Kit Fine on Transparency in Metaphysics

I thought Aristotle's notion of the 'indefinite diaphanous' disappeared along with the aether. Has it been resurrected?

Kit Fine, writing recently on the nature of Metaphysics, has appealed to the notion of 'transparency'.

(Apart from aprioricity & generality) the concepts of metaphysics are also distinguished by their transparency. Roughly speaking, a concept is transparent if there is no significant gap between the concept and what it is a concept of. Thus there is a significant gap between the concept water and the substance H2O of which it is a concept but no significant gap between the concept identity and the identity relation of which it is a concept.

This sounds like the 'primitive notion' or 'undefined term' of Tarski. It's something we all understand and in terms of which we define other things in our universe of discourse.

Is Fine defining 'transparency' in relation to the primitive term 'concept'? The problem here is that there could already be a concept of transparency- indeed there may be several each of which may claim to be the only coherent one. Each of these may dispute that a 'gap' exists between itself as a concept and as a possible 'primitive notion'.

The thought then is that the concepts of metaphysics are more akin to the concept of identity than that of water. 

The problem here is that there is nothing in metaphysics which militates for consensus re. 'the concept of transparency' or even 'the concept of concept'. Defining transparency in relation to 'concept' (with the latter being a primitive term) does not help us thin things out intensionally. Everything remains as opaque as ever.

Perhaps there is another way of looking at this.

Let us see what Fine means by 'identity' and 'identity relation'-

 ...we need to get clearer on the relata , on what is a foundation for what, and on the relation, in what way the one relatum is a foundation for the other.

If transparency is a feature of concepts in metaphysics why do we need to get clearer on anything? What if, not transparency but occlusion is a feature of such concepts? Then, for sure, we would need to get clearer on relata and relatum- but not otherwise.

As a step towards answering the first question, let us distinguish between two different ways in which a statement might be said to concern the nature of reality.

Why must reality have a nature? Must it also have an essence? What about a soul? Why not also a nice wifey and a faithful dog and a pipe and a pair of carpet slippers?

In any case, why answer the first question at all? How does it help us to decide, a priori, what is a foundation for what? Either one thing is founded upon another or it isn't. That is an empirical matter.  It may also be a useless matter- e.g. the question is the egg the foundation of the chicken or vice versa?

Furthermore, if any statement can be said to concern the nature of reality, we could usefully distinguish a myriad ways- more, indeed, than there are objects in reality- in which it does so. I am part of reality and I want to know how this new putative discovery about how things really are affects my own life-plan.

Fine, however, is not really speaking about statements concerning the nature of reality at all. Rather he is referring to stupid didactic formulae which are obviously erroneous.

It might, on the one hand, be a statement like: Water is H2O, which describes the nature of water but involves no reference, either explicit or implicit, to the nature of water ; or it might be a statement like: Water is by its nature H2O , which does involve a reference, either explicit or implicit, to the nature of water. 

The problem here is that a Cloud and a block of ice too may be H2O. The reference implicit or explicit was not helpful.
The nature of water- speaking ordinarily- is that it is a liquid with certain properties vital to Life as we know it.

Let us call a statement that is concerned with the nature of reality eidictic , from the Greek word eidos for form; and let us call statements of the former sort eidictic as to status and those of the latter sort eidictic as to content .

Why bother? Neither statement is helpful. We may say 'water is the liquid form of H2O'. We might also tartly observe, 'Water is liquid by its nature', if we ask the waiter for it and he suggests we should quench our thirst by jumping into the air and swallowing a cloud.

We shall take a broad view of the latter – not only will they include such statements as that water is by its nature H2O , but also such statements as that if water is H2O then it is by its nature H2O. As long as there is some reference to nature, the statement will count as eidictic as to content. 

How is this helpful? If I get to say 'statements which are eidictic as to content, are, by their very nature, the supercalifragilisticexpialidocious meows of the Nicaraguan horcrux of my neighbour's cat' what great benefit is secured?

  What I have in mind by way of an answer to the first question, concerning the relata, is that metaphysics should attempt to provide a foundation for all truths eidictic as to content;

How can metaphysics provide foundations for true statements of the form 'if x is y, then, by nature, x is y'? All it can do is say 'if metaphysics, by its nature, is able to provide foundations for true eidictic statements, then if it says it provides a foundation for if x is y and, by nature, x is y, then it actually does so.'

Socioproctology could now stick its oar in. It could say with equal truth and equal utility, 'if Socioproctology, by its nature, is able to provide foundations for true Metaphysical statements then etc.'

Why stop there? If the Nicaraguan horcrux of my neighbor's cat, by its nature, is able to provide foundations for true Socioproctological statements then etc.

This way madness lies.

and what then provides the foundation are the metaphysical truths that are eidictic as to content, along with the possible addition of other ‘auxiliary’ truths that are not eidictic as to content. Thus given the non-eidictic truths, the eidictic truths of metaphysics will provide a foundation for all other eidictic truths.

Only coz of the kindly nature of the Nicaraguan horcrux of my neighbor's cat. Given something nonsensical any other sort of nonsense follows or receives a foundation. This is ex falso quodlibet. It's not something we should want for any discipline we practice or encourage the practice of.

Note that, in contrast to the previous foundational project, it is the fundamental facts themselves, rather than the foundational relationships, that are properly taken to belong to the province of metaphysics.

The problem is these 'foundational relationships' don't bottom out as primitive terms in metaphysics. There can always be a concept of the foundational relationship and a concept of that concept and so forth.

One way forward is to put our faith in Logic- a field where Fine has certainly made his mark.

A minimal answer to the second question, concerning the relation, is that the metaphysical eidictic truths (along with the auxiliary non-eidictic truths) should provide a logical basis for the other eidictic truths; the latter should follow logically from the former.

If metaphysical eidictic truths enabled us to deduce physical truths, why don't Metaphysicians make great scientific discoveries? So far as we know, they are wholly useless. Indeed, the suspicion is, they are talking nonsense.

One might want to insist, of course, on something more than a logical basis; it might be required, for example, that the eidictic truths of metaphysics should provide some kind of explanation for the other eidictic truths. But the notion of explanation here is somewhat obscure; and my suspicion is that, for all practical purposes, it will be sufficient to insist upon a logical basis – that anyone who succeeds in finding a logical basis will also succeed in finding an explanation in so far as an explanation can be found. Thus again, in contrast to the previous case, there is no need, in making sense of the foundational enterprise, to appeal to a distinctive form of explanation or ‘ground ’. 

So, if a metaphysician sitting in his armchair can discover a truth about the world, then there is indeed no 'gap' between at least one concept in metaphysics and what it is a concept of. But, this hasn't yet happened and there seems little prospect of it ever happening.

Fine next shows the difficulty in 'factorizing' a statement so as to separate its 'metaphysical' content.

  How, for example, are we to ‘factor out’ the claim that an electron by its nature has a negative charge? One might propose a factoring along the following lines: Electrons have a negative charge; If electrons have a negative charge then they have negative charge by their very nature, where the first statement is non-eidictic (as to content) and the second is to be eidictic and a priori. However, it is far from clear that the second statement is a priori, for it is not true, in general, that something with a negative charge has a negative charge by its very nature and so why, in particular, should this be an a priori truth concerning electrons? 

Is a priori a primitive term? How could it be? It is defined in terms of self evident truths- but we know of none. There may be a school of metaphysics, as there may be a school of magic, for which self evident truths exist. But this still leaves the question of valid deduction.

In Physics, arguments about whether or not you can split the atom terminate when the atom is actually split. Surely, the one self-evident thing about metaphysics is that it is useless?

Perhaps there is some ingenious argument that the claim is a priori in the case of electrons. But still, cases such as these make it far more difficult to see how factoring might always be achieved. In the light of such difficulties, we might think of dividing our grand foundational aim into two more modest aims. The first is to provide a basis for the a posteriori eidictic truths (such as that water is by its nature H 2 O ) within the realm of the a priori. Thus ultimately the nature of things will be seen to have an a priori source (such as that water is by its nature H 2 O if it is H 2 O ).

This is merely a manner of speaking- a foolish one. Water, by its nature, is not H20, it is a liquid largely composed of H2O.

Why speak of nature at all? Why not artifice? What's so special about foundations- buildings may need them but birds don't.

 People are happy to work with ZFC though there is no proof of consistency to give it a 'foundation'.

Why bother providing a 'basis' for stuff which is useless?

The second is to provide a basis for all a priori eidictic truths within the realm of metaphysics.

Just say it is all the play of the Nicaraguan horcrux of the neighbor's cat and leave it at that.

Thus ultimately the a priori nature of things will be seen to have a metaphysical source.

But that metaphysical source is socioproctological.

Consider, for example, the a priori eidictic claim that red and green are by their nature incompatible.

They aren't. My red tie isn't strangling my green tie. They get on perfectly well. What a foolish claim!

This is not itself a claim of metaphysics, since it is lacking in the appropriate level of generality. But it may be derived from the following three claims: (1) red and green are two distinct determinates of the determinable color (2) distinct determinates of a determinable are incompatible (3) if distinct determinates of a determinable are incompatible then they are by their very natures incompatible The first two are plausibly taken to be a priori and non-eidictic (as to content), while the third is plausibly taken to be an eidictic principle of metaphysics.

Nonsense! Experience alone dictates the notion that red and green aren't the same. Distinct determinates of a determinable may be compatible for e.g. in the case of hermaphroditism. The third statement may be a tautology but only if 'nature' is a primitive term. However, experience shows that a discourse which use it thus turns out to be utterly shit. It is bound to fuck up by saying something hugely offensive and getting its adherents banned from Twitter or elected President of the United States of America.

Thus it appears that the same kind of ‘factoring’ that was used to span the a posteriori/a priori divide can also be used, within the realm of the a priori, to span the metaphysical/non-metaphysical divide.

That's not a good thing. The same kind of factoring could also be used to span the cat/computer divide with the result that if my mouse goes missing I blame Moggie for eating it.

  My suspicion is that the second of the two more modest aims might be somewhat easier to achieve

because there are no a priori eidetic truths whatsoever.

and, if this is so and some a posteriori eidictic truths resist ‘apriorification’, then there is something to be said for focusing more attention on the a priori realm.

But that field is empty.

But even here there may be difficulties. Consider, for example, the claim that it lies in the nature of any set to have the members that it does.

Wonderful! So the set of all things which have no nature, itself has a nature which is to have the members that it does. But, in that case, they are by their nature members of it.

Our limited experience of the world may have led us to the conclusion that everything has a nature but we recognize that what we have just said is nonsense. This may be a good thing. It may cause us to think twice before saying foolish things about what is or isn't 'natural'.

This is presumably an a priori eidictic claim that, on account of its lack of generality, does not belong to metaphysics. But just as in the electron case, it is somewhat hard to see how it might be derived from the more general eidictic claims of metaphysics (though my own view is that it can be so derived).

So much the worse for metaphysics. Why stick with a discipline which leads you to talk nonsense?

Moving onto 'Subject matter', an area where there is much agreement between Fine & Yablo, surely the thing can only be imperative, not alethic? After all, statements are made by persons and parsed by them. They must have some imperative force and intentionality behind them. They need have no alethic value at all. Even if we agree about the imperative subject matter of a statement, how can we be sure we also agree on its alethic ramifications? We'd need to have the same Bayesian priors and believe Aumann Agreement is a Muth Rational theory. There is a good reason not to do so. The thing aint 'regret minimizing'.

Protocol bound discourses can rely on buck-stopped 'truth makers' such that statements are made true by states, or situations, rather than whole worlds. However, such judgments are defeasible. They follow an 'artificial reason'. A guilt man may be 'innocent' as far as Criminal Justice system goes. He may however be found guilty and forced to pay damages under Civil Law because 'truth makers' are different.

Metaphysics isn't really 'buck-stopped' even if it is protocol bound. There is also a more fundamental problem re. its 'subject matter'- viz. a mixed statement can refer to itself and thus determine its own truth maker. Thus 'subject matters' don't carve up reality along its joints. They can be anything goes. Socioproctology can be the foundation of metaphysics and the transparent Nicaraguan horcrux of the neighbour's cat can take a nap on the mat of their mutual methexis.

Consider the following-

 Any field of enquiry deals with certain propositions, those that lie within its purview and whose truth it seeks to investigate. 

This is clearly nonsense. When enquiring about a proposition we don't know in advance which field it will lie in. Nor can fields be carved up after the fact in a canonical manner. Most propositions are going to be 'mixed' and only arbitrarily, if at all, factorizable.

Thus mathematics deals with mathematical propositions, logic with logical propositions, and so on.

To the extent that this happens, it does so because things which previously were thought of as mathematics or logic are shown to have been a specious type of rhetoric or a type of systematic error.

The problem with metaphysics is it has no similar method of weeding out failed research programs.

We might call the set of propositions with which a field of enquiry deals its domain of enquiry (to be distinguished, of course, from its domain of quantification).

 We risk talking nonsense if we do anything so foolish. Socioproctology immediately gets promoted to the level a field of enquiry. Metaphysics can become its domain of quantification. Both are subsumed under the rubric of Horcruxology as it pertains to Nicaragua and the neighbour's cat.

 Any proposition has a certain subject-matter. Thus the proposition that Socrates is a philosopher has as its subject-matter the man Socrates and the property of being a philosopher.

Nonsense! The proposition is wholly imperative. It has no content. It is a cliche of a scenes a faire type and might feature in an early Woody Allen film or Monty Python sketch.

The only transparent aspect of Fine's metaphysics is that it wants to be metaphysical.  But a gap- a chorismos- remains between this mimetic desire and its impossible object.  As the Liberation Theologians- who constitute the chief intellectual source of Resistance to Arrow-Debreu neo-Liberalism within the diverse strains, and trains, of the London Underground- are so fond of saying- 'Mind the Gap'!