the prevailing eusebia.

In our present context, it bears reflection whether in the name of seeking legitimation for its actions, the Supreme Court is really justifying itself by citing the abstract need to secure ‘public confidence’ in the judiciary.

Why did Iyengar not protect himself from such rape and molestation as we, reading between the lines of his article because we are properly guided by a superior understanding of Hannah's Aunt, inevitably must pity him for suffering? Was Iyengar consenting to his own degradation? By citing the abstract need to write stupid shite in the Wire, is not Iyengar shoving his own head up his rectum so as to receive Karl Marx's lollipop in his mouth? But it isn't really a lollipop is it? Sad. 

Secondly, in Arendt, “Violence appears where power is in jeopardy”.

But also where it isn't in jeopardy coz some peeps be gangsta. Power often fucks off from where it is in jeopardy and isn't making a profit. One day, Karl Marx's lollipop will stop thrusting into Iyengar's greedy little mouth. Sad.  

It is what regimes have to resort to when they become insecure about their legitimacy.

No. Regimes which are proactively violent when they are feeling most secure don't have these complexes. The Stationary Bandit can do well out of violence. After it has secured its powerbase, it can do mechanism design and shear the sheep rather than just stealing and eating them. 

Lurking beneath the court’s reasoning last week, in the way it skirts Bhushan’s voluminous charges, might we not read a tacit acknowledgement that it is really quite a ‘power’less institution? That public confidence in it is at such a low-ebb that only spectacular violence of this kind can secure its foothold?

What 'spectacular violence' is this cunt talking about? Advocate Nedumpara got a three month suspended sentence. Why the big boo hoo?  

Lastly, in Arendt’s conception, violence is essentially arbitrary and for this reason, it has seldom been theorised.

Arendt was publishing this slow witted shite after Wohlstetter and Kahn and Dr. Strangelove and so forth had buried Eisenhowerian ad hocism in the arena of Nuclear doctrine. Game theory does not see violence as arbitrary at all. The thing is a purely economic phenomenon in the animal kingdom as well as throughout human history. 

Iyengar could have studied something useful at Columbia. Instead he has become stupider than when he first left India. 

When a hyena mauls a fawn, one can react with horror, disgust, or anger, but it is pointless to analyse this violence.

Fuck off! Ethologists must analyse this. How much energy is the hyena expending? How much is it getting in return? Zahavi showed 'stotting' behavior was eusocial. There's a reason hyenas are carrion eaters. Stuff like this is game theoretic and can be immediately adapted for 'Law and Econ'. The first draft of the Goodwin 'Class Struggle model'- which was developed in India with Haldane's help- was adapted from Lotka-Volterra predator-prey model. 

No wonder Indian lawyers are so shit. The subject attracts cretins. Apparently, Bhushan got into Princeton to study Philosophy!

There are no principles it observes. One might say the same of the arbitrary and absolute contempt jurisdiction that the Supreme Court has articulated in this case. Much of the response to the decision has, consequently, taken the form of anger and disappointment.

Bhushan has been badgering and browbeating the Bench for years because he has political ambitions. Why should he not get the sort of sentence Nedumpara got?  

That public confidence in it is at such a low-ebb that only spectacular violence of this kind can secure its foothold?

What violence? Was Bhushan held down and sodomized by the Bench? But if so, the thing happened in Imaginationland where Iyengar himself is being violated in all sorts of very horrible ways. Is public confidence in Varadarajan's The Wire at such a low ebb that only the spectacular violence he inflicts on the anal cherry of this trembling Iyengar can secure him a foothold up his own now very capacious arse?  

Let me turn to a second important rhetorical feature of this decision. Contempt cases are possibly the most pleasurable forms of adjudication that the Supreme Court indulges in.

Yes, yes. We know. They sodomize the contemnor while the Attorney General looks on weeping tears of anguish. 

In each case of this kind, behind the sombre facade of having to determine a contemnor’s guilt, the court really gifts itself an occasion to unabashedly and publicly adore itself.

Very true. They are constantly taking selfies of themselves while riding Bhushan ragged.  

Thus the Supreme Court announces, in this judgment, that it is an institution engaged in the business of ‘upholding the majesty of the law’, of ‘delivering fearless and impartial justice’, that it is the ‘guardian of the rule of law’, and that it is not just “any pillar”, but the ‘central pillar’ of the democratic state.

Iyengar has suffered a lot from 'pillars' being thrust up his butt in Imaginationland. Hopefully Kamala Harris will adopt him and prevent his repatriation to India where the Bench will certainly have its wicked way with him.

It is the ‘overseer’ of the executive and the legislature and is responsible to ensure that they act within the framework of the constitution.

True enough. That is the law of the land. Iyengar should get refugee status in the US because we all know what type of 'overseer' the Bench is. Look at the spectacular violence they have unleashed on Bhushan! You know what they say about Prashants. Buggering one is never enough. Begin with a Bhushan and you end with an Iyengar.

It would be vain to try to dispute any of these convictions.

But vanity is not in short supply amongst 'Doctoral candidates' who write shite for the Wire.  

Instead, I would like to direct attention to a troubling suggestion – that the immense institutional narcissism that these statements evince is affirmed continuously by extrinsic sources.

e.g Bhushan's bunghole which is dripping with cum. 

Specifically, this narcissism is nourished by a scholarly, journalistic, literary and cinematic discourse of ‘judicial exceptionalism’. At least since independence, but possibly even longer, we have trafficked in a particular discourse about the Supreme Court that anoints it as exceptional – both in the activity in which it engages and its relation to other institutions. It is the invisible hand of this discourse, along with the judge’s pens, that convicts Bhushan.

When Iyengar writes 'pens' we know he means penises. 

It is true that the Bhushans and various other fuckwits tried to pretend that the Indian Bar and the Indian Bench weren't utterly shite back in the Eighties. But since the 'common man' has little dealing with either, nobody gave a shit. That is why Kejriwal could boot the Bhushans out of AAP. 

Can Bhushan win enough publicity for himself to get a Rajya Sabha ticket out of some Political Party? Maybe. Who knows.  But the thing does not matter in the slightest. That's the trouble with 'discourse'. Money talks. Bullshit walks. Econ matters. The Law does not. It gets disintermediated if it is utterly shite. 

Let me list merely three features of this discourse, and the role they have played in convicting Bhushan. Alongside, I offer a few feeble suggestions for discursive amendments that we need to undertake. Absurdly, this seems more attainable than legal reform. 

Bhushan was convicted because Nedumpara was convicted. Why was Nedumpara convicted? Because he went after the Narimans. But what percentage of Indians gives a shit about Nedumparas and Narimans? 0.00001 percent. But they were having a shit anyway and why not dump your load in the name of Bhushan? What else is the cunt good for?  

Firstly, it has been an effect of this discourse that we think of justice as the exclusive province of the judiciary.

Nonsense! We think of the judiciary as providing a remedy for unjust deprivation of Hohfeldian entitlements and immunities. But Courts may be crap. So we find other mechanisms or go jurisdiction shopping. 

The executive may deliver services and parliament may pass laws, but we get ‘justice’ solely from the judiciary.

Fuck off! I got plenty of justice from my Mummy who would beat the shit out of me if I didn't score well on my Math exam. 

Only when one begins with such an exclusionary conception of the site of ‘justice’, could it follow that criticism of the judiciary equates to an attack on the ‘majesty of justice’.

This is not the case. Majesty is another word for Sovereignty which in turn means one has a Hohfeldian immunity with respect to a self-regarding action. I may say 'my home is my castle.' Within it I may do what I consider best for myself. There may be some limitations on this sovereignty but those are of the same sort that limit actions by the Bench. It too is sovereign in the sense that it is not subject to review or held to account by a superior power in connection with any self-regarding action. To use the language of Kripke, we may say that the Indian Judiciary is a protocol bound, 'buck stopped', decision process. The buck stops with the Bench. What it says, goes. But everybody has some Hohfeldian immunity where the same can be said. There is no 'judicial exceptionalism'. India, it is true, over the last 30 years, has tended to have a weaker 'doctrine of political question' or 'executive privilege' or 'exigent circumstances'. This has suited political parties which want to steer clear of 'wedge issues'. But, the times may change. The Bench may draw in its horns. Something like the Pakistani 'doctrine of necessity' may come into vogue. But, no matter what happens, the fact remains that India is very very poor. Justice is merely a service industry- a very badly run one. It is not 'adding value' because lawyers are crooks and judges are cretins. So it simply does not matter. 

When we criticise politicians or bureaucrats, by contrast, ‘the majesty of justice’ does not seem to be imperilled.

But they too have remedies available to them which may be more, not less, effective.  

As a countermeasure, I think it is very important that we discursively redistribute the ‘justice function’ more equally among the executive and legislature.

Why stop there? Why not include Religious and Social bodies? What about khap panchayats? Why not revive the Smarta Vicharam? How about Sharia Courts? Or, if want to come across as libertarian- let every Corporation itself have a judicial function. 

Currently, the Executive has some 'effective' and the Legislature some residuary judicial functions. But there are very good reasons why we don't want to increase either. Judges may be stupid but they do know the law. 

Justice must be depicted as the default activity that every organ of the government is charged with doing, and we ought to have the license to rebuke them for their failure in doing so. This is not to be read, however, as implying that the executive and legislature should be allowed to punish for their contempt. 

But why exercise a function unless you are paid extra to perform it? How much fun is it being rebuked by all and sundry? What happens when you try to exercise a judicial function and are told to go fuck yourself? What if people start tweeting your address and pictures of your little daughter? 

A Vinculum Juris linking rights to remedies under a bond of law is simply a economic mechanism like any other. At the margin, it is either incentive compatible- i.e. the obligation holder has an incentive to provide the legally mandated remedy- or it is wholly ineffective. 

Indian Lawyers, it seems, are too stupid to understand this. Or maybe they are simply bullshitting in a cynical manner.

Secondly, it has been an effect of this discourse that we think of the activity of justice as something that stands apart from and above the messy business of politics.

Iyengar speaks as though India- a very poor country- is exactly like America. This is foolish.  

What politicians do is regarded as inherently partisan and in need of overseeing by the judiciary. It is only when one starts with such an impossibly pristine expectation for ‘justice’, that insinuations of political collaboration, such as those made by Bhushan, would ‘diminish the dignity’ of the judiciary. To rival this conception, we may need to popularise an insight, arrived at by the patient work of a generation of critical legal scholars and feminist theorists, that ‘justice’ is inherently and always ‘political’ – even in its best moments, and whether delivered by the judiciary, the executive or parliament.

So what? We may, as politicians, want to have a mechanism to avoid making political decisions. We want to kick the can down the road by pretending it is sub judice. The problem with 'critical legal theory' is that it is paranoid nonsense. It is directly competing with guys in tin foil hats. There's no point paying for crazy when you can always get crazy for free.  

In the context of Bhushan’s case, the advantage of acknowledging the judiciary’s political existence is that it would enable us to re-conceive criticism directed against the institution as political dissent, rather than contempt.

Political dissent is to say the Judiciary should be abolished or subordinated to something else. That isn't contempt. But one who is promoting this type of dissent may choose to scandalize the court so as to advance his agenda. He has the motive. But it is up to the Court to decide whether what he publishes has this tendency.  

Constitutionally, political dissent has always enjoyed a longer leash than contempt.

There is no relationship between the two. I may speak approvingly of the blow struck for Gay Rights by the Bench joyously sodomizing a grateful Bhushan. But such speech might well be considered criminal contempt. By contrast, I may demand a Gandhian Utopia without Courts or Armies while testifying to the wise and dignified manner in which a particular Courts conducts proceedings.  

Once again, this ought not to normalise an easy relationship between judges and politicians.

Judges and politicians are welcome to have 'easy relationships'. They may sodomize each other in a respectful and courteous fashion. Iyengar may be too prudish to agree, yet such is the law of the land. 

But it ought not to occasion punishable ‘scandal’ when politicians and judges are spoken about as collaborators.

Why not? A Scandal is something which is a stumbling block to Faith in a person or Institution. It is the case that Scandalizing the Bench is an offense in India just as it is in Scotland. Laws ought to be implemented where they apply. It is a different matter that the Legislature may want to change those Laws or that the Bench may decide they are unconstitutional.  

Lastly, one effect of this discourse is that it constructs the judiciary as the sole institution that the public can really turn to for relief with ‘confidence’.

Then this discourse does not exist anywhere in the world. People rely with 'confidence' on Mummy and Daddy and Teacher and Police Man etc, etc.  

It is commonplace, for instance, within legal scholarship to flatter the Supreme Court as a ‘people’s court’.

I am not aware of any such scholarship. 

If parliaments are appointed by public election, this discourse implies that the judiciary in India is no less elected by ‘public confidence’.

This is quite mad. Judges in India are not elected.  Iyengar's preferred discourse is less connected to reality than one concerning his head being up his anus in Imaginationland and then Karl Marx offers him a lollipop- but it isn't a lollipop at all. Sad. 

Little surprise then, that the court regards any attempts at ‘shaking’ this confidence as insurrectionary.

Insurrectionary? How ignorant is this moron? There was a Naxal insurrection during which Judges were killed. They immediately backed the fuck away from any type of involvement. Extrajudicial killing on an industrial scale occurred in the Sixties, the Seventies, the Eighties, the Nineties...and the thing could still come back.  

Against this notion, let me suggest that we need to normalise the notion that the Indian public permanently ‘lacks confidence’ not just in the judiciary, but in any institution.

In which case they lack confidence in cunts like Iyengar and whichever shite branch of Academia he hangs from by his tail. The Press is shite. So is everything else.  

That this suspicion is primordial, and has its roots in our struggles against colonial power.

Why did Ireland and Egypt get independence in the early Twenties but not India? It is because our struggles weren't against the colonial power at all. The British Umpire was welcome to stay. It only departed when it couldn't make a profit on running the show.  

And that far from being a threat to our democracy, this suspicion might, in fact, serve as a source of vitality for our post-colonial republic.

Yes, yes. We know. Suspicion is definitely a source of vitality. Plants and animals require plenty of suspicion to thrive.

Stupid economists think countries and peoples need money to buy nice shiny stuff. Iyengar knows better. Suspicion is the way to go.  

Other publics in other countries may be lulled into professing ‘confidence’ in their institutions, but our historical experience has schooled us to never be so naive.

Says a naive cretin who went to Law School in India before going to Columbia. 

Within a milieu of such institutional hostility, Bhushan’s tweets could never truly ‘shake’ the confidence of the Indian public – it was already and irretrievably ‘shooken’ from the start and has never really stopped.

Iyengar is being naive. Indians are so suspicious that they don't think tweets exist. Must be it is just Maya- Cosmic Illusion- isn't it?  

Can a republic, much less a judiciary, survive when the ‘foundations of its edifice’ are ‘eroded’?

Yes. Even if its fundament gets pounded it can survive. Indeed, it may enjoy the experience.  

This is an anxiety that appears to nag the court.

Iyengar may also like to nag the court with various anxieties he really ought to have. One such is, who will employ this cretin? 

They needn’t fear, though. As a stroll through any Indian slum would tell us, life continues obstinately even amidst ruins.

So there you have it. The Courts can put all anxiety aside as Iyengars saunters through the slums- not cruising for rough trade, as you might think- but seeking...what exactly? 

It has no alternate existential modality.

OMG! Nobody told Iyengar that death is one of life's alternative existential modalities. He believes he is immortal! The truth is being very very fucking sick is another existential modality of life. After that death beckons. Saunter not through the slums young Iyengar! Save your anal cherry for an episode of Indian Matchmaking on Netflix. I'll be cheering for you. Mind it kindly. Aiyayo!

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